Art and Emotion

Filippo Contesi

This is a pre-print.

Please refer to the published version (*Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy*):

Art and Emotion

Filippo Contesi

Temple University

Introduction

The study of the arts in philosophy has often concentrated on the role that emotions (and affective responses more generally) play in art's creation and value. Philosophical theories of art have sometimes even defined art in terms of its capacity to elicit or express emotions. Philosophers have debated such questions as what it is to express an emotion in art; whether emotions form part of the value of an artwork; whether the emotions involved in art appreciation are of the same kind as those that we experience in real life, or of a different, even *sui generis* kind (i.e. aesthetic emotions); whether it is rational or appropriate to experience emotions in response to art; and what value, if any, there is in art that evokes unpleasant emotions. Although the focus here will be on what, to a first approximation, can be characterized as the 'Western mainstream philosophical tradition', discussion of the role of emotions in art can also be found in different approaches and traditions of thought: from Indian philosophy to cognitive science, to so-called 'Continental philosophy'.

General Overviews

The most useful brief introduction to the key issues in the contemporary analytic aesthetics debate is Levinson 2006. Neill 2003 and Robinson 2004 provide more argumentative and historically richer introductions, which have the further advantage of discussing the issue of emotion expression. Hjort and Laver 1997 is an exceptionally well-curated collection introducing the views of many of the most prominent players of the end-of-the-century debate.

Hjort, Mette and Sue Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts*, Oxford University Press, 1997.
> A fine collection of original essays on the role of emotions in art appreciation. The essays contained in it are written for the most part by aestheticians, alongside philosophers of mind, psychologists and literary theorists.

Levinson, Jerrold, "Emotion in Response to Art", in *Contemplating Art*, Oxford University Press 38–55, 2006.
> This is a brief introduction to the key topics in analytic aesthetics, originally published in 1997 but still very useful. It offers original (though on occasion debatable) categorizations of the logical space of the central debates that have occupied analytic aestheticians to this day.

Neill, Alex, "Art and Emotion", in Jerrold Levinson, *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, 421–435, 2003.
> This is a rich and thought-provoking essay. It is especially good at tracing the history of the different ways in which the emotions have been seen as central to art.

Robinson, Jenefer, "The Emotions in Art", in Peter Kivy (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, Blackwell, 174–192, 2004.
> This critical review of the debate covers a lot of ground both in terms of topics and authors surveyed. It makes an important distinction between cases of emotion expression and cases of emotion elicitation in art.

The Paradox of Fiction

Many have found it *prima facie* puzzling, even paradoxical, that we would respond emotionally to what we take to be fictional narratives, images and other fictional content. Philosophers have

discussed at least two issues connected to this paradox of fiction. The first issue concerns the rationality of our being moved by what we know not to exist or occur. Radford 1975 concluded that our emotional engagement with fiction is indeed irrational. Dadlez 1996 argues against this charge of irrationalism. Matravers 2005 offers a rich development of the arguments from both camps. What has created more interest, however, is a second issue, viz. the very possibility of emotionally engaging with fictions. Lamarque 1981 offers what is currently the most popular account of this issue: the so-called 'thought theory'. Walton 1978 offers an alternative account which appeals to what he calls 'quasi-emotions'. Coleridge 1817 famously suggested that engagement with poetic fiction requires a "willing suspension of disbelief". However, for reasons such as those outlined by Schaper 1975, aestheticians have generally avoided using Coleridge's suggestion as the basis for a solution to the paradox of fiction. More popular has been the view that we have emotions about fictional characters or events insofar as these resemble actual people and events we could have those kinds of emotions about (Charlton 1984). Finally, some accounts of the general problem of truth and reference in fiction have enjoyed some popularity as solutions to the paradox of fiction; amongst these are Meinong 1904/1960 and Thomasson 1999.

Charlton, William, "Feeling for the Fictitious", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 24: 206–216, 1984.

    An elaboration and defense of the view that our emotions for fictional characters are grounded in emotions and desires we could have for real people we care about, if we believed these people to be in the kinds of predicaments presented to us in the relevant fictions.

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Biographia Literaria*, *Project Gutenberg[https://www.gutenberg.org/files/6081/6081-h/6081-h.htm]*, 1817.

    The poet's literary autobiography. The famous passage on the willing suspension of disbelief is in Chapter XIV.

Dadlez, Eva, "Fiction, Emotion, and Rationality", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36: 290–304, 1996.

    A thorough and articulate rebuttal of the charges of irrationalism raised against fiction.

Lamarque, Peter, "How Can we Fear and Pity Fictions?", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 21: 291–304, 1981.

In this essay Lamarque argues that our emotional engagement with typical fictional characters and events involves genuine, garden-variety emotions. These emotions are directed at the contents of our thoughts about those characters and events.

Matravers, Derek, "The Challenge of Irrationalism, and How Not To Meet It", in Matthew Kieran (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*, Blackwell, 254–264, 2005.

A complex piece, which develops arguments for and against the claim that emotional responses to fiction are irrational. Although deeming the claim implausible, the author argues, it is difficult to refute definitively.

Meinong, Alexius, "The Theory of Objects", in Roderick Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, Free Press, 76–117, 1904/1960.

This essay develops a notoriously generous ontology, designed to give every mental state an intentional object. Meinong's ontology comprises both existent and non-existent objects, including fictional and impossible ones.

Radford, Colin, "How Can we Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 49: 67–80, 1975.

This paper brought the paradox of fiction to contemporary prominence. It argued that our emotional engagement with fictions is "incoherent".

Schaper, Eva, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 18, 31–44, 1978.

This paper defends a solution to the paradox of fiction which denies existential commitment to our beliefs about fictional characters and events. It is unclear that this counts as a solution to the paradox; nonetheless, the paper usefully outlines a number of important issues connected to the paradox of fiction and concerning the notion of *suspension of disbelief*.

Thomasson, Amie, *Fiction and Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

An elaboration and defense of the view that fictional objects exist as "abstract artifacts", i.e. as entities which lack a spatiotemporal location but are created and can change or cease to exist.

Walton, Kendall, "Fearing Fictions", *The Journal of Philosophy* 75: 5–27, 1978.

> In this extremely influential paper, Walton argues that audiences of fiction do not typically experience fear, pity etc. towards fictionally fearsome, pitiful etc. characters and events. Since they know that it is only fictional or make-believe that those characters and events are fearsome, pitiful (etc.), audiences only experience quasi-fear, quasi-pity (etc.), and are more broadly only make-believedly afraid, moved to pity etc.

The Paradox of Negative Emotions

Why do we positively value artworks (e.g. tragedies, dramas, horror fictions) the subject of which would, in real life, be emotionally negative or unpleasant? This is the central question posed by the paradox of negative emotions. Smuts 2009 provides a survey of different solutions to the paradox. Levinson 2013 gives a sense of contemporary approaches. The paradox has often been addressed with respect to specific art genres and emotions. Its traditional instantiation is often taken to be the paradox of tragedy, but other instantiations of the paradox have also been significantly discussed (see *Tragedy*, *The Sublime*, *Disgust* and *Horror*). An original perspective from the point of view of art creation is provided by Matravers 2013.

Levinson, Jerrold (ed.), *Suffering Art Gladly: The paradox of negative emotion in art*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

> A collection of essays about different emotions and art forms, which testifies to the enduring relevance of the paradox.

Matravers, Derek, "Negative Emotions and Creativity", in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), *Suffering Art Gladly*, Palgrave Macmillan, 207–223, 2013.

> Thought-provoking piece which identifies the roots of the paradox of negative emotions in the essential role that negative emotions play in the artist's creative process.

Smuts, Aaron, "Art and Negative Affect", *Philosophy Compass* 4: 39–55, 2009.

> A handy reference article surveying major solutions to the paradox. It also advances the author's original "rich experience" account.

Tragedy

The paradox of tragedy is typically traced back to Aristotle's 4th century BCE/1996 definition of tragedy. There, in a few words, Aristotle characterizes the typical emotional effect of tragedy on audiences as involving the *catharsis* of pity and fear. Such catharsis, variously translated as 'purgation' or 'purification', is typically understood as mediating a positive effect of tragedy, arising out of emotions Aristotle considered as unpleasant. Halliwell 1986 provides a succinct overview of the wide number of different interpretations of Aristotle's pronouncements. Slightly less cryptic, but also variously interpreted, has been David Hume's 1777 account of the pleasures of tragedy. Feagin 1983 advances a contemporary solution to the paradox of tragedy appealing to emotional meta-responses to tragedies. With a more general focus on negative emotions, Eaton 1982 and Morreall 1985 argue that the safe distance we are guaranteed in most works of art and fiction allows us to enjoy the pleasurable aspects of their aesthetic features and of negative emotions themselves.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, translated by Malcolm Heath, Penguin, 4th century BCE/1996.

    Classic text of dramatic theory. Chapter 6, 48b (4.1) mentions catharsis in the context of a definition of tragedy.

Eaton, Marcia, "A Strange Kind of Sadness", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 41: 53–63, 1982.

    The essay argues that the typical nature of works of art allows us to find pleasure in their aesthetic aspects, by affording us a sufficient degree of control over the negative emotions they elicit.

Feagin, Susan, "The Pleasures of Tragedy", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20: 95–104, 1983.

    Presents an account on which tragedy's pleasure lies in an audience's meta-response to the audience's first-order, negatively emotional responses to the events represented. This pleasurable meta-response consists in the recognition that our first-order responses are appropriately sensitive to our fellow human beings.

Halliwell, Stephen, "Appendix 5: Interpretations of *katharsis*", in *Aristotle's Poetics*, Duckworth, 350–356, 1986.

    This is a useful classification of the interpretations given over the centuries of the notion of *catharsis*.

Hume, David, "Of Tragedy", Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, *davidhume.org[https://davidhume.org/texts/tr/]*, 1777.

> The classic text outlining Hume's account of what he calls the seemingly "unaccountable" pleasure that audiences receive from "well-written" tragedies. The account appeals to a conversion of unpleasant into pleasurable emotion.

Morreall, John, "Enjoying Negative Emotions in Fiction", *Philosophy and Literature* 9: 95–103, 1985.

> A defence of the thesis that we can often enjoy the pleasurable aspects of the negative emotions fictions elicit.

<u>The Sublime</u>

The earliest surviving theoretical work on the sublime, in the sense of a grand rhetorical style capable of eliciting strong emotions, is Longinus 1st century CE/1995. In modernity, interest in the sublime shifts from being about a type of language to being about a powerful emotional and aesthetic response elicited by certain artistic subjects and natural scenes. Burke 1757 and Kant 1790/2009 are the classical modern discussions of the sublime in this latter sense. Brady 2013 offers an account of the major modern views and argues for the contemporary relevance of the sublime. Saint Girons 2005 charts the history of the sublime from antiquity.

Brady, Emily, *The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Nature*, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

> The first part of this book provides an account of key modern thinkers' views of the sublime. The second part argues for the sublime's contemporary relevance.

Burke, Edmund, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful*, *Project Gutenberg[https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15043/15043-h/15043-h.htm]*, 1757.

> This is a foundational text in the modern study of the sublime. Burke was not the first to be interested in the topic but provided a durable examination of it, with a special focus on the paradox of negative emotions.

Cochrane, Tom, "The Emotional Experience of the Sublime", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 42: 125–148, 2012.

This paper offers a discussion of the nature of the sublime experience.

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Judgement*, translated by J.C. Meredith, Oxford University Press, 1790/2009.

> This is perhaps the *locus classicus* of modern philosophical accounts of the sublime. It was intended by Kant to play an important part in his Critical philosophy.

Longinus, *On the Sublime*, translated by W.H. Fyfe, revised by Donald Russell, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1st century CE/1995.

> The parts of this treatise which have survived to this day discuss sublime rhetorical effects and the techniques that can be used to achieve them. The author is sometimes referred to as the 'Pseudo-Longinus', to avoid identification with the 3rd-century rhetorician Cassius Longinus.

Saint Girons, Baldine, *Le Sublime: de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, Desjonquères, 2005.

> An extensive account of the history of the sublime.

<u>Disgust</u>

It has sometimes been thought that the paradox of negative emotions is most challenging in the case of (bodily) disgust (in which case one may call it 'the paradox of disgust in art'). Kant 1790/2009 goes so far as to rule out that disgusting subjects can be sources of aesthetic pleasure. Lessing 1766/1962 takes a slightly more nuanced stance, whilst being sceptical of the appropriateness of a wide positive role for disgust in art. By contrast, Aristotle 4th century BCE/1996 seemed to think that representations can provide pleasure no matter how disgusting its subjects. Korsmeyer 2011 appeals to the semantic connections between disgust and mortality to make a case for the positive importance of disgust in art. Contesi 2016 provides reasons to doubt the importance of such connections for a solution to the paradox of disgust in art. Menninghaus 2003 offers a well-documented history of major views on the artistic importance of disgust.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, translated by Malcolm Heath, Penguin, 4th century BCE/1996.

> At Chapter 4, 49b (3.1), Aristotle claims that we delight in viewing imitations of the "lowest species of animals" and of corpses.

Contesi, Filippo, "The Meanings of Disgusting Art", *Essays in Philosophy* 17: 68–94, 2016.

> Argues that ideas of mortality are not sufficiently associated with our typical disgust responses to be able to ground a solution to the paradox of disgust in art.

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Judgement*, translated by J.C. Meredith, Oxford University Press, 1790/2009.

> In a paragraph of §48, Kant rules out disgusting subjects from the realm of the subjects that artists can turn into sources of aesthetic pleasure.

Korsmeyer, Carolyn, *Savoring Disgust: The foul and the fair in aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, 2011.

> This book defends the value of disgust in art, with a special emphasis on the emotion's (alleged) embodiment of human mortality.

Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, *Laocoön: An essay on the limits of painting and poetry*, translated by E.A. McCormick, Bobbs-Merrill, 1766/1962.

> Lessing's treatise was important for bringing to modern aesthetics a nuanced study of the effects of different art forms. Like other thinkers of the same period, Lessing expresses scepticism concerning a positive contribution of disgust to art.

Menninghaus, Winfried, *Disgust. Theory and History of a Strong Sensation*, State University of New York Press, 2003.

> A detailed investigation into some major modern views on disgust.

Horror

One of the more modern incarnations of the paradox of negative emotions is the paradox of horror (fictions). Carroll 1990 puts forward the classic philosophical account. Neill 1992 and Gaut 1993 suggest an alternative, revisionary solution to the paradox, according to which our affective responses to artistic horror are not unpleasant. Twitchell 1985 is a useful book on the horror genre written by an English literature scholar. Solomon 2004 has the merit of discussing the emotion of horror outside the horror genre.

Carroll, Noël, *The Philosophy of Horror, or, Paradoxes of the Heart*, Routledge, 1990.

The classic treatment of horror in contemporary analytic philosophy. It argues that the value of horror fictions lies in our fascination with horror monsters and in the cognitive pleasure of finding out how the plot develops.

Gaut, Berys, "The Paradox of Horror", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 33: 333–345, 1993.
Based on an analysis of the connections between the negative value and unpleasantness of emotions, this paper argues that horror, and negative emotions more generally, need not be unpleasant.

Neill, Alex, "On a Paradox of the Heart", *Philosophical Studies* 65, 53–65, 1992.
Argues that horror, and negative emotions more generally, need not be unpleasant even though the typical objects of those emotions are negative.

Solomon, Robert, "Real Horror", in *In Defense of Sentimentality*, Oxford University Press, 2004.
An illuminating and broad-ranging discussion of the emotion of horror.

Twitchell, James, *Dreadful Pleasures: An anatomy of modern horror*, Oxford University Press, 1985.
An insightful discussion of horror from the perspective of an English literary scholar.

Sentimentality

Sentimentality (or sentimentalism) is, especially in contemporary culture, often viewed as a negatively valuable type of emotional involvement in art. However, this negative attitude is not universal, nor is there much agreement on the naming and nature of sentimentality. Schiller 1795–6/1993 described sentimental poetry in positive terms as the art that most characterizes modernity. Wilde 1897/2000 by contrast famously defined a sentimentalist as someone "who desires to have the luxury of an emotion without paying for it". For Savile 1982, sentimentality is a mode of feeling or thought that involves a misrepresentation of reality. Solomon 2004 instead defends sentimentality as an "appeal to tender feelings".

Savile, Anthony, "Sentimentality, Vulgarity, and Obscenity", in *The Test of Time: An essay in philosophical aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, 236–266, 1982.

In Section I of this chapter, the author defines sentimentality as a particular way in which many different feelings and thoughts can be felt or entertained. Since sentimentality involves a "false-colouring of reality", Section II argues that it works against the chances of an artwork's withstanding the test of time.

Schiller, Friedrich, "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry", translated by D.O. Dahlstrom, in *Essays*, Continuum, 179–260, 1795–6/1993.

Distinguishes between two kinds of poetry: the naïve (most characteristic of the ancients) and the sentimental (most attuned to the modern age).

Solomon, Robert, "In Defense of Sentimentality", in *In Defense of Sentimentality*, Oxford University Press, 3–19, 2004.

This paper, originally published in 1990, argues that there is nothing wrong with sentimentality. It understands sentimentality with reference to a particular subset of tender emotions which includes pity, sympathy, fondness etc.

Wilde, Oscar, "To Lord Alfred Douglas", in *The Complete Letters of Oscar Wilde*, Henry Holt, 683–780, 1897/2000.

In a brief passage of this celebrated letter, which was later published as *De Profundis*, Wilde formulates a characteristically pithy definition of sentimentalism.

Emotion and Value

The value of emotions in art has been a topic of investigation for centuries. Plato 380BCE/2009 was wary of the role that emotions play in art. Aristotle 4th century BCE/1996, by contrast, saw a positive value in tragedies for their bringing about the catharsis of pity and fear. More recently, Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949 and Lamarque 2014 have argued that a proper assessment of the artistic value of a work of literature ought not to consider the affective responses of its readers. By contrast, Feagin 1996 defends the claim that an important part of the value of literature lies in its capacity to elicit affective responses in readers.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, translated by Malcolm Heath, Penguin, 4th century BCE/1996.

Aristotle paints a much more positive picture of the effects of tragedy than the one his teacher Plato provided.

Feagin, Susan, *Reading with Feeling*, Cornell University Press, 1996.

> This book defends the view that reader affective responses are an important part of the value of literature.

Lamarque, Peter, "On Keeping Psychology Out of Literary Criticism", in *The Opacity of Narrative*, Rowman & Littlefield International, 185–200, 2014.

> Argues that the features of actual affective states of readers and authors of works of literature should not play any role in judgements of literary value concerning those works.

Plato, *The Republic*, translated by Benjamin Jowett, *The Internet Classics Archive[http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html]*, 380 BCE/2009.

> In various passages of his description of the ideal city, Plato warns of the dangers of art for an enlightened society. In Books III and X, in particular, he argues that theatre has negative effects on both actors and audiences as a result of the peculiar ways in which it elicits and expresses emotions.

Wimsatt, W.K. and Monroe Beardsley, "The Affective Fallacy", *The Sewanee Review* 57, 31–55, 1949.

> Attacks the view that reader emotional responses should influence judgements of literary value.

Theories of Art

Some of the strongest defenders of the important role of emotions in art have gone so far as to claim an essential or definitional connection between emotions and art. Romanticism was especially instrumental in this respect, with a particular focus on the artist's expression of emotions. For instance, Wordsworth 1802 famously declared that "all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings". Theories of art that can be seen as developing in various ways this Romantic insight include Tolstoy 1898/1995, Croce 1913/1965 and Collingwood 1938/1958. For Bell 1914, the central goal of art is to elicit a distinctive type of emotion he calls an 'aesthetic emotion'. Tormey 1971 argues against theories of art that appeal to the artist's expression of their feelings or emotions.

Bell, Clive, *Art*, Project Gutenberg[https://www.gutenberg.org/files/16917/16917-h/16917-h.htm]*, 1914.

> According to Bell, the key value of art is to furnish certain "forms and relations of forms" which suggest emotion and convey ideas. In particular, such "significant forms" provoke a distinctive kind of emotion he calls 'aesthetic emotion'.

Collingwood, R.G., *The Principles of Art*, Oxford University Press, 1938/1958.

> Influenced by Croce, Collingwood presents a theory of art on which art properly so called is an imaginative experience in the artist's mind (which is then recreated in an appreciator's mind). This imaginative experience consists in the expression of the artist's emotions.

Croce, Benedetto, *Guide to Aesthetics*, translated by Patrick Romanell, Bobbs-Merrill, 1913/1965.

> On the view Croce sketches here, art (or, as he says, "poetry") is to be understood as a mental construction that consists in an idealized or symbolic expression (or "intuition") of the artist's emotions.

Tolstoy, Leo, *What is Art?*, translated by Larissa Volokhonsky and Richard Pevear, Penguin, 1898/1995.

> Tolstoy argues that the goal of art is to transmit feelings from artist to audience.

Tormey, Alan, *The Concept of Expression: A study in philosophical psychology and aesthetics*, Princeton University Press, 1971.

> This book contained an influential attack on viewing art in terms of the artist's expression of their feelings or emotions (Chapter 4).

Wordsworth, William, *Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*[http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/lbprose.html#preface]*, 1802.

> A manifesto of Romantic poetry which, together with the collection of poems it prefaced, is often considered to mark the beginning of English literary Romanticism.

Expression and Music

Partly as a result of the popularity of Romanticism-inspired theories of art, the concept of emotion expression has been studied to a significant degree. Robinson 2005 provides a useful, opinionated survey of the terrain and advances a self-styled 'new Romantic theory of expression'. Matravers 2013 is another survey, which focuses on music. Emotion expression has had a special relevance in the case of (non-representational, pure instrumental or absolute) music, which often appears to elicit affective responses without representing characters or events those affective responses can be about. Davies 1994 and Kivy 2002 argue that music expresses emotions in virtue of its resembling some of the ways in which we commonly express emotions (e.g. with our bodily gestures, gait etc.). Levinson 2006 presents an alternative account, which postulates a music's *persona* expressing the relevant emotions. For Hanslick 1891/1986 and Zangwill 2004, by contrast, the essence or central value of music is not to express emotions. Goodman 1976 and Matravers 1998 develop two less popular views of expressiveness in art: the semantic and the arousal theory respectively.

Davies, Stephen, *Musical Meaning and Expression*, Cornell University Press, 1994.

> This book, especially its Chapter 5, defends the view that music is expressive in virtue of its resembling some of our common expressions of emotions.

Goodman, Nelson, "The Sound of Pictures", in *Languages of Art: An approach to a theory of symbols*, 2nd edition, Hackett, 45–95, 1976.

> Goodman here argues that an artwork expresses an emotion insofar as it metaphorically exemplifies it. His account of metaphorical (possession and) exemplification, however, is rather elusive.

Hanslick, Eduard, *On the Musically Beautiful: A contribution towards the revision of the aesthetics of music*, translated by Geoffrey Payzant, Hackett, 1891/1986.

> Originally published in 1854, this short treatise argues against the Romantic view that the key value of music is to elicit or represent feelings or emotions (*Gefühle*). It proposes that the beauty of music lies instead in its more formal features.

Kivy, Peter, "Emotions in the Music", in *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*, Oxford University Press, 31–48, 2002.

Succinct introduction to Kivy's "contour theory of musical expressiveness". It illustrates the author's mature view of the advantages and limits of the theory.

Levinson, Jerrold, "Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-As-Expression", in *Contemplating Art: Essays in aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, 91–108, 2006.
> This article argues that music expresses an emotion insofar as we hear it as a musical *persona*'s expression of that emotion.

Matravers, Derek, *Art and Emotion*, Oxford University Press, 1998.
> This is a book-length defense of the view that an artwork expresses an emotion in virtue of its causing an emotional response in an appreciator.

Matravers, Derek, "Art, Expression and Emotion", in Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (eds), *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 3rd edition, Routledge, 404–414, 2013.
> A useful critical introduction to most major accounts of emotion expression in art. A lot of the piece focuses on music, though it neglects those views which downplay the role of emotions in music appreciation.

Robinson, Jenefer, "Expressing Emotion in the Arts", in *Deeper than Reason*, Oxford University Press, 229–292, 2005.
> Introduces and critically surveys some of the major accounts of expression in art, and argues for an account that crucially appeals to the emotions of an artistic *persona*.

Zangwill, Nick, "Against Emotion: Hanslick was right about music", in *Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the limits of description*, Routledge, 27–40, 2015.
> This article argues that music does not express (or possess, represent etc.) emotions in any interesting sense.