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Descartes's Method of Doubt

JANET BROUGHTON


In Descartes's Method of Doubt Janet Broughton undertakes a close study of how Descartes uses doubt in the first three Meditations in order to set the foundations for subsequent knowledge claims. This is a masterful, insightful, and ambitious treatment of the topic. Broughton is careful and precise in her writing, philosophical argumentation, and attention to texts. The care in detail is joined by an engaging treatment of broader implications, both for Descartes's philosophy itself and for its relation to ancient and contemporary concerns. The book is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with the development of doubt in the Meditations, and the second of which deals with the way Descartes uses the method of doubt in that work. The first part addresses such issues as the nature of the doubter (the mediator), the relation of Descartes's form of scepticism to ancient forms, the strategic nature of his method of doubt, Descartes's motivations for posing his method of doubt, and the relation of this scepticism to common-sense beliefs. In the second part, Broughton proposes an original way of understanding the way Descartes uses his method of doubt to achieve his goal of uncovering foundational knowledge, knowledge which includes one's existence and certain self-attributes (for example, "I am doubting"), the existence of God as one's creator, and the causal principle that nothing comes from nothing. This book is not for beginners in philosophy, but it is essential—and pleasurable—reading for the serious Descartes scholar.

The First and Second Meditations present the reader with the following curios fact that demands explanation: within the class of clear and distinct perceptions, there are those that are unassailable, surviving all of Descartes's four "radical grounds for doubt"—lunacy, dreaming, God, and "fate or chance" (p. 63)—and there are those that are usable to withstand the supposition of the deceiving God.

"Among those favored ideas are 'I exist'. . . 'I seem to see a light', . . . But mathematical ideas are nor among the favored few [ideas that are indubitably true], despite their clarity and distinctness" (p. 181). In order to explain how Descartes is able to divide the class of clear and distinct ideas in this way, Broughton argues that we must reconsider the way he uses his method of doubt in the early Meditations. According to an extremely common interpretation of that method, we start from the belief that "we ought to pursue knowledge in our inquiries; knowledge requires certainty; and certainty requires ruling out radical skeptical doubts" (p. 8). Accordingly, what is prior is Descartes's conception of knowledge as that which is wholly certain. His method of doubt, on this interpretation, is consequently invoked as a tool to help us arrive at such knowledge. The belief that Descartes "has a prior commitment to a very demanding conception of knowledge" (p. 17) gets the order of Descartes's method wrong, says Broughton. Rather, "in spite [Descartes's] use of the method of doubt be what explains the very demanding account of knowledge that he articulates?" (p. 10). But, if radical scepticism is prior to and gives rise to Descartes's conception of knowledge as certainty, what motivates the method of doubt itself? Acknowledging a number of commentators who have offered various answers to this question (pp. 10-16), she argues that "Descartes's use of the method of doubt enables him to execute a simple and coolly calculated strategy for establishing the first principles of philosophy he believes to be true" (p. 17), which will allow him "a way to achieve sturdy and lasting results in the sciences . . . to discover, establish, and embrace the fundamental truths that should replace the basic errors that took root in his mind during his early cognitive development" (p. 50). It is a strategy that should convince others to believe what he takes to be true.

To substantiate her interpretation, and thereby show how Descartes is able to draw a principled and useful distinction within the class of clear and distinct perceptions between the truly indubitable and all the rest, Broughton proposes that Descartes's various arguments introduced to rescue specific beliefs from radical doubt are actually "dependence arguments." What does this mean? Broughton writes: "What I believe Descartes aimed to do was to establish the absolute certainty of some of his beliefs by showing that their truth is a condition of his using the method of doubt" (p. 98). The fact of Descartes's proceeding with the method of doubt depends upon certain beliefs being true. These beliefs, consequently, are ones that I cannot rationally doubt . . . I would be able to be absolutely certain about [them]" (p. 99). One significant consequence of reading Descartes's Second Meditations arguments as dependence arguments is that this would establish both the truth of and certainty in the beliefs that are the conditions for using doubt. Broughton resists calling these arguments "transcendental" for reasons she develops in the final chapter of the book (pp. 186-96). (This is one example of Broughton's ability to connect the themes of her investigation of Descartes with the broader history of philosophy, including contemporary interests, without being anachronistic. Indeed, while the book is a superb study of Descartes's epistemology, it will also appeal to those with interests in epistemology more generally.)

After giving the details of different kinds of dependence arguments found in the Second Meditations, and some textual support for them, Broughton proceeds to show how Descartes's Second and Third Meditations could be read as employing these arguments to secure the truth of and our certainty in a number of beliefs about "inner conditions" (chap. 2), such as "I exist," and about "outer conditions"
(chap. 8), such as "from nothing, nothing comes." Broughton argues, for example, that (at least in the Meditations) "I exist" is a belief that the meditator establishes as true and holds with certainty, not by first asserting the utter certainty (and so truth) of "I think," and then inferring "I exist" from that certainty. In fact, in the Second Meditation, he establishes his existence a full three paragraphs before asserting his certainty in the belief that he is thinking (p. 112). Rather, Descartes employs a dependence argument. "His existence is a necessary condition of his doubting whether sky, earth, body, or minds exist. 'I exist' must be true if I am to doubt, and so one thing I cannot rationally doubt, as I doubt everything possible, is that 'I exist' is true" (p. 116).

Not all clear and distinct ideas are necessary conditions of the meditator's doubting. For instance, 2 + 3 = 5 is not, and so it does not emerge from the method of doubt as necessarily true and so impossible to not believe with certainty. And, indeed, the deceptive God could have made the meditator think this belief to be true because clear and distinct, even if it were not true. The "favoured" clear and distinct perceptions are protected from the deceptive God strategy not by their clarity and distinctness but by their status (established by the dependence arguments) as necessarily true beliefs. This, Broughton argues, provides Descartes with a powerful tool for avoiding the infamous Cartesian circle (pp. 175-80). Briefly, the circle results by claiming jointly that certainty in God's existence requires certainty in clear and distinct perceptions, and that certainty in clear and distinct perceptions requires certainty in God's existence. A sketch of Broughton's solution is that some clear and distinct perceptions emerge from dependence arguments and do not, therefore, depend upon the existence of a benevolent God. These clear and distinct perceptions are then used to establish God's existence.

This is a clever attempt to exonerate Descartes of the charge of circularity, and it is one example of a string of astute moves in this book. Determining whether it works will depend upon a careful examination of the dependence arguments, including an examination of their foundations and justification. This is one of many lines of investigation that Broughton's terse and rich book opens up. The book itself, and the debate it should spark, will advance Descartes scholarship significantly.

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Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality
ROBERT B. BRANDON

Matching its title, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Robert Brandon's book has an unusual, even strange, construction. It is composed of two parts, the first entitled "Talking with a Tradition," the second, coming in at twice the length of the first, entitled "Historical Essays." The historical essays of the second part—Brandon calls these "the substantive essays" (p. 33)—were, however, historically first, having been written over a period of twenty-five years. But it would be wrong to read Part 1 as merely a long hindsight introduction to Professor Brandon's first volume of collected papers. That is not the nature or construction of the book and will not begin to do justice to the peculiar and fascinating way in which, in these Tales, the nose wags the dog.

The subtitle Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality signals two plotlines running through the entire book and which, as narrative moments, give rise to a third plotline found only in and dominating Part 1.

There is, in one plotline, the history—Brandon's exposition of the views of a select group of six eminent figures in the history of philosophy, viz., Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Frege, Heidegger, and Sellars. The second narrative moment or plotline, by contrast with the first, is the ahistorical, putatively "right story" about intentionality (am und für sich). It is, of course, Brandon's story, some large portions of which are retailed in his magnum opus, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). This in turn gives rise to some might say by a dialectic of defensiveness) to a third narrative moment or plotline devoted to elaborating a complex story of the relation between the historical essays and the ahistorical thesis about intentionality.

The core of the second narrative moment or ahistorical plotline (the right account of intentionality by Brandon's lights) is the affirmation of an internal connection between rationality and intentionality. More specifically, rationality is here conceived on an "inferential model" ("On this view, to be rational is to play the game of giving and asking for reasons... Conceptual contents [of utterances and mental states] are functional inferential roles" [p. 6]), and intentionality is conceived "in a sense broad enough to include both what it is to have a thought that things are thus and so, and what it is to be thinking of or about things in a certain way" (pp. 16-17).

Brandon's central historical claim (narrative moment one) is that his central ahistorical claim (narrative moment two—the "right" account of the metaphysics of intentionality) may be found in or extracted from each of the six historical figures. They each, one way or another and by degrees of more or less inoculation, have the right stuff. The question raised by the historical claim, and yielding the third narrative moment, is: By what right? By what right does Brandon find his preferred view of intentionality in each of the six? More to the point, indeed more pointedly, might he not be "projecting"?

This is a question to which Brandon is very (perhaps overly) sensitive. The sin of having pulled "a Strawsonian" (i.e., extracting one's own view from that of another philosopher [Kant]), is one that many of us only wish we had the genius to commit (even were it justly imputed to Strawson). In different ways and, it may be said, in different senses, Brandon repudiates the charge. That is, his responses to the charge range from denying that he has committed any such sin to denying that there is any such sin to commit. Of four distinguishable responses to the charge, two straightforwardly aim to undermine the justice of the charge, and two, more interestingly, aim to undermine the very sense of the charge.

Brandon, at first flatly, or almost so, denies the charge of having foisted a set of views on the historical figures: "The essays were written over a period of twenty-five years... They were certainly not written in an attempt to fill in some antecedent picture that I had of a tradition to which they belong. On the contrary that picture (and the tradition it retrospectively constitutes) was the cumulative product of detailed investigations of the sort epitomized here" (pp. 133-34). Earlier he had said that his historical figures generally offer functionalist, inferentialist, holist, normative, and social pragmatist explanations of intentionality and that his "claim