Marty and Brentano

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The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 - Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano’s pupils. Within Brentano’s school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would-be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61-2). There is no doubt that Brentano’s doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to Brentano’s views. This is true of his views about space and time and about judgment, emotions and intentionality. In the latter case, for example, Marty develops Brentano’s view and its implications in great detail (Mulligan 1989; Rollinger 2004), but uses them to formulate a very unBrentanian account of intentionality as a relation of ideal assimilation (Chrudzimski 1999; Cesalli & Taieb 2013). Marty’s philosophy of language, on the other hand, is one of the first philosophies worthy of the name.

In what follows, we contrast briefly their accounts of (i) judgment and states of affairs and of (ii) emotings and value (two topics of foremost significance, for Brentano and Marty’s theoretical and practical philosophies respectively) (§1), and their philosophies of language (§2). Brentano’s view of language is based on his philosophy of mind. Marty takes over the latter and turns a couple of claims by Brentano about language into a sophisticated philosophy of language of a kind made familiar much later by Grice. Marty’s philosophy of states of affairs and value and of the mind’s relations to these also takes off from views sketched by the early Brentano, views forcefully rejected by the later Brentano.
1. Correctness, States of Affairs and Values

Two categories prominent in twentieth-century philosophy are state of affairs and value. The prominence of these categories in subsequent philosophical discussion owes much to Brentano. His philosophy of what he called judgment contents, and which his students Stumpf and Husserl successfully baptised Sachverhalte, or states of affairs, and his philosophy of value, went through three phases. He initially toyed with what might be called a naively realist view of states of affairs and values: judgings are directed towards judgment-contents and are correct only if these obtain or exist; emotings are directed towards value and are correct only if value is exemplified. But predication of value, he then came to think, should be understood in terms of correct emoting and knowledge thereof (see Chap. 23). And the distinction between correct and incorrect judging, he argued, should be understood without any reference to judgment contents or states of affairs (see Chap. 10). These two analogous developments received further support from a final turn in his thinking about ontology. As he came to think that there are only things (i.e. real entities, res), a view sometimes called reism, he had further reasons to reject such non-things as states of affairs and values and value-properties, as well as judgings and emotings, reasons which are independent of his views about correct judging and emoting, or rather, correct judgers and emoters. In what follows, we shall pay no attention to Brentano’s reism (see Chap. 15 for discussion).

The three greatest philosophers formed by Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Marty, all came to reject his turn away from naive realism about states of affairs and values, and never endorsed his reism. They all developed versions of Brentano’s early naive realism and employed Brentano’s distinctions between correct and incorrect judging and emotings. The idea that not only beliefs but also non-intellectual mental states and acts, such as desire and choice, are correct or incorrect goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle (see for example Kraus 1937: 7-34, Mulligan 2017). But it surfaces only sporadically in the history of subsequent philosophy, for example in Anselm of Canterbury’s De veritate, with the notion of rectitudo, and later in Aquinas, until Brentano puts it at the heart of his philosophy and so at the heart of the philosophies of his students. Naively realist views about the relations between correct judging and states of affairs were published by Husserl and Meinong at the beginning of the twentieth century. But it is Marty who published the first unified naively realist account
of the relation between (in)correct judging, emoting and preferring, on the one hand, and states of affairs, values and comparative values, on the other hand.²

In what follows, we first outline Brentano’s early view about (in)correct judging and emotion, judgment contents and value, then Marty’s 1908 development of this view, and only then Brentano’s mature view.

1.1. Early Brentano

In a note appended to his 1889 lecture Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Brentano writes that truth has often been said to be an agreement of judgment and its object. He dismisses one way of understanding this dictum: “as a sort of identity between something contained in the judgment or the presentation on which the judgment is based and something which lies outside the mind”. But the dictum is “in a certain sense correct” provided we bear in mind that “agreement” here means “fit” (passen), “correspond” or “be in harmony with” (in Einklang stehen, harmonieren):

The concepts of existence and non-existence are the correlates of the concepts of the truth of (einheitlicher) affirmative and negative judgments. Just as what is judged belongs to the judgment ... so there belongs to the correctness of the affirmative judgment the existence of what is affirmatively judged, to the correctness of the negative judgment the non-existence of what is judged negatively, and whether I say that a negative judgment is true or that its object is non-existent, in both cases I say the same thing. (Brentano 1889: 75-7, n. 25).

It is difficult to know how Brentano thought he could reconcile the claim that the concepts of existence and of true judgment are correlatives and the claim that to say that a negative judgment is true and that its object does not exist is to say the same thing. But that is not our concern here.

What is it that is judged? In his 1875 logic lectures, Brentano refers to contents of judgments (Urteilsinhalte). He also says that what one states is the content of the judgment corresponding to the statement and that this is the meaning (Bedeutung) of the statement (EL80, 13.143[3]). In 1907 Stumpf asserts that three decades earlier Brentano had sharply emphasized in his logic lectures that “to a judgment there corresponds a specific judgment content, which is to be distinguished from the content of presentation (the presentation’s matter) and is expressed in that-clauses or
nominalised infinitives” (1907: 29). Stumpf also says that he himself employs for this specific judgment content the expression “Sachverhalt”, or “state of affairs”, and had introduced this expression in 1888 in his own logic lectures. Stumpf says that Bolzano had employed the term “Satz an sich” for what Brentano called a judgment content (Stumpf 1907: 29-30). But a Satz an sich consists only of concepts. Did Stumpf really want to attribute to Brentano the view that judgment contents consist only of concepts?

Brentano’s early views about the mind and value resemble his early views about mind and judgment contents. In 1866 Brentano asserted that

... the concepts of the good and the beautiful differ in that we call something good in so far as it is worthy of being desired (begehrenswert), and beautiful in so far as its appearing is worthy of being desired. (Brentano 1968: 141)

In 1889 desire-worthiness is replaced by love-worthiness and correct love, where “love” comprehends all pro-emoting, desiring and willing:

We call something good, if love of it is correct. What is to be loved with correct love, what is worthy of love, is the good in the widest sense. (Brentano 1889: 17, §23)

And Brentano asserts that every loving, hating, being pleased by and being displeased by, is either correct or incorrect (Brentano 1889: 17, §22). In the same year, he also asserts that every loving and every hating is either fitting (passend) or unfitting and that accordingly, whatever is thinkable falls into two classes, one of which contains everything for which love is fitting and the other everything for which hate is fitting. We call what belongs to the first class good and what belongs to the second bad. Thus we may say, a loving and hating is correct or incorrect according to whether it is a loving of what is good or a hating of what is bad or, conversely, according to whether it is a loving of what is bad and a hating of what is good. We may also say that in cases where our behaviour (Verhalten) is correct our emotion corresponds to the object, is in harmony with its value, and that, on the other hand, in cases where behaviour is wrong (verkehrt) it is opposed (widerspreche) to its object, is in a relation of disharmony with its value. (Brentano 1930: 25, §53)

In Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Brentano is also tempted by a view of preferring and betterness very different from the view he will subsequently adopt. He there contrasts two views about correct preferences. According to the first view, certain acts of preferring are “characterised as correct”, as are certain acts of liking something; our knowledge that one thing is better than another has its origin in preferrings which
are characterised as correct. This view is the one he will develop later. According to the second view, preferrings “are characterised as correct because they allow themselves to be guided by an already apprehended betterness”. According to this second view, preferrings are not the source of our knowledge of betterness and the apprehension of betterness involves knowledge of analytic judgments. Brentano says that someone who accepts the second rather than the first view “perhaps has more right on his side” but does not endorse either view (Brentano 1889:24, §31).

The harmonies between correct emoting and the exemplification of value and between correct judging and existence or truth to which Brentano refers in these passages are just that. Neither side of the harmony enjoys any priority. Brentano does not say, as a certain sort of realist does, that loving love is correct because love is valuable.

1.2. Marty

Judging, choosing, desiring, acting, inferring, emoting, preferring and even sympathy, Marty thinks, are correct or incorrect. He argues, like the early Brentano, that judging and emoting are correct if the world is a certain way. In this context, he talks of the relations of correspondence, fitting, adequation and ideal similarity between the mind and the way the world is. Unlike the early Brentano and like Husserl, Marty argues that, if emoting or judging is correct, it is correct because of the way the world is. Just as judgment contents make judgings correct or incorrect, so too, the exemplification of value of different types—“objective value situations (Wertverhalt) … value, disvalue, lesser value” (Marty 1908: 427)—makes emoting correct or incorrect. There can only be analogues of the correctness and incorrectness of judging in the realm of interest, he argues,

... if there is something which is independent of the subjective phenomenon of loving and hating and which is in this sense objective, which grounds (begründet) this correctness of mental behaviour, just as the being of the object provides the foundation for the correctness of acceptance of this object... (Marty 1908: 370)
By judgment content … is to be understood that by which the correctness of the judgment is objectively grounded, and so what, if the uttered judgment is correct, is intimated in the proper sense of the term by the statement. (Marty 1908: 369-70)

The “valuable is something objective, which stands in a relation to loving which is analogous to the relation between the true and what is (das Seiende)” (Marty 1908: 428). Thus:

Just like certain judgments, so too, certain acts of interest are distinguished by the fact that they announce themselves as correct and thereby characterise what they love as truly valuable. (Marty 1908: 370)

Marty, then, is precisely the sort of realist Brentano is not.

1.3. Brentano’s Mature View

Brentano’s suspicions about the naive-realist view of value emerge clearly in a note (footnote 28) to *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*. Aristotle, he says, seems to have given in to the “understandable temptation” to think “we recognize the good as good, independently of the stimulation of affective activity” (Brentano 1889: 89). This, he suggests, is connected with Aristotle’s claim...

... that the good and the bad are in things, unlike the true and the false... that although predicates such as ‘true God’, ‘false friend’ are attributed to things only in relation to certain mental acts, namely, true and false judgments, the predicates ‘good’ and ‘bad’ hold of things in a dissimilar way, that is, not merely in relation to a certain class of mental activities. (Brentano 1889: 89)

But “all this”, he says, is “incorrect”. Indeed Hume, the Gefühlsmoralist, has the advantage over Aristotle “when he stresses: how should one recognize that something is to be loved without the experience of love?” (Brentano 1889: 90, n.28). The temptation to which Aristotle has succumbed is understandable:

It is due to the fact that together with the experience of an emotion (Gemütstäütigkeit) characterised as correct knowledge of the goodness of the object is always simultaneously given. It then easily happens that one gets the relation the wrong way round and believes that one loves here as a result of (in Folge) the knowledge and apprehends the love as correct through (an) its agreement with this, its standard (Regel). (Brentano 1889: 90)
The relation which those who think goodness and badness are in things get the wrong way round seems to be a relation of causal explanation. The naive realist thinks that one comes to know that an object is good, and then on this basis, comes to love the object, and then comes to grasp that this love of an object which is good is correct. Knowledge of goodness is prior to knowledge of correct emotion.

Brentano’s diagnosis of what he takes to be Aristotle’s mistakes about goodness suggests that Brentano thought that Aristotle was wrong to treat truth and goodness in different ways and that Aristotle’s account of truth was closer to the truth than his account of goodness. We see here one of the roots of Brentano’s later philosophy of truth, existence and value. According to this philosophy, it is important to distinguish between two types of predicate: on the one hand, predicates such as “red”, “round”, “warm”, “thinking”; on the other hand, predicates such as “good” and “existing”, “non-existing”. The first group of predicates Brentano calls “sachlich”, material or objective, predicates. Brentano’s distinction between material or objective predicates and non-objective predicates is related to the medieval distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denominations and also to Husserl’s distinction between formal and material concepts. Brentano employs his distinction as follows:

If we call (nennen) an object good, ... we do not thereby want to add a further determination (Bestimmung) to the determinations of the thing in question ... If we call certain objects good, and others bad, we say no more than that whoever loves this, hates that, is correct to do so (verhalte sich richtig). (Brentano 1952: 144)

Similarly, to say of something that it exists is just to say that whoever accepts it, judges truly or correctly (Ibid.). Here and in other places Brentano does not say that if something is good, it is good because love of it is correct; the latter claim is one he makes very rarely. Nor is he a non-cognitivist about value-claims. He thinks that axiological and ethical claims have truth-values. Even before his rejection of properties (his reist turn), he denies that being valuable is a determination of things in the sense in which redness is. There are interesting questions about the exact content of his view that to say or mean that something is valuable is just to say or mean that love of it is correct. But it is not necessary to answer these questions in order to measure the difference between Brentano’s mature view and Marty.
1.4. Marty’s Last Word

In 1916, a year before Brentano’s death, Marty’s final verdict on Brentano’s views were published posthumously:

According to Brentano, the ... correctness of a judgment does not consist in its adequation to a content or state of affairs. In reality there is no such thing as contents of judgments and of relations of interest (states of affairs and values), but only differences between correct and incorrect ... psychological modes of being related.... [If there is no such thing as the “contents” of these relations, then what we have taken to be ... the concepts of which these contents are the objects are not truly concepts of non-real determinations of being nor of real determinations of being... (Marty 1916: 155)

Brentano’s “attempt to give an account of the objectivity of judgment and interest without any appeal to what we have called ‘contents’ seems to me”, says Marty, “to be unsatisfactory and untenable”:

The only possible explanation (Erklärung) of [such] objectivity or correctness ... is that it consists in an ideal (ideellen) adequation to something (which is not merely mental and subjective, but objective, that is, independent of what is given in consciousness). In the case of judgment this is the state of affairs, in the case of interest, the value or disvalue of the object to which the judgment or interest relates. (Marty 1916: 155-6)

Marty also, like Husserl (1988: 344), rejects Brentano’s account of self-evidence (Evidenz): “the concept of correctness is not to be clarified by appealing to Evidenz, it is Evidenz which ... is a manifestation (kundgeben) of correctness” (Marty 1916: 157).10

2. Brentano and Marty on Language

2.1. Brentano

Brentano’s writings contain no detailed philosophy of language and meaning.11 But the topic is by no means absent from his work, as one would expect given the prominence there of the reform of logic and his conviction that philosophers are often misled by ordinary language. The best and most reliable source for his views on language and meaning are his logic lectures from the late 1880s (manuscript EL 80).12
2.1.1. Language and thought.

In very general terms, Brentano characterizes language as being “essentially a sign of thinking” (“Zeichen des Denkens”, EL 80, 12.978[9]). This is not to say, however, that linguistic expressions faithfully reflect thoughts. As Brentano insists in Sprechen und Denken:

> Language should express what we think. In such a case, the utterance corresponds to the thought. Some think therefore that in the case of truthfulness, expressions and thoughts correspond completely, and therefore also part by part. This is in no way the case. (Brentano 1905, in Srzednicki 1965: 117)\(^{13}\)

This suspicion about the ability of linguistic expressions to reflect the way the mind works and Brentano’s further suspicion about the ability of language to represent the way the world is are at the heart of Brentano’s Sprachkritik, the opening shots of the Austrian critique of language to which Marty, Mauthner, Oskar and Karl Kraus and Wittgenstein will all contribute.

Brentano points out that the immediate aim of language, as a sign of thinking, is the communication of thoughts (12.986[4]). Language also influences thinking, both positively and negatively. It contributes to a more fine-grained distinction of ideas, compensates for the shortcomings of memory, and allows for the simple expression of complex contents (sentences are useful for the logicians as symbols and written numbers are useful for the mathematician, see EL 80 12.978[7]). On the other hand, language disturbs and perturbs thinking by making equivocation and synonymy possible, thereby facilitating paralogisms and other mistakes (EL 80 12.990[2]–12.997[2]).\(^{14}\)

2.1.2. The nature of linguistic meaning.

At several points in the first part of his logic lectures, Brentano tackles the question of what linguistic expressions mean, focusing, as one would expect, on names and statements. As it turns out, both cases are similar, with an important difference:

> What do names designate (bezeichnen)? The name designates in a certain way a presentation’s content as such, [i.e.] the immanent object. In a certain way, [names designate] that which is presented by the content of a presentation. The former is the meaning (Bedeutung) of the name. The latter is that which the name names. Of it we say that it has the name (kommt ihm zu). It is
that which, when it exists, is the external object of the presentation. One names through the mediation of meaning. (EL 80:13.016[1]-13.018[5]; see also EL 80:13.001[3]-13.002[7].)

What do [statements] designate (bezeichnen)? 1. When we raised that question for names, we distinguished between what they mean (bedeuten) and what they name (nennen). Here, as well, we make a distinction, but not the same one. They [i.e. the statements] mean (bedeuten), but they do not name. 2. Like names, they have a twofold relation, a, to the content of a mental phenomenon as such, and b, to possible external objects. The former is the meaning (Bedeutung). 3. But in such a case, the phenomenon at stake is not a presentation, but a judgment. The judged (Geurteilte) as such is the meaning (Bedeutung). (EL 80:13.020[1]-13.020[5])

Names and statements are linguistic signs and, as such, have a meaning. Both mean the content (or immanent object) of the mental phenomenon they express: the content of a presentation for names, that of a judgment for statements. The very nature of contents thus understood provides them with a mediating function: the content of a presentation is itself said to present the external object.

The difference between the semantics of names and statements consists in the fact that names stand in a twofold semantic relation—meaning and naming—to something else, whereas statements mean judgment contents (i.e. the immanent objects of judgings), but are not semantically related to the object of the presentation on which the expressed judgment is (necessarily) based.

It is, of course, one thing to specify what different types of linguistic expressions mean, quite another to identify the very nature of linguistic meaning as such. Unlike Marty, Brentano does not pay much attention to this crucial distinction. In one passage, however, he seems to suggest that what is meant by a statement possesses a normative feature, something that may motivate a hearer to form a judgment similar to the one expressed by the statement:

... the linguistic expression of the judgment obviously indicates in a twofold manner: 1) the judgment whose expression it is, 2) by means of the judgment, that the object is to be judged in a certain manner, to be accepted or rejected, in a word: the content of the judgment. (EL 80:13.132)

Brentano's claim that among the things indicated by the expression of a judgment is a norm—"the object is to be judged in a certain manner"—is at the heart of Marty's philosophy of language. In the passage quoted, Brentano does not see that this norm is the content not of a judgment but of an intention of the speaker. The statement that
Socrates is wise expresses the judgment that Socrates is wise and its content, [Socrates is wise], differs from the content [Socrates is to be judged as wise]. The latter is not the content of a judgment but of an intention, the content of which is normative; in the language of Brentano’s psychology, an intention is a phenomenon of interest. The recognition of this point, a point Brentano does not make, is the fundamental idea of Marty’s intentionalist semantics. The passage quoted may well have been the starting point for Marty’s original theory. If so, it is a hint Marty was to transform into a subtle philosophy of language.

2.2. Marty

Brentano’s only Swiss pupil developed a sophisticated philosophy of language (or descriptive theory of meaning) based on the psychology of his master.\(^{17}\) The theory contains three core ideas. We take them up in turn.

2.2.1. The empirico-teleological nature of language.

As Marty showed in his first monograph—*On the origin of language* (1875: 64)—, the most plausible way to account for the development of language is to suppose that it progressively emerged from human interactions guided by the need to communicate (a view explicitly directed against the nativists Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt). The resulting view is the so-called “empirico-teleological” account of language, according to which language is a vocal communication tool developed intentionally (*absichtlich*) but without any plan (*planlos*), that is, according to the principle of trial and error and thus something akin to Darwinian natural selection (see Marty 1916b, GS I.2: 157, see also Marty 1908: 89).\(^{18}\)

Although language is directly dependent on thought,\(^{19}\) there is nothing like a parallelism between the two (Marty 1879; 1884-1892; 1893):

> Language is certainly not logical in the sense that it is simply the expression of our thinking, something like its immediate and necessary emanation (*Ausfluss*)... [L]anguage does not display any strict and trustworthy parallelism with thoughts. (Marty 1893: 99-100).

One of the most striking examples of this absence of a strict correspondence between thought and language is the discrepancy between the logical (i.e. psychological) and the
grammatical (i.e. the linguistic) form of the judgment: whereas the *linguistic* expression of judgment is propositional, the mental act of judging is non-propositional (i.e. it is the mere acceptance or rejection of a presented object—Marty 1884-1895).²⁰

2.2.2. The central role of intention and action in the account of meaning.

Marty distinguishes three classes of linguistic tools (or means), corresponding to Brentano’s threefold division of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments and emotions: names (*Vorstellungssuggestive*), statements (*Aussagen*), expressions of interest (*Emotive*, see Marty 1908: 224-7). Linguistic meaning is a functional property of certain sounds used as communication tools. It is to be explained primarily in terms of *intentions*. In that sense, Marty’s theory can be labelled an intentionalist or intention-based theory of meaning (Mulligan 2012: 101-24; Cesalli 2013). In that context, Marty likes to refer to the medieval principle: “*voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus*” (“words signify things by means of concepts”, see for example Marty 1908: 436, n.1).

The fact that a linguistic tool is a sign (i.e. its *Zeichensein*) is analysed in terms of a twofold intention: the speaker’s immediate, but secondary intention to intimate or express (*kundgeben*) her inner life; the speaker’s mediate, but primary intention to guide (or influence) the inner life of an interlocutor. The content of the primary intention possesses a *normative* dimension. As Marty says, what a speaker primarily intends is “that the hearer should form a mental phenomenon similar to the one expressed by the uttered expression” (cf. e.g. Marty 1908: 288). This *Bedeutung* is always mediated by intimation or expression and the primary intention aims at triggering in an interlocutor a mental phenomenon analogous to the one intimated by the speaker:

… in the case of voluntary speech, and thus in the case of statements as well, we always have to do with a twofold way of meaning (*Bezeichnen*): something which is primarily, and something which is secondarily intended, and correspondingly, something which is mediatly intended, and something which is immediately intended. And just as we use the term ‘to express’ (*Ausdrücken*) or ‘to intimate’ (*Äussern*) for the latter, so, we want (as a rule) to use the term ‘to mean’ (*Bedeuten*) and ‘meaning’ (*Bedeutung*) in order to designate mediatly and primarily intended sign-giving (*Zeichengebung*). (Marty 1908: 286)

“Voluntary speech” says Marty “is a special kind of action whose ultimate aim is to trigger certain mental phenomena in other beings” (Marty 1908: 284) and involves the two semantic functions of intimating and meaning (signifying).
One class of linguistic tools—names or, more generally, Vorstellungssuggestive—possesses a further semantic function, that of naming (Nennung). Just like meaning (Bedeutung), naming is a mediated function:

However, through the intermediary of the functions of intimating (Kundgabe) and of meaning (Bedeutung), names also acquire that which we call [the property of] naming (Nennen). We speak of naming in relation to the objects which possibly do correspond in reality to the presentations produced by the names, or at least can correspond (without contradiction) to them. These <objects of the presentations> are that which is named (das Genannte). (Marty 1908: 436)21

What is named by a name is the object of the presentation it intimates and triggers. In that sense, what is named—das Genannte—can be qualified as the "objectual moment" of a name's meaning, or, as Marty himself puts it, as its meaning "in the narrow sense" (whereas a name's meaning "in the broad sense" is its Bedeutung—Marty 1908: 495-6).

The same distinction applies for statements: in the broad sense, statements mean "that a hearer should form a judgment such that...", whereas in the narrow sense, they only mean the content of the judgment intimated and triggered:

We said that in a broad sense, statements mean as a rule that the hearer should perform an act of judging whose matter and quality are identical to the ones of the act of judging which, by the utterance, is indicated as taking place in the speaker. In a narrower sense, however, ... one also calls something else the meaning of the statement ...: the statement indicates the content of the judging and, in this sense, means it. (Marty 1908: 291-2)

2.2.3. The hylomorphic account of language and meaning.

The correlates matter and form play a crucial role in Marty's philosophy of language and, it seems, no role in Brentano's account of language. 'Form' is understood in the precise sense of container (Gefäß), and 'matter' (Stoff) as being what the container contains (Marty 1908: 101-20, see also Majolino 2003). This is what allows Marty to say that meaning is the matter of language. As for the form of language, one has to distinguish external (i.e. externally perceivable) and inner (i.e. only internally perceivable) linguistic form (Marty 1893: 68-75; Marty 1908: 121-50).22

From a descriptive point of view,23 inner linguistic form is constituted by auxiliary presentations which are required by (but do not constitute) meaning. They facilitate the association of the heard sound with the intended meaning. For example, the auxiliary presentation (the image) of a body in an unstable position facilitates the
grasping of what is meant by a speaker using an expression such as ‘unstable in judgment’ (*schwankend im Urteil*) although a body and its physical instability cannot possibly be meant by the expression at stake.

The recognition of the existence, uses, misuses and effects of inner linguistic form by Marty goes well beyond Brentano’s *Sprachkritik* in numerous directions and to great effect. In particular, Marty argues that numerous views in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics are based on misleading pictures. Thus the view that mental acts have immanent objects, a view endorsed by the early Brentano, is, Marty argues, a result of a failure to understand the role of inner linguistic form.24

**Conclusion**

In what precedes, we have given an overview of the relationship between Brentano and the philosopher Meinong once called, in a slightly ironic and exasperated remark, Brentano’s “prophet” (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61n). In §1, we considered the issue on which Brentano and Marty came to disagree most seriously: the account of what it means for a judgement, and an emotion, to be correct. At the end of the day, the main point of disagreement is an ontological one: if one accepts an ontology of judgment-contents, one can describe correctness as a correlation holding between a mental phenomenon and a certain entity. Brentano held this view early in his career, and Marty maintained this realist line—although he always was and remained a nominalist with respect to universals—against the Evidenz-based new theory of later Brentano. In §2, we turned to Marty’s acknowledged field of expertise—philosophy of language—in order to distinguish his Brentanian heritage from Marty’s own, distinctive contribution. The result, pace Meinong, shows that Marty made an essential move, a move certainly based on Brentano (and actually more on Brentano’s psychology than on what he has to say on language and meaning), but clearly absent from the master’s works, namely, the conception of linguistic meaning as fundamentally intentional, that is: dependent on what language users intend to do whenever they speak.25
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1 On the phase during which Brentano was prepared to allow that judgings and emotings may correspond to something, cf. Kraus 1937: 194, 182.

2 Some of Husserl’s views about correct emotions and values were published in 1908 by one of his students, cf. Lessing 1908. They are now to be found in Husserl 1988, cf. Mulligan 2004.

3 Outside the Brentanian tradition, Julius Bergmann employs the term « Sachverhalt » (Bergmann 1879: 2, 4) in the same year in which Frege, in his Begriffsschrift, refers to circumstances (Umstände).

4 One may wonder what Marty took to be the relation between grounding the correctness of judging and being a necessary condition thereof. At one point he writes, “a judgment content is what objectively grounds the correctness of our judging, or to put things more exactly, is that without which that behaviour could not be correct or adequate” (Marty 1908: 295 – our emphasis).

5 Brentano refers to Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7, 1072a29 and to De anima III.9-10.

6 Brentano here refers to Aristotle Metaphysics VI.4, 1027b25.

7 Brentano gives no reference here to Hume’s writings.


9 Brentano thinks that there are true ethical principles. And God, he thinks, has axiological knowledge (Brentano 1929: 477). See Chap. 23.

10 Thanks to Guillaume Fréchette for his helpful comments on the first part of this paper.
§2.3. \[11\] Meaning can itself be analysed in terms of matter and form: meaning’s matter is constituted by the semantic value of “autosemantic” linguistic means; meaning’s form by the semantic value of “synsemantic” linguistic means. A linguistic means is “autosemantic” iff it is by itself able to express a complete mental phenomenon. If a linguistic means is not “autosemantic”, it is “synsemantic” (see Marty 1908: 205-6).
Unlike genetic approaches, the descriptive approach to a given phenomenon ignores the chain of its causal history and considers only the elements and principles at work in its present state. This fundamental methodological distinction is genuinely Brentanian (see e.g. Brentano 1889: 3; see also Chap. 3). Inner linguistic form also plays a central role in the genetic perspective: it is the main principle at work in the development of the vocabulary and syntax of conventional linguistic means (Funke 1924: 45-72). On the distinction between the description of the structure of some phenomenon and hypotheses about the genesis of the phenomenon in the brentanian tradition and Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012: 11-48.

Marty also thinks that the view that judging is propositional (see above, §2.1, and note 12) is due to a failure to understand the workings of inner linguistic form (see Marty 1908: 415-6; Marty 1884-1895: 256-7). On the relation between misleading pictures in Marty and Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012: 39-42.

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