members. Hampton believes that homogenous nation-states often fail to protect the survival of the group, and also that ‘the idea of the nation-state has often fostered conflicts and wars that are seriously damaging to cultural communities’ (87). Hampton suggests that multicultural countries are often safer for minorities than having their own nation-states.

All of these essays discuss immigration from within liberal political philosophy, but few of them give sufficient attention to the liberty dimension of national boundaries (Stephen Perry’s essay, which criticizes the right to free international movement, is an exception.) After all, political boundaries are human-imposed barriers that interfere with a significant liberty, namely freedom of movement. Carens notes that ‘borders keep people out, ultimately because people with guns are prepared to enforce the boundaries’ (2). And Michael Trebilcock notes that immigration involves a conflict between two values: liberty and community (220). Liberals typically give priority to the former — although cases where communities are extremely fragile and vulnerable may be an exception — and hence should find wholesale restrictions on immigration problematic.

Further, the freedom to immigrate is usually supported by other core liberal values such as distributive justice and human rights. Mark Tushnet’s essay does a good job of explaining how these values support more open borders: ‘[T]he question of immigration policy would seem very different — perhaps even disappear — if the world’s societies were organized to achieve distributive and political justice’ (153).

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Roger Scruton
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Why such a book? From Descartes to Wittgenstein in 300 pages: not a task for the ruminative. But that may say more of Scruton’s intended readers than of Scruton himself, who has revised and enlarged his 1981 text From Descartes to Wittgenstein to take into account recent scholarly reassessments of some featured philosophers (Hume and Fichte among them). We still get a tidy book, one whose approach to the history of philosophy is decidedly in
the analytic tradition. What that means in this instance is a book which
commits itself ‘to translate the thought of previous philosophers from the
jargon that might obscure its meaning, to remove from it all that is parochial
and time-bound, and to present it in the idiom which modern people would
use in the expression of their own most serious beliefs’ (viii).

Despite the disclaimer to parochialism, this is a decidedly British history.
F.H. Bradley warrants as many pages as Nietzsche (four), and there are
unhurried discussions of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler, but scarcely a
word about, say, the American pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey, whose
stock has risen on more shores than just American since the first edition of
Scruton’s book. While the practice of philosophy remains among the humanities relatively apolitcized, it may be that, as Tip O’Neill might have said, all histories of philosophy are local.

That is not to deny that Scruton covers a lot of territory. Following an
introductory chapter on the precursors of modern philosophy, he sketches in
five parts a very readable, at times illuminating, review of rationalism (with
chapters on Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and responses to the Cartesian
revolution), empiricism (chapters on Locke and Berkeley, on eighteenth-cen-
tury British moral science, and on Hume), Kant and idealism (separate
chapters on the Critique of Pure Reason and on Kant’s moral and aesthetic
writings, a fine discussion of Hegel, and a breezy summary of the reaction
against Hegel in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche), political phil-
osophy (from Hobbes to Marx, Utilitarianism, and beyond in three chapters),
and ‘Recent Philosophy’ (chapters on Frege, on continental thought from
Brentano to Sartre, and concluding, as advertised, with Wittgenstein).

Scruton is inspired where his sympathies are in play, but tends to be
merely amusing when his hackles are raised. He characterizes Hegel’s
Encyclopedia nicely as a work ‘in which the whole of the world, as it appears
to reason, is blessed, as it were, by an act of philosophical recognition’ (161).
And he closes the arc of his history by registering the shift in philosophical
method from Descartes’ fixation on the first-person case to Wittgenstein’s
reorienting us to the priority of the third-person case. But when faced, for
example, with Kierkegaard’s sense of philosophy as a mode of writing, he
explains it away as ‘marred by the acute self-consciousness which led him
also constantly to hide behind pseudonyms’ (182). If all the stratagems of
philosophy could be so easily dismissed, Descartes to Wittgenstein in thirty
pages would suffice.

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