Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time
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1. Introduction

Our everyday existence is permeated by a multitude of affective experiences: of ourselves; of others; and of the world around us. For the most part, emotions, moods, and feelings are present to us both proximally and forcefully. Not only do we experience them as having a certain phenomenological character, but their very experience carries with it a certain ‘force.’ Pre-theoretically at least, affective experiences appear to affect us: they seem to motivate and sometimes even to compel us to pursue certain goals. Yet the significance of affective experiences extends beyond their ubiquitous place in human life and their assumed causal role. That is, affective experiences are meaningful. They are revealing of certain features of situations in which we find ourselves (social or otherwise). On account of this revelatory dimension, affective experiences can shed light on the valence of situations; they can be informative of how to act in certain contexts; and they can even give us guidance as to how to live our lives.

Both phenomenological and other (conceptual or empirical) approaches to affectivity have recognized the central and vital role that affective experiences play in our lives. Yet phenomenological accounts – and especially that of Martin Heidegger – are distinctive in that they treat the above characteristics of affective experiences as also revealing of fundamental features of our own, human, existence. In fact, Heidegger holds that our capacity to have moods is constitutive of human existence. We are who we are, according to Heidegger, not only because we are rational, social, or practical beings, but also because we are affective, and specifically, mooded beings: that is, beings who experience moods. On Heidegger’s account, it is because we are mooded that the world is disclosed to us and that we find ourselves amidst worldly projects and social situations that already matter to us and that emotionally affect us. The principal aim of a phenomenological study of affectivity is not to explicate and categorize a set of psychic phenomena or mental states. In the age of cognitive science and neuroscience, philosophy is no longer the best candidate for such an investigation. Rather, a phenomenological study of affectivity aims to offer an understanding
of affectivity that relates to and discloses the meaningfulness of our complex worldly and social existence. From the perspective of phenomenology, one cannot come to terms with the nature of affectivity without at the same time also delineating the character of our existence, nor vice versa.

In this essay, we provide an analysis of the role of affect in Martin Heidegger’s writings from the mid- to late 1920s. We begin by situating Heidegger’s account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time (BT).\(^1\) We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit (often translated as “attunement” or “disposition”) and Stimmung (“mood”) in Heidegger’s account of human existence; explicate the relationship between the former and the latter; and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more vivid and comprehensive picture of Heidegger’s account of mood, we also focus on the experience of anxiety (Angst) by articulating both its function within fundamental ontology and, relatedly, its revelatory nature. We conclude by considering the relationship between Heideggerian moods and emotions. In a companion essay, “Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond,” we complement our present analysis by revisiting the issue of affectivity in terms of Heidegger’s discussion of temporality in Division II of BT. We also expand our present discussion by considering the fundamental mood (Grundstimmung\(^2\)) of boredom and certain moods that Heidegger considers within his later thinking.

2. The Project of Fundamental Ontology in Being and Time

In order to recognize the importance of mood (Stimmung) for Heidegger’s thinking in the mid- to late 1920s, we must first understand the context in which his account of mood is situated. Heidegger’s account of mood is laid out in a systematic fashion within the context of his project of fundamental ontology as developed in his magnum opus, BT. The aim of

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\(^1\) All references to Being and Time will be indicated by “BT” followed by the English and German pagination. The German pagination corresponds to the seventh and later editions of the text. Unless otherwise stated, we will be using Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Sein und Zeit.

\(^2\) The word “Grundstimmung” appears only once in BT (358/310). It becomes much more important in Heidegger’s thinking after 1929.
this text is to understand the meaning of Being and the way that Heidegger proceeds in order to accomplish his aim is to launch an analysis of the only kind of being for whom such a question arises, namely, human beings. In a radical move, Heidegger reconceptualizes the notion of human being anew not as subject with qualities – as most of the tradition, at least in one way or another, holds – but rather as what he calls “Dasein,” which literally means being-here or being-there. (“Da” in German can mean “here” or “there.”)

Dasein is the kind of being whose Being is disclosed (erschlossen) to it in a manifold of ways. Most of BT is an ontological-existential analysis of how Dasein exists in the world, of what it means for Dasein to exist in the world, and of how Dasein’s existence in the world is disclosed to it. Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) refers specifically to the way in which the “Da” is here or there (BT 171/132). Human existence, as Dasein (i.e., as always a “being-here” or a “being-there”), is essentially a worldly existence. For Dasein to exist means that it always already exists in a world, but not insofar as we are simply located in some container called “world.” Rather, being-in-the-world is a basic constitution of our Being and to exist in the world means to be embedded in it within a complex web of relations, to be familiar with it (BT 80/54), and to be open to it in a way that matters to us. ‘By its very nature, Dasein brings its “there” along with it… Dasein is its disclosedness’ (BT 171/133). Heidegger thus rejects a subject-object model of worldly existence and with it, eschews the language of consciousness, awareness, and, to a large extent, intentionality. A model that is rooted in consciousness as the primary mode of explaining Dasein’s way of Being in or relating to the world is misconstrued, according to Heidegger, because from the outset it “splits the phenomenon asunder” (BT 170/132): it conceptually and, indeed, irrevocably severs human beings from their world. On the contrary, disclosedness as a model of existence circumvents such concerns. Instead of relating to the world primarily by being conscious of it, by representing it, or by intentionally ‘reaching out’ to it, we relate to and are engaged with the world directly and pre-theoretically and on a more primordial level.

As already mentioned, first and foremost Heidegger’s project in BT is an ontological one: he sets out to understand the ontological or fundamental constitution of Dasein in order to explicate the meaning of Being. According to Heidegger, Dasein is constituted ontologically by four basic existentials or structures of existence: Befindlichkeit, understanding (Verstehen),
fallenness (Verfallensein), and talk (Rede). These four existentials are equiprimordially united in Dasein’s ontological structure, care (Sorge), which unifies and discloses Dasein’s being-in-the-world as temporal (BT, e.g., 375/327, 293/249, and 277/234). Each of the ontological structures manifests itself ontically through the various specific ways in which Dasein finds itself in the world. These two dimensions – the ontological and the ontic – are two different but intimately connected ways of understanding and articulating Dasein’s existence: the former pertains to the underlying and indeed necessary structures of its existence whereas the latter pertains to the concrete aspects of its comportment to the world and to others. Our analysis will focus on Befindlichkeit since it is both the context in which Heidegger’s account of mood is developed and also, we will suggest, the condition for the possibility of moods and emotions. Before continuing, however, it is important to underscore that even if analytically we can separate out any one of the existentials from the others (as we will do with Befindlichkeit), each existential on its own is only a single and incomplete moment in Dasein’s overall ontological constitution. This means that such a separation of one existential from the others can only be done in analysis. In existence, any one of the existentials mutually implies all of the others for they are all inextricably linked (BT 385/335).

3. Befindlichkeit and Stimmung

3.1. Befindlichkeit and affective disclosedness

“Befindlichkeit” is a difficult term to translate and indeed, an elaborate discussion could be devoted to all of the linguistic and philosophical problems of translating it. Insofar as we do

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3 There are places in BT in which Heidegger excludes talk from the list of existentials (235ff./191ff., 263ff./221ff., 401/350) and places in which he replaces fallenness with talk (172/133, 203/161, 342296). Still, in BT 384/335, he mentions all four.

4 In their English translation of Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson (1962) use the phrase “state-of-mind,” which is problematic since Befindlichkeit is neither a state, nor does it refer only to a mind. Carman (2003), Dahlstrom (2001), Kisiel (1992), and Wrathall (2001) all use “disposition” or “disposedness” which seem to suggest more of an ontic state than an ontological structure and fail to adequately convey Befindlichkeit’s ontological depth. In his translation of the Zollikon Seminars, Mayr (2001) translates Befindlichkeit as “ontological disposition,” but this ignores its corresponding ontic dimension. Haugeland (2013) notes that “disposition” risks implying subjectivity (which Heidegger explicitly rejects), conflicts with an established philosophical usage of the term, and carries behavioral connotations (p. 34, n.26). Instead, Haugeland uses “findingness.” Previously, he had also used “sofindingness” (see 2013, p.18, n.1). Dreyfus (1991), Blatter (2007), and Crowell (2013) all use “affectedness” or “affectivity.” The benefit of this translation is that it captures the notion that existing in the world, we are always already affected by and feel things, as well as the sense in which
not think that there exists an English term that adequately captures all of the semantic and philosophical complexities of “Befindlichkeit,” we have decided to leave it untranslated. “Befindlichkeit” relates to the colloquial German expression “Wie befinden Sie sich?” which literally means “how do you find yourself?” but which is also used as the common expression “how are you?” Befindlichkeit is a basic ontological structure of human existence that makes it possible for human beings to find themselves situated in or attuned to the world in a way that is meaningful to them. It is one of the ways in which Dasein’s existence in the world is disclosed to it. In his lecture course The History of the Concept of Time (1925), much of which several years later becomes the text of BT, Heidegger defines Befindlichkeit as the “finding of oneself in being-in-the-world” which “belongs with being-in-the-world as such” (Heidegger 1992, p. 255; translation altered).

In BT, the term “Befindlichkeit” is used ontologically to denote a phenomenon that is ontically most familiar to us: namely, mood (Stimmung\(^5\)) (BT 172/134). The terms “Befindlichkeit” and “Stimmung” hence designate one and the same phenomenon, each, however, signifying it in a different way. As an ontological structure of Dasein’s existence, Befindlichkeit is a basic mode of existence in, and openness to, the world. As the ontic manifestation of Befindlichkeit, Stimmungen are the various and specific ways in which Dasein can relate to and disclose the

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\(^5\) We follow Macquarrie and Robinson (1962), Guignon (1984), Dreyfus (1991), and Polt (1999) among others, in translating “Stimmung” as “mood,” not as “attunement.” Originally, the noun “Stimmung” referred to the tuning of an instrument; it also referred to the word for one’s mood or humor (Heidegger 1962, 172/134, note 3). Even if the translation of “Stimmung” as “attunement” is more etymologically precise, “mood” retains the folk psychological associations of our ordinary understanding and use of “mood.” It is important to note, however, that the colloquial understanding of “mood” only captures some of Heidegger’s meaning of “Stimmung.” For Heidegger, as we see below, “Stimmung” does not merely refer to a type of affective experience; it also captures the manner in which the world and others are disclosed to us.
world, all of which occur against the backdrop of the structure of _Befindlichkeit_. Insofar as _Befindlichkeit_ belongs to the structure of Dasein’s existence and insofar as it is always manifested through mood, Dasein is always in some mood, where even indifference is considered to be a mood (BT 173/134).

But what exactly is a mood for Heidegger?

Unlike psychological accounts of moods which posit them to be internal, subjective, mental states often caused by one’s external situation that can be inferred from one’s outward behavior, posture, or facial expression; for Heidegger, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are both constitutive and disclosive of the way one exists or finds oneself (sich befinden) attuned to the world and of how one is faring in the world with others. In _Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics_, Heidegger specifies that “moods [Stimmungen] are not side-effects [of cognition, volition, or action], but are something which in advance determine our being with one another” (Heidegger 1995, p. 67). He continues: “[M]oods are not something merely at hand. They themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and fundamental way of Being, indeed of being-there, and this always directly includes being with one another” (ibid.). Heidegger rather helpfully likens moods to atmospheres (ibid.; cf. Blattner 2006, p. 77). Moods, like atmospheres, are already there and we exist in them. They are not some inner, private, or subjective states of Being. Instead, moods are the pervasive medium or lens through which the world is disclosed to us and in existing, we constantly find ourselves in them. Moods are already there, however, not insofar as they exist independently or outside of Dasein. Rather, moods are there in the sense that they belong to and constitute the very being-there of Dasein. In other words, they are “ways of the being-there of Da-sein” or, equivalently, “fundamental ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way” (Heidegger 1995, p. 67; see also BT 173/134)

In addition to being atmospheres of existence, moods also have an important, underlying revelatory dimension in that they affect and to an extent even determine how things appear to us. That is, moods are a background horizon against which the world is made present to

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6 “Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition that reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things and persons” (BT 176/137).
us. Before articulating the specific revelatory dimension of moods – that is, before specifying what moods reveal to us – it is important to highlight two general features of their disclosive character. First, the way that moods are disclosive is, for the most part, pre-reflective and unthematic (BT 173f./134f.; cf. Heidegger 1992, p.256; Heidegger 1995, p.68). Moods are irremovable lenses through which the world is made manifest to us, yet they are rarely the focus of our attention; in fact, most of often we find ourselves in moods without realizing it. Second, Heidegger privileges affective disclosure over theoretical disclosure. Not only is the former more “primordially revealing” than the latter, but the latter also always occurs through the lens of a mood even when the presence of a mood goes unnoticed (BT 177/138; cf. Heidegger 1995, p.68).

3.2. Befindlichkeit’s three essential characteristics

According to Heidegger, it is through moods that three key features of existence are disclosed to us. Specifically, mood discloses to us (a) our thrownness (Geworfenheit), (b) Being-in-the-world as a whole, and (c) what matters to us. Let us explain each point in turn.

(a) Thrownness is a central feature of Dasein’s existence in the world. Along with fallenness and existence (projection), thrownness (facticity) is one of the constitutive moments of Dasein’s ontological structural whole, what Heidegger calls “care” (BT 227/182, 235ff./191ff., 329/284, 364/316, and 376/328). In Division I of BT, Heidegger articulates the care structure in terms of the dynamic and intimate interconnection of understanding, Befindlichkeit, and talk. “Thrownness,” manifest in each of these existentials, refers to the “that it is and has to be” of Dasein (BT 173/134): to the fact that Dasein always already finds itself in social, political, cultural, and historical situations that it did not choose, that are beyond its control, but that importantly and fundamentally determine who Dasein is and can be. Thrownness is not something that is finished and settled like an ancestral fact of

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7 “The possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods” (BT 174/134; see also BT 175/136, BT 177/138).

8 Dasein “never comes behind its thrownness” (BT 434/383), which is to say that Dasein has no control over and cannot change where and how it has been.

9 Thrownness relates to projection and understanding: “as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call ‘projecting’” (BT 185/145). That is, as thrown, Dasein can project itself only upon a set of specific factual possibilities (BT 346/299; cf. 376/328).
one’s existence. Rather, as long as Dasein exists, it is always thrown (BT 223/179, 321/276 and 344/297) - a condition that is revealed to it through moods, sometimes explicitly and rather poignantly as in the case of anxiety and boredom. Most often, however, Dasein’s thrownness goes unnoticed and unacknowledged (BT 173-5/134-6, 315/270, and 330/284). The specific manner in which thrownness is disclosed through moods is discussed further in subsection 3.3.

(b) Moods also disclose Being-in-the-world as a whole. That is, they disclose equiprimordially the world, Dasein-with (Mitdasein)\(^\text{10}\), and one’s own existence (BT 176/137). In fact, it is on the basis of such a holistic disclosure that directing oneself towards something specific is possible (ibid.; see also Heidegger 1992, p. 257). For Heidegger, our moods are not the symptoms of a causal relationship that holds between Dasein and the world; Dasein is not something separate from or merely contained in the world. Rather, that we can be affected by the world indicates both our ontological constitution and also our prior embeddedness in it. Furthermore, moods are neither subjective nor objective states. A mood, Heidegger notes, “comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being” (BT 176/136; cf. Heidegger 1995, p.63 ). Moods are possible only because Dasein is fundamentally a worldly being, a being-in-the-world. But Dasein’s mode of Being involves not only having a world (an openness to the world) but also, and at the same time, a disclosedness of the world. Consequently, not only do moods arise out of our worldly, concernful, social existence but, at the same time, they arise as ways of being in the world; they disclose the world to us.

(c) Finally, in order for Dasein to encounter entities in the world, those entities must matter to it. Heidegger writes: “Letting something be encountered is primarily circumspecitive; it is not just sensing something or staring at it” (BT 176/137). This mattering (or concernful encounter of worldly entities) is grounded in Befindlichkeit, for mattering “has the character of becoming affected in some way.” (ibid.) Heidegger writes:

[T]o be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of that which is

\(^{10}\) “Mitdasein” refers to the type of being of others as it is innerwordly manifested to Dasein (BT 152/116, 158/118). According to Heidegger, Dasein can be encountered as Mitdasein by others only insofar as Dasein has the essential structure of being-with (Mitsein) (BT 157/121).
ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as Being-in as such has been
determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-
world can “matter” to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can “matter” to it is
grounded in Befindlichkeit (ibid.).

Hence, moods are necessary in order for things in the world to matter to us; consequently,
moods make our everyday practical dealings with worldly entities and with others possible.

This third characteristic of Befindlichkeit is already found in the second: insofar as moods, by
disclosing Being-in-the-world as a whole, make possible all specific modes of directedness,
any type of circumspective concern presupposes our capacity to affectively find oneself in
the world. “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of
Befindlichkeit (die Genmittheit der Befindlichkeit)” (ibid.) In fact, it is only insofar as one is in a
mood that anything can appear to one in a valenced way:

Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come
about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if attuned
or mooded Being-in-the-world had not already submitted itself to having
entities within-the-world “matter” to it in a way which its moods have outlined
in advance” (BT 137/177; translation altered).

Dasein, according to Heidegger, is the being for whom its Being is an issue. In order for its
Being to be an issue for Dasein, worldly entities as well as Dasein itself must and do matter
to it. It is only on account of moods that such mattering is possible.

3.3. Thrownness, Anxiety, and Fallenness

Moods, as we have already discussed, disclose Dasein's thrownness. However, the precise
manner in which they do so deserves additional discussion. For the most part, Dasein’s
thrownness is disclosed in a peculiar manner. Dasein is not typically made aware of its
thrownness – it does not perceive it nor does it apprehend it as a fact (BT 174/135). Instead,
Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed to it insofar as Dasein “finds itself in its thrownness” by
turning away from it (ibid.). For the most part, moods disclose Dasein’s thrownness “in the
manner of an evasive turning-away” (BT 175/136; cf. 230/185).

In the very revelatory character of moods, one thus finds a type of concealment: “The pure
‘that it is’ shows itself, but the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ remain in darkness” (BT 174/135;
see also 175/136). That is, in moods there is a tendency to turn away from the fact that we
already find ourselves here (in this specific situation, family, socio-economical context, culture, historical era) and that we inhabit a space of specific and already delineated future possibilities. For instance, in sadness, after the loss of a close relative or friend, or in being rejected by a loved one, one often ‘drowns’ oneself in worldly projects and social affairs. By busying oneself with worldly concerns, one ‘covers up,’ ‘covers over,’ and forgets one’s facticity; the weight of Being and having to be escapes one’s notice (BT 174/135).

In this type of evasion that is characteristic of moods, we see a clear connection between Befindlichkeit and fallenness. “It is always by way of Befindlichkeit,” Heidegger writes, “that this turning-away is what it is” (ibid.). He adds: “In the face of thrownness Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of the they-self” (BT 321/276). Thus, for the most part, through moods Dasein flees in the face of itself – it turns away from its facticity. It falls instead into the ‘they’ and into the ‘world’ of concern (BT 233-4/189).

But “one is not necessarily fleeing whenever one shrinks back in the face of something or turns away from it” (BT 230/185). In fact, there is a type of turning-away that is not, at the same time, a fleeing or falling. Instead, Dasein can turn-away and in so doing, come to see itself for what it is (BT 230ff./185ff.). In this type of turning-away, one turns away from everydayness and turns toward one’s existence; that is, one finds oneself face-to-face with one’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 321/276). This special kind of turning-away occurs in the fundamental mood (Grundbefindlichkeit) of anxiety (Angst).

Anxiety is a deeply disconcerting, rare, and potentially profound experience that may arise even in the midst of our most common and familiar practices. That in the face of which we are anxious is not a particular entity. What elicits anxiety, in other words, is not something that we encounter in our worldly existence, but rather our very own existence, our being-in-the-world. “Anxiety … springs from Dasein itself” (BT 395/344). This feature of anxiety makes its onerous character all the more pronounced, for one cannot escape from anxiety. Furthermore, in anxiety, one is not anxious about some worldly entity or another; nor is one anxious about some concrete possibility. One is anxious about oneself as “Being-possible” (BT 232/188), as an entity that is more than its present way of Being, always projecting into the future (see also BT 236/191-2).
During anxiety, the world of our everyday concern ultimately loses its significance. But this happens not insofar as the world becomes absent to us (BT 231/186); rather, it happens insofar as familiar entities appear to be foreign. Entities show up as disconnected from their everyday uses and meanings (BT 231/186-7, 393/343). The world that is disclosed in anxiety is one of unfamiliarity and the hitherto familiar world becomes uncanny. One feels at home nowhere. When one finds oneself in this unnerving place, one is incapable of understanding oneself, at least in the manner that we tend to understand ourselves vis-à-vis the social and practically oriented world of our fallen everydayness. As a profound crisis of meaning, anxiety allows one to see oneself for who one really is (BT 235/191): a thrown, fallen, finite being who constantly projects its future possibilities. Heidegger writes:

Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization (BT 232/187-8).

The significance of anxiety, however, goes beyond its unique revelatory function. Anxiety is important for Heidegger not only because it compels Dasein to come face-to-face with its own existence and, in so doing, prepares the ground for philosophizing proper (Heidegger 1995, §2). Anxiety is also important because it grounds the phenomenon of falling away from one’s own possibilities (BT 230/186). In everydayness, one flees not in the face of entities within the world; rather, one flees towards those entities and away from the uncanniness that is manifested in anxiety. Fallenness is a refuge for the unbearable uncanniness that is revealed in anxiety. Fallenness is thus only possible because the possibility that anxiety will break through is always already there: “That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquilized and familiar is a mode of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse” (BT 234/189).

We are now in a position to understand why Heidegger calls anxiety a “Grundbefindlichkeit.” Anxiety is a Grundbefindlichkeit not only because in anxiety one can see who one really is. It is also a Grundbefindlichkeit insofar as it serves as the ground for the very evasive turning-away

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11 “Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted” (BT 232/187).
that is characteristic of other moods. As such, anxiety is the ground of other ways of being mooded or of affectively experiencing the world, including fear. “The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible” (BT 230/186). In other words, one can find oneself in the mood of fear only because anxiety is already a possibility for oneself. Fear, for Heidegger, is an inauthentic mode of Befindlichkeit (BT 391/341; 234/189). It is inauthentic because the turning-away that is present in fear and indeed the turning-away that makes fear possible is a type of fleeing. In fear, one turns-away from one’s self; one fails to face one’s own existence (BT 229f./185f.; cf. 180-1/141-2). Stated otherwise, fear is only possible because we have already “fallen” into the world of everydayness. Fearing for one’s life is still fearing for some worldly entity with which one identifies and it is not, in Heidegger’s sense, fearing for death. That is, in fear one does not come face-to-face with “the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (BT 294/250): “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all” (BT 307/262).

4. Conclusion: The Place of Emotions in Being and Time

It is in line with this comment that one can understand Heidegger’s claim that “he who is resolute knows no fear” (BT 395/344). The person who is resolute relates to the world in a way that precludes the possibility of fear arising. This also suggests that although anxiety is the ground for fear insofar as it is the condition for the possibility of fear, its very presence takes away the possibility of fear arising (see also Ratcliffe 2013). None of these remarks should lead one to think that the experience of fear is inherently problematic or one that should be avoided. First, fear is indeed the right response in many situations and often reveals relevant features of our surroundings. Second, even if we accept that fear is only possible in fallenness, one must keep in mind that fallenness is not an optional feature of one’s existence: “Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself” (BT 220/176).

In Division II of BT, Heidegger undertakes the task of demonstrating that the fundamental structures of Dasein’s being ought to also and even more fundamentally be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The aim of this return to the themes of Division I is not to merely show that there is an alternative way of understanding what it means to be a human being. Rather, the primary aim is to establish that human existence is enabled and made possible by temporality. Indeed, Heidegger’s conclusion is that “[t]he primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (BT 375/327). That is, what makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling is temporality.

Admittedly, an explication of Heidegger’s account of human existence and its affective component that does not discuss the temporal nature of Befindlichkeit is incomplete: it does not articulate the distinctive openness to temporality that makes this affective existence possible, nor does it ground the distinction between authentic and inauthentic (modes of) Befindlichkeit in a difference in modes of temporality (BT 377/328). On account of space limitations, we cannot discuss the temporal nature of Befindlichkeit here. We do, however, provide a detailed discussion of this character in a companion piece to this essay.
Although Befindlichkeit and mood play a crucial role in Heidegger’s account of human existence, surprisingly, Heidegger has very little to say about emotions and feelings. Perhaps one explanation for this striking omission in BT is the fact that in this context Heidegger is concerned with explicating the ontological structures of human existence and not with discussing all of the possible ontic manifestations or modes of these structures. Furthermore, he is interested in undertaking such an analysis of human existence only to the extent that it will allow him to articulate, in the end, the meaning of Being. Indeed, Heidegger admits this much (BT 178/138).

But even if this conspicuous absence of a discussion of the relationship between moods and emotions is justified given the aim and scope of BT, one would be remiss not to inquire into the nature of this relationship. After all, not only have emotions been a central topic within the history of philosophy, but emotional phenomena are also integral to the very fabric of human existence. Thus, an account of affectivity that has no place for emotions would not only be a rather peculiar and revisionary one, it would also be one that arguably fails to come to grips with what it means to exist as a human being.

Unfortunately, providing a sketch of the relationship between emotions, moods, and Befindlichkeit turns out to be a difficult task. In addition to the fact that Heidegger does not discuss this relationship in BT (or anywhere for that matter), he fails to discuss the role of the body in our everyday affective experiences (BT 143/108), and in BT he only addresses in detail the Grundbefindlichkeit of anxiety and the mood of fear. What is more, on the basis of his discussion of fear, it is neither clear nor convincing that fear should be considered a mood (or a mode of Befindlichkeit) at all, as opposed to an occurrent emotion (see Freeman 2015 and Blattner 2007). In §30, Heidegger announces that what we fear is something threatening within the world, which approaches us from a specific direction and which is detrimental to us. The fact that fear is directed at a specific worldly entity can be taken as evidence in support of the claim that fear, even in Heidegger’s understanding, is an emotion, and not a mood. Heidegger’s discussion of the different variations of fear further supports this pronouncement (BT 181-2/142).

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14 In his discussion of the temporality of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger, very briefly, mentions joy, hope, enthusiasm, gaiety, satiety, melancholy, sadness, and despair (BT 395/345).
Still, we do believe that there is way of construing the relationship between moods and emotions that is largely in agreement with Heidegger's overall account advanced in BT. Our interpretative suggestion is that moods should be thought of as the background against which occurrent and intentionally specific emotions arise – in fact, moods are not just the background conditions for emotions but for most other intentionally directed states as well (see also Ratcliffe 2013 and 2008; Slaby 2010; and Elpidorou 2013). This suggestion captures the crucial role that Heidegger assigns to moods; it is also supported by Heidegger’s claim that being in a mood is necessary for experiencing worldly entities as mattering to us. Moods are not the affective ‘colorations’ of an already encountered and experienced world. Rather, moods are basic affective states that make circumspective engagement with the world possible: they open up the world to us and reveal it to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that matter to us. If moods are the grounds upon which circumspective engagement is first made possible, then moods are necessary for emotions. This is because in order to have emotions what is required is a world that already matters to us. Love, hatred, fear are rendered meaningless in a world in which nothing whatsoever matters to us.

In addition to being consistent with Heidegger’s main position in BT, understanding mood as that which allows emotions to appear provides us with a way of making sense of Heidegger’s discussion of fear. Even if fear is taken to be an emotion, one could still argue that there is a mood that renders that emotion possible, namely, what Heidegger calls “fearfulness.”

Finally, the proposed reading of the relationship between moods and emotions paves the way for new areas of enquiry. By specifying the place that emotions occupy in Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of our affective existence, it facilitates a dialogue between Heidegger and the many contemporary philosophical and empirical accounts of emotions (see, for example, Freeman 2014).

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15 This point is articulated and defended in Ratcliffe 2013. In support of this position, Heidegger writes: “This ‘fearfulness’ is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some factual ‘individualized’ disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential Befindlichkeit of Dasein in general…” (BT 182/142).
Works Cited


Indiana University Press, 1992.)


