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earlier religious thought? Was Hume's skepticism strictly anti-rationalist in origin, as Kant suggested, or was it (as Husserl suggested) the product of a clash Hume encountered when he tried to use science based on facts of human nature to serve as a foundation for sciences which were exact and certain? The section ends with a previously unpublished account of Kant's use of dialectic as a way of exposing metaphysical illusion rather than as the highest form of knowledge production. Once again, Butts's emphasis is on the way matters addressed in science — in this case physiology and psychology — intrude in the creation of such transcendental illusion, and how the results are reckoned by critical reason.

The final part of the volume contains four papers directly centered in the philosophy of science. Topics addressed include the traditional (a critique of the hypothetico-deductive method; philosophy as a conservative extension of science), the recently interesting (how to distinguish science from pseudoscience), and a final one, published here for the first time, recounting (often from personal experience) the reception and progress of German scientific philosophy in North America. It is both a detailed recounting of the influences which led to the main turning points in twentieth-century philosophy, but it also contains historical theses designed to make sense of those events. Thus Butts suggests, for instance, that, rather than the German influence falling on untilled soil, in fact, conditions were already favorable to its reception. But the article is more than that. It is a wonderful reminiscence of what it was like to be a student in the period of the intellectual diaspora of the time.

Butts captures the sense of sheer intellectual excitement like no other, and the paper is a classic recounting of the period.

[N.B. As this review was being written, terribly sad news arrived of the sudden and untimely death of the editor of the volume. While much of the subject matter addressed in it lies outside Graham Solomon's prime area of philosophical interest — it was obviously done out of respect and affection for Robert Butts — the work will stand as a small year, typically well done, of an intellectual life cut far too short.]

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J.A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne
Substance and Individualization in Leibniz.
Pp. x + 307.

Leibniz scholarship has seen a tremendous renaissance over the past decade or two. Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's book is an exciting and exceptional addition to a thriving field. This is not an easy book, and it is not for beginner students of Leibniz. The authors are dealing with some of the most central and difficult concepts in his metaphysics, and they are dealing with them at a high and rigorous level. This results in one of the book's chief virtues: it significantly forwards the debate in current Leibniz scholarship on a number of interesting fronts. This book thus does more than its share of the work in keeping the field of Leibniz scholarship a stimulating and challenging one.

Within the first few pages of the introduction, we get a couple of statements of the authors' aims. 'Our historical objective is to gain some measure of appreciation for how Leibniz's views on substance and individualization emerge in the context of certain scholastic themes, and to secure a better understanding of those themes and their place in Leibniz's overall system' (1). And the 'philosophical aim of this work is to grasp more clearly the metaphysical problems of individualization by taking seriously how these are played out in the hands of one influential philosopher standing as an important mediary between scholastic and modern metaphysics' (4). These are ambitious goals, and the chapters that follow will satisfy the reader who takes that ambition seriously. But at least as interesting is the authors' position, implicit here, although made explicit a few pages further on (5, 8), regarding the debate surrounding the relation between history and philosophy: is it the philosopher's job to give an historical explication of the works of past philosophers, or ought we to engage in collegial debate with these historical figures? Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne state their intention to do both, and this ambition, too, is well satisfied. The book is historically sensitive and philosophically engaging, and so should appeal to historians of philosophy (of whatever inclination), and to contemporary metaphysicians alike.

This approach is evident from the first chapter. Here, Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne lay out the conceptual terrain of the problem of individualization, and they then turn to a discussion of how the issues are addressed in some Scholastics. With this philosophical and historical groundwork set, the authors then turn to Leibniz's own early account of individualization as found in his 1663 Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individuali. They draw out four themes from this early text: a principle of individualization has to be internal; metaphysical unity must be grounded in numerical unity; universals are conventional and not real; and there can be no formal distinctions, but rather only real or mental differences (38-38). They also identify Leibniz's own positive doctrine of individualization in this text: the 'whole entity'
doctrine: The approach Leibniz is keen to reject in the *Disputatio* is the view that, among the non-accidental components of thing, only a subset of them need be invoked to explain [the thing's] individuality' (40-1). Cover's and O'Leary-Hawthorne's aim with subsequent chapters is to investigate how these early themes develop, change, and are augmented with new ideas, as Leibniz's philosophy matures.

As this work unfolds, we are taken into some of the most complex and central terrain of Leibniz's metaphysics. Reviving old answers to some debates and joining many of those debates that are currently most lively among Leibniz scholars, the authors develop a rich interpretation of this metaphysics. So, for example, they contest the recent trend which denies that Leibniz envisions a reduction of inter-menadic relations, and instead they revive the old interpretation that indeed, Leibniz is a reductionist about such relations. But to bolster their claim, they give a careful analysis of what is meant by 'reduction', showing that we need to think of the problem from a broader (metaphysical) perspective than that offered by Leibniz's subject-predicate logic (chapter 2). This material on relations is crucial, argue Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, because getting straight about this will help us gain a better understanding of issues that bear more clearly on a discussion of individuation proper. These include: Leibniz's views on modal individuation, especially the sort of essentialism he endorses (chapter 3); what Leibniz intends by his Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (chapter 5); and why spatio-temporal relations cannot be invoked to account for the identity of individuals that are distinct from one another.

At the outset of the chapter on essentialism, the authors identify an addition to Leibniz's mature metaphysics of individuation, namely, the complete concept doctrine. This indicates a modal approach to individuation that gives rise to two serious issues. First, Leibniz's complete concept doctrine seems to necessitate that individuals be world-bound—that they exist in one possible world only (87-8). Second, and more fundamentally, the authors ask how it is possible to make use of a complete concept to define an individual (143). Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne note that this latter problem is manifest as a serious tension in Leibniz: 'while Leibniz gives undeniable voice to a haecceitist position, various strands of his thought exert significant pressures toward an anti-haecceitist view' (144). They address the first problem by arguing for what they call 'strong essentialism'; a view that is weaker than the super-essentialism endorsed by many Leibniz scholars, and yet stronger than mere moderate essentialism. This position, the authors contend, allows Leibniz to maintain the trans-world identity of individuals that they think fits more accurately with Leibniz's system. Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne address the second problem (chapter 4) by arguing for a 'brand of weak haecceitism' (169) that they also believe best preserves central Leibnizian themes. (Haecceitism, as used here, is the doctrine that allows a common individual essence despite radical dissimilarity of the individual across possible worlds [143-4].) This, in turn, brings them back to a consideration of the complete concept doctrine and their particular interpretation of what that doctrine must be in order to salvage Leibniz's various metaphysical commitments in the fashion argued for by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne. The chapter on haecceitism also leads the authors to a consideration of 'the relationship between haecceitism and two important Leibnizian principles: the Identity of Indiscernibles ... and the Principle of Sufficient Reason ... ' (155, chapter 5).

The penultimate chapter of the book addresses the problem of the enduring identity of individuals, and the role of Leibniz's doctrine of the law-of-the-series in dealing with this problem (chapter 6). And the authors complete their study of Leibniz on individuation by turning to a consideration of the threat of Spinozism—and the slide into a one-substance metaphysics—that looms over Leibniz (chapter 7).

As noted, this is an ambitious book. As the arguments unfold, the reader gains an appreciation for the authors' rich and interconnected interpretation of many strands of Leibnizian metaphysics. Part way through the book, having argued for a number of substantive conclusions, they note that they will now begin to take 'the first steps, to be continued in later chapters, toward combining the relevant threads of Leibnizian thought into a unified and coherent picture' (145). Given the sometimes hard-to-reconcile lines of thought in Leibniz's corpus, the authors provide a strongly argued and plausible account of how at least large parts of the system might all fit together: 'one begins to see strong essentialism, [the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles], [the Principle of Sufficient Reason], and weak haecceitism as intimately connected in such a way as to form inseparable aspects of a sweeping metaphysical vision. One might have expected as much from Leibniz' (161). It is a pleasure to see this sweeping metaphysical vision explicated and argued with within the context of the Scholastic background that Leibniz inherits.

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