New Interpretations of Berkeley’s Thought

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JHP
BOOKS SERIES
Published in Cooperation with the
Journal of the History of Philosophy

Humanity Books
an imprint of Prometheus Books
59 John Glenn Drive, Amherst, New York 14228-2119
2008
8 Berkeley's Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance

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Commentators often note that, for Berkeley, minds should not be understood as the same kinds of objects of knowledge as ideas. Rather, as he says, minds are active principles or simply active beings that are "subjects of discourse" (PHK 89) of which we have no ideas, only notions. But it is not uncommon to hear people talk about Berkeleian minds in the same way that they talk about objects of mind (i.e., ideas). With a wink and a nod and an occasional caveat that our notions of mind are not ideas, some historians go right ahead and discuss minds as if they were the same kinds of things that Descartes and Locke refer to when they speak of minds as "spiritual substances."

To be sure, Berkeley sometimes does refer to minds as spiritual substances. And when he does, the temptation is to think that he is drawing on a tradition (traceable as far back as Aristotle) in which minds are treated as objects of knowledge (i.e., things we know). But Berkeley explicitly denies that minds or spiritual substances are such objects (i.e., ideas): "Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say, they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them" (PHK 142). To claim, therefore, that spirits exist or are beings or are even things at all is, for Berkeley, to misunderstand the nature of mind. Furthermore, if minds don't exist in the same way that things exist, then by extending Berkeley's celebrated esse est percipi to include aut percipere, we risk failing to distinguish the existence of ideas from the "existence" of minds.
Some commentators hold that all this talk is a mere subterfuge, and they claim that in dismissing the concept of material substance, Berkeley also rejects the notion of substance in general. Others argue that Berkeley retains core features of the supposedly “traditional” Cartesian or Lockean view of spiritual substance by treating minds as the self-subsisting things in which ideas “inhere.” Still others counter that even if spiritual substances can be said to “support” or “cause” ideas, that does not mean that minds can be considered apart from their activities of perceiving or willing. But these latter commentators leave unexplained what such a claim means regarding the ontological status of minds as substances. Nonetheless, they suggest that Berkeley’s position on spiritual substances can be considered Cartesian or Lockean as long as we recognize that, for Descartes and Locke, mental substances cannot be conceived apart from or exist apart from their activities of perceiving or willing, even if they can be abstracted (by a conceptual distinction) from those activities.

This last way of speaking is developed in Descartes’ doctrine that “thought... must be considered as nothing other than thinking substance itself... that is, as mind” (Principles of Philosophy I.63; CSM 1: 215). In other words, the mind is not composed of modes of thought, for that would equate the mind’s essential activity with its modes (i.e., ideas). But because “we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it” (Principles I.61; CSM 1: 214), and because “thought itself... is not conceived as a mode, but as an attribute which constitutes the nature of a substance,” the attribute of thinking (and not its modes) can be said to define a mental substance (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, CSM 1: 298).

For Descartes, though, thinking substance can be conceptually distinguished from its activities, even if it is more easily known in terms of those activities or attributes:

Indeed, it is much easier for us to have an understanding of extended substance or thinking substance than it is for us to understand substance on its own, leaving out the fact that it thinks or is extended. For we have some difficulty in ab-
As with Descartes, Locke proposes a notion of spiritual substance that is defined by its essential activities. By placing those activities in a supposition that goes beyond the proper limits of experience, Locke invokes a strategy in which a spiritual substance again becomes an abstraction that Berkeley would have found unacceptable.

A few years ago I proposed an interpretation of Berkeley that retains the vocabulary of spiritual substance but rejects the view that minds are things that can be conceived apart from activities of perception or will. Marc Hight and Walter Ott have questioned my interpretation, saying that when Berkeley talks of spiritual substance, he obviously must be adopting the "traditional" or "received" view of spiritual substance as that which is persistent and independent. But by assuming that Berkeley is willing to accept Descartes' and Locke's view of spiritual substance as an abstraction and by ignoring the possibility that he could be drawing on a completely different notion of substance, they have to dismiss some of Berkeley's early comments about minds, saying that those remarks reflect positions he later rejects.

In this current collection, Talia Bettcher also challenges my interpretation. She suggests that, for Berkeley, a mind is "an object of inner awareness," an "agent" distinct from its specific activities. But as with the Hight-Ott account, her view also seems to be inconsistent with Berkeley's anti-abstractionism.

I here explain how my interpretation not only avoids the pitfalls of thinking of mind as an abstraction but also shows how Berkeley's comments (from early and late works) can be seen as consistent with one another. My approach requires that we think of his view in a context in which spiritual substances are understood in a non-Cartesian, non-Lockean way. Because that way of thinking (which I associate with Stoicism) is adopted by some of Berkeley's contemporaries (e.g., Leibniz, Jonathan Edwards), it is presumptuous and misleading to use the Cartesian-Lockean model—no matter how often it is referred to as the "traditional" or "received" view of spiritual substance—as the means for understanding Berkeley.

I. THE STOIC CONTEXT

Berkeley frames his discussion of the relation of mind to ideas within a network of terms that signal an appeal to a distinctly Stoic outlook. In particular, he often invokes a Stoic distinction when he insists that, even though ideas or bodies can be said to exist, they cannot be said to subsist apart from mind. Like the Stoics, Berkeley appeals to this distinction to highlight the fact that, even though the act by which a thing is identified is itself real, the act itself is not a thing and thus cannot be said to exist. Instead, the act subsists as the incorporeal activity by means of which those things are identified and on which they therefore depend for their existence. Accordingly, whenever Berkeley uses the word subsist, it is always to emphasize the fact that, apart from the activity of mind, no thing can exist (PHK 6, 46, 56, 86–87, 89–91, 133, 137, 146; DHP 175, 190, 197, 199, 212, 216, 261). By this he does not mean that when a mind perceives, it bestows the gift of existence on an already determinate and identifiable thing. That would make it sound as if the thing already has what Berkeley calls a "natural subsistence" prior to its being perceived (PHK 86, 91). That, he points out, would beg the question by presuming that a thing could perhaps be some unknown, external substance apart from its being perceived (DHP 260). But because a thing has no identity prior to its being perceived as that thing (and thus no existence, at least relative to finite perceivers), it cannot subsist apart from the very act of being perceived (which is the activity of mind).

This distinction between existence and subsistence is hardly ever mentioned by many of Berkeley's contemporaries, because they assume that the existence of a thing is (at least in principle or by reason) separable from what the thing is or is perceived to be. But Berkeley dismisses such a view as unintelligible (PHK 3) and contradictory (DHP 230). As he observes, "For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? . . . For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself" (PHK 5; also see PHK 6, 81); and "I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible
thing from its being perceived” (DHP 230; also see PHK 6, 81; DHP 193–94, 222–23). His basic point is that a thing cannot be perceived as that thing apart from its existence. That is why its being consists in nothing other than its perception: its esse is percipi.

As Berkeley repeatedly states, though, the being of the thing perceived (of which we can have an idea) is different from the being of the activity by which it is perceived (of which we can have only a notion). Both, as he says, are “real things,” “real beings” (DHP 260, 262). Further, regardless of whether we refer to the thing perceived or the perceiving act by which the thing is identified, both can be called perceptions because, as in Stoic epistemology, in perceiving something we identify the state of affairs in terms of which qualities are related to one another. That is, when we perceive something, we identify the state of affairs by which the thing is perceived as that thing. The existence of that thing thus depends on its being perceived, but the activity by means of which it is perceived is not itself perceived: the activity does not exist; rather, it subsists. This is the point of the Stoic doctrine that even though only bodies exist, there is more to reality than existent things.

Although such Stoic ideas appear frequently in Berkeley’s writings, they do not draw much attention. Even when commentators mention Stoicism in the context of Berkeley’s thought, they generally limit their remarks to Berkeley’s late work Siris (1744) where he invokes themes about the World Soul, “seminal reasons,” and the animating fire or aether of the universe. The Stoic heritage of other Berkeleian doctrines (e.g., about notions, the laws of nature, and the semantic character of reason) is seldom recognized; and when it is, little is typically made of it in explaining his thought in general.

That, I propose, is a shame, considering how we can understand Berkeley’s doctrine of mind better by noting how it, along with other aspects of his thought, draws on the semantic ontology implicit in Stoic logic. That logic (or as the Stoics call it dialectic) identifies the practices by which semantics, ontology, and what we (after Aristotle) refer to as logic are derivatively differentiated. Retrieving the perceptual immediacy of that aboriginal logos is at the heart of Berkeley’s effort to explain reality as a discourse or language. As Berkeley observes in citing his favorite scriptural passage—the line from the Stoic poet Aratus quoted by St. Paul (Acts 17:28)—it is in terms of that divine Word that we “live, move, and have our being.” It also informs his scattered remarks on meaning, mind, and freedom. Because those remarks can hardly be said to constitute explicit theories, I suggest that it becomes all the more important to retrieve the Stoic context that unites them.

That Berkeley would have been familiar with Stoic ideas is not surprising. After all, Stoic doctrines had been discussed extensively by some of the Cambridge Platonists. Like Berkeley, the Stoics believed that all objects of sensible perception are embedded in a discursive context—or as Berkeley puts it, in the language of nature. As I have suggested elsewhere, Berkeley was exposed to many of these doctrines indirectly through the seventeenth-century followers of the Renaissance logician Peter Ramus, whose influence at Kilkenny (where Berkeley studied as a boy) and at Trinity College Dublin is much more pronounced than has hitherto been recognized.

I will not go into detail here about the evidence for a Ramist influence on Berkeley. Suffice it to say that Berkeley’s exposure to Ramist ways of thinking occurs so early and so pervasively that, for him, they hardly constitute a distinct philosophy. Unlike the strategies of Locke or Malebranche, they do not have to be singled out by name because, for him, they identify simply what it means to think in the first place. But as I say, I don’t want to get into the question about the extent to which Berkeley’s thought exhibits characteristically Ramist traits. Instead, I want to indicate how, by focusing on features of Stoic philosophy that are subsequently appropriated in Ramism, we can make more sense of Berkeley, specifically his notion of mind.

The key to Ramist dialectics lies in understanding how it draws on the Stoic preference for propositional logic over predicate logic. In the logic of predication assumed in Platonic-Aristotelian and Cartesian-Lockean thought, subjects and predicates have meanings that are independent of the determinate rhetorical ex-
pressions in which they appear. They can be removed (i.e., abstracted) from their grammatical places without affecting their meanings. The sense or meaning of terms (e.g., “Socrates” or “running”) is considered a semantic or etymological issue, having little logical or ontological significance. This logic is concerned most directly with reasoning about how terms are related and is only indirectly concerned with how ideas and the things to which they refer are related.

In predicate logic, then, the substances and properties depicted in propositions do not depend on one another for their intelligibility. Thinking about Socrates or running does not require thinking either that Socrates runs or that Socrates and running have any particular relation to one another. Likewise, asking whether minds necessarily think or whether bodies are necessarily extended cannot make sense, because thinking and extension are properties that are intelligible apart from how they happen to be linked in propositions. The fact that they have been joined in sentences that require them to have specific conjuctions or tenses, declensions or case endings, is an accident of grammar, not an indication of any ontological importance.17

By contrast, where being is defined in terms of propositional logic, subjects and predicates are embedded in a network of expressions that constitute intelligibility.18 Within that network, each expression identifies the meanings of its terms by situating them in grammatical relations to one another. Those relations—expressed in terms of something’s having a declension or case ending (e.g., nominative, genitive, dative) or a conjugation (e.g., infinitive or first-person singular present tense)—identify the thing as what it is. Nothing intelligible exists without being a function of such expressions. There is no abstract meaning (e.g., “Socrates” or “running”) that is supposedly referred to by all of its grammatical or rhetorical forms, for even to think of such a meaning would require the use of one of those forms as a stand-in for the rest. But the stand-in (e.g., the nominative “Socrates” or the infinitive “to run”) does not point to some meaning that exists apart from the material, determinate expressions or propositions that constitute the ground for all relations and thought.

The logic of propositions is thus not simply added onto the logic of predication—as if reasoning begins by relating terms to one another in propositions and then continues by relating propositions to one another.19 Such a model for reasoning overlooks how the differentiation of terms inscribed in their meaning already places terms in relation to one another. Furthermore, because such a model does not account for how terms originally get their meanings, it is unable to explain how the logos of reasoning is tied to the logos of the universe.20

By contrast, in the logic of propositions things are meaningful in terms of their appearance in a discourse that establishes the semantic and syntactic requirements for intelligibility. This “language of nature” constitutes the possibility for signification, in that it identifies the logos of the universe as a system of things differentiated from, and related to, one another.21 Individual things are determinate and meaningful only to the extent that they are identified as different or related, and in this way they are linked to one another as signifiers and signifieds.

2. Mind as the Active Principle of Ideas

In the Stoic-Ramist context in which Berkeley formulates his doctrines, a spirit or mind is not an object of thought (i.e., an idea). Rather, mind is the principle or activity whereby ideas are identified and subsequently thought in relation to one another. Such a turn does not require Berkeley to reject all talk of spiritual substance. It means only that his appeal to the vocabulary of substance when speaking of minds has to be qualified in a way that distances him from those who use substance-talk to portray minds as if they are known “by way of idea” (PHK 27, 135-42; DHP 233). If they are not ideas (i.e., objects), they likewise cannot be substances in any Aristotelian, Scholastic, Cartesian, or Lockeian sense, because they cannot be objects of thought. Furthermore, spiritual substances are not substrata in which ideas inhere (PHK 89), nor do they “support” ideas other than as the “willing, thinking, and perceiving” of ideas (PHK 138; DHP 234, 237).22 Instead,
the *substance* of mind (i.e., spiritual substance) is simply the activity whereby determinate, real things are identified, differentiated, and related to one another perceptually, imaginatively, and volitionally. As Berkeley puts it, the “substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble that may be made on the word it), to act, cause, will, operate; its substance is not knowable, not being an idea” (NB 829). In other words, the *substance* of a mind is not a thing at all but the activity in terms of which things exist: that is why it is best referred to not as “it” but as “to act.”

This insistence on treating spiritual substance not as a *what* but as a *that* pits Berkeley against the so-called traditional substantialist metaphysics of his contemporaries in ways that cannot be overstated. It precludes any effort to describe consciousness as an attribute (even the “principal attribute”) of mind because it denies that the mind is something modally distinct from its activity. The mind is its activity, and it is this activity that makes it substantial (i.e., effective) and gives it substance. Indeed, when Berkeley writes, “there is not any other substance than spirit” (PHK 7; DHP 261), he highlights how mental activity constitutes the relative identification, differentiation, and organization of objects in the world (see Siris 295).

However, just as Berkeley’s notion of mind requires a different understanding of substance, so it also requires a different understanding of idea. As Berkeley’s contemporaries would have known, this other understanding draws explicitly on how the expression “by way of idea” means a communication from God. But for Berkeley such a communication cannot be *from* God to independently existing minds, for that would imply that minds are objects (at least as far as God is concerned). Indeed, other minds cannot be objects even for us (PHK 145, DHP 231). So it is more accurate to say that a divine communication is an expression of God, in which God wills that there be a “subject of ideas” (DHP 233) in which perceptions or thoughts are “comprehended” (i.e., held together) as or in a mind.

This way of thinking about spirits or souls permits Berkeley occasionally to speak of their “existence” (e.g., PHK 89, 139) in the context of their perceiving, thinking, or willing determinate ideas. That is because the perception, thought, or volition of *those* ideas not only constitutes the existence of those ideas but also (reflexively) identifies the perceiving, thinking, or willing of those ideas as *those* particular perceptions, thoughts, or volitions. In referring to the “existence” of souls, Berkeley thus points to how the mind is the active cognition by which objects are identified, not the re-cognition of objects assumed to exist prior to perception or thought. In perceiving, the mind does not make a *judgment* about an object (e.g., that a cherry is red), for that would imply that the terms of the judgment (cherry, red) are already determinate and intelligible. Instead, the perception of an idea is an event in which ideas or objects are identified as meaningful by being differentiated. My having the idea *cherry* is an expression of God’s will that there be a differentiation of determinate objects in experience. This event of perceiving is not a judgment that I make *about* the cherry (as if “cherry” could be intelligible apart from its color), nor is anything predicated of anything else in the idea *cherry*, for the characterization of the cherry as red is not a judgment or proposition at all. Rather, the event expresses a proposition, namely, that there is (in virtue of this event) a differentiation that heretofore has not existed. Of course, we could describe this positing of an idea in propositional terms (i.e., as a particular act of will responsible for a particular idea), but such a description would always be derivative.

Accordingly, when we engage actively in perceiving (e.g., by turning our gaze in a certain direction), our sensations are associated with one another affectively (i.e., volitionally) (NB 672a). But since volitions are distinguished only by differences in *what* we apprehend, we can attribute differences in volition to different *acts* of will only after the fact. As Berkeley writes, “there can be no idea of volition. . . . We see no variety or difference between the volitions, only between their effects. Tis one will, one act distinguished by the effects. This will, this act is the spirit, operative principle, soul, etc.” (NB 756, 788). The activity of differentiating objects does not exist apart from the actual differentiation of those objects, just as the will does not exist apart from the particular
volitions or actions by which ideas are identified (NB 792, 808; PHK 143). Nonetheless, objects of thought can be said (after the fact) to be the effects of volitions in terms of the differentiating activities whereby they are identified.

Speaking in this precise and technical way about will is important for understanding the nature of spiritual substances, particularly considering how “the soul is the will properly speaking” (NB 478a). Prior to the actual differentiation and identification of ideas and their relations, there is no mind or spirit. That is why Berkeley claims that “if there were no sensible ideas, there could be no soul” (NB 478); “the very existence of ideas constitutes the soul” (NB 577); “to say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing” (NB 652). The will that there be differentiation and identification is not “itself” differentiated or identified, so it cannot be the act of an already differentiated and identified being. Instead of speaking about a being that wills, then, we should refer to “nothing but a will, a being which wills being unintelligible” (NB 499a):

If you ask what thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing or any thing like any idea, then I say tis no thing at all that wills. This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms ‘thing’, ‘is’, etc. . . . Again if by ‘is’ you mean is perceived or does perceive, I say no thing which is perceived or does perceive wills. . . . While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing (NB 658–59, 791).

Will cannot be merely one of the activities of a being, since the very identity of the being consists in the differentiations and identifications it expresses. Its differentiation and identification must be based on some principle, which itself would have to be caused by yet another principle, and so on. The only way out of this regress is to shift the account of will away from an explanation of things to activities. This acknowledges that the “alterity” of a mind (to use the expression from Siris 329) is based on no other principle than the divine fiat that there be an “active principle of motion and change of ideas” (PHK 27), a determinate sequence of experiences that (especially from God’s eternal perspective) is a unity, not a mere bundle of disconnected ideas.39 It is in this sense that “the spirit, the active thing, that which is soul and God, is the will alone” (NB 712)—specifically, the will that there be difference and identity (i.e., certain perceptions, thoughts, volitions).

Of course, for Berkeley, the mind does not create the “train and succession of ideas” by which ideas are identified (in terms of relative existence) as those ideas in those relations (NB 629), but it is the active principle or will that there be such perceptions, thoughts, and volitions. It is not inappropriate to conclude, therefore, that “there are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us” (NB 649), because the existence of those ideas depends on the mind, and the identity of the mind is characterized by its perceiving ideas and having volitions. To say that ideas are innate is simply to say that those ideas exist as the ideas of particular minds, not (as Malebranche would have it) as ideas in the mind of God (DHP 213–14). According to Berkeley, God knows our ideas not because he has those ideas but because he wills for all eternity that there be the specific perceptions, thoughts, and volitions that differentiate minds as distinct and simple unities, and it is in this sense that “the soul taken for the will is immortal” (NB 814).31 The will that there be a distinctive sequence of experiences is thus not something distinct from the eternally determined sequence (and certainly not a mere bundle of experiences). Rather, it is one, simple, eternal unity.32

Because no specific mind exists apart from such a fiat, no mind is constrained by divine fiat. Any activity in which the mind engages identifies the mind reflexively as the substance that it is. Since nothing other than its own nature is expressed through these activities, it is eminently free. By understanding Berkeley’s doctrine of spiritual substance in this way, we discern not only how ideas are related to minds but also how human freedom is possible in a world in which God creates all things.

Just as ideas exist as differentiated determinations of will, so volitions are differentiated by the ideas they identify. As such, the positing or willing of differentiation and the cognition of those
differentiations are inextricably bound to one another. As Berkeley puts it, "there can be no perception, no idea, without will. . . . It seems to me that will and understanding, volitions and ideas, cannot be severed, that either cannot be possibly without the other" (NB 833, 841). As that which determines the identity of this or that idea in this or that relation, the will that there be such determination constitutes the existence of ideas. That is, apart from the activity by which they are differentiated, those ideas do not exist. Nor do specific volitions exist prior to the perceptions they identify. Indeed, as activities, volitions do not really exist at all; rather, they "subsist" as the principles by which perceptions are identified. So "distinct from or without perception, there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception" (NB 674).

Ideas are said to exist "in" the mind ("by way of idea") precisely because they are identified or perceived as those ideas. That specification cannot be due to the fact that certain objects are perceived, for that would make those ideas active and capable of existing apart from their being perceived. Instead, the existence of ideas is based solely on their having been willed to be perceived as those ideas. Nothing other than those volitional differentiations—and thus those ideas—reflexively and derivatively identify a mind as that mind.

This last point leads Berkeley to conclude that the mind is not a thing that perceives but is rather a particular congeries or concrecence of perceptions (NB 581): "Take away perceptions and you take away the mind; put the perceptions and you put the mind" (NB 580). As I have suggested, this does not mean that the mind is a Humean bundle of already differentiated ideas but rather the unique, singular, divinely instituted principle or activity of differentiation and association by means of which ideas are identified and related. That is why there is no mind apart from the specific succession of perceived, thought, or willed ideas (NB 651). In Berkeley's succinct expression, "the soul always thinks" (PHK 98; NB 842), because its very existence consists in the activity of distinguishing and associating (i.e., perceiving) ideas.

Of course, the activity by which ideas are identified and related to one another is radically different from the objects (i.e., ideas) that are bundled. In other words, the "bundling" activity of the mind is different from the "bundled" objects that are thus distinguished or associated. By being differentiated from and related to one another, ideas are said to be "supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances" (PHK 89; also 135). This, however, does not involve invoking a second-order notion of mind, because it does not identify mind as a bundle of ideas (as if ideas could have identities apart from their differentiation in mind) or as a thing that does the bundling. Indeed, the mind cannot be a thing about which one can predicate anything (including the having of ideas), for mind is the activity by which things are identified. The mind simply is the differentiation, identification, and association of ideas—if you will, the "bundling" (or more properly, "bundling") of perceivings.

Berkeley is thus not concerned with identifying the activity of mind, because mind is nothing other than that very activity. For him, mind—and note how I speak of "mind" rather than "the mind" in order to make this point—is simply the existence of those ideas differentiated and identified as such. We can have no idea of existence because there is nothing that could differentiate such an idea from others (NB 552, 725, 772). And because the very differentiation of an idea as that idea establishes its existence, its identity consists in its being perceived/willed. In this way "existence [is] not conceivable without perception or volition; [it is] not distinguished therefrom" (NB 646). If we do not recognize the connections of our ideas as internally caused and affectively related, we think of them as perceptions unrelated to volitions (NB 645). But once we understand how ideas express mental activity, we treat them as thoughts (NB 194, 378).

To "have" an idea, then, is to think it as an element in a complex of perceiving, willing activity. As the differentiation, production, or association of ideas, that activity is will (NB 155; PHK 27); as the identification or perception of ideas, it is understanding (NB 587, 821; DHP 240). But because will and understanding refer (respectively) to the differentiation and identification of objects, to speak about the will and the understanding is to ignore how they are "abstract ideas, i.e., none at all, they not being even
rationes different from the spirit qua faculties” (NB 871; PHK 143). Not even modally distinct from mind, will and understanding are simply different ways of speaking about the differentiation of ideas. We might even express the difference between will and understanding (in more contemporary terms) as a contrast between acts and events. But regardless of how we formulate the distinction, it is crucial, for Berkeley, to explain mind in terms of ideas and vice versa—which, in turn, requires his distinctive doctrine of spiritual substance.

For Berkeley, then, ideas are intelligible only to the extent that they are cognized by mind. To understand what that means requires that we understand Berkeley’s use of the expression “by way of idea” as a description of how ideas are differentiated and identified by mind. His Notebooks are especially helpful in this regard, because they indicate how we should not think about ideas apart from their place in a broader discussion of the relation of will and understanding. Because most current interpretations of Berkeley’s doctrine of ideas minimize the role of will in the identification of ideas, they fail to explain what it means to say that ideas are “in” the mind. Efforts to describe an idea using the act–object distinction—even as qualified in formal–objective, intentionality, or adverbial accounts—or using the mental act–mental event distinction do not capture Berkeley’s central insight about how ideas or sensible objects are initially identified by being differentiated. Such views overlook his point that existence is not simply added onto a thing—as if it could have an identity apart from its place within the affective-cognitive matrix that defines the mind. Because an object’s relative being consists in its being perceived as that thing, its being that thing consists in its being perceived as that thing by a particular mind. So to describe an idea as a mental event does not really help us, because one of the questions regarding ideas concerns what it means to call them objects of mind in the first place.

In the end, though, the act–event distinction is useful in describing ideas because it indicates how ideas are produced in and through events of differentiation. That is, the distinction is useful because it does not presume that the differentiation of things needs to be understood in terms of discrete acts by individual minds; for if ideas were identified that way, we would be faced with insurmountable difficulties regarding how ideas in different minds can be said to be the same. In my proposed modified version of the act–event distinction, those difficulties are avoided by reformulating the issue not as a problem with how the same idea can be in different minds but as a problem with how minds themselves are differentiated.

3. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE: LEIBNIZ AND EDWARDS

By describing spiritual substance in a way that eschews both the Cartesian claim that ideas “inhere” in minds and the Lockean claim that an unknown substratum “supports” ideas, Berkeley appeals to a way of thinking in which ideas can be said to be “in” or caused by a mind which is not some “third thing” that supports will and intellect (PHK 27). This way of thinking about the relation of spiritual substances to objects of thought is, I suggest, found not only in Berkeley but also in others for whom “there is not any other substance than spirit” (PHK 7).

For example, like Berkeley, Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards maintain that God wills a substance (from all eternity) to be the specific continuous sequence of activities that identifies and relates all the things that can be said of it. Since such a notion of substance is of that which is inherently active and necessarily spiritual, it precludes the possibility of a material substance. But more to the point, such a notion also precludes the possibility of thinking of spiritual substance as some thing that engages in activities of willing and perceiving or as some “I know not what” support of such activities. It comes as no surprise, then, that Berkeley’s doubts about referring to mind as “that thing that wills” (NB 658–59) mirrors Leibniz’s similar criticism of Locke’s “thing that understands and wills, imagines and reasons” and Edwards’s treatment of substance.
To use the “received” view of Descartes or Locke to interpret Berkeley’s doctrine of mind is thus perverse, since it is the very view that his account undermines. Instead, Berkeley can be better understood by being aligned with Leibniz and Edwards, in that for all three a spiritual substance is the eternally identified unity of perceivings by which ideas have their “very existence” (NB 577) as ideas in harmony with other ideas. Accordingly, God does not first create minds and then cause them to have sequences of experiences that just happen to have the determinate and harmonious character of laws of nature. Rather, God creates simple spiritual substances as unities by means of communicating ideas in unique, orderly sequences. The creation of a world of objects (ideas) is thus complemented by the simultaneous creation of a universe of perceivers, each one of whose identities is distinguished less by its ideas than by its activity of having and willing those ideas. That is why ideas are more the products of differentiating events rather than objects created by the discrete acts of individuals.

Of course, as commentators have noted regarding Leibniz and Edwards as well, this way of speaking raises questions about whether created minds are free to will in terms of any sequence of ideas other than the one that identifies their divinely instituted and coordinated natures. But as Berkeley notes in Alciphron (VII.16–20; 309–18), his compatibilist solution to this question (in which the certainty of a person’s action is not equated with its necessity) does not require a description of what a person is beyond that identified by his or her actions. The fact that this discussion of freedom arises out of Alciphron’s VII.4–10 (289–303) discussions of grace, personhood, and original sin all the more indicate how, for Berkeley, talk of spiritual substances needs to be retrieved for practical purposes from those who would treat minds as metaphysical objects rather than as the principles by which objects are identified.  

To appreciate how Berkeley is not alone in thinking about substance in this way, we need look only to Leibniz and Edwards for similar discussions. For example, in the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz ridicules Locke’s view that there is some thing underlying the activities of mind:

If you distinguish two things in a substance—the attributes or predicates, and their common subject—it is no wonder that you cannot conceive anything distinctive about the subject. That is inevitable, because you have already removed all the attributes by which its details could be conceived. Thus, to require of this “pure subject in general” anything beyond what is needed for the conception of “the thing itself”—e.g., the thing itself that understands and wills, imagines and reasons—is to demand the impossible.  

Berkeley makes a similar point when he notes that acts of perceiving (“perceptions”), just like acts of will, are not mere expressions of mind; rather, they constitute what mind is “in the strictest sense” (DHP 240):

Say you the mind is not the perceptions, but that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words that and thing; those are vague, empty words without a meaning. . . . If you ask what thing it is that wills, I answer if you mean idea by the word thing or any thing like an idea, then I say tis no thing at all that wills. This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, etc. . . . It should be said nothing but a will, a being which wills being unintelligible . . . Tis an easie matter for a man to say the mind exists without thinking, but to conceive a meaning that may correspond to those sounds, or to frame a notion of a spirit’s existence abstracted from its thinking, this seems to me impossible.  

As with Leibniz’s substances, Berkeleian minds cannot be abstracted from their activities; they are those activities. Indeed, those activities comprise the principle by which objects are identified and related in certain ways. In this sense, minds substantiate their objects. That is why, as Leibniz says, they are thus the most perfect (and perhaps the only) substances in the world.  

Like Berkeley, Edwards (who refers explicitly to his Ramist training) maintains that “nothing has any existence anywhere else
For Berkeley, then, as for Leibniz and Edwards, a substance is the principle whereby things are identified as differentiated and related. "Its" identity consists in nothing other than the will that there be such differentiation and association. Such a differentiation is what constitutes a mind as a specific ordering of activities (including both perceiving and willing). To say that the mind is a "collection" of these activities can easily be misinterpreted as a bundle in the Humean sense, because "collection" suggests that the things in the collection exist prior to their being collected. In my interpretation, for Berkeley, the things identified by mind exist in virtue of their being differentiated and related to one another, and this constitution of ideas-in-relation is exactly what the mind is and does.

The activities of understanding and willing thus constitute the mind, and the mind is not different from its activities. What gives the mind its identity over time is not that it is some substance underlying its activities; rather, it is the fact that those activities constitute the particular ordering (or, if you will, "bundling") of ideas that are the contents of what we understand and will. Of course, the acts of differentiation that constitute the mind are not the same as the things differentiated (even if they are reflexively designated as specific acts in virtue of their products). When we perceive things, we perceive them as distinct from and related to one another. By that act we intend or "will" their differentiation. 48 That is how Berkeley can claim in his Notebooks that no volition occurs apart from understanding, and no act of intellection occurs apart from a simultaneous act of volition.

It is perhaps more in keeping with Berkeley's insight to refer to his notion of "mind" rather than the derivative and potentially misleading concept of "the mind" or "a mind," because if we think of a mind as already differentiated prior to its activity (e.g., in the mind of God), then it must be considered an idea (and thus inherently passive). To say, as Berkeley does to Samuel Johnson, that the mind is passive shows we are not completely responsible for the activities of differentiation and relation whereby the things we experience are ordered. But that in no way detracts from the compatibility of divine sovereignty and human freedom, because in
such an account God is understood to will that there be a particular arrangement or sequence of acts of intellect and valuation that constitute what I am. Accordingly, my mind is the principle for the differentiation and relation of things and is thus the “substance” of those things. Apart from such a designation, those things would have no identities and thus not exist as those things.

This way of interpreting Berkeley still maintains that, properly speaking, only God is substance. But the fact that things can be thought of as differentiated and related means that the principles of those associations (viz., finite minds) can also properly be called substances. As long as we limit our understanding of substance to this way of speaking, we will not refer to spiritual substances (as Descartes and Locke do) as objects in the world whose identities are simply given as things that engage in or underlie perceiving and willing. Rather, we will think of minds as the specific patterns in which things in the world are experienced.

As in the case of material substances, nothing more than this ordering is needed to provide a principle of identity. But unlike in the case of material substances, that principle of identity is the active, organizing pattern for the distinctive sequences of experiences that characterize spiritual substances. Only in this sense can a mind be said to be different from any of its acts of perceiving or willing.

One final point: in creating a mind, God also creates a pattern by which ideas are differentiated, related, and summarized in the laws of nature. The creation of minds (and simultaneously, their ideas) thus registers God’s active involvement in every detail of our existence. Our experience of the world may be passive (in the sense that we do not determine the sequence of our ideas), but it is active in that we are the ones who experience the sequence. To the extent that we understand our perceptions and volitions in ways that are consistent with that divinely ordained pattern, we are reconciled with God.

23. I appeal to Berkeley’s Notebooks to clarify points about his theory of mind that were to be developed in the second (ultimately lost) volume of his Principles. I take his notes not as juvenile musings that are superseded by his “mature” publications only a year or two later, but as guides for what Berkeley had in mind for the subsequent volumes of the Principles. I assume, therefore, that it is possible to think of the doctrines in the Notebooks as consistent with those in his published works.


30. This incorporeal predication by which a body is perceived as a thing is what the Stoics call a lekton. Lekta do not exist, rather they subsist; and they are the “substance” of the thing insofar as the thing is understood as embedded in a system of signs. That is why Sextus Empiricus says of the Stoics, “the sign has its substance [hypostasis] in the lekton.” See Barnouw, Propositional Perception, 157.


32. Only from a temporal perspective could one ever mistakenly think that the mind is composed of its perceived, disconnected objects. There is thus no need to think that Berkeley ever adopted the so-called bundle theory of the self, even as a passing phase in his Notebooks. Cf. Bertil Belfrage, “Berkeley’s Four Concepts of the Soul (1707–1709),” in Reexamining Berkeley’s Philosophy, ed. Stephen H. Daniel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 172–87.


35. In her essay in this collection, Bettcher is, no doubt, correct in saying that ideas are related to minds in some way other than as modes (e.g., as “elements” of consciousness). But she proposes to put aside the question of how Berkeley thinks of spirits as things. However, I think this issue cannot be avoided, especially since she uses the fact of consciousness as the basis for claiming that the self is an agent (an “I” who acts and who is passive in sense perception). To do that is to fall back into thinking of the self as an abstraction distinct from acts of consciousness. That is precisely what Berkeley rejects when he explicitly denies that there is something that perceives or wills (NB 581, 658–59): “I answer you are abus’d by the words that & thing[s]; these are vague empty words w/o a meaning. . . . I say no thing w/o is perceived or does perceive Wills.”

36. Also see Berkeley to Samuel Johnson, 24 March 1730, in W 2: 293; and Daniel, “Berkeley, Suárez,” 622–34.


39. On the practical foundations of Berkeley’s ontology, see the essays in this collection by Jeffrey Barnouw and Geneviève Brykman.


44. Edwards, “Mind” #40 [1725], SPW 356–57; also #36 [1725], SPW 355.

45. Edwards, “Notes on Knowledge and Existence” [mid-1750s], SPW 398.

