A PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT PHENOMENA? CARL STUMPF’S CRITICAL REMARKS ON HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

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Abstract. This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf’s evaluation of Husserl’s phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf’s reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his “pure” phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre, directs toward the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl’s self-criticism regarding the Cartesian approach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf’s criticism and partly confirms the latter’s diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I.

One hundred years after the publication of the first book of Husserl’s Ideas, we are still far from having reached a consensus regarding the philosophical implications of this work and its contribution to the philosophical program of the founder of contemporary phenomenology. Soon after its publication in 1913, this book received a mitigated reception (to say the least) from Husserl’s first students (the Munich phenomenologists); it gave rise to many controversies on the ins and outs of Husserl’s phenomenology and on the book’s central theme, that is, intentionality. It is in this book that Husserl introduced the concept of noema, which represents the heart of his theory of intentionality, and we know that since the 1960s the reception of Ideas I has been the subject of a vigorous debate which still arouses a great deal of interest from Husserl’s commentators even today. But the
main issue in this debate is not merely exgetical, it concerns the relevance and value of Husserl’s phenomenology and his theory of intentionality in the domain of philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

It is in light of these debates that Stumpf’s critical evaluation of his student Husserl’s work acquires its full significance. Stumpf’s evaluation is of particular interest in Husserl studies given that these two students of Brentano maintained a close relationship for over fifty years and that Stumpf followed with great interest the evolution of Husserl’s thought from the Halle period (1886-1901) to that of Göttingen (1901-1916). The latter period is characterized by the transcendental turn to which Husserl subjected his phenomenology in the first book of Ideas. That said, Stumpf’s evaluation of the two versions of phenomenology that correspond to these two periods is significantly different. Indeed, as shown by Stumpf’s scattered remarks on the Logical Investigations in his two important articles published in 1906 (Stumpf 2006a, 2006b), Husserl’s phenomenology constitutes a major contribution not only to descriptive psychology, but also to the theory of knowledge, ontology and logic. However, in his book Erkenntnislehre, published posthumously, Stumpf takes a very critical attitude towards the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in the first book of Ideas and offers an insightful and enlightening analysis of the philosophical program that constitutes the common starting point of these two students of Brentano.

In this study, I propose to examine, first, Stumpf’s reception of Husserl’s phenomenology in the Logical Investigations. I will then turn to §§ 85-86 of the first book of Ideas in which Husserl compares his “pure” phenomenology with Stumpf’s. In the third section, I analyze Stumpf’s criticism of the account of phenomenology offered in
Ideas I in § 13 of his book *Erkenntnislehre*, and in the fourth, I will summarize the main points of the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section focuses on Husserl’s self-criticism regarding the Cartesian approach to the phenomenological reduction in *Ideas I* and on the parallelism that Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I put forward the hypothesis that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during his Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf’s criticism and partly confirms his diagnosis in *Erkenntnislehre*.

1 **Stumpf and the Phenomenology of the Logical Investigations**

The name of Carl Stumpf is known to Husserl’s readers insofar as it occurs frequently in the works that Husserl published during the Halle period. We also know that it was Stumpf who, under the recommendation of Brentano, of whom he was also the first student, supervised the young Husserl’s studies in Halle and his habilitation thesis on the origin of the concept of number. What is less known, however, is the close relationship that Husserl and Stumpf maintained throughout their lives and the major influence that Stumpf exercised on the young Husserl during the Halle period. These facts, however, were recognized in Husserl’s seminal book on phenomenology, which is dedicated to Stumpf in recognition of his reverence and friendship.1 I cannot, in this study, account for the personal and scientific relationships that these two philosophers have maintained during this period (see R. Rollinger 1999, D. Fisette 2009), and I shall confine myself to a brief review of Stumpf’s remarks on the Logical Investigations in two important papers published in 1906 by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin under the titles “On the Classification of Sciences” and “Phenomena and Psychical Functions”.

The first important point that stands out from Stumpf’s reading of the Logical Investigations is that the version of phenomenology that Husserl presents in the general introduction of this book is intended to be a direct contribution to Brentano’s descriptive psychology, despite the significant revisions that Husserl imposes on it in the last two stud-

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1 A letter from Stumpf to his friend Felix Klein provides evidence of Stumpf’s high esteem for his student Husserl. In this letter dated June 4, 1901 Stumpf recommends to the famous mathematician Husserl’s candidacy for a position in Göttingen. This letter is reproduced in the appendix.
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ies of this work and the severe criticism that he directs toward Brentano in the appendix of this book. Stumpf first refers to Husserl’s definition of phenomenology in the general introduction of this book as descriptive psychology, which is understood as a preliminary science to genetic psychology:

Pure phenomenology represents a field of neutral researches, in which several sciences have their roots. It is, on the one hand, an ancillary to psychology conceived as an empirical science. Proceeding in purely intuitive fashion, it analyses and describes in their essential generality - in the specific guise of a phenomenology of thought and knowledge - the experiences of presentation, judgement and knowledge, experiences which, treated as classes of real events in the natural context of zoological reality, receive a scientific probing at the hands of empirical psychology. (Hua XIX, 1/ 166; see also §6)

Stumpf rightly emphasizes the importance of the distinction which Husserl refers to in this passage between descriptive and genetic psychology, a distinction that Brentano already taught in his lectures in the mid-1880s and which Husserl attended during his studies in Vienna. However, as Husserl explains in § 7 of the fifth Investigation (Hua XIX / 1, 336-350), which has been subtracted from the second edition of the book, descriptive and genetic psychology are not two independent disciplines but two aspects of a single discipline:

Psychology’s task - descriptively - is to study the ego-experiences (or conscious contents) in their essential species and forms of combination, in order to explore - genetically - their origin and perishing, and the causal patterns and laws of their formation and transformation. (Hua XIX/1, 347/88)

Following Brentano, Husserl claims that the task of descriptive psychology is to describe and analyze what genetic psychology, i.e. the physiological or experimental psychology at the time, explains causally. Methodologically, the description of conscious experience has precedence over the explanation of these phenomena because the analysis of the explanandum is an essential step prior to its explanation by genetic psychology.

Stumpf suggests that it is primarily to avoid the confusion between these two aspects of psychology that Husserl opted for the term phenomenology which he defines, in the Logical Investigations, as de-
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But the choice of this term is questionable, according to Stumpf, because in identifying phenomenology with descriptive psychology, Husserl runs the risk of confusing two distinct domains of research, i.e. sensory phenomena and psychical functions, and in so doing of eradicating the close relationship that Husserl wants to maintain between descriptive and genetic psychology. As Stumpf points out in a footnote that Husserl comments in Ideas I, phenomenology and psychology must fulfill very different tasks:

I use here the term phenomenology in another sense and I want to keep the term “descriptive psychology” for the mere description of the experiences of mental acts which is more appropriate for this purpose because, in fact, the object, namely the basic psychical function, is common to descriptive and genetic psychology, and because this common object may be obscured by the choice of a completely different expression. (Stumpf 1906b, 200)

The term phenomenology, as used by Stumpf in his two treatises of 1906, refers in fact to a research domain that is distinct from that of descriptive psychology, the latter of which is limited to psychical acts or to what Stumpf calls psychical functions. The field of phenomenology, in Stumpf’s sense, pertains only to sensory phenomena or what Husserl also calls, following Brentano, physical phenomena.

The distinction between phenomena and mental functions is of importance in order to understand another objection that Stumpf directs toward Husserl’s classification of the sciences regarding the distinction between descriptive psychology and the natural sciences. Stumpf again refers to § 7 of the fifth Investigation in which Husserl criticizes Mach’s phenomenalism and the Hume-Berkeley view according to which corporeal phenomena are reduced to aggregates of sensations or elements. Husserl criticizes phenomenalism for confusing the “phenomenon, understood as an intentional experience, and the corresponding object” and thus conflating the complex of lived experiences or sensations with the complex of objective properties. It is in this context that Husserl resorts to internal perception as a criterion of demarcation between descriptive psychology and natural sciences, and proposes a definition of psychology that he again here takes over from Brentano:
The definition of psychology as the science of psychic *phenomena* must therefore be understood just as we understand the definition of natural science as the science of physical phenomena. The phenomena in question do not mean an objective scientific field which they are to exhaust, but only the nearest points of attack (*Angriffspunkte*) for our scientific researches. So understood, these definitions raise no objections. (Hua XIX/1, 350/91)

Stumpf agrees with Husserl’s criticism of phenomenalism, but he rejects the arguments put forward by Husserl regarding his distinction between descriptive psychology and natural sciences, including genetic psychology, because, on the one hand, Stumpf does not consider that internal perception is a reliable criterion and, on the other hand, he does not admit that natural sciences and descriptive psychology are distinguishable solely in function of their object of study because psychical phenomena, on the basis of which Husserl defines descriptive psychology, also constitute the object of genetic psychology. This objection equally applies to the field of physical phenomena or to what Stumpf calls phenomenology because Stumpf believes that this domain of investigation is common to descriptive psychology and to the natural sciences. That is why Stumpf argues that this distinction only concerns ultimately “the material that is used in the formation of the object”. (Stumpf 1906b, 186-187)

Another important aspect of descriptive psychology to which Stumpf pays particular attention in his two treaties of 1906 concerns Husserl’s pure logic. In the passage where Husserl puts forth his definition of descriptive psychology in the general introduction to his *Logical Investigations*, he clearly indicates that phenomenology is not confined to the role of a propaedeutic to genetic psychology. For its primary philosophical task consists in the analysis and elucidation of the fundamental concepts and laws of logic:

Phenomenology, on the other hand, lays bare the “sources” from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of pure logic “flow,” and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them all

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2 Stumpf does not seem to take into account Husserl’s criticisms of Brentano in the appendix to the *Logical Investigations*. (see Fisette 2010) However, in *Erkenntnislehre*, Stumpf argues against Husserl that the source of the problem in Brentano’s theory of perception is not to be found in his conception of physical phenomena, but in his theory of perception as judgment. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 218-219)
the “clearness and distinctness” needed for an understanding, and for an epistemological critique, of pure logic. (Hua XIX/1, 3/166)

This is the main task which is assigned to phenomenology understood as a theory of knowledge in the Logical Investigations. This dual task assigned to phenomenology is at the origin of the apparent tension between the critique of psychologism, which is the main issue of the first volume of the Logical Investigations, in which Husserl challenges the contribution of psychology to logico-mathematical questions, and the remaining parts of the book in which the analysis and description of the fundamental concepts of logic belong to a phenomenology of knowledge understood as descriptive psychology. This tension has been clearly identified by Stumpf (1906b, 200). He first refers to a footnote in the Prolegomena in which Husserl discusses the work of Külpe and Elsenhans with regard to his critique of psychologism and its bearing on psychology. He claims that even if philosophy has nothing to expect from a genetic explanation of logic, descriptive psychology still remains at the foundation of genetic psychology and pure logic:

I should probably have said exactly the same before beginning my present investigations, or before realizing the insoluble difficulties in which I was plunged by a psychologic view of the philosophy of mathematics. Now, however, having the best reasons to see the error of such a view, I can rejoice and take the liveliest interest in the otherwise very promising development of scientific psychology, but not as one who expects philosophical enlightenment from it. I must, however, add, to guard against misunderstanding, that I sharply distinguish empirical psychology from the phenomenology (taken as a pure theory of the essences of experiences) that underlies it (as epistemology underlies it in a wholly different manner). This will become clear in the actual Investigations which follow these Prolegomena. (Hua XVIII, 235-236/319-320)

Stumpf interprets this passage as claiming that the logical psychologism that Husserl criticizes in his Prolegomena only concerns the genetic aspect of psychology and not descriptive psychology as such. For Stumpf understands logical psychologism as the thesis according to which the laws and principles of pure logic are reducible to the laws of genetic psychology, whatever form it may take, be it the oldest form of associationist psychology or Wundt’s physiological psychol-
ogy, for example. For Stumpf, there is no contradiction between Husserl's criticism of logical psychologism and the important function which he assigns to phenomenology understood as descriptive psychology:

When theorists of knowledge oppose, as Husserl in particular does, the amalgamation of psychology with “pure logic,” then it is genetic psychology they have in mind, but not descriptive psychology which, in the penetrating research of Husserl, represents its privileged object and is used almost at every point. Description, distinction, classification of lived acts and the study of their finest connections penetrate the whole work. (Stumpf, 1906b, 200)

Stumpf is also sympathetic to Husserl’s project of a pure logic as a theory of science as presented in the last part of the Prolegomena, as confirmed by his remarks in his book Erkenntnislehre which I will discuss later.

In this regard, Stumpf’s doctrine of formations (Gebilde) is of particular interest to Husserl’s logic because it deals with the “necessary correlates” of psychical functions (Stumpf, 1906a, 156 ff.) and with the specific contents of each class and subclass of mental functions. For example, Husserl's notion of moments of unity falls under the concept of formation as well as states of affairs, which were first introduced by Stumpf in his logic lecture of 1888 and which refer, at first approximation, to the specific content of the class of judgments. Stumpf emphasizes the importance of this distinction between the content and the object of an act (Stumpf 1906b, 171) in the Logical Investigations, and in this case, between the content of an act of judgment (its propositional content or meaning) and its object that Husserl conceives following Stumpf, as a state of affairs. Like Husserl,

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3 The theme of psychologism, which Husserl associates with the debates on the foundation of logic in the Prolegomena, essentially reproduces the theoretical framework used by Stumpf in his 1891 article on the relation between psychology and the theory of knowledge. In the Prolegomena, Husserl refers twice to this article: firstly, to a footnote in § 18 in order to indicate that, as Stumpf in this article, he uses the term psychologism without any “pejorative nuance”. In the second (Hua XVIII, 63), Husserl refers to a passage (Stumpf, 1891, 469) where Stumpf uses the Kantian argument against psychologism, i.e. that logical psychologism can never provide general and necessary truths. Husserl says that although Stumpf deals only with the theory of knowledge and not specifically with logic in his article, it “is not an essential difference”. (see D. Fisette, 2014a)
Stumpf recognizes the objective nature of the Gebilde that he explicitly equates to Bolzano’s propositions in themselves (Stumpf 1906a, 157-159, 1906b, 214) and like Husserl, he recognizes the distinction between the meaning of an act of judgment and its object, i.e. the state of affairs, as confirmed by the following passage:

Husserl rightly pointed out that the concepts of “equiangular triangle” and “equilateral triangle” are different even if they refer to the same thing. He speaks of a different “meaning” with the same “object”. Similarly, the judgments “a > b” and “b < a” have a different meaning but they express the same state of affairs. (Stumpf 1906a, 161)

The field of study of the Gebilde and states of affairs falls within what he calls eidology (see C. Stumpf, 1906b, p. 197 ff.) which, like the domain of relations and that of phenomenology, is a neutral domain, i.e. a field of research that does not belong to the class of natural sciences, nor to that of human sciences. Stumpf further claims that this neutral science constitutes a preliminary domain of research to all sciences.

2 Husserl and Stumpf’s Phenomenology
In §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, Husserl refers explicitly to Stumpf’s two Academy treatises of 1906 and responds to the objection that has been
discussed above regarding the choice of the term phenomenology to
designate the field of descriptive psychology. We saw that Stumpf
disagreed with this terminological choice arguing that, from the point
of view of the researchers in psychology, it was likely to confuse the
domain of sensory phenomena (= Stumpf’s phenomenology) with that
of psychical functions or acts (= Stumpf’s descriptive psychology),
which are for Stumpf and Brentano two distinct domains. Husserl’s
response to Stumpf’s objections in Ideas I clearly shows that their dis-
pute over phenomenology is no longer merely terminological, because
the new meaning that Husserl confers to phenomenology in this book
is quite different from both the phenomenology referred to in his
Logical Investigations, understood as descriptive psychology, and that
of Stumpf, understood as the field of sensory phenomena. In Ideas I,
Husserl establishes a correspondence between two distinctions:
Stumpf’s distinction between mental functions and phenomena, which
is a psychological distinction, and that presented in the Logical Inve-
sigtions between acts, defined as intentional Erlebnisse, and “primary
contents”. In the §85 entitled “Sensual Hylè and Intentional Morphè,”
Husserl replaces the notion of primary content with the well-known
expression of “hyletic Data or stuff-Data” (Ideas I, 205), by which he
refers to a very broad field that includes:

color-Data, touch-Data and tone-Data, and the like, which we shall no
longer confuse with appearing moments of physical things - colored-
ness, roughness, etc. - which “present themselves” to mental processes
(erlebnismaßig) by means of those "contents". Likewise the sensu-
ous pleasure, pain and tickle sensations, and so forth, and no doubt
also sensuous moments belonging to the sphere of “drives”. (Hua III,
172/203)

The changes that affect his conception of intentionality, however, are
not only terminological. Husserl acknowledges his debt to Brentano
who deserves the credit for having characterized

the concept of “psychical phenomena” in one of its delimiting deter-
minations by the peculiarity of intentionality. Precisely as a result he
brought the “psychical” into the sphere of vision of our times in that
distinctive sense which had a certain emphasis but was not annulled in
the historical signification of the word. (Hua III, 175/206)
However, he makes substantial changes to the structure of intentional acts by introducing the noetico-noematical correlations, which I will later comment on.\(^5\)

In the light of this new terminology, we can establish a correspondence between, on the one hand, Stumpf’s psychology of functions or Brentano’s descriptive psychology and Husserl’s noetic, and on the other hand, between Stumpf’s phenomenology and what Husserl calls the “Hyletik”. In § 85 of Ideas I, Husserl uses the opposition between form and matter, or more precisely, the opposition between intentional morphè and sensory hylè, and conceives of the relation between these two terms in a way that is reminiscent of Kant’s well-known formula: “formlose Stoffe” (formless stuffs) and “stofflose Formen” (stuffless forms). At first glance, these formless materials reflects more closely the account of sensory phenomena criticized both by Husserl and by Stumpf – as indicated in the latter’s book on the origin of space perception – than the sensory phenomena of phenomenology. For the expression seems to suggest that the field of sensory phenomena is itself amorphous and unstructured, and whose organisation is thus dependant on the intentional morphè, which “animates” it by imposing its own categories from without. If this is indeed the case, then the introduction of the notion of hylè not only marks a change in terminology, but also differs significantly from the conception of primary contents, understood as wholes structured by relations that are not imposed from without but are inherent to the phenomena themselves. As Stumpf rightly pointsout in his posthumously published book Erkenntnislehre, this is particularly true of the theory of wholes and parts, which Husserl took over from Stumpf and which he systematically

\(^5\) Husserl prefers to avoid the notion of psychical phenomenon or of intentional experience (act) in Ideas I and uses instead the notion of “noesis” which he describes as follows: “These noes make up what is specific to nous in the broadest sense of the word; it refers us back, according to all its actual life-forms, to cogitationes and then to any intentional mental processes whatever”. (Translation changed, Hua III, 174/205) In § 86 of this book, he seems to identify the notion of noesis with that of function in Stumpf’s sense and says that the most important problems of his phenomenology are functional problems. Moreover, Husserl introduced the notion of noema in Ideas I immediately after this long comment about Stumpf in § 88, which is entitled “Real and intentional components of experience. The noema”. The noema is considered as the non-real or “irreal” component of an act and it corresponds to what is commonly called an intentional content. The equivalent concept in Stumpf is that of formation (Gebilde) which is also considered the correlate of an act.
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developed in the third Investigation. As confirmed by another remark in § 86 of Ideas I, the close relationship that Husserl establishes between noesis and hylè explains why phenomenology, in the sense of Stumpf, is subordinated to what he calls, in Ideas I, eidetic psychology:

On the other hand, the idea of the hyletic eo ipso is transferred from phenomenology to the basis of an eidetic psychology which, according to our conception, would include Stumpf’s “phenomenology”. (Hua III, 179/210)

Husserl’s response to Stumpf further suggests that this new version of phenomenology, which in fact has, according to Husserl, “a completely different signification” (Ideas I, 210) than Stumpf’s phenomenology, does not give equal importance to the field of sensory phenomena as Husserl did during the Halle period. For in subordinating the hyletic to psychology and in setting apart “pure phenomenology” from psychology (whatever its definition might be), Husserl seems to take a path that diverge significantly from Stumpf’s philosophical positions and the one he advocated in Halle. This is at least Stumpf’s diagnosis in Erkenntnislehre, which I propose to examine in the next two sections.

3 Stumpf’s Criticism of “Pure” Phenomenology in Ideas I

Husserl’s clarification about the nature of his phenomenology in the first book of Ideas is the starting point of Stumpf’s comments on the new version of Husserl’s phenomenology in the fourth part of § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre. Stumpf himself recognizes, in accordance with Husserl, that the dispute over the meaning of phenomenology is no longer a matter of mere terminology given the wide gap not only between the two versions of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also between the “pure” phenomenology of Ideas I and Stumpf’s own version in Erkenntnislehre. In the following passage, Stumpf compares Ideas I’s version of phenomenology with that advocated by Husserl in his Logical Investigations:

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6 Husserl claims indeed that only “superficial readers of both writings have confused more than once Stumpf’s concept of phenomenology (as the doctrine of “appearances”) with ours”. (Hua III, 178/210)
What Husserl originally meant by “pure phenomenology” was nothing other than the descriptive or phenomenal psychology of Brentano, more specifically the analysis and description of the experiences of thinking. But later he developed a more general concept of phenomenology understood as the science of a priori eidetic knowledge, which constitute the foundation of all empirical sciences. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 185-186)

The first question raised by Stumpf in his examination of Ideas I’s philosophical project is whether this new version of phenomenology constitutes a significant and viable contribution to the research conducted by Husserl during his Halle period. The value of this contribution is measured on the basis of Brentano’s philosophical program as it was carried out in the Logical Investigations, and his evaluation focuses accordingly on the aspects of this “pure” phenomenology by which Husserl departed from the fundamental principles of the philosophical program in his Logical Investigations. One of Stumpf’s important concerns in his reading of Ideas I regards his own phenomenology, i.e. the field of sensory phenomena and its place in this pure phenomenology. In this regard, he seeks to demonstrate that “pure” phenomenology, insofar as it brackets at the outset this dimension of experience, is at the end a “phenomenology without phenomena”. In this section, I will briefly discuss some of the arguments that support Stumpf’s criticism and I will address, in the following section, his Spinozist interpretation of Husserl’s parallelism between noesis and noema, which he proposes in Erkenntnislehre and in his two studies on Spinoza.

The first tangible sign of the modifications that the Logical Investigation’s definition of phenomenology underwent is its dissociation from descriptive psychology. That is confirmed by Husserl in the introduction to the first book of Ideas where he recalled that soon after the publication of his Logical Investigations, he was led to abandon the definition of phenomenology as descriptive psychology and to criticize the philosophical naturalism which he attributes to Brentano and to several contemporary psychologists. In this introduction, Husserl says “that pure phenomenology, access to which we shall prepare in the following essay […] is not psychology and that neither accidental delimitations of its field nor its terminologies, but most radical essential grounds, prevent its inclusion in psychology”. (Hua III, 2/XVIII) In addition to the reasons of principle raised by Husserl in
this passage, the gap created between pure phenomenology and psychology also depends, as Stumpf pointed out in *Erkenntnislehre*, on the narrow definition of psychology in this work. For Husserl conceives psychology in the narrow sense of a “science of facts” or as “matters of fact in the sense of D. Hume’s”, and in this sense psychological phenomena are considered as “real” events. In contrast, the new phenomenology differs from the latter both with respect to its tasks and to the ontological status of its objects: it is a “science of essences” and of the laws of species on which the empirical sciences and philosophy in general are based, while the phenomena and objects with which it deals are defined as “unreal”. (Hua III, 4/XX) Stumpf wonders whether these two criteria justify such a radical separation between this new phenomenology and descriptive psychology. For, as Stumpf reminds us, psychology since Aristotle cannot be reduced to a science of facts dealing with the biography of, say, the “inner experiences of Johann Nepomuk Oberniedermayer born in Straubing in 1741”. It has always been defined, instead, as a regional ontology and as a science of the laws of structure of psychical life. And these laws, as Stumpf claims,

are the specific objects of descriptive psychology in the sense of Brentano, but also of Lotze and all their predecessors. This descriptive psychology is nothing but a phenomenology or regional ontology in the sense of Husserl, and he himself made a significant contribution in his the *Logical Investigations*. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 194)

Stumpf therefore accuses Husserl of ignoring the important contributions of Brentano and of his students to the question of regional ontologies, an issue to which we shall later return.

That said, the first obstacle that stands before an understanding of Husserl’s philosophical project in *Ideas I* is its style, which is reminiscent of the great German “thinkers” of the early nineteenth century. Stumpf criticizes his use of a new technical vocabulary without justifying it, and he notes the lack of relevant examples to clarify many aspects of the doctrine which remain abstract and sometimes obscure. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 188-9) But beyond the style of the book, Husserl’s philosophical project in this book is comparable to that of Kant and to a critique of pure reason, as Husserl implicitly suggests in the following passage where he quotes Kant:
The insight will be awakened that genuine philosophy, the idea of which is the actualizing of absolute cognition, is rooted in pure phenomenology; and rooted in it in a sense so important that the systematically strict grounding and working out of this first of all genuine philosophies is the incessant precondition for every metaphysics and other philosophy “that will be able to make its appearance as a science”. (Hua III, 5/XXII)

Stumpf rightly distinguishes between Husserl’s philosophical project and the role assigned to pure phenomenology in this passage. The philosophical project is on a par with the idea of a pure logic and of a universal doctrine of science whose model is the theory of definite multiplicities developed by Husserl during his research on geometry and arithmetics in Halle.⁷ Hence the importance granted to this research on axioms in his phenomenology.

That said, Stumpf’s assessment of Husserl’s phenomenology in Ideas I occurs in the context of a study on axioms which is a central theme not only in Stumpf’s Erkenntnislehre, but already in his habilitation thesis which focused on mathematical axioms. (Stumpf, 1870; D. Fisette 2015, 24-27) In Erkenntnislehre, his starting point lies in the distinction between formal or logical axioms, which concern arbitrary objects, and material axioms (gegenständliche) that apply to objects of a given type. Stumpf discusses formal axioms in § 12 and the class of materials axioms (regional or objective) in § 13. In the fourth part of § 13, Stumpf evaluates primarily Husserl’s contribution to material axioms and proposes in the fifth part of this section, a critical examination of his pure phenomenology. The importance that Stumpf grants to Husserl’s doctrine of essences and regional ontologies is motivated in part by this topic’s importance in Husserl’s phenomenology, whose main task, among other things, consist in the search of essences, i.e, to quote Husserl, of “axioms, immediately evident judgments

⁷ Stumpf refers to this passage of Ideas I where Husserl says: “Connected with this is the practical ideal of exact eidetic science which, strictly speaking, only recent mathematics has shown how to actualize: it has shown how to bestowed on any eidetic science the highest degree of rationality by reducing all of its mediate steps of thinking to mere subsumptions under the axioms of the particular eidetic province, these axioms having been assembled once for all and reinforced with the whole set of axioms belonging to ‘formal’ or ‘pure’ logic (in the broadest sense: mathesis universalis) – unless, of course, from the very beginning it is a matter of that logic itself”. (Hua III, 32-33/17; see D. Fisette 2003)
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that of which indeed all the other judgments in a mediate grounding lead back”. (Hua III, 14/13) This task is divided into two parts, the first concerns the search for material axioms and it employs regional ontologies. Pure phenomenology, however, investigates the more general species in view of founding the project of a transcendental philosophy.

Let us begin with the classification of axioms that Stumpf proposes in Erkenntnislehre and examine his conception of the class of regional axioms. The thesis defended by Stumpf is that this class of axioms only refers to “elementary intuitions”. (Stumpf 1939 to 1940, 167) That is why this class of material axioms is divided into three sub-classes that correspond in part to the domains of the neutral sciences that we discussed above, namely phenomenology and eidology, and partly to that of psychology. (Stumpf 1939 to 1940, 169) Stumpf relates these material axioms to the laws of essences underlying Husserl’s regional ontologies and emphasizes the importance of these ontologies for the foundation of the individual sciences, namely for the foundation of the natural sciences. He raises the question as to what is the original contribution of Ideas I to regional ontologies in comparison to the major contributions of Meinong and of Brentano in this domain, but also of Stumpf himself and of Husserl in his Logical Investigations.

Stumpf maintains that this research related to regional ontologies can be understood as an extension of Brentano’s (and Lotze’s) initial program of a psychognosie, and this “program is nothing but a regional or phenomenological ontology in the sense of Husserl”. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 194) In this respect, Brentano’s contribution to a regional phenomenology and to the formulation of material axioms and of a priori principles of psychology as a whole is not negligible. Stumpf considers the following examples: “everything that is mental is in a certain way directed towards an object (and according to Brentano’s late conception, towards something real), and every judgment includes within itself presentations” (Stumpf 1939-1940, 160-1); “that all psychological acts are based on presentations, and that every act is directed towards a primary and a secondary object (towards itself) in three different modes: representational, judicative (evident), and emotional”. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 182) According to Stumpf, these principles underly the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations and some of these principles are presupposed in the more ambitious and comprehensive project of Ideas I. Stumpf associates his own contribution to
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The formulation of axioms with his early work on the origin of space perception (Stumpf, 1873, § 5), to his Psychology of Sound (Stumpf, 1890, § 6) and to his two Academy articles of 1906 in which several important structural laws are formulated. In the field of eidology, which we discussed above, the formations (Gebilde) also involve general and necessary laws that structure all kinds of formations in this domain. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 161-162) States of affairs, for example, obey specific principles that he calls, following Bolzano, Folgerungssätze or laws of inference, which also belong to the domain of eidology. But the field of elementary sensory phenomena, i.e. Stumpf’s phenomenology, remains perhaps the main issue in his discussion with Husserl because, from the point of view of the Erfahrungspessimologie advocated by Stumpf in Erkenntnislehre, this domain is the ultimate source of all concepts in that it provides the raw material for the formation of concepts. As a domain of “neutral” research, it is common to both the natural sciences and to psychology, and as a propaedeutic, it represents the common starting point of all the empirical sciences. This amounts to saying that for Stumpf a regional ontology, whose task is to formulate the essential material axioms of all empirical sciences, must begin with first-order phenomena and with sense perception that provides a direct access thereto. This was also Husserl’s starting point in the third Investigation in which he formulated the main axioms of his formal ontology and of his theory wholes and parts whose origin lies in the primary relations that structure the sensory material:

The distinction between independent contents of representation and simple partial content (I also once called “psychological parts”) was developed by Husserl in his Logical Investigations in his theory of wholes and parts, and the example of color and space also plays a decisive role in his phenomenology. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 24)

In this regard, the contribution of the young Husserl to regional ontologies is more substantial than that in Ideas I which, according to Stumpf, contributes “nothing essentially new” in that respect.

Another important point raised by Stumpf in Erkenntnislehre concerns the question of the justification of the axioms that Husserl addressed in § 5 of Ideas I. We said that species are axioms or general principles based on immediate and evident judgments, which serve as the common basis for all other judgments. Husserl argues that these
axioms require a noetic foundation, i.e. “in order to make them matters of insight – a certain seeing of essences which one could designate also (in a modified sense) as a seizing upon essences; and this seeing too, like the eidetic intuition which makes essences objects, is based on sighting but not on experiencing individual single particulars”. (Hua III, 27/13) That is why this Wesenschau only operates at the level of imagination, merely on presentations or imaginations (Phantasiesichtigkeiten), and there is “consciousness of what is sighted, as sighted; it ‘appears’ but is not seized upon as factually existent”. (Hua III, 27/13) Stumpf wonders why Husserl confines his phenomenology to mere imaginary presentations in his search for the general laws of regional ontologies and empirical sciences, and how he justifies, in the case of material axioms, this sharp distinction between what Stumpf calls first and second order phenomena, i.e. between mere presentations and contents of sense perception. What is at stake for Stumpf is nothing less than his own phenomenology and the domain of first order phenomena, whose bracketing within Husserl's doctrine of essences, shortcircuits the field of sensory phenomena as a whole. Stumpf believes instead that (regional) axioms relate exclusively to sensory intuitions (Stumpf 1939-1940, 167, 190) and he cannot see why one should restrict the investigation to mere imaginary presentations when one aims at elucidating the general laws of contents of sensory experience. In a passage of his treatise of 1917 on the attributes of the visual field, Stumpf already formulated his reservations about this method:

When phenomenology in the sense of Husserl promises to provide, as Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, but on the new basis of a vision of the species, a priori principles of phenomena from which we could take an apodictic stance on the question of the intensity of color, we would all be very grateful to him. But I am afraid that in order to be convinced, the phenomena must be examined individually and very precisely within every sense. (Stumpf, 1917, 36-37)

Stumpf considers that all the issues relating to sensory phenomena, including kinestheses to which Husserl devoted a remarkable study in his lectures of 1907 Thing and Space, cannot be treated solely by mere thought experiments; one must also take into account the sensory experience and genetic psychology which are indispensable in this research. Deprived of this phenomenological basis, the Wesenschau and
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the Ichblick, which Husserl compares explicitly to a mind’s eye (Hua III, 118), is not very far removed from the intellectual intuition of Schelling and it recalls, as Stumpf ironically said, the “Nirvana of the penitent Indian gazing at his navel”. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 192)

One of the sources of the problem in Husserl’s doctrine of the Wesensschau resides, according to Stumpf, in the specific difference that is presupposed between mere imaginary presentations and the contents of sensory perception such as intensity, vividness (Lebhaftigkeit), clarity, etc. Stumpf maintains against this thesis, which he also attributes to Brentano, that there is a gradual difference, and not a partition, between presented contents and contents of sensation or sensory phenomena. (Stumpf, 1918) This thesis is, by the way, not unlike the old distinction between esse and essentia, which played a key role in Arabic philosophy, in the Scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, and in Spinoza. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 187) Any eidetic science must disregard the existence of its objects, and pure phenomenology, as Husserl explains it in § 60 of Ideas I, must bracket, by means of the phenomenological reduction, the existence of its objects and by the same token, all material eidetic disciplines. In his commentary on this section, Stumpf raises serious doubts regarding the very practicability of this method and wonders what we can win in such a way if we have to disregard, in our investigation, not only the field of phenomenology (as defined by Stumpf) but also that of descriptive psychology. Stumpf then warns against the dangers of this method in the hands of Husserl’s students and of “phenomenologists” who adopt the phenomenological attitude and, while comfortably sitting at their desk, engage in eidetic variations, phenomenological reduction, adumbrations, etc. “What can be more comfortable, asks ironically Stumpf, than intuiting essences of any arbitrary objects by looking, while sitting at one’s desk, at the smoke of a cigar?” (Stumpf 1939-1940, 199) Stumpf takes as an example the work of Husserl’s students on sensory perception and deplores this way of dealing with the perceived as it completely ignores, as this method requires, the psychological and physiological theories. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 319) Stumpf believes that this method ultimately leads to superficial results, and takes as an example the theme of attention which has always arisen a
great deal of interest in his work in psychology. In his commentary to section 92 of *Ideas I* where Husserl presents his theory of attention, Stumpf sees in this theory the proof that this method ultimately leads to trivialities:

The theory seems rather to lead to nothing but the most traditional and popular view according to which (following Lotze’s sarcastic remark) attention is comparable to a candle with which the soul moves around in its dark rooms and lights sometimes this room and sometimes another. Yet these are only images, stones instead of the bread of truly illuminating knowledge. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 195)

As for the search for “formal” axioms in this book, Stumpf claims that he did not succeed in finding any (Stumpf 1939 to 1940, 193) and he questions the significance of the opposition between the predicates “regional” and “pure” through which Husserl distinguishes regional axioms from those of pure phenomenology. Stumpf argues that the opposite of “regional” is not “pure” but rather “universal” axiom, and he criticized Husserl for confusing “universal” (formal axioms being more universal because they have more extension) and “pure” as Husserl uses this predicate in expressions such as “purified transcendental consciousness”, “pure ego,” or “pure Ichblick”. Hence Stumpf’s criticism of the very idea of a “pure” phenomenology: it is an empty framework, a “chimera, or even a contradiction in itself” (Stumpf 1939-1940, 192) in the sense that the field of sensory phenomena plays no role in the research domain of this phenomenology purified by the phenomenological reduction and it is therefore a mere “phenomenology without phenomena”. Stumpf concludes that there is nothing in this new version of phenomenology that in principle justifies the bracketing of descriptive psychology, let alone phenomenology understood as the domain of sensory phenomena.

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8 It is difficult to establish the connection between this theory of attention in *Ideas I* and that which Husserl develops in his lectures of 1904-1905 on perception. In an important manuscript of Husserl (“Notes on the Doctrine of Attention and Interest”) published as an appendix to these lectures (Hua XXXVIII, 159-189), he carefully examines Stumpf’s theory of attention understood as “Lust am Bemerken” that he defends in his *Psychology of Sound*. 
Let us now consider another option available to Husserl in order to justify the main distinction between descriptive psychology and pure phenomenology. It is based on the fundamental distinction between noesis and noema put forth in Ideas I, which, in Stumpf’s own terms, can be formulated as follows:

[You] did not take into account the fundamental distinction between acts and contents of consciousness. Phenomenology is not only about the essence of acts, but also about the essence of contents or, in the terminology of Husserl, not only about the noesis but also about the noema. If one also accepts that with respect to the noesis, phenomenology coincides (sich decken) with descriptive psychology, then there remains for it the infinitely rich field of research of noematical essences and of axioms relating thereto. (Stumpf 1939-1940, 195)

The noema is indeed the non-real component of an act or, in other words, its intentional content. Stumpf’s equivalent notion is that of Gebilde, which, as we said, is the intentional correlate of a mental function and it belongs to the neutral domain of eidology. It is in this perspective that Stumpf tries to situate the Husserlian noema in the domain of his transcendental phenomenology while the noesis, which is a real component of psychical life, belongs to Husserl’s eidetic psychology. Between the noesis and the noema, between eidetic psychology and transcendental phenomenology, there is a form of parallelism that Husserl understands as follows:

Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn), i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case of remembering has its remembered as remembered, just as its <remembered>, precisely as it is “meant,” “intended to” in <the remembering>; again, the judging has the judged as judged, liking has the liked as liked, and so forth. (Hua III, 305-306/214)

Stumpf conceives the perceptual noema or the perceived as perceived as an intentional content that is distinct both from the act and its object and whose function is to mediate the relation between the act and its object.9

9 This is confirmed by this excerpt from Stumpf’s studies on Spinoza: “Das, worauf
In Erkenntnisselehre, Stumpf claims that the idea of noetico-noematical correlations comes from a long tradition which goes back to Aristotle, and he proposes an original interpretation of the notion of correlation based on Spinoza’s parallelism between the attributes of thought and that of extension:

An historical glance at Spinoza’s doctrine of attributes is of particular interest here. According to Husserl, the noetical behaves, with respect to the noematical, just like the attributes of thought and of extension behave in Spinoza: “una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa”. And in the same way as in Spinoza, the laws of nature are at the same time the laws of mind, noetic laws are also simultaneously noematic laws. It could even be shown that we have here more than a simple analogy, and that namely the Spinoza correctly understood had nothing else in mind with his talk on thought and extension, than the acts and contents of the divine thought. His [Husserl’s] doctrine of the parallelism between acts and contents of consciousness has its origin in [...] Aristotle and Spinoza, and like many others, he has acquired it through his scholastic studies. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 196)

Let us leave aside for the moment the historical thesis advanced in this passage. The appeal to Spinoza aims at showing, against Husserl’s objection formulated above, that the noetico-noematical parallelism cannot be used as an argument for separating pure phenomenology from descriptive psychology because it follows from Spinoza's principle mentioned above (“the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”) that, in the same way that, for Spinoza, the laws of nature are at the same time the laws of thought, the laws in the domain of the noetical and in that of descriptive psychology are also the laws of the noematical and of pure phenomenology. In addition, in taking into account another principle of Spinoza’s Ethics (una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa), descriptive psychology and phenomenology should be considered, according to Spinoza’s parallelism, as one and the same discipline applied to two classes of objects. Under these conditions, Stumpf argues that we can no more separate descriptive psychology from pure phenomenology, nor a phenomenology of acts from a phenomenology of noematical
content then we can have an arithmetic of pears and an arithmetic of nuts. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, 196)

This Spinozist interpretation of the theory of intentionality in Husserl’s Ideas I as well as the thesis of its Aristotelian origin that Stumpf advances in this passage have been developed extensively in Stumpf’s two studies on Spinoza published in 1919 by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. (Stumpf, 1919b) Stumpf proposes an original and unorthodox interpretation of the parallelism of Spinoza in his Ethics and seeks to show, among other things, that this parallelism, when well understood, has nothing to do with the psychophysical parallelism which was dominant at the time ever since Fechner. Stumpf maintains that Spinoza’s parallelism, when well understood, is a parallelism between an act and the immanent object towards which it is directed. (Stumpf 1919b, 19) Stumpf further contends that the act-content parallelism has its source in Aristotle and it has been conveyed to Husserl through many philosophers from Aquinas to Brentano and from Brentano to Husserl. It is in this context that the sketch of a letter of Husserl to Stumpf takes its full value. In this letter, Husserl commented positively the two studies on Spinoza and emphasizes its important contribution to the drawing a connection between intentionality and Spinoza’s doctrine of attributes:

It is a highly important step forward in the interpretation of Spinoza that the relationship to intentionality be the focus of this study, and that all aspects of Spinoza’s doctrine of attributes be then clarified from this point of view; there is no doubt that a fundamental layer in the contradictory whole of Spinoza’s doctrine of attributes is brought to light in a clear and decisive manner. (Husserl, Briefwechsel, 174)

Even if Husserl does not explicitly say that he endorses this interpretation of Spinoza’s thesis in the sketch of his letter to Stumpf – but we shall see in the next section, the parallelism that Husserl defends during the period of Freiburg is not very far from that of Spinoza –, by recognizing the value of Stumpf’s interpretation, he thereby does not

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10 Unfortunately, I cannot examine in this study the contents of Husserl’s extensive letter of Stumpf’s interpretation of Spinoza. It is an illuminating commentary on various aspects of the doctrine of parallelism in Spinoza’s Ethics, which is based on the psychological interpretation of Stumpf and the distinction between act and intentional content.
exclude the possibility that his doctrine of the noetico-noematical correlations can be understood along these lines.

This is further supported by the fact that in this study, Stumpf explicitly targets Husserl’s phenomenology when he says that Spinoza’s law of parallelism thus understood “is a matter of descriptive psychology (Husserl would rather say “phenomenology” because it is based a priori on a ‘vision of essences’”). (Stumpf, 1919b, 33-34)

In his two studies on Spinoza, Stumpf’s point of departure is the accepted view at the time according to which Spinoza was considered to be the founder of psychophysical parallelism which postulates the existence of a world independent of consciousness and whose changes accordingly occur in parallel with the contents of consciousness. Stumpf calls this version of parallelism “transcendent” and opposes it to an “immanent” version of parallelism based on the distinction between act and content, and according to which these two aspects evolve in parallel within consciousness. Psychophysical parallelism is said to be transcendent from this point of view because it tranposes the parallelism of act-content onto the outside world as constituting the support of the intentional contents of consciousness. (Stumpf, 1919b, 34) This immanent version of parallelism formulated on the basis of an interpretation of Spinoza’s seventh principle, as stated in the second part of his Ethics (“The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things”), is considered by Stumpf a principle of descriptive psychology. Stumpf further contends that this interpretation is consistent with Spinoza’s pantheism insofar as the distinction between an act and its immanent content is transposed to God. For since God’s understanding is considered by Spinoza as the only possible subject, intentional acts and their contents are necessarily two of his innumerable modes or attributes. (1919b, 19, 24)

In support of his interpretation of Spinoza’s psychological parallelism, Stumpf offers a historical genetic account of intentionality, and more specifically of the relationship between intentional act and its content, which he traces back to Aristotle’s De Anima. (Stumpf, 1919b, 10) But it is clear that Husserl’s theory of intentionality in Ideen I conveys some of the same traditional assumptions when one considers the connections that Stumpf made in Erkenntnislehre between Husserl’s noetico-noematical correlations and Spinoza’s parallelism. This historical genetic account is strongly influenced by the work of Brentano and it presupposes the theory of intentionality formulated in
his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. For example, when Stumpf (1919b, 11) attributes to Aristotle the paternity of the distinction between intentional content and immanent object, he relies on Brentano’s habilitation thesis on the psychology of Aristotle. (see F. Brentano, 1867, 80 ff., 113 ff.) But in doing so, he also presupposes an immanent interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, which is in fact the subject of many debates in Brentanian studies. (see Fisette (ed.), 2013, section II) For the notion of intentional content presupposes, in Stumpf as in Husserl, the twofold distinction between, on the one hand, noesis and noema, and on the other hand, that between the noema and the referent of the act or its object, a distinction that one hardly finds in Brentano’s writings on intentionality. Be it as it may, after having traced the filiation from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, and then from the latter to Descartes and Spinoza, Stumpf claims that Brentano took over from this tradition the distinction between act and immanent object which he also understands in terms of psychological parallelism:

That is how Brentano, starting from Aristotle, emphatically took over the distinction between the mental activity (the act) and its immanent object which he used as the main characteristic to distinguish psychological phenomena, as opposed to physical phenomena; and he took as the basis of his classification of acts the different modes of “relation to an object”. (Brentano, 1874, 115, 260 ff.) Between the immanent object and the act directed towards it, there is also, according to Brentano, a constant parallelism particularly with regard to intensity. (Stumpf 1919b, 157)

Stumpf refers in this passage to the topic of intensity that Brentano developed systematically in his Munich conference on individuation (see Brentano, 1907) where he argues that the intensity of sensations
is due both to the act of sensing (the presentation) and to its content (or immanent object) and that both run in parallel. (Stumpf, 1919b, 17-18) It is well-known that this question is at the heart of a lively debate between Brentano and Stumpf that I shall not comment here. (See D. Fisette, 2013)

5 The dual Life of the late Husserl’s Phenomenology
In order to complete this study, I will briefly review some aspects of Husserl’s self-criticism regarding the version of the phenomenological reduction in Ideas I, notably from his writings belonging to the period of Freiburg. This self-criticism coincides with the important role that Husserl assigns to intentional psychology from the early 1920s and the close relationship that he establishes between the latter and transcendental phenomenology. I want to show that several aspects of this self-criticism confirm Stumpf’s diagnosis in Erkennislehre and, more specifically, the thesis according to which pure phenomenology and (descriptive) psychology are parallel and inseparable. In this section, I shall first examine Husserl’s self-criticism directed at the method of reduction that he used in Ideas I and the support of what he calls the psychological way to reduction; I will then turn to the role that Husserl assigned to eidetic psychology in his phenomenology and to the so-called duplicity (Doppeldeutigkeit) or dual life of phenomenology; finally, I will discuss the idea of a parallelism in phenomenology between intentional psychology and transcendental philosophy.

From the mid-1920s, Husserl undertook a revision of the conception of phenomenology as defended in Ideas I. For example, in connection with Gibson’s translation of the first book of Ideas in the late 1920s, Husserl undertook a thorough revision of some aspects of this work, which mainly concerned the method of the reduction and the ambiguous relation between psychology and transcendental philosophy in the first edition of this work. This is confirmed in particular by Husserl’s annotations in the margin of the Fundamentalbetrachtungen in this book (see K. Schuhmann, Hua III, introduction) and by several remarks in Husserl’s Postscript (Hua V) to Ideas I published in 1930. Moreover, as evidenced by many lectures, manuscripts and published books written from 1920, from the lecture on phenomenological psychology delivered between 1925 and 1929 (Hua IX) to the Crisis (Hua VI), these revisions, far from being limited to the new edition of this book, reflect the major changes that Husserl’s phenomenology under-
went during this period. However, these changes coincided with the increasingly significant role granted to intentional psychology within phenomenology and concerned the most important points that Stumpf had identified in his commentary on the first book of *Ideas*.

In his lectures on first philosophy from 1923-1924 (Hua VII, VIII), Husserl already distanced himself from the version of the method of the reduction as it was carried out in 1913 and he then clearly distinguished between two ways of using this method, or, as he sometimes says, two ways of accessing the actual field of transcendental philosophy. The first, which is that of the first book of *Ideas* 1, is the Cartesian way, which is modelled on the methodological use of doubt as advocated by Descartes in his *Meditations*, but purified from Descartes’ errors. (Hua VI, § 43) It is characterized, on the one hand, by its starting point, i.e., by the knowledge of the transcendental subjectivity, and it proceeds then to a “criticism of the experience of the world by highlighting the possibility of the non-existence of the world”. (Hua VIII, p. 177; Hua VII, §52) On the other hand, as in Descartes, this pathway assumes the apodictic character of the evidence with which pure subjectivity is given. (Hua VIII, § 46) Husserl calls the latter the direct pathway because it is meant to lead directly to transcendental subjectivity. But as Husserl pointed out in the *Crisis*, the Cartesian way, by neglecting the preliminary analysis of the empirical ego, has the immense disadvantage of presenting transcendental subjectivity “into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained”. (Hua VI, 188-9/ 155) Contrariwise, the new path that Husserl adopted in several of the writings belonging to the Freiburg period consists in the indirect pathway, which passes through what he calls intentional or phenomenological psychology and which serves as a propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology. (Hua IX, § 16) The starting point of the indirect pathway is more natural in the context of a philosophy based on a phenomenology of lived experience, and therefore of a philosophy that proceeds from a bottom-up approach, i.e. of a philosophy that takes its starting point in the intramundane experience and in the natural attitude. The question which then guides the phenomenology that adopts the psychological way is no longer that of the possibility of the non-existence of the outside world, but
“the immediate evidence that may pre-exists all sciences”. (Hua VIII, 41) Its advantage over the first approach to the reduction is to provide “a broader and more profound understanding of the subjectivity as such”. (Hua VIII, 164)

However, Husserl warns those who might be tempted to identify this phenomenological psychology with Brentano’s descriptive psychology in light of which, as we saw, Husserl defined his phenomenology in the Logical Investigations. For while Husserl acknowledges his debt to Brentano’s discovery of the intentionality of consciousness, he argues in the same breath that his “pure” psychology is distinct from Brentano’s psychognosie:

However great is the veneration and gratitude with which I remember my teacher and his genius, and as much as I consider his transformation of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a descriptive foundational concept of psychology to be a great discovery, without which phenomenology would never have been possible, nevertheless an essential distinction has to be drawn between pure psychology in my sense, a psychology contained implicitly in transcendental phenomenology, and Brentano's psychology. (Hua III, 154/422)

The main criticism that Husserl directs toward to Brentano during the Freiburg period is his commitment to a kind of naturalism that he closely relates to Brentano’s views on physical phenomena and to the function of the psychophysical causality in his psychognosie.12 However, Husserl’s phenomenological psychology remains a descriptive science whose task is to analyze the most general specific character of

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12 In the Crisis, Husserl associates Brentano’s naturalism with the parallelism between descriptive and genetic psychology, that Husserl himself advocated in his Logical Investigations. The following excerpt, which I draw from the Crisis, clearly summarizes the meaning of the criticism of the kind of naturalism which he imputes to Brentano: “Unfortunately, in the most essential matters he [Brentano] remained bound to the prejudices of the naturalistic tradition; these prejudices have not yet been overcome if the data of the soul, rather than being understood as sensible (whether of outer or inner "sense"), are [simply] understood as data having the remarkable character of intentionality; in other words, if dualism, psychophysical causality, is still accepted as valid. This also applies to his idea of a descriptive natural science, as is shown by [his conception of their] parallel procedure—setting the task of classifying and descriptively analyzing psychic phenomena completely in the spirit of the old traditional interpretation of the relation between descriptive and explanatory natural sciences”. (Hua VI, 236-237/234)
psychical life, i.e. intentionality. (Hua IX, § 4, 47-49) Husserl assigns to psychology the dual function of reforming empirical psychology and of serving as a preliminary stage (Vorstufe) to transcendental phenomenology.

But the main question raised by this passage of the Postscript is in what sense intentional psychology is implicit in transcendental phenomenology. This passage suggests that psychology, as a propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy, is an integral part of phenomenology and it is in this sense that it constitutes an unavoidable step to transcendent philosophy. This is what seems to confirm Husserl at the beginning of his Amsterdam lectures when he says that phenomenology has a dual identity and a twofold meaning:

In the further course of its development it [the phenomenological] presents us with a double sense of its meaning: on the one hand, as psychological phenomenology, which is to serve as the radical science fundamental to psychology; on the other hand, as transcendental phenomenology, which for its part has in connection with philosophy the great function of First Philosophy; that is, of being the philosophical science of the sources from which philosophy springs. (Hua IX, 303/214)

In other words, the duality of phenomenology and of psychology is not based, as Husserl suggested in Ideas I, on an ontological criterion, but it rests on a semantic criterion (double meaning of phenomenology) and an epistemic criterion (dual mode of apprehension). Husserl further suggests that there is a thematic, if not an ontological identity, between intentional psychology and transcendental philosophy, but a dualism with respect to their respective functions within transcendental phenomenology. Husserl seeks to reconcile this aspect of his phenomenology, which operates on the ground of common sense and whose function, as required by the indirect pathway to the reduction, is to serve as a Vorstufe to transcendental philosophy, with the other face of transcendental phenomenology being what Husserl defines as first philosophy (or a theory of science) and whose task is to provide phenomenology with its ultimate justification. (Hua V, 192) Indeed, it appears that psychology, like any other regional science, is no longer, during the last period of Freiburg, entirely divorced from transcendental phenomenology. Husserl thus seems to recognize with Stumpf that psychology is implicit in and inseparable from transcendental phe-
nomenology when he tries to account for the relationship between these two branches of transcendental phenomenology by using the idea of parallelism. Indeed, Husserl speaks of an overlapping (Deckung) of phenomenological psychology with transcendental phenomenology (Hua IX, 82; Hua VI, § 72, Hua I, 71/76-7), arguing that the content of one overlaps or coincides with that of the other. It follows from this remarkable parallelism, says Husserl, that “to every eidetic, as well as to every empirical, constatation on the one side, a parallel must correspond on the other side. (Hua V, 190/414) We now see that this duality of meaning within transcendental phenomenology and the idea that psychology is implicitly contained in the latter is based on the notion of parallelism, which in turn justifies, on the one hand, the results of the intentional analysis at the level of the natural attitude as a prerequisite for transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the idea that intentional psychology constitutes a propaedeutic to the latter.

This parallelism within phenomenology raises two problems that are at the heart of Husserl’s philosophical concerns during the Freiburg period. The first concerns the specter of psychologism while the second relates to the meaning and justification of the philosophico-transcendental reduction. The form of psychologism at stake during this period differs from the logical psychologism in the Logical Investigations, in that transcendental psychologism rests on the outright reduction of phenomenology to a mere descriptive psychology of consciousness. Hence the name of transcendental psychologism (Hua XVII, 340) which ignores, as Husserl explained in his Cartesian Meditations, the philosophical implications of this simple nuance that distinguishes these two parallel lives of phenomenology.

To be sure, pure psychology of consciousness is a precise parallel to transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Nevertheless the two must at first be kept strictly separate, since failure to distinguish them, which is characteristic of transcendental psychologism, makes a genuine philosophy impossible. We have here one of those seemingly trivial nuances that make a decisive difference between right and wrong paths of philosophy. […] Accordingly the difference between the sense of a psychological, and that of a transcendental phenomenological exploration of consciousness is immeasurably profound, though the contents to be described on the one hand and on the other can correspond. (Hua I, 76-7/32; see Hua V, 192)
That is because, to make use of the Husserlian jargon, this psychology, to be pure, remains at the level of the doxa and conveys therefore many beliefs that can only be justified at another level of analysis borne by transcendental phenomenology. The transition from psychology to transcendental phenomenology is made possible through this methodological artifice that Husserl calls the transcendental reduction, which occurs specifically as a change of attitude and which “withdraws the whole foundation for the natural attitude and at the same time all the validities constituting this foundation”. (Hua VIII, 200) The last justification that Husserl is searching for with his transcendental philosophy is ultimately this fundamental belief in an external world which underlies the Urdoxa and which, by this change of attitude, acquires its transcendental value:

In other words: Instead of positing a world in advance, this pregiven world, and then only asking how this self-evidently existing world is to be determined truly, this world is instead treated as noema. (Hua IX, 328/235)

The question is how a simple change of attitude that accompanies the phenomenological reduction, regardless of whether it makes use of the direct or indirect pathway, may confer to this mere “nuance” such a significant philosophical value because, ultimately, Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is based on a change of attitude that confers to it its “transcendental meaning”. For, Husserl argues, “what at first seems so odd, i.e., attending to the nuance, the nuance that conducts one from a pure inner psychology to transcendental phenomenology, actually is what decides between the being or non-being of a philosophy”. (Hua V, 192/415) Husserl relies on the good faith of philosophers to grasp the meaning and the philosophical implications of this “phenomenological conversion” and the Selbstdesinnung made possible by the transcendental reduction.

6 Final remarks
It stands out clearly that Husserl’s phenomenology during the Freiburg period anticipates several of Stumpf’s objections to the phenomenology of Ideas I and thus confirms Stumpf’s diagnosis in Erkenntnislehre. It could also be shown that several lectures and working manuscripts written during this period, including Experience and
Judgment, correct the impression left by § 85 of Ideas I regarding the conception of primary contents. For Husserl provides an analysis of sensory experience and of what he calls passive syntheses that is closer to the position he advocated during the Halle period, and therefore to that of Stumpf, than that he suggests in the first book of Ideas. (see D. Fisette, 2014) It also appears that the parallelism that the later Husserl establishes between psychology and transcendental phenomenology confirms an important argument in Stumpf’s Erkenntnislehre, namely that phenomenology and psychology are identical and inseparable because, as Husserl pointed out in his Amsterdam lectures, they are two faces of the same coin. But even if these modifications partly confirm Stumpf’s diagnosis, the form of parallelism advocated by the last Husserl does not escape the criticism that Stumpf directed toward parallelism everywhere in his work. Because, unlike Brentano and Husserl, for example, but in agreement with Lotze, Stumpf advocates a form of interactionism which, according to him, has the advantage of being more consistent with his critical realism and his pantheistic worldview. In his treatise on Spinoza, Stumpf’s criticism of parallelism is of the same kind as his later criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e. that it inevitably leads either to a form of phenomenalism à la Mach or to Schelling’s natural philosophy, and in both cases, to solipsism and idealism. This warning is directed a fortiori at Husserl’s noetico-noematical correlations and his parallelism between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology:

If the variations of acts were always parallel to those of their contents, then we should ask ourselves what justifies, in fact, this distinction, and if the so-called psychical world could not be described by using the concepts and expressions [used to describe] the physical world, and vice versa; this is what actually want, in their own way, the pure phenomenalist and sensualist psychology, as well as the speculative philosophy of nature. (Stumpf, 1919a, 36-37)

Stumpf believes that we can avoid the pitfalls of parallelism by advocating a form of interactionism, based on a form of critical realism, which postulates the existence of an external world independent of experience, and in which acts and sensory contents (or mental functions and phenomena) can vary independently from one another, i.e. that a psychical function can vary without any variation in the corresponding phenomenon, and vice versa. (Stumpf 1906a, 15)
Now, if one takes into consideration Stumpf’s many objections to Husserl, the question arises as to whether it is justified, in these circumstances, to regard in Husserl’s phenomenology a form of extension of Brentano’s initial philosophical program despite Husserl’s own account that seems to prove the contrary. Stumpf undoubtedly knew Husserl’s memoirs on Brentano (“Reminiscences of Franz Brentano”) in which, while acknowledging his debt to Brentano, he recalled that his own conception of philosophy had departed significantly from the teachings of the master both in regard to the method or the philosophy of history, and also with respect to descriptive psychology and Kantianism in general. If, however, Stumpf believes that Husserl's phenomenology follows in the footsteps of Brentano (Stumpf, 1920, 60), it is because he conceives of Brentano’s program broadly enough as to include philosophers like Meinong, Twardowski and himself who also significantly deviated from the teaching of Brentano. Stumpf believes that some of these philosophers tend to overestimate their originality with respect to the philosophy of Brentano whereas Husserl, according to Stumpf, “does not underestimate the power and richness of the seed propagated by his master”. (Stumpf, 1919a, 219) It is in this broad sense that Stumpf, in his autobiography, speaks of the kinship between the students of Brentano:

Between the students of Brentano, there are naturally many ties of kinship due to a common starting point, and some other relations that are attributable to the need felt by those who adopted the same orientation, to change, pursue, and complement the doctrine. (Stumpf, 1924, 28)

We have seen that in his commentary on Husserl in *Erkenntnislehre*, Stumpf has identified several of these relations by focusing on the field of mental phenomena, intentionality, and ontology, but it could be shown that these relations also extend to ethics, value theory, philosophy of language and to all human sciences. History has mainly emphasized the contribution of these philosophers to the theme of intentionality, which has always been the central theme of Husserl’s phenomenology, and in this respect, his debt to Brentano cannot be underestimated.
Lieber Freund,

Ich war auf Deine Mitteilung hier bei Elster und erfuhr, dass noch nichts geschehen ist, dass aber demnächst die Aufforderung zu Vorschlägen an die Facultät ergehen soll.


Dass Ihr auch einen durchaus verlässigen und umgänglichen Kollegen an Husserl haben würden, kann ich verbürgen.

Dich bestimmten empfehlenden Worte das Urteil der dortigen Fachmänner vorzugreifen.


Herzlicher Gruß, auch an Deine verehrte Frau von Deinem alten

C. Stumpf

Wenn Du Willhausen siehst, bitte ich, ihn auch zu grüßen, ich wollte noch zu ihm, fand aber die Zeit nicht mehr.

References


A Phenomenology without Phenomena?


