Table of Contents

Natalie Araújo, Rachel Wilson, Bronwyn Clarke and Landon Carney
The Global at Home, At Home in the Global: A study tour case study from The Belonging Project

Matthew Bannister
Nothing but time: Duration, system theory and musical creativity

Gilbert Burgh & Simone Thornton
Engagement as Dialogue: Camus, pragmatism and constructivist pedagogy
Abstract:
Study abroad and study tour opportunities have become the dominant model of intercultural exchange in Australian universities. While these initiatives can provide meaningful opportunities for the empathetic engagement with Others, the development of cosmopolitan consciousness, and multicultural identity (Paige, Fry, Stallman, Josic, & Jon, 2009; Bellamy & Weinberg, 2006; Ribeiro, 2005) for students who are able to access them, they are not unproblematic. As Waters and Brooks (2010) have noted in the UK context, these students ‘remain a highly privileged group and their experiences [may] serve only to facilitate the reproduction of their privilege.’ The fly-in, fly-out nature of these exchanges may limit the effectiveness of fully reciprocal relationships.

This paper draws on the research of The Belonging Project, a four-year longitudinal project at RMIT University that aims to support the participation and integration of students from diverse backgrounds, circumstances and cultures. Specifically it draws on qualitative research and an ethnographic case study of a course initiative between the RMIT Melbourne and RMIT Vietnam campuses. It explores low-cost possibilities for pedagogical innovation and virtual collaboration as means to develop more sustainable, equitable, and accessible intercultural opportunities.

Keywords:
pedagogy, study tour, exchange, equity, student experience
The Global at Home, At Home in the Global:
A study tour case study from The Belonging Project

Over the past twenty years, Australian universities have increasingly turned their attention toward globalization of the curriculum and internationalization of the student experience. During this same period, study abroad and study tours have become the dominant model of intercultural exchange. While these programs can provide meaningful opportunities for the empathetic engagement with cultural Others, the development of cosmopolitan consciousness, and multicultural identity (Paige, Fry, Stallman, Josic, & Jon, 2009; Bellamy & Weinberg, 2006; Ribeiro, 2005) for students who are able to access them, they are not unproblematic. As Waters and Brooks (2010) have noted in the UK context, students who are able to access study abroad opportunities ‘remain a highly privileged group and their experiences [may] serve only to facilitate the reproduction of their privilege.’ Moreover, the fly-in, fly-out nature of these exchanges may limit the effectiveness of fully reciprocal relationships. As a result, layers of privilege that replicate both socio-economic disparities within nations and the geo-political inequalities across national borders may become embedded within institutional practices.

Nonetheless, study abroad remains a key tool in the development of professional competencies in an increasingly transnational job market and in the personal development of the empathetically engaged global citizens needed to address complex real-world worlds. Paige, Fry, Stallman, Josic, and Jon’s (2009) retrospective study of the long-term impacts of study abroad on US university graduates highlights the potential impact of study abroad opportunities for those who engage in them. The study’s 6,291 respondents ranked study abroad as most significant curricular or co-curricular experience of their university lives in terms of impact on their long-term life trajectories—above peer relationship and curriculum. Other large-scale surveys of the sustained impact of study abroad have yielded similar results particularly with respect to the personal development of participants and their increased intercultural competency (see e.g. Kehl & Morris, 2008; Chieffo & Griffiths, 2004; Dwyer & Peters, 2004). While there is some evidence that longer exchanges yielded greater impact (Dwyer, 2004), it is increasingly recognized that even short-term study tours offer students considerable benefits. They may increase capacity for intercultural awareness, improve intercultural communication skills and offer practical benefits in the form of extended international networks (Cooper, 2009; Williams, 2005). Notably, short term ‘study tours’ are also more likely to involve intercultural exchange between staff members. For this reason, they are more likely to support professional development of educators and, by extension, more extensive internationalization of the curricula (Festervand & Tillery, 2001; Hutchins, 1996).
Given both the transformative potential of intercultural exchange and the barriers to diversity within this context, a critical question for higher education institutions is how best to increase access and equity within study abroad opportunities. An important corollary is the challenge of reducing power imbalances where possible. This paper draws on a 2014 pilot initiative of The Belonging Project, a longitudinal project based at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, which attempted to address these issues. It focuses a curricular initiative undertaken as part of The Belonging Project’s research: ‘The Global at Home, At Home in the Global’. Specifically it draws on qualitative research and an ethnographic case study of a course initiative between the RMIT Melbourne and RMIT Vietnam campuses, which sought to address obstacles in institutional habitus in order to facilitate greater depth of engagement for short-term study tour participants. As part of this initiative, course-coordinators pursued opportunities for pedagogical innovation and virtual collaboration as means of developing more sustainable, equitable, and accessible intercultural opportunities for all students. We argue that while embedded bias may prove to be formidable obstacle to full reciprocity, small practical changes in the development and delivery of study tours may increase their effectiveness as tools of intercultural engagement.

**Changing Education Sectors**

The issue of equity in study abroad cannot be separated from that of access in the higher education more broadly. Australian higher education institutions have been attracting more diverse cohorts following developments in the local sector. In 2008, the Bradley Review sought to address the changing global economic environment, specifically an increasingly knowledge-based economy, by prioritizing access to education arrangements (Bradley et al. 2008, p. 88). Since that time the government has adopted strategies to ensure that a greater number of Australians become university-educated. This has occurred during a period in which the government policy has simultaneously driven a shift toward student-as-market-consumer conceptualizations of the education sector. Governmental strategies have included national targets of 20% of higher education enrolments at undergraduate level from LSES backgrounds by 2020 (Ibid, p. xiv).

A critical question for RMIT, as for similar institutions, is how best to position itself at the intersection of training and industry (Wright, Davis, Bucolo, 2013). In addition, the university must contend with how to remain diligent in upholding its philosophical and ethical imperatives as agents for social change. Like many universities, RMIT University has responded to these pressures by creating a mandate for programs ‘to foster the development of graduates as critical and
creative thinkers, multi-skilled and collaborative practitioners, and responsible leaders with a global perspective’ (School of Media and Communication Workplan, 2012). This strategic goal has spurred wide-scale curriculum redevelopment and major shifts in course delivery modes. In addition, as in the wider sector, RMIT University has increasingly emphasized the role of internationally engaged work-integrated-learning (WIL), study tours, and intercultural virtual collaboration as a means of providing spaces for the development of global awareness and globalized professional identities.

**The Belonging Project**

Emerging out of this context rapid change, The Belonging Project is a longitudinal project investigating an improved student experience in RMIT University’s School of Media and Communication. The Belonging Project as a whole aims to:

1. Develop strategies to support the participation and integration of students from diverse backgrounds, circumstances and cultures, including in particular students those from low Socio Economic Status (SES) backgrounds
2. Enhance student satisfaction and retention rates
3. Help develop and make known a distinctive RMIT student experience

In order to achieve these goals, The Belonging Project developed the Belonging Project Narrative Model (Carlin et al, 2011; Wilson et al, 2012; Morieson et al, 2013; Araujo et al, 2014). This model proposes a three-tier student experience, beginning with a strong grounding in a *diverse disciplinary cohort* (Tier One), broadening out to encompass the *interdisciplinary community of the school* (Tier Two), and grounded in a sense of belonging to a profession as an *employable and ethical global citizen* (Tier Three).
Diagram 1: The Belonging Project Narrative Model of Student Engagement

The Belonging Project Narrative Model reflects and prepares students for an employability context in which industry is shifting toward new operational standards and cultural milieus (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The model prepares students for this landscape by crafting a holistic approach to professional and personal development. In proposing such a model, The Belonging Project supports the contention that ‘future graduates in Media and Communication will need to be connected across disciplines and borders’ (Peterson & Hansen, 2012, p. 3).

In 2014, the The Belonging Project began work on the forth phase of its research, The Global at Home: At Home in the Global, an exploration of intercultural communication and global citizenship. As part of this phase of research, The Belonging Project proposed to trial and develop a peak ‘global’ experience based primarily in the student’s home campus as an alternative or adjunct to overseas study tour options. The initiative builds upon the established best practice of the global/internationalized curriculum as proposed by people such as Betty Leask (see e.g. Leask, 2008, 2009) and Michelle Barker (Ramsey, Jones, & Barker, 2007; Daly & Barker, 2005; Mak, Westwood, Ishiyama, & Barker, 1999). It had four primary aims:

1. Increase the participation of low SES students in global experiences
2. Foster a more unified perception of RMIT identity between multiple ‘home’ campuses
3. Facilitate sustained intercultural engagement for those unable to participate in long term study abroad
4. Support the development of more equitable relationships between participants

The case study utilized research practices that were primarily qualitative, ethnographically informed, and narrative based. Emerging from that research, this paper draws on participant-observation of an embedded researcher who observed and participated in the redevelopment of the existing course, the ‘Interdisciplinary Communications Project,’ and its deployment via hybridized study-tour. It also draws upon interviews with 18 of the 20 participating students, interviews and critical reflections of teaching and support staff, and the students’ formal and informal written reflections. Participants in earlier iterations of the course were also interviewed for comparative purposes.

**Interdisciplinary Communication Project**

Intercultural Communication Project is a project-driven, client-focused 12-credit point course taught in three iterations across the RMIT Melbourne and RMIT Vietnam campuses. It is semester-long course for Professional Communication students on the Vietnam campus. In addition, it is offered both as a semester-long School of Media and Communication elective on the Melbourne campus, and as a two-week study tour that brings Melbourne-based students to the Vietnam campus to work alongside Vietnam students during the Melbourne campus’ winter break. On both campuses, the course runs as a professionally-oriented learning experience for students looking to expand their real-world competencies. The course has consistently utilized a project-led structure and drawn on interdisciplinary competencies to support the development of transferable skills. In past iterations, however, focus on intercultural competencies was minimal or absent in the course structure.

In 2013, the course coordinator of the Melbourne study-tour applied for and received funding for ten AsiaBound Grants to support Melbourne-based Australian citizens to participate in the Vietnam study tour iteration of the course. The AsiaBound Grants program is an Australian government funding scheme that provides financial support to Vocational Education Training (VET) and Higher Education students who wish to participate in education opportunities in any one of 26 Asian destinations. They were introduced in 2013 as one of the government’s responses to its white paper, ‘Australia in the Asian Century,’ (October 2012) which recognized the role of Asia economies as both the world’s largest producers of goods and services and the world’s largest consumers. As Robertson and Lundbeg (2013, p. 13) note, the rise of Asia’s geo-political power has meant that, for Australia, ‘the tyranny of distance that North America and Europe once presented has been
replaced by the ‘prospects of proximity’. These small grants\(^1\) aim to facilitate students ability to become ‘Asia-literate’ so as to more fully seize upon these possibilities. As with broader shifts in the higher education sector, the AsiaBound program can be seen to at once facilitate the development of ethical global citizens (Nikolic and Gledic, 2013; Green, 2012) and shape the emergence highly specified workplace competencies to fuel the Australian economy (Universities Australia, 2014).

By securing AsiaBound Grants, the Melbourne course coordinator was presented with the opportunity to provide greater access to study abroad opportunities for socio-economically marginalized students, thereby increasing their stake in global citizenship. Moreover, she was able to seize the opportunity to reshape the course content and structure to better support the dual employability and engagement principles that inform the grants. In the case of the Interdisciplinary Communication Project study tour, this provided a space to experiment with the development of a study tour that exceeded the traditional parameters of this model of intercultural engagement.

Previous iterations of the Vietnam study tour involved limited pre-departure requirements, two weeks of collaborative work between Vietnam and Melbourne cohorts, and virtually no post-tour cross-cultural engagement. This fly-in, fly-out model is typical of many of the study abroad opportunities offered in the School of Media and Communication and is quickly becoming a dominant model in the higher education sector more broadly (Donnelley-Smith, 2009; Mills, Deviney, & Ball, 2009). While longer study abroad experiences have been associated with greater depth of engagement and a wider array of intercultural capacities, such options are not appropriate or desirable for all students. They may be especially problematic for students from Low Socio-Economic Status (SES) backgrounds who must often work to meet the ever-rising costs of education. The challenge for institutions is to shape experiences that meet the needs of multiple stakeholders. This must include those with socio-economic barriers to participation and those who may prefer intercultural ‘tasters’ and wish to primary learn in the context of their own comfort zones.

In collaboration with the Ho Chi Minh based course coordinator, the Melbourne coordinator worked to create a model of the study tour that could replicate the long-term benefits of semester abroad study options within the context of hybridized study tour and ‘at home’ experience. The first innovation in course delivery was a decision to ‘time shift’ the study tour so as to allow study tour participants to interact with their Vietnamese peers over a sustained period of time. The

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\(^1\) As of 2014, $5000 per student is available for semester programs and $2000 per student for study tours.
Melbourne campus and Vietnam campuses technically form parts of a singular institution, The Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Though operating under a common institutional framework, the campuses maintain unique contextually-shaped academic cultures and institutional habitus. Among the practical challenges to sustained collaboration were differences in time zones, academic calendars, and timetables. The Vietnam campuses operate on a trimester system, while the Melbourne campuses use semesters. This variation enabled previous study tours to operate during breaks in the Melbourne academic calendar and still enjoy interactions with Vietnamese cohort. However, it presented considerable challenges to deeper engagement. In response, in the new model, coordinators agreed to require Melbourne-based study tour participants to commit to participating in the Vietnam course delivery sequence. This was to be achieved through virtual learning and teleconferencing ‘at home’ and embodied engagement ‘abroad’ during the two-week study tour occurring during Melbourne winter holidays that corresponded to teaching weeks of the Vietnam trimester.

The coordinators recognized that Australian participants would require deep commitment to participation and willingness to actively nurture cross-cultural relationships both in Vietnam and virtually. In light of this, the students were chosen through a competitive process whereby they were asked to provide short essay answers to a series of questions related to their motivations for participating, skill sets, and pre-existing intercultural understanding and/or assumptions. Whereas many study abroad opportunities at RMIT University rank students according to academic performance (GPA), the selection committee explicitly chose to focus on the qualitative responses to the selection kit. Quantitative indicators such as GPA were relied upon only when candidates were equally ranked. Selected students were offered $2000 AsiaBound grants to offset the expenses of participation. While the grants served as an incentive for sustained participation, they were also envisioned as a means of encouraging applications from Low SES students.

Following acceptance, Melbourne students engaged in a pre-departure meeting held during the Melbourne non-teaching period. They were briefed about the course expectations and outputs and given an overview of the Vietnam context in which they would be working. In the following weeks, two ‘virtual’ classes were arranged to coincide with the Vietnam Interdisciplinary Communication Project’s normally scheduled classes. During these times, videoconferencing was used to bring together students in Vietnam and Melbourne. The course coordinators in Vietnam and Melbourne delivered the course content jointly. In these virtual sessions, students were introduced to each other, the projects on which they would be working, and their Melbourne and Vietnam industry-based clients. Importantly,
considerable time was also spent unpacking intercultural communication style, differences, and strategies.

In late June, Melbourne-based students departed to join their Ho Chi Minh based peers for Weeks 3 and 4 of the Vietnam semester. In Vietnam, they engaged in a series of ice-breakers that built-upon the virtual ice-breakers undertaken in the teleconferencing sessions. Following this, students were divided into two groups each consisting of ten members with an equal mix of Vietnam and Melbourne-based participants. The groups became the working teams for the project-based learning that unfolded over the next ten weeks. One team was assigned to work on behalf of the RMIT Melbourne Education Abroad unit to devise a campaign to boost the numbers of Melbourne-based students studying abroad on the RMIT Vietnam campuses. The second group was tasked with working on behalf of the RMIT Vietnam Global Mobility unit to launch new partnerships with four institutions in North America and Europe. During their time in Vietnam, both teams were brought together for three formal classes and required to meet each day to undertake work on the projects. These informal meetings informed assessment tasks due during those two weeks, including a client pitch and critical reflections.

Their team-based projects continued beyond the two-week study tour. After the Melbourne students returned to their campus, they continued to work in their intercultural and now transnational teams to achieve project goals and deliverables. To support their continued engagement, Melbourne and Vietnam course coordinators scheduled three further ‘virtual’ classes in addition to virtual client meetings with industry partners, and regular weekly workshop opportunities. These ensured that students on both campuses maintained contact with teammates and were supported as they continued a process of intercultural competency development.

Student Perceptions

In the course of one-on-one interviews, students from the Melbourne and Vietnam campus almost universally expressed the value of the intercultural exchange to their personal and professional development. They noted that the experience ‘helped [them] to really understand how people in other places work— the ideas, the practices, the expectations’. This was seen as important professional advantage not only for those interested in working abroad, but also for those looking for a competitive edge in their respective ‘home’ markets. The twelve-week course structure was emphasized as being particularly important to the success of the experience as a whole in that it ‘required ongoing conversations and negotiation
with the client and team members’ in ways that a two-week exchange of the kind previously employed would not.

Beyond specific project-based skills, several students from each cohort highlighted the transformative personal experiences that emerged from the study tour. One Melbourne-based student noted that she had made deep and sustainable friendships with Vietnamese peers:

I don’t see or talk to my Melbourne classmates everyday, but I have interacted with [Vietnamese peers] every day since we got back. We Skype and text and Snapchat constantly.

Three other Melbourne-based students spoke of plans to visit Vietnamese peers in coming months. In contrast, a student who had participated in the 2013 (study tour only) iteration of the same course expressed that she and her peers had developed an appreciation for Vietnam and desire to explore Asia, but not necessarily developed meaningful interpersonal relationships during their short experience.

Melbourne-based students were not the only ones to report personal gains from the experience. A Vietnam-based student shared his beliefs about the long-term value of the experience:

I definitely think it was valuable. I learned how to work with Australians. Really work with them. You know, we do things differently here, but it is good to know how they work. I think also it is good because I would like to visit one day and I feel I have friends now and support to do that.

In expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to work alongside Australian peers, the student also identified a potential limitation of the experience. After expressing his desire to visit Australia, he continued: ‘I wish we could do what they’ve done. I wish we could spend two weeks working with them in Melbourne.’ In his statement, the student drew attention to the absence of full reciprocity in the course structure. While Melbourne students had been required to engage as full members of the Vietnamese cohort through embodied and virtual engagement, they may also have disproportionately benefitted. They experienced not only an intercultural learning opportunity, but also a new and exotic locale.

While the focus on intercultural competencies early in the course had left Australian students feeling ‘prepared and confident’ in their abilities to navigate intercultural communication, this imbalance expressed itself to varying degrees throughout the
course. In one-on-one interviews, Vietnamese students noted that while the grants had created contracts for engagement for the Australian students, they were asked to meet the same high expectations but without the incentive of international travel. Moreover, while Melbourne students were able to focus exclusively on the Interdisciplinary Communication Project during the first six weeks of the course as it was undertaken in their winter break, Vietnam-based students lamented that they shouldered the same responsibilities as their Melbourne peers but with three other courses to manage. They almost universally expressed that this was ‘not fair’. One student went so far as to insist that she and her cohort had been ‘taken advantage of’ by Australian students who were experiencing a ‘great holiday’ but sometimes acted without consideration for the personal needs of their peers. Though her view was expressed more emphatically than the concerns of other Vietnamese students, it is indicative of a pervasive unease with persisting imbalances in the respective student experiences.

Once Melbourne-based students returned to their campus and began other courses, they were better able to reflect on this reality. The overwhelming majority of Melbourne students expressed an opinion that the Vietnamese peers should ‘have the same opportunity.’ Yet, some were concerned that they themselves ‘wouldn’t be able to manage’ daily meetings or ‘wouldn’t be able to be as accommodating’ as their Vietnamese hosts had been. This delayed understanding did not overcome the inequalities experienced by the Vietnam cohort, but nonetheless it speaks to increasing empathetic understandings.

Reflecting on Equitable Intercultural Engagement

The re-conceptualized Interdisciplinary Communication Project was designed to provide students from diverse backgrounds with opportunities for sustained work-integrated intercultural engagement. Viewed from the perspective of the Australian cohort, the initiative was a success. Of the ten Australian participants, six identified in interviews that without grant support they would not have been able to participate. All spoke to increased awareness of the Vietnam campus and the majority noted their transformed perceptions of Vietnam more broadly. Overall, the Melbourne-based students echoed the belief that the hybrid offering had, in the words of an interviewee, allowed for intercultural relationships to develop, ‘as organically as possible’. Still, full reciprocity and equitable intercultural engagement remained ongoing issues. Reflecting on the teaching experience the course coordinators asserted that time-shifting and prolonged engagement had resulted in overall better student experiences. However, like students, they noted that prolonging cross-cultural interactions did not completely negate the ethnocentric behaviors that had characterized earlier iterations of the subject.
It is, of course, overly ambitious to assume that any single curriculum experience can produce full intercultural competency. Intercultural awareness is developed through a spectrum of experiences that shape both ‘mindsets’ and ‘skillsets’ (Bennett, JM, 2008; Bennett, J. & Bennett, M., 2004; Bennett, M. & Adelphi, 2001). Like any learning experience, these opportunities provide basic tools for capacity building, if not full transformation. The acquisition of these capacities occurs in stops and starts. Importantly, as demonstrated by the Melbourne students growing awareness of inequities, awareness develops over time.

The study tour model trialed by The Belonging Project attempted to provide students with such a space. However, our research strongly suggests that broader reflection on the institution limits, assumptions and obstacles to equitable engagement is necessary. Too often study tours are treated as a cure-all: a one-stop answer to the development global citizens. The challenge for educational institutions and educators is to recognize that ‘study abroad in and of itself does not lead to [that] development’ (Lutterman-Aguilar & Gingerich, 2007). Meaningful intercultural learning requires purposeful design that shapes spaces not only of encounter but also of sustained reflection.

References


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Title: Nothing but time: Duration, systems theory and musical creativity

Abstract:
This paper offers a critique of the kind of intellectual frameworks typically used to explain creativity in music (for example, the kind of research questions typically asked of a student commencing a music project at postgraduate level). These questions are typically analytical, say around the conventions of a genre and how they can be used to produce new work, but they fail in my view to acknowledge creativity as a process, analytical questions being more suitable to assess a finished work, not one that hasn’t even started yet, or is in process. The conventional academic wisdom is that the “new” is a revoicing or recombining of the familiar, but in this formulation, the “new” remains essentially untheorised. I use concepts around creativity as novelty from Henri Bergson, such as duration and movement, to offer a critique of systems theories of creativity (Toynbee, McIntyre and Csikszentmihalyi) that seek to reduce the creative process to a series of “choices” between different pre-existing creative possibilities. In its place I propose a focus on novelty, duration and movement as aspects of creative process.
This paper argues that Western thought has struggled with the concept of creativity, because of its tendency to see knowledge as the discovery of eternal and changeless truths and laws about the world. However, the philosophy of Henri Bergson, partly as interpreted by Gilles Deleuze, has “transformed philosophy by posing the question of the ‘new’ instead of that of eternity” so that we can ask afresh “how are the production and appearance of something new possible?” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 3).

Traditionally creativity was explained as a mysterious force either issuing from Nature, the cosmos, a deity, or, in the case of artistic creation, from the intuitive “genius” of the human mind. More recently it has been demystified and theorised as a mechanism – ranging from materialist accounts of evolution in science to critical theoretical reflections on “art” and creativity as the product of complex cultural systems. Bergson argues that neither model is adequate, because both assume that “all is given” – ie either that there is a final cause or author, or on the other hand that the phenomena can be adequately understood as conforming to a set of laws that arise from scientific observation (Bergson, 1944, p. 45). What both accounts omit, according to Bergson, is time. Time means that all is not given, because we don’t know the future, which is both scary (because human knowledge is not absolute) and exciting, because it makes novelty possible. Rather than understanding the world in terms of fixed, eternal truths, Bergson argues that change and difference are primary, and this is one with his insistence on time, or as he calls it, duration. This is not clock time, divisible, measurable, linear, predictable, spatial, but more like time as experienced, though not reducible to experience, rather a way of linking individual consciousness to continuous, indivisible, open-ended processes of change. Bergson proposes that creativity is a fundamental life process, and that human creativity provides the best means to participate in, if not understand, it. Creativity is a differentiating movement in time.

Bergson’s philosophy is built around apparent dualisms, but dualism is his method, rather than his end point (Matthews, 1999). His concept of difference is not about variations between two terms, or how one term negates the other, rather difference is a creative force operating in time to produce multiple varieties of newness (Grosz, 2005). As we have already seen with difference, Bergson’s philosophy is based on paradoxes – for example that the only certainty is change. In paradox, logic collides with lived experience: A is not A; identity is not itself, experience taking time into account, whereas logic does not (Colie, 1966). He tends to use paradox in two ways – the first is to analyse traditional philosophical paradoxes and show how they are badly analysed composites – that they mix two different kinds of knowledge – intellectual on the one hand, and time-based, broadly experiential, or intuitive (Deleuze, 1991). This leads to the formulation of a series of paradoxes – that questions contain more than answers, that nothing is more than something, that
disorder is more than order, that the reality of a work of art precedes its possibility, that continuity and heterogeneity, or singularity and multiplicity can co-exist, and that creativity, far from being an optional add-on or culmination of experience, is in fact its fundamental generative principle.

Bergson's career in philosophy began with the explication of Zeno's paradoxes of motion, such as Achilles and the tortoise (1944, pp. 328-30). Mathematics tells us that because the space between Achilles and the tortoise is infinitely divisible, he will never overtake the tortoise. However, Bergson argues that it is mistaken to substitute the analysis of the movement for the movement itself - while space may be infinitely divisible, movement is continuous and indivisible – if you break a movement up into a series of steps, it is no longer the same movement (think of a melody). Moreover, movement takes place in time - we don't actually know when or where the movement is going to end, whereas mathematics necessarily treats the movement as complete, or at least predictable. The intellect treats movement as a series of frozen positions. So the paradox arises from the mixture of two modes of knowledge, or the attempt to explain one in terms of the other. The same argument can be applied to systems theories' attempt to explain novelty as the recombination of pre-existing elements. “If I consider parts... abstractly, I cannot understand the movement which goes from one to the other. Imagine I am starving at A and at B there is something to eat, when I have reached B and had something to eat, what has changed is not only my state, but the state of the whole which encompassed B, A and all that was between them” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 8).

The systems theory of creativity, as discussed in McIntyre (2006, 2008), Csikszentmihalyi (1988), and Toynbee (2000), sets out agents and possibilities in various fields, structures or domains and sees creativity as arising from interactions between them. I think these theories have important insights in terms of seeing creativity as a social process, as “greater” than the individual creator, and in emphasising intertextuality – the extent to which new work is a recombination or “revoicing” of existing parts. But they fail to understand the experience of creativity, or to link that experience to actual creation, to explain how novelty is possible in a field where everything is already given, for example why it gave rise to “that” work as opposed to another. It is possible to show how grass grows in terms of a complex system of interactions between seeds, soil, weather and environment. But no two blades of grass are the same and while this might be trivial in some contexts, in an artistic or cultural context, the difference, not the similarity, is what excites our interest and engagement. I will proceed by problematizing the terminology of systems theory, for example “field” and “possibility”.

McIntyre, Toynbee and Csikszentmihalyi propose that creativity is an “activity whereby products, processes and ideas are generated from antecedent conditions by the agency of someone … and the resultant novel variation is seen as a valued addition to the store of human knowledge” (McIntyre, 2006, p. 202). That is, there is an agent (presumably the artist) and structure, typically split between a formal field (in McIntyre a domain of knowledge) and a social or cultural field. In Toynbee the split is between a field of production and a field of works. Both theorists use Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to mediate between structure and agent (so that agents and structure are continually rewriting each other). Both also note that manoeuvring in the field has to do with the acquisition of cultural capital.

The question arises – how do we know something is novel? McIntyre and Csikszentmihalyi’s answer is that the field tells us so. This argument is somewhat circular – besides it could just as easily be argued (as Bourdieu does) that novelty is actually cultural capital, which isn’t really novelty at all (Bourdieu, 1996). Also, what form does this recognition take? Is it critical reception, sales (the answer surely depends somewhat on the field)? What about retrospective recognition? What is new about the works apart from the fact that they are “recognised” as such?

Nothing, according to McIntyre: “the information that goes into the creative idea existed long before the creative person arrived on the scene” (2008, p. 41). For Toynbee it is about the translation or transgression of existing work or ideas. Although arguing (correctly) that one of the advantages of the systems model is that it does not privilege the creator (creativity can start at any point in the system), nevertheless both McIntyre and Toynbee offer a model which places the creator in some kind of field from which they “choose” different possibilities, constrained and enabled by their habitus and the nature of the field itself. “Producing variations in the symbols systems, they make decisions and choices about them. The limitations on autonomous decision making are… set by the field and domain, acting as both … constraints and enabling factors” (McIntyre, 2008, p. 49). Toynbee talks similarly about the “selection of possibles”, his eventual point being that authorship is “social”, as in the example of Charles Mingus, because Mingus drew on many traditions of African American music (2000, p. 46). But clearly there is a difference between analysis of complete body of work and a creative process. One deals with a (reasonably) finished body of work, one with a process of becoming.

Field is obviously a spatial metaphor, which we fill with ideas, concepts or examples. Bergson argues that “the habit of proceeding from emptiness to fullness is the source of non-existent problems” (1965, p. 113). Rather, he argues for treating reality as a fullness from which space is extracted by an act of mind. If we are always experiencing something, the experience of nothing (or of space) is a logical impossibility, or rather it relates to the human experience of lack – “nothing” is the lack of the thing we were looking for. Or as John Cage puts it in relation to musical
experience: “there is no such thing as silence” (2011, p. 51). Perception is always interested, or, if you like, because we’re always in the field, we never see it as a distinct thing, except perhaps in retrospect. But then the creative act is already over. To put it another way, perception is action (another paradox), and this is never more true than in a creative process.

The most radical inversion is that of the possible and the real, and this is the one that relates most directly to creativity. Conventionally we think that the possible is less than, and precedes the real, which actualises or fills out possibility. But for Bergson it is the opposite way round – the reality of a creative work precedes its possibility. Like nothing, possibility is an act of mind, so it includes the real plus the mind engaging with it. Bergson imagines he is asked to predict what will occur in the field of post-war drama: “If I knew what was to be the great dramatic work of the future, I should be writing it” (1965, p. 118). The creation of a work is what makes it possible. The obvious analogy is evolution – while scientists can classify and analyse what has already occurred, they can never predict what new forms life will take in the future. And so it is, to some degree, with cultural processes as well. In McIntyre’s discussion of the Beatles’ “Yesterday” (2006) he explains how interactions of the field, domain and agents gave rise to the conditions that allowed “Yesterday” to be written. But what can never be explained is why it was that song that was written and not another. It’s always possible to explain something in retrospect, but this is to look for the mirage of the past in the present.

This argument seems pertinent to the explanation of the evolution of music scenes, the Dunedin Sound for example. There are two points here – first that many accounts often seem to cite the same kind of precedents: isolation, university town, possibly inclement weather, a lack of cultural stimulation, a few highly educated record collections, perhaps a college radio station – sounds like Dunedin... or Seattle, or Athens, Georgia... and so on (McLeay, 1994; Shuker, 1998). The second point is that if the Dunedin Sound had not been some kind post-punk alternative guitar rock but had been another genre like electronica or a ska revival, the same factors would be cited. “If the event can always be explained afterwards by an arbitrary choice of antecedent events, a completely different event could have been equally well explained in the same circumstances by another choice of antecedent – nay, by the same antecedents ... otherwise perceived” (Bergson, 1965, p. 122).

Frith similarly argues against the idea that people create music, which expresses their social conditions, emotions, culture etc. A Marxist model might show how a “base” produces a particular cultural superstructure, but “the difficult trick is to do the analysis the other way round, to show how the base produced this superstructure” (1996, p. 109). Rather than identities creating music, music creates
identities. It’s “not that social groups agree on values which are then expressed in cultural activities ... but that they only get to know themselves as a group through cultural activity, through aesthetic judgment. Music is a living of ideas” (1996, p. 111).

The idea that there is more in the possible than the real means that the analysis of the work as a series of choices always comes after creation. What appear as choices retrospectively are not primarily experienced as choices at the time. Would the same choices lead to the same work? No, because time has moved on – so the choices could not be the same because they would carry with them the weight of experience (eg of having previously made these choices). This is like trying to recreate a demo that you like because it has a distinctive quality. It never works – you have to remake it in a different way. Creativity is not a repeatable process, or rather it can be repeated – but it will be different.

Part of the problem is that the term “possibility” contains at least two different meanings, which such accounts conflate and present as one. There is possibility in the sense of “nothing hindering its realisation” – it is possible, though unlikely, that I will resign my academic position and become an ice-cream vendor next week. This is also possibility in the sense of a rational choice, where I can see different courses of action and choose one. The idea of “absence of hindrance” has been allowed to merge imperceptibly into the idea of ideal pre-existence – as if the possible was an idea or choice in my mind that I can choose to bring into full existence (Bergson, 1965, p. 121). Or that possibilities were laid in front of me, as on a table, and I chose one. Toynbee comes close to this concept when he describes the radius of creativity as an arena of possibles – about which musical agents “made particular decisions at particular moments” (2000, p. 39).

Obviously the point Toynbee wants to make is that creative action is just like any other action – it consists of an agent, operating in a series of fields or domains, selecting possibilities, constrained and enabled by habitus. And it’s certainly important to recognise that creative fields are not totally different to other spheres of human action, otherwise “some notion of the ineffable power of the artist will drift back in” (2000, p. 39). But I don’t think that creative possibility is the same as “absence of hindrance” or “rational choice”. “Potential is not ... an ability to add on to something that is” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 15). Rather it refers to a transformation. Questions of choice ultimately go back to the idea of free will, which is usually discussed in terms of the relation between agent and structure – each influence each other. Obviously the more can be known about the agent and structure the more likely we can predict what will happen, but ironically this sets us on the path of determinism – if we could know everything, it suggests, everything could be
predicted. But choice is not merely an oscillation between two possibilities. The possibilities do not actually exist - they are abstracted in mental space as fixed points, which the ego “chooses” between, but what is real according to Bergson is the evolution of the mental state, which changes constantly (after all if it did not change, how could one come to a decision?) (Bergson, 2001, pp. 175-176). Hence he sees not fixed points, but many tendencies of a “self which lives and develops by means of its very hesitations...” the continuous living activity of the self (2001, p. 176). Choice is a dynamic process.

Bergson and Deleuze see philosophy, art and science not as bodies of knowledge but as creative activities – as the creation of problems, that is the correct framing of questions, and the avoidance of false problems caused by mixing different modes of knowledge. They argue that questions, just like answers, can be true or false, and decry the standard academic model in which teachers ask questions and students answer. Rather they would apply the test of true and false to problems: “True freedom lies in a power... to constitute problems themselves” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 15). To refer to an inversion that is typical of Bergson’s thinking – problems and solutions are like possibility and reality - there is more in the problem than there is in the solution. The correct posing of the problem is the creative act.

A standard question used at my institution is “what are the techniques, conventions and practices of genre X, and how can these be used to create new work?” This kind of question clearly refers to a systems model of creativity - it implies that new work is simply a recombination or revoicing of existing elements. According to Bergson, such a problem is based on a faulty premise – the creation of novelty is taken for granted. It reifies at least two errors – “mistaking the more for the less” - reducing the creative act to a series of pre-existent possibilities (the techniques, conventions, etc.) when Bergson argues that the possibilities are created by the creative act, not the other way round. Alternatively the question contains another kind of error – what Bergson calls a badly analysed composite which arbitrarily groups together things that differ in kind. The idea of conventions and techniques is clearly spatial, that of novelty relates to duration. The new is reduced to a quantity – ie with the new work, there will be now more, where there was previously less. The new is like a brick, added to an existing pile, but there is very little in this situation that could be considered novel. Rather, creativity is a kind of movement or change that takes place in time.
References


In this paper we will explore how Albert Camus has much to offer philosophers of education. Although a number of educationalists have attempted to explicate the educational implications of Camus’ literary works (Curzon-Hobson, 2003; Denton, 1964; Gibbons, 2013; Götz, 1987; Heraud, 2013; Marshall, 2007, 2008; Oliver, 1965; Roberts, 2008, 2013; Roberts, Gibbons & Heraud, 2013; Weddington, 2007) these analyses have not attempted to extrapolate pedagogical guidelines to develop an educational framework for children’s philosophical practice in the way Matthew Lipman did from John Dewey’s philosophy of education, which informed his philosophy for children curriculum and pedagogy. To this end we offer comparisons and contrasts between Camus and the pragmatist educational discourse centred on communities of philosophical inquiry (or, more broadly, collaborative philosophical inquiry). In particular we focus on the phenomenology of inquiry, namely, that ‘inquiry must begin with a problem, question, or doubt and must aim at a solution or resolution, both of which are genuinely felt—something in which the inquirer actually has a stake’ (Gregory & Granger, 2012, p. 13). We conclude that what Camus calls lucidity has implications for the notion of reconstruction, prominent in Dewey’s thoughts on education, and central to Lipman’s focus on philosophy functioning educationally.

**Keywords:** Camus; community of inquiry; Dewey; Lipman; Peirce; pragmatism.
Charles Sanders Peirce rejected the epistemology of Descartes, as did Albert Camus. For both, there is no Cartesian dualism between human essence and the world; they reject the notion of the mind as an inner space that directly apprehends ideas, which when clearly and distinctly perceived, constitutes knowledge. In different ways, both writers have much to offer philosophers of education, albeit neither attempted to extrapolate pedagogical guidelines towards the development of a framework for educational practice or for active learning in the classroom.

Pierce was the instigator of pragmatism. Although he later separated himself from other pragmatists, calling himself a pragmaticist, he is, nonetheless, instrumental not only in the history and development of pragmatism, but in understanding the core tenets of pragmatism. Underpinning these core tenets is the pragmatist maxim; ‘a rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their “practical consequences”’ (Hookway, 2013). Peirce did not speak directly on education. However, his influence on educational theory and practice echoes loudly in the historical development of community of inquiry educational discourse. For Peirce, the scientific method encapsulates his notion of inquiry as arriving at conclusions through synthetic reasoning. He believed that the human mind straddles between doubt and belief; doubt being a state of agitation that leads to uncertainty, and belief which prompts action. Between these two states sits inquiry. It is this notion of inquiry that has been ‘adopted and developed by educational theorists of different orientations’ (Pardales & Girod, 2006, p. 299). Its philosophical origins in education can be found in the groundbreaking and progressive thoughts of John Dewey. In the 1960s, Matthew Lipman, building on Dewey, extensively developed the community of inquiry as an approach to teaching that transforms the structure of the classroom in fundamental ways.

While Camus’ writings do not explicitly address educational matters, he was an influential literary figure with wide ranging contributions, including novels, plays and short stories. These have had some impact on educationalists, and articles can be found on how his non-fictional and fictional works have bearing on educational matters (see Curzon-Hobson, 2003, 2013a, 2013b; Denton, 1964, 1967; Gibbons, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; Götz, 1987; Heraud, 2013; Marshall, 2007, 2008; Oliver, 1965; Roberts, 2008a, 2008b, 2013a, 2013b; Roberts, Gibbons & Heraud, 2013; Weddington, 2007). Typically, these articles either draw comparisons between aspects of Camus’ characters and the classroom experiences of teachers and students, or focus on the notion of the absurd relationship, which, for Camus, is located in the divorce between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints, as having potential to inform questions on the nature and purpose of education. To date, attempts to glean philosophical implications from Camus’s writings have had limited scope as they are largely predicated upon the idea that his literary works are illustrative of his philosophical concepts or that his philosophical essays can
somehow guide educational practice. Nevertheless, his philosophical insights on the human condition provide at least possible conclusions for education. Drawing on Camus’ theory of reality and the nature of moral living within that reality, David E. Denton (1964) concludes that ‘Education, in its institutional form, can justify its existence only to the extent that it implements programs for the development of lucid individuals’ (p. 99). We agree with Denton’s claim and add that this would require teachers who are both lucid and understand how to facilitate lucidity within the classroom.

From this brief introduction, two questions that have implications for educational theory and practice spring to mind: Are these two views of understanding the human capacity to create and articulate knowledge compatible? If so, do they tell us anything about the relationship between self, community and educational processes? We explore the possibility of an alignment between Camus’ starting point for philosophy, the undeniable absurdist experience in which rebellion is rooted and subsequently presents an opportunity to examine itself in order to learn how to act and the pragmatist notion of genuine doubt as the prime mover for inquiry which is directed toward easing the disarray that is a consequence of ‘recalcitrant reality’ brought about by contradictory experiential episodes. These two perspectives present different responses to the rejection of the Cartesian solution, but they align insofar as the presence of experience expressed in a particular uneasy relationship between humans and their world constitutes the starting point for phenomenological inquiry.

We determine that including Camus in the ongoing scholarly discussion on community of inquiry as pedagogy offers insights into the relationship between the nature of phenomenological inquiry and the communal processes of constructing, reconstructing and validating beliefs as educational process, which can inform the notion of active learning in the classroom, prominent in Dewey’s pedagogy of experiential learning, and central to Lipman’s focus on philosophy functioning educationally. Camus’ insights can illuminate aspects of pragmatism, notably Dewey’s ideas on practice, insofar as Camus’ response to the experience of the absurd raises questions of ‘ethics that operates outside of any appeal to the authority of philosophy’ (Lamb, 2012, p. 102). It further emphasises communicative ethics within the context of an embedded rebellion, i.e., rebellion as a lived philosophy responding to a situated narrative (Sleasman, 2011). We begin with a brief overview of Pragmatism’s contributions to the development of a theory of truth and fallibilism, and the importance of these concepts to the educational process.

**Pragmatism: Community of Inquiry as a Learning Community**
Peirce’s ideas were forged in the meeting of philosophy and science, and constituted a revolt against the absolutism of Cartesian Dualism which he saw as a reconstruct of the scholastic worldview of philosophy, namely, the appeal to the mind as an inner space capable of directly apprehending clear and distinct ideas through introspection. Peirce summed up his objections as follows:

1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.
2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church.
3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises.
4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that ‘God makes them so’ is to be regarded as an explanation. (Peirce, 1868, p. 140)

Peirce (1868) concluded that ‘without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this’ (p. 140). He contended that complete doubt cannot be a starting point, but instead, that we must begin inquiry with all the prejudices, which are ‘not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned’ (p. 140). Peirce did not believe that anyone could doubt everything simultaneously, as to act in the world requires beliefs about the world and the things we do. Any attempt at universal doubt would lead to self-deception. ‘Let us not’, he said, ‘pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (p. 141). Cartesian scepticism was a form of what Peirce referred to as ‘paper-doubt’ rather than a case of genuine doubt (Hildebrand, 1996; Johanson, 1972).

Peirce’s (1868) next criticism is that if absolute truth and certainty were to reside in individual consciousness, then we should have been convinced with reasoning, rather than require an individual test of certainty akin to that of the Cartesian maxim, which amounts to: ‘Whatever I am convinced of, is true’ (p. 141). Making individuals absolute judges of truth is tantamount to claiming that metaphysics has reached certainty beyond that of the physical sciences. To Peirce, for any theory of reality (i.e., metaphysics) to be reliable it requires the rigor of the scientific method, hence his stress on the importance of a community of inquirers as an active learning community.
In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (p.141)

The notion of people coming together to rigorously test ideas and hypotheses by employing an interpersonal method of arriving at results forms the basis of his notion of the community of inquiry. We can speak of knowledge, truth and reality only insofar as such concepts are grounded in the community of inquirers, and not in individual consciousness as a result of introspection (Murphy, 1990). However, Peirce did not reject a world independent of minds about which we are able to develop beliefs (Pardales & Girod, 2006). By independent reality he did not mean independent of thought per se, but that we come to know the world through ongoing engagement in the scientific method via a communal and pluralistic community of inquirers: ‘The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality’ (Peirce, 1878, p. 300). There was no doubt in Peirce’s mind that the embodiment of inquiry can be found in the scientific method, in which the community of inquirers proceeds only from tangible premises, arriving at conclusions only through synthetic reasoning. The phenomenology of inquiry is characterised by the interactions between members of the community of inquiry shifting between states of doubt, which is a state of disequilibrium or agitation leading to uncertainty, and belief, a state of equilibrium, leading to action, confidence and eventually to habit. Inquiry is the movement between doubt and belief. Reality, truth and knowledge, therefore, are identified through belief resulting from persistent, rigorous inquiry, defined by the inquiry being a rational, scientific process that, by virtue of its logic, delivers the same results in spite of the inquirer’s interests and not by the fact that we hold a belief (Smith, 1983).

Peirce believed it a necessary process to subject our prejudices to standards that were outside of our own interests, and that our thinking must be continually subjected to a community whose standards demand that we engage in self-correction and revision of our ideas as we test them in the course of our daily living. The method of scientific investigation ‘serves as an arbitrator of standards and the justification for the production of reliable knowledge’ (Pardales & Girod, 2006, p. 302). It is Peirce’s conception of the community of inquiry that has been adapted as
a model for education by Dewey and that later received extensive development as classroom pedagogy by Lipman and features as a core element in his Philosophy for Children curriculum (Burgh, 2005; Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980; Lipman 1991). Dewey wrote prolifically on the topic of education and related issues, such as childhood, curriculum, and the relationship of education to democracy. He was also concerned with the relationship between pedagogy and curriculum. For example, in The Child and the Curriculum he puzzled over whether children and their interests should drive education, or at least, whether it should be the fundamental concern of education, or, conversely, that the curriculum, i.e., bodies of knowledge, to be imparted to children should be the focus. Unlike traditional philosophers of education who saw the task of philosophy as examining contentious concepts and controversies, Dewey rejected the idea of philosophy as spectator that turns its gaze on education, instead, he wanted ‘each discipline to overcome its tendency to alienate knowledge and theory from experience and reconstruct itself as an enterprise aimed at personal and collective well-being’ (Gregory & Granger, 2012: 1). Dewey's characterisation of reconstruction of philosophy, or as he initially put it, reconstruction in philosophy, captures his contribution to the development of pragmatism.

If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it must be artificial. The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. (Dewey, 1966, p. 328)

Dewey's pragmatism emphasises reconstruction in philosophy, namely, philosophy as problem-solving, philosophy for everyday living and philosophy as education (Burgh, 2010; Saito, 2006). Dewey insisted on the need for philosophy to make a difference in practice, i.e., to bring about changes in our dispositions and actions. In this way it was seen as beneficial to the development of mutual learning and the ongoing creation of democratic communities in which individual enhancement was developed through communion with one another (Dewey, 1988). Peirce, unlike Dewey, was hopeful that the conglomeration of constructed knowledge over time would lead to a final understanding of truth. Dewey rejected any hope of unification, in favour of a process of ongoing evolution and reconstruction of knowledge. For Dewey, reconstruction and the dissemination of the knowledge of how to reconstruct knowledge is imperative for the survival and flourishing of our species. He purported that ‘if there is any knowledge which is of
most worth it is knowledge of the ways by which anything is entitled to be called knowledge instead of being mere opinion or guess-work or dogma’ (Dewey, 1910, p. 125). This knowledge has the highest value to Dewey, because it is this knowledge that promotes flourishing.¹

Dewey’s pragmatism, which he called instrumentalism, is an even more radical reconstruction of the nature of experience. Like Peirce, Dewey understood that experience contains inference, and that knowledge is always mediated—the outcome of a critical process of inquiry. However, whereas Peirce’s philosophy was informed by logical and speculative interests, Dewey’s thoughts were shaped by a social and biological approach to problem solving. He made paramount the concept of ‘transformation and construed experience in terms of its role in resolving problematic situations or in transforming the indeterminate, unsatisfactory situation into a determinate and non-problematic one’ (Smith, 1985, p. 549).

Dewey wrote extensively on education, but did not attend to the topic of children as philosophers, nor did he prescribe philosophy as a subject for schools. In Lipman’s hands, these received extended treatment. Clearly a continuation of Dewey’s philosophy (Lipman, 2004; Nussbaum, 2010), Lipman’s work goes beyond Dewey; albeit in ways Lipman would have considered to be Deweyan (Gregory & Granger, 2012). In practice, the classroom is transformed into a community of inquiry through the sharing of stimulus material that relates to the students’ experiences. The materials are intended to provoke philosophical questioning, which forms the basis for the construction of a discussion agenda. This agenda is then pursued by students together through dialogical inquiry, intellectually guided by the teacher-facilitator who assists the process of exploring questions from different perspectives, building on ideas, evaluating arguments, and constructing and testing hypotheses. Student engagement in rigorous, self-correcting communal dialogue creates new associations in response to new problems that occur in a lived situation. This process exemplifies the educative experience of which Dewey spoke.

The community of inquiry, by virtue of being the common space where interpersonal meanings are coconstructed and negotiated, and a matrix in which what has been internalized by individuals gets externalized in new communication, also produces individual dispositions and reflective habits that are internalizations of procedures that originate in the community. As such, the experience of communal philosophical inquiry, when it functions optimally, is an exemplar of what Dewey called “educative experience.” (Stoyanova Kennedy, 2012, p. 84)

Vital to the educative experience is finding activities that connect a range of past experience with problematic situations in order to challenge students’ habits by arousing ‘in the learner an active quest for information and for production of new
Lipman’s educational innovation of philosophical novels for children reconstructs the history of philosophy into childhood experience, making it accessible to students of various ages. The novels typically describe the characters encountering, grappling and coping with perplexity in order to engage students in imaginative wondering, and provoke philosophical inquiry, including metaphorical and hypothetical thinking, and the creation of fictional scenarios (Bleazby, 2012). These novels are illustrative of Dewey’s call to bring together the psychological and the logical, and the child and the curriculum. They succeed by, the illumination of philosophical problems in children’s own experience; provoking perplexity and arousing their logical dispositions through an active dialogical relationship that is both informative and transformative of the students’ thinking (De Marzio, 2011; Kennedy, 2012). Owing to the structure of the novels, the agenda ‘is guided by the students’ interests, not by the logical organization of the subject matter’ (Stoyanova Kennedy, 2012, p. 84). Further, Lipman, again following Dewey, advocated engaging students with the philosophical dimensions of each subject area—or discipline—thereby intellectually and socially involving them in situational encounters. Philosophical inquiry into contestable concepts common to all disciplines, Lipman argued, increases understanding of the relationships between ideas and therefore, has relevance to the daily life of children by helping them to better understand the disciplinary dimensions of their own experiences, and the interdisciplinary situatedness in which their experiences take place. This includes aesthetic and ethical inquiry into cultural values and their relationship to the disciplines, as well as epistemological inquiry to facilitate the reconstruction of beliefs and habits.

Our aim in this section was not to intellectually dissect the extent to which Lipman’s educational philosophy could be said to be authentically Deweyan or a reconstruction of Dewey’s educational theories in practice. Much of Lipman is original; including the introduction of philosophy as subject matter for school aged students through age specific, purpose-written philosophical novels and immersion in the guided, structured, dialogical speech, hallmark of the community of inquiry (Kennedy, 2012). For Dewey and Lipman, philosophy is a method of intelligence applied to human problems. However, Dewey thought of philosophy as the general theory of education, and therefore, applicable to large-scale ethical, political and cultural issues, whereas Lipman saw in Dewey’s writings implicit pedagogical guidelines not yet invented that lent themselves to philosophy functioning educationally (Lipman, 2004), and therefore, addressing issues in personal experience that ‘fall within the scope of ordinary life-experience’ (Dewey, 1967, p.73) for children. But Peirce’s ideas remain the bedrock for their pragmatic educational projects, specifically the twin tenets of anti-Cartesian epistemology and fallibilism as a regulative ideal for the educational process. Also, featuring heavily is the emphasis on experience, and hence the phenomenology of inquiry, i.e., that
inquiry must begin with a problem, question, or doubt and must aim at a solution or resolution, both of which are genuinely felt—something in which the inquirer actually has a stake (Gregory & Granger, 2012, p. 13). The emphasis on genuinely felt experience, including genuine doubt as a prime mover for wonder and the beginning of inquiry aimed at reconstruction of beliefs and habits will be the topic for further investigation later in the article. Before doing so, we need to invite Camus to join the discussion.

Educating Sisyphus

In common with Peirce, Camus rejected the Cartesian reliance on introspection as a moment of certitude and basis for rebuilding knowledge. However, their point of departure went in different directions. Peirce appealed to a rigorous interpersonal method for arriving at reliable knowledge. Camus focused on ‘a contradictory experience involving the sense of a crumbling, disintegrating reality eroding his ontological security’ (Sagi, 2002, p. 1), contrasted with his desire to know with certainty; an inner contest he referred to as the absurd. The absurd lies between the human subjective experience of being in the world and the objective distancing from the world. It is the phenomenological realisation that the epistemic possibility of clarity or understanding of the world always remains out of reach; that there is no absolute knowledge or certitude.

While Camus’ and Descartes’ responses to the problem of existence contrast each other, they share a methodological similarity. The difference between the two comes at the conclusion of their processes. Whereas Descartes ends in the sole certainty of the cogito, Camus sees no reason to accept such reasoning. To Camus (1991), the absurd is ‘a point of departure, the equivalent, in existence, to Descartes’s methodical doubt’ (p. 8). It is the only certitude to which Camus will consent, yet—and herein ends the similarity—it is not singular. Rather, it ‘is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of the elements compared; it is born of their confrontation’ (p. 33). In the case of consciousness, the absurd is the divorce between the desire to know the world, to find comfort, rest and reason in it and the indifference to our desires we find in the world when we look with lucid clarity upon existence.

Absurdism, like methodical doubt, has wiped the slate clean. It leaves us in a blind alley. But, like methodical doubt, it can, by returning upon itself, open up a new field of investigation, and in the process of reasoning then pursues the same course. I proclaim that I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd, but I cannot doubt the validity of my proclamation and I must at least believe in my protest. (p. 8)
Camus (1977) captures absurdity in an image of Sisyphus, who after struggling to push his boulder up the mountain, only to watch as it rolls back down, descends after it to begin ‘the struggle for the heights’ anew, in an endless cycle of repetition. The example of Sisyphus is illustrative of human struggle to find meaning or to understand life’s purpose, a struggle that is inevitably meet with the disappointment of universal silence. If we accept Camus’ absurdist thesis, the inevitable question is: What is the role of rational analysis, argument, or, indeed, communities of inquiry within it? We will address this question in more detail in the next section, but for the moment, it is sufficient to say that Camus makes his task that of trying to understand the limits of rationality. Pierce, also acknowledging the limits of rationality, turned to the community of inquiry as a regulative ideal to facilitate the tension between two contradictory experiences, those being genuine doubt and belief. We argue that Camus’ absurdist thesis, also an acknowledgement of the tension between two contradictory experiences, leads to solidarity within the context of embedded rebellion. These two positions, albeit from different philosophical traditions, converge with respect to the phenomenology of inquiry and thereby prove informative to the educational process.

It should be noted that in spite of Camus’ public rejection of association, due to his approach to the human condition, the literary world and general public have often associated him with the philosophical tradition of Existentialism. Elmer H. Duncan (1979), for example, counted Camus with the existentialists because ‘the existentialists are pessimistic about the possibility of solving the problems that plague human kind’ (p. 27). While this could be said to be true of Camus’ writing writ large, an idea well illustrated in his book *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus also, very much, furthers the possibility of conscious creation as a means of embracing struggle. As Ignacy S. Fiut (2009) points out, Camus maintained that with the recognition of existential angst comes the obligation to ‘search for a way of thinking about man, which would differ from the traditional one, and would be an optimistic way out of this uncomfortable and pessimistic existential situation in the future’ (p. 342).

Through Camus’ (1977) eyes, Existentialists were guilty of denying the absurd in their attempts to appeal to something beyond the limits of the human condition. He acknowledged that humans are unable to free themselves from ‘this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion’ (p. 51), but he urged us not succumb to these impulses and to instead accept absurdity. Therefore, in contrast with Existentialism, ‘The absurd is lucid reason noting its limits’ (p. 49). Lucid is the mind actively engaged in conscious creation, such as the artist at work, or the actor on stage. They understand the constructed nature of their engagement in the act of creation, and in so doing, simultaneously increase their proficiency to create meaning in their lives and multiply their possibilities for doing so.

35
Nevertheless, when Camus said ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide’ (p. 11), he posed one of the twentieth century’s best-known Existentialist problems, namely, ‘Judging whether life is or is not worth living’ (p. 11). Suicide for Camus was the ultimate negation of a person’s ability to create. Because of this, he determined to follow the logic that leads from awareness of the absurd to the act of taking one’s own life. What he finds is that it is, in fact, recognition of the absurd that drives creation, and negation of it that leads to despair.

Living, naturally, is never easy. You continue making the gestures commanded by existence for many reasons, the first of which is habit. Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation and the uselessness of suffering. (p. 13)

In his novel, The Rebel, the ‘uselessness of suffering’ is embodied in a passage Camus (1991) quotes from Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov: ‘If the suffering of children serves to complete the sum of suffering necessary for the acquisition of truth, I affirm from now onward that truth is not worth such a price’ (p. 51). This amounts to a very personal rejection of absolute morality. The rule of law can hold no claim on the individual mind of one who does not accept its authority. Hence, we start to feel the depth of importance, the multifaceted concept of revolt held for Camus. A similar notion of truth echoes through The Myth of Sisyphus: ‘This heart within me I can feel, and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction’ (Camus, 1977, p. 24). Truth, to Camus, is constructed.

For Camus, the problem of how we are to cope with the absurd is an existential concern. To reach the lucidity that is recognition of the absurd, absurdity must first be felt, must first be experienced. In this sense, lucidity constitutes the phenomenological aspect of Camus’ philosophy of Absurdism. Absurdity is an elusive feeling; it is the worm in the heart that can strike at any moment, ‘on a street-corner or in a restaurant’s revolving door’ (pp. 18-19). It is the void that is felt when connections with the world and others are severed. In response, it becomes either the catalyst for one to seek the absolute to overcome fear of nothingness, or the beginning of lucidity when fear is faced and the absurd is recognised. Once absurdity is felt ‘the primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia’ (p. 20). Absurdity strips from the world ‘the images and designs that we had attributed to it beforehand’, it ‘evades us because it becomes itself again’ (p. 20). The world is not alone in its absurdity, ‘men, too, secrete the inhuman; (pp. 20–21). Absurdity then is the feeling and experiencing of the inhuman, or existence as it is as much as it can be
experienced without being reduced by the intellect. As Matthew Lamb (2012) puts it, Camus is ‘only concerned with analysing the feelings associated with the absurd; he is not concerned with synthesising these analyses and elevating them to the status of knowledge’ (p. 104).

These feelings are born of experience; they are primary, the phenomenological aspect of doubting. Taken in a positive light, lack of certainty is a passport to creation, an opportunity to embrace flux and shape our human nature and the nature of others in a critical and considered manner. In a negative light, lack of meaning can lead to despair, desperation and destruction. The balance lies in choice.

As Camus argued, the recognition of all rules as constructed does not lead to the necessity of their negation. Rules should be viewed as adaptive to survival, not fixed and final. In this way, Camus argued against murder and suicide for it is in opposition to uncertainty and is most definitely a definitive end, a negation of the absurd. Hence, without recourse to certainty or authoritarianism Camus was able to place a limit on human actions by virtue of the logic of the absurd.

For Camus, whether there is a transcendent meaning or an ultimate reality is forever beyond the reach of human knowledge. However, he did not doubt the existence of the world that lay beneath his fingertips. We cannot witness existence divorced from our human perspective, but this does not lead to the conclusion that the world is unreal, a mere representation, neither does it give us absolute certainty in our conclusions. For Camus the truth lies somewhere in-between. The world is ever-changing, uncertain and beautiful. It is not simply a puzzle to be solved but an experience to be lived, to be appreciated.

If we take into consideration Camus’ rejection of certainty and absolute truth, his acceptance of human fallibility in providing answers about the world, and his emphasis on experience, he and the pragmatists share the same concerns. We, therefore, hope to enumerate on these commonalities and address our previously unanswered question of the role of analysis and argument, specifically within the community of inquiry, accepting Camus’ thesis of life’s essential absurdity. Our argument will take place in the context of the pragmatist emphasis on genuinely ‘felt’ experience, including genuine doubt as a prime mover for wonder and the beginning of inquiry aimed at reconstruction of beliefs and habits offering insights into the educative process.

The Phenomenology of Inquiry

In this section, we will argue that Camus’ notion of the absurd can inform discussion on the relationship between the phenomenology of inquiry and the communal processes of reconstructing knowledge. In particular, it focuses attention on the need ‘for the development of lucid individuals’ (Denton, 1964, p. 99), and, therefore,
on what we call lucid education. Lucid education can provide a means to understanding the processes of habituation that lead to inoculation; education as resistance against familiarity to certitude. The relationship between lucidity and inoculation has implications for classroom practice and teacher-facilitation. For Camus, lucidity is more than the confession of Socratic ignorance, and more than just the denial of Cartesian scepticism in favour of fallibilism. It is more than awareness of a world without answers, although it is that also. Nor is it merely intellectual doubt. Rather, it is the palpable consciousness of the existential situation of inhabiting an absurd world. It is the relationship between human longing for meaning and rejection of absolute explanations of reality; the ability to grasp that our relationship to our situatedness is devoid of certainty. This phenomenological insight can play a vital role in self-interrogation in the community of inquiry. It is a deep sense of awareness directed at engagement in such exploration; a state of being between question and answer. It demands that we neither deny nor escape the experience, but accept ‘the desperate encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe’ (Denton, 1964, p. 100). This demand not only offers a phenomenological description of absurdity, but indicates a necessary response as re-focusing of attention on every action as an opportunity for a new understanding of life; to construct meaning in a given moment.

The full force of importance comes from understanding the ramifications that our ignorance of the absurd causes. As mentioned in the previous section, through rejection of salvation, Dostoevsky’s character, Ivan, emphasises the importance of judgment in relation to our everyday actions and connections to the lives of others. His rejection is based on the individual realisation that if those of whom he judged as innocent are condemned based on truth, then that truth to him is a lie. Camus (1991) elucidates on this logic in saying ‘that if truth does exist, it can only be unacceptable. Why? Because it is unjust. The struggle between truth and justice is begun here for the first time; and it will never end’ (p. 51). The struggle begins when we accept dogma of any kind, for in doing so we accept justification for the suffering of others. Through an understanding of nature as inherently fixed and fated comes the acceptance of things the way they are, rather than as constructed and influenced by our beliefs, values and actions and therefore open to our judgment, our rebellion and within the realm of our responsibility. Camus uses the metaphor of vaccination to highlight the importance of critical reflection on the individual choices we make out of habit and with little thought to their consequences to others.

[W]e are vaccinated against horror. All those faces disfigured by bullets and heels, all those crushed bodies, those murdered innocents, at first filled us with the revulsion and disgust we needed in order to know what we were fighting for. Now the daily struggle has colored everything, and
although we never forget the reasons for it, we may at times lose sight of them. (Camus, 2006a, p. 5)

We extend Camus’ metaphor of vaccination to that of inoculation in order to broaden its range of applicability beyond the kinds of atrocities he describes as horrors. We do this to reflect that we may also become inoculated to injustices that occur in our everyday lives, due to a lack of insight into our own beliefs and actions. For once problems become familiar, we lose sight of them, i.e., we habituate or adapt to them, rather than continuing to question and strive to create solutions. The relationship between lucidity and inoculation can be likened to Plato’s description of Socrates as gadfly, i.e., a relationship of an uncomfortable goad to Athenian politics, which he compared to a slow and dim-witted horse.

How does this view reconcile with the pragmatist notion of genuine doubt? To Peirce, genuine doubt is ‘an irreducible and unmistakable species of experience’ (Hildebrand, 1996, p. 37). Its presence is felt as a state of unease or irritation brought about by the dissatisfaction of contradictory experiential episodes that throw into disarray habitual beliefs which result in habitual actions being disrupted. However, the experiential presence of genuine doubt is inclined toward the eradication of the state of disequilibrium (accompanying irritation) to settle into equilibrium (a state of habitual belief) brought about by inquiry (the means by which belief is settled).

The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. (Peirce, 1877, p. 6)

Genuine doubt is an irritating quality with an innate capacity to motivate us to substitute doubt with the satisfaction of belief. Genuine doubt, however, should not be mistaken for what Peirce called ‘paper-doubt’, or the pretence of doubt, which lacks the ‘heavy and noble metal’ of genuine doubt. Paper-doubt is merely self-deception, typically illustrated in the cogito. For doubt to be genuine it must actually interfere with my firmly fixed belief-habit and accompanying habitual action, causing me to hesitate and put my beliefs to the test in the form of inquiry. Genuine doubt, therefore, acts as a gadfly, a persistent irritant that challenges established beliefs, values, and reality. The relationship between doubt and belief—of which inquiry is
the movement between the two—is not unlike the relationship between lucidity and inoculation—the encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe. It could be argued that there is a stark difference between Camus’ response and the pragmatist’s response to the Cartesian maxim. Whereas Camus’ response relied heavily on the individual to address the everyday problems of the historical moment in which he or she lived, Peirce spoke of communal dialogue as an interpersonal method for developing beliefs about the world. Seemingly, this gap in their thinking could make them incompatible in terms of a mutual educational process. However, what might seem like Camus’ over-reliance on the self as solipsistic hero is subverted by his views on communicative ethics, namely, rebellion as a lived philosophy responding to a situated narrative. Being situated in a particular narrative structure ‘allows one to respond to these absurd circumstances from the position of embedded rebellion’ (Sleasman, 2011, n.p.), within which individuals actively engage others who hold different world views. To understand the relationship between Camus’ view and how it fits into the context of the embedded rebellion we need to revisit Camus on the notion of revolt. Camus (1977) states that his method ‘acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible’ (p. 12), which champions the ongoing process of revolt. It is revolt against the certainty of others’ judgments of existence that has the capacity to tie us together in appreciation of difference.

Therefore the first progressive step for a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realize that this feeling of strangeness is shared with all men and that human reality, in its entirety, suffers from the distance which separates it from the rest of the universe. The malady experienced by a single man becomes a mass plague. In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the “cogito” in the realm of thought: it is the first piece of evidence. But this evidence lures the individual from his solitude. It founds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore we exist. (p. 28)

The concept of the absurd is the negation of the Cartesian first principle of existence (i.e., the only indubitable knowledge is that “I” am a thinking thing, as to doubt my own existence is in and of itself proof that I exist). The reflection on this negation leads to the discovery of first certitude; that of rebellion or revolt ‘from which the progress toward positive direction becomes possible’ (Sagi, 2002, p. 108), i.e., towards the solidarity of suffering and the community of humanity the recognition of the universal nature of suffering can create. In other words, the concept of the absurd subverts Descartes’ solipsism, ‘placing “we” before “I” and culminating in the concept of solidarity’ (p. 1). While Camus casts ‘doubt on the ability of individuals to be released from the shackles of the self to turn to others to turn to others’, he does
not ‘retract from a general perception of individual existence as constituted through the relation to the other’ (p.2). To understand better Camus’ notion of the individual being ‘lured’ by the evidence from solitude to the first value of ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’, we turn in greater detail to Brent C. Sleasman’s concept of embedded rebellion.

Sleasman draws on Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics to link the situatedness Camus speaks of in relation to a community of lucid individuals. The question that arises from Camus, as we noted earlier, is how to understand lucidity beyond the individual’s experience and connect it to inquiry. According to Sleasman (2011), ‘[t]he vantage point of a person’s situatedness is not a totally objective standpoint from which to judge the surrounding world. One can act and engage the world only from a particular position with a limited view of events’ (n.p.). The first recognition, found in both Camus’ and Peirce’s writing, is that regardless of the certainty of one’s own experiences, that certainty still comes from a unique position, situated in a given context, wherein an individual experiences and interprets their experiences from that particular perspective. This has implications for engagement in dialogue, namely, that our attempts to interpret the world from a given perspective requires the effort of ‘bracketing all positing of being and investigating the subjective modes of givenness’ (Gadamer, 2004, p. 256).

Sleasman refers to this situatedness, in which ‘experience has implicit horizons of before and after, and finally fuses with the continuum of the experiences present in the before and after to form a unified flow of experience’ (Gadamer, 2004, p. 257), as ‘existential rebellion’. He notes that while Camus did not use the term, ‘the concept is consistent with his understanding of rebellion in the face of absurdity’ (Sleasman, 2011, n.p.). However, existential rebellion occurs only when one takes action, when at that given moment an opportunity is taken to interpret life and construct new meaning or understanding. If we, as individuals, accept Camus’ phenomenological description of absurdity, we eliminate the need to seek the production of a meta-narrative. Instead, each lucid individual can rely only on themselves to address the problems they confront, but they also understand that existential rebellion can only be understood within historical contemporary moments. The lucid individual, therefore, recognises that their own existential rebellion is directly connected to a given contemporary moment; a moment of embedded rebellion. Embedded rebellion occurs in episodic experience; an engagement in absurd historical moments. It is in this way that the following quote by Sagi (2002) should be understood: ‘The uniqueness of Camus’s philosophy is that it touches everyone. Its significance lies in its ability to awaken us, compelling us to reconsider the question of meaning in concrete human life, which we tend to neglect by transmuting it into others’ (p. 2). This situatedness negates the need for ‘transmuting into other’ in favour of recognition of ‘we’. In this sense, Camus, like Peirce, recognised that the individual is situated within a particular narrative
structure without recourse to a meta-narrative, and that doubt about certainty necessitates the ‘we’ in the struggle from meaning. There is still another question that cannot be avoided. If lucidity and genuine doubt are necessary conditions for inquiry, how can teachers engage students in the educational process, especially those who are not always philosophically open or eager to engage in inquiry, that is, inoculated against questioning their own understanding of the world? This question highlights what Wendy Turgeon (1998) calls the problem of the reluctant philosopher, wherein various obstacles—psychological, behavioural and environmental—prevent students from participating in philosophical inquiry. There is a tendency for the literature to be generally optimistic that philosophical inquiry itself can provoke the reluctant philosopher into dialogue. However, this does not take into account the problem we have outlined here, namely, that the students are part of the greater community which, itself, could be inoculated against critical inquiry. Therefore, educators need to do more than provide students ‘with the tools to challenge their attitudes, values, beliefs or conceptions, and to encourage them to ask questions’ (Burgh & Yorshansky, 2011, p. 444).

We argue that understanding of the notion of genuine doubt in Pierce’s writings together with Camus’ notion of inoculation can equip the teacher-facilitator to act as Socratic Gadfly. Genuine doubt bears resemblance to the experience of absurdity within Camus’ work; indeed absurdity can be thought of as the phenomenological awareness of genuine doubt. As it is conceivable that anyone may experience genuine doubt or absurdity under apt conditions, in the absence of such conditions, it is the task of teachers-facilitators to take notice of potential moments of genuine doubt, such as instances of hesitancy, uncertainty, or disagreement, in order to provoke the experience of lucidity. As these moments propagate within the classroom, it creates the potential for disequilibrium and subsequently embedded rebellion leading to a lucid community. If genuine doubt and the absurd come from within situatedness, we cannot expect children to make the transition from individual existential rebellion to embedded rebellion without guidance. The goal is not to immediately push them into critical thinking, but to extend their experience of the imaginative (Bleazby, 2012). To sustain critical awareness, the imaginative must be fostered, for it is the imaginative that acts as catalyst for critical thinking. It is the role of the teacher-facilitator to sustain these moments of awareness; the lucid person is the one who sustains lucidity. Lipman’s novels attempt to reflect childhood experience by drawing attention to moments that can create genuine doubt. In this way, they are a form of potential disruption to the students’ belief-habits. Because the narratives do not always speak for themselves, the teacher must act as lucid guide to elaborate on moments of potential lucidity in order to transform the classroom into a community of inquiry. To borrow from Gadamar, it is about the expanding of horizons through the
imaginative world. For Dewey this is engagement in intelligent imagination, an 'imaginative process of creating possible means of reconstructing experience (Bleazby, 2012, p. 99). It is also akin to Camus’ writings on absurd creation. For Camus (1977), ‘Creation is the great mime’ (p. 87) which frees us to lucidly play under the knowledge of an absurd sky. Like two children gazing at the night sky and connecting the stars, turning them into images that create narratives, together they recognise, create and recreate their shared imaginative reality. These historical narratives stay with us as we grow into adults, and, therefore, need to be questioned and explored to avoid a society inoculated against wonder.

Conclusion

Curzon-Hobson (2003) argues that Camus’ writings echo ‘central tenants of philosophers of education such as Dewey, Buber and Freire’ (p. 380). We have concentrated on Dewey and the pragmatist tradition starting from Peirce, and leading to Lipman’s development of Dewey’s guidelines for educational philosophy in the classroom. To this end we have shown where Camus and the pragmatists align in their thinking, insofar as they can inform the educative process of the community of inquiry. This alignment comes from the recognition of the experience of disorientation, which for Peirce is genuine doubt and for Camus is lucidity in the face of the absurd, leading to the need to act on that experience, which for both dictates a particular logic. For Peirce it means engagement in the community of inquiry, in order to test our experiences of the world in relation to those of others, to see if there are practical consequences in which we can live, and, therefore, reconstruct the paradoxical or contradictory positions in order to create a habitat in which new beliefs and habits can form. Camus aligns with Peirce’s position, but his language and description differs. For Camus, the logic of the absurd dictates that once it is recognised we are faced with a choice of whether or not to inoculate ourselves from the logic. If we choose against inoculation, by virtue of our knowledge of the logic of the absurd we become lucid. This in turn increases the probabilities of the creation of other lucid people and the prospect of creation of a community free from dogmatic certainty and open to constructive and creative dialogue.

What we have concluded is that the role of the teacher is to develop lucid individuals in a classroom that is transformed into a community of inquiry embedded in contemporary historical moments. In other words, what is significant about our project is that we focus on Camus’ philosophy as having educational guidelines for teachers to facilitate the education of lucid individuals. These guidelines are aimed at teachers in order to aid in their understanding of how to facilitate the types of inquiry that pragmatic education proposes. The teacher as lucid individual becomes the catalyst for bringing about Peirce’s genuine doubt, leading to the creation of a
community of inquiry founded on fallibilism. In this sense, we are advocating that through lucid teaching in conjunction with the community of inquiry as a regulative classroom ideal Camus can inform us on how to goad curiosity or a sense of wonder in children in order to engage them in philosophical inquiry. Our extended analysis is a response to Denton’s claim, with which we agree, that the central purpose of education is to develop lucid individuals.

The one major objective of education will no longer be to produce primarily a rational man or social animal; it will no longer be, as the Educational Policies Commission would have it, to discover the values inherent in rationality; rather, if we take our cue from Camus, education will have a new primary objective: to produce the moral individual – moral because, in the face of the absurd, he lucidly lives the philosophy of limits. (Denton, 1967, p. 127)

For Camus, the moral is characterised by the absurd, which is the ‘catalyst for fundamental doubt and, in turn, lucid reflection’ (Curzon-Hobson, 2013a, p. 463). It is also characterised by a philosophy of limitations, which we have argued is situated in embedded rebellion. This has connections with Peirce’s ideas of genuine doubt and fallibilism. In practice, the teacher needs to be lucid, insofar as lucidity assists the teacher in finding those moments of hesitation to explore within a community. These moments, when facilitated, can create and sustain a tension that pushes students past their comfort zone and compels them to test their belief-habits and accompanying actions. For Camus, these moments constitute lucidity and awareness of the absurd, and for Dewey they are enhanced through experimentation leading to reconstruction of the individual embedded in a community of inquirers.

We are not putting words into Camus’ mouth, nor are we saying he would have thought himself a pragmatist or agreed with their views. Rather, the narrative we have told is one of engaging Camus with the pragmatist discourse of community of inquiry and showing that lucidity has an important, and we would argue, necessary role to play in this educational process. One could say therefore that a teacher’s role is to facilitate an embedded inquiry of the absurd.

Notes

1. The absurd holds the same appeal for Camus. Writing for the resistance newspaper *Combat* during the second world war, he attest that ‘It is not emotion which can cut through the web of a logic which has gone to irrational lengths, but only reason which can meet logic on its own ground ... the problem is not how to carry men away; it is essential, on the contrary, that they not be carried away but
rather that they be made to understand clearly what they are doing’ (Camus, 2006b, p. 274).
2. ‘Between the certainty I have of my existence and the content I try to give to that assurance, the gap will never be filled. For ever I shall be a stranger to myself. In psychology as in logic, there are truths but no truth ... And here are trees and I know their gnarled surface, water and I feel its taste. These scents of grass and stars at night, certain evenings when the heart relaxes—how shall I negate this world whose power and strength I feel?’ (Camus, 1977, pp. 24–25).

References


