Two hostile bishops? A reexamination of the relationship between Peter Browne and George Berkeley beyond their alleged controversy

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For decades scholars have argued that there was a heated argumentative exchange between the bishop of Cork and Ross, Peter Browne, and the bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley. Thus, they have unduly reduced Browne to a mere adversary of Berkeley. They also thereby distorted the perception of the Irish intellectual milieu in the seventeenth / eighteenth century and the way its participants influenced one another. Contrary to this controversy-reading I establish how ill-supported the prevailing narrative of the relationship between the bishops of Cork and Cloyne is. This, in turn, allows me to demonstrate that the discussion about the problem of divine analogy in seventeenth / eighteenth century Ireland was embedded in a larger context, which has hitherto been too little appreciated. I will illustrate this point by demonstrating that the two bishops not only reacted to William King’s solution to the problem of divine analogy, but that they did so by accepting his ‘resemblance-requirement’. That is, King’s notion that divine representation requires resemblance. This indicates how the discussion about the problem of divine analogy in seventeenth / eighteenth century Ireland was influenced by the way these churchmen thought about the relation of resemblance, representation, and knowledge more generally.

KEYWORDS
Peter Browne; George Berkeley; Divine Analogy

1. Introduction

The aim of my paper is to correct the longstanding misperception of the relationship between two key figures of the Irish intellectual milieu of the seventeenth / eighteenth century: the bishop of Cork and Ross (1710–1735), Peter Browne (c. 1665–1735), and the Bishop of Cloyne (1734–1753), George Berkeley (1685–1753).¹ This misperception is not only (historically) inaccurate but has also resulted in a distorted perception of this Irish intellectual milieu in general and the significance of Peter Browne in particular. While Browne was considered to be one of the most influential intellectuals in Ireland in his lifetime,² he is mostly known today (if at all) for being the (vice-)provost of Trinity
College in Dublin (1699–1710) when Berkeley was studying there (1700–1704). Accordingly, most of the scholarly attention to Browne has been confined to his relation to and his alleged influence on Berkeley.³

For more than 200 years, scholars have proceeded on the assumption that there was a controversy (in the sense of an argumentative exchange) between the two bishops about what I will call the “problem of divine analogy”. This problem concerned one of the most vexing issues for seventeenth / eighteenth century Irish intellectuals.⁴ Simply put, virtually everyone agreed that analogies are needed when God, the divine nature, or attributes are spoken of. However, there were two key areas of disagreement concerning (1) ontology and (2) semantics. On the one hand, (1) it was discussed whether God’s attributes differ in degree or also in kind from their human counterparts. On the other hand, (2) there was disagreement about the proper (semantical) understanding of the analogical attributions needed to describe God.

My aim in this paper is to rectify the current misperception of the relationship between the two bishops by demonstrating that Browne and Berkeley did not engage in a controversy with each other. While it is certain that Berkeley and Browne advanced conflicting solutions to the problem of divine analogy and that Browne felt attacked by Berkeley (cf. §§2–3), there are textual and contextual grounds to reject the notion that there was an exchange in the first place, because Berkeley was largely indifferent to Browne (cf. §§4–5). In contrast to the prevailing controversy reading, I will defend the following view: Browne surely felt attacked by Berkeley’s elaborations in Alciphron (1732) and reacted to them in his Divine Analogy (1732/1733). However, there was no argumentative exchange because Browne’s Procedure (1728) had virtually no influence on Berkeley and his writing of Alciphron. Rather, it seems that the specific target of these sections was the Archbishop of Dublin (1703–1729), William King (1650–1729) (cf. §3). The available evidence suggests that Berkeley was also indifferent to the elaborate criticisms of Alciphron found in Browne’s Divine Analogy (cf. §5).

In short, §§2–5 establish the background of the problem of divine analogy and the controversy reading, and they demonstrate how ill-supported the prevailing narrative of the relationship between the bishops of Cork and Cloyne is. In closing, I will highlight why it matters to get rid of the controversy reading from a more general intellectual historical point of view. Namely, this reading has helped to block from view how the discussion about the problem of divine analogy in seventeenth / eighteenth century Ireland was embedded in a larger context. I will illustrate this point by demonstrating that the two bishops not only reacted to William King’s solution to the problem of divine analogy, but that they did so by accepting his “resemblance-requirement”.⁵ That is, King’s notion that divine representation requires resemblance. This, in turn, indicates how the discussion about the problem of divine analogy in seventeenth / eighteenth-century Ireland was influenced by the way these churchmen thought about the relation of resemblance, representation, and knowledge more generally. Thus, displacing Browne as active interlocutor of Berkeley paves the way for a more comprehensive understanding of this intellectual milieu and the (often implicit) assumptions that drove their discussion.⁶

2. Browne, Berkeley, and the problem of divine analogy

The discussion about the nature of God and the divine attributes as well as the limitations on our ability to describe God is almost as old as Christianity itself. For example, these
topics were already discussed by Augustine or Boethius. One of the most famous instances of this discussion is found in the works of Aquinas. In the thirteenth quaeestio of his Summa Theologica, dedicated to the “Names of God”, Thomas asked “whether a name can be given to God?” and, if so, in what sense this “name” (i.e. description) must be understood. Aquinas’ discussion of these questions proved to be particularly influential for the seventeenth / eighteenth century Irish context, as Thomas articulated the idea that analogies were needed to describe God in detail. Following this idea, the Irish discussion of the problem of divine analogy turned on two interrelated questions.

1) Do God’s attributes, such as wisdom, mercy, or power, differ in degree or in kind from their human counterparts?
2) Is “analogue attribution” only concerned with the structure or also with the modus of the attribution? That is, does it just mean we have to use analogies for our divine attributions or is it a separate mode of speech (next to the metaphorical and literal)?

In his Letter (1697), Peter Browne, the then Vice-Provost of Trinity College Dublin, argued concerning the first question that the “Nature of God is truly Mysterious”. That is, as Browne put it on page 138 of his Procedure (1728), all of God’s attributes are “totally different in Kind from those Properties in us bearing the same name” (Procedure, 138). Despite this fundamental difference between God and humans, Browne believed that we can have knowledge about God: while this difference entails that we can have no “conception or notion” of God “as it is in itself”, we do have a “sort of composition we make up from our idea’s of Wordly Objects”. These “mediate and improper” ideas are formed by using analogies. According to Browne, the usage of analogies allows for a “real” or “proper substitution of notions and conceptions”. For instance, Browne argued that we come by the notion of divine wisdom by using an analogy to “transfer” our notion of human knowledge to God in order to “express a real, and correspondent, but otherwise inconceivable Perfection”. Crucially, this notion of divine wisdom gets its content from our conception of human knowledge, of which we have an “immediate Perception or Consciousness”. According to Browne’s solution, then, we have to use analogies when we attribute anything to God: “When God himself is spoke of, ’tis always by analogy”. Crucially, when we use analogies to describe God, these analogical attributions constitute a separate mode of speech because of the difference in kind between God and humans. Browne described this analogical way of speaking as a “middle way” between literal and metaphorical speech.

Berkeley, on the other hand, held that we can properly describe God by using words in their literal sense because God and humans only differ in degree but not in kind. Similarly to Browne, he adhered to the Peripatetic axiom that “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses”, and they both believed that the mind is imperceivable by the senses. It is important to note, however, that they advanced this opinion for very different reasons. In Berkeley’s case, we can have no idea of God, an infinite mind, because ideas, which, for Berkeley, can be internal or external “objects”, can “only be like ideas”. Because minds are active and ideas passive, we can have no ideas of a mind in general. Browne argued in the Procedure that what he now called “ideas of sensation” are limited to “our simple sensations” of “material external objects”. As the mind is a
“thinking immaterial substance”, Browne held that we have no ideas of the “operations of our mind” or the “substance or properties of spirit.”

Thus, both thinkers agreed that we can have no idea of God, who is “pure spirit.” Unlike Browne, however, Berkeley argued that I can use my own mind as a model to create an “active thinking image of the Deity” by “reflecting on my own soul heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections.” God is, for instance, wise in the “same sense” as a human being, but divine wisdom is “without any of that alloy which is found in the creatures.” In order to do this fundamental difference justice, we have to use analogies, which does “signify a similitude of proportions.” For instance, 6:2 is proportionally similar to 9:3 and the same holds, according to Berkeley, in the case of human and divine knowledge. The knowledge is the same in kind and serves the same ends. That is, the relation between (in)finite beings and their respective knowledge is the same, but, “as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man.”

Given this proportional difference, Berkeley contended that we have to use analogies when speaking about God, as this usage allows us to attribute anything “proportionably” to God, i.e. it allows us to preserve “a proportion to the infinite nature of God.” Yet, Berkeley did not think that these analogical attributions constitute a separate mode of speech. Concerning the second question, he argued that an analogical attribution is nothing above and beyond using an analogy when attributing something to God. This you can do by using either literal or metaphorical speech. To put it differently, analogical attributions, for Berkeley, only concern the structure of our attributions and do not constitute a separate mode of speech.

3. The (Brownian) origin of the controversy reading

The last section has shown that Browne and Berkeley were obviously advancing vastly different solutions to the problem of divine analogy. In this section, I will establish that Browne ought to be considered as the originator of the controversy reading and trace its history.

Browne clearly felt attacked by Berkeley’s elaborations on the problem of divine analogy in §§16–22 of the fourth dialogue of Alciphron. This becomes evident in the eighth chapter of Divine Analogy, which was published a few months after Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732). In the introduction to this chapter, Browne wrote:

Just as this Treatise was finished and sent away to the Press, I was very accidently surprised with a threatening Appearance of a powerful Attack upon the Doctrine of Divine Analogy, from an anonymous Author [i.e. Berkeley] under the Disguise of a Minute Philosopher the judicious Reader will observe how this entire Chapter is calculated, not for an Answer to that Author in particular; but to all such loose and general Reflections as too frequently occur in other Writers, who have not sufficiently weighed and considered this Subject; […] Take then this Author’s Saying in his own Words, and in the Order I met with them, all of them such as proceed entirely from a gross Mistake of Analogy, and no other than so many of plain Misrepresentations of the Truth of that Doctrine we maintain.

While it is an exaggeration to call the eighth chapter a “long diatribe” against Berkeley, Browne’s downplaying of Berkeley’s importance in the quoted passage was in fact more rhetoric than reality. This is already suggested by the length of the chapter, which spanned almost a third of the whole book (181 pages out of 554); a fact that is even
more noteworthy given that Browne said himself in the quoted passage that his book was already sent to the publisher when he became aware of *Aliciphron*. Thus, those pages were written in a very short period. Secondly, the harshness and partially personal tone of Browne’s criticisms also indicate how irritated he was by *Aliciphron*, which he perceived to be a direct attack on his position.\(^{47}\)

It is sensible to consider Browne as the originator of the controversy reading inasmuch as he was the first to claim (*nota bene* without giving any evidence) that Alc. 4.16–22 was an attack on him and his *Procedure* more specifically.\(^{48}\) This claim was taken up in the advent of what would become the discipline of the history of philosophy. In 1819, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann claimed, without giving any explanation or justification either, in his *Geschichte der Philosophie* that Berkeley wrote *Aliciphron* in answer to Browne’s *Procedure*.\(^{49}\) In 1871, this interpretation was taken up and refined by Alexander Campbell Fraser, who was the first to edit and collect Berkeley’s writings in English. In the first edition of his *The Works of George Berkeley* (1871), he wrote: “Tennemann says that Berkeley’s *Aliciphron* was written as a reply to him [i.e. Peter Browne], although this only applies for a few sections in this Dialogue [i.e. Alc. 4.16–22]”.\(^{50}\) A few years later, Fraser doubled down on this interpretation:

This part of *Aliciphron* [i.e. Alc. 4.16–22] was occasion of a polemical criticism by Dr. Peter Browne [who] had indicated a peculiar opinion about the nature of human theological knowledge in his answer to Toland [i.e. the *Letter*], and afterwards, in 1728 [i.e. in the *Procedure*] […] this analogical hypothesis of Peter Browne is criticized in no flattering terms by Berkeley in the [§§16–22 of the fourth] dialogue. The criticism drew the Bishop of Cork into the controversy. (my emphasis)\(^{51}\)

This interpretation was not scrutinized in the following years, despite the development of a more critical scholarship. On the contrary, it was reaffirmed in 1942 by W. W. S. March who wrote that Berkeley “set to work to criticize Browne” in Alc. 4.16–22, hoping “to settle the dispute” on the issue of divine analogy.\(^{52}\) Subsequently, this controversy reading has come to be accepted by virtually anyone who discussed both Browne and Berkeley. Most notably, it has been defended by David Berman ever since his 1969 paper with Jean-Paul Pittion.\(^{53}\) Following this controversy reading, the alleged argumentative exchange between Browne and Berkeley has often been the focal point of the discussions of the problem of divine analogy in seventeenth / eighteenth century Ireland. Furthermore, Browne has been reduced by most scholars to an (more or less able) adversary of Berkeley, whose writings can be used to shed light on Berkeley’s solution to the problem of divine analogy because the supposedly latter formulated this solution in reaction to Browne’s position.\(^{54}\)

In sum: the controversy reading has shaped the perception of the intellectual milieu of that period in Irish thought, but given the lack of evidence that accompanied its inception, there are at least two important questions.

1) Are Browne and other proponents of the controversy reading right to interpret *Aliciphron* in the way they do?

2) Is there any reaction by Berkeley to Browne’s elaborate criticisms in *Divine Analogy*?

The first question is important because, if *Aliciphron* was not written in reaction to the *Procedure*, an important part of the alleged argumentative exchange dissolves. Yet, the narrow
focus on Browne and the controversy reading could still be defended if Berkeley reacted to *Divine Analogy*. For then, the controversy reading could be adjusted by saying that *Divine Analogy* (and not the *Procedure*) drew Berkeley into an argumentative exchange with Browne. I will thus address both questions in turn in the following sections.

### 4. Rejecting the inconclusive: Berkeley’s targets in *Alciphron*

My goal in this section is to call the force of Alc. 4.16–22 as evidence for the controversy reading into question. There have been three suggestions for why we ought to read these passages as a reaction to Browne. I will deal which each suggestion in turn and demonstrate how each of them is inconclusive.

Berkeley’s *Alciphron* is a work devoted to defending the “Christian religion, against those who are called Free-Thinkers”. It consists in seven fictitious dialogues between the free-thinkers Alciphron and Lysicles and (Berkeley’s spokesmen) Euphranor and Crito, which are recounted by a fifth and mostly silent participant, Dion, to his friend Theages. As Berkeley seldomly refers to the authors he is arguing against and takes interpretative liberties in “improv[ing] on their hints, and draw[ing] conclusions from their principles” and because he is using pseudonyms, it is often challenging to figure out who he has in mind. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that there is neither a reference to Browne’s works nor a pseudonym referring to him. Instead, there are three plausible suggestions that would justify reading Alc. 4.16–22 as a criticism of Browne.

1) Berkeley’s use of “divines” in the plural in Alc. 4.17.
2) Berkeley’s criticism of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in Alc. 4.19.
3) Berkeley’s use of the “man born blind” in Alc. 4.21.

According to the first suggestion, Berkeley used “divines” in §17 of the fourth dialogue because he did not only want to refer to Browne but also to William King and potentially other churchmen of his time. However, the problem with this suggestion is that, even though “divines” may include Berkeley’s contemporaries as well, it does, first and foremost, refer to the “Fathers and Schoolmen”:

17. LYSICLES. You must know, Diagoras, a man of much reading and inquiry, had discovered that once upon a time the most profound and speculative divines, [...] taught that the words knowledge, wisdom, goodness, and such-like, when spoken of the Deity, must be understood in a quite different sense from what they signify in the vulgar acceptation, or from any thing that we can form a notion of or conceive.

[...]

EUPHRANOR. This account of a Deity is new to me. I do not like it, and therefore shall leave it to be maintained by those who do.

19. CRITO. It is not new to me. I remember not long since to have heard a minute philosopher triumph upon this very point; which put me on inquiring what foundation there was for it in the Fathers or Schoolmen. (all emphases are mine)

Lysicles here tells the others that Diagoras, a free-thinker whose identity I discuss below, discovered that “the most speculative and profound divines” had problems solving what I
have called the problem of divine analogy. Yet the phrase “once upon a time” already suggests that Berkeley was not (primarily) thinking about contemporaries here. This impression is strengthened when Crito says in §19 that he heard a minute philosopher (i.e. a free-thinker) making similar claims to Diagoras’. This prompted him to look at the “Fathers and Schoolmen”. Thus, while I cannot prove beyond any doubt that “divines” does not refer to Browne, I believe that, in the more natural reading of these passages, “divines” does not refer to Berkeley’s contemporaries at all.

O’Higgins identified a second reason why Alciphron should be read as an attack on Browne, viz. Berkeley’s reference to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Following the previously quoted passage, Crito names “those writings which have been published under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite” as the origin of a problematic account of the deity. According to this account, we know almost nothing about God. This is supposedly telling because Berkeley thought that Browne advanced such an account and because Browne repeatedly referred to the latter in both the Letter and Divine Analogy. However, there are at least three things to note concerning this suggestion.

Firstly, there are equally plausible explanations for why Berkeley referred to Pseudo-Dionysius other than a reference to Browne. Most notably, Aquinas invoked Pseudo-Dionysius’ works eleven times in his thirteenth quaestio of the Summa, the third article of which was pointed to by Berkeley in Alc. 4.20.

Secondly, if the reference to Pseudo-Dionysius were really aimed at Browne, it is prima facie surprising that Berkeley quoted from other passages than Browne. For instance, one would have expected Berkeley to use the same passages to show how they ultimately lead Browne astray. However, as Berkeley used different passages, such a rationale does not naturally lend itself to the proponents of the controversy reading.

Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the reference to Pseudo-Dionysius was prompted by Browne’s writings, it was important to note that Browne only quoted from and referred to Pseudo-Dionysius in the Letter and Divine Analogy. However, according to the controversy reading, it is Browne’s Procedure that prompted Berkeley’s criticism in Alc. 4.16–22. As far as I am aware, there are no (explicit) references to Pseudo-Dionysius in the Procedure. Thus, the controversy reading would in the very least have to be adjusted. Rather than reacting to the Procedure, Berkeley may have remembered something Browne said a couple of decades earlier (1697) when writing §§16–22. This, of course, starts to paint a different picture from the heated exchange between the two bishops that supposedly took place in 1728–1733.

This brings me to the third suggestion why Alc. 4.16–22 should be read as an answer to Browne, viz. Berkeley’s usage of a “man born blind.” At the end of §21, Berkeley wrote that we may not have an adequate notion of the divine attributes, yet we understand “more of them than one born blind can of light and colours”. This was supposed to justify the controversy reading because this usage is antagonistic to Browne’s. The latter used the “man born blind” example repeatedly in his writings when dealing with the problem of divine analogy.

Thus, it is evident that Browne and Berkeley used the “man born blind” in their respective discussion of the problem of divine analogy to advance very different solutions. However, if we proceed from the reasonable assumption that Berkeley used this example to refer to someone in particular, it is far from clear that this someone was Peter Browne.
Consider that the application of the “man born blind” example to the issue of divine analogy was by no means a distinctive feature of Browne’s argument. Rather, it can be found in the writings of some of the most eminent churchmen and thinkers at that time. Most notably for my purpose, however, the man born blind was also used in 1709 by the Archbishop of Dublin, William King, in his *Sermon*. King advanced a similar position to Browne’s and (in contrast to the writings of the latter) we know that Berkeley read the *Sermon*. Furthermore, I have pointed out that someone named “Diagoras” is very important for Berkeley’s argumentation in Alc. 4.16–22. It has been convincingly argued by Pascal Taranto that “Diagoras” is the pseudonym of the English free-thinker Anthony Collins (1676–1729). This is relevant because Collins attacked King’s *Sermon* in his *Vindication of the Divine Attributes* (1710) as well as his *Discourse of Free-Thinking* (1713); the latter of which was explicitly mentioned in TVV §6 (cf. §5). Considering this, the similarities between Berkeley’s elaborations in Alc. 4.17, in which he espoused the position he ultimately aimed to refute, and King’s in §7 of the *Sermon* are more than just noteworthy. Both thinkers, for instance, wrote about the inconsistency of the “contingency of (future) events” with God’s “foreknowledge”, which would be prevented by paying attention to the “difference in kind”, which would be comparable to the difference between light (what one sees) and sound (what one hears). Of course, this does not suffice to prove that King was the sole (or main) target in Alc. 4.16–22. However, what has been said suffices to establish that there are many at least equally plausible explanations for Berkeley’s usage of the “man born blind” example other than a reference to Peter Browne.

This section demonstrates that Alc. 4.16–22 was not obviously an attack on Browne and his *Procedure*. While it seems likely that King’s *Sermon* was targeted in these sections, it is questionable whether Berkeley thought about Browne at all; and, if he did, it was more likely the *Letter* than the *Procedure*. Thus, reading *Alciphron* the way Browne did, and as did most subsequent commentators, is in dire need of justification. With this in mind, I want to turn to the question of whether there is any reaction by Berkeley to Browne’s elaborate criticisms in *Divine Analogy*?

**5. Berkeley’s reaction: TVV §6 and three challenges for the controversy reading**

There is one particularly important piece of (alleged) evidence for the contention that Berkeley reacted to *Divine Analogy*, which is to be found in §6 of Berkeley’s *Theory of Vision Vindicated*. In this section, I introduce three challenges to argue that TVV §6 does not support the controversy reading because: it is unclear whether Berkeley read *Divine Analogy* before writing TVV §6; and, even if he read it, TVV §6 only highlights Berkeley’s disregard of Browne.

The first challenge I call the “reference challenge”, as it is again unclear who Berkeley referred to in TVV §6 or if he was referring to someone in particular at all. Consider in detail what Berkeley wrote:

> An instance of this may be seen in the proceeding of [Anthony Collins] who, [...] appears to insinuate his atheism from the differing notions of men concerning the nature and attributes of God, particularly from the opinion of our knowing God by analogy, as it hath been misunderstood and misinterpreted by some of late years [...] If there be any modern well-
meaning writer, who (perhaps from not having considered the fifth book of Euclid) writes much of analogy without understanding it, and thereby hath slipped his foot into this snare, I wish him to slip it back again. (my emphasis)⁷⁴

One of the first questions that arises when reading this section concerns the scope of “some”. It seems more natural to take Berkeley’s use of “some” seriously and read it the following way: in Berkeley’s view, there were, in fact, several people who advanced the wrong solution of the problem of divine analogy in recent years. This might very well include Browne, but it is far from certain that it did.

Secondly, it must be asked why Berkeley uses the conditional. Did he want to suggest there is no such well-meaning writer? Maybe this passage was intended as a warning to any future writer on the problem of divine analogy not to repeat past mistakes. Yet, if we (reasonably) assume that Berkeley’s conditional ought to be interpreted as an instance of careful wording, then it must be admitted that Browne was the most plausible target; especially because he was still alive in 1733, when the text was published, while King, whose Sermon was arguably in the background of Alc. 4.16–22 (cf. §4), died in 1729.⁷⁵

Even if TVV §6 was targeted at Browne, this does not support the controversy reading. Note that this reading would be best supported if §6 was written in reaction to Divine Analogy, because then the following could be argued: While it may be true that Alciphron was not written to criticize Browne’s Procedure, it did elicit thorough criticism by Browne in Divine Analogy, which in turn prompted Berkeley to reply. Thus, we would have a controversy between the two bishops, although a smaller one than has usually been claimed. Contrary to this “light” interpretation, I put forward two more challenges for the controversy reading.

The next challenge I call the “chronological challenge”, for it has hitherto not been considered that it may have been almost impossible for Berkeley to have read Divine Analogy before writing this remark in TVV §6. This uncertainty arises because we do not know the exact publication dates of Divine Analogy or TVV. However, by consulting contemporary periodicals, I was able to narrow down the publication dates to a period from November 1732 to March 1733 for Divine Analogy⁷⁶ and January to March 1733 for TVV.⁷⁷

Without any further evidence, we can discount neither the possibility that the two works were published almost simultaneously, nor that Divine Analogy was published after TVV. Thus, it is possible that Berkeley did not even know about Divine Analogy when writing TVV and it is entirely plausible that he had little to no time to read it before TVV was published.

Even if we, again, assume for the sake of argument that Berkeley read Divine Analogy before writing TVV §6, this would only raise another challenge for the controversy reading, viz. the “disregard challenge”. On 4 April 1734, Berkeley suggested in a letter to his friend Samuel Johnson (1696–1772) that he never reacted to Divine Analogy:

As to the Bishop of Cork’s [i.e. Browne’s] book, and the other book you allude to, the author whereof is one Baxter, they are both very little read or considered here; for which reason I have taken no public notice of them. (my emphasis)⁷⁸

The fact that Berkeley wrote about “public notice” may be taken to imply, by proponents of the controversy reading, that he took notice privately. Based on this they might draw the consequence that TVV §6 was not a reaction to Divine Analogy but still one to
Browne, as Berkeley could be thinking of the Procedure (or maybe even the Letter). However, prima facie this interpretation would only make sense if Alc. 4.16–22 was directed at Browne as well, which is doubtful at best (cf. §4). Otherwise, it seems strange that Berkeley would not have considered Browne’s already available writings when dealing with the problem of divine analogy extensively in 1732 and at the same time felt compelled to react to them with an off-hand remark a couple of months later, in a book dedicated to defending his theory of vision.79

For this reason, I propose an alternative interpretation of TVV §6: I believe that the publication of Divine Analogy prompted Berkeley to make this remark because it seems likely that he knew that Browne criticized him in this work.80 This does not, however, mean that Berkeley had carefully read the book. In fact, as I have emphasized, the proximity of the publication dates renders this rather unlikely. This would have allowed him to (truthfully) say to Johnson that he had never publicly reacted to Divine Analogy. This would, moreover, fit nicely with the generality of his remarks. However, even if we assume that Berkeley was dishonest with Johnson (for whatever reason), his remarks in TVV §6 are far from engaging in an argumentative exchange with Browne. Given their dismissive nature, it feels inappropriate to call TVV §6 a “response” at all, in light of the 180 pages of criticism Browne wrote. Even if you are inclined to call it that, it is a reaction that primarily highlights the level of disregard Berkeley seemed to have felt towards Browne.81

6. Looking beyond the controversy reading: an outlook concerning representation

The previous sections have established that there are good reasons to reject the controversy reading. In this section, I argue that this rejection has an additional upshot beyond rectifying a historically inaccurate narrative: it matters because it corrects a distorted perception of the Irish intellectual milieu in the seventeenth / eighteenth century and the way its participants influenced one another. This distorted perception of relations between the participants of this Irish intellectual milieu not only lead to a misguided assessment of their individual philosophical contributions, it has also blocked from view the larger context their discussion of the problem of divine analogy was embedded in, viz. representation. As I demonstrate, looking at Browne and Berkeley without presupposing the controversy reading reveals that both reacted to King’s Sermon and, in particular, his requirement that (divine) representation requires resemblance.82

In his Sermon, King pointed out that God is imperceptible by our senses and so they cannot provide us with any knowledge about the divine nature or attributes.83 In that respect we are, he claimed, to God as a man born blind is to light and colour.84 He concluded that if we are to have any knowledge about God at all, this must come from “Deductions of Reason, by Analogy and Comparison, by resembling him to something that we do know and are acquainted with” (my emphasis).85 King argued that we can generate representations of the divine by reason and adamant that those representations must resemble God. That is, the solution he developed operates under the constraint that divine representation requires resemblance.

While King did not explain the reason for this “resemblance-requirement”, it is arguably his way of counteracting the worry of agnosticism, as the (contextually obvious)
alternative would have been that our divine representations signify, in the same way as words do: by an arbitrary act of imposition. Yet, on such an arbitrary foundation, it seems impossible to generate knowledge about God. This can be contrasted with a representation founded on resemblance, which reveals something about the represented thing. King illustrated this with the example of a map: a map will provide someone unfamiliar with the depicted country with some knowledge about it. This person can “apprehend its Bounds and Situation”. According to King, the notions we get when we describe God by analogies are like the one this person has of this unfamiliar country. That is, in virtue of likening God to us, which we are justified to do because of a “measure common to both”, we can generate “imperfect representations” of God, which in turn ground our “imperfect knowledge” of the divine nature and attributes. This knowledge might be limited, but it is still better than the alternative, viz. “entire Ignorance”.

While much more can be said about King’s solution of the problem of divine analogy, the crucial point to note for my present purpose is the following: King’s introduction of the “resemblance-requirement” shaped the subsequent discussion in the Irish intellectual milieu. For, although Browne and Berkeley rejected King’s position, they accepted the “resemblance-requirement” and modified their solutions accordingly.

This is particularly evident in the case of Browne, who shared King’s commitment to a fundamental difference in kind between God and humans. Browne’s criticism of King can arguably be read as an attempt to substantiate the use of the “resemblance-requirement” to defend this position. Browne stressed that King did too little to distinguish metaphor from analogy and hence he was particularly concerned with establishing this difference. Crucially, Browne argued that this difference boils down to the fact that only analogies allow for representations that are grounded on a substitution, which is justified by an “Actual Similitude and a Real Correspondency in the very Nature of Things”. Browne even compared the divine representations that are generated by using analogies to a mirror, the reflection of which cannot show us the “Essence or Properties of the thing itself”, but is nonetheless a “true” representation based on a “Real Likeness”. It is precisely because of that likeness that the reflection provides us with “Real and true knowledge” of the reflected thing. As it is this likeness that allows us to substitute the real thing for its reflection, in Browne’s words, “The idea of a face we never saw but in Glass is a just one, and may well be substituted in the Mind for the Face itself”.

Similarly to Browne, Berkeley accepted the “resemblance-requirement”. Consider that Berkeley’s commitment to the gradual difference between God and human beings in turn entails that they are fundamentally alike. This can be further corroborated by taking Berkeley’s literal interpretation of the imago-dei thesis (i.e. the thesis that humans are made in the image of God) into account. Moreover, Berkeley emphasized that this likeness between the human and divine mind creates “some sort of an active thinking image” (my emphasis). Berkeley’s usage of image here is telling because, in general, he believed that an image represents via resemblance. This, for instance, becomes evident when he argued that our ideas of imagination are “images” or “copies” of the things they represent because they resemble them.

If Berkeley’s solution to the problem of divine analogy is read with the resemblance requirement in mind instead of the controversy reading, the following rationale is
suggested: according to Berkeley, a proper analogy is nothing but a “similitude of proportions”.\(^\text{101}\) That is, using analogies when speaking about God is informative because the relations, e.g. between wisdom and the respective being, are similar. So far, Berkeley agreed with King that our divine knowledge is grounded in a proportional resemblance, but he departed from King and Browne in that his commitment to the gradual difference between God and human beings allowed him to hold that analogous relations are similar because the relata are similar in kind as well. For instance, wisdom serves the same function in God as it does in humans because they are the same kind of being; God just happens to be perfect, while we are deficient copies.\(^\text{102}\)

There is a lot more to say about the relation between (divine) resemblance, representation, and knowledge as well as its connections to the problem of divine analogy.\(^\text{103}\) However, this section suffices to establish that looking at Browne and Berkeley beyond the controversy reading offers a new perspective on the Irish intellectual milieu: it helps to appreciate the importance of the resemblance requirement, which was accepted by all the considered thinkers despite their vastly differing positions. Furthermore, it shows that the different solutions of Browne and Berkeley are not intriguing because they developed them in reaction to each other. Rather, their difference of opinion is interesting because they proceeded from the same starting point (viz. King’s Sermon) and worked under the same constraint (viz. the “resemblance requirement”).

7. Conclusion: getting beyond the controversy reading

I have argued that, given the currently available textual and contextual evidence, the controversy reading must be rejected. While it seems likely that Berkeley knew Browne’s solution to the problem of divine analogy and his Letter, it is unclear whether Berkeley had read the Procedure. It is thus doubtful that Alc. 4.16–22 was written in response to it. Moreover, I have argued that the suggestions of why we ought to read Alciphron as an answer to Browne’s writings in general are inconclusive. The available evidence, rather, suggests that William King was the target of these sections (cf. §4). Finally, even assuming (reasonably) that TVV §6 constitutes a reaction (in a broad sense) to Divine Analogy, and considering Berkeley’s letter to Johnson, all of this extant evidence only highlights Berkeley’s disregard towards Browne (cf. §5).

In sum, Browne and Berkeley advanced vastly different solutions to the problem of divine analogy. Browne argued that God as well as humans differ in kind and that analogical attribution was to be understood as a separate mode of speech between the literal and the metaphorical. Berkeley, on the other hand, contended that the difference between humans and God ought to be considered one of degree and that analogical attribution is nothing above using analogies in our divine predications (cf. §2). However, if we consider these fundamental differences neutrally (i.e. without presupposing the controversy reading), it becomes evident that what makes them interesting is not that they were the result of an argumentative exchange. Rather, what renders their difference in opinion intriguing is the fact that both reacted to King’s solution to the problem of divine analogy while sharing many fundamental assumptions. For instance, they both accepted the Peripatetic axiom and, given the (sensual) imperceptibility of minds, they agreed that we have no (sensory) idea of any mind. Also, they believed that analogies are indispensable when we speak about God (cf. §1). Finally, both thinkers accepted
that divine representation and knowledge requires resemblance (cf. §6). That is, they accepted King’s “resemblance requirement”. In virtue of doing so, they (tacitly) adopted King’s idea that the problem of divine analogy turns on issues about the working of (mental) representation and its relation to resemblance. This is suggested in their respective rejection of King’s solution (cf. §6). While substantiating this claim requires future research, I have shown that looking at Browne and Berkeley beyond the controversy reading does open promising new pathways for future analysis.

Notes

1. I will use the following abbreviations for Browne’s works: Letter for his A letter in answer to a book entitled, Christianity not mysterious (1697); Procedure for his Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding (1728); Divine Analogy for his Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human (1733). With the exception of the correspondence, for which I use Marc Hight’s The Correspondence of George Berkeley, all my references to Berkeley are to the nine-volume edition by Arthur A. Luce and Thomas E. Jessop (Works I–IX). I use the following common abbreviations: NB = Notebooks; NTV = New Theory of Vision; MI = Manuscript Introduction; PHK = Principles of Human Knowledge; DHP = Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; Alc. = Alciphron; TVV = Theory of Vision Vindicated.

2. Winnett, Peter Browne, chap. 3, 5–6.

3. Cf., for example, Berman’s works, such as Berkeley and Berman, Alciphron in focus, 2–11; Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 15–17; “Cognitive Theology”, 204.


5. This point has been acknowledged in the secondary literature ever since James O’Higgins’ article “Agnosticism or Anthropomorphism”, 90–3. However, in light of the controversy reading, the scholarly focus was often confined to the issue of analogy. Thus, the larger framework this discussion was embedded in has been largely overlooked (cf. Bettcher, Berkeley’s Philosophy, 62–70; Berman, Berkeley, 139–44; Curtin, “Divine Analogy”, 600–15; Hochschild, “George Berkeley”, 163–6).

6. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this turn of phrase. It is also worth noting that the rejection of the controversy reading is salient for the still ongoing endeavour to expand the Early Modern philosophical canon (cf., for example, Shapiro, “Early Modern Philosophical Canon”, 365–83; Marshall and Sreedhar, The New Modern Philosophy), inasmuch as this reading has unduly reduced Browne to a mere adversary of Berkeley without any philosophical contributions of his own. This becomes evident when you consider that, with the exceptions of Winnett (Peter Browne) and Pearce (“Peter Browne”), Browne has almost never been analysed as an interesting thinker on his own right but usually in connection with Berkeley. While Browne’s own philosophy is also not the focus of my article, rejecting the controversy reading and uncovering the importance of the “resemblance requirement” (cf. §6) paves the way for future research on Browne, as it places the latter in a proper contextual light and draws attention one of his key assumptions.


10. Aquinas ST Iª q. 13 a. 2–6.

11. Simply put, Thomas identifies the following problem: because God is a fundamentally different being we cannot speak univocally of God (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 3; SG I c. 22–5). However, we must be able to speak non-equivocally of God because otherwise we cannot know anything about God (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.; SG I c. 33). Thomas solves this tension by
arguing that the use of analogies allows a middle way between the univocal and the equivocal and that this usage is (metaphysically) justified because humans are like God, but God is unlike humans (SG I c. 29–30). For more on the Scholastic notion of analogy, see Ashworth & D’Ettore, “Medieval Theories”, §§1–5, and, for Thomas’ position in particular, cf. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible.

12. Of course, Berkeley and Browne are not the only ones contributing to this discussion. Other contributions include Synge, A Gentleman’s Religion; King, Sermon; Skelton, Letter. Furthermore, the discussion is not confined to Ireland but also includes representatives of the Church of England, such as Harris, Being of God; Clarke, Demonstration.

13. Letter, 223. Browne’s Letter was written because Archbishop Marsh (1638–1713) asked him to reject the arguments of the Irish free-thinker John Toland’s (1670–1722) Christianity not Mysterious (1696). For more on Toland’s work and the way it influenced the Irish context at the time, cf. Berman, Irish Philosophy, 82–8; Daniel, “John Toland”; Jones, George Berkeley, 177–81; McGuinness, “John Toland and Irish Politics”.


17. Browne, Procedure, 141. Cf. Pearce, “Peter Browne”, 219–23. I will discuss how this is supposed to work in more detail in §5, where Browne’s and Berkeley’s understanding of analogical knowledge is readdressed. To this day, one of the best depictions of the differences in Berkeley’s and Browne’s positions and the potential issues each of them faces is found in O’Higgins, “Agnosticism or Anthropomorphism”.


19. Browne, Divine Analogy, 420. See Pearce, “Peter Browne”, §§2–3, for a more detailed account of Browne’s substitution theory in general and the question Browne understands by “correspondence” in particular. Pearce (ibid., 227) also points out that our notion of divine wisdom requires several analogical substitutions, starting from “thinking” to knowledge in humans to “wisdom” in God.


23. Berkeley, Alc. 4.22

24. Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19


27. Berkeley, PHK §§28–33.


30. Browne, Procedure, 34.


32. Browne, Procedure, 58.


34. Browne, Procedure, 63–64.

35. Browne, Procedure, 442. For Browne, this only concerns the mind and its operations inasmuch as it is immaterial. As Pearce (“Peter Browne,” 234) has pointed out, Browne holds that human cognition arises from an interplay between the immaterial spirit and the material body. This is arguably why Browne believes that we have the previously mentioned “immediate consciousness” (Browne, Procedure, 66). Although, in distinction to the Berkeleyan position, this consciousness does not even allow forming something analogous to Berkeley’s “active thinking image”. As Pearce (“Peter Browne”, 223 n. 14) puts it: “Browne’s view of ignorance [concerning the nature of the mind] is stronger”.


40. Berkeley, Alc. 4.21.
41. For a more detailed treatment of Berkeley’s position, see Bettcher, Berkeley’s Philosophy, 55–62; Brykman, “Berkeley et l’Analogie”; Daniel, “Berkeley’s Rejection”.
42. Berkeley, Alc. 4.21.
43. I have dealt with this aspect of Berkeley’s position in more detail in: Fasko, “A Scotist”, §4; Die Sprache Gottes, chap. 2.
44. By using this turn of phrase, Browne referred to the full title of Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher. However, it is unclear whether Browne misunderstood that the free-thinkers are the minute philosophers (Alc 1.10), or whether he wants to imply here that Berkeley is as bad as they are.
46. Cf. Luce in Pittion and Berman, “New letter”, 383. This is inaccurate because Browne has several justified objections and worries. This is particularly evident when it comes to Berkeley’s rather idiosyncratic reading of the Scholastics (Browne, Divine Analogy, 451–79). Also, Browne was right to point out that it remained unclear how Berkeley could dissolve the apparent inconsistency between divine foreknowledge and the contingency of event (Browne, Divine Analogy, 390), as, in Berkeley’s account, God’s knowledge is of the same kind as human knowledge, albeit God possesses knowledge in an infinitely greater degree (Browne, Divine Analogy, 488).
49. Fraser, The Works IV, 199.
51. That said, it is worth noting that he has been more critical of it in his more recent work (Berman, Irish Philosophy, 94).
54. Berkely, Alc. 1.1.
56. O’Higgins, “Agnosticism or Anthropomorphism”, 93.
57. Berkeley, Alc. 4.17–19, 163–66.
58. O’Higgins, “Agnosticism or Anthropomorphism”, 100.
59. Berkeley, Alc. 4.19.
60. Berkeley, Alc. 4.18.
61. Browne, Letter, 182–84; Divine Analogy, 64 & 80–82.
62. Berkeley, Works III, 168. Given the fact that Berkeley referred to his works, it seems likely that the version of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Opera that was sold when his grandson’s library was
dissolved in 1796 belonged to Berkeley (cf. item no. 649 in: Berman, Responses, 490). Also note that Pseudo-Dionysius was still one of the most famous proponents of “negative theology” when Berkeley and Browne were alive.

65. While Browne referred to Letter IX to Titus, Mystic Theology, chap. 1 of Heavenly Hierarchy and chap. 13 of On Divine Names (Letter, 182–4), Berkeley only referred to the latter two works (Works III, 166). However, his quotes come from different chapters (chap. 2 of Heavenly Hierarchy and chap. 7 of On Divine Names), both of which are also referenced by Aquinas (e.g. ST Ia q. 13 a. 3 & 6).

66. Note that there is some indication that Berkeley possessed the Letter but currently none whatsoever that he owned the Procedure as well (cf. item no. 1399 in: Berman, Responses, 512). For instance, it was not even among the 1546 items that were sold in 1796.


69. Although it could be the case that Berkeley did not intend it as a reference (to someone particular) at all. The “man born blind” is part of the so-called “Molyneux problem” (Ferretti and Glenney, “General Introduction”) and was widely discussed in seventeenth / eighteenth century Irish Philosophy, which is why Berman (Irish Philosophy, 87) calls the example its “root metaphor”. Berkeley expressed an interest in this problem and the “man born blind” as early as the Notebooks (1706–1708, cf. NB 454) and used it throughout his later works: cf. NTV §§41, 79, 94, 110, 128, 132; PHK §§43 & 77; Alc. 4.9–11.

70. King, Sermon §§7, 12–13 & 36.


73. Cf. Daniel, “Berkeley's Rejection”, 151; Daniel, Berkeley, 266, in which he contends that Browne is amongst Berkeley’s targets in TVV §6, which is partly explained by his assumption that Divine Analogy was published in November 1732 (ibid., 268).

For a long time, the so-called New Letter was also considered as a key piece of evidence. This letter was discovered in 1969 by Pittion and Berman, who argue that Berkeley is the author, for instance by highlighting that Arthur A. Luce and Thomas E. Jessop (the editors of Berkeley’s Works, which are still considered to be the standard edition in Berkeley scholarship) supported their interpretation (Ptitton and Berman, “New Letter”, 381, 385). This attribution was forcefully criticized by Daniel (“Berkeley’s Rejection”, 157–9) and Belfrage (“A Study”) in 2011. For example, Belfrage (“A Study”) wrote that Pittion and Berman persistently conclude “from the possibility that this might have happened [that] it did”. Daniel (“Berkeley’s Rejection”, 159) even called the attribution “scholarship run amok” and pointed out that they fail to consider plausible alternatives such as John Jackson (1686–1763) (cf. Daniel, Berkeley, 268–72). In light of the serious doubts Belfrage and Daniel raised concerning the authorship of Berkeley and the fact that scholars have advanced the controversy reading (cf. Curtin, “Divine Analogy”, 600–24; Grzeliński, “Alciphron”, 183–5) without attributing the New Letter to Berkeley, I will not consider it in the following.


75. Although it is worth noting that that Collins’ death in 1729 did not prevent Berkeley from criticizing him specifically in TVV §6, and thus the same may hold true for King, particularly if we consider that Berkeley referred to page 42 of Collins’ Discourse, in which the latter dealt with King.


80. All it would have taken for Berkeley to know that he was (going to be) attacked in Divine Analogy was that someone told him about it (possibly even before the publication of the
book). It would have also sufficed if Berkeley briefly picked up the book and read the first few sentences of the eighth chapter.

81. The extent of this disregard becomes further evident if we consider Berkeley’s sole reaction to Browne’s extensive criticism in *Divine Analogy* (Daniel, Berkeley, 267 n. 13). The reaction in question is a twofold omission of the term “formal” in the revised 1752 edition of Alc. 4.20 (Works III, 168–9), the use of which has been heavily criticized by Browne (*Divine Analogy*, 476–7). However, considering that Browne dedicated roughly 30 pages in *Divine Analogy* to point out mistakes Berkeley made in his exegesis of the Schoolmen in Alc. 4.16–22, it is more than telling that Berkeley, after almost 20 years, felt the most pressing issue was that he used “formal” two times too many.

82. This remains largely implicit over the course of Alc. 4.16–22 (cf. §4), but is explicitly addressed in Browne’s *Procedure*. Browne suggests that King “worded himself incautiously” (*Procedure*, 13) and that this caused “Opposition to the Doctrine of Analogy” (*Procedure*, 22); an opposition he sought to squash by “more fully and rightly” explaining this solution and by showing its “true use in religion” (ibid.). Thus, unsurprisingly, scholars have appreciated that Browne and Berkeley reacted to King (cf. Daniel, “Berkeley’s Rejection”, 153 n. 9, which provides a good overview on this). However, because of the controversy reading, the focus has remained on (divine) analogies and the ways Berkeley and Browne quarreled about it (cf. n. 5).

86. Locke, Essay III.i.i.1.
89. King, *Sermon* §12.
100. Berkeley, MI §12; Alc. 4.7. Pearce (“Matter, God, And Nonsense, ,186–8) has pointed out that it is the resemblance in kind between the divine and human mind that allows this sort of representation. Berkeley’s unargued-for acceptance of this more general resemblance requirement is well-acknowledged in the secondary literature (Carriero, “Berkeley, Resemblance”; Hill, “Berkeley’s Missing Argument”; Jacovides “How Berkeley”, 416–20; Hight, *Idea and Ontology*, chap. 8.3). Although, following Winkler (Berkeley, 14–21; “Doctrine of Signs”, 126–38), it is generally agreed that there is a loose and strict sense of representation in Berkeley. The strict sense, which is of concern here, describes the way ideas (necessarily) represent in virtue of resembling the things they are ideas of. The loose sense describes the (arbitrary) way that words represent and can thus be called “signification”. It would require further research to establish whether Browne and King also endorsed resemblance-based accounts of representation. While there are some remarks suggesting this (*Sermon* §8; *Procedure*, 58–61), there are also ones that seemingly endorse a causal account (*Sermon* §15; *Procedure*, 182–3).
101. Berkeley, Alc. 4.21.
102. Berkeley, Alc. 4.21–22.
103. Peter West and I deal with these issues in more depth in: Fasko & West, “The Irish Context”.
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