glorified for centuries and old age dreaded. Neiman is striking in her analysis and the logical extension of Plato’s and Kant’s thought. The plethora of choices for consumer goods given by the governments is a sweet distraction from more important issues.

Neiman’s eloquence is poetic: ‘Direct control leads to rebellion; indirect control leads to dependency’ (39). ‘Reason drives your search to make sense of the world by pushing you to ask why things are as they are. For theoretical reason, the outcome of that search becomes science, for practical reason, the outcome is a more just world’ (115). She tells us that we need grown-ups to build an equitable society and reminds us that it was Rousseau who first treated growing up as a philosophical problem. Her statements are spiritual and sometimes have uncanny resemblances to the tenets of Advaita Vedanta. She almost repeats the Bhagavadgita when she says: ‘Two passions, for glory and for luxury, are the source of all our ills; we are wicked because of the one and miserable because of the other’ (53). But, her sentences are bereft of any religious colour or dogma. This book is a testimony to how philosophy and spirituality need not be frightening or out of reach. Neiman emphasises the need for an ideal and encourages that we strive for achieving it. And for this, we need to give an appropriate education to our children. ‘Children are not born acting on principle, and most adults never get there. If we want them to have a chance of doing so, we have to adopt an education appropriate to their development’ (58).

Neiman does a critical analysis of Rousseau’s *Emile* and establishes that it is ‘the clearest and most detailed practical manual of Enlightenment ever written’ (56). This volume also traces various stages of the growing up of a human being. The first experience is surprising and wonderful and thereafter the surprise wears off. This is what growing up is, says Neiman. She is not content with easy explanations and believes that ‘the claim that virtue is all there is to happiness is an eloquent variation on the fox’s sour grapes’ (114). Neiman argues that we stifle the interest of children to grow up by philosophising and learning, because it is easier to shut up questions.

Jean-Francois Lyotard asks: ‘Why Philosophize?’ (See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Why Philosophize* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014)). He says we do that because ‘there is desire, because there is absence in presence, dreadness in life; and also because there is our power that is not yet power; and also because there is alienation, the loss of what we thought we had acquired and the gap between the deed and the doing, between the said and the saying; and finally because we cannot evade this: testifying to the presence of the lack with our speech’ (*Why Philosophize*, 123). Neiman convinces us that growing up and philosophising are the same thing and that we need to do it for the same reasons as Lyotard’s. Only she does it in a much more eloquent and friendly manner. She gives her short reason for growing up: ‘Because it’s harder than you think’ (192).

Neiman concludes her book by saying: ‘Courage is needed to oppose all the forces that will continue work against maturity’ because it is a ‘process of permanent revolution’ (234). Many misconceptions are cleared in this book, which is a revised edition of the original publication in 2014 and has all the qualities of a self-help book and much more. For instance, our attention is drawn to the fact that Enlightenment was not Eurocentric. On the contrary, it questioned blind adherence to European ideals. This is a book on parenting as much as it is a book about rereading Enlightenment. Philosophy has for once become readable and more importantly, enjoyable. Recommended for anyone interested in human life.

*Editor*
Prabuddha Bharata

**Chinnamastā:**
*The Awful Buddhist and Hindu Tantric Goddess*
Elisabeth Anne Beard

Wikipedia has replaced Encyclopaedia Britannica. Yet if one reads the entries of each of the ten Mahavidyas in Wikipedia, then one longs for Encyclopaedia Britannica. Each Wikipedia entry has the same information and are haphazard. For example, the entries on Mothers Dharmavati and Matangi are mirror-articles. And the entry on Mother Chinnamasta is a disaster. (See ‘Mahavidya’ and the links to the ten Mahavidyas <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahavidya> accessed 06 September 2016).

Online searches regarding Mother Chinnamasta return arcane facts, mantras, and esoteric non-historical nonsense.

Elisabeth Anne Beard’s monograph is a readable source on Mother Chinnamasta. Unlike the material online that confuses the Buddhist Vajrayogini with the Hindu Mahavidya, Beard knows her subject. ‘Comparison of Buddhist and Hindu Tantra’ (75–8) is a concise discussion of the distinction between Buddhist and Hindu tantras available within the academic study of Hinduism and Buddhism. Studying Beard one understands that worshipping Mother Chinnamasta is to destroy ‘the internal enemy—ignorance which creates the illusion of separateness between a being and Brahman’ (105).

Motilal Banarsidass has done a great service by publishing this monograph as a paperback. But the book needs updating. Beard mentions that there is a temple of Mother Chinnamasta in Bishnupur. How is it possible that in spite of the Internet neither Beard, nor her Indian publisher has cared to either put in more about that temple or change the black and white pictures to colour? The plight of Hinduism as a missiologically oriented religion is apparent from this book. It is as if both the writer and the publisher want this book to be read by seekers after cultic and esoteric knowledge. But Mother Chinnamasta is not the patrimony of either Hindus or misleadingly fearsome tantrics. She is the Mother of all. Appendix I of this book detailing the Mother’s thousand names proves her universal Motherhood.

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Hatred and Forgiveness
Julia Kristeva
Trans. Jeanine Herman

The author Julia Kristeva says: ‘The disabled person opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled.’ She addresses ‘the very borders of the human species’ and finds it exploding (29) since disabilities cause anxiety in those who feel themselves mistakenly integrated. In short, disability evokes hatred in the non-disabled. Kristeva’s knowledge of the Bible and Catholic Religious Orders in relation to the polis (35–8) is central to understanding this book as itself a work of caritas, a theological virtue. This book in particular might have prompted Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942) to write on the Franciscans in his The Highest Poverty (See Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2013)). Kristeva unabashedly praises the Franciscan way of life in this book (35). It surprises this reviewer that while Kristeva feels the need to study monasticism and Christianity and other religions to enact psychoanalysis, which is caritas in praxis, psychoanalysts and philosophers of the mind and cognition are stuck at Jacques Lacan’s (1901–81) clinical positions vis-à-vis clinical psychoses. To appear learned and confuse beginners, Lacan’s being a medical doctor is often forgotten. In universities around the world his Seminars (See The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 20 vols (New York: Norton, 2007)) have nearly made psychoanalysis theoretical, therefore redundant, and something so obscure that few understand what the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic are in Lacan! Kristeva’s book under review could replace Lacan in universities where Lacan is meaninglessly taught and generations of students search the Internet to understand terms which only clinical practice can make explicit.

Kristeva, on the other hand, is the real heir to