STOIC PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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1. Introduction: Four Questions and a Strategy

Apathy is the best-known feature of Stoicism; even Webster's records that a Stoic lives without passions.¹ But it remains unclear what Stoic apathy amounts to, because it remains unclear what Stoics understand by passions and why they find passions problematic. In this essay, I start with four unsettled questions about the Stoic definition of passions, and to answer these questions, I explain the passions as central elements of Stoic psychopathology, that is, as defects relative to the Stoic account of the psychological norm. This hypothesis, I claim, clarifies what the evidence by itself leaves uncertain. I close by bringing my conclusions to bear on the scope of Stoic apathy.

Throughout, I focus on the account of the passions offered by the greatest Greek Stoic, Chrysippus of Soli, who headed the school in the third

¹McKechnie, Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, s.v. 'Stoical': "1. Stoic. 2. [s-] not affected by passion..." (Further information about the works I cite by short title here and throughout the notes can be found in the list of sources cited at the end of the essay.)
century BCE. It is widely recognized that Chrysippus defined passions as judgments. (See T1: "They say that the passions are judgments, according to Chrysippus in his book On Passions" (Diogenes Laertius VII 111).) But four questions stand in the way of settling exactly what judgments Chrysippus takes passions to be.

First, is the content of a passionate judgment evaluative? Some evidence suggests that a passion is a judgment one forms by assenting to a simple evaluative proposition (e.g., I judge that this here is good). But Michael Frede has argued, and no one has convincingly refuted, that a passion is a judgment one forms by assenting to a non-evaluative proposition, judged in a certain way (e.g., I judge, in a certain way, that this is here). On either approach, one can call the passionate judgment evaluative. But the approaches differ in how they understand the evaluative nature of the judgment.

Second, is a passionate judgment necessarily false? The consensus of the scholars would suggest that it is, but at least one passage suggests that a true judgment can be passionate.  

Third, how is the account of passion as a judgment related to the characterization of it as an impulse? Some scholars, following Galen, suggest that Chrysippus departs from the earlier Stoic view of passions as impulses when he insists that there is nothing more to a passion than an evaluative judgment. But others insist that a Chrysippean passion requires

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2 See Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul." For a gallant, but unsuccessful attempt to show where Frede has gone wrong, see Brennan, "The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions," 44-52. Ledbetter, "The Propositional Content of Stoic Emotions," 110, and Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extermination of the Passions," 377n47, simply cling to the evidence in the face of Frede's position. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 258n30, flatly and inadequately insists, "We should not attempt to mitigate the Stoic claim that passions and first and foremost beliefs, which are directly to be understood as assertions of propositions."

3 See Cicero, Tusc III 77-78, discussed in §§3-4 below.

4 See, e.g., Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extermination of the Passions," with the contrast with Zeno highlighted on 372.
both an evaluative judgment and an impulse, which is identical to an impulsive judgment. This gives rise to the question of how the passionate judgment is related to the impulsive judgment. Some scholars clearly think that one can have a passionate judgment without any accompanying impulse, which is to say that one can have a passionate judgment without having a passion.\(^5\) Other scholars seem to think, although this is not often fully explicit, that one cannot have a passionate judgment without some accompanying impulsive judgment.\(^6\) To distinguish these views, I will say that the one takes the Stoic passion to be a molecular compound of an evaluative and an impulsive judgment whereas the other takes it to be an atomic compound. All told, there are three answers to my third question: a Stoic passion is a simple evaluative judgment, a molecular compound of an evaluative judgment and an impulse, or an atomic compound.\(^7\)

Fourth, how is the account of passion as a judgment related to the other characterizations of it that bring out what is wrong with passion? Ancient evidence reports the Stoic views that passions are irrational movements or flutterings of the soul. Again, some scholars follow Galen and drive a wedge between these characterizations and Chrysippus' account in terms of judgments,\(^8\) whereas others try to harmonize the various accounts.\(^9\)

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6 For some recognition of complexity in the passion without clear commitment on the nature of the relation between the parts, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, esp. 151, and Ledbetter, "The Propositional Content of Stoic Emotions," esp. 111. I take myself to be very close to Inwood's position on this question.

7 These are the common answers, not the only logically possible ones. In particular, one might wonder why the evaluative judgment should not be identical to an impulsive judgment. I rule this out when I discuss the question in §5 below.


These questions are unsettled largely because the most obvious evidence by itself does not decisively settle them. Different scholars, impressed by different passages, draw different conclusions. Each scholar then makes a reasonable attempt to represent the "preponderance of the evidence" from the standpoint that best respects the passage he or she finds clearest and most trustworthy.

For fresh guidance where the evidence is uncertain, I propose a different starting-point. I suggest that the Stoic account of passions is part of their psychopathology, part of their account of how human psychology can go wrong. So I propose that we start with the Stoic account of how human psychology can go right. The evidence concerning the Stoic norm is less contentious. And the Stoic account of the norm will make clear what would count as a psychological defect, and this, in turn, will illuminate the evidence concerning the Stoic account of the passions.

2. The Norm of Coherence

The Stoic psychological norm is virtue. The goal of living is to live in agreement with nature\textsuperscript{10} and virtue just is "a disposition in agreement."\textsuperscript{11} Fortunately, the Stoics say more about what it is to have a disposition in agreement. They say that virtue is knowledge,\textsuperscript{12} and that knowledge, whether it is a cognitive grasp, a system of grasps, or a state of receiving impressions, is secure, stable, and unshakeable by reason or argument.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., Stobaeus II 7.6a 75,11-76,15.
\textsuperscript{11} DL VII 89; cf. Stobaeus II 7.5b1 60,7-8.
\textsuperscript{12} See Stobaeus II 7.5b 58,9-11 and II 7.5b4 62,15-20, and DL VII 90. All of the standard virtues are defined as forms of knowledge (ἐπιστήμα): see Stobaeus II 7.5b1-2 59,4-62,6 and DL VII 92-93.
\textsuperscript{13} For the primary definition (not just a κατάληψις or τέχνη but also something ἀσοφάλες, βέβαιον, ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου), see Stobaeus II 7.5l 73,19-74,1; DL VII 47; Sextus M VII 151; Pseudo-Galen SVF 2.93; Philo SVF 2.95; and cf. Cicero, Academica I 41-42, who attributes the account to Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. For the
Stability and "unshakeability" make this an exclusive norm. Whoever lives up to it cannot be forced in an argument to give up something that he takes himself to know\textsuperscript{14} and cannot be led by what he takes himself to know or by sense-perception to assent to anything false. So one must satisfy four conditions. First, one must have perfect reliability in assent to sense-impressions (else one might assent to something false).\textsuperscript{15} In addition, one must perfectly master dialectical argument (else one might be led to infer something false from one's true beliefs [DL VII 47]), and one must be entirely free of false beliefs (for false beliefs are changeable by reason and can be used in dialectical argument to lead one to change true beliefs). Finally, if each of one's beliefs is to be unshakeable, one must ensure that each of them is firmly held in place by its inferential connections to the others.

To hang a name on this picture, I will say that the Stoics adopt the norm of psychological coherence. Their norm rests on a robustly holistic conception of knowledge, according to which any false belief or inferentially unsupported belief undermines one's claim to know anything. It does not, however, require omniscience. The Stoic sage can withhold assent when matters are unclear, and she does not need every matter to be clear.\textsuperscript{16} She

\textsuperscript{14} This is not to say that a sage cannot forget something that he once knew, or even that a sage will never come to deny something that he knew. What is unchangeable by reason might be changeable by failing memory or even by drunkenness or disease. (Cleanthes and Chrysippus apparently disputed about whether drunkenness and disease could render known grasps changeable, Cleanthes taking the negative and Chrysippus the affirmative. See DL VII 127, and the related evidence collected at SVF 3.238-244.)

\textsuperscript{15} Here the Stoic doctrine of the "kataleptic impressions" (καταληπτικα ψαντασια) earns its keep. On this view, some of our impressions are self-certifyingly true, and one can make progress toward the norm by restricting one's assent to these special, "kataleptic" impressions.

\textsuperscript{16} See especially the Stoic remarks of the Antiochean Lucullus in Cicero, Acad. II 57.
simply needs a sufficiently rich enough set of beliefs over a sufficiently rich range of matters to render unshakeable every belief she has.¹⁷

The Stoic commitment to this norm of coherence is clear from their embrace of its consequences. So, first, like their hero Socrates, they deny that they are wise. Instead of pointing to human sages, they point to humans who have made progress, and they affirm that the sage is "rarer than the Phoenix."¹⁸ Additionally, the holistic conception of knowledge suggests that any person who does attain wisdom might fail to notice. After all, one achieves knowledge when one acquires a final, network-confirming true belief or eliminates a last false belief, and it is difficult to know that the belief one is acquiring or purging is the last belief that needs to be acquired or purged. But the Stoics embrace this strange result, too, and it is hard to see why they should not.¹⁹ But the most striking and difficult consequence of the Stoics' epistemological holism is the sharp distinction between sages and non-sages. According to a Stoic, all non-sages are vicious because they do not have coherent systems of beliefs. Some have more true beliefs than others, or inferentially richer sets of true beliefs. But all who are unwise are fundamentally in the same situation: because they all lack perfectly coherent beliefs, they lack virtue and goodness, and all of their judgments are weak

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¹⁷ I do not suggest that the sage can get by with scant knowledge. The Stoics think that coherence requires a full range of philosophical beliefs: they treat the various parts of philosophical discourse—about reason ("logic"), nature ("physics"), and character ("ethics")—as subject matter of distinct virtues, and they treat all virtues as one. For the former point, see Philo SVF 2.95, DL VII 46-47, DL VII 92, Fin III 72-73, and Andronicus SVF 3.267, with Ierodiakonou, "The Stoic Division of Philosophy." For the latter, see DL VII 125-126; Stobaeus II 7.5b5 63,6-25; and Schofield, "Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue."

¹⁸ For the connection to Socrates, see my "Socrates in the Stoa;" for the phoenix, see Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 28 199,18 Bruns and Seneca, Ep 42.1; for Chrysippus' denial that he is a sage, see Plutarch, Stoic rep 1048e and Diogenianus ap. Eusebius, Praep ev VI 8.8-24; for full discussion, see Brouwer, "Sagehood and the Stoics."

¹⁹ See Stobaeus II 7.11n 113,12-16; Plutarch, Comm not 1063bc; Philo SVF 3.541.
and shakable. As Cicero's Cato expresses the point, some of the vicious may be closer to the surface of the water, but all are drowning.\textsuperscript{20}

According to this picture of the Stoic psychological norm, a particular belief can be defective in one of two ways. It might be false, but it might be defective though it is true because it is not stable and unshakeable. In other words, a belief might be defective in and of itself, or because of the larger network of beliefs in which it is situated. Consider, for example, erotic love (\textit{\epsilonρως}). For both the fool and the sage (T3), "love is an attempt at making a friend on account of manifest beauty."\textsuperscript{21} The fool experiences this love as a passion, an appetite.\textsuperscript{22} The sage, on the other hand, experiences it as knowledge.\textsuperscript{23} It is plausible that the fool and the sage assent to the same proposition about making friends with a beauty, although they assent to it differently. One might easily explain the difference in terms of other propositions concerning which the fool and the sage disagree. Does the fool identify beauty as the potential for virtue, as the sage does?\textsuperscript{24} Does the fool want as his friend a sex partner, or does he, like the sage, want a virtuous, platonic friend?\textsuperscript{25} And does the fool notice, as the sage does, that erotic love gives way to the love of friendship once one succeeds in making one's beloved a friend?\textsuperscript{26} Most fools experience love passionately because they err


\textsuperscript{21} \textit{\epsilonρως} ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφασίσθησαν. So say Stobaeus II 7.10c 91,15-16 and DL VII 113, in lists of passions, and Stobaeus II 7.11s 115,1-2, Diogenes Laertius VII 130, and Cicero, \textit{Tusc} IV 72, in an account of the sage's love. For explicit acknowledgement that the definition of love applies to what both sages and fools experience, see Stobaeus II 7.5b9 66,9-13.

\textsuperscript{22} Both Stobaeus II 7.10c 91, 15-16 and DL VII 113 treat love as one species of appetite.

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Stobaeus II 7.5b9 66,6-9.

\textsuperscript{24} See DL VII 129-130, and Stobaeus II 7.5b9 66,6-8 and II 7.11s 115,2-4 .

\textsuperscript{25} See DL VII 130 (cf. Stobaeus II 7.5b9 66,6-8), with the Stoic insistence that only the virtuous are friends: Stobaeus II 7.11m 108,5-25; DL VII 33; DL VII 124; Seneca, \textit{Ep} 81.12; Philo \textit{SVF} 3.634; Cicero, \textit{Nat} \textit{D} I 121; Clement \textit{SVF} 1.223.

\textsuperscript{26} See Plutarch, \textit{Comm} not 1073a and Paradoxically 1058a.
in one or more of these particulars. But even if the fool copies the sage in all of these particulars, there is some weakness in the way that the fool loves, because the fool's love, unlike the sage's, is not secured by a perfectly coherent set of commitments.\textsuperscript{27}

3. The Content of Passionate Judgments

Against this background, the first question about Chrysippean account of passions as judgments comes into focus. Does a passionate judgment have as its content some evaluative proposition, or is one's judgment passionate because of the way in which one assents to a non-evaluative proposition?

Michael Frede has argued for the second of these. He points to evidence (T4) that the Academic Arcesilaus criticized the Stoics for saying that one assents to an impression instead of saying that one assents to the propositional content of the impression (Sextus M VII 154). Frede then defends what Arcesilaus appears to represent as the Stoic position. After all, "one and the same proposition that \( p \) can be thought in many different ways, and hence the thought, or the impression, that \( p \) will differ correspondingly, depending on the way in which it is thought that \( p \)."\textsuperscript{28} Frede finds more support for his interpretation of the Stoic position by appealing to the distinction between clear and distinct impressions, on the one hand, and obscure and confused ones, on the other. "The difference between these two kinds of impressions is not a difference in propositional content."\textsuperscript{29} So, Frede supposes, two people can both judge that Socrates is dying, while only one judges this in such a way as to fear Socrates' death.

\textsuperscript{27} For further discussion of the Stoic account of erotic love in general, see Nussbaum, "Eros and the Wise," Inwood, "Why do Fools Fall in Love?" and Gaca, "Early Stoic Eros."

\textsuperscript{28} Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of Affections of the Soul," 104.

\textsuperscript{29} Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of Affections of the Soul," 104.
Frede surely captures one way to theorize emotions as propositional attitudes. Moreover, the picture of passions as defects relative to the psychological norm of coherence welcomes Frede's thought that a judgment can be passionate because of the way in which one forms it. But do the Stoics really believe that passionate judgments do not have evaluative content?

The first thing to notice is that Frede's evidence fails to show this. Archesilaus' skeptical argument does not even establish that Stoic assent is to an impression instead of the propositional content of the impression. In T4, he charges that "if the katalopsis is assent to a katalaptic impression, then katalopsis is non-existent" since "assent is not to an impression but to rational content [λόγον] (for assents are to propositions)." But Archesilaus' modus ponens could well be the Stoic's modus tollens. Chrysippus might say that because assent is to the proposition and katalopsis does exist, katalopsis is not, strictly speaking, assent to a katalaptic impression.30

Moreover, one can easily explain how Archesilaus could have come to launch such an argument against the Stoics. All it takes is a Stoic shortcut, a willingness to say that a human assents to the impression when one means, strictly speaking, that a human assents to the propositional content of the impression. A sympathetic reader would not miss the point of the shortcut, but the Academic skeptic is no sympathetic reader. Archesilaus can play the shortcut against the technical doctrine to make it seem as though the Stoics have no coherent position. If this best explains Archesilaus' argument—and it is at least as plausible as Frede's reading, independent of the rest of the evidence—then no one should take the shortcut or Archesilaus' polemical use of it to represent any Stoic's considered view. What clinches this reading of Archesilaus' argument is independent evidence (T5) that assent is given to the proposition (Stobaeus II 7.9b 88,4).

30 Cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 57.
Frede's other piece of evidence, concerning the distinction between clear and distinct impressions and obscure and confused ones, is fine so far as it goes, but it does not show that the Stoics would explain passionate judgments without assuming evaluative content. The Stoics think that to explain our apprehension of the world, we must suppose that one and the same proposition can be thought clearly and distinctly or obscurely and confusedly. Why must they also think that to explain our passions, we must suppose that one and the same proposition can always be thought fearfully or calmly? That a theorist makes use of some differences in how a given proposition is thought does not require that he use every possible difference in how a given proposition is thought. He might well insist that some differences between two human thoughts are better explained by reference to divergent propositional content than by reference to various ways of thinking of one and the same proposition.\(^{31}\)

In fact, the evidence quite clearly records that Chrysippus did exactly that. The Stoics recognize four primary passions, appetite, fear, pleasure, and distress. We have Chrysippus' definitions of three of these, which reveal the content of the passionate judgment. According to Galen (\textit{T6}), Chrysippus "completely abandons the ancients' opinions in the definitions of the generic passions that he has given first, since he defines distress as a fresh belief that bad is present, fear as an expectation of bad, and pleasure as a fresh belief that good is present."\(^{32}\) On the assumption that the fourth generic passion, appetite, parallels fear, it would be the expectation of good.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) Cf. Brennan, "The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions," 46. He also distinguishes between the case of clarity vs. obscurity and the case of, e.g., fear vs. calm. But he invokes truth-value to do so, and that is a mistake (see §3 below).

\(^{32}\) Galen, \textit{PHP} IV 2.1. I discuss the corresponding evidence of Andronicus, \textit{Περὶ Παθῶν} 1 (SVF 3.391), Cicero, \textit{Tusc} IV 14-15, and Stobaeus II 7.10b 90,7-18 below.

\(^{33}\) This conjecture is supported by the definition of \textit{libido} at Cicero, \textit{Tusc} IV 14. Galen himself does not give Chrysippus' definition of appetite because he prefers to infer a
Chrysippus goes beyond recognizing some examples of passions as judgments with evaluative content. If this were all he did, one might suppose that some passionate judgments have evaluative propositional content whereas others do not. But these are definitions of the generic passions. All other passions are species of one of these four, and so partly defined in terms of these four. On this evidence, then, every passion must be definable at least in part as a judgment that something good or bad for me is present or potential. Additional evidence considered below will make it clear that this is not all there is to a Chrysippean passion, but it will not in any way undermine the suggestion that the core of the Chrysippean passion is a judgment with evaluative content.

4. The Defect of Passionate Judgments

The first complication enters with the question about how a passionate judgment is defective. The standard view is that passionate judgments are

definition that appears self-contradictory. He reports that Chrysippus defined desire (δειδεικτικός) as "rational impulse for something that pleases to the extent that it should" (PHP IV 2.4). But desire comprises the species well-reasoned desire (βούλητικος or "wish") and irrational desire (ἐπιθυμία or "appetite"). So Galen draws an inference (PHP IV 4.2):

"Having defined appetite as irrational desire in the first book of On Passions, he [viz., Chrysippus] says again in the sixth of his generic definitions that desire itself is a rational impulse for something that pleases to the extent that it should, and he defines it this way also in his books On Impulse. The result is that the definition of appetite, expanded, becomes something of this sort: appetite is an irrational rational impulse for something that pleases to the extent that it should." Galen polemically confuses two senses of 'rational'. When Chrysippus calls desire a rational impulse, he means that it belongs to rational creatures and not to non-rational ones (see, e.g., Stobaeus II 7.9 86,20-87,2); when he says that appetite is irrational, he means that it is contrary to reason (see Stobaeus II 7.10a 89,4-5).

34 This is the emended version of Frede's thesis that Brennan cannot quite rule out ("The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions," 49), though he finds "little attraction in it" (52).

35 It is not hard to imagine that Galen gives truncated versions of the definitions to serve his polemical purposes. He wants to drive a wedge between Zeno and Chrysippus, and the truncated definitions make it mysterious how a Chrysippean passion could identical to the impulses that Zeno characterized as passions. See section §5 below.
defective insofar as they are false. On this view, a passionate judgment takes something that is strictly speaking indifferent to a human being's success in life as though it were not, as though it were good or bad. It is easy to identify a mistaken passion this way. Imagine that I am grieving for my lost parka. It seems plausible that I am wrong to think it bad to have lost it, plausible that I attribute value to the parka that it does not in fact have for me. But the Stoics have an austere theory of value. On their view, only virtue, strictly speaking, is good for me because only virtue, strictly speaking, benefits. The Stoics allow that virtuous actions, insofar as they are particular dispositions of virtue, and virtuous persons and collections of virtuous persons are also good. But to consider anything else good or bad would be a mistake. So if I treasure a relationship with a relative and grieve at his or her death, I judge falsely.

Given their austere theory of value, it is clear that the Stoics could explain most everyday passions as false judgments. But it is equally clear that they cannot explain them all this way. In T7, Cicero records a clear case of a true passionate judgment: Alcibiades feels distress (aegritudo) at

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36 Even scholars who know better give this answer. Compare Brennan, "The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions," 48-51, with Brennan, "The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions," 31. The former passage does an excellent job explaining what is wrong with the latter, and includes a fine discussion of Tuscan Disputations III 77-78. For a reasonable apology, see Brennan, "Stoic Moral Psychology," 290.

37 For three senses of 'good', see Stobaeus II 7.5d 69,17-70,3; Sextus M XI 25-26; and the textually problematic DL VII 94. In the primary, causal sense, good is that from which or by which (ἀφ’ οὖ ἢ ἐφ’ οὖ) benefiting results; the second sense is that in accordance with which (καθ’ ὁ) benefiting results; and the third is that 'such as' (οἷον) to benefit. Only virtue is good in the first sense (the disposition of the [physical] mind); virtuous actions (the particularly disposed [physical] mind) are good in the second sense; and third is the sense in which virtuous persons and collections of persons (e.g., a city properly denominated) are good. The Stoics distinguish between bodies (e.g., a virtuous mind-brain) and incorporeals such as "sayables," including propositions and predicates (e.g., actions), and this distinction explains the claim that virtuous actions (honeste facta at Cicero, Fin III 21) are not, strictly speaking, good. The Stoics believe that goods must be corporeal because goods must benefit, benefiting is a kind of causing, and only bodies are causes. (For the fullest discussion of these points, see Seneca, Ep 117.) For fuller discussion of these distinctions, see Menn, "The Stoic Theory of Categories."
his vice and desires to be made virtuous by Socrates (Tusc III 77-78).
There is no mistake here. Alcibiades is vicious, his vice is bad for him, and it
would be good for him to become virtuous. Cicero has a special agenda in
introducing this example. He considers the therapy that different
philosophers would recommend for Alcibiades, and he prefers the
Chrysippian therapy that depends, or so he would have us believe, on a
more complicated theory of the passions than the Stoic Cleanthes' less
effective therapy does. I return to this agenda in the next section. For now,
it is enough to notice that Cicero gives every indication that both Cleanthes
and Chrysippus would recognize Alcibiades' distress and desire as passions
in need of therapy. Indeed, how could they not? Alcibiades is in tears,
imploring Socrates to give him virtue. In his distress, Alcibiades is clutching
at counter-productive thoughts about how he might become virtuous, hoping
that Socrates might simply implant virtue in him. His distress inhibits his
progress toward virtue.38

As soon as one asks about the Stoic response to it and looks back at
the Stoic account of distress, one realizes that the Stoics do not, in fact,
define passions as false judgments. Where they are explicit, they
characterize the judgment as weak, not false. So say Cicero—"The
judgment that we have included in all the above definitions they want to be
weak assent" (T8: Cicero, Tusc IV 15)—and Stobaeus—"In all the passions

38 Erotic love (see §2 above) might be another example of a passion in which the core
judgment is true. It is clear that for both the sage and the fool, erotic love is an
"attempt" (ἐπιθυμία), and that an "attempt" is defined as an "impulse before an impulse"
(Stobaeus II 7.9a 87,18). But it is far from clear what the propositional content of the
impulsive impression to which one assents when one experiences love would be. Also
unclear is whether and how this impulsive judgment relates to an evaluative judgment
of the form "something good or bad for me is present or potential." For some
speculation, see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 232-233.
of the soul, when they say that they are beliefs, 'belief' is used instead of weak supposition" (T9: Stobaeus II 7.10 88,22-89,2).39

This should not at all be surprising. The passions are flaws relative to the norm of psychological coherence. Since the most salient feature of this norm is the stability of one's commitments, the most salient defect should be their instability. As T10 puts it, "The sage supposes nothing weakly, but rather securely and firmly" (Stobaeus II 7.11m 112,1-2).

5. Passionate Judgments and Passionate Impulses

Thus far, then, Chrysippus holds that a passion is a weak judgment that something good or bad for one is present or potential. More complications now enter when one tries to relate this account to the other canonical Stoic definitions of passions as impulses. Consider T11: "They say that passion is an impulse that is excessive and disobedient to reason's choice, or it is a motion of the soul that is irrational and contrary to nature" (Stobaeus II 7.10 88,8-10). This text gives two definitions, but they come to the same thing because an impulse just is a motion of the soul (Stobaeus II 7.9 86,19). My fourth question concerns the ways in which these definitions consider passions to be problematic. First, though, my third question asks for clarification of how these definitions in terms of impulse relate to Chrysippus' account in terms of judgment.

39 "For [the Stoics say] that there are two kinds of belief (δόξας), assent to the incognitive and weak supposition" (Stobaeus II 7.11m 112,2-4). The latter sort of belief is assumed in passions, and it is not necessarily false. (It is true that the sage is free of belief (Stobaeus II 7.11m 112,2), but this does not impugn belief as false. It is enough that belief be weak, for "the sage supposes nothing weakly, but rather securely and firmly" (Stobaeus II 7.11m 112,1-2). It is also true that ignorance is changeable and weak assent (Stobaeus II 7.11m 111,20-21), which would suggest that all belief is ignorance. But this just reflects the broad way in which the Stoics talk of ignorance to describe any state of mind short of their norm of psychological coherence. Even when the fool is assenting to a cognitive impression, he is ignorant.) The distinction between two kinds of belief noted by Stobaeus is not always appreciated. Cf., e.g., Sextus, M VII 151: "Belief is weak and false assent."
There is some hope that the impulse-definitions might not just come to the same thing as each other but also come to the same thing as the judgment-definition, since impulses are also judgments (Stobaeus II 7.9b 88,1). But the trouble is that Chrysippus' definition makes a passion out to be a weak judgment that something good or bad for me is present or potential. An impulse, on the other hand, must be a judgment that some action is appropriate, reasonable, to be done, or such, for the impulse itself is to the action-predicate contained in the proposition to which the impulse's assent attaches (Stobaeus II 7.9b 88,2-6). In other words, Chrysippus makes the passion a simple evaluative judgment, which is not well-suited to be an impulsive judgment.

This might suggest that there is an unbridgeable difference between Chrysippus' definition of passions as evaluative judgments and the account of passions as impulses. Another text, T12, attributes the latter to the founding Stoic: "Passion itself, according to Zeno, is a motion of the soul that is irrational and contrary to nature or an excessive impulse" (DL VII 110; cf. Cicero, Tusc IV 11). This suggests one possible answer to my third question: Zeno and Chrysippus offer different definitions of passion.

But this will not do, at least not exactly like that. For Galen reports that Chrysippus also defines the passions in terms of impulses (T13): "Defining distress, he also says that it is a lessening at what is thought to be something to avoid, and defining pleasure, he says that it is a swelling at what is thought to be something to choose" (Galen, PHP IV 2.5). Galen charges Chrysippus with inconsistency. On his view, Chrysippus sometimes sticks to his innovative account of passions as evaluative judgments, and sometimes reverts to Zeno's incompatible account of them as impulses.

But other sources report the judgment-definitions and the impulse-definitions as if they were compatible (see, e.g., DL VII 110-111 and Stobaeus II 7.10 88,8-89,3). This encourages the thought that passions
might be both judgments and impulses, and this would be the case if each passion should consist of both a simple evaluative judgment of the form "something good or bad for me is present or potential" and an impulsive judgment.

Much of the evidence supports this picture. Consider, for example, the following definitions of the generic passions. First, as preserved by Andronicus, *On Passions* 1 (T14):

 Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh belief that something bad is present, at which people think one should contract.  
 Fear is an irrational shrinking, or avoidance of an expected terrible thing.  
 Appetite is irrational desire, or pursuit of an expected good.  
 Pleasure is irrational expansion, or a fresh belief that a good is present, at which people think one should expand.

Second, from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (IV 14, T15):

 Distress is a fresh belief that something bad is present, in which it seems right to be depressed and contracted in one's mind;  
 pleasure is a fresh belief that a good is present, in which it seems right to be elevated;  
 fear is a belief that something bad is imminent, an evil which seems to be intolerable;  
 appetite is a belief that a good is a prospect, a good which it would be useful to have present here and now.

Finally, from Stobaeus' account of Stoic ethics, which unfortunately is too textually corrupt to give us independently valuable formulations of appetite and pleasure (II 7.10b 90,7-18, T16):

 They say that fear is a shrinking that is disobedient to reason, and its cause is believing that something bad approaches when the belief has
the stimulation and freshness that it [viz., the bad thing] is really worth avoiding.
And they say that distress is a contraction of the soul that is disobedient to reason, and its cause is thinking freshly that something bad is present, at which it is appropriate <to contract>.
If we first abstract from the differences, these texts explain how each passion can be characterized either as an impulse or as a judgment. The judgment these texts identify is a complex belief that something good or bad is present or imminent, on the one hand, and that it is appropriate to respond in a certain way, on the other. That is, the judgment consists of both a simple evaluative judgment and an impulsive judgment. But the impulsive judgment endorses a particular way of reacting that just is the movement defined as the passionate impulse. So one half of the complex judgment is closely joined to the impulse. More than closely joined, in fact, if we recall that impulses are assents. One half of the complex judgment is the same as the impulse.

But this harmonization occurs at some level of abstraction, and there remain some difficulties in the details. Worse, and first, there remains a large question for the abstract harmonization: what is the relation between the simple evaluative judgment and the impulsive judgment? Richard Sorabji has worked out an especially clear answer to this question.40 On his view, the two judgments are entirely separable. One can have the evaluative judgment without the impulsive judgment, and if one does so, then one is free of the relevant passion. I dub this the molecular view of passionate judgment: a passion is a molecular compound of an evaluative judgment and an impulsive judgment, and the passion can be dissolved by

40 Emotion and Peace of Mind, esp. 32-33. See, too, Graver, Cicero on the Emotions, 90-94 with appendix C. Graver takes Tusc III 61 ad fin. and 68-70 to be especially telling. These passages do, I agree, suggest the molecular view, but I do not think that they accurately reflect Chrysippus’ views. Rather, they are Ciceronian flourishes, and they misunderstand the Chrysippean theory he is working with.
severing the impulsive judgment from the evaluative judgment. Opposed to this is the atomic view of passionate judgment, according to which a passion is an atomic compound of a simple evaluative judgment and an impulsive judgment, by which I mean that the evaluative judgment cannot be separated from some impulsive judgment or other. I want to split the difference. On my view, a fresh evaluative judgment necessarily contains some impulsive judgment or other—though the content of this impulsive judgment is not fixed by the content of the evaluative judgment. So freshness makes the compound atomic. But the molecular view is correct insofar as we are talking about non-fresh evaluative judgments.

Sorabji gives several reasons why a Chrysippean passion must be defined in terms of two judgments instead of just one. Not all of them are supposed to establish the molecular view. One of them, for example, simply notes that if the passion is supposed to be an impulse and judgment, it must be in part an impulsive judgment.\(^{41}\) Another mistakenly asserts that there must be an impulsive judgment because the evaluative judgment can be true and the passion's judgments as a whole must be false.\(^{42}\) But two of Sorabji's arguments might be taken to establish that the impulsive and evaluative judgments form a molecular compound.

First, he argues that the impulsive judgment must be a separable part of the passion because it is the main thing attacked in some Chrysippean therapy.\(^{43}\) Some Chrysippean therapy aims to reduce, say, one's wailing over a lost parka, by targeting the judgment that it is appropriate to mourn a lost parka and not the judgment that it is bad to have lost a parka. I do not contest the observation about Chrysippean therapy. But I do not see where Chrysippus assumes that such therapy suffices to eliminate the


\(^{42}\) Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 32.

passion. Might he not think that this therapy merely lessens the passion without eliminating it?

Sorabji's other important argument draws on evidence that suggests exactly this. The crucial text is T17 (Galen, PHP IV 7.12-14):

Chrysippus also testifies in Book Two of On Passions that passions soften in time even though the beliefs remain that something evil has happened to them, when he writes thus: "One might inquire also about the lessening of distress, how it happens, whether with change in some belief or with all the beliefs continuing, and why this will be."

Then, proceeding, he says, "I think belief of this sort remains, that the actually present thing is bad, but when it grows older, the contraction and, as I believe, the impulse to the contraction lessen."

Sorabji takes Chrysippus to say that the passion ("the contraction") fades only when the impulsive judgment ("the impulse to the contraction") changes. This, I think, is right. Moreover, it establishes something important about Chrysippus' approach to the passions. The problem of one's passions is a global problem about one's psychology: so long as one is not a sage, all of one's judgments of good and bad are passions. This poses an obvious difficulty for anyone who would like to live as a Stoic, without passion: there is just too much work to be done. There is a pragmatic problem about how to go about doing this work. Chrysippus responds by recommending that the most disruptive passions be lessened, to make easier the project of eventually eliminating them by eliminating one's false beliefs and firming up one's true ones. This procedure, as Cicero sees with reference to Alcibiades' distress (Tusc III 77-78), is far more likely to succeed than Cleanthens' flat-footed insistence that a person in distress

44 The lines that follow are important as well, though they are not part of Sorabji's case. Contrast Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 149, and Long and Sedley 650.

simply surrender the passionate evaluative judgment. Compare the procedures one might use to help a child who is upset about some trivial matter. One might say, "Oh, that's not important." Or one might say, "Oh, I am sorry about that, but there is no use to getting upset about it now."

Notice that Chrysippus' commitment to this sort of therapy provides no support for the molecular view. In T17, Chrysippus does not explain how emotions disappear while their evaluative judgments remain (as he should if the impulse-judgment were separable from the value-judgment); rather, he explains how emotions lessen (ἀνέσεως).

But Sorabji has more to say about T17. He also contrasts Chrysippus' account here with the view that the passion fades when the evaluative judgment ("belief of this sort") loses freshness. This, I think, is not right. Although Chrysippus does not here tie the change in the impulsive judgment to a loss of freshness in the evaluative judgment, there is solid evidence that he would do so. First, Chrysippus himself defines passions in terms of fresh opinions (Galen PHP IV 2.1; Cicero Tusc. IV 14). Second, there is strong evidence linking the 'freshness' of an evaluative judgment with the stimulation of impulse (T18: Stobaeus II 7.10 88,22-89,3): "In all the passions of the soul, when they say that they are beliefs... 'fresh' is said instead of 'stimulative of irrational contraction or expansion'." Finally, T17 itself hints that change in the impulsive judgment is tied to a loss of freshness in the evaluative judgment: Chrysippus notes that the impulsive judgment lessens when the evaluative judgment "grows older."

As I understand the appeal to freshness, Chrysippus is not making a merely chronological point. Rather, to judge freshly that something good or bad for me is present or potential is, in addition to judging that it is bad, to think that some reaction to this good or bad thing is appropriate. Which

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47 *Resurrecting Frede*s move here: make it more explicit.*
reaction I take to be appropriate will depend on my dispositions, of course. We do not all behave exactly alike when pleased or grieving, and we can condition ourselves to behave differently in response to passionate evaluative judgments. But in no case can one make a fresh judgment that something is good or bad for one without making an impulsive judgment of some sort. Having an impulsive judgment is just part of what it is to make a fresh judgment that something is good or bad for one.48

Such, then, goes my answer to the third question, based on a happy abstraction from the details of T14, T15, and T16. Does this answer survive the rough and tumble of the details? There are two main worries I can see. First, Andronicus and Cicero define distress and pleasure but not fear and appetite as fresh beliefs. One might infer that freshness cannot apply to fear and appetite, and one might then worry that this sinks my proposal that the judgments relate atomically if and only if the evaluative judgment is fresh.

Brad Inwood has in fact argued that only distress and pleasure are defined as fresh beliefs.49 He cites (T18: Stobaeus II 7.10 88,22-89,3): "In all the passions of the soul, when they say that they are beliefs... 'fresh' is said instead of 'stimulative of irrational contraction or expansion'." Then he notes that contraction and expansion define distress and pleasure, respectively. This secures, he says, the reason why the sources do not report that fear and appetite are fresh beliefs.

This, I think, moves too quickly. T16 does in fact attribute freshness to a belief that defines fear. Moreover, that report closely links freshness

48 I here agree with Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 146-155, esp. 150-151. Nussbaum misses the significance of Stobaeus II 7.10 89,2-3 when she rejects Inwood's view (Therapy of Desire 383n59), and she insists that "the proposition that it is appropriate to be upset... is really a part of the evaluative content of the main proposition" (ibid., cf. 377). This might suggest an atomic view, though the more usual impression she gives is that Chrysippus defines a passion as an evaluative judgment merely.

49 Ethics and Human Action, 146-147.
with the power to stimulate impulse, and so its use of freshness seems appropriate. Why, then, don't more sources record that fear and appetite are fresh beliefs that something good or bad is a prospect for me? The first point to realize is that the term fresh is simply an expository convenience. Instead of saying at length that a given belief stimulates an impulsive judgment and impulse, one can say simply that it is fresh. (It is true that Andronicus in T14 and Cicero in T15 do not take advantage of this convenience, but notice Galen in T6.) So the question is, why do the Stoics not often use this term of convenience with pleasure and distress but not with appetite and fear? Well, first, it is not obvious that they do not: we are stuck with the evidence that we have. But more important, notice that the need to tie the evaluative judgment to impulse is more pressing in the cases of pleasure and distress than in the cases of appetite and fear. Appetite and fear have, as it were, a limited shelf-life. They are directed toward future things, and once those future states of affairs are no longer future, one cannot be afflicted with further appetite or fear. Of course, some future states of affairs never recede to one's past—one's death, for example. But speaking generally, appetite and fear are timed to expire. Pleasure and distress, by contrast, are directed at present things, and so are not defined by any time limit. So it might seem plausible to assume the tight connection between judgments of potential good or bad and impulse without assuming such a tight connection between judgments of present good or bad and impulse.

The second sticky detail of T14, T15, and T16 is this. Stobaeus suggests that the account of passions as impulses and the account of passions as judgments are quite different, since the judgments are the causes of the impulses. (Stobaeus is not alone in this. Just before T15,

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50 I owe the way of putting the point to Candace Vogler, I believe. As I recall, she wanted to make the point that relatively few interesting desires have a limited shelf-life. This gives me pause.
Cicero turns from his discussion of passions as impulses to his discussion of them as judgments by saying (T18) that "they [viz., the Stoics] think that all passions occur by judgment and belief." Does this threaten the harmonization of Chrysippus' account of passions with the definition of passions as impulses?

Now, it is indisputably true that a cause cannot be precisely identical with its effect on any account of causation. But the Stoics do not suppose, as a Humean would, that a cause and its effect must be too temporally distinct events. On the Stoic account, a cause must be a body and an effect must be a predicate that obtains at a body. T16, it is true, has predicates—'thinking'—as causes. But this is a blemish brought on by shorthand. The Stoic's point can be understood in this way: when a person thinks, his mind-brain is particularly disposed, and this particularly disposed mind-brain is a body that causes certain predicates to obtain, including the predicate 'believing'. When I believe that something good is present at which it is appropriate to swell, my particularly disposed mind-brain also causes swelling to obtain in my soul. The swelling, on this account, does not follow my belief. My soul swells at every moment that my mind is particularly disposed in such a way that I might be said to believe that something good is present at which it is appropriate to swell. So understood, T16's talk of the belief causing the impulse is no threat to T14-T15's treatment of the belief and the impulse as two ways of characterizing the same thing. What T16 and T18 add is only that the judgment-analysis goes deeper by capturing the causal root of the whole passion-event.

I conclude, then, that Chrysippus' judgment-account of passions harmonizes with the impulse-account of passions. We can express the harmony by insisting on the importance of freshness. A passion is a weak, fresh judgment that something good or bad for me is present or potential.
6. The Problem with Passions

What is so bad about such judgments? In T11, passions are characterized as excessive, disobedient to reason's choice, irrational, and contrary to nature." These characteristics require an explanation.

The defect of weakness, alone, does not explain any of these problems. After all, every judgment of every non-sage, which includes every belief I am expressing in this essay and every belief that occurs to you as you read it, is weak.

That passions are weak evaluative judgments is also not yet the full problem. For passions are just a subclass of the evaluative judgments one can make. One can judge, for example, that health is indifferent to one's success in life but still preferable, still generally worth going for. That is an evaluative judgment quite different from the judgment that health is good, for to judge that health is good is to judge that health is one of those things the having of which helps to make one's life a success. Success or objective happiness just is the state of enjoying the goods.51

This distinction between "cool" impulses for what one sees as indifferent but nevertheless preferable and "hot" impulses for what one sees as part of one's happiness begins to suggest what is especially wrong with

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51 I here take issue with those, including Frede, "On the Stoic Conception of the Good," esp. 75 and 92, and Cooper, "The Emotional Life of the Wise," who attribute to the Stoics the Socratic thesis that people always act for the sake of what they conceive to be good (see Plato, Gorg 467c-468e). But the Stoics do not think that all rational impulses (λογικαὶ ὁρμαί) are rational impulses for the good (ὑφέξεις) because they take rational impulses for the good (ὑφέξεις) to constitute just one species (ἐίδος) of rational impulse (Stobaeus II 7.9 87,2-3). That is why "the Stoics define the telos as that for the sake of which one appropriately does everything but which one does not do for the sake of anything else" (Stobaeus II 7.3b 46,5-7: Λέγεται δ’ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν Ἱστικῶν ὀρικῶς "τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ ἑνὲι πάντα πράττεται καθήκοντος, αὐτὸ δ’ ἐπὶ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἑνὲι.") Finally, it is worth noting that the Stoics distinguish between choosing, an impulse for the good, and selecting, an impulse for an indifferent; this distinction is difficult for Frede and Cooper to explain. For further discussion, see Brennan, "Stoic Moral Psychology," 283-290, and Kamtekar, "Good Feelings and Motivation," 222-224.
passions. In the mind of the sage, every judgment is stable and unshakeable, bound tightly by every other. In the rest of us, every judgment is weak and unstable: it is not held in bounds. Every weak impulsive judgment, then, moves without being fully controlled. Such an impulse can get away from us, so to speak. But passionate impulsive judgments are especially problematic because they have special motive force. Passionate impulses do get away from us.

This is not just my metaphor. As quoted by Galen (PHP IV 2.14-18), Chrysippus compares a non-passionate impulse, which is not excessive, with the impulse to walk, and the passionate impulse, which is excessive, with the impulse to run. Just as the runner's legs outstrip the control of his impulses to stop or change direction, the passionate person's impulses outstrip the control of his reason to stop or change or direction.  

This explains why Chrysippus would accept that passions are excessive impulses. It also explains the full sense in which passions are disobedient to reason's choice. Any weak judgment falls short of right reason, but a passionate judgment actively outstrips the power of further judgments. The Stoics' other ways of characterizing how the passions are problematic simply piggy-back on these two, for when a Stoic call passions "irrational," he means that they are "disobedient to reason" (Stobaeus II 7.10a 89,5), and

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52 I borrow the language of "hot" and "cool" impulses from Menn, "Physics as a Virtue," 12-13.

53 This motivational difference between "hot" passions in response to what we think is good or bad for us and "cool" impulses to go for what we see as merely preferable or appropriate might help to explain why Cicero occasionally makes it seem as though the Stoic passion is a judgment that something is very good or bad. (See, e.g., Tusc III 24-25 and Fin II 13.) If one were skeptical about the distinction between preferred indifferents and goods, as Cicero often is, then one might misrepresent the Stoic distinction between "cool" and "hot" impulses in this unfortunate way. (Contrast Tusc III 24.) On the other hand, Cicero might just have conflated the passions, events that depend upon the judgment that something good or bad for me is present or potential, with the infirmities that are dispositions toward passions and depend upon thinking that, e.g., money is a great good. Nussbaum (Therapy, 377-378) seems to make the latter mistake, which is not helped by one of Galen's paraphrases (at PHP IV 5.25).
when he calls them *contrary to nature*, he means that they occur contrary to right and natural reason (Stobaeus II 7.10a 89,14-16).\footnote{Add material on flutterings (Stobaeus 10, Plutarch LS 65G, and Galen LS 65T) and akrasia (Plutarch LS 65G)?}

Such are the passions that the Stoics seek to eliminate. They do not take aim at all emotional experiences, let alone all affect. Rather, they isolate certain judgments for elimination. These judgments are defective because they are weak, but they are targeted as problematic because they also have great motivational force.

On the Stoic view, so long as we are ignorant, we should minimize the damage caused by passions by retraining our impulses. The most promising therapy will work indirectly, to get us to change the way in which we judge that such-and-such is good or bad for us, so as to weaken the passion by softening the freshness of the judgment. Eventually, some of us might be able to follow Epictetus' advice (Ench 2) and give up desire for the good altogether, in favor of nothing but cool impulses for what is indifferent but preferable. This reduces our affect without eliminating it, for we still respond to certain features of the world as worth going for and others as worth avoiding.\footnote{The Stoics do not characterize the phenomenology of selecting and rejecting indifferents we might try to get or reject, nor of our attitude toward preferred indifferents we have or lack. I assume that at least the former must have an affective dimension to be remotely plausible. Brennan ("Stoic Moral Psychology," 271) assumes that the latter must be total indifference. I am less certain: is there no felt difference between the sage's attitude toward her health and her attitude toward the number of blades of grass in the town square?} But reduced affect is not the Stoic goal, for no Stoic plans to live indefinitely without a conception of the good. The goal is to reclaim desire as the stable, unshakeable judgment that action in agreement with one's knowledge is good for one. In addition to coolly affective evaluative and impulsive judgments that concern things that are indifferent but preferable or worth rejecting, the sage who realizes the Stoic goal enjoys the
correlates of passions, the "good ways of feeling" (ἐὐπάθεια) that are stable judgments that something good or bad for one is present or potential.\(^5^6\)

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