Partly as a result of philosophical arguments advanced by Skolem, Tarski, Quine and others, partly as a result of mathematical theorems proved by Gödel, Craig, Robinson and others, and partly as a result of successful first-order formalization of set theory, first-order logic (once treated mainly as a fragment of type theory) has come to be widely regarded as “the” underlying logic of scientific discourse, or at least as the best available approximation thereof [cf. W. V. O. Quine, *Philosophy of logic*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970; MR0469684 (57 #9465)]. For this and other reasons, the agonizing difficulties involved in trying to discover a “symbolic logic” which was at once consonant with what were regarded as common-sense features of scientific discourse and also immune to the paradoxes have been swept aside. The present article, which recounts and critically analyzes Bertrand Russell’s early (pre-1913) attempts to deal with these difficulties, is therefore mainly of historical and philosophical interest. It is compactly written and surprisingly comprehensive. Consequently, it presupposes extensive knowledge of the analytic philosophy and symbolic logic of the period. Philosophers, historians of mathematics, and logically oriented linguists will find much of interest in it.

{For the entire collection see MR8100000}

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