Freedom and the Open Future

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Abstract: I draw upon Helen Steward’s concept of agential settling to argue that freedom requires an ability to change the truth-value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true and that this ability requires a metaphysically open future.

1. Introduction

The consequence argument is a critical component of the case for leeway incompatibilism, the view that free will, i.e. the kind of control required for basic desert moral responsibility, requires the ability (or power or disposition or opportunity) to do otherwise, and that this ability is incompatible with causal determinism. Proponents of this argument maintain that, if determinism is true, then our actions are a consequence of things that aren’t up to us, viz. the deterministic laws of nature and the past, and, as a result, our actions aren’t up to us either.

Here is one version of the argument that relies on a transfer principle by Finch and Warfield (1998) that is not subject to McKay and Johnson’s (1996) counterexamples to van Inwagen’s (1983) original transfer principle.

Transfer: \{N p, □ (p → q)} entails N q

\(P_t\) = a proposition that describes the complete state of the world at some time t in the remote past, i.e. a time at which no agent has yet existed.

\(L\) = a proposition that describes the conjunction of the laws of nature

\(p\) = any true proposition whatever

\(N p\) = p and it is not, and never was, and never will be up to anyone whether \(p\).

(1) \(N (P_t \& L)\)  
(2) □ ((\(P_t \& L\) → \(p\))  
(3) \(N p\) 1, 2 Transfer

1 The consequence argument traces back to Ginet (1966), Wiggins (1973), van Inwagen (1975; 1983), Lamb (1977), and others. According to causal determinism, a true proposition describing the intrinsic, complete state of the world at a time, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entails all other true propositions describing the intrinsic, complete state of the world at every other time. One may feel free to include in the definition of causal determinism that every event is (deterministically as opposed to indeterministically) caused at least in part by an earlier event (if there is an earlier event).

2 I am following Finch’s (2013) version of the consequence argument that, like Finch and Warfield’s version, relies on the Transfer principle below. Later I will be defending Finch’s (2013) further improved version that similarly relies on this Transfer principle. See also Widerker (1987), Vihvelin (1988), and Kapitan (2002) for further discussion of this and many other transfer principles. Note that the box is a modal operator that represents metaphysical or broad logical necessity, and the arrow is a material conditional.

3 The “never will be” phrase is my addition.
Since ‘p’ may refer to any true proposition, it follows that if determinism is true, then it is not, and never was, and never will be up to anyone as to whether any proposition describing their action at some time is true, and so no action is up to anyone at any time if determinism is true.

It has often been suggested that a dialectical stalemate exists between leeway compatibilists and leeway incompatibilists because of the charge that the consequence argument is question-begging against leeway compatibilism.\(^4\) Let me explain. Despite subtle differences among them, leeway compatibilists often distinguish between a causal or strong power over the past or the laws and a non-causal or weak power over the past or the laws. Utilizing this distinction or something similar, leeway compatibilists maintain that free will only requires a non-causal or weak power over the past or the laws.\(^5\) For example, Lewis (1981: 115) says that the Strong Thesis is false but that the Weak Thesis is true.

**Weak Thesis:** I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.

**Strong Thesis:** I am able to break a law.

The ability at issue in the Weak Thesis does not consist of an ability to cause a law to be broken or an ability to cause the truth-value of a proposition about a law to be different, whereas the ability at issue in the Strong Thesis does consist of an ability to either cause a law to be broken or cause the truth-value of a proposition about a law to be different; and similarly for the past and the truth-value of propositions about the past.\(^6\) Tracking this distinction, we may similarly say that there is a strong sense in which something is up to us and a weak sense in which something is up to us. Someone like Lewis may say that the laws of nature and the truth-value of propositions about the laws of nature are up to us in a weak sense but not in a strong sense, whereas our actions and the truth-value of propositions about our actions are up to us in the strong sense. Let’s now apply Lewis’ leeway compatibilist perspective to this version of the consequence argument.

Leeway compatibilists like Lewis will say that a strong or causal interpretation of “N p” renders this version of the consequence argument invalid because this interpretation of Transfer is invalid. In other words, just because we are not able to cause the truth-value of a proposition about a law of nature or the past to be different, it doesn’t follow that we are not able to cause the truth-value of a proposition about what we will do to be different. So, the conclusion, (3), does not follow from (1) and (2). On the other hand, when we apply a weak or non-causal interpretation of “N p” to this version of the consequence argument, leeway compatibilists will simply deny premise (1). In other words, they will say that we are, in fact, able to do something such that, if we were to

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\(^5\) Leeway compatibilism may be broadly divided into two camps: local miracle compatibilism (as endorsed by Lewis) and multiple pasts compatibilism. The local miracle compatibilist says that I can do something such that if I were to do it, then the laws of nature and the immediate past would be slightly different. The multiple pasts compatibilist says that I can do something such that if I were to do it, then the entire past would be different. To be clear, all leeway compatibilists deny that we can cause a law or the past to be different, and I do not dispute this denial for the purposes of this paper. See also the subsequent footnote.

\(^6\) A broken law is simply a law of nature that does not hold in the actual world. Graham (2008: 81, fn. 15) claims, persuasively to my mind, that Lewis seems to be rationally committed to the view that we can, in fact, break laws, i.e. cause a law to be broken. See also Looper (2021). However, to be clear, nothing I argue for in this paper relies on the controversial claim that leeway compatibilists are committed to the Strong Thesis.
do it, then the truth-value of a proposition about either the laws or the past would be different. In response to this question-begging charge against the consequence argument, leeway incompatibilists are perhaps justifiably predisposed to deny that we have any such weak or non-causal power over the past or the laws, despite its apparent substantive contrast to the strong or causal power that we certainly do not possess (cf. O’Connor 2000: 15–17; van Inwagen 2004).

I think that, even beyond considerations about the consequence argument, a general stalemate between leeway compatibilists and leeway incompatibilists will persist unless and until leeway incompatibilists maintain that freedom requires not only indeterminism but, more specifically, a metaphysically open future according to which all future contingents are false. A future contingent is a proposition about the future that is not entailed by propositions about the laws and the intrinsic or “hard” past. So, all propositions about what we will freely do are, according to this approach, false because all such propositions are future contingents, and all future contingents are false. To that end, I employ Helen Steward’s (2012) incompatibilist-friendly account of agential settling in order to offer three arguments for the conclusion that freedom requires an ability to change the truth-value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true (at which point these tenseless propositions are no longer future contingents), and that only a metaphysically open future can accommodate such an ability.7 The preliminary argument focuses on the relationship between freedom and time. The second argument focuses on the relationship between freedom and the consequence argument. The third and final argument focuses on the relationship between freedom and fatalism. I conclude by highlighting some implications for the relationship between freedom and deliberation.

In order to precisely describe the conclusion for which I wish to argue, I must first make a few clarifying points. Let us call the commonsense phenomenon of change over time within the same world or within the same timeline that may share multiple possible future timelines ‘intra-change’. For example, a substance possessing incompatible properties at different times within the same world or the same timeline, such as an agent’s standing at t1 and sitting at t2 in the same world or the same timeline, is an instance of intra-change. Next, let us call the unquestionably impossible phenomenon of “change” across incompatible worlds or incompatible timelines ‘inter-change’. For example, the phenomenon of traveling from one possible world W1 at time t1 to a numerically distinct world W2 at some time, or from one timeline TM1 at t1 to another incompatible timeline TM2 at some time, is an example of inter-change, and this phenomenon is, once again, undoubtedly metaphysically impossible (cf. Perry 2004: 246; Vihvelin 2008: 315–316; Rummens 2021: 527).8 Finally, let’s understand a freedom-ability to do otherwise as an ability that meets two

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7 In this paper, I am not assuming Steward’s position that all actions involve an ability to do otherwise. Rather, I’m only assuming the more modest position that all specifically free actions involve an ability to do otherwise.

8 Two timelines are incompatible with each other if they share a time that is intrinsically different in some respect, and two timelines are compatible with each other if one of the timelines is a part of the other timeline.

9 Denying the possibility of travelling across possible worlds is not, however, entirely uncontroversial because this position is not entirely neutral with respect to modality. To see this, suppose that we agree with Adams (1974) that a possible world is a maximally consistent set of sentences. If Russellian Open Futurism is true, then, as I will explain in further detail throughout the paper, a presently false tenseless future contingent, such as “Jill x-s in 2030”, can intra-change its truth-value from false to true. In that case, if Russellian Open Futurism is true and Adams’ account of possible worlds is correct, then we do travel across possible worlds over time. Suppose there is a maximally consistent set s that does not include “Jill x-s in 2030” as a member and suppose that s is presently true/actual. The set s becomes false/non-actual at any later point in time at which a presently false, tenseless future contingent, such as “Jill x-s in 2030”, changes from presently false to true in the future, at which point it is no longer a future contingent. At that future point, s is no longer true/actual, and some other maximally consistent set of sentences s* that includes “Jill x-s in 2030” as a member becomes true/actual. So, under these assumptions, Jill travels across possible worlds once Jill
requirements. First, it at least partly grounds moral responsibility, assuming that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities or some variant thereof is true despite putative counterexamples by Frankfurt-style cases. Second, this ability is being tracked in the consequence argument and, more specifically, in the ‘up to’ location in ‘N p’ such that whether p is true is up to an agent only if that agent has a freedom-ability to do otherwise.\(^\text{10}\)

With these clarifications in place, I’m going to argue on the basis of Steward’s conception of agential settling that a freedom-ability to do otherwise requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a specifically tenseless future contingent over time from false to true, at which point that tenseless proposition is no longer a future contingent. This ability requires a metaphysically open future, and, more specifically, the “All False View” (AFV) according to which there is no actual future and all future contingents are false. Here is the basic idea. If it’s presently up to Jill whether to x in 2030, then both of the following tenseless future contingents are presently false: “Jill x-s in 2030”, “Jill does not x in 2030”. Once 2030 arrives, if Jill x-s at that time, then the former proposition becomes true and the latter proposition remains false, at which point both tenseless propositions are no longer future contingents. Similarly, if Jill does not x throughout 2030, then the former proposition remains false and the latter proposition becomes true. In the next section, I provide my preliminary argument for the view that freedom requires the AFV by focusing primarily on the relationship between freedom and time.

2. Freedom and Time

2.1 Steward, Settling, and Ockhamism

According to Steward (2012: 39–42), a certain question, such as the question of what we are going to do, is settled once we freely act, and this question can be settled only once.\(^\text{11}\) The reason why this one-time-only idea of settling is meant to support incompatibilism and, more specifically, an open future requirement for freedom is that, if determinism is true, then the question of what we will do is already settled by the past and the deterministic laws of nature, and so there is nothing left for us to settle when we act.

Compatibilists can, according to Steward, only subscribe to a more modest conception of settling according to which a question can be settled multiple times because this notion of settling is only tracking causal dependence. For instance, an event at \(t_3\) can causally depend on, and be weakly settled by, both an event at \(t_2\) and an event at \(t_1\). To illustrate this point further, the question of what I will do tomorrow in a deterministic universe is settled by the deterministic laws and the state of the universe one thousand years ago, and this question is also settled by the deterministic

\(^{10}\) See Frankfurt (1969), Fischer (1982), Leon and Tognazzini (2010), and Sartorio (2016: 7–44) for a rejection of PAP and similar principles.

\(^{11}\) The notion of agential settling is also discussed from a compatibilist perspective by Perry (2004) and Clancy (2013), the latter of which proposes, contra Steward, a compatibilist one-time-only conception of settling. See also Steward’s (2013) response.
laws and the state of the universe one million years ago. So, if we wish to instead subscribe to Steward’s one-time-only conception of agential settling which seems to better represent the kind of control that concerns genuine freedom, then we must conclude that such control cannot exist in a deterministic universe.\(^{12}\) So far, so good. But what exactly does it take for a question to be settled, and is the falsity of determinism enough to guarantee that the future is open in the relevant sense?

Steward (2012: 13) accepts an open future requirement for freedom that is characterized as follows: “To say that the future is ‘open’...is to say that more than one future is genuinely physically (and not merely epistemically) possible, from the perspective of the present”.\(^{13}\) Notice that this articulation of an open future does not appear to exclude Ockhamism. According to Ockhamism as I shall understand the term, indeterminism is true, and so there is more than one physically possible future, i.e. a possible future that is compatible both with the entire past leading up to the present and with the laws of nature, but exactly one of these possible futures is actual, metaphysically privileged, or marked by a “thin red line”, and, moreover, there are true future contingents precisely because there is a unique actual future among multiple physically possible futures.\(^{14}\) I shall also assume that, according to Ockhamism as it is standardly formulated, if a tenseless proposition is true at any time, then it is true at all times. For instance, if it’s presently true that “Jill x-s in 2030”, then, according to Ockhamism, this proposition is true at every other time. Finally, I shall also assume that Ockhamists are committed to leeway incompatibilism.

I do not think that Steward necessarily wishes to embrace Ockhamism. In fact, the absence of any talk of a thin red line or a metaphysically privileged possible future may even suggest that Steward would want to reject Ockhamism and instead embrace the AFV. At any rate, I worry that a conception of an open future that that includes Ockhamism undermines the idea that some question is settled only at the time at which an agent freely acts. For, according to Ockhamism, a tenseless proposition such as “Jill x-s in 2030” was true millions of years ago, and so there is, I think, a clear sense in which the question ‘does Jill x in 2030?’ was already settled millions of years ago for two reasons: that question had an answer millions of years ago, and, most importantly, that answer cannot intra-change, i.e. change over time within the same possible world or timeline. The answer cannot intra-change given Ockhamism because if the proposition “Jill x-s in 2030” is true at any time, then it is true at all times.

We have seen that Ockhamists cannot subscribe to the idea that a freedom-ability to do otherwise requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition, and, as a result, Ockhamism is unable to accommodate Steward’s one-time-only account of settling. Instead, Ockhamism maintains that, if we have free will, then we can presently do something such that, if we were to do it, then we wouldn’t be in the very circumstances in which we presently find ourselves, where such circumstances include all presently true propositions. To illustrate, suppose that the tenseless future contingent, “Jill x-s in 2030”, is true and that Jill can presently do other than x in 2030. Ockhamists must then say that if Jill were to do other than x in 2030, then this proposition would have been false all along. In other words, this proposition that is true at all times would instead be false at all times, including the present time at which it is, in fact, true. So, the Ockhamist’s conception of a freedom-ability to do otherwise consists of an ability to inter-change,

\(^{12}\) If one is utterly devoid of the intuition that Steward’s one-time-only account of settling captures the nature of free will, then one may feel free to view the arguments of this paper as conditional on this intuition.

\(^{13}\) Steward does not define a physical possibility, but we may charitably suppose that, like van Inwagen’s concept, a physical possibility is one that is compatible with both the past and the laws. As we shall see, I want to define a physical possibility as one that is compatible with the laws and with both the past and the present.

\(^{14}\) For an articulation and defense of Ockhamism, see Adams (1967), Plantinga (1986), and Rosenkranz (2012).
i.e. “change” across incompatible worlds or incompatible timelines, the truth-value of a tenseless proposition. Steward’s one-time-only form of settling, however, seems to require instead an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a proposition, such that the proposition “Jill x-s in 2030” is not true unless and until Jill, in fact, x-s in 2030.

Before we turn to a narrower conception of an open future that excludes Ockhamism and that is more amenable to Steward’s one-time-only conception of settling, let us consider some additional metaphysical reasons as to why we might reject Ockhamism if we wish to uphold an open future requirement for freedom.

2.2 Against Ockhamism

A metaphysically open future appears to be incompatible with eternalism (also known as the B-theory) and the standard moving spotlight theory (a version of the A-theory) because either theory seems to be committed to a future that is fixed insofar as questions about how the future will unfold are settled.15 So, in order to uphold Steward’s one-time-only account of agential settling, we need a kind of contingency in which the future is not fixed, and this kind of contingency seems to require one of two versions of the A-theory: presentism or the growing block theory. The problem for Ockhamism is that it faces metaphysical obstacles if either presentism or the growing block theory is true.

More specifically, given either presentism or the growing-block theory, Ockhamism conflicts with the intuitive idea that either contingent truths require truth-makers or contingent truths supervene on being. This is because, if either presentism or the growing-block theory is true, then there is no actual future and, a fortiori, there is no actual future to ground or make true the present truth of a future contingent. There is no similar problem for necessary truths (perhaps because certain necessary truths don’t require truth-makers) or for truths about the future that are necessitated by the truths about deterministic laws and truths about either the past or the present. But there is a problem with finding truth-makers or a supervenience base for true future contingents that, by definition, are not necessitated by truths about the laws and truths about either the past or the present.

Ockhamists must say either that true future contingents simply lack truth-makers (cf. Tallant 2009), or that they presently lack a truth-maker but will have a truth-maker (Smith 1999; cf. O’Connor 1992; Rosenkranz and Correia 2018), or that they are presently true in virtue of a non-deterministic, non-concrete, forward-looking or future-oriented aspect of reality according to which, e.g., the proposition “S will freely x” is true because S will freely x (cf. Merricks 2007, 2009; Swenson 2016: 667). So, insofar as these Ockhamist perspectives deviate from the position that propositions with contingent truth-values require truth-makers when those propositions are true, or that truth supervenes on being, I would consider these perspectives to be less than ideal, although I acknowledge that not everyone will share these intuitions.16 To be sure, an Ockhamist can avoid the truth-maker problem for future contingents by embracing eternalism or the standard moving spotlight theory. However, to repeat, both theories appear to be committed to a fixed

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15 Eternalism is sometimes defined as the view that the past, present, and future exist, thus being neutral between the B-theory and the moving spotlight theory. This terminological point makes no substantive difference to the current discussion.

16 Swenson (2016: 666–668) considers some other suggestions for non-concrete truth-makers of future contingents given presentism, and I share Swenson’s dissatisfaction with these suggestions for the reason mentioned in the next paragraph, viz. that they are less ideologically parsimonious than the position that there are no true future contingents. I return to this issue in subsection 3.3.
future, and so neither theory is able to accommodate Steward’s one-time-only conception of agential settling. So, embracing either eternalism or the moving spotlight theory in order to solve the truth-maker problem comes at the cost of giving up on Steward’s one-time-only account of settling.

There are additional reasons to think that Ockhamism is false that are completely independent of considerations about freedom. I reject Ockhamism on the grounds that it is ideologically more parsimonious to suppose that there are no contingent truths that are brute in the sense of lacking truth-makers and not supervening on being, and so there are no brutally true libertarian counterfactuals of freedom or brutally true future contingents (Sider 2011: 153–156). Similarly, on grounds of ideological parsimony, I say that there is no non-deterministic, non-concrete, forward-looking or future-oriented aspect of reality, and no thin red line or metaphysically privileged actual future among multiple physically possible futures.17 If there are multiple physically possible futures, then, on grounds of ideological parsimony, none of them are actual, or metaphysically privileged, or glowing with a thin red line.18

2.3 Open Futurism

Some may be sympathetic to some of the aforementioned criticisms of Ockhamism but deny that the alternative open future views incur smaller costs. For example, let us define Aristotelian Open Futurism as the view that there is no actual future and that all future contingents are neither true nor false (cf. Łukasiewicz 1957; Prior 1957).19 Some object to this view on the grounds that it is inconsistent with classical logic and, specifically, with bivalence or the law of excluded middle (van Inwagen 1983: 50–54; Merricks 2009: 39–40).20 In other words, Aristotelian Open Futurism conflicts with the intuitive idea that every proposition has a determinate truth-value of being either true or false. I accept this criticism and, consequently, I prefer the AFV precisely because it is consistent with both bivalence and the law of excluded middle.21 The specific version of the AFV to which I will subscribe is Todd’s (2016: 792) Russellian Open Futurism according to which the

17 Presentists who wish to maintain that there are no (indeterministic) non-concrete, forward-looking aspects of reality must mark some metaphysical difference between the past and the future because there seem to be non-concrete, backward-looking aspects of reality insofar as there appear to be truths about the past even in indeterministic worlds, though see Markosian (2013) and Inghthorsson (2016: 136–139) for a different perspective in which there are no past contingent truths given presentism and indeterminism. One could adopt Forrest’s (2004) view that, unlike the present, the past exists but is devoid of sentience, or adopt McDaniel’s (2017: 78–108) ontological pluralist version of presentism according to which there is a present mode of being and a past mode of being. Moreover, an A-theorist must arguably draw some metaphysical difference between the past and the present anyway in order to avoid the epistemic or ‘when am I’ objection that is often directed at the growing block and moving spotlight theories (cf. Miller 2019). Henceforth I assume that there is some satisfying account of the metaphysical difference between the past and the future insofar as the past is fixed (as is the present) and the future is open, and I assume that there is some metaphysical difference between that past and the present that allows one to circumvent the epistemic or ‘when am I’ objection. See also Grandjean’s (2021) discussion of the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future.

18 See Belnap & Green (1994), MacFarlane (2003), and Barnes & Cameron (2011) for a critique of Ockhamism’s ability to account for a metaphysically open future

19 Aristotle himself may not have been an Aristotelian in this sense. I set aside this important question for the purposes of this paper.

20 In The Nature of the Gods, Cicero (45 BC/2009: 12–13) attributes something like Aristotelian Open Futurism to Epicurus in order to escape logical fatalism. Cicero also attributes a similar critique of Aristotelian Open Futurism on behalf of the Academic Skeptic, Gaius Cotta, who is in dialogue with the Epicurean, Gaius Vellius.

21 See Andreoletti’s (2019) discussion of how both Aristotelian Open Futurism and the AFV critically engage in a similar way with arguments for fatalism.
semantics for tensed propositions about the future of the form “it will be the case that P” are as follows.22

(UAF-R*) It will be the case that p iff there exists a unique actual future, and that future features p, OR p is true in all causally possible futures.23

Here’s why this open future view is Russellian in spirit. The negation of “the present king of France is bald” is not “the present king of France is not bald”. Instead, its negation is “it’s not the case that the present king of France is bald” which does not assume that there is a present king of France (Russell 1905). Similarly, the negation of “Jill will x” is not “Jill will not-x”. Instead, its negation is “It’s not the case that Jill will x”, and this latter proposition does not assume that there is a unique thin red line or a metaphysically privileged actual future among multiple physically possible futures. So, just as the disjunction, “the present king of France is bald or the present king of France is not bald”, is false in virtue of each disjunct wrongly presupposing that there is a present king of France, the following disjunction, “Jill will x or Jill will not-x”, is similarly false in the right sort of indeterministic universe in virtue of each disjunct wrongly presupposing that there is a unique actual future among multiple physically possible futures, or in virtue of each disjunct wrongly presupposing that a proposition such as “Jill x-s” or “Jill doesn’t x” is true in all causally possible futures. In a word, neither disjunction is of the form ‘P or not-P’, despite surface-level appearances.

The second disjunct of UAF-R* accounts for, among other things, truths concerning deterministic aspects of an overall indeterministic universe. For example, suppose that it is causally determined that Jill will purchase a soda, but it is not causally determined as to which soda Jill will purchase. Even though there is more than one physically possible future, the tenseless proposition “Jill purchases a soda” is true at some point in time in all physically possible futures, and so the tensed proposition, “it will be the case that Jill purchases a soda” is presently true. The second disjunct of UAF-R* also accounts for metaphysical necessities in all physically possible futures as exemplified, e.g., in the proposition “it will be the case that 2+2=4”.

Another kind of open future view is that of Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron (2008, 2011) and Cameron (2015). They argue that a metaphysically open future is compatible with determinism, eternalism, and the moving spotlight theory respectively and that a disjunction like “Jill will x or Jill will not-x” may be true, but it may be metaphysically indeterminate as to which disjunct is true. I prefer Russellian Open Futurism over this position because Russellian Open Futurism fits better with classical logic and, more specifically, with the idea that if a disjunction is true, then it is true in virtue of at least one of its disjuncts being (determinately) true. For this reason, I contend that if the future is metaphysically open in the sense required for freedom, then determinism is false and some version of the A-theory other than the moving spotlight theory is true.

I want to supplement Todd’s semantics for tensed propositions about the future with similar semantics for tenseless propositions about the future. Let’s say that the semantics for a tenseless future contingent such as, “Jill x-s in 2030”, look something like this: “there exists a unique actual

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22 According to earlier versions of the AFV, “it will be the case that p” is true just in case the event corresponding to proposition p is causally determined to occur (Hartshorne 1941; Prior 1957). If my aforementioned case against Ockhamism (that, on grounds of ideological parsimony, there is no actual future among multiple physically possible futures) is correct, then the distinction between these semantics for future contingents and Todd’s semantics seems to collapse.

23 Todd’s notion of a causally possible future seems to be the same as van Inwagen’s notion of a physically possible future.
timeline leading up to and including 2030, and that timeline features Jill’s x-ing”. So, just as the disjunction “Jill will x or Jill will not-x” is presently false in the right sort of indeterministic universe, so too the following disjunction of tenseless propositions, “Jill x-s in 2030 or Jill does not x in 2030”, is presently false in the right sort of indeterministic universe, but it becomes true in 2030 in virtue of one of its disjuncts becoming true in 2030, at which point neither disjunct is a future contingent.\(^{24}\)

In the next subsection, I wish to further clarify the relationship between time and the truth-values of propositions.

\(^{24}\) In order to maintain this symmetry between disjunctions of tensed future contingents and disjunctions of tenseless future contingents, a slight revision to UAF-R* is necessary, as I will now explain. Todd (2016: 794–795) rightly maintains that the following disjunction of tensed future contingents,

\[ (A) \text{“Phar Lap will win or Phar Lap will not win”} \]

is presently false because each disjunct wrongly presupposes that there is a unique actual future among multiple physically possible futures. Now, unlike the disjunction of tensed future contingents, the following disjunction of tenseless propositions that are presently future contingents is, we may suppose, true in all physically possible futures (where ‘t’ refers to some future time):

\[ (B) \text{“Phar Lap wins at } t \text{ or Phar Lap does not win at } t' \text{”}. \]

Given both the second disjunct of UAF-R* and the truth of (B) in all physically possible futures, it follows that the following proposition is presently true:

\[ (C) \text{“It will be the case that either Phar Lap wins at } t \text{ or Phar Lap does not win at } t' \text{”}. \]

I find it odd that (C) is presently true even though (A) is presently false. Moreover, Todd does not explicitly say whether disjunctions of specifically tenseless future contingents like (B) can be presently true, and it is not clear what should be said in light of this aforementioned oddity. I want to say that (A), (B), and (C) are all presently false, and, as a result, I wish to revise the semantics for propositions about the future in the following manner:

\[ (UAF-R**) \text{It will be the case that } p \text{ is presently true iff there exists a unique actual future, and that future features } p, \text{ OR } p \text{ is true in all physically possible futures, and } p \text{ is true in those physically possible futures not in virtue of some numerically distinct tenseless proposition } q \text{ that (i) is true in those respective futures, and that (ii) is presently a false tenseless future contingent.} \]

According to this proposal, it is presently true that,

\[ (D) \text{“It will be the case that } 2+2=4 \text{”} \]

because “2+2=4” is true in all physically possible futures, and “2+2=4” is true in those physically possible futures not in virtue of some numerically distinct tenseless proposition q that (i) is true in those respective futures and that (ii) is presently a false tenseless future contingent. In contrast to “2+2=4”, even if (B) is true in all physically possible futures, UAF-R** implies that (B) is presently false because (B) is true in those physically possible futures in virtue of some numerically distinct tenseless proposition q that (i) is true in those respective futures and that (ii) is presently a false tenseless future contingent. In some physically possible futures, (B) is true in those futures in virtue of “Phar Lap wins at t” being true in those futures, and (B) is true in all other physically possible futures in virtue of “Phar Lap does not win at t’” being true in those futures.
2.4 Truth-Values Are in Time

So far, I’ve argued that the kind of metaphysically open future that accommodates Steward’s one-time-only form of settling requires some version of the A-theory other than the standard moving spotlight theory. A-theorists maintain that at least tensed propositions have their truth-values in time as opposed to timelessly because A-theorists are realists about tense, and irreducibly tensed propositions intra-change their truth-value in virtue of events intra-changing from future to present and from present to past.25 For instance, the tensed proposition “the 2025 championship will occur” intra-changes from true to false once the championship passes from future to past. I also accept that there are tensed propositions without specific dates or “time-determinations” whose truth-values may also intra-change over time.26 For instance, the tensed proposition, “it is presently raining” is true when it’s raining and becomes false once it stops raining, and this proposition once again becomes true once it rains again, and so forth.

Some philosophers such as van Inwagen (1983: 34) think that propositions have their truth-values eternally or, perhaps more accurately, timelessly, and so the truth-values of propositions cannot intra-change: “[I]t would seem that if a proposition is true at some particular moment then it must be true at every moment”. Van Inwagen (1983: 35) goes so far as to say that he doesn’t understand phrases like ‘true at some particular moment’, ‘true at every moment’, ‘remained true’, ‘is unchangeably true’, etc. This is presumably because, following Frege (1968: 553) and others, van Inwagen thinks that all propositions have specific dates or “time-determinations”, and perhaps also because there are no irreducibly tensed propositions, although van Inwagen does not appear to commit to a specific theory of time.27

For the reasons previously given, however, an A-theorist should find it quite natural to suppose that at least tensed propositions have their truth-values in time, and we need to accept some version of the A-theory in which the future is not fixed in order to uphold Steward’s one-time-only form of settling. Moreover, once we admit that all propositions have their truth-values in time, we should be open to the possibility of the truth-value of tenseless propositions intra-changing from false to true. So, for the remainder of this paper, I’m going to assume that the truth-values of propositions are, in fact, in time.

Although someone like van Inwagen is technically not a Ockhamist in virtue of being committed to timeless truth-values rather than truth-values holding in time, it is important to see for the purposes of this paper that the metaphysical gap between van Inwagen and Ockhamists is narrow. Ockhamists say that I can do something such that if I were to do it, then some proposition that has been true all along would not have been true all along, and van Inwagen says that I can do something such that if I were to do it, then some proposition that is timelessly true would be timelessly false. Crucially, on neither approach is it the case that I can intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition from false to true.28 I will thus oscillate throughout the paper between

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25 B-theorists may also think that propositions have their truth-value in time. Indeed, the so-called new B-theorists who take tense seriously, such as Lewis (1979) or Mellor (1998), claim that the truth-value of tensed propositions can change over time. However, as I will discuss in the next section, only a presentist or growing block theorist can maintain that the truth-value of tenseless propositions can intra-change over time from false to true.

26 See Brogaard’s (2012) full-fledged defense of temporalism. See also, e.g., Smith’s (1993) and Craig’s (2000) case for the A-theory.


28 It is also worth pointing out that van Inwagen (2008) seems to think that the Boethian or divine timelessness response to the problem of theological fatalism is in no better shape than the Ockhamist response to theological fatalism. Van Inwagen’s general strategy to establish this point is to replace a God with essential foreknowledge in the remote past
critically discussing Ockhamism and critically discussing van Inwagen’s approach given that any critique I provide of one approach may be applied to the other approach, notwithstanding the narrow metaphysical difference between them. In the next subsection I show that, unlike Ockhamism, Russellian Open Futurism can accommodate Steward’s account of agential settling.

2.5 Settling with a Russellian Open Future

From the perspective of Russellian Open Futurism, just as the truth-value of a tensed proposition can intra-change, so too the truth-value of a tenseless proposition that is presently a future contingent can intra-change from false to true (or simply remain false), at which point this tenseless proposition is no longer a future contingent. For example, as we saw in section 2.3, the tenseless future contingent, “Jill x-s in 2030” is, in the right sort of indeterministic universe, presently false, and once 2030 arrives this tenseless proposition either becomes true or remains false, at which point this tenseless proposition is no longer a future contingent. So, there has always been an answer to the question, ‘Does Jill x in 2030?’, and that answer has always been ‘no’, at least up until 2030. Once 2030 arrives, however, Jill might x, and if this happens, then there is a new answer to this question, and that answer is ‘yes’. On the other hand, if Jill refrains from x-ing throughout 2030, then the answer remains ‘no’.

We have seen that, before 2030, the question, ‘Does Jill x in 2030?’, has an answer, but this question is not yet settled because prior to 2030 this answer can intra-change. Ockhamists cannot subscribe to a similar conception of settling because they deny that the truth-value of tenseless future contingents can intra-change. So, unlike Ockhamism, Russellian Open Futurism is able to accommodate the idea of settling a question that was not yet settled in virtue of being able to accommodate the possibility of a tenseless proposition intra-changing its truth-value from false to true, at which point that tenseless proposition is no longer a future contingent.29

Given this intra-changeability of the truth-value of tenseless propositions from false to true, the Russellian open futurist agrees with Prior’s (1958/2014) Peircean solution to the problem of future contingents, according to which the following inference is invalid: if it is the case that p, then it was the case that it will be the case that p (Øhrstrom 2019: 74–76). To illustrate, suppose that the present moment is t1 and that the proposition “S x-s at t2” is presently false because it is a tenseless future contingent, and suppose further that you presently (at t1) assert this proposition. Now suppose that S x-s once t2 becomes present. The proposition that you asserted at t1 is false at t1, despite the fact that S ends up x-ing at t2, and despite the fact that this proposition becomes true at t2. To reiterate, at t1, the tenseless future contingent, “S x-s at t2”, is false because it wrongly

with a slab of stone in the remote past that correctly reports the propositions that a timeless God believes to be true about what we consider to be the future from our temporal perspective. So, if the problem of theological fatalism is parasitic on the more general problem of non-theological or logical fatalism, then van Inwagen should likewise think that the Ockhamist response to logical fatalism, which assumes that the truth-values of propositions are in time, is in no worse shape than a response to logical fatalism that assumes timeless truth-values (cf. Taylor 1962: 57).

29 Another view of time that is compatible with this kind of intra-change is Geachianism (Todd 2011). I will not explore Geachianism here partly because I think that Russellian Open Futurism is the more plausible perspective on the nature of time. Geachians deny, and Russellian open futurists affirm, the following quote from Taylor (1974: 66), at least if we replace ‘statement’ with ‘tenseless proposition’: “No power in heaven or earth can render false a statement that is true. It has never been done, and never will be.” On the other hand, both Geachians and Russellian open futurists deny that no power in heaven or earth can render true over time a tenseless proposition that is presently false.
presupposes that there is an actual future timeline extending to \( t_2 \), irrespective of our supposition that this proposition becomes true at \( t_2 \).\(^{30}\)

Even if we know the present truth-value of all propositions in an indeterministic universe, there is still a sort of inexpressible, or at least non-propositional, ignorance that we face towards the future if Russellian Open Futurism is true.\(^ {31}\) Even if we know that all future contingents are false and we know all true propositions, there is still a sense in which, if we are allowed to speak loosely, we don’t know how the future will unfold. This is because a complete or exhausted propositional description of reality does not imply that reality itself is complete or exhausted.\(^ {32}\) Indeed, the Russellian open futurist denies that reality is complete or exhausted precisely because the future is metaphysically open. And it is precisely this incomplete or unexhausted aspect of reality that provides genuine metaphysical space or elbow room for a freedom-ability to do otherwise.

This concludes my preliminary argument for the position that, in accordance with Steward’s concept of agential settling, freedom requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition from false to true, and that such an ability requires the AFV and, more specifically, Russellian Open Futurism. I now turn to the second argument that focuses on the relationship between freedom and the consequence argument.

3 Freedom and the Consequence Argument

3.1 The Necessity of the Present and the Transtemporality Thesis

The garden of forking paths model of free will (Fischer 1994: 3–4) encapsulates the leeway incompatibilist’s conception of freedom, as does Ginet’s (1990: 102–103) claim that our freedom is the freedom to add to the given past, and, I would add, the given present. This model seems to suggest that freedom-ability attributions are to be construed diachronically rather than synchronically. In other words, when we talk about an agent’s present freedom-ability, we are, or should be, talking about an agent’s present freedom ability to do something in the future rather than in the present.

The question of whether ability attributions or, more specifically, freedom-ability attributions should be construed synchronically or diachronically has been raised before both within the context of free will and more broadly in the philosophy of action (Goldman 1976: 453; Carlson 1995: 77; Bykvist 2002: 47; Portmore 2011: 166). Van Inwagen (1983: 72, fn. 12) is not convinced that a diachronic account of freedom-ability attributions is correct, nor does he believe that he needs such an account for the purposes of arguing for incompatibilism. I think that this is mistaken because an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition from false to true is itself a diachronic ability rather than a synchronic one. To see this, consider the following

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\(^{30}\) Is there a sense in which your prediction at \( t_1 \) that “\( S x\)-s at \( t_2 \)” was true? The most I’m willing to say is that the proposition that you predicted at \( t_1 \) is false at \( t_1 \) but became true at \( t_2 \). All Russellian open futurists must face this prediction problem. See Todd and Fischer’s (2015: 34–36) discussion of various responses to this problem.

\(^{31}\) This concept of inexpressible ignorance is somewhat similar to Dasgupta’s (2015) discussion of inexpressible ignorance about one’s spatial location in Newtonian space. However, the analogy between inexpressible ignorance about the future and inexpressible ignorance about spatial locations should not be overstated since there is no actual future according to Russellian Open Futurism, but there are spatial points in Newtonian space.

\(^{32}\) Michael Dummett (1960) appears to make this questionable assumption in his reconstruction of McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time. See Ingthorsson (2016: 60–76) for further discussion.
two incompatible timelines, $W_1$ and $W_2$, such that $t_1$, the first moment of time, is the present time in each timeline.\footnote{\(W_1\) and \(W_2\) are not worlds but rather are mere timelines shared by multiple worlds. Recall that if at \(t_1\) all future contingents are false, then, at least at \(t_1\), there is no actual world. These timelines are incompatible with one another because different events are occurring at \(t_1\).}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (A) at (0,0) {A};
  \node (B) at (2,0) {B};
  \node (C) at (1,1) {C};
  \node (D) at (1,-1) {D};

  \draw [dotted, ->] (A) -- (C);
  \draw [dotted, ->] (A) -- (D);
  \draw [dotted, ->] (B) -- (C);
  \draw [dotted, ->] (B) -- (D);

  \node at (0,-2) {\(t_1\)};
  \node at (2,-2) {\(t_2\)};

  \node at (0,2) {\(W_1\)};
  \node at (2,2) {\(W_2\)};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{figure}

Suppose that \(S\) A-s at \(t_1\) in \(W_1\) and that \(S\) B-s at \(t_1\) in \(W_2\). Now, if we say that, at \(t_1\) in \(W_1\), \(S\) can B at \(t_1\) instead, then we are saying that, at \(t_1\) in \(W_1\), \(S\) can do something at \(t_1\) (viz. B), such that if \(S\) were to do it, then it would never have been true at any time, including \(t_1\), that \(“S\) A-s at \(t_1”\). Consequently, the truth-value of either of the following propositions, “\(S\) A-s at \(t_1\)” or “\(S\) B-s at \(t_1\)”, cannot intra-change over time. So, \(S\) cannot, at \(t_1\), intra-change the truth-value of either “\(S\) A-s at \(t_1\)” or “\(S\) B-s at \(t_1\)” over time. At most, \(S\) can, at \(t_1\), intra-change the truth-value of either “\(S\) C-s at \(t_2\)” or “\(S\) D-s at \(t_2\)” from false at \(t_1\) to true at \(t_2\).

Generalizing from this case, if we uphold the intra-changeability requirement for freedom in accordance with Steward’s one-time-only conception of agential settling, we should affirm the necessity of the present, the principle that nothing we are presently doing is presently up to us. For, the question of what \(S\) does at \(t_1\) is already settled at \(t_1\), whereas the question of what \(S\) does at \(t_2\) is not yet settled at \(t_1\). If anything is presently up to us, it is our future actions rather than our present actions.

The necessity of the present came into full focus with Joseph Campbell’s (2007) no past objection to the consequence argument. This objection targets the premise that we have no choice about whether some proposition about the remote past is true by considering the possibility that there simply is no remote past. An agent’s action at the first temporal moment has no past, and so the consequence argument doesn’t show that such an action in a deterministic world is not free.

I think that it is a mistake to concede to Campbell, as Brueckner (2008) does, that an action at the first moment of time in a deterministic universe can be free because, as I have just argued, Steward’s account of settling requires the necessity of the present. Loss (2010), Hasker (2011), and Finch (2013) defend the necessity of the present, and Finch (2013: 153) also defends a diachronic approach to freedom-ability attributions that is crystallized in the transtemporality thesis.

**The Transtemporality Thesis**: Necessarily, for any agent \(S\), any time \(t\), any time \(t’\), any world \(w\), and any proposition \(p\), it is up to \(S\) at \(t’\) in \(w\) whether \(p\) only if (i) \(p\) describes a state of \(w\) at \(t\) and (ii) \(t’ < t\).

In arguing for this thesis, Finch (2013: 168) seems to emphasize intra-change as well as the diachronic nature of free action when saying that “changes happen in time” and that “if a change occurs, it is true by definition that things were first one way, and then another”. However, Finch
(2013: 165) thinks, at least partly due to a commitment to bivalence, that truth does not capture the difference between propositions about the past and the present and propositions about the future. Instead, the difference between such propositions may be captured by Freddoso’s (1983) notion of accidental necessity, according to which a proposition is accidentally necessary at some time as opposed to being accidentally necessary simpliciter.

I accept Freddoso’s notion of accidental necessity. For example, I would say that, at $t_1$ in $W_1$, the proposition “$S\ A$-s at $t_1$” is accidentally necessary from $t_1$ onwards, but the proposition “$S\ C$-s at $t_2$” is accidentally necessary only from $t_2$ onwards. However, I do not think that this notion is sufficient to capture the kind of contingency that is required for freedom because Ockhamists may similarly uphold Freddoso’s notion of accidental necessity, and, as we have already seen, Ockhamists are unable to accommodate Steward’s one-time-only account of agential settling. For, according to Ockhamism, if, e.g., “$S\ C$-s at $t_2$” is true at any time, then it is true at all times, and its truth-value cannot intra-change. On my view, in order for the proposition, “$S\ C$-s at $t_2$”, to be accidentally necessary only from $t_2$ onwards rather than from $t_1$ onwards, this proposition must be false at $t_1$ as well as be subject to the possibility of intra-changing from false at $t_1$ to true to at $t_2$. To put this another way, if this proposition is already true at $t_1$ and its truth-value cannot intra-change at $t_2$, as Ockhamists contend, then this proposition is, in fact, accidentally necessary from $t_1$ onwards. Truth does, I think, capture the difference between propositions about the future on the one hand and propositions about the past and the present on the other hand. Unlike tenseless propositions about the past or the present, only tenseless propositions about the future can intra-change from false to true.

In the next sub-section, I consider Finch’s improved version of the consequence argument that is motivated by the transtemporality thesis and argue that, unlike Ockhamists, only the Russellian open futurist can consistently accept this argument while simultaneously rejecting logical fatalism.

3.2 An Improved Consequence Argument: A Problem for Ockhamists

Incompatibilism is often succinctly and correctly characterized as the view that an action is unfree if it is causally determined by factors beyond an agent’s control, but it’s important to remember that there are other ways in which circumstances may preclude an agent’s ability to settle the question of whether some action occurs. Given the necessity of the present and the transtemporality thesis, an action is not free when that action is not preceded by a time at which the agent could settle whether that future action occurs, either because that action is not preceded by the right kind of indeterministic causal connection, or because there simply is no such prior time. By presupposing the existence of a remote past, formulations of the consequence argument such as van Inwagen’s do not capture every way in which agential settling is precluded in deterministic worlds.

Given these additional ways in which an action can be unfree, leeway incompatibilists should follow Finch’s (2013: 161) version of the consequence argument that does not presuppose the existence of a remote past. The crucial difference between traditional consequence arguments such as the one introduced in the outset of this paper and Finch’s (2013) revised argument below is that the latter takes “$P$” to refer to any proposition that completely describes the world at any time rather than only at some remote past time.

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34 The notion of accidental necessity, in fact, traces back to Ockham himself.
\[ \textbf{P}_t = \text{a proposition that describes the complete state of the world at some time } t. \]

(1) \( \square (\text{P}_t \& \text{L}) \) \hspace{1cm} \text{Premise}
(2) \( (\text{P}_t \& \text{L}) \rightarrow p \) \hspace{1cm} \text{Consequence of determinism}
(3) \( \text{N} p \) \hspace{1cm} 1, 2 Transfer

Now, following Campbell’s (2007) thought experiment that motivates his no past objection, consider an agent’s action \( x \) that is performed at the first moment of time \( t \). That agent’s action is admittedly not a consequence of the past and the laws for the simple reason that there is no past. So, traditional versions of the consequence argument don’t show that the agent’s action is not free. However, suppose that \( P_t \) is a proposition that describes the complete state of the world at \( t \). Does the agent have a freedom-ability at \( t \) to do other than \( x \) at \( t \)? Not according to the transtemporality thesis. According to this thesis, it must be up to the agent prior to \( t \) as to whether that agent \( x \)-s at \( t \), and since there is no such prior moment, it follows that the agent’s action at \( t \) is not free.

I think that Finch’s (2013) consequence argument is sound and that it avoids Campbell’s no past objection in the manner just described. However, I doubt that any Ockhamist can rationally accept this version of the argument because, according to this version, “\( P_t \)” may refer to a proposition that is about any time, including a \textit{future} time, and I do not see on what grounds an Ockhamist may say that a presently true tenseless proposition about the past or present is not presently up to us, but that a presently true tenseless proposition about the future is presently up to us precisely because, given Ockhamism, no tenseless proposition can intra-change its truth-value. In that case, if there are future true contingents, then Finch’s (2013) consequence argument shows that, regardless of whether or not determinism is true, no one has a freedom-ability to do otherwise. In other words, if there are true future contingents, then Finch’s argument shows that fatalism is true.

The Ockhamist might attempt to revise Finch’s argument in such a way that “\( P_t \)” only refers to either a past time or a present time. This revised version of Finch’s argument admittedly remains silent about whether future contingents are presently up to us while still avoiding Campbell’s no past objection. However, it is implausible, I think, to suppose that Finch’s argument is unsound but that this revised version of Finch’s argument is sound. For, it is the intra-unchangeability of the truth-value of tenseless propositions about the past and present (and of propositions about the laws) that precludes our freedom-ability to do otherwise, and tenseless propositions about the future are, given Ockhamism, similarly intra-unchangeable. So, while this revision to Finch’s argument is admittedly silent about whether fatalism is true, it nevertheless seems to rely on a property of truths about the past and present that, given Ockhamism, is \textit{shared} by truths about the future. The truth-value of all such tenseless propositions are, given Ockhamism, intra-unchangeable.

The Russellian open futurist, by contrast, can accept Finch’s argument without surrendering to fatalism for the following reason. While “\( P_t \)” may refer to a proposition about any time, it must refer to a \textit{true} proposition in order for premise (1) to be true. This is because a minimal condition for the truth of “\( \text{N} (\text{P}_t \& \text{L}) \)” is the truth of “\( (\text{P}_t \& \text{L}) \)”, and, \textit{a fortiori}, the truth of “\( P_t \)”. However, according to Russellian Open Futurism, there simply are no true tensed or tenseless future contingents. Thus, in virtue of marking a genuine difference between a metaphysically open future, on the one hand, and a fixed past and present, on the other hand, the Russellian open futurist can systematically avoid the threat of fatalism by highlighting that, unlike the truth-values of
tenseless propositions about the past or the present, only the truth-values of tenseless propositions about the future are intra-changeable.

Ockhamists are likely to remain steadfast in their position that they can accept Finch’s consequence argument while evading fatalism. They are likely to say that premise (1) of Finch’s argument is false if “Pt” refers to a true future contingent about what we will do in the future because such presently true future propositions are soft facts whose truth-values are dependent upon what we will do in the future as opposed to hard facts that are neither partly about nor dependent upon the future. Notice, however, that this Ockhamist response is still in conflict with Steward’s one-time-only conception of settling. Even if a presently true future contingent is dependent upon what I do in the future, the question of what I will do in the future already has an answer, and that answer cannot intra-change. So, even if a proposition about what I will do in the future is dependent upon my future action, the question of what I will do is already settled. In the next subsection, I elaborate on this criticism.

3.3 Metaphysical Dependence

Trenton Merricks (2009) has also observed similarities between arguments for logical fatalism based on truths about the past and the future, respectively, as well as similarities between the consequence argument and arguments for fatalism. Rather than denying that there are true future contingents, Merricks rejects arguments for fatalism by underscoring a connection between freedom and metaphysical dependence. To see this, consider the following two arguments, and let’s assume that the proposition Jones sits at t is a tenseless future contingent at any point in time prior to t and that the present moment is prior to t.

\[(4)\] Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago.
\[(5)\] Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago, then Jones sits at time t.

Therefore,

\[(6)\] Jones has no choice about: Jones’s sitting at time t (Merricks 2009: 33).

\[(4^*)\] Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now.
\[(5^*)\] Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now, then Jones sits at time t.

Therefore,

\[(6)\] Jones has no choice about: Jones’s sitting at time t (Merricks 2009: 35–36).

Merricks (2009: 39–41) denies both (4) and (4*) on the grounds that Jones does have a choice about whether that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago and whether it will be true a thousand years from now. Merricks (2009: 36) thinks that everyone will agree that the latter argument fails and that, given the similarity between these arguments, we should likewise think that the former argument fails. More specifically, both arguments are unsound because truth depends upon the world, and the truth of that Jones sits at t in both the past and the future depends upon Jones’ sitting at t (Merricks 2009: 43). Moreover, cross-temporal relations of dependence,

\[35\] Todd (2013) provides a plausible articulation of soft facts in terms of ontological dependence.

\[36\] The premises are numbered differently in this paper.
like the truth of *that Jones sits at t* at a point in time a thousand years ago depending upon Jones’ sitting at t, do not involve backwards causation (Merricks 2009: 41, 43). I agree with Merricks that both arguments stand or fall together but reject both arguments on the grounds that both premises (4) and (4*) wrongly presuppose that there are true future contingents. Premise (4) is false because it wrongly presupposes that the tenseless future contingent, *that Jones sits at t*, was true a thousand years ago. Similarly, premise (4*) is false because it wrongly presupposes that, presently, it will be the case *that Jones sits at t*.

Merricks’ contention that Jones has a choice about *that Jones sits at t* because truth depends upon the world and not vice versa is, I think, mistaken for the simple reason that truth’s dependence upon the world is not sufficient for free will, even if it is required for free will. To illustrate with Campbell’s no past thought experiment, consider any world, deterministic or indeterministic, such that the time at which Jones sits, t, is the first moment of time.37 The proposition *that Jones sits at t* undoubtedly depends upon Jones’ sitting at t, and not vice versa. However, as we have already seen in light of my intra-change requirement for freedom (as well as the necessity of the present and the transtemporality thesis), Jones’ sitting at t is not free because this action does not constitute the exercising of an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition over time from false to true, and, given Steward’s one-time-only account of settling, a free action requires the exercising of this ability.

Bivalence is one of Merricks’ (2009: 39–40) motivations for maintaining that there are true future contingents, but, as we have already seen, the Russellian open futurist can consistently accept this principle while denying that there are true future contingents. Moreover, even if we grant Merricks (2009: 41, 43) that true future contingents do not require backwards causation, there nevertheless appears to be a problematic backwards-dependence relation between a presently true future contingent and the actual future. This relation is problematic because, on grounds of ideological parsimony, if indeterminism is true, then there is no unique actual future, and so there is nothing for an allegedly true future contingent to metaphysically depend upon (cf. Finch and Rea 2008).

To reiterate, there is no truth-maker or dependence problem if either eternalism or the standard moving spotlight theory is true because, on either theory, both *relata* of the dependence relation exist. However, the truth-value of tenseless propositions cannot intra-change if either theory is true. So, neither eternalism nor the standard moving spotlight theory help the Ockhamist escape fatalism, even if either theory helps the Ockhamist avoid problematic backwards-dependence relations.

Philip Swenson (2016) also employs metaphysical dependence in order to show that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with true future contingents, and, specifically, with God’s foreknowledge of true future contingents, even though the ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Swenson (2016: 662) provides a fixity of the independent past principle to establish that our future choices do not (even partly) explanatorily depend upon God’s past beliefs, but, if determinism is true, then our future choices do at least partly explanatorily depend upon the past. Here is that principle.

**Fixity of the Independent Past (FIP).** An agent S can (at time t in world w) do X at t only if there is a possible world w* in which all of the facts in w up to t that do not explanatorily depend on S’s choice(s) at t hold and S does X at t.

37 If we wish to be a bit more precise, we may replace the action of sitting with the action of deciding to sit.
According to Swenson, FIP secures the asymmetry between determinism and divine foreknowledge so long as, unlike the independent past, God’s beliefs in the past explanatorily depend on our future actions. Swenson (2016: 662) also thinks that this dependence relation is plausible if determinism is false.

“Given the falsity of determinism, it appears that there are no present or past conditions sufficient to guarantee that certain future choices will be made. But, given God’s essential omniscience, it would appear that the full explanation of God’s beliefs must include something that does guarantee the truth of his beliefs. Thus, his beliefs must be explained by something located in the future, most plausibly by the choice itself.”

Swenson (2016: 662, fn. 11) also notes, however, that one will not find these remarks persuasive if one is committed to the position that God lacks beliefs about future contingents. Swenson might have in mind Aristotelian Open Futurism. I think that a Russellian open futurist will find these remarks unpersuasive for similar reasons. If God exists, then God always believes (if God is in time) that all future contingents are simply false; in an indeterministic presentist or growing block universe, there are no present or past conditions sufficient to guarantee that certain future choices will be made, and, on grounds of ideological parsimony, there is no unique actual future among multiple physically possible futures. So, there simply is no true future contingent for God to believe in.38 Swenson is sympathetic to such ideological parsimony but is inclined to accept eternalism which does not face the truth-maker problem for true future contingents. Nevertheless, for the reasons previously given, Steward’s one-time-only account of agential settling is incompatible with eternalism.

This concludes my second argument for the view that freedom requires Russellian Open Futurism. I now turn to the final argument that focuses even more directly on the relationship between freedom and fatalism.

4 Freedom and Fatalism

4.1 How to Avoid Fatalism

Anyone who is committed to true propositions about what we will allegedly freely do in the future is subject to the threat of logical fatalism, the view that, as a matter of pure logic, and, more specifically, given bivalence or the law of excluded middle, no one has free will. Opponents of an open future requirement for freedom like van Inwagen say that we cannot deduce the absence of free will from the intra-unchangeability of the truth-value of some true statement S (van Inwagen 1983: 39), and this is because “it is within my power to make it the case that S was always false” (van Inwagen 1983: 42; emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that van Inwagen thinks that propositions have their truth-values timelessly rather than eternally, van Inwagen’s response is similar to the Ockhamist’s response. Both deny that a freedom-ability to do otherwise requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition. Richard Taylor rightly, to my

38 Immutability is a traditional attribute of God that is contrary to the view of the open theist and the process theist that God is inside time. It is difficult to see how the existence of a timeless being is compatible with the A-theory. But if it is, that timeless being is not omniscient in virtue of not knowing, and not being able to know, which moment is present. See Kretzmann (1966).
mind, protests against van Inwagen’s power in their personal correspondence (van Inwagen 1983: 42).

“You say you have the ability to render false the proposition that you will shave tomorrow…even though this proposition is in fact true. Very well then, let us see you exercise this power that you claim.”

In response, van Inwagen (1983: 42) considers this demand to be illegitimate: “I claim to have a certain power and the description I give of this power depends for its application on this power’s not being exercised.” This implies that a freedom-ability to do otherwise consists of an ability to inter-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition, and such “change”, by definition, cannot be seen because, as we have already established, travelling from one possible world to another is metaphysically impossible, and that which is metaphysically impossible cannot be seen.

Far from being an illegitimate demand, Taylor’s emphasis on the unobservability of van Inwagen’s power suggests that such a power is metaphysically impossible, or at least that this power misrepresents the nature of freedom by eschewing an intra-change requirement for freedom. Taylor’s demand for the observability of a power is closely connected to his more precise case for fatalism that relies on the following principle.

(A) No agent is able to perform an act in the absence of a condition necessary for its accomplishment.

This principle is perhaps prima facie plausible, but van Inwagen (1983: 45) rightly notes that it implies that no one can do other than what they do since a necessary condition for an act’s accomplishment is that the act is performed. So, (A) must be false, at least if ‘able’ is tracking a freedom-ability to do otherwise. Nevertheless, I think that Taylor is getting at something right and that his argument can be salvaged. To see this, let’s begin by considering the following modified principle that accommodates Finch’s transtemporality thesis.

(B) No agent $S$ is able at time $t$ to perform an act $x$ at time $t^* (t < t^*)$ in the absence of a condition necessary for its accomplishment at either $t$ or $t^*$, excluding both the necessary condition of $S$’s performing $x$ at $t^*$ and any true proposition at any time that is necessitated by $S$’s performing $x$ at $t^*$.

Principle (B) does not collapse the distinction between what one does and what one can do, and an Ockhamist or van Inwagen can arguably accept this principle without surrendering to fatalism. To illustrate, a necessary condition for the accomplishment of an agent $S$’s $x$-ing at $t^*$ is that $S$ $x$-s at $t^*$. Moreover, assuming that propositions have their truth-values in time, at least an Ockhamist must say that $S$’s $x$-ing at $t^*$ necessitates the truth of the proposition, “$S$ $x$-s at $t^*$”, at all times. Now, suppose that the proposition, “$S$ $x$-s at $t^*$”, is false at $t^*$. Principle (A) implies that $S$ cannot, at $t (t < t^*)$, $x$ at $t^*$, whereas principle (B) does not have this implication. For, although it is false at all times that “$S$ $x$-s at $t^*$”, principle (B) does not require this proposition to be true at

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39 I am quoting van Inwagen who is summarizing his personal exchange with Taylor. Although this quote is, strictly speaking, focusing on a tensed future contingent, the same charge may be applied to tenseless future contingents.

40 See Taylor (1962) for the full-fledged argument for fatalism that similarly seems to rely on something like principle (A).
any time in order for $S$ to be able, at $t$, to $x$ at $t^*$. Nevertheless, there is yet another principle that
is, I think, able to establish Taylor’s desired conclusion once we focus on the distinction between
what is true at $t^*$ and what is true at the prior moment $t$.

(C) No agent $S$ is able at time $t$ to perform an act $x$ at time $t^*$ ($t < t^*$) in the absence of a
condition necessary for its accomplishment at either $t$ or $t^*$, excluding both the
necessary condition of $S$’s performing $x$ at $t^*$ and any true proposition at $t^*$ that is
necessitated by $S$’s performing $x$ at $t^*$, but not excluding any true proposition at $t$ that
is necessitated by $S$’s performing $x$ at $t^*$.

Principle (C) implies that, if Ockhamism is true and if $S$ does not $x$ at $t^*$, then $S$ cannot, at
$t, x$ at $t^*$. This is because if Ockhamism is true, then the proposition, “$S$ has $x$ at $t^*$”, is false at all
times, and this proposition’s being true at $t$ is, for Ockhamism, a necessary condition for the
accomplishment of $S$’s $x$-ing at $t^*$. Notice, moreover, that principle (C) similarly subjects the
compatibilist to fatalism in virtue of compatibilists agreeing with Ockhamists that there can be true
propositions about what we will freely do and that their truth-values cannot intra-change.

Now consider the application of (C) to Russellian Open Futurism. As we saw in section
2.5, the Russellian open futurist accepts (or should accept) a Peircean solution to the problem of
future contingents, according to which $S$’s $x$-ing at $t^*$ does not necessitate the truth of “$S$ has $x$ at $t^*$”
at the earlier time $t$. Moreover, the falsity of “$S$ has $x$ at $t^*$” at $t$ is compatible with $S$’s $x$-ing at $t^*$
because the truth-value of this proposition can intra-change from false at $t$ to true at $t^*$. According
to Russellian Open Futurism, both of the timeless propositions, “$S$ has $x$ at $t^*$” and “$S$ does not $x$ at $t^*$”,
are false at $t$ in the right sort of indeterministic universe for the simple reason that, contrary to
what either timeless proposition assumes, at $t$ it’s not the case that there is a unique actual length
of time extending to $t^*$, and it’s not the case that either proposition is true in all causally possible
futures. But once $t^*$ is present, there is an actual length of time extending to $t^*$, and either
proposition may become true (but not both), at which point neither timeless proposition is a future
contingent. In virtue of being able to accommodate the intra-changeability of the truth-value of
timeless propositions, only the Russellian open futurist can accept (C) without succumbing to
fatalism.

In response to Taylor’s emphasis on the unobservability of van Inwagen’s power, one
might think that, despite the distinction I have stressed between inter-change and intra-change, no
one can observe someone exercise an ability to do otherwise. I respond by saying that the notion
of an ability to do otherwise needs to be disambiguated. According to my open future requirement
for freedom, no one has an ability to do other than what they will do for the simple reason that
there cannot be a true proposition about what someone will freely do. If it is presently true at $t_1$
that an agent $S$ will $x$ at $t_2$, then, given the ideological parsimony argument against Ockhamism,
we should conclude that $S$’s $x$-ing at $t_2$ is causally determined, and so the action is not free. If we
have free will, then we have an ability to do other than what we might do in the future, and it is
not impossible to observe this ability. For example, you may observe $S$ $x$ at $t_2$, and this action may
be the exercising of $S$’s $t_1$-ability to do something (viz. $x$) other than what, at $t_1$, $S$ might do at $t_2$
(e.g., $y$).

In the next subsection, I aim to show that the responses by van Inwagen and Ockhamists
to arguments for fatalism are structurally similar in crucial respects to leeway compatibilist
responses to the consequence argument.
4.2 Ockhamism and Leeway Compatibilism: No Intra-Change Required

Virtually all leeway compatibilists who do not rely on Humeanism about the laws in order to argue against the consequence argument, despite some subtle differences between them, concede that we cannot cause either the laws or the remote past (if there is a remote past) to be different. Instead, leeway compatibilists will say that, in a weak or non-causal sense, we can change the laws or the remote past, and in a weak or non-causal sense we can render false a true proposition about either the laws or the remote past.\footnote{Lewis himself embraces Humeanism about the laws, but he does not appear to critique the consequence argument by relying upon Humeanism. See Beebee and Mele (2002) for such a critique and see Buckareff (2019) for a related discussion.} Let’s review once again the distinction that Lewis (1981: 115) makes.

**Weak Thesis:** I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.

**Strong Thesis:** I am able to break a law.

According to Lewis’ local miracle compatibilism, an agent can do something such that if they were to do it, then some true proposition about the laws (and some proposition about the immediate past) would have been false all along (cf. Gallois 1977; Foley 1979: 73). Multiple pasts compatibilists similarly say that we can do something such that, if we were to do it, then the entire actual past would not have been actual all along, and true propositions about the past would not have been true all along.

Notice, then, that a substantive feature shared by leeway compatibilists like Lewis and by van Inwagen and Ockhamists is that a freedom-ability to do otherwise does not require an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition. There are, of course, subtle differences between Lewis, specifically, and other defenses of leeway compatibilism (even within the camp of local miracle compatibilism), but none of these subtle differences seem to cast doubt on the common feature that I’m attributing to both leeway compatibilists on the one hand and van Inwagen and Ockhamists on the other hand.

To see further the prevalence of inter-change, consider Rummens (2021: 527) who, despite subtle disagreements with Lewis within the camp of leeway compatibilism, says that “when we talk about an ability to do otherwise we are always comparing the actual course of events with an alternative course of events.” Rummens’ case against the consequence argument seems to hinge on this picture of an ability to do otherwise. However, from the perspective of Russellian Open Futurism, there is no actual future, and when we talk about an ability to do otherwise we are comparing one merely possible course of events with yet another merely possible course of events. This is because a freedom-ability to do otherwise is an ability to do other than what an agent might do, as opposed to an ability to do other than what they will do. Prior to the occurrence of the free action, it is false that that action will occur, and it is false that that action will not occur.

I agree with Rummens that, in reference to van Inwagen’s (1975) example, it is impossible for a judge to both raise their hand and not raise their (same) hand at the same time in the same world. An ability to do otherwise does indeed involve a comparison of two numerically distinct worlds/timelines, but, crucially, neither world/timeline is actual. If the judge has free will, the judge is able at some time $t_1$ to intra-change the tenseless proposition “the judge raises their hand at $t_2$” from false at $t_1$ to true at $t_2$ (or render this proposition permanently false from $t_2$ onward); and similarly for the proposition “the judge does not raise their hand at $t_2$”.
We have seen that, similarly to Ockhamists and van Inwagen, leeway compatibilists deny that a freedom-ability to do otherwise requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition. To be sure, leeway compatibilists disagree with van Inwagen and Ockhamists about which propositions are such that we can inter-change their truth-values, but this difference is, I claim, not enough for van Inwagen or an Ockhamist to either consistently endorse Finch’s consequence argument while escaping fatalism or avoid Taylor’s revised argument for fatalism that relies on principle (C). The fundamental flaw shared by van Inwagen, Ockhamists, and leeway compatibilists alike is the assumption that there are, or even can be, true propositions about what we will freely do in the future and that their truth-values cannot intra-change.42

In the final sub-section, I critique leeway compatibilism’s core commitment to Kratzer-style semantics for abilities and then show how responses to arguments for fatalism by van Inwagen and Ockhamists are similarly committed to such semantics.

4.3 Agentive Modals

All leeway compatibilists who think we have free will arguably must, following Horgan (1979) and List (2014), adopt a basic commitment of Angelika Kratzer’s (1977; 1981) semantics for ability attributions, viz. that true ‘can’ claims have the qualifier “in view of X” which is determined by the context of utterance (cf. Whittle 2016).43 A claim like “S can Φ in view of X” is true just in case “S does Φ” is consistent with the facts that are being held fixed given the context that is picked out by the implicit or explicit qualifier ‘in view of X’.

For instance, Christian List (2016: 169–171) agrees with Kratzer (1977: 342–343) that if a judge asks himself whether someone S who is a murderer could have refrained from committing a murder, the answer to such a question depends upon whether “S refrains from committing a murder” is compatible with only certain aspects of the situation, such as the agent’s general psychological capacities, as opposed to being compatible with all of the facts (including facts about the past and the laws) leading up to the murder.

I consider these Kratzer-style semantics to be roughly equivalent to what Mandelkern, Schultheis, and Boylan (2017) refer to as the orthodox view of agentive modals, i.e. agential ability and inability attributions, which traces back to Hilpinen (1969), Lewis (1976), and, of course, Kratzer (1977). None of these views hold fixed all presently true propositions when considering the manifestation of a present ability to do otherwise in the future, and which present facts remain fixed when considering the manifestation of a present ability to act in the future depends upon the context of utterance.

The underlying assumption behind the compatibilist’s commitment to the orthodox view is that the exercising of a freedom-ability to do otherwise is incompatible with all of the facts, which, as I have been stressing, implies that a freedom-ability to do otherwise does not require an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition. In this way, the orthodox account of the semantics for ability attributions, or at least for freedom-ability attributions, is biased against an open future because, according to my open future requirement for freedom, ‘can’ claims that

42 Mackie (2003) also underscores the similarity between compatibilist responses to the consequence argument and Ockhamist responses to arguments for fatalism. I want to infer on the basis of this similarity that neither response is tenable because freedom requires the intra-changeability of the truth-value of tenseless propositions.

43 Lewis (1976) also clearly relies on Kratzer-style semantics for ‘can’ claims in his assessment of various time travel paradoxes by subscribing to the position that a time traveler can do otherwise only if the performance of that action is compatible with certain facts, but not with all of the facts.
involve a freedom-ability to do otherwise do not need an ‘in view of X’ qualifier.\textsuperscript{44} We can hold fixed all of the facts when evaluating true freedom-ability claims because a complete description of reality does not mean that reality is complete.

Van Inwagen and Ockhamists are also clearly committed to something like these semantics for freedom-ability attributions by maintaining that an agent’s present ability to do otherwise is an ability to do something that is incompatible with certain presently (or timelessly) true propositions, and, more specifically, with certain true future contingents. Recall that, in response to the threat of logical fatalism, van Inwagen (1983: 42) describes his power to do otherwise as a power that “depends for its application on this power’s not being exercised”. For this reason, a present ability to do otherwise is, according to van Inwagen, an ability the exercising of which is restricted to a certain proper subset of all present (or timeless) facts.

If Russellian Open Futurism is true, by contrast, then agents may presently have a freedom-ability to do other than what they might (not will) do in the future, and, as a result, \textit{all} presently true propositions are compatible with propositions of the form “S does Φ” being true in the future once the future arrives. For example, suppose that, at \(t_1\), S has a freedom-ability to \(x\) at \(t_2\), and, at \(t_1\), S also has a freedom-ability to \(y\) at \(t_2\). In accordance with Prior’s Peircean solution to the problem of future contingents, there are no propositions whose truth-values at \(t_1\) are incompatible with either “\(S\ x\)-s at \(t_2\)" or “\(S\ y\)-s at \(t_2\)" being true at \(t_2\) once \(t_2\) is present (and no earlier), notwithstanding the fact that both propositions are false at \(t_1\). According to my open future requirement for freedom, we do not need to pretend that certain facts aren’t facts when we consider the manifestation of a freedom-ability to do otherwise. The very idea of not holding fixed all present facts in order to consider a possible future manifestation of a present ability obfuscates the kind of contingency that is required for free will. We need a kind of contingency that is compatible with all present facts, and this kind of contingency requires a reality that is incomplete or unexhausted. In other words, this kind of contingency requires a metaphysically open future.

5. Concluding Remarks: Freedom and Deliberation

I relied on Steward’s one-time-only account of agential settling in order to argue that a freedom-ability to do otherwise requires an ability to intra-change the truth-value of a tenseless proposition from false to true, and that only Russellian Open Futurism (or, more broadly, the AFV) can accommodate this ability. A freedom-ability to do other than what an agent might do in the future is one the exercising of which is compatible with every fact. Relatedly, I contend that when we deliberate about what to do, we aim (or should aim) to do so on the basis of all facts (or, at least, all of the normatively salient facts) because we are, as a matter of fact, deliberating in a certain set of circumstances, and, in accordance with the necessity of the present, it is not presently up to us as to which circumstances we are in when we are presently deliberating.

The so-called orthodox view of agentive modals does not fit well with this approach to deliberation precisely because this view does not hold fixed all present facts when considering the

\textsuperscript{44} A libertarian could, strictly speaking, adopt a maximally unrestricted version of the orthodox view in relation to freedom-ability to do otherwise attributions. The libertarian could maintain that the “in view of X” qualifier always holds fixed the past and the laws (Grzankowski 2014), and I would stress, the present. Weir (2016) argues that Grzankowski’s (2014) libertarian approach to Kratzer-style semantics does not surpass the dialectical stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. From the perspective of an open future requirement for freedom, there is, I think, a non-question-begging reason for why a freedom-ability attribution involves holding fixed the past, the present, and the laws. According to my approach to the necessity of the present, \textit{all} present facts are to be held fixed when considering the manifestation of an agent’s present freedom-ability to perform some future action.
manifestation of a present ability to do otherwise. If we instead reject the orthodox view of agentive modals and accept Russellian Open Futurism, then it is perfectly natural to hold fixed every fact when deliberating about what to do in the future. As noted earlier, the sort of ignorance that we face towards the future if Russellian Open Futurism is true is inexpressible in the sense that such ignorance does not amount to a deficiency in propositional knowledge. For these reasons, I maintain that contrary to Baker’s (2016) position, rational deliberation doesn’t require propositional ignorance.45

An open future requirement for freedom can also explain why many uphold an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, i.e., the requirement of, roughly, not knowing what one will do in the future in order to rationally deliberate about what to do in the future. According to my open future requirement for freedom, we cannot know what we will freely do because there simply is no such truth to know. There cannot be truths about what we will freely do. So, we trivially satisfy the epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation if we have free will.46

References


45 Rational deliberation roughly consists of deliberation without the possession of inconsistent beliefs that are salient to one’s deliberative purposes.

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