Sex by Deception

Berit Brogaard

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Edited by Manuel Vargas and John M. Doris

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Abstract and Keywords

In this chapter I will use sex by deception as a case study for highlighting some of the trickiest concepts associated with sexuality and moral psychology, including rape, consensual sex, sexual rights, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, and disrespectful sex. I begin with a discussion of morally wrong sex as rooted in the breach of five sexual liberty rights that are derived from our fundamental human liberty rights: sexual self-possession, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, sexual dignity, and sexual privacy. In light of this discussion, I then examine a puzzle about sex by deception—a puzzle which at first may seem to compel us to define ‘rape’ strictly in terms of ‘physical force or threat’ rather than ‘sexual autonomy’. I proceed by presenting an argument against the view that, as a rule, sex by deception undermines consent. Even when sex by deception does not compromise consent, I argue that it nonetheless is inimical to the respect we owe all persons, not because it vitiates sexual autonomy and thereby obstructs the possibility of consent, but because it fails to respect other sexual rights that we have, such as our rights to sexual dignity, individuality, or privacy.

Keywords: doctrine of double effect, human rights, informed consent, principle of respect for persons, rape by deception, rape by fraud, sex by deception, sexual assault, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality

33.1 Introduction

SONJA is sipping ice water at Sushi Samba while waiting for Bjørn to arrive. They met at a party a few weeks ago, and he invited her out. She doesn’t know much about him. But he told her that he is 23 and about to graduate with a major in psychology from Florida International University. She is 21 and a junior at the University of Miami, double-majoring in philosophy and psychology. She immediately recognizes him, as he enters the outdoor seating area. He is even cuter than she remembered. They are both shy at first, but before long the conversation flows effortlessly. At the end of the night, they agree to have sex. A few weeks later Sonja discovers that Bjørn lied to her. He is not 23 and about to complete his major in psychology but 33 and about to finish his PhD as a clinical psychologist. How should we think about Bjørn’s sexual conduct? Does the fact that Bjørn lied to
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Sonya make her assent to sex less than fully consensual? Did she indeed have sex with the one she consented to have sex with? Did he rape her?

In this chapter I will use sex by deception as a case study for highlighting some of the trickiest concepts associated with sexuality and moral psychology, including rape, consensual sex, sexual rights, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, and disrespectful sex.

I begin with a discussion of morally wrong sex as rooted in the breach of five sexual liberty rights that are derived from our fundamental human liberty rights: sexual self-possession, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, sexual dignity and sexual privacy. In light of this discussion, I then examine a puzzle about sex by deception—a puzzle which at first may seem to compel us to define ‘rape’ strictly in terms of ‘physical force or threat’ rather than ‘sexual autonomy’.

I proceed by presenting an argument against the view that, as a rule, sex by deception undermines consent—a view maintained by prominent thinkers such as Patry (2001), O’Neill (2003), Rubenfeld (2012), Dougherty (2013a; 2013b), Short (2013), and Bromwich and Millum (2013; 2018). As we will see, sex following a deception perpetrated by one party in order to facilitate sexual contact does not always constitute rape. Lying about your age, education, job, family background, marital status, or interest in a relationship, for example, does not make your sex partner incapable of consenting, which is to say that sex by deception need not be rape.

I thus reject the extremely capacious view of rape according to which, say, Fabio lies about colouring his hair, or using rogaine, to improve his prospects, and ends up having raped the person he had sex with because he lied. Lying about colouring your hair to improve your prospects may not be kosher, but sex on the basis of deception of this kind is such a wildly different animal from forcible assault that it seems worth having more than one concept of sexual misconduct.

I even go so far as to say that sex with another person that is facilitated by withholding information about having a venereal disease shouldn’t be classified as rape, although it should be classified as a kind of assault. This is thus another place where heterogeneity of cases of misconduct suggests the need for multiple concepts.

We can differentiate different concepts of sexual misconduct by distinguishing among the different sexual rights that an individual can have. Although sex by deception only rarely compromises consent, I argue that it is nonetheless inimical to the respect we owe all persons, not because it vitiates sexual autonomy and thereby obstructs the possibility of consent, but because it fails to respect other sexual rights that we have, such as our rights to sexual dignity, individuality, or privacy.

In the final section of the chapter, I argue against widely accepted experimentally based conclusions in moral psychology that take people’s intuitive judgments about morality to be driven by incoherent ethical principles. I show that we can make sense of people’s in-
tuitive judgments as grounded in the principle of respect—a principle that grounds our human liberty rights, including our human sexual rights.

### 33.2 Sexual rights

In recent years, there has been a preoccupation in academic circles and popular media with consent to sex (Mappes 1987; Wertheimer 2003). Consent is often treated as the key factor in determining whether a sex crime has been committed, suggesting that wrongful sex equals rape (or sexual assault).

The attempt to tie the moral status of sex to consent is in my opinion based on a mistake. An extreme case that proves this point is that of the 43-year-old Berlin engineer Bernd Brandes, who consented to have sex with and then be eaten alive by the 42-year-old Berlin computer expert Armin Meiwes. Because cannibalism wasn’t wrong in Germany back in 2001 when the events unfolded, and Brandes consented to the act, Meiwes was tried for murder for the purposes of sexual pleasure. In 2004 Meiwes was convicted of manslaughter and was imprisoned for eight years. The act of eating another person purely for the sake of sexual pleasure is an extreme case of using a person and disregarding their humanity. Here I assume that Meiwes acted for the reasons reported in the news, i.e. the murder wasn’t a case of helping Brandes facilitate his values. Consent can indeed excuse or justify behaviour, but I maintain that it cannot do so when the behaviour is motivated solely by one’s own selfish interests (Brogaard 2020).

Sex can clearly be morally problematic, even when it isn’t rape. It is morally problematic, I will argue, when it cannot be reconciled with our common sentiment that we ought to respect the worthiness of the common humanity of all persons, irrespective of their specific virtues, talents, attitudes, and choices. This is also known as the principle of respect for persons. This principle—which is commonly associated with Immanuel Kant and the ethics of *The Metaphysics of Morals*—renders it morally wrong to treat people merely as a means to an end. The humanity that all persons share in common morally demands respecting their self-governing, autonomous, unique, private, dignified and vulnerable personhood (Rawls 1971; 1980; 1989; Korsgaard 1986; 2008). By respecting others, we grant that they have rights in virtue of the intrinsic worth of personhood and not merely in virtue of their utility—for example, rights to engage in self-directed behaviour and to adopt and pursue their own ends.

The principle of respect for persons, on its modern conception, is commonly taken to accommodate the following five related ideals (among others) (Maclagan 1960a; 1960b; Rawls 1971; 1980; 1989; Nickel 1987): respect for self-government, respect for personal autonomy, respect for individuality, respect for privacy, and respect for dignity and a minimally decent life. These correspond to five fundamental human liberty rights: ‘The right to self-possession, the right to personal autonomy, the right to individuality, the right to privacy, and the right to dignity and a minimally decent life’ (UN Universal Declaration of
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Human Rights, UN Assembly 1948). Each fundamental human liberty right encompasses a corresponding sexual right.\(^5\)

The right to self-possession (or self-government) is a fundamental right to be in control of one’s own body and hence not to be sexually controlled, mastered, or possessed by another person. Sometimes, self-possession is given a narrow ‘bodily’ interpretation, where this right falls out of your body being your property. Self-possession is a precondition for autonomy and individuality. Indeed, as the case of sex by deception will make apparent, one can flout autonomy and individuality without flouting self-possession. The right to sexual self-possession can be glossed as follows:

\(\text{(p. 686)}\)

**Sexual Self-Possession**

Any person has a right to be in control of her own body and hence not to be sexually controlled, mastered or possessed by another person without consent.

Historically, US rape law has been based on the thought that rape violates the right to sexual self-possession (or self-government) (West 1996; Whisnant 2017). This characterization, however, limits rape to sex by physical force, sex by true threat, and sex with a person who is clearly incapacitated and therefore unable to govern themselves sexually. Severe disability, alcohol intoxication, and drug use, for example, can preclude knowledge of what’s happening, which rules out the possibility of consent. As we will see, however, at least some sexual acts that occur without physical force, threat, or incapacitation ought to count as rape, despite not vitiating a person’s right to sexual self-possession.

The right to personal autonomy, or self-direction, is the fundamental right to act in accordance with one’s own values in physical space (Nickel 1987; McLeod 2005; Korsgaard 2008; Doris 2015). As John Doris puts it,

> self-directed behaviors are sourced in features of the self [ … ] as opposed to features of the environment that are ‘external’ to the self, such as political regimes or natural disasters. [ … ] Deciding what is internal and external to the self is, notoriously, a passel of grief. But one has to start somewhere, and I’m going to blunder ahead with the notion of value, and say that behavior is self-directed when it expresses the actor’s values.

(Doris 2015: 25–6).

The analogous right to sexual autonomy can be cashed out as follows (the clause ‘so long as one’s acts don’t infringe on the rights of others’ has been omitted here and below):\(^6\)

**Sexual Autonomy**

Any person has a right to act in accordance with their own sexual values.
We look closer at the conflicting conceptions of consensual sex defined in terms of sexual self-possession versus sexual autonomy in §34.3.

Next, the right to individuality is the right of a person to reign over their own inner self. This includes the right to have, develop, and be respected irrespective of one’s own personal interests, preferences, personality and identity. Implied is our right to sexual individuality:

*Sexual Individuality*

Any person has a right to have, develop and be respected irrespective of their unique sexual interests, preferences, personality, identity, and orientation.

Sexual individuality can come into conflict with sexual autonomy in that the latter protects the individual’s right to choice of action and expression in physical space, whereas individuality protects the individual’s right to embrace and make decisions about aspects of her own mind. It is individuality that gives people the right to differentiate themselves from others as *persons*. Although our sexual personality, interests, preferences, identity and orientation (p. 687) can form the basis for our decision to engage in some types of sex but not others, an individual can have a strong interest in a particular type of sex and yet not act on it, for example, by choosing not to act on it, because she believes another course of action is more beneficial to her.

The notion of sexual interest and preferences makes reference to a person’s weighted preferences for particular types of sex and attributes of sex partners as well as their sexual values. For example, a person might sexually value only having sex with homosexual women, not exposing herself to sexually transmitted diseases, and not having sex with a person who is in a monogamous relationship with someone else.

The concept of sexual personality refers to a person’s sexual style or signature, for instance, an inclination to wear sexually provocative or non-provocative clothing, to be sexually adventurous or conservative, to be sexually dominant or submissive, to be sexually monogamous or polygamous, or to have a small, moderate, or large amount of sex.

The notion of sexual identity refers to the sex or gender a person identifies with (if any) or to their lack of identification with any sex or gender. The sex or gender that a person identifies with (if any) may or may not be the same as the one assigned to them at birth (Serano 2007).

Finally, the notion of sexual orientation refers to a person’s standing sexual preference for not having sex at all (asexual), or for having sex with people who were assigned a particular sex or gender at birth or who identify as male, female, non-binary, or gender-fluid.

These aspects of sexuality should be viewed in the context of the right to dignity and a minimally decent life, which includes the right to decent human treatment, and hence the right not to be treated with indecency, understood as all forms of degradation, humilia-
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tion, discrimination, stigmatization, harassment, and bullying (McCrudden 2008; Brännmark 2017). This right arguably extends beyond life itself (Lindner 2001). For example, you currently have a right not to have swastikas drawn on your future dead corpse. Analogously, the right to sexual dignity is:

**Sexual Dignity**

Any person has a right not to be subjected to torture, degrading or inhuman treatment, humiliation, ridicule, stigmatization, or exploitation, whether during sex or as a means to bully or harass the person because of their sexual appearance, preferences, personality, identity, or orientation.

It should be emphasized that your dignity can be violated even if you don’t know it has been, which makes it broader than a notion like humiliation, which requires awareness or feeling. Consider the case of Karl—a misogynist who regards women as inferior to men (Morgan 2003; Manne 2017; Brogaard 2020). Karl wants to seduce Sophie but what he really desires is to feel empowered by thinking about Sophie in degrading ways while having sex with her. Using superficial charm, Karl manages to seduce the girl, and true to his nature, he thinks of their encounter as one in which he is degrading her. Sophie doesn’t know this. Even so, his attitude towards her during sex vitiates her sexual dignity.

Finally, the right to privacy is the right of a person to be left alone and undisturbed (e.g. by light, smoke, noise, odour, or touch) and the right to conceal aspects of their life from publicity, which includes the right not to be recorded without consent. The right to privacy encompasses the right to sexual privacy (Fried 1968; Mayo 1997).

**Sexual Privacy**

Any person has the right to have undisturbed and unobserved sex in private and to conceal aspects of their sex life from the public.

The right to sexual privacy enables people to develop their sexual individuality without worrying about how they look in the eyes of others and the possible repercussions of their sexual idiosyncrasies.

One of the many toxic ways in which bullies deprive people of their dignity as human beings is by disrespecting their right to sexual privacy. Such was the bullying incident involving Rutgers student Tyler Clementi. In 2010 Clementi asked his roommate Dharun Ravi to use their room on the evenings of September 19 and September 21 for a private visit. On September 19 Ravi left the computer webcam on and joined his friend Molly Wei in her room, where the two of them secretly viewed Clementi and his boyfriend in a sexual encounter. Shortly after the spying, Ravi posted a tweet about the incident: ‘Roommate asked for the room till midnight. I went into molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I saw him making out with a dude. Yay.’ In anticipation of Clementi’s second private evening, Ravi invited his friends via social media to join him in spying on Clementi but Clementi averted the attempt by disabling the webcam, and later that evening he reported the incidents to school officials. On September 22, only three days following the view-
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ings, Clementi jumped from George Washington Bridge and was found dead in the Hudson River. Ravi was tried and convicted in 2012 on multiple charges related to the spying but he appealed and his sentence was reduced to ‘attempted violation of privacy’.

Like human rights more generally, sexual rights can come into conflict with and supersede the normative force of other rights (Dworkin 1978; Griffin 2008). As we will see in the next section, it can be morally permissible to knowingly violate a right for the sake of a greater good, if the rights violation is unintended despite being foreseen. Sexual rights can also be restricted in scope or be nullified due to other weightier normative considerations. For example, having a right to sexual autonomy does not entail having a right to sex with children, corpses, or non-human animals or a right to sex while incarcerated for a crime.

All unjustifiable infringements on rights, including sexual rights, betray a violation of the principle of respect for persons and hence involve a failure to recognize the humanity that sinners and saints have in common, despite their individual differences.

Some thinkers, including Kant himself, argue that sexual desire that is not based on love, relationship, or marriage objectifies the other and therefore implies disrespect (Nussbaum,1995; Soble 2001). This is because sexual desire by its very nature involves a kind of all-consuming attention to the body or body parts that leaves no room for attitudes of recognition of the intrinsic worthiness of the person (Soble 2001; Halwani 2018).

In reply to this, it may be argued that recognizing the humanity in the other as an end is not about appreciating what is good, admirable, or sexually arousing in any particular person but about recognizing the goodness of persons in any form (Maclagan 1960b). Prizing the goodness of a person qua person does not require that all of one’s attention is allocated to this activity. So, one can prize the goodness of a person and at the same time appreciate, admire, or be sexually aroused by a person’s unique appeal.

Furthermore, non-exploitative sexual desire doesn’t ordinarily compromise any sexual rights, which is just another way of saying that it is compatible with the recognition of the inherent worth of people. So, desiring a person sexually—even a complete stranger—doesn’t imply instrumentalizing them.

33.3 Rape and the riddle of sex by deception

In colloquial speech, ‘rape’ (and ‘sexual assault’) has connotations of sex by force.\(^8\) This is even more transparent in other languages, for instance, Italian: stupro (sex by force); German: Vergewaltigung (assault); Danish: voldtægt (taking by violence). The vernacular interpretation coheres with the definition upheld by the US judicial system until January 2013.\(^9\) The US Department of Justice now defines ‘rape’ as ‘penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim’. While this is a vast improve-
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ment on the definition that included a requirement of force, the new rendition is elusive insofar as it depends on how ‘consent’ is glossed.

The problem of how to cash out ‘consent’ primarily arises when considering sexual activity that would not previously have qualified as rape because both (or all) parties voluntarily agreed to every aspect of the act. Sex by deception falls into this category. To a first approximation, we can say that sex by deception is sex that involves duplicity that is intended to increase the probability that the person subjected to the duplicity will voluntarily agree to sex. When understood in this way, we can define ‘sex by deception (A on B)’ as follows:

**Sex by Deception (A on B)**

(i) A actively engages in deception (lying or withholding of information) that causes B to believe that A is F.

(ii) A believes that B is significantly more likely to assent to sex with A, if B believes A is F than if B believes A is not-F.

(iii) A engages in the deception to improve the chance that B will assent to sex with A (as a way to promote A’s interests rather than a way to promote a greater good or B’s sexual rights; see n. 24).

(iv) B is significantly more likely to consent to sex with A, if B believes A is F than if B believes A is not-F.

An especially disturbing example of sex by deception is sex following non-disclosure of a known positive HIV status. HIV criminalization laws have led to some rather severe sentences—sometimes 30 years in prison—for reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and attempted murder in the US and for sexual assault in Canada and the United Kingdom (Buchanan 2015).

In the US, explicit rape status has been given only to a limited variety of sex by deception, chiefly cases where the perpetrator impersonates someone else’s significant other in order to obtain consent (faking identity) and cases where the perpetrator convinces someone else that the impending sexual act is a necessary medical intervention or other non-sexual act (faking the nature of the act). Here are a few representative examples:

In 2009, California resident Julio Morales was convicted for rape by fraud for sneaking into the dark bedroom of an 18-year old woman and having sex with her under the false pretence of being the woman’s boyfriend, who had just left. The conviction was eventually overturned because the law of 1872 only criminalizes rape by fraud when someone impersonates a woman’s legal husband in order to get her consent. This loophole was closed when Assembly Bill 65 and Senate Bill 59 were signed into California law in 2013.

In 2016 Mario Ambrose Antoine was charged in federal court in Kansas City with multiple counts of rape by fraud after having had sex with more than 25 women who were told they would be performing as paid adult actresses. Antoine used fake documents to convince them to have sex with him in exchange for large sums of money as well as a ‘shot
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... making even larger sums of money if chosen for the films. They never received any money, and Antoine had none of his claimed status in the adult film industry. To stop the women from filing formal complaints, Antoine used scare tactics, threatening to send compromising pictures to family members or publicizing sex recordings. Although Kansas does not explicitly recognize rape by fraud, federal prosecutors cited Missouri rape legislation, which has ratified rape by fraud, in support of their case against Antoine. Antoine eventually pleaded guilty to a plea bargain of wire fraud.

In 2018 Larry Nassar, former Michigan State and USA Gymnastics doctor, was tried and convicted for raping and sexually assaulting female athletes as young as 12 in his clinics from 1994 to 2016. Nassar had also sexually abused a friend’s daughter from the age of 6 until she was 12. Over the years Nassar’s victims had been telling parents, coaches, counsellors, and MSU athletic trainers that the physician had digitally penetrated them both vaginally and anally without gloves or lubricant and without a third party in the room, claiming to be performing ‘intravaginal adjustments’ (which, arguably, exemplify sex by deception, although his deception wasn’t always successful). However, the sufferers were met with scepticism and were discouraged from filing formal complaints, and Nassar continued to practice sports medicine at Michigan State University and serve as chief medical coordinator and team doctor for USA Gymnastics for decades before finally being charged with rape and assault.

These cases exemplify the increasing public and judicial awareness of the insidiousness of rape by deception. Such horror stories, however, are exceptions that prove the rule. Except when it’s the result of impersonation or a cover-up of the act, sex by deception is not rape, in the eyes of the law. Lying about your age, marital status, or emotional involvement to increase the likelihood of sex is not rape, legally speaking.

Jed Rubenfeld has drawn attention to current rape law’s differential treatment of sex by deception (Rubenfeld 2012). He blames the discrepancy on the widely held belief that rape should be criminalized because it infringes on a person’s right to sexual autonomy (McGregor 1994; Schulhofer 2000: 16–17; Falk 2002). Recall that the right to sexual autonomy implies that we have a right to decide who we have sex with and what types of sex we engage in.

Current rape law criminalizes rape because it vitiates consent. According to a common interpretation of the notion of consensual sex in legal contexts, consensual sex requires respecting sexual autonomy. Rubenfeld argues against this notion of consensual sex on the basis of sex by deception. Sex by deception, he argues, vitiates sexual autonomy. So, if current rape law is taken to criminalize non-autonomous sex, then all sex by deception is rape and should be criminalized. But the implausibility of regarding all sex by deception as rape suggests that we need a new definition of ‘rape’.

Legal theory provides a foundation for drawing a distinction between different types of sex by deception. Fraud is said to be either ‘in the factum’ or ‘in the inducement’. Judicially, sex by fraud in the factum vitiates consent and therefore is rape, while fraud in the inducement does not viti ate consent and therefore does not affect the consensual status
of the act. In the case of fraud in the factum, the very nature of the act consented to is misrepresented as being something other than it is. In the case of fraud in the inducement, there is no misrepresentation of the identity of the conniving person or the nature of the sexual act but merely a misrepresentation of contingent features of the conniving person, such as job status, marital status, or religious affiliation, or contingent features of the sex act, such as being an expression of love, being special, or being one’s first time. In other words, the person who is deceived has been given false information about some contingent aspects of the sexual act but is nonetheless still in a position to know that it is sex that she consented to as opposed to, say, a medical procedure.

Rubenfeld, however, does not think a principled distinction can be drawn between sex by deception in the factum, which vitiates consent, and sex by deception in the inducement, which does not. One problem, he argues, is that in many other areas of the law, fraud in the inducement is taken to vitiate consent. For example, in cases of trespassing and contract law, misrepresentations of one’s occupation or other personal characteristics that are not essential to one’s identity are regarded as vitiating consent to enter or consent to access. Rubenfeld finds it puzzling that pretending to be the cable guy in order to get the green light to enter private property vitiates consent, when pretending to be a bachelor in order to ‘enter a woman’s body’ does not, in the eyes of the law. I assess this point in the chapter’s final section.

The second problem with in-the-factum/in-the-inducement distinction, according to Rubenfeld, is that the distinction fails to explain why sex by deception is only occasionally treated as rape. Masquerading as someone’s spouse to obtain consent to sex with them misrepresents the nature of the act. But, Rubenfeld argues, so does pretending to have a characteristic you do not have, for instance, pretending to be a bachelorette or a pilot, when described as sex with a bachelorette or sex with a pilot. Justifying the criminal nature of rape on the grounds that it vitiates sexual autonomy doesn’t improve matters, Rubenfeld argues, because if sexual autonomy has any significance, then ‘it surely includes the right not to have sex with a married man if you don’t want to’ (2012: 25). Rubenfeld presents a similar case against a differential treatment of sex disguised as something it is not. If disguising a sexual act as a medical procedure to obtain consent is rape, so is disguising sex as an act of love. In both cases, the conniving person disguises a sexual act as something it is not: a medical procedure or an act of love.

If we insist on preserving the principle of sexual autonomy as a foundation for rape law, then we have two options, Rubenfeld argues: we can either count all sex by deception as rape or none at all (for the former view, see Falk 1998; Short 2013).

Rubenfeld—rightly in my view—thinks the first option is absurd. As he points out, it has the grotesque consequence that if a 17-year-old woman tells a 20-year-old man that she is 18 to avoid rejection and they have sex, not only would the man have committed statutory rape, the teen would also be guilty of raping the adult man. Or, in another scenario envisaged by Rubenfeld, a ‘man who only rapes models could claim to have been raped by his victim if she falsely told him she was a model’ (2012: 1415).
Arguing for a similar point in reply to Tom Dougherty, Hallie Liberto (2017) envisages a case in which a couple are having sex and that the man (who wants the sex to continue) lies to the woman about his slight discomfort in order to prevent the woman from discontinuing the sexual act. Like Rubenfeld, Liberto argues that it would be preposterous to think that the couple’s lovemaking is non-consensual and that the slightly discomforted person is raping his partner by not revealing the discomfort.

This would then seem to leave us with the second alternative: count all sex by deception between people of legal age as consensual, even when consent is obtained by impersonating a partner or disguising the act as a medical procedure. But sex by deception is an infringement on our right to sexual autonomy, in Rubenfeld’s opinion. So, given that we must settle for the second option, sexual autonomy should not serve as the foundation of rape law.

Rubenfeld ponders whether we could opt for a compromise by treating not just sex by physical force, including ‘true’—i.e. deadly—threats, but also sex by coercion as rape, where sex by coercion may include non-deadly threats, such as a threat of public embarrassment or bodily discomfort (for a defence of this view, see Falk 1998; Chiesa 2017). However, Rubenfeld doesn’t think this expansion of the physical-force requirement is sustainable or warranted. A definition of ‘rape’ as ‘sex by physical force or coercion’ fails to resolve the conundrum, because deception, however manipulative, isn’t coercion, legally speaking. Furthermore, Rubenfeld argues, sex by coercion, like sex by deception, conflicts with our right to sexual autonomy. So, if ‘consent’ is glossed in terms of sexual autonomy, and a coerced ‘yes’ doesn’t count as consent, then neither should a deceived ‘yes’. But this brings us back to the first horn of the dilemma: regard all sex by deception as rape.

Rubenfeld concludes by reiterating that the riddle of sex by deception arises because ‘rape’ is legally glossed in terms of ‘sexual autonomy’. Not only is sexual autonomy unable to serve as a foundation of rape law, it should not figure anywhere in the law, Rubenfeld argues, as the very concept of sexual autonomy is incoherent.

To back up this claim, he makes a case for the view that sex can be a matter of one person allowing the other to have complete control over what happens. This is an essential component of bondage/discipline/sadomasochism (BDSM), whose practitioners do not play by the ‘No means No’ rulebook. The person in control is allowed to degrade, humiliate, restrain, discipline, or physically hurt the other. Rubenfeld grants that it is commonplace to use ‘safe words’ (e.g. ‘banana’, ‘yellow’, or ‘red’) as a way to tell the other to slow down, decrease, or completely cease an action. But not saying ‘No’ does not equal consent. BDSM, he argues, thus vitiates sexual autonomy.13

BDSM is at the extreme end of the spectrum. According to Rubenfeld, sex by deception is an integral part of almost all sex preceded by seduction. In common scenarios of seduction, you disguise the way you normally look, sound, and behave, for example, by wearing a corset, a push-up bra, fake eyelashes, or slimming yoga pants or by putting a sock in your pants, talking with a deeper voice, or nonchalantly buying multiple rounds of drinks.
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If the fake nipples you used to up your chances of spending the night with the school’s hottest guy were successful, you would be guilty of sex by deception. Rubenfeld certainly makes a good point when drawing attention to the absurdity residing in classifying sex by seduction as rape.

In the end, Rubenfeld chooses to advocate for a legal definition of ‘rape’ as a sexual act that contravenes a person’s right not to be physically forced into sexual service, which he takes to be a special case of the right to sexual self-possession. The harm in rape, he argues, lies in the violation of bodily self-possession where ‘the victim’s body is utterly wrested from her control, mastered, possessed by another’ (2012: 1427). This utter loss of one’s possession of one’s own body is akin to the violations of self-possession that occur in slavery, captivity, and torture. Rubenfeld’s proposal thus suggests an account of consensual sex as sex that all parties assent to and that doesn’t violate any party’s right to sexual self-possession. This is essentially the old legal definition of ‘rape’ in terms of ‘physical force’. I will now argue that the puzzle about sex by deception is a false dilemma.

33.4 Consensual sex as autonomous sex

The riddle of sex by deception, I will now argue, is a false dilemma. Sex by deception does not compel us to reject an account of consensual sex in terms of sexual autonomy.

The riddle of sex by deception rests on an argument from analogy, which lumps together all sex by deception ranging from sex by impersonation to sex by seduction. On the face of it, this analogy may seem sound. Upon further scrutiny, however, the parallel breaks down.

There are key differences between pretending to be a particular woman’s husband to obtain consent to sex—say, Karla’s husband Kai—and pretending to be a husband to obtain consent to sex with commitment-phobic Boline (or pretending not to be a husband to obtain consent to sex with desperate Dorte). In fact, the phrase ‘pretend to be someone’s husband’ is ambiguous between a reading where ‘someone’s husband’ takes narrow scope relative to the verb ‘pretend’ and a reading where it takes wide scope:

**Narrow Scope**

Bachelor Børge pretends to be someone’s husband (i.e. Børge pretends to be married to someone or other).

**Wide Scope**

There is some person (Kai), such that husband impersonator Hans pretends to be that person (i.e. Hans pretends to be Kai).

To pretend to be married to someone or other without pretending to be any person other than oneself (narrow scope) is clearly different from pretending to be identical to some-
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one else (wide scope). If husband impersonator Hans sneaks into Karla’s bedroom, pretend­ing to be her husband, Kai, this is to be understood on the wide-scope reading: Hans the husband-impersonator is pretending to be Kai. But Karla cannot consent to an activity that has not even been proposed to her. So, husband-impersonator Hans does not give Karla the option of consenting to sex with him. If, on the other hand, bachelor Børge pretends to be someone’s spouse to obtain consent from commitment-phobic Boline (or alternatively: bluff-bachelor Børge pretends not to be anyone’s spouse to obtain consent from desperate Dorte), where ‘someone’s spouse’ takes narrow scope, Boline is given the option of consenting (or not consenting) to sex with Børge.

Why does pretending to be someone other than you are vitiate consent when pretending to be something you are not does not? To answer this question, let’s have a closer look at the meaning of ‘consent’. ‘Consent’ is shorthand for ‘voluntary informed consent’. Voluntary consent is consent a person has not been physically forced to give, for example, by being tortured until they say ‘yes’. To say that the consent is informed is to say that it is based on true information about the nature of the act and the identity of the person requesting consent.

Consent is not informed when a person who assents to the activity doesn’t understand what they assent to and is unaware of the generally known consequences of partaking in the activity (Wertheimer 2003). Children, for example, are unable to consent to sex. This is not because minors are unable to consent to anything. Certainly, if a parent asks an average 6-year-old whether she would like the parent to brush her hair, and the 6-year-old responds that she would, her agreement counts as consent. Six-year olds are normally old enough to understand what it means for someone to brush their hair, and hair-brushing rarely has any harmful consequences. So, not only is the child voluntarily assenting to the act, she also understands its nature and consequences. A 6-year old cannot consent to sex, however, as she is not in a position to know what to expect during or after the encounter. Severely disabled or incapacitated individuals are unable to consent to sex for the same reason.

Informed consent does not require knowing everything about the type of act that one is consenting to or everything about the person who is to perform or partake in the act. Consenting to surgery requires knowing in broad strokes what is likely to happen during the procedure as well as risks and benefits of surgery versus alternatives to the surgery (if any). In order to consent to surgery, however, you don’t need to know even a fraction of what the surgeon knows about medicine. Furthermore, surgery doesn’t require knowing anything about the person who ultimately carries out the operation. If Surgeon Feinstein falls ill mid-surgery, and Surgeon Shamon finishes the act, there is no breach of consent.

There is no sharp cut-off between when you have been sufficiently informed and when you have not. The reason for this is that the term ‘informed’ is vague much like ‘bald’, ‘cold’, and ‘sounding British’, which is to say, there are borderline cases in which the term neither clearly applies nor clearly fails to apply (e.g. someone with a bit of hair on
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the temples). But this is no cause for alarm, for there are also cases where the term clearly applies and cases where it clearly doesn’t apply. Bruce Willis is clearly bald; Robert Redford is clearly not. Karla is clearly sufficiently informed to consent to sex with her husband, Kai, and clearly isn’t sufficiently informed to consent to sex with husband-im­

personator Hans.

I will propose that, in order for a person to consent to participation in an activity of kind \( \kappa \), there must be a meaningful and officially recognized sorting of activities in the relevant domain into (social or natural) kinds or prototypes, and \( \kappa \) must clearly belong to one of those kinds or prototypes. In medicine, for example, heart surgery and brain surgery are officially recognized as being different kinds of surgery. Likewise, within the domain of heart surgery, heart transplant, coronary artery bypass grafting, and heart valve replacement are distinct, officially recognized types of heart surgery. So, a patient can consent to heart valve replacement without thereby consenting to coronary artery bypass grafting or heart transplant.

We can make sense of the idea of consent to sex with a particular person only on the assumption that people have personal identities that are unchangeable and non-interchangeable and that make each person distinct from every other person. We are not destined by genes or otherwise to have all the attributes and relational features we in fact have. You could have had a different job, gone to a different university, lived in a different city, and had a different marital status and still have been the person you are. Things, I submit, are different when it comes to the unique person each of us is. On what we might call ‘the biological account’, a person’s identity is given by her origin—i.e. the zygote she came from (Kripke 1980). For simplicity’s sake, we can take this to mean that a person’s origin is limited only by his or her genetic material. On this view, you could not have been a kangaroo, have been born with gills, or have used your leg hair to detect the electromagnetic field of flowers.

Despite having been a staple of philosophy for decades, the biological account is unlikely to offer much insight into what makes you the unique person you are. It can explain why you could not have been a fish or a bumble bee, but not what makes you the unique human person you are as opposed to an entirely different person. What makes you you is likely going to involve a vast number of intentional behavioural tendencies and the mental states that ground them (Vargas 2013; Doris 2015). Even if a realistic account of what makes (p. 696) each of us the unique person we are is currently unfathomable, different theories of personal identity are bound to concur that features such as one’s education, profession, marital status, sex assignment at birth, love relationships, and personal wealth are not typically part of what defines a person.15 Even an imprecise notion of a person’s identity will thus suffice for explaining the legal outliers among sex-by-deception cases. It will suffice for explaining why pretending to be a doctor performing a medical procedure in order to obtain consent to sex ought to be treated differently from lying about being in love with a person in order to obtain consent: Medical procedures and sexual intercourse are distinct types of action. So, you can
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consent to one type of activity in a given typology without thereby (by default) having consented to other types—and this is so even if the types overlap.

Turning to the impersonation case: even an imprecise notion of person’s identity will suffice for explaining why Karla’s agreement to sex with husband-impersonator Hans fails to constitute consent to sex with Hans, even though Boline’s agreement to sex with pretend-bachelor Børge, who has lied to her about his marital status, does constitute consent to sex with Børge. Karla’s consent to sex with her husband, Kai, doesn’t constitute consent to sex with husband-impersonator Hans disguised as Kai, because Kai and Hans are different people. Even so, Boline’s agreeing to sex with Børge, who has lied to her about his marital status to up his chances, constitutes consent. We are rarely (if ever) 100 per cent honest with our sex partners—particularly not people we are about to have sex with for the first time (for fear that it may dampen their interest). Requiring ‘full revelation’ for consent to sex thus has the absurd implication that (nearly) all sex is rape. So, while sex by impersonation vitiates consent, sex by fake marital status does not.

Using legal terminology, we can say that fraud in the factum requires pretending to be a different person (someone with different parents, say) or pretending that the act for which consent is sought is a different type of act. Fraud in the inducement, by contrast, merely requires pretending to have a non-essential feature, without thereby masquerading as an entirely different person and without disguising the sexual act as an entirely different type of act in an officially recognized typology of acts.

Pace Rubenfeld, a principled distinction can thus be drawn between rape by deception recognized as such by current rape law in most states in the US and consensual sex preceded by deception. Only sex by deception where the offender masquerades as someone else or convinces the victim that the sex act is a different type of act, say a medical procedure, vitiates sexual autonomy.¹⁸

My thesis here, of course, should not be taken to imply that rape only violates the right to sexual autonomy. In many instances, rape vitiates sexual self-direction and the survivor’s rights to sexual individuality and sexual dignity.

33.5 Sexual rights and sex by deception

People’s intuitive moral judgment, I have suggested, are guided by the principle of respect for persons, which encompasses five related ideals: respect for self-government, respect for personal autonomy, respect for individuality, respect for privacy, and respect for dignity and a decent life. I have, furthermore, argued (pace Rubenfeld) that a legitimate distinction can be drawn between sex by deception that violates sexual autonomy and sex by deception that does not, and that the puzzle about sex by deception therefore does not compel us to rethink the current definition of consensual sex in terms of sexual autonomy—which is to say that, with rare exceptions, sex by deception is consensual sex.
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Even when consensual, sex by deception is morally problematic. This is because all sex by deception vitiates the principle of respect for persons. Different instances flout different facets of the principle. Consider our initial scenario. Bjørn tells Sonya that he is 23 and about to graduate from college to increase his chances of sleeping with her; he is in fact 33 and about to finish his PhD. Although Sonya’s sexual preferences were not stated in the original story, let’s assume for argument’s sake that she would have been much less likely to have sex with Bjørn if she had known his true age. On this assumption, Bjørn intentionally disrespects Sonya’s sexual preferences, which is to say that his conduct violates her right to sexual individuality, viz. her right to have, develop, and be respected irrespective of, her own unique sexual preferences, personality, identity, and orientation.

Now, let’s cancel the assumption regarding Sonya’s preferences and assume instead that, contrary to what Bjørn believes, Sonya actually prefers a considerable age difference, or alternatively that she couldn’t care less either way. Under either assumption, Bjørn’s conduct doesn’t violate Sonya’s right to sexual individuality. But his behaviour reveals that his has no regard for her sexual rights. Why else would he lie? His lying is an overt attempt to disregard her rights. Bjørn is thus guilty of an attempted violation of Sonya’s sexual individuality, which makes his sexual conduct disrespectful.

So far we have been concerned exclusively with lying or deceiving with the intent of increasing the likelihood of consent to sex. Suppose, however, that Bjørn lies about his age for entirely idiosyncratic reasons, and that it never occurs to him that doing so might make Sonya more likely to consent to sex. Suppose further that a ‘reasonable person’ would have no reason to think Sonya cared about his age. In this scenario, Bjørn’s lying isn’t an attempt (p. 698) to deceptively make Sonya agree to sex. So, his sexual conduct doesn’t satisfy the mens rea (‘guilty mind) requirements of criminal law.19

Lying prior to sex—even if not to increase your chances of sex—could turn your sexual conduct into a civil liability, however (see MacKinnon 1989: 180–81). In civil law, unlike in criminal law, a person can be held responsible for harm or damage he or she didn’t foresee and didn’t directly cause. Suppose you recently opened your own petting zoo. You own a mule, a donkey, and a goat. One day your goat goes mad and starts running around the enclosure like a maniac. A little girl gets in the way of the runaway goat, which causes her to trip and break her arm. In the envisaged scenario, you didn’t cause, or intend to cause, harm. Since you didn’t carry out the action, you would not ordinarily be held criminally liable. But a civil court may order you to pay for the medical costs incurred by your goat. If your behaviour is also deemed subjectively reckless (see below), your penalty could be punitive as well—for example, the civil court could order you to serve time or pay restitution.

Negligence is an omission or failure to act that unintentionally inflicts harm or damage that was neither intended nor foreseen by the agent (Brady 1980), for instance, omitting to schedule the weekly veterinarian site visit to monitor the psychiatric state of your goat and other animals, because you got caught up watching the Tour de France and paying no heed to the fact that visitors could get hurt as a result. Negligence that doesn’t violate a
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legal claims right (e.g. your child’s right to your care as a parent or caretaker) can be a civil liability, but not a criminal liability, as criminal liability requires a positive action rather than an omission, except when a claims right is violated.

(Subjective) recklessness is a positive action that inflicts harm or damage which the agent didn’t intentionally bring about but had foreseen and yet didn’t care to avoid (Sullivan 1992). For example, it would be reckless for you to keep your goat outside with visitors, while being well aware of its random caprice yet failing to care about anything except increasing your profits. Being reckless thus also differs from causing a foreseen side effect that you choose for the sake of a greater good. Recklessness can vary in legal kind, being either a civic liability or a criminal offense.

Sex by deception sometimes compromises sexual dignity rather than sexual individuality. Consider again the case of Karl, a misogynist who has had his eyes on Sophie for a long time. Karl’s desire to degrade and humiliate women is so sickly strong that he happily plays his part as a man who respects women in order to seduce and eventually devalue Sophie. At first Sophie gives Karl a hard time. But after a few weeks, she is hooked, and he knows it. When they finally have sex, which they both refer to as an act of ‘love making’, Karl’s main thought is how good it is to finally ‘fuck that little disgraceful whore’. In this scenario, Karl evidently infringes on Sophie’s right to sexual dignity.

In other cases, sex by deception vitiates sexual privacy. In 2010, Colgate University student Michael Piznarski secretly recorded having sex with his girlfriend on several occasions. Piznarski informed her about the video recordings after their breakup, which made the girlfriend file a complaint with the police. The police obtained a search warrant and confiscated the recordings, one of which showed Piznarski having sex with a different woman. Piznarski was eventually convicted for breach of sexual privacy under New York’s unlawful surveillance statute, called ‘Stephanie’s Law’.

33.6 Respect for persons, trolleyology, and foreseeable but unintended side effects

So far I have spoken rather uncritically about immoral sex as disrespectful of a person’s sexual rights. The rights of persons go hand in hand with our common sentiment that we ought to respect people because of their intrinsic worth and not merely because of their usefulness.

But why think that the principle of respect should be guiding our behaviour in the first place? Kant is often read as regarding the principle as an absolute and unconditional directive for how to treat all persons (Simpson 1979; Korsgaard 1986; Langton 2007; Merritt 2017). I will argue for the somewhat related view that we should treat the principle of respect as behaviour-guiding, because it is so deeply ingrained in most humans. Respect for others appears to be distinctly human and intrinsically communal (Darwall 2006). Most of us have a fundamental drive toward community, mutuality, and inclusive-
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ness (at least before being corrupted by society’s appraisal mechanisms). As we will see, experimental results in moral psychology turn out to demonstrate this very vividly.

We humans are on average quite sensitive to the plight of others and often adjust our ways accordingly—though more so in Eastern than Western cultures (Batson 1991; 2011; Gold et al. 2014). Admittedly, few of us are inclined to treat all human beings as equally deserving of respect (Maclagan 1960a; 1960b). Although not condoned by Kant, we are fond of drawing razor-sharp distinctions between good and evil. Unlike such saintly personas as the Dalai Lama, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Mother Teresa, inherently evil existences like Genghis Khan, Vlad III (Dracula), Adolf Hitler, and Heinrich Himmler are not easily seen as deserving of our respect, owing to their ostensible vices and almost complete lack of virtues. But very few people will be this evaluatively uniform. Still, our default practical attitude is to regard all persons as inherently worthy of what Stephen Darwall calls ‘recognition respect’, even those who are utterly unworthy of what he calls ‘appraisal respect’ (Darwall 1977). Where recognition respect is the respect owed to all persons, appraisal respect is the respect we have for others because of their virtuous deeds and omission of vicious acts.23 Unfathomably wicked humanoid existences, like Genghis Khan or Heinrich Himmler, may simply fail to be persons in any sense other than the most trivial.

(p. 700) Despite our allegiance to the principle of respect in many scenarios, empirical data may appear to suggest that we are inclined to deviate behaviourally when we can do a lot of good without directly causing harm. The widely discussed trolley problem is one of the best illustrations of this behavioural tendency (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976; Kamm 1989; Greene et al. 2001; Gold et al. 2014). The first of the standard pair of trolley cases (see Figure 34.1) runs as follows:

A runaway trolley is hurtling down the railway tracks. Five people are tied up and unable to move on the tracks ahead. The trolley is headed straight for them. You are standing in the train yard, next to a lever. If you pull the lever, the trolley will switch to a side track. However, you notice that one person is tied up on the side track.

You have two options: (i) Do nothing and the trolley kills the five people on the main track. (ii) Pull the lever, diverting the trolley onto the side track, which kills one person but saves five.

How will you proceed?
In studies of these cases, the majority of research participants subjected to this dilemma say that they would pull the lever, which would kill one but save five (Greene et al. 2001; 2004; 2008). Their moral choice satisfies the utilitarian principle that you should aim at maximizing well-being. Pulling the lever kills one person and saves five, whereas not pulling it kills five and lets one live. So, you are more likely to maximize well-being if you pull the lever than if you do not. People’s inclination to pull the lever in this case may thus seem to be a result of thinking in accordance with the utilitarian principle (Greene et al. 2001).

The second of the standard pair of trolley cases runs as follows (see Figure 34.2):

As before, a runaway trolley is about to hit five people tied up and unable to move on the tracks ahead. You are on a bridge overlooking the track. You know that you can stop the trolley and save the five people by putting something very heavy in front of it. As it happens, a very large man is standing next to you. You have two options: (i) Do nothing and the trolley kills the five people on the track. (ii) Push the large man over the bridge and onto the track, which kills him, but saves five.

How will you proceed?
Despite the analogy between the two scenarios, most people do not respond in the same way to the second problem. Even people who happily switch the lever in the first scenario typically allege that they would not push the large man in order to save the five.

This finding suggests that we give more weight to the principle of respect for persons when it is salient to us that we must harm a person by active force of our own in order for us to prevent the death of others (Greene et al. 2001; 2004; 2008; Cushman and Young 2009; Cushman et al. 2010). So, while we are generally sympathetic to utilitarian principles, our attraction to the principle of respect overrides our utilitarian inclinations once it is made salient to us that saving lives requires intentional killing, or murder. But using a person merely as a means to save others infringes on the principle of respect. So, our unwillingness to push the large man onto the tracks indicates that we only believe in maximizing utility when this is compatible with respect for persons.

This would appear to be a reasonable conclusion if it could be established that people’s sentiments in the trolley cases are rational. However, Joshua Greene (2004; 2008)—a staunch utilitarian—argues that we are not acting (or judging) rationally when judging differently in the trolley cases. If we are willing to pull the lever in order to save the lives of five people in the first case, we should be equally willing to push the large man down on the tracks in order to save the lives of five people in the second case. Our irrational responses in ‘contact’ or personal-force trolley cases, Greene argues, are the result of fast, sub-personal cognitive processes (type 1 processes). While he holds that type 1 moral processing can work (p. 702) pretty well for familiar or small-scale, evolutionary problems, they can turn us into moral fossils in ‘contact’ trolley cases.

There is some evidence to suggest that fast cognitive processing can be fairly reliable when we have limited information (see e.g. Gigerenzer 2007; Brogaard 2018; see also Mallon and Nichols 2010; Prinz and Nichols 2010). This, however, will not be my concern here. Instead I will defend an alternative analysis of the collected responses in trolley cases and present some of my own data as well. I will argue that ordinary folks are not inconsistently relying on utilitarian principles in some cases and the principle of respect for persons in others. Prevalent folk responses to trolleyesque thought experiments appear to be based on the principle of respect as well as the doctrine of double effect (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 64, art. 7; Mangan 1949; Foot 1967; 1985; Quinn 1989; McMahan 1994; Mikhail 2011), which I will argue suggests that people’s judgments about the trolley cases reflect coherent application of defensible principles (despite being a conscious product of unconscious cognition).

The principle of respect, in its technical sense, tells us that no person should ever be treated merely as a means by which we achieve our desired end. Implicit in this formulation is the presumption that the degrading of another person to the level of mere instrument is an intended outcome of our doings. If you intend to kill a person and act on your intention for no excusable reason, this reflects a deep disregard for the inherent value of personhood.
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When a harmful effect is both unintended and unforeseen, it can be considered an accident. However, there are also cases where a harmful effect is an unintended but foreseen consequence of bringing about a highly desirable end. In such cases, the doctrine of double effect implies that in spite of the fact that you intend to cause harm to someone, you have not used them as a mere means to an end. Here is a classical example of a morally acceptable side effect (cf. Cushman and Young 2009; McIntyre 2014).

**Good Doctor**

After trying all FDA-approved cancer drugs to no avail, a doctor considers giving a cancer patient an experimental drug that until now has cured 25 per cent of people with the same type of cancer within six months of starting treatment. The doctor knows that the drug causes osteoporosis, a harmful effect. Yet he thinks that the one-in-four chance of being cancer-free within six months overrides the harm of osteoporosis (a treatable condition). So, he gives the drug to the patient.

The doctor intends to cure, not harm, his patient, and he believes that osteoporosis is a fair (or more than fair) price to pay for a one-in-four chance of being cancer-free. We typically take this to be sufficient for the doctor’s action to be morally justified.

But the end does not always justify the means. Consider the following variation on Good Doctor:

**Bad Doctor**

After trying all FDA-approved cancer drugs to no avail, a doctor considers giving a wealthy cancer patient an experimental drug that until now has cured 25 per cent of people with the same type of cancer within six months of starting treatment. The only obstacle is that he has run out of the drug. For it to work, it must be produced from bone marrow from organ donors, yet there is not enough time to wait for a new organ donor. To be able to produce the drug for the other patient, the doctor searches the hospital for a suitable donor. When he locates a homeless alcoholic who is unlikely to make it through the night, he gives the homeless man an overdose of morphine. His bone marrow is sent to the local pharmacy that delivers the experimental drug. The doctor gives the drug to his wealthy patient, and within six months the wealthy patient is cancer-free.

In Bad Doctor, the doctor intends to cure, not harm, and he believes that the one-in-four chance of his wealthy patient being cancer-free within six months overrides the harm of taking the life of a homeless alcoholic. Yet most people judge that the doctor’s action is not morally defensible.

The pervasiveness of a ‘guilty’ verdict in Bad Doctor suggests that a harmful effect is justifiable only when the person who is harmed has been used without his consent to bring about the good. In Bad Doctor, killing the homeless alcoholic is the only feasible way for the doctor to get his hands on more of the cancer drug. So, the homeless man serves as
mere means to an end, viz. as the main supply of the experimental drug for the wealthy patient.

For a harmful double effect to be justifiable, then, several conditions need to be satisfied. My tentative suggestion is that we cash out the doctrine as follows. Where S brings about a harmful effect B (for ‘bad’) in the process of attempting to bring about the desired outcome G (for ‘good’), S’s action is morally justified just in case:

**Doctrine of Double Effect**

1. S intends to bring about G.
2. S believes bringing about G is likely to bring about B.
3. S does not intend to bring about B.
4. S wishes B would not happen.
5. S believes that B is proportional to G.
6. S believes B is not a mere means to G.

How is the last condition to be understood? I would like to suggest that we take (6) to signify that the agent believes his action would have had the same good effect even if the unintended but foreseen harmful consequence had not occurred. In terms of possible worlds, we can put this as follows:

**Bad Effect B is not a mere means to Good Effect G**

S believes that if S had behaved as he did but B had not occurred, G might still have occurred.

Let it be granted for simplicity’s sake that ordinary folks are reasonably rational agents who (below the level of conscious awareness) evaluate counterfactuals in roughly the way Lewis (1979) proposed that we evaluate counterfactuals. On this proposal, we (unconsciously) determine the truth-value of counterfactuals by envisaging a realm of alternative possible worlds that are ordered by magnitude of similarity to our actual world. The more similar, the closer. Lewis proposes the following default similarity measure for determining the world closest to the actual. The default similarity measure is an ordered list of how much or how little weight should be given to particular deviations from the actual world when determining which worlds in which the antecedent is true are closest to the actual.

1. It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.

4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly. (Lewis 1979: 47–8)

More colloquially put: possible worlds that do not comply with the laws of nature—for instance, worlds where we use means of transportation that go faster than light or where genuine miracles occur—are to be regarded as very distant from the actual world, and they are to be regarded as more distant than worlds where everything that occurs is compatible with our laws of nature but where long stretches of past or future occurrences diverge in radical ways from actual occurrences. Still closer are worlds involving minor violations of the laws of nature—say, worlds where a particle travels faster than light on a single occasion but where every other occurrence is near-indistinguishable from events in the actual world. Possible worlds that differ from the actual world merely in terms of small localized facts or events are to be treated as closest to the actual.

Applying Lewis’s similarity measure to the first trolley case, we must adjudicate between two sets of worlds. In one set of worlds you pull the lever and divert the trolley to a track where a man is tied up but where the trolley miraculously stops before hitting the man, or where the man miraculously survives the impact. In the other set of worlds you pull the lever, but the man is able to free himself and jump to safety before the impact occurs, or he was never tied up in the first place. The first kind of scenario is more likely to involve either big violations of law or a significant mismatch of particular facts than the second. So, in the lever–trolley case the same good effect (five saved) would still have occurred, even if the harmful effect (one dead) had not occurred.

This is not so in the large man/trolley case. By Lewis’s default similarity metric, worlds in which you make the train stop by pushing the man but the man miraculously lives are less similar to the actual world than worlds where you push the man but he does not land on the tracks and therefore fails to stop the trolley. That’s because it is very improbable that the man stops the trolley with his body and yet survives the impact. But to say that it is very improbable is just to say that the worlds where that miraculous event happens are significantly different from—or far removed from—the actual. It either involves big, widespread, diverse violations of laws of nature or large regions of mismatches between particular facts.

So, the closest worlds where you push but don’t kill the large man aren’t worlds where you push him and he miraculously survives. Rather, they are worlds where he doesn’t land on the tracks and therefore doesn’t stop the trolley with his body. Thus, in the second case, unlike in the first, were you to decide to push the large man and thereby save five, using the large man to stop the trolley would be equivalent to treating him as a mere means to a greater good—a treatment which we ordinarily condemn. 24
The upshot is this. When reinterpreted, the doctrine of double effect can account for why most of us are willing to kill a man to save five when all we need to do is pull a lever, but are unwilling to kill a man to save five when we need to push him or get into close contact with him in some other way.

It may perhaps seem that the proposed reading of condition (6) deprives the doctrine of double effect of its ability to explain the apparent acceptability of killing in self-defence or sacrificing one’s own life to save the lives of others (McIntyre 2001; 2014). This is not so. Although I will not be able to go into the details here, the doctrine as formulated can explain the widely recognized acceptability of self-defence killings, when the killing is an unwanted side effect of an intention to harm without killing but not self-defence where the intent is to kill.25

The above considerations cast doubt on Greene’s (2013) claim that we are not acting rationally when judging differently in the trolley cases. The fact that we are judging differently can be explained on the view that we are inclined to abide by the principle of respect for persons, but that this principle permits harming a person when the harm can truly be considered a double effect.

Even if we can explain the differential judgments in the trolley cases by appealing to the doctrine of double effect, one might wonder whether our folk decisions in critical choice situations are indeed guided by the doctrine (i.e. guided on an unconscious level, likely by recruitment of subcortical emotional brain regions; see Prinz and Nichols 2010). Experimental studies of our intuitions about intentional action may seem to cast doubt on this claim (McIntyre 2014). In a study conducted by Joshua Knobe (2003; 2006), two groups of research participants were assigned one of the following vignettes:

1A

The vice-president of a company goes to the chairman of the board and says, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, but it will harm the environment.’ The chairman of the board answers, ‘I don’t care at all about the environment. I just want us to increase our profits. Let’s start the new program.’ They start the new program, and sure enough, the environment is harmed.

Did the chairman intentionally harm the environment?

1B

‘[ ... ] and it will help the environment.’ [ ... ] The chairman of the board answers, ‘I don’t care at all about the environment. I just want us to increase our profits. Let’s start the new program.’ They start the new program, and sure enough, the environment is helped.

Did the chairman intentionally help the environment?
Knobe found that when the chairman knows that a side effect of his decision is harmful yet doesn’t care whether it occurs (1A), most people judge that he intentionally brought about the harm. When the chairman knows that the side effect of his decisions is good yet still doesn’t care whether it happens (1B), most people judge that he didn’t intentionally bring about the good side effect. Knobe (2003; 2006; 2010) takes these data to show that we are inclined to regard a harmful result as a foreseen but unintended side effect when we believe that it is brought about by the right kinds of considerations, yet take the side effect to be intentionally brought about when we judge it to be a result of morally despicable considerations (see also Harman 1976; Knobe and Doris 2010). This is also referred to as the ‘the side-effect effect’.

Alison McIntyre (2014) argues that these findings threaten to undermine the explanatory power of double effect. The doctrine presupposes that a principled distinction can be drawn between a foreseen but unintended effect and an effect brought about intentionally. Yet experimental results indicate that most of us tend to treat the effects of action as intended whenever they are based on morally despicable considerations. When the same morally despicable considerations precede a morally good side effect, on the other hand, we tend to treat the side effect as foreseen but unintended. This may seem to suggest that we can never draw an objective distinction between intentional outcomes and outcomes that are merely foreseen, which is required by the doctrine of double effect.  

However, I don’t think Knobe’s results undermine the doctrine of double effect. Rather, I think we might get these results because most people haven’t been taught the difference between specific intent and general intent plus malice (where malice is specific intent to harm, reckless disregard for the welfare of others, or criminal negligence of a duty of care). For an act to amount to theft, the actor must have specifically intended to permanently deprive the victim of his or her property. But for an act to be murder, it may suffice that the actor performed the act with malice, and that the act resulted in the foreseeable death of the victim. Consider the following variation on Knobe’s vignette:

2A

The vice-president of a company goes to the chairman of the board and says, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, but a couple of poor people will die.’ The chairman of the board answers, ‘I don’t care at all about poor people. I just want us to increase our profits. Let’s start the new program.’ They start the new program, and sure enough, a couple of poor people die.

Did the chairman intentionally kill the poor people?

Most people would answer ‘yes’ here. But isn’t that ‘a’ correct answer? It is true that the chairman didn’t specifically intend to kill the poor people but he intentionally performed an act with malice (i.e. his decision), and that act resulted in the foreseeable death of a couple of poor people, which means that he could be convicted of murder.
In the original vignette in (1A), Knobe’s envisaged chairman doesn’t care whether the environment is harmed, which means that he intentionally performs an act with malice that results in foreseeable harm to the environment. But if a positive answer to (2A) is ‘a’ correct answer, then so is a positive answer to (1A). The asymmetry between (1A) and (1B) is also easily explained. In (1B), the chairman evidently didn’t act with malice, as his decision effectively ends up helping the environment. So, a failure to distinguish specific intent and general intent plus malice could well explain Knobe’s findings.

33.7 Conclusion

In this chapter we looked at sex by deception as a case study in order to highlight some of the issues around sexuality and moral psychology, including sexual self-possession, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, sexual interest, consensual sex, and disrespectful sex.

Sex by deception appears to give rise to a puzzle that lends credence to an account of rape in terms of force rather than autonomy. As it turns out, the puzzle rests on a mistake, viz., that of treating all cases of sex by deception alike. This is a mistake because even though some instances of sex by deception vitiate sexual autonomy and therefore ought to be considered rape, most instances aren’t rape because they don’t violate sexual autonomy. Sex by deception, however, is morally problematic because it infringes on fundamental human rights, such as the right to sexual individuality.

The moral severity of a person’s violation of another person’s sexual rights could well match or surpass that of rape, although the extent to which it does (if at all) would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Sex facilitated by failure to disclose a HIV-positive status, concealment of bizarre sexual inclinations with significant ramifications such as a desire to have sex with children, and not informing your sex partner that you are their bygone biological parent clearly fail on the moral scale.

In the final section of the chapter, I argued against widely accepted experimentally based conclusions in moral psychology that take people’s intuitive judgments about morality to be driven by incoherent ethical principles. I argued that we can make sense of people’s intuitive judgments as grounded in Kant’s principle of respect—the principle that underlie our human liberty rights, including our human sexual rights.

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References


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O’Mahony, C. 2012. There is no such thing as a right to dignity. *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 10(2): 551–74.


Notes:

(1) For a critical review of Tom Dougherty (2013a), see Manson (2017).


(4) The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf, retrieved 28 May 2018. Human rights are to be understood as normative principles the satisfaction of which enables us to nourish our capacity for self-directed behaviour and to adopt and pursue our own ends. The question of which fundamental human rights we have qua persons has, not surprisingly, been the subject of ferocious debate. See e.g. Nickel (1987; 2014), McCrudden (2008), O’Mahony (2012), and Brännmark (2017). Human rights can be divided into liberty rights and claims rights (Nickel 1987). A liberty right is a right everyone has that does not depend on someone else having a duty to fulfil it (of course, everyone has a prima facie obligation not to violate liberty rights, so there are often claim rights associated with liberty rights). A claims right, by contrast, is a right that needs to be fulfilled by a particular person or institution. Charlotte’s right to choose between taking the metro and the car to work is a liberty right, whereas her right to receive the $100 she is owed by Lucas is a claims right.

(5) Other sexual rights may include the right to reproduce, the right to freedom of sexual thought and expression, the right to a sex education, and the right to a fair trial when charged with a sex crime.

(6) As every person has the same human rights, every person is required to protect and promote the human rights of everyone else. The principle of respect is thus constitutive of agency and rationality (Korsgaard 2008: 12). Christine Korsgaard explains: ‘To believe on the basis of a rational consideration is to believe on the basis of a consideration that could govern the beliefs of any rational believer, and still be a belief about the public, shared world’ (p. 12). Emotional receptivity to the demands of reason across many different situations and using prudence in balancing one’s personal interests arguably are also constitutive of agency (pp. 15–18).

(7) If your future corpse is treated disrespectfully, we can say that this constitutes a posthumous violation of your current rights to dignity.

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(9) In many jurisdictions, rape is sexual violence that involves non-consensual sexual penetration (a special case of sexual assault). Sexual violence that involves non-penetrative non-consensual sexual activity, such as non-consensual kissing, touching, or sucking, is often considered sexual assault but not rape. This assumption has, unsurprisingly, been challenged, and for a horde of good reason (for discussion, see Whisnant 2017). Here is one—rhetorically put: Why think a woman raping another woman needs to involve penetration? In what follows I will continue to use the word ‘rape’, but I don’t personally take it to be referentially restricted to penetrative non-consensual sex.


(12) Dougherty (2013) likewise defends the view that a wide range of sex by deception vitiates consent and therefore is a serious offence. I argue against this stance below.

(13) The premise that the legality of BDSM makes sexual autonomy unusable in a legal context is questionable, as temporarily giving up self-direction and not just sexual autonomy is integral to the practice. A similar point is made by Dougherty (2013b). In his comments on this chapter, John Doris has also questioned the premise that BDSM violates sexual autonomy. Suppose that there is an encounter where nothing happens to the person in the putatively non-autonomous role that does not conform to their all things considered desires—or values, on his view. (On this reading, safe words reflect all things considered desires, as do negotiations prior to the act.) That seems as if it should count as autonomous, if things happen that are counter to their transient, first-order desires. The same analysis applies to your checking into a ‘lockdown’ drug treatment facility—it conforms to an autonomous plan of life, even if some desires are frustrated. None of this, of course, is to take a view on whether paraphilias like BDSM are ‘healthy’ or ‘pathological’. If the right view was that they were always pathological, they might not be genuinely consensual.

(14) Baker (2015) argues for a similar view but on purely pragmatic grounds: the law should cover only cases of rape that occur as a result of physical force or threat, because it is virtually impossible to prove that sex where no physical force or threat was used is rape. Bernstein (2015) argues that rape law should include a conception of rape that is best suited as a way of preventing the vitiation of self-possession, which he thinks is best accomplished by understanding rape as an infringement on sexual autonomy.

(15) This sort of view presupposes the falsehood of strong situationism; see Doris (2003) for potential issues presented by situationism, and Vargas (2013) and Doris (2015) for a plausible generic compatibilism.
As Doris has argued (Doris, 2015: ch 8), such features might make a difference on psychological continuity accounts. A confirmed bachelor getting married might count as a change of identity, if the change were significant enough.

It may perhaps seem that the biological account implies that a person’s sex assigned at birth is fixed by her individual essence. However, this is not so, as the sex assigned at birth can, and often does, change (Serano 2007).

In the terminology of dual process theory: the type I heuristics (or ‘short-cuts’) we automatically rely on when making quick decisions on the basis of limited information can be more reliable than slow type II reasoning on the basis of a lot of information (see Gigerenzer 2007; Haidt 2007). So concealing information or lying to make someone agree to sex need not vitiate sexual autonomy. Alfano (2015) and Strudler (2016) make a similar point. As Alfano puts it, ‘additionally, we need a nuanced, empirically-informed conception of autonomy. More information doesn’t always lead to better decision-making, and can even introduce bias. Promoting someone’s autonomy can therefore involve concealing information or even providing misinformation’ (2015: 2). Arguably, the same can be said about promoting someone’s individuality and perhaps other rights as well. Being presented with too many options, for example, might prevent us from developing preferences in a particular domain. This suggests that only some kinds of ‘deception’ violate the principle of respect, viz. the kinds carried out with the intention of promoting one’s own selfish ends (as opposed to a greater good or the ends of the deceived).

For discussion of mens rea in the context of rape, see Whisnant (2017).

In fact, the effect-causing actions in Knobe’s chairman cases are paradigmatic instances of recklessness (see Knobe 2010; Knobe and Doris 2010).


‘Respect’ is short for ‘respect in the practical sense’ (MM, 6: 449) as opposed to respect as a will-defying feeling or attitude, which Kant denied could be assigned a proper normative value.

The notion of respect should also be kept apart from that of care. If we care about a friend whose unhealthy lifestyle is nearly killing her, we may be inclined to recommend lifestyle changes. However, upon further reflection, we might refrain from offering lifestyle advice out of respect for our friend as self-governing (Darwell 2006: 162–6).

My proposal may seem superficially similar to the suggestion made by Warren Quinn that in order for a harm to be an unintended side-effect of an intended end, the harm must not be the result of direct agency. Direct agency, Quinn argues, is ‘agency in which harm comes to some victims, at least in part, from the agent’s deliberately involving them in something in order to further his purpose precisely by way of their being so in-
volved’ (1989: 343). However, my suggestion is different, as it does not imply that double effects cannot be a result of direct agency.

(25) I don’t think it is straightforwardly morally permissible to sacrifice one’s own life for the sake of others. There is a cultural tendency to celebrate ‘supererogatory’ acts, i.e. acts that go above and beyond our call of duty, even when the acts are grounded in irrational feelings (Brogaard 2015). For example, you are considered a ‘hero’ if you knowingly jump to your own death in order to save a child.

(26) However, see Holton (2010) for a reply.

Berit Brogaard
Berit Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami.