Troubles with a Second Self:
The Problem of Other Minds
in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument offered by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher of recognition) to the effect that even in another’s body, one must feel and recognize one’s own self, if one is able to address that embodied person as a “you”. The otherness of You does not take away from its subjectivity. In that sense, just as every second person to whom one could speak is, first, a person, she is also a first person. Even as I regret that I do not know exactly how some other person is feeling right now, I must have some general access to the subjective experience of that other person, for otherwise what is it that I feel so painfully ignorant about? My subjective world is mine only to the extent that I recognize its continuity with a sharable subjective world where other I-s can make a You out of me.
You are a woman, you are a man,
You are a young boy, or again, you are a young girl.
You are old, wobbling with a walking stick
You, getting born, become world-faced all around!

(Atharva Samhita 10.8.17–27; Śvetāsvatara Upanishad 4.3)

When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then [...] he is You and fills the firmament.

(Martin Buber 1958: 59)

Desire is defined as trouble. The notion of “trouble” can help us better to determine the nature of desire. [...] Troubled water [...] is given as a clogging of the water by itself [...] the desiring consciousness is troubled [...] because it is analogous to troubled water.

(Jean-Paul Sartre 1956: 503)

As used, the term (“I”) has a uniquely singular reference; but as understood, it is general in the sense the term unique is general [...]. You are individual to me primarily through my act of addressing and only secondarily through what appears to my imagination as your identification with or appropriation of your body.

(Krishna C. Bhattacharyya 1958: 382–383)

1. The main trouble with you is that you are a self, but not my self. This may be the root of the better-known “existential trouble” of human relations: that I want you, but cannot stand You. But in this paper I would like to address a different aspect of this troubled relation between the first and the second person, the one having to do with our epistemic access to the second person’s inner, especially emotional, states.

The trouble with you can be traced back to a more basic trouble with I: its demand for a uniqueness that it cannot rationally refuse to share with other similar uniqueness-demanding subjects. Yet what could it mean to share a uniqueness? If both you and I have to be unique with respect to the single property or being “the self” — like none other — there seem to be only two alternatives: either to strictly, numerically, equate you with I, because such identity follows from both being equated to a single Self, or, to take turns and sometimes recognize the ego alone and sometimes the other alone to be the only self. But neither of these would constitute a genuine “sharing”, let alone a “facing each other”, whatever that seductive verb means.

Thus, the I is in “trouble” in so far as it desires a you. Both the ancient Indian Upanishads and the modern Immanuel Kant give voice to this logico-emotional dilemma of needing and yet fearing a second, of “not being able to bear those without who one cannot bear to live” (Kant
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1963, 4th thesis). Kant calls this “the unsocial sociability” of human nature. The Upanishads call this “the self-imposed veil of ignorance of the self”.

In certain kinds of suffering, I feel so alone in the world that I have to befriend others to confide in them that I have no friends. This may sound incoherently and at best deliberately paradoxically. But the basic trouble is that I understand you best when I stand next to you in your troubled times and confess to you, in all humility, that I, as long as I remain myself, fail to understand you fully. I somehow open myself to your wound just when I feel most acutely and painfully that it does not hurt me quite the way it hurts you. Even to feel your separateness from me, I need to imaginatively try to fill up the hollow of your foreignness with the kernel of my subjectivity and face you as if I am facing myself, emptying myself from my first-person-ness and giving all my I-ness to you. It is well-known that solipsism is one view that can neither expect endorsement from a fellow-solipsist nor can acknowledge disagreement with another. Yet, in spite of such logical awkwardness, does not each of us, independently of the use of the first person singular pronoun, at least in certain pensive situations, feel imprisoned in a solitary bubble?

I would not be any one at all, I would not even be myself without you, unless I recognize my qualitative identity with and numerical distinction from you. I need you to speak to and listen to me, or even as someone whom I can noticeably stop talking to, or as someone who ignores and does not listen to me. I learned calling myself “I” from your calling me “you”. So there must be some translation rules from the word “you” to the word “I”. Yet I am not one with you (in the singular), and I am not one-of-you (in the plural). We are distinct as ego and non-ego, but we are the same as self or subject, and that is why when I refer jointly to you and I, I do not say “you” in the plural, or “the two of you”, but say “we” or “the two of us”. Together we are two first persons; but apart, I alone am I and you are another. Much of this may well be a linguistic muddle. But not all of it.

The other connected epistemological trouble with you is that when you are angry or happy, sometimes I know vividly that you are but I still do not quite feel your anger or happiness, because if I did feel them they would be my anger and happiness, and therefore not yours. Sometimes I can see that you are feeling an emotion when you really are, without myself having those emotions. Yet, the only emotions I seem to directly experience are emotions I have. It seems perfectly possible for me to see your nose without having your nose, but somehow not so easy for me to experimentally and immediately feel your rage without having that rage too.
2. How do I know that you are listening, reading, paying attention, perhaps — per impossibile — even enjoying this paper, that you are not bored? If you are distracted, upset, overjoyed or outraged, how do I know that? The classical answer, repeated by Dharmakīrti in Santānāntarasiddhi, is the argument from analogy. His formulation is slightly different from John Stuart Mill’s classic formulation of the argument which simply says that since my own bodily changes and actions are correlated with introspected inner feelings, other’s observed bodily changes must also be inferred to be preceded by inner stirrings of desire and feelings; since when I run to get some object, I first feel a desire for the object, the other must be feeling a similar desire when she/he is running. Dharmakīrti puts it more cautiously and negatively: since the movements and actions experienced in another body are not caused by any will or cognition within my/this stream of consciousness, they would either be uncaused, or caused by a will or cognition which is outside this stream of consciousness, belonging to another stream. Since we cannot coherently call such observed actions uncaused, there must exist other streams of awareness (cf. Stcherbatsky 1969: 69–70). Four hundred years after Dharmakīrti, in the same Yogācara school of Buddhist epistemology, another logician called Ratnakīrti wrote Refutation of the Other Stream-of-consciousness (Santānāntaradūṣāṇa) exposing fatal fallacies in any attempt at justifying a claim about another mind on the basis of an inference. The refutation is extremely sophisticated and complex. Let me run just a simplified version of it here.

In Indian logic, all inferences from the sign F to the unobserved property G have to be based on a prior knowledge of a universal concomitance of the form: wherever there is an F there is a G, such that F cannot exist where G is absent. Now, what is the prover-sign for my inference that there is another stream of beliefs and desires in you? It has to be your talk, your tone of voice, your facial expressions, your movements. What is the basis for the supporting universal concomitance? Well, it must be the agreement in presence and absence I observe in my own case.

In myself, when I do not introspect a believing and desiring states, I do not see any corresponding conversation or conduct either. Now, any failure to perceive something is not a proof of its absence. Only the non-perception of that which is perceptible is taken as a proof of absence, when we could argue: “Had it been there, we would have seen, but we do not see, so it must not be there”. Now Ratnakīrti asks a tough question to the I-to-you generalizer. This desiring mind which I wish to prove inside Your body — the so-called “Other stream of consciousness” — is
it visible or invisible? If it is assumed to be visible, and yet, I have never directly seen or felt it, then by the method of non-perception-of-that-which-is-fit-to-be-perceived, I would prove such states as Your pain or Your desire to be non-existent. If, on the other hand, we regard it as in principle invisible, like an electron, then merely the fact that I do not see it will never prove that it is not there. But if we can never be sure of its absence, we would not be able to establish the agreement in absence between these mental states and other's conduct and conversation. So how could we be certain that wherever there is sure absence of a desire and cognition, there is absence of movement and talk? The only way I could claim to confirm the universal concomitance between the external signs and the internal states to be inferred is by claiming to observe the presence and absence of internal states in many cases, even outside myself, in the presence and absence of the external signs. But to claim that is to claim clairvoyance — a direct perception of the inner states of others — which renders this entire analogical inference process redundant!

As if this death-blow to the inference to another mind was not enough, Ratnakīrti then proceeds to show the intrinsic incoherence of the very idea of a phenomenal subjective state which is not of the first person. If the other stream of mind-states were even possible, I would observe myself, always, as either distinct or non-distinct or as neither distinct-nor-non-distinct from these other streams. But surely the last two options are unacceptable. I do not perceive myself to be non-distinct from you. My very being myself consists in not being you or he. And to be neither distinct nor non-distinct is a logical contradiction which I cannot ascribe to Your mind-stream.

So, the first option is the only plausible one: I perceive the series of my own mental states as distinct from your series. But a distinction between one thing and another cannot appear unless both the things appear distinctly. Yet, by our own admission, I can only see or feel my own stream of perceptions, emotions, desires, pleasures and pains. I can never see yours. Thus, the distinction between my stream or its waves and your stream or its waves cannot clearly appear to me. Since none of the three possible consequences of its assumption can be accepted, the Other Stream of mental states is not even a coherent possibility. You not only do not exist, as a conscious being other than me, you are not even consistently conceivable! But the point of this exercise was not to prove solipsism. Who was Ratnakīrti trying to prove it to? The point was to show how useless any attempted inference for the existence of another feeling and desiring mind would be.
3. In the 20th century Peter Strawson raised the most constructive objections against the analogical argument for other minds. It is too mild a complaint to say that the analogical inference is a bad inductive argument from a single case. Even in the single case of myself the mental predicate cannot be coherently applied, Strawson insisted, unless I already know how to apply it to others. If the idea of a mental state or P-predicate were somehow uniquely ego-centric then it will not be a general predicate at all. The skeptical question which is answered by Dharmakīrti by the analogical argument, cannot even be coherently posed, because the concept of a person — a santāna or ‘stream’ in the Yogācara Buddhist case — would not be a concept unless there were more than one instances of it. The consciousness predicates, in order to be self-ascribed, have to be other-ascribable, because of the generality constraint on any intelligible predicate.

Strawson shows how we do not need to reduce your inner state of depression to your depressed behavior in a crude or Rylean behaviorist fashion. But neither should we be skeptical like the typical dualist, obsessed with the first person privileged access, whether any one other than myself ever suffers the very same property of depression. Although I know that I am depressed by direct first person introspection, whereas I know that you are depressed by using your depressed behavior as “criterion” for my ascription of that predicate to you, the predicate retain its sameness of meaning across these two sorts of application-rules. If it did not, it would not be a P-predicate. If psychological predicates were only mine, then they would not even be mine, says Strawson, coining one masterly maxim in his chapter on persons in Individuals (1959). I could not tell others that I am depressed, as it were my private language — and expect to be understood — if somehow my depression was mine alone. “X is depressed” is a predicate which I feel from inside when I attach it to myself, but observe from outside in you, and you feel from inside in you, but observe in me.

4. The contemporary Western scene in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, roughly, is an on-going tussle between two competing theories of our apprehension of the second person’s mind.

Theory-of-mind Theory. Mental states are theoretical posits like electrons or magnetic fields, and equally unobservable. Around the age of four, a (non-autistic) child starts manifesting his or her tacit knowledge of a set of causal-explanatory conditionals, connecting current behavior with future or past or current behavior or mental states.
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For example: “If she is so red in the face, she is going to cry”; “If he came back from the door, he must have forgotten to take his keys”; “If she got up in the middle of dinner, she must have needed to use the toilet”. Hundreds of such conditional interpretation-rules constitute the child’s rough-and-ready theory of mind which is also known as a “folk psychology”. One major rift within the Theory-Theory camp is between empiricists, such as Paul Churchland, who claim that a folk psychology is entirely learnt, confirmed and corrected empirically by the child from its human environment, and those innatists, such as Peter Carruthers, who argue that unless the child is born with a core Theory of Mind, it could not pick up more such law-like connections by observing and interacting with its similar others.

Simulation Theory. A competitor to Theory-Theory, simulation theory claims to be a “hot”, as against a “cold” theory of mind-reading. The core idea is enshrined in the popular idiom of oneself getting into someone else’s shoes in order to figure out how she feels. If A notices B in a certain condition and “understands” that B is nervous, anxious or embarrassed, the steps of simulation are supposed to be:
  — A observes B in uncomfortable position with certain bodily changes;
  — A imagines himself in B’s position and imagines having such overt changes;
  — A simulates, impersonates, pretends that he is B;
  — A (in the role of B) undergoes some feelings, experiences, beliefs, desires etc., as if they are A’s own;
  — A goes “off-line” — de-linking these mental states from his own ego-involvement;
  — The out-puts of this simulation process are taken and tagged on to B;
  — A knows or has some justification to believe that B feels afraid, anxious, embarrassed, etc.

Ignoring the big and small internal differences within this camp, what is the most vital distinction between these two accounts of mind-reading? It seems that they have split between themselves the two insights that originally prompted the analogical inference view. That view was rooted in the idea that we need to figure out or use some general premise to infer the current mental states of another, and that, in the process, our sense of possibly being in a similar position has some role to play. Now, T-T seems to have taken the inferential figuring out part seriously but ig-
nored the analogical “what if I were you” part. Thus, there is no need to
look within and feel the emotions that one is going to ascribe to the oth-
er for a folk psychologist who is completely uninvolvedly giving a theo-
retical explanation of the other’s behavior, in the form: “She would not
have cried if she was not upset”; “He would not have stuck to her in the
party unless he was attracted” etc. The mind-reader does not need to in-
trospect or play at introspecting in this account. But, my similarity to
you is crucial in the simulation theory and it goes through the “let us see
what I would have felt had I been in a similar position” in a spontane-
ous mimicking way, and to the extent I can make you myself, in this
make-believe re-enactment, the rest of the inner story is supposed to au-
tomatically unroll — following no set of theoretically articulable connec-
tions — as detachable narrative of my own pretend-branching-out life.
In their basic outlooks Theory Theorists treat others as alive objects of
explanation, studying them in interaction with each other but objective-
ly, ascribing them mental-state in the functionalist sense of the term,
whereas Simulationists are still under the common Cartesian spell that
primarily subjective mental states are best apprehended in oneself, and
then grafted on to others.

Empathy — from Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Simon Baron-Cohen’s
work on autism, Shaun Gallagher and new born child’s imitation of oth-
ers, Dan Zahavi. No empirical findings in recent times: the elements of
all the following six seem to be involved in mind-reading which is quite
easily, reliably, though fallibly done by normal adults:
— (innate) facial and muscular mimicry and emotional contagion;
— eye-direction detection;
— shared attention mechanism;
— face-reading cues;
— theory-depolyment;
— simulation.

Perhaps we should propose a newly recognized but perennially used
knowledge-source or pramāṇa: empathy which is a mixture of all six of
these. That solves the epistemological problem.

But, in spite of the emergence of such a synthetic view, the basic con-
ceptual issue — the trouble with you — still remains unsolved. How can
I directly and subjectively “experience” your pain or anger or desire,
without making it my pain, anger or desire? This is where I would like
to derive new insights from 10th century Indian philosopher of emotions
and consciousness, Abhinavagupta of the Kashmir Śaiva tradition.
5. Abhinavagupta first reconstructs Dharmakīrti’s version of the analogical inference for the existence of other minds. “It could be said that in myself I observe voluntary actions such as utterance of words, invariably pervaded by a wish of the form: […] let me speak” assuming the causal role, now such actions as speaking must therefore be preceded by such inner wish even in the body of Chaitra — the body which is not mine. By self-awareness I have established the connection between my will and my action. From other’s action I can infer back a will outside the stream of my consciousness, therefore the existence of another stream of consciousness is easily established. Could not we say that? (cf. IPV: 216).

Then he goes on to expose a fatal logical error in it: “Here, one who infers has two types of experience of utterance of words. At the time of establishing the rule of universal concomitance (vyāpti) the drawer of the inference correlates the experience or phenomenon describable as “I am uttering words” with the subjective experience “I have a desire to communicate”. But in applying the rule of vyāpti to the case of the other body, he at best has the experience or the sense-datum: “That other body is emitting words”. Now, this new phenomenon, “that body utters” unconnected with the subjectivity of the one who draws the inference, is quite distinct from the sign which has been established as concomitant with an inner desire, since that sign was “I am uttering”. The first person cause: my inner desire, could explain the occurrence of the first person effect: my utterance. How can it explain the distinct type of third person effect: his utterance? And, if I know that what I have to infer from your utterance is not my inner desire but your desire to speak, then I must have already formed the concept of you as another person capable of having desires, and the whole inference to the existence of the other stream of consciousness is rendered redundant.

So Abhinavagupta is threatening the classical analogical inference with a dangerous dilemma: either the sign or premise of the inference “uttering of words by the other body” is inconclusive because it has no pre-established general connection with the inner states of wish etc. Being based in one’s own case, the inductively generalizable sign would have to be “uttering of words by me” connected to “my wish to mean something”. The alleged inferential sign “emission of word-sounds from that other body” is entirely unlike the felt first person phenomenon of my uttering words. And the inference fails. Or, alternatively, one has already learnt to treat “he utters words” as a special case of “I utter words” (said with an “I” which is a mere place-marker for general subjectivity), in which case one has already established the existence of a first person — a self — in the other body and one does not need this kind of analogical inference. So the so-called proof
of other minds is either inconclusive or circular (iha anumātuh vyāptigrahanakāle [...] vyāpter eva asiddhīh; IPV: 217–219).

Modern Western (post-Cartesian) thought not only finds the problem of the Other Mind hard to solve, it also ends up finding the very presence of the other as existentially constraining and self-annihilating as “Hell” (Sartre 1958). Abhinavagupta, on the other hand, finds the You to be a foundational middle-reality between the pure Self and the apparent Non-Self in contrast and community with which the Self discovers its own playful knower-hood. He insists that even if we try to look upon the other person’s body as a mere physical object, the moment “this body” is addressed in communication — even when we say such dramatic things as: “Listen, You Stones, you mountains!” — it is completely enveloped with the I-feeling of the addressor. Every speaker-subject is ultimately the I (Śiva — the Supreme Divine). The this (nara — the mundane object) that is addressed as a you becomes a I-this (śakti — the feminine power). This Tantric principle of deriving the Second person through making an I out of the It, is beautifully reflected in the transformations of the German verb ‘to be’: the ist of the 3rd person, when immersed in the bin of the first person, becomes bist. (Taking out the contrasting m from asmi, and the contrasting t from asti, the second person śakti only retains what is common between śiva and nara: “asi”). The principle of addressing demands that when I say: “Hey You! standing there”, I mean that just as I stand and feel my cognition-will-action manifest itself as standing, you are standing too, thus assimilating your this-ness into my I-ness, and together creating an uninterrupted relishing of subjectivity. This is very far from a being-with or Mitsein that the existentialist could come up with in overcoming the problem of alterity.

“The sense in which the addressor and the addressee, though different, become one in the addressing is indicative of the parapara Goddess, whose characteristic is identity in difference” (IPV: 70–71). With similar non-dualistic insight, Ramchandra Gandhi (1985) has characterised addressing as a uniquely non-coercive, non-referential, quintessentially linguistic non-causal invitation of the attention of the other person, while giving notice of his or her freedom not to respond. Abhinava tells us that in addressing the other I address the self in the other, and thereby imagine myself to be addressed. In friendship and love we get an empathic re-discovery of the original unity of all apperception.

The second person which is characteristic of śakti, shedding its standard divisive use, acquires the aspect of the first person which is characteristic of śiva, when, for instance, one feels: “My dear friend! You indeed am I” (IPV: 27).
Both Abhinavagupta and Ramchandra Gandhi tell us about the convertibility of the I into you and the you into I, through linguistic acts such as addressing and speaking of oneself as another, such as in “Look at me, this is myself! Fie on me” (dhik māṃ!). This may prove that all that a single person comes to apprehend and imagine is somehow woven into a single self-enjoying creative I-consciousness, into some sort of unity that is tolerant of a projected plurality of times — my past, my present and my future. But what about the distinction between one cognitive emotive agent and another, between myself and others? Abhinava gives a very subtle argument to overcome that basic otherness:

First, let it be admitted that my own consciousness is known to me directly. I know what it is like to be self-aware and aware of objects. And if, say in the context of an effort at empathy with a friend, I feel acutely that I am not feeling this friend’s own emotions, as a missed feeling don’t I have to subjectively be aware of those emotions, in however inadequate a fashion? (IPV: 75–76).

In that sense, could not the unfelt pleasures and pains of another person become objects of my direct awareness as what I fail to feel just as a remembered event is experienced by the same experiencer as what is not now happening? My self-awareness manifests itself through my bodily activities, and I notice others’ bodily activities just as immediately as I notice my own, though there are differences of access set up by our habitual walls of individuality. Observable actions of sentient beings are quite distinct from mere physical movements. As Abhinava remarks in Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī (IPV: 105), the going of a living being is not like the movement of water, neither is the motionless sitting by a person similar to the motionlessness of a stone. Everywhere it is undeniable that we notice the actions of others as an action enlivened by self-sentient “feels”. Just as “He knows” is said as an abbreviation of “He is in a position to say ‘I know’”, similarly, “He walks” is said in the sense that he is able to make himself aware that “I am walking”. Thus even others’ actions are observed (not inferred) by us to be shimmering with the same subjectivity as I feel behind my voluntary actions. We must reject the suggestion that our knowledge of other minds is merely an analogical inference.

The word used by Utpala in the context (IPK: 1.I.4) of our awareness of consciousness in other bodies is uhyate. And Abhinava clarifies: Uhyate does not mean that others sensations are merely inferred. To do Uha is to intuitively extrapolate, directly postulate from “otherwise inexplicability”, to make it highly likely. Here, the process is partly a function of our sense-organs, we see that the other is in pain, we can feel their pleas-
ure (sometimes more than at other times), thus the word *uha* signifies “direct acquaintance”. “Distinguishing itself presupposes knowledge of the distinguished, and thereby bringing it within the light of I-ness” (*atra amse indriya-vayaparanam api asti* [...]. *tatasca saksatkaram upalaksayati “uha”* — IPV: 101). When we are thus directly aware of the power of activity in others’ bodies as something cognitive and conscious, this awareness inside others does not appear to us as a “this”, as a mere inert material property. To be a “this” is to be non-cognitive, non-conscious. Whatever the modern brain-mind identity theorist may say, when I say and see that my friend is in pain or my daughter is singing happily I do not mean thereby that she is undergoing some physical objective event in her C-fibres or in her amygdala or somewhere else in her body. I mean (even if I do not feel it as mine) exactly the same sort of thing that I mean when I say that I am in pain or I am singing (something as subjectively feelable as that). If a state of consciousness appears as a “this thing out there”, then it is not appearing as a state of consciousness at all, hence it is as good as not appearing. But others’ states of consciousness are “seen” in their faces and postures — to make a Wittgensteinian point, minus Wittgenstein’s allergy against the “inner”. Therefore even other’s mental states appear to us as subjective, as connected to the I. The otherness only belongs to the adjuncts and dividers such as these outer bodies, but the consciousness ascribed to them, qua consciousness, rests on the I-ness of the knower-in-general, as much as my own consciousness rests on the I-ness. Thus even the awareness in/of the other is indeed one’s own Self! (*sa ca para-s’ariirādisāhityena avagatam svam svabhāvam jñānātmakam avagamayati, na ca jñānam idantayā bhāti... bhāti ca yat tadeva aham ityasva vapuḥiti parajñānam svātmā eva*). It is on the basis of such a passionate and playful I-ing and you-ing of discursive consciousness that Abhinavagupta could write:

The free power of self-consciousness (*vimarsa*) can do everything. It can turn the other into its own self, it can turn the self into an other, it can identify the two, and it can leave aside and ignore even this unification of the self and the other [...] and this self-synthesis is nothing other than inner dialogue — a speech that is not ruled by artificial semantic conventions, but is an uninterruptedly self-relishing use of natural signs like inward noddings (IPV 1.5.13: 252)

Was Abhinavagupta anticipating the recently discovered close developmental link between mirror-neurons responsible for gestural mimicry and language ability in a child, between the sense of self and empathy, between action, interpersonal affect, and conscious cognition? He was surely embracing a more Scheler type “direct perception” view of our
knowledge of other people’s feelings. But more fundamentally, he was
gesturing towards a transcendental argument from the very possibility of
genuine empathy and interpersonal communication to the underlying
unity of all sentience.

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