The Rorty-Dworkin Debate

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Ronald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a deflated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”.¹ If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these foundational, or metaethical, questions. The point of this chapter is to show that things are not what they seem: Rorty and Dworkin largely agree on metaethics. The difference between them is largely a difference in emphasis.

The layout of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1, I explain in further detail why Rorty and Dworkin are thought to disagree. I outline their commitments and summarize their direct criticisms of one another with respect to metaethics. In Section 2, I begin the rapprochement. I note that several scholars have identified something “pragmatist” in Dworkin’s thought, particularly in his legal thought. This work, then, shows that he might be closer to Rorty than first appearances suggest. Nevertheless, that work, taken as a whole, suffers from a few limitations. What pragmatism means for those various theorists is either too vague or too various to be helpful. Also, even when some of this work clearly explains a sense in which Dworkin is a legal pragmatist, it fails to explain how pragmatism also figures in Dworkin’s moral philosophy. A further limitation is that this secondary literature confuses how specifically Rortyan Dworkin’s moral thought turns out to be. That last limitation – not recognizing the specifically Rortyan elements of Dworkin’s moral thought – this is examined and corrected in Section 3. In the final substantive part of the chapter, Section 4, I try to diagnose this faux fight between Rorty and Dworkin. I argue that the difference is largely a matter of emphasis. Dworkin stresses his continuity with traditional moral realism, while registering some complaints. Rorty castigates realism before admitting that he can assent to the basic structure of such a view. If this is a case of “six of one, and a half-dozen of the other”, one might be led to think any further comparison of what these thinkers say

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is purely aesthetic or something. Not so. I argue that Rorty’s emphasis is more faithful to the larger ambitions of both thinkers. Dworkin, by contrast, is misleading.

1 Rorty and Dworkin at Loggerheads

Rorty and Dworkin are thought to disagree rather deeply about metaethical matters. Three reasons support this thought. First, Dworkin claims that there is moral truth and moral objectivity; whereas, Rorty’s metaphilosophical outlook casts aspersions on truth, at least as commonly understood, and on objectivity. Second, Dworkin, an anti-Archimedean about morality, explicitly criticizes Rorty’s metaethical views as Archimedean. Third, Rorty is a pragmatist globally, which means his pragmatism affects his moral thought, and Dworkin explicitly disclaims any affiliation with the pragmatism school of thought. In this section, I further explain each of these contentions.

For Dworkin, first-order moral claims like “Abortion is morally permissible” can be true, just as a physical claim like “A kilogram of gold weighs the same as a kilogram of iron” can be true. Also, Dworkin would maintain that both claims are not only truth-apt but are also, in fact, true. Dworkin additionally thinks that true moral claims, such as the abortion claim, are objectively true. I defer, for now, the task of explaining what objectivity means for Dworkin. For drawing our little contrast between Dworkin and Rorty, all that is presently important is that Dworkin is a fan of objectivity. Rorty is often seen as enemy of truth or as a skeptic who denies the possibility of truth. Reading Rorty this way is patently misguided, but it is part of the popular philosophical imagination and is part of the reason for thinking that he differs in outlook from Dworkin. If Rorty held such stances toward truth in general, one would expect him to deny that there is moral truth. Moving from the rumor mill, Rorty did author a well-known essay decrying objectivity, essentially saying that we would be better off if we abjure its pursuit. I defer, for now, the task of explaining what objectivity means for Rorty. For drawing our little contrast, all that is presently important is that Rorty is no fan of objectivity. Summing up this first reason for sharply distinguishing Dworkin from Rorty, the former philosopher is pro-truth and pro-objectivity while the latter is anti-truth and anti-objectivity.

The second reason for seeing distance between the two concerns Archimedeanism. To explain this notion requires a deep dive into Dworkin’s essay, “Truth and Objectivity: You’d Better Believe It”. It is common to distinguish between first-order moral claims like “Factory farming is evil” and second-order, or metaethical, claims like “Statements of value... are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false”. The second-order claims are about the first-order. Metaethical claims characteristically purport to describe the meaning and truth-aptness of
first-order moral claims as well as, determining whether any first-order claims are true and in what such truth would consist. Metaethics as a discourse seeks to sit apart from first-order moral discourse and to judge it. In a phrase, metaethics seems to take a God’s eye view of morality. Dworkin calls this Archimedeanism. Dworkin argues that occupying an Archimedean view on moral thought is impossible; we are always inevitably making first-order moral claims when we purport to only make metaethical claims. On this score, Dworkin is probably incorrect and maybe incoherent, but leave this aside. Importantly, Dworkin singles out Rorty as someone who tries to be Archimedean about morality: “Richard Rorty... is the most prominent American exponent of wholesale archimedean skepticism”. Rorty falls into the Archimedean camp insofar he advocates a sort of ironical stance toward our own first-order moral views. For Rorty, we should recognize that these are not “grounded” by anything, or in other words, there is nothing to which we can point in order to disprove our interlocutors. Nevertheless, says Rorty, we can hold our moral views rather steadfastly. To Dworkin’s ears, Rorty’s claims about grounding and the like amount to an attempt to step outside of first-order moral talk, to ascend to a higher, nobler plane of abstraction, but none of this, says Dworkin, is useful or possible.

The third point of contention concerns Dworkin’s avowed and repeated disdain for pragmatism. Rorty, on the other hand, was an avowed pragmatist at least since his December 1979 address at the American Philosophical Association. By detailing this point of contention, it must be admitted that the term pragmatism is often used in various, inconsistent ways. Over his long and illustrious career, Dworkin invoked the term to talk about different ideas. Sometimes, he was referring to a style of judicial decision-making. Sometimes, he was discussing what he took to be Peirce’s theory of truth. Other times, he was talking about a crude theory of normative ethics. Still other times, he was discussing Rorty and Archimedeanism. It is striking that, however pragmatism is characterized, Dworkin invariably registers a complaint.

2 Dworkin as Pragmatist

The preceding has been a foil. The erudite scholar of Rorty or Dworkin knows that the friction between the two was more smoke than fire. In this second section of the paper, I begin unraveling the tension. First, I draw on scholarship claiming that Dworkin was friendlier to pragmatism than he let on. In particular, scholars, including Rorty himself, have argued that Dworkin’s legal thought is indebted to pragmatism. Second, after reciting this work, I turn to examining its main contention, using a three-part typology of pragmatisms. With my typology in place, I can show that Dworkin is, in fact, a kind of pragmatist with respect to legal theory. In the third portion of this section, I outline the interpretive work that lies unfinished.
Contrary to what he professed, Dworkin has been read as a pragmatist in some quarters, especially with respect to his legal theory. For instance, legal philosopher Robert Westmoreland argues that the difference between Dworkin’s theory of law and a pragmatist theory of law breaks down under scrutiny.\(^\text{17}\) Celebrated legal theorist Margaret Jane Radin agrees that Dworkin “is a pragmatist of sorts”.\(^\text{18}\) Rorty himself doubts “that one has to broaden the sense of ‘pragmatist’ very far to include [Dworkin] under this accommodating rubric”.\(^\text{19}\) A recent piece by Hillary Nye continues this refrain.\(^\text{20}\)

This agreement that Dworkin has a pragmatist legal philosophy is, after all, a false agreement, for these different voices mean different things. To illustrate, Westmoreland means that Dworkin, despite himself, endorses a pragmatic theory of adjudication, that is, a theory of deciding legal cases which looks to the practical character, costs, and benefits of certain outcomes as the criteria by which to render decisions. A pragmatic theory of this kind is, in a sense, forward-looking and stands in contrast to a view on which judges should decide cases based on some pre-existing thing called “the law”. Dworkin himself castigates this view,\(^\text{21}\) but Westmoreland claims that Dworkin endorses it *sotto voce*. Whether or not this interpretation succeeds, this finding of pragmatism in Dworkin is worlds away from what animates Radin’s reflections. For Radin, evidence of Dworkin’s pragmatism is found in “his commitment to the ubiquity of interpretation, and his concomitant commitment to finding meaning in assembling concrete events… rather than to measuring correspondence with abstract truth or justice”.\(^\text{22}\) Without trying to plumb this rich passage for all its wisdom, Radin clearly thinks that Dworkin’s pragmatism amounts to more than a sophisticated instrumentalism when deciding cases.

To make headway here and to demonstrate conclusively how Dworkin is friendly to pragmatism, we must have a working definition (or set of definitions) of pragmatism on hand. Below, I sketch three pragmatist views and then explain how Dworkin fits.\(^\text{23}\)

First is the pragmatist theory of truth. This view is summed up in the Jamesian proclamation that truth is what works. Now, this is clearly a view about the *metaphysics* of truth, and it stands in bold contrast to the correspondence theory of truth, which contends that true propositions are those that correspond to the facts or states of affairs.

Second is what I call the pragmatist theory of meaning or understanding. On one iteration of this theory, the meaning of some proposition \(p\) is determined by the set of consequences an agent expects upon believing that \(p\). On another iteration, the meaning of \(p\) is determined by the ways that an agent uses \(p\). Moving from semantic meaning to the something like understanding, another iteration of this theory holds that cognition of an object is just all of the practical effects of the object on the agent.
Third is what I call the pragmatist approach to inquiry. This is a metaphilosophical view about how inquiry is to be conducted. Such “inquiry-pragmatists” argue that we ought to assess claims by the practical consequences of believing them or accepting them. As an illustration, consider the famous passage in Pascal’s *Pensées* where he argues for the claim “God exists” on the basis of an argument about the expected utility of believing that God exists. Pascal does not claim that God’s existence depends on the expected utility calculation; Pascal does not even say (à la the pragmatist theory of truth) that the truth of “God’s exists” depends on the expected utility calculation. Instead, Pascal claims that the norm for settling the question of whether God exists is expected utility. What I am calling an inquiry-pragmatist approves of this general strategy for assessing claims. Individual pragmatists within this type might disagree with expected utility as the proper criterion, but all such pragmatists urge using practical norms to decide the given questions.

None of these views is rightly called the true pragmatism. Pragmatism is a family of views. Sometimes people say that pragmatists all embrace the “rejection of metaphysics”. But then one wonders what becomes of the most famous pragmatist doctrine of all, the pragmatist theory of truth. That seems to be a metaphysical view. Or what of those who claim that meaning is use, is that not a claim about the metaphysics of meaning? The slogan “rejection of metaphysics” is inaccurate, but it is telling. When we think of metaphysics, we often envision something high and lofty and disconnected from human interests. Pragmatists of various stripes are forever urging us to look to what we want and we do for answers to our questions, metaphysical or otherwise.

Where does Dworkin fit into all of this? According to my three-part typology, Dworkin is best read as an inquiry-pragmatist. To show this, I consider some claims advanced in Nye’s recent article on Dworkin and pragmatism. Nye labels Dworkin a pragmatist due to his rejection of metaphysics, his anti-Archimedeanism, and his thought that truth is somehow tethered to the human perspective. In explaining why I agree with each of these claims, I build the case for seeing Dworkin as an inquiry-pragmatist.

In a way of speaking, Nye is right that Dworkin rejects metaphysics, if metaphysics is a discourse demarcated by both its characteristic questions and its norms for assessing answers to those questions. Looking at Dworkin’s legal philosophy should help to make this clear. Famously, Dworkin offers a theory of the correctness conditions for first-order legal claims within a particular jurisdiction. A first-order legal claim, to give an example, is a claim like “Trading foreign aid for investigation of political rivals is an impeachable offense under the American Constitution”. On Dworkin’s theory, such a claim should be judged correct if (a) endorsing the claim coheres reasonably well with the web of legal norms historically treated as the jurisdiction’s own and if (b) the claim is good
policy. Upon hearing that second condition, it is easy to think that Dworkin is *just* offering a version of natural law theory. According to natural law theory, some norm counts as a legal norm only if (or to the extent to which) the norm coheres with some set of moral strictures. But this is not exactly what Dworkin has in mind.

Dworkin is not offering to *describe* law, that is, to give a picture of law that is correct only if it mirrors, or accurately represents, some *thing* called “law”. Though he lacks the proper vocabulary for voicing his concerns, Dworkin’s railings against “semantic theories of law” are, in fact, concerned with jettisoning metaphysical conversations about law, if understood as regulated by ordinary descriptive or representational norms. Natural law theory and its rival view, legal positivism, are both usually understood as attempts to describe law using accuracy-related criteria. Dworkin, while he holds a natural law theory, endorses it on entirely different grounds, grounds not related to accuracy. What is driving Dworkin’s theory of first-order legal claims is ultimately a *normative* concern about making law-talk worthy of our respect, or as he puts, making it truly able to justify “the exercise of coercive power by the state”. As many a legal philosopher has pointed out, this normative concern is simply not the criterion for assessing metaphysical theories, if metaphysics is understood in the ordinary way. This is the sense in which Dworkin is not up to metaphysics.

In explaining the sense in which Dworkin rejects metaphysics in his legal theory, it should also become clear how Nye’s other pragmatist elements – anti-Archimedeanism and tethering truth to human interests – find expression as Dworkin’s inquiry-pragmatism. On the anti-Archimedeanism, we can understand Dworkin’s concern narrowly or more expansively. Narrowly, Dworkin claims that metaethical questions are really just first-order moral questions. As I mentioned, this claim might just be incoherent. However, looking at anti-Archimedeanism more expansively, we can see two thoughts which may be wrong but certainly are not incoherent. The first thought urges us to be normativists all the way down (or all the way up). The thoroughgoing inquiry-pragmatist thinks that practical concerns should guide our answers to all questions. Essentially, then, the inquiry-pragmatist *turns* all questions into moral questions. (That is, of course, different from the claim that all questions were always already moral questions.) Dworkin’s fervor for anti-Archimedeanism understood narrowly may be a way of stumping for global inquiry-pragmatism. The second thought that may lie behind the narrow version of anti-Archimedeanism is a deep acknowledgment of our situatedness. How does this relate to inquiry-pragmatism? Well, the original metaphor of Archimedes is that of someone capable of standing outside the Earth and thereby able to point to the truths without the distorting effects of perspective and situatedness. Dworkin, the anti-Archimedean, abjures this model of inquiry. Inquiry-pragmatism may
help to explain why he does. The Archimedean model suggests that accuracy is the norm for assessing claims. Inquiry-pragmatism denies this. Moreover, as I explain below, Dworkin even denies that there is anything for our moral and legal claims to correspond to in the first place.

The preceding has been a meandering story, thus, a recap is in order. Several scholars have said that Dworkin’s legal thought expresses pragmatist leanings, but they were often talking about different things. As a result, their consensus is not particularly informative. To justify the contention that Dworkin is a pragmatist, I enlisted a three-part typology of pragmatisms. Armed with this and looking specifically at Dworkin’s legal thought, I demonstrated that Dworkin endorses a version of inquiry-pragmatism.

Still, this does not complete the kind of rapprochement between Rorty and Dworkin suggested at the outset of the chapter. I have only thus far proved that Rorty is a pragmatist of some sort and that Dworkin is a pragmatist of a particular sort. I hope to show that Dworkin and Rorty espouse similar versions of pragmatism and that they share a metaethical position such that their understandings of moral truth and moral objectivity, despite their squabbles, are precisely the same.

3 Dworkin as Rortyan

In this third section, I show that Dworkin is a Rortyan pragmatist with respect to metaethics. There are two tasks. First, I show that Dworkin adopts a version of pragmatism that is broadly Rortyan. Second, I show that Dworkin’s metaethics mirrors that of Rorty.

On the first task, the central piece of evidence requires returning to my typology of pragmatisms. I said that Dworkin adopts a pragmatist approach to inquiry. Rorty is also this type of pragmatist. Rorty rejects the pragmatist theory of truth in favor of a deflationist view. Rorty nowhere endorses any version of meaning-pragmatism. Instead, Rorty’s project is telling us to inquire guided by the thought of what will help us best to cope with our environment, broadly understood. Having other goals, such as accurate representation of the external world, is misguided.

This much is easy. The real challenge lies in showing that Dworkin and Rorty, both inquiry-pragmatists, have a similar substantive metaethics. To demonstrate this, let’s play a game. The game is Who Said It: Rorty or Dworkin. (Don’t read check the footnotes!)

“[A] moral judgment is made true by an adequate case for its truth”.32

“[I]t would be absurd to think that the wrongness of the Iraq invasion caused you to think it wrong”.33

“Grand metaphysical theories about what kinds of entities there are in the universe can have nothing to do with [ethics and morality]”.34
“That new epistemological regime [from the Enlightenment] posed an immediate problem for convictions about value, a problem that has challenged philosophy since. We are not entitled to think our moral convictions true unless we find these convictions either required by pure reason or produced by something ‘our there’ in the world. Thus was born the Gibraltar of all mental blocks: that something other than value must underwrite value if we are to take value seriously.”

“We cannot be, in any causal way, ‘in touch’ with moral truth. But we can nevertheless think well or badly about moral issues.”

“We must take care to respect the distance between responsibility and truth. But we cannot explain that distance except by appealing once again to the idea of good and better argument.”

“The difference between justification and truth makes no difference.”

Which is Dworkin and which is Rorty? All but the last is Dworkin, but they sound Rortyan. Even the last one, which is Rorty and which sounds like it registers a disagreement with Dworkin, marks a point of agreement. In that particular article, Rorty was saying that aiming at truth and aiming at justification is the same. It does not make sense to talk of aiming at the one and not the other. However, Rorty notes that there is a cautionary use of the term true: we use true (and its cognates) in that way to flag that we may come up with better arguments someday, which will imply that beforehand we were justified but our view was not true. This is precisely what Dworkin claims in the penultimate passage.

This little game reveals these two thinkers share quite a bit on metaethical matters, but my demonstration can go further. In previous work, I argued that Rorty subscribed to metaethical minimalism. This view is also called quietist moral realism. The view is defined by commitment to three theses. First, the minimalist says that moral discourse is truth-apt. Second, she says that we have some moral knowledge, which, of course, entails that some moral claims are, in fact, true. Third, the minimalist says something waffling about moral properties. She does not want to outright deny the existence of moral properties because the conversational implication of such denial is to suggest that moral talk is make-believe or fake. Nevertheless, the minimalist wants to impress upon philosophers that the notion of moral properties that can cause us to have particular moral convictions, when we are right, and that serve as a standard by which to judge our moral convictions – this notion has to be jettisoned. As I mentioned, in previous work, I have shown that Rorty holds this view. The quotations from above amply show that Dworkin subscribed to that view as well.

What about the apparent disagreements mentioned in the first section? These can be easily explained away now.
Accusation 1: Dworkin seems to like truth and objectivity, but Rorty not so much. Rorty and Dworkin both admit that moral claims can be true, and Rorty’s distaste for objectivity comes when conceiving of objective judgments as those judgments somehow required or produced by the object of judgment. There are no moral properties in this sense, says Rorty. But Dworkin, who says that we cannot be “in touch” with moral truth, thinks the same. The sense of objectivity that Dworkin endorses can be captured in two thoughts. The first is that, in making arguments about what is right and wrong, we are answerable to a community, not just to our private fantasies. The second is that there is space between justification and truth. Both of these Rorty happily admits.

Accusation 2: Dworkin is anti-Archimedean, but Rorty is Archimedean. On this score, Dworkin might be confused. If being Archimedean simply means talking about first-order moral discourse in a way that does not engage with it, then all metaethicists, Dworkin included, are guilty. Dworkin’s discussion of Archimedeanism is Archimedean. Now, there are legitimate nearby concerns with Archimedeanism, as I mentioned above. If the anti-Archimedean is ultimately concerned to emphasize our situatedness, Rorty can agree. He even uses the language of Archimedeanism to voice his own arguments against god’s-eye view realism. If the anti-Archimedean is ultimately concerned to urge top-to-bottom normativism, Rorty is onboard there too. Even more generally, if the anti-Archimedean is ultimately concerned about those who wish to transform ethics from a discourse about what to do into a discourse about what there is, this is a real mistake, but one that Rorty calls out too.

Accusation 3: Dworkin is anti-pragmatist, but Rorty is a pragmatist. There is no need to flog a dead, quartered horse here. Dworkin is an inquiry-pragmatist just like Rorty.

Let me take stock. In the previous section, we saw, inter alia, that Rorty and Dworkin both adopt a kind of inquiry pragmatism. That philosophical methodology proclaims that the standard by which to assess claims is practical. At least in moral, legal, and political thought, both Rorty and Dworkin are adherents. We also saw in the previous section that a number of thinkers have labeled Dworkin a kind of pragmatist (usually in another sense of the word) in reference to his legal thought. In this section, we saw that Rorty and Dworkin share more than a label (used equivocally) and more than a methodology, i.e., inquiry pragmatism. They also shared a metaethical view, which I called metaethical minimalism. Since they shared so much after all, it may began to feel curious that there was any dispute in the first place. Diagnosing the dispute is the task of the next section.

4 Diagnosing the Dispute

In this final section of the paper, I step back from the exegesis and try to offer more general reflections on the longstanding feud between Rorty
and Dworkin. Ultimately, I argue that the differences between the two thinkers were largely differences in emphasis. Nonetheless, as I finally suggest, even those differences matter. Dworkin undersells the radicalness of his metaethics and falsely suggests that his view is a standard form of moral realism. Rorty’s emphases make it clear upfront whose side he’s on.

To get a handle on the different emphases, consider the fact that Dworkin’s landmark essay in metaethics is entitled “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it”. With a title like that, one would think that Dworkin has a robust understanding of what makes moral judgments true. As it turns out, Dworkin thinks there are moral truths but no moral truthmakers. In other words, nothing makes true moral claims true. The most we can say is that good arguments lead the way toward moral truth, but that is not, for Dworkin, a conceptual or metaphysical claim. It is a normative one. Recast more accurately: Dworkin merely endorses argumentation as the means by which to settle moral questions. Objectivity, for Dworkin, merely amounts to the platitude that consensus does not make right and that some kind of fallibilism is appropriate. Again, note that, for Dworkin, fallibilism is appropriate. This is not a description of our epistemic situation; it is a prescription of how to proceed. None of this looks like traditional moral realism, and it is no wonder that moral realists have attacked Dworkin.

Dworkin, as I mentioned before, subscribes to metaethical minimalism. In this regard, he resembles theorists like Hilary Putnam and T.M. Scanlon. This is one important difference between him and them. Dworkin is an inquiry-pragmatist, and this comes out in explaining why Dworkin endorses the key minimalist principle, the denial of moral truthmakers. Putnam and Scanlon both advance a two-step argument for this. Step One is a companions-in-guilt argument: it seems like there can be mathematical truth without mathematical truthmakers, so perhaps there could be moral truth without moral truthmakers. Step Two: Occam’s Razor. Dworkin’s argument for the denial is completely different. In his discussion of “morons”, that is, whatever would serve as moral truthmakers, Dworkin essentially says that these should not be morally relevant. This kind of argument puts Dworkin at odds with even the traditional minimalists. Of course, it puts him in good company with Rorty who says, “[the pragmatist] thinks that his views are better than the realists’, but he does not think that his view corresponds to the nature of things”.

Rorty, with claims like that, makes it clear where he stands. Dworkin unnecessarily muddies the waters and confuses commentators (and himself). Rorty, in reflecting on their differences chalks it up to fundamental personality differences.

For the dialectical standoff in contemporary analytic philosophy between pragmatists and their “realist” opponents (Nagel, Dworkin,
Searle, et al.) is usefully thought of as the reciprocal unintelligibility to one another of two very different types of people. The first are those whose highest hopes are for union with something beyond the human — something which is the source of one’s superego, and which has the authority to free one of guilt and shame. The second are those whose highest hopes are for a better human future, to be attained by more fraternal cooperation between human beings. These two types of people are conveniently describable in Freudian terms: they are the people who think subjection to an authority-figure is necessary to lead a properly human life and those who see such a life as requiring freedom from any such subjection.48

In the end, the Rorty-Dworkin debate may boil down to one thing. Dworkin could not fully embrace the freedom embodied in his positions, but Rorty did.

Notes
1 Rorty (1991a).
2 Dworkin, as some will know, was a longstanding defender of abortion rights. See Dworkin (1993).
3 Nye, for example, intermittently calls Rorty a skeptic and relativist (2016, 76–8).
4 Rorty (1991a).
5 Dworkin (1996).
6 Ayer (1946, 136).
7 Dworkin (1996, 88). This name owes to the story, likely apocryphal, that Archimedes once said that he wished to stand outside the Earth. See Srinivasan (2015, 353–8) for more information including a history of the philosophical use of the term Archimedeanism.
8 See, e.g., Tiefensee (2014); Enoch (2011, 129); Michaelson (2012); Ehrenberg (2008).
9 The conversation about Archimedeanism seems to be the very kind of metaethical conversation that it is supposedly impossible to have.
11 For his definition of irony, see Rorty (1989, 73).
12 One can find the address first mentioned in APA (1979). The address itself was first published in 1980 but was reprinted in Rorty’s 1982 collection of essays, Consequences of Pragmatism. The address was given just a few months after the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In Mirror, Rorty was calling his view “epistemological behaviorism” (2009 [1979], 176). Of course, even in Mirror, Rorty only avoided the term pragmatist because it was “a bit overladen” (176).
13 E.g., Dworkin (1986, chapter 5).
14 Dworkin (2011, 177).
20 Nye (2016).
21 Dworkin (1986, chapter 5).
23 I have sketched this three-part typology elsewhere. See Donelson (2020, 103–4).
24 Pascal (1958).
25 As Nye puts it, “opposition to metaphysics is a core idea in pragmatism” (2016, 76).
26 Note: that is not how I have used the term in the preceding.
27 Dworkin elaborates this view in many places (e.g., Dworkin 1986, 225). He is particularly succinct his late work *Justice in Robes*: “A proposition of law is true, I suggest, if it flows from principles of personal and political morality that provide the best interpretation of the other propositions of law generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice” (Ibid., 14).
28 Dworkin (1986, chapter 1).
29 Dworkin (1986, 190).
30 See, e.g., Leiter (2003, 32).
31 As I’ve demonstrated elsewhere, for Rorty, we must “understand that claiming that a proposition is true is not to say anything about correspondence, or ‘getting reality right.’ Saying that a moral statement, or any statement, is true is just to express commendation” (Donelson 2017, 294).
32 Dworkin (2011, 37).
33 Dworkin (2011, 27).
34 Dworkin (2011, 25).
36 Dworkin (2011, 12).
37 Dworkin (2011, 39).
38 Rorty (1998b, 41).
40 Donelson (2017).
41 Dworkin mocked the idea of a moral reality that we could be in touch with. Speaking in jest, he wondered whether such reality would be composed of special particles called “morons” (Dworkin 1996, 104).
42 As Nye puts,

One way of understanding objectivity is as a sort of externalist, god’s-eye view that can see how the world really is… it cannot be this sort of objectivity that [Dworkin] insists on. Dworkin’s idea of objectivity is better understood as the view that truth is independent of what people think about the matter

(2016, 82)
45 Scanlon (2014).
47 Rorty (1991a, 23).

References


