Dewey’s and Pareyson’s Aesthetics
A Dialogue between Pragmatism and Hermeneutics

Andrea Fiore
1. Deweyan Resonances in Pareyson’s Aesthetics

1 John Dewey (1859-1952) and Luigi Pareyson (1918-1991) are two different philosophers in many respects. As is generally known, the former is one of the most significant representatives of the pragmatist tradition, while the latter is a leading figure in existentialism and hermeneutics. Differences notwithstanding, their aesthetic theories appear strikingly similar. On this ground the opportunity opens up for pragmatism and hermeneutics to interact and share ideas.

2 The connections emerging from the dialogue between Dewey’s pragmatism and Pareyson’s hermeneutics about aesthetics strengthen the idea that experiencing the world aesthetically is a way to make human life full and satisfying.

3 Estetica. Teoria della formatività (first published in 1954) is one of Pareyson’s most important writings, containing the main elements of his aesthetics, which were already sketched out in his mid-1940s works and furtherly defined in the 1960s and 1970s in connection with his existentialist and personalistic outlook (Finamore 1999: 18-20). Another feature of Estetica is its fundamentally hermeneutic character, anticipating the founders of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, Gadamer and Ricoeur (Tomatis 2003: 47). In the Preface, Pareyson explicitly acknowledges his debt to Dewey in aesthetics (Pareyson 1988: 8).1

4 The key concept in Pareyson’s aesthetics is formativity, a word coined by Pareyson himself to indicate a specific kind of doing. The importance of doing is the first clear element Dewey and Pareyson share (Simonini 1968: 225-31). Formative doing “creates the way of doing while doing” (Pareyson 1988: 59). This means that rules in the process of forming are not external or previously established, being embedded in the activity of forming. In this way, Pareyson’s formativity is peculiar to all human experiences and this is in line with the Deweyan idea of the aesthetic character of the whole experience.
In art, formativity has a special meaning, even though art is not considered, either by Pareyson or by Dewey, as a separate field of experience. Rather, the notions of “pure” formativity (belonging to art) and “overall” formativity (belonging to the whole experience) allow us to distinguish (both in Pareyson and, retrospectively, in Dewey) what is specifically art from what is not, without severing the strong ties between art and experience. For Dewey, what is actually related to art is “artistic,” whereas the term “aesthetic” certainly encompasses works of art but has a wider meaning, including all (both objects and deeds) that might make our experience deeper, richer, wider, more refined and intense. According to Dewey, the artistic experience is paradigmatic of all experiences that are understood as aesthetic. Similarly, for Pareyson formativity has specific importance in art, where it is prevailing and intentional, so rendering the work of art an end in itself with its own rules whereas in other activities not specifically artistic the formativity is an element which gives a work whose ends are extrinsic greater sense and value (ibid.: 23).

The accomplished work emerging from doing permeated with formativity is not, according to Pareyson, a “result,” but a “successful completion” (riuscita), that is, “something having found its own rule, recognizing it as such, instead of applying one previously established and generally accepted” (Givone 2008: 154). Furthermore, a work of art features an important trait, that is, its infinite interpretability. Here the formativity acquires a fundamental hermeneutic character, because interpreting a work of art is an open process very similar to forming it. Both come about through attempts, and the outcome might be a success or a failure (Restaino 1991: 229; D’Angelo 2011: 70). Both the notions of successful completion and attempting constitute another important correspondence between Dewey and Pareyson (Finamore 1999: 28), because attempting is included in all human activities and is a characterizing element of successful completion.

In *Experience and Nature* (1981: 18, 280) Dewey defines experience as a unitary and integrated whole of elements. Human life does not exist either before or independently from the experience of the world, but it emerges and builds itself within that experience. As mentioned above, for Dewey the aesthetic dimension can enhance the experience as long as it is not considered an area detached from other human activities and from human existence. For Dewey, this would cut off the connection with “the materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing, and achievement” (1987: 9).

According to Dewey, an experience is aesthetic when realized in a whole that comes to form a perfect and organized integration of means and ends starting from the need to overcome an obstacle or a fracture requiring attempts and errors to find a solution (ibid.: 42-3). Moreover, that whole of experience is anchored to the past and future dimensions of time, and has a specific emotional character. Art fosters and disperses the aesthetic experiences, keeping alive all human capacities, as we will see below. These traits of Deweyan aesthetics also resonate in Pareyson’s *Estetica*, assuming an existential character, in the general sense of referring to human life in its many social and individual aspects. We notice these resonances, for example, when the Italian thinker writes that also “in art occurs what happens in human experience in general, that one learns to be himself only discovering himself in others” (Pareyson 1988: 158) or when he claims that “in a work of art parts have a twofold relation with each other: everyone with the other, and everyone with the whole” (ibid.: 107), likewise the
The Deweyan resonances in Pareyson’s aesthetics can be connected to the question of the relations between American Pragmatism and Italian philosophy, particularly to the reception of Dewey’s thought in Italy. It is worth noting that both Dewey and Pareyson had a conflictual relation with Croce’s aesthetics (Vercellone 2011; D’Angelo 2011; Copenhaver 2017). Since the correspondences between Pareyson and Dewey are ascertained, as well as the influence of the latter on the former in aesthetics (Perniola 1972: 223-4; 2007: 131), it can be said that some characteristic elements of Deweyan pragmatist aesthetics have seeped through Pareyson into the Italian post-Crocian aesthetics contributing to its renewal.

2. Aesthetics as Education and Interpretation: Towards a Fulfilled Life

The discussion of Croce’s aesthetics might be the starting point for considering both Dewey’s pragmatist and Pareyson’s hermeneutic aesthetics in a eudemonic perspective. In fact, both converge towards the idea that aesthetic experience (including the artistic as a model of fully accomplished experience) strengthens and deepens the connections between human beings with each other and with the world, in this way creating the conditions for a fulfilled existence.

Croce detached art from the concreteness of life. Pareyson, on the contrary, considers both art and formativity included in the whole experience. The same goes for Dewey, who integrates “artistic” and “aesthetic” dimensions in the experience, so getting rid of the dualisms in which Croce was still entangled (Copenhaver 2017: 67).

Dewey’s claim is not a mere theoretical statement but corresponds to a philosophical proposal with a concrete operating value. Reality is a complex of objects, people, and events that presents itself as a continuous unity. Human beings are to be educated to grasp that continuity in their own experience and to put it into effect. Taking into account the general meaning of “aesthetic” for Dewey, indicating what the term αἰσθητικός meant for the ancient Greeks (i.e. to be able to sense and understand the world intellectually and emotionally), it becomes apparent that the artistic/aesthetic element in education can promote the activation of all the components of human nature and their participation at the highest level of complexity and use in the organization of capabilities and energies. For example, the biological structure of the eye is in continuity with the environment. However, seeing does not suffice for us to be able to take advantage of the eye at the highest level of meaningfulness and relationality. Besides the mere biological machinery, further resources are to be activated (intentionality, emotion, cognitive assessment, and so on) so that the quality of experience is enhanced, rendering the experience itself dense and fulfilled. This corresponds to the “aesthetic sensibility,” which allows human beings to acquire a sharpened and multi-perspectival attitude to look at the world, thus clearing the way for more profound interactions between human beings and their social and natural environment. Dewey summarizes this as follow. “The hasty sightseer no more has an aesthetic vision of Saint Sophia or the Cathedral of Rouen than the motorist traveling at sixty miles an hour sees the flitting landscape. One must move about, within and
without, and through repeated visits let the structure gradually yield itself to him in various lights and in connection with changing moods.” (Dewey 1987: 224). This passage shows that the development of the aesthetic sensibility enhances our lives to a satisfactory and perhaps noble level. In order to achieve this, for Dewey, it is important to give art a key role in education (cf. Dewey 1976: 52-3).

13 In Pareyson, too, there emerges the educational value of art in order to develop the aesthetic sensibility, although the Italian philosopher does not recommend structured educational proposals as Dewey does. Certainly, this is a trait that marks the difference between Dewey and Pareyson. The former is action-oriented (think, for example, of the Laboratory School in Chicago), whereas the latter tends to move in theoretical terms. On closer analysis, however, it is also possible to find in Pareyson’s view the educational role of art, that is, its capacity to develop the aesthetic sensibility. Apart from the training the aspiring artist must follow as illustrated in *Estetica* (Pareyson 1988: 156-63), the educational value of art lies in its hermeneutic character.

14 According to Pareyson, a piece of art requires interpretation, that is, to be judged and considered capable of promoting other “forms” (ibid.: 139; Finamore 1999: 66). In this perspective, the piece of art is a model, and its *rule* (in the sense we have seen at the beginning) “presents itself in terms of operational effectivity being able to be integrated and carried, reinvented and transferred, instead of being [simply] translated into a norm” (Pareyson 1988: 146). A piece of art stimulates those who come into contact with it. Thus, not only does an artwork become a model, but its users become “interpreters” or “performers.” These terms are synonymous, because in the hermeneutic perspective Pareyson neither distinguishes so neatly the professional performer from the amateur nor indicates a different meaning for the role of listener or spectator compared, for example, to an instrumentalist or an actress/actor. All of them are interpreters, and their interpretation mutually involves receptiveness and activity (ibid.: 183). In this sense, the piece of art corresponds to a stimulus that disrupts our experience and needs it to be rearranged at a new level. Thus considered, this point looks like Dewey’s *Circuit of Inquiry*. According to Dewey, non-reflective experience is disrupted by a problem that stimulates inquiry. We can solve that problem by testing a hypothesis through the use of physical tools and data. This experiment leads to the realized object, which returns to and enriches the non-reflective background (Ryan 2011: 28). We should add that for Pareyson, too, interpretation involves sensory knowledge, not being only an intellectual and abstract process (Pareyson 1988: 190).

15 To clarify how close Dewey and Pareyson are on this key point, it is worth highlighting that the interpretation is an “encounter.” One among the potentially infinite points of view of the interpreter encounters one of the revealing and infinite aspects of the artwork (ibid.: 227-8). This entails the interpretation being tentative and having an experimental character. Pareyson seems to confirm it, defining the interpreter as a person who knows (the “knowing”) and the interpreted as a “known,” namely a form (ibid.: 180). In this way he suggests that there are no predetermined elements or rules in interpretation. Of course, the artwork is something accomplished, but for Pareyson this means that it is infinite and inexhaustible in its interpretations (Pareyson 1988: 238). In addition, since the interpreter is a person, and the person is placed in a unique and particular point of view, then the interpretation is a constitutively open and infinite process.
To confirm the closeness of Pareyson’s hermeneutics to Dewey and its importance for the fulfilment of human life it may be helpful to take into account the example of play, which is considered one of the most primordial aspects of human existence (Graham & Kirby 2016: 8), strongly connected to art and the aesthetic dimension. Play cannot be considered as an abstract activity or category, because its mutually integrated elements arise from playing itself (ibid.: 14; Stoller 2018: 49). In a Deweyan perspective, play shows a strong experimental nature when it enters the Circuit of Inquiry, forming thereby new habits (cf. Fiore 2022). Its aesthetic and artistic value lies in the fact that it leads human beings to develop a deeper sensitivity towards the world, and it helps to creatively build new habits. This can be described through the following example.

Think of a child taking a walk next to a lake or a shore with a calm sea. She spontaneously picks up a stone and throws it towards the water. The stone bounces on the surface, then it splashes and sinks. The gesture of throwing has given a new meaning to some elements of the situation (stone, water surface, arm, hand, and their movements) whose meaning and function were different before that gesture. Let us imagine that this event occurs for the first time in the child’s life. She will do it again and again, trying to make the stone bounce as much as possible. To succeed, she will get flat and light stones, learn to coordinate her movements and know how much effort to make. Thus, a non-reflective behaviour generates a problem to solve through an experimental outlook that requires a new habit, consisting in the skill of throwing bouncing stones and, more important, of seeing and experiencing in some objects of the world something she has never seen and experienced before. Through the gesture of throwing stones in the water, the child’s quality of experience has been transformed, making her aware of “some of the connections which had been imperceptible” (Dewey 1980: 83). In addition, her behaviour has become an organized activity with “a directing idea which gives point to the successive acts” (ibid.: 211; Vanderstraeten 2002: 235).

Play transforms the quality of experience, and this is what play and art share (Patton 2014: 244). Both art and play are always a matter of constructing and re-constructing the world, producing something new. Every artist, as well as every player, re-elaborates objects and situations, giving them new meanings and eliciting an emotional response (Dewey 1987: 73).

In How We Think, Dewey says that “scientific observation does not [...] merely replace observation that is enjoyed for its own sake. The latter, sharpened by the purpose of contributing to an art like writing, painting, singing, becomes truly aesthetic, and the persons who enjoy seeing and hearing will be the best observers.” (Dewey 1986: 322). The development of intelligence and knowledge depends upon carrying out observations in the way Dewey describes. Play, in its aesthetic and artistic sense, involves this process (Henricks 2015: 51). Here Dewey seems to be not only close to Gadamer, who claims that play more than science offers the key to disclose “the full context of any given situation by promoting a freedom of possibilities within the horizon of one’s own life-world (that is, the world directly and immediately experienced)” (Graham & Kirby 2016: 9); but also to Pareyson, who considers art a process of interpretation in which persons with their intelligence and sensitivity are involved. Pareyson also seems to recognize, like Dewey in How We Think, that the interpretation requires a balanced mixture of the familiar and the unexpected (Pareyson 1988: 244).
So described, play can surely be understood as a process of performance and interpretation in the broad sense Pareyson holds. If we consider play, for example, as a drama or playing an instrument, it can be noticed that all the people involved (performers as well as spectators) contribute to constructing the meaning of the artwork through interpretation. In play, understood for example both as a drama or a football match, spectators participate and are not merely detached and neutral observers (Eberle 2014: 214).

The example of play shows that, ultimately, for Dewey as well as for Pareyson both the artist and the public act in view of a balance of elements in a dynamic whole of experience. Therefore, the aesthetic education promotes habits to realize that balance in an ever-changing world. Art plays a fundamental role in this process that, when achieved, creates the conditions to allow persons to better know and enjoy the possibilities of reality, so that it becomes possible to have a fulfilled life. It is worthwhile here to underscore that, from the educational point of view, the distinction between “artistic” and “aesthetic” is important for setting the right tone with the aesthetic sensibility and elevating taste (Pareyson 1966: 10). In this perspective, the dialogue between Dewey and Pareyson can be connected to some contemporary issues and inquiries involving aesthetics and everyday life, particularly so-called “everyday aesthetics.”

3. Dewey and Pareyson: Aesthetics and Everyday Life

According to the definition given by Jonathan M. Smith, everyday aesthetics is to be understood “both as an extension beyond the traditional domain of the philosophical study of aesthetics, usually confined to more conventionally understood works of art, and as a step into a new arena of aesthetic inquiry – the broader world itself” (Light & Smith 2005: ix). One of the main assumptions of everyday aesthetics is “that aesthetic objects do not constitute a set of special objects, but rather are determined by our attitudes and experiences” (Saito 2001: 87). Therefore, the goal of everyday aesthetics is to educate human beings to appreciate and enjoy the little, ordinary, and familiar things in their lives, even though it is not limited to the aesthetic experience of humble objects and quotidian acts (Leddy 2005).

Dewey is an important and acknowledged source for everyday aesthetics (Dreon 2021: 8; Leddy 2005: 20), mainly due to his claim of the aesthetic character of the whole experience (Haapala 2005: 40). As we have seen, Pareyson and Dewey share this trait. Accordingly, it is also possible to establish a connection between Pareyson’s aesthetic theory and the everyday aesthetics. In addition, key notions of both Pareyson’s and Dewey’s thought appear to be important for finding solutions to some difficulties arising from everyday aesthetics.

Let us start with the hermeneutic character of Pareyson’s aesthetics, particularly from the perspective of people who experience art not as artists or professional performers do. This trait of Pareyson’s aesthetics affords to define certain aspects of everyday life as aesthetic, but it is also useful for distinguishing the specific field of art from other human activities or experiences. In short, not every human activity and product is art, but many things or activities can be made or performed with art.
People reading a book, listening to music, or looking at a painting are certainly involved in an aesthetic experience. In this way they become, Pareyson holds, interpreters/performers because they draw new life from the artwork they are experiencing. We have also seen that a person who comes into contact with a piece of art is stimulated to reorganize her/his experience. This kind of aesthetic experience is clearly common in our everyday life, but it appears problematic to be strictly categorized as everyday aesthetics due to its somehow extraordinary character. The relation ordinary-extraordinary is a dilemma in everyday aesthetics. Indeed, when the aesthetic potential of the ordinary is discovered, its meaning and value increases and this jeopardizes the fundamentally “everyday” nature of this kind of experience. Saito (2007) notices the contradiction, and tries to find a solution by emphasizing the role of custom and familiarity with spaces and objects of daily life (Saito 2017). However, Saito considers Dewey’s aesthetics not helpful for solving the problem (Saito 2007: 44-5; 2017: 21). On the contrary, I believe that Dewey can offer a way to find a solution, but it is to be looked for elsewhere than in Art as Experience. This is connected to Pareyson’s ideas.

Instead of the direct experience of artworks, a better connection with everyday aesthetics can be found in the experience of what Pareyson calls “natural beauty” (1988: 204-18). In chapter 5 of his Estetica, the Italian philosopher writes that “all our experience is studded with aesthetic situations suddenly and unexpectedly emerged” (ibid.: 204), and that to really know the world it is necessary to look at things “with interest and respect” (ibid.: 210; 2009: 99). Thus, the aesthetic character of everyday life emerges in a successful process of interpretation, directed to other ends than the contemplative (i.e. not strictly artistic) and involving the natural environment as well as the social one, that is, every person in her original and unique life. In this sense, even though Pareyson does not explicitly refer to them, it is possible to include in his discourse ordinary actions and objects. Pareyson, however, recognizes the importance of structured and aware interpretation, instead of one that is totally spontaneous and unexpected, to make an experience truly aesthetic (Pareyson 1988: 206-7). He uses the term “beauty” as synonymous with “form,” and claims that grasping the form in the environment corresponds to knowing the very nature of the world. Pareyson suggests that objects should be treated the same way as persons, that is, with a hermeneutic attitude and without the bias that leads us to think of persons as being “mobile and open, whereas things seem closed and definite” (ibid.: 207; 2009: 95). On the contrary, it is possible (and, for Pareyson, desirable) to speak with and question objects in order to familiarize with and deeply understand them (Pareyson 1988: 208-9; 2009: 96).

Knowing the environment requires an experimental attitude permeated with emotion. The experimental nature of existence Dewey cherished is joined here to the hermeneutic character of aesthetics held by Pareyson. The Italian philosopher tells us of the farmer’s love for the land he works or the committed attitude of a mountaineer who questions the mountain to climb (Pareyson 1988: 215). This sounds like Dewey’s passage in Experience and Nature about seeding and harvest, as well as the work of the farmer and his emotions, all included in a whole of experience (Dewey 1981: 18). Being embedded with the environment, as well as questioning and understanding it, corresponds to a hermeneutic attitude and an aesthetic sensibility. It requires a continuous adjustment of one’s perspective on the world in order to grasp the meanings and relations of reality, just as one has to find the best light and viewpoint, and adjust the focus to take a good photo.
Besides these correspondences, Dewey and Pareyson may help to solve the dilemma of the opposition ordinary-extraordinary. As mentioned above, one of the main problems of everyday aesthetics is how to balance the relation between what is usual, routine, quotidian, and what is special, extraordinary, astonishing. If something ordinary becomes extraordinary, we leave the quotidian, thus making the word “everyday” in combination with “aesthetics” meaningless. For example, if participating in a party or celebration is a quite common situation, rendering this a “special” event means detaching it from ordinary life. This implies that participating in such an event is to live and experience it more deeply and intensely, leaving the rest of life in a blurry and dull background. In this case, does it still make sense to talk about everyday aesthetics?

Pareyson and Dewey can help us to find an answer. According to the former, the whole human experience can be permeated by formativity. This means that even activities and situations not specifically understood as artistic can be performed or experienced with aesthetic sensibility, as Pareyson himself tells us through the examples of the farmer and the mountaineer mentioned above. In this perspective, the problem is not how to render the ordinary extraordinary but how to render the aesthetic sensibility a leading principle in our lives. In order to answer this question, Pareyson’s formativity can be supported by the Deweyan notion of “habit,” as described in Human Nature and Conduct. According to Dewey, habits are functions that connect the self to the environment. They are tools to be used in an organized and active way to successfully deal with the environment (Dewey 1983: 22). “The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts.” (Ibid.: 32). Therefore, to render the aesthetic sensibility a leading principle in our lives we need to make it a habit, that is, an attitude of experiencing the world, grasping the great varieties, shades of meanings, and connections in the world itself.

Dewey reminds us that “repetition is in no sense the essence of habit” (Ibid.), because what really matters in habits is attitude, not repetitiveness. Therefore, even an action that happens only once may result from a habit. However, he recognizes that “mechanism is indispensable,” and highlights the importance of intelligent repetition in certain activities (Ibid.: 51). If we understand repetition in this positive meaning, that is, for example, the daily training of a violinist, or the craftsman’s work, the term acquires a qualitative meaning. “How delicate, prompt, sure and varied are the movements of a violin player or an engraver!” (Ibid.).

Thus, the term “craftsman” encompasses different people and activities, such as the carpenter, lab technician, conductor, and in a broader sense all the people who would like “to conduct life with skill” (Sennett 2008: 11). These people “are all craftsmen because they are dedicated to good work for its own sake” (Ibid.: 20). To conduct life with skill (or with art) involves the development of an aesthetic sensibility within a frame in which repetition is functional to habit, that is, based on doing that fosters attitudes directed to a more effective integration with the environment.

Repetitive behaviour such as the example described above of the child throwing stones in the water can foster good habits. Sennett claims that people who develop sophisticated manual skills do not experience repetition as routine and boredom. On
the contrary, “doing something over and over is stimulating when organized as looking ahead” (ibid.: 175). This is the experience of rhythm, and it gives us pleasure “like a swimmer’s strokes, sheer movement repeated becomes a pleasure in itself” (ibid.). If we combine together formativity and habit in the light of repetition as understood by Sennett, we might affirm that everyday objects and activities can be potentially performed and experienced with art, and this is truer if the capacity to see and produce forms becomes a habit that guides our daily existence.

A conclusive example drawn from Sennett may show briefly the extension of this discourse to the social sphere. After the Second World War, the Dutch architect Aldo Van Eyck (1918-1999) filled with playgrounds a number of empty and forlorn spaces in Amsterdam and other Dutch cities. “The designer’s aim for these small places was to teach children how to anticipate and manage ambiguous transitions in urban space.” (Ibid.: 232). There were edges, but not sharp separations between the elements forming the park, such as sand and grass, paths to toddle or climb. The task of every child was to find for herself/himself the best way to interact with the environment and with other children, helping one another. In some cases (e.g. the Van Boetzelstraat playground in Amsterdam) all the users, “children, adolescents, and adults learned to use it together” (Ibid.: 234). Van Eyck’s creations can be considered works in which the search for form is combined with an educational aim, that is, the improvement of the aesthetic quality of the experience through the integration of the individual with the urban and social environment. This example is highly significant, showing the aesthetic character of human works and their high social value. Such playgrounds were conceived to be forms that could habituate people to experience the environment in an aesthetic way, strengthening at the same time social bonds in daily matters. This is the background Dewey, Pareyson, and the theorists of everyday aesthetics share.

4. Conclusion

In the spirit of Pareyson’s hermeneutics I have attempted to interpret his aesthetic theory by having it dialogue with Dewey’s and vice versa, thus showing a number of similarities between them. Therefore, it can be said that pragmatism and hermeneutics have important points of contact in aesthetics, not only theoretically, but empirically too. Moreover, they are related to present questions in aesthetics with significant consequences on human life. However, to accurately situate my reflections about their aesthetics it is important not to neglect some fundamental differences between Pareyson and Dewey, summarized as follows.

1) Pareyson’s aesthetics is closely bound up with transcendency, as is his whole thought. It is important to keep in mind this point in examining similarities and resonances with Dewey. 2) Although Dewey’s thought is an important source for Pareyson, it is neither the main nor the sole one, and therefore the Pareysonian approach to aesthetics is to be considered completely original. 3) In comparison with Dewey’s, Pareyson’s aesthetic theory is more focused on problems of art, and this is probably because of his hermeneutical and transcendental-ontological interests in philosophy. 4) The notion of “aesthetic emotion” occupies a key place in Dewey’s aesthetics. I have not dealt with that notion, because it does not represent, in my opinion, a strong point of contact with Pareyson, even though the latter takes into
account the emotions in art and aesthetics. Unlike Dewey, Pareyson neither appears to give specific room to them nor does he develop a sound theory of the emotions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


GIVONE Sergio, (2008), Storia dell’estetica, Roma-Bari, Laterza.


NOTES

1. Some of Pareyson’s writings have been translated into English and collected in a volume edited by Paolo Diego Bubbio (Payerson 2009). When quotations are drawn from this book I indicate it with the double reference to the original Italian text and to the English translation (e.g. 1988/2009). When quotations do not refer to that book the translation into English is mine. In this case, I have only left the reference to the original Italian text (e.g. 1988).

2. For further details about the Croce-Dewey controversy it is helpful to read their interchange (Dewey 1989: 97-100, 438-44). Pareyson comes to define as “Crocean censorship” (Pareyson 1988: 7) the cultural dominance of Croce’s aesthetics in the first half of the 20th century.

3. Because of conceiving art as intuition, Croce neglected many fundamental aspects belonging to art, such as technique, practice, and materials (Pareyson 1966: 79-86; Vercellone 2011: 36-7; Eco 2011: 42-4) as well as the concrete work of the artist that leads to an artwork (D’Angelo 2011: 65). In addition, it should be highlighted that Croce denied the importance of sensations, emotions, feelings, and impulses, so depositing “the vital organs of Dewey’s aesthetics in the morgue of nothingness” (Copenhaver 2017: 63).

4. Insofar as the “successful completion” of a work of art and of its interpretation depends on a set of balanced and integrated elements in a whole, through Pareyson’s discourse one can see Deweyan transactionalism as described in Knowing and the Known. Transaction is “the right to see together, extensionally and durationally, much that is talked about conventionally as if it were composed of irreconcilable separates” (Dewey & Bentley 1989: 67). Where self-action and interaction look at a whole as the sum of its parts, transaction sees the parts as determined by the whole (Ryan 2011: 35).

5. This is an aspect deeply connected to Pareyson’s transcendental ontology (Finamore 1999: 82; Tomatis 2003: 51-2).

6. Dowling (2010) and Irvin (2008) propose to pay attention to the little things and behaviours of the ordinary that give us aesthetic pleasure, such as drinking a cup of coffee.

7. This also might happen when we experience a piece of art, for example looking at a Hopper painting at an exhibition, listening to a Haydn string quartet in a concert hall, or watching a movie at the cinema. This kind of aesthetic experience may be in strong contrast with ordinary existence, especially for people who have little direct experience of great artworks, so rendering everyday life more boring and dull. Thomas Leddy offers an interesting contribution to solving the dilemma of the opposition ordinary-extraordinary through a reference to Dewey’s anti-dualistic stance (Leddy 2021).

ABSTRACTS

Even though the American thinker John Dewey and the Italian Luigi Pareyson belong to two different philosophical traditions, on the aesthetic ground they show many resonances and similarities. Using Pareyson’s words, “just as it happens between people, who in particularly
happy encounters [...] reveal themselves to each other," it is therefore possible to have Dewey’s aesthetics and Pareyson’s dialogue with each other, highlighting their affinities. This operation can strengthen the idea that the aesthetic experience is a way to fulfil human existence. Thus, the hermeneutic character of Pareyson’s aesthetics in combination with Deweyan pragmatist aesthetic theory not only have great importance for the artistic experience, but also considerable value for human beings’ everyday lives.

Starting from some Deweyan resonances in Pareyson’s aesthetics, the discourse focuses on his aesthetics in its educational and hermeneutic significance within the dialogue between the two philosophers, coming, finally, to Dewey’s and Pareyson’s aesthetics in connection with so-called “everyday aesthetics.” Although a Deweyan influence on Pareyson is ascertained, and the similarities between them are not superficial at all, it is worth bearing in mind the different backgrounds of the two philosophers in order to accurately situate their reflections.

AUTHOR

ANDREA FIORE

Università Pontificia Salesiana
fiore[at]unisal.it