Introduction: The Connection between Politics and Teleology in Kant

Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman and Tatiana Patrone

Kant develops his political philosophy in the context of a teleological conception of both nature and human history. For Kant, political thought must be undertaken in the context of a progressive historical view of humanity’s place in nature. For this reason Kant would strongly agree with John Rawls’s claim that one of the key roles that political philosophy plays in a society’s political culture is that of ‘probing the limits of practicable political possibility. In this role, we view political philosophy as realistically utopian’ (Rawls 2007, pp. 10-11). The fact that political philosophy has this public role helps to explain the close links that exist between politics and teleology in Kant’s work. Teleology is the study of ends and of the purposiveness of both nature and history. One of the key roles of political philosophy is, for Kant, to probe what politics and human societies more generally can, will and should become in the context of the historically developing and purposive natural systems of which humans are part. Politics must be understood in its natural and historical context, but nature (especially human nature) and history must in turn be understood from a progressive political perspective. For Kant, the historical outcome of this purposive natural system, the end of history, is the full development of humanity’s predispositions for the use of reason within a moral and just society.

As well as these close conceptual links between history, politics and teleology in Kant’s writings, there also exists close textual links. Indeed, many of Kant’s insights into political philosophy are developed in his writings on history, anthropology, natural teleology, and practical philosophy (broadly construed). Apart from the ‘Doctrine of Right’, these insights span a wide range of Kant’s critical works that are not exclusively or even explicitly
political, works such as *Idea toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, *Critique of Judgment, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, and *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Indeed, the fact that much of what Kant has to say about politics is contained in his works on history is itself significant: his philosophy of history is infused with practical vocabulary and is charged with normativity, and his politics is nested within an understanding of history as naturally progressing. This poses the dual challenge of reconciling Kant’s normative political theory with both his *a priori* moral philosophy and his teleological philosophy of history.

However, interpreting Kant’s political theory teleologically raises particular challenges. This is because teleological approaches are often seen by the contemporary sciences as based on an out-dated and pre-Darwinian mode of thinking which conceives of nature as a purposive system designed by God. If teleology is out-dated more generally, then isn’t this a problem for Kant’s political philosophy? But as Allen Wood argues, Kant does not claim that we are ‘entitled to ascribe the purposiveness we find in nature to any *intention*, for example God’s, which is supposed to produce the objects according to his representation of them’ (Wood 1999, p. 218). Rather, Kant argues that understanding nature teleologically in terms of ends or purposes, rather than merely mechanically in terms of causes and effects, is based on a ‘regulative’ (and not a ‘constitutive’) principle which helps us ‘to achieve a complete and systematic knowledge of nature as a whole’ (Altman 2011, p. 46). Understanding nature from a teleological perspective is, for Kant, no more than a ‘regulative’ principle to be used as the ‘as the basis for research’ (KU 5:387).

However, even if we accept for the sake of the argument that, post-Darwin, the need for teleological regulative principles ‘as the basis for research’ (KU 5:387) in the biological
and natural sciences is questionable, this wouldn’t, as Wood argues, immediately discredit the application of teleological regulative principles to history and politics (Wood 1999, p. 222). This is because the interpretation of, and meaning we ascribe to, both historical events and future political possibilities cannot be reduced to simplistic biological explanations, but must take into account the ends, goals and self-interpretations of political actors and communities. Indeed, if political philosophy is to fulfil its public role of probing ‘the limits of practicable political possibility’ (Rawls 2007, pp. 10), then it needs to investigate teleologically the ends and purposes of political communities in their historical and natural contexts. Such an investigation raises three broader questions: 1) What are the political ends that we should be working towards as a political community? 2) What are the appropriate means that we should, or nature will, employ towards those ends? And 3) how can we situate the pursuit of those ends and means within our natural and historical context?

Within Kant’s corpus the common conceptual thread between these three questions can be expressed in terms of teleology. This allows us to understand teleology in terms of several of its meanings. First, taking teleology in its colloquial sense of having to do with ends or functions, we can cast a broad net for an inquiry into the ‘end of politics’. Of relevance to us here are Kant’s arguments concerning the function and purpose of a civil state, the demands of justice and morality, and the required shape of international political structures. This immediately leads to our second question concerning the appropriate means for bringing about these ends. Kant is well-known for rejecting crude means-ends (or cost-benefit) analysis when it comes to normative matters. For Kant, the assessment of means to ends is not to be done primarily in terms of efficiency (although this may be of secondary importance), but in terms of moral permissibility or compatibility with the demands of justice or right. This brings us to a second sense of teleology which Rawls (1999, pp. 21-26)
employs when he distinguishes between ‘teleological theories’, which define the right in terms of the good, and ‘deontological theories’, which do not define the good independently of the right. Kant’s theories of justice and morality are clearly deontological and not teleological theories in this sense, since for Kant the rightness or morality of the means is relevant to the goodness of the ends. However, Kant also cautions that even the use of permissible means to achieve required political ends should not be undertaken recklessly or prematurely. The ‘moral politician’ should not ignore ‘political prudence’ (ZeF, 8:372-73). This leads to the third set of questions concerning the historical, social and natural context within which political ends and means are to be interpreted and pursued and, in particular, whether or not history and nature are to be understood as conducive to the achievement of political and moral ends. This is the third sense of teleology – teleology as purposiveness – which is expressed in Kant’s view that nature as a whole is essentially progressive. Kant believes that there is a ‘hidden mechanism of nature’ (IaG, 8:29) that leads humankind toward establishing a political state. Kant also argues that reason has its own natural use and develops to fulfil its unique purpose. Finally, Kant argues that to claim that nature does not have a purpose for humankind is to contradict a ‘teleological theory of nature’ (IaG, 8:18).

As such there are very good reasons – both exegetical and philosophical – to explore the connection between Kant’s teleology and his politics. But exploring these connections also has significant contemporary relevance. In his A Theory of Justice Rawls says that his conception of justice ‘generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant’ (Rawls 1999, p. 10). This conception proved to be so influential that only three years after its publication in 1971, Robert Nozick was able to say that ‘political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not’ (Nozick 1974, p. 183). While the revival of the social
contract theory is important in its own right, Rawls’s concern with justice and the ‘primacy of the right over the good’ can be traced back to Kant’s deontology.

But Rawls is careful to say that in its ‘mode of presentation’ his own liberal political doctrine differs from Kant’s doctrine (Rawls 1993, p. 78). Kant’s political thought is, according to Rawls, a ‘comprehensive’ liberalism since it relies on what Rawls considers to be controversial metaphysical, teleological or axiological claims. In contrast, Rawls argues that a theory of justice fit for modern pluralistic societies needs to be a ‘political liberalism’. That is, a non-comprehensive view that does not appeal publically to controversial metaphysical, teleological or axiological claims that are not accepted by all members of a society. However, Rawls’s non-comprehensive approach has been widely criticised for not allowing citizens to publically engage political issues properly and fully (e.g., see Sandel 1998 and 2005, Canovan 1998). While such critics do not always seek to revive metaphysical approaches to politics, they do argue that the language of a purely formal political theory is conceptually poor and that a theory of justice needs to be rooted more broadly in the concepts of human nature, human dignity, human nations, human history, and human relations both to one another and to the non-human world. A focus on teleology helps to bring all of these issues to the foreground. Therefore exploring the links between politics and teleology in Kant’s work will help us to learn from Kant in ways that should be welcomed by contemporary theorists who are dissatisfied with the conceptual limitations of political liberalism.

Kant’s approach, however, raises questions of its own. Can a Kantian theory of politics and justice be justified in the context of diverse, pluralistic modern societies in which
both teleological and universal axiological claims are seen as lacking in legitimacy? If Kant’s teleological approach to nature is seen as questionable, can Kant’s use of teleology in the context of politics and history be separated from his teleological approach to nature more generally? Can Kant’s political philosophy deal with widespread scepticism about an end of history? Is Kant’s progressive view of history still plausible given subsequent historical events, such as the many wars and genocides of the twentieth century and widespread environmental degradation? These and other important questions deserve further investigation.

**Overview of the Volume**

Kant’s political works are written in dialogue with the natural right (or natural law) tradition. Although this tradition is itself quite diverse, following Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) it acquired a set of features that provided the context for Kant’s own political thought. But while Kant was influenced by the natural law tradition, he significantly departed from it by developing a new type of political doctrine which is decidedly more normative (and deontological) than metaphysical. In his contribution to this volume, ‘Natural Right in Perpetual Peace’, Howard Williams situates Kant’s arguments in *Toward Perpetual Peace* within the context of the natural right tradition. This tradition, Williams argues, was the dominant approach to political theory in Kant’s day, and it is therefore important to question to what degree Kant embraces it in his mature writings. According to Williams, Kant is ambivalent on this issue: while he respects the tradition on both historical and philosophical grounds, he reinterprets it to fit his own critical doctrine. The key assumption of the natural right tradition that Kant rejects is the assumption of state egoism, according to which
international politics is essentially a global state of nature. Contrary to this assumption, Kant argues that states ought to be considered as moral persons who have obligations to one another that transcend merely prudential concerns. As a normative account, his view reinterprets the notion of nature. Williams shows that while in *Toward Perpetual Peace* Kant argues that ‘nature works with the human species’, Kant’s view is different from his predecessors. First, while his predecessors held that nature and humanity work hand-in-hand for human betterment, Kant’s view of nature is more ‘conflictual’. Nature works by ‘means of discord between human beings [and] even against their will’. Second, although ‘Kant does not want to abandon’ entirely this ‘teleological view [of nature]’, he takes the claim that nature ‘wills’ to aid human progress to be ‘theoretically uncertain’ and to be held only on practical grounds. Williams’s contribution to the volume sets the parameters for the discussions that follow. It introduces the tension between normativity and teleology in Kant’s corpus; it highlights the important role that nature and history play in Kant’s political works; and by comparing Kant to the early modern tradition, it underscores the normative aspect of Kant’s political theory, including the moral limits of political action.

Reading Kant’s political theory in a normative vein is the approach taken up by Paul Formosa in his paper – ‘The Ends of Politics: Kant on Sovereignty, Civil Disobedience, and Cosmopolitanism’. Formosa reconstructs Kant’s political theory (both domestic and international) in normative terms by focusing on the central role that the concept of unjustified coercion plays in Kant’s practical philosophy. The power to coerce is, for Kant, intimately interconnected with his account of political sovereignty, since only the sovereign can justifiably coerce others unconditionally. But isn’t Kant’s account of sovereignty and the associated power to coerce others unconditionally incompatible with his strong emphasis on the dignity and autonomy of all rational persons? Despite this appearance of internal tension,
Formosa argues that Kant consistently defends an account of absolutist popular sovereignty which is consistent with his core normative commitments. To show this Formosa explores the normative basis of sovereignty in Kant’s work, the case for civil disobedience when rulers do not represent the people’s general will, and the conditions for cosmopolitan peace in relation to state sovereignty. Formosa explores these issues through the prism of political teleology by asking: What are the political ends towards which we should work at the domestic and international levels and what are the legitimate means by which we should pursue those ends? The end for Kant towards which we should work, but only through gradual, peaceful and consensual means, is a world constitutional republic which alone could guarantee the highest political good, perpetual peace, and conclusively secure the rights of all humans. Formosa’s analysis helps us to see how the ethical dimension of Kant’s corpus (e.g., his claims concerning the ‘vocation and end of humanity’ and the obligation to leave the domestic and international ‘state of nature’) can be translated into a Rawlsian political concern for allowing a diversity of people and peoples to flourish in accordance with their own conceptions of a good life.

Kant’s views concerning the ends of politics are explicitly linked with his account of the final end of history in Pauline Kleingeld’s paper, ‘The Development of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism’. Kleingeld starts with an examination of Kant’s views on what constitutes a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ as described in his 1784 essay, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective. In that essay Kant argues that a global state-like federation of states is needed to achieve the final end of human history, the complete development of humanity’s predispositions for the use of reason. However, Kleingeld notes that in his texts on cosmopolitanism from the mid to late 1790s, such as Toward Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant changes his mind on a number of important points from the
view he endorses in his 1784 essay, even though he remains committed to the same final end of human history. In particular, Kant changes his view on the nature of the international federation, drops his earlier defence of a racial hierarchy, develops the category of cosmopolitan right, becomes critical of the exploitative colonialist practices of Europeans and develops a positive assessment of the role of international trade in the process towards peace. Kleingeld’s chapter therefore adds considerable nuance and depth to our understanding of Kant’s changing views about the ends of politics.

The next paper further explores the relationship between political means and ends. But instead of focusing on the ends of politics, Allen Wood’s primary focus in his paper, ‘Kant’s Principles of Publicity’, is on the means that politicians may employ in the pursuit of even ‘noble’ and justified ends. Wood does this by examining in detail the Appendix to Toward Perpetual Peace where Kant gives his fullest treatment of the relationship between morals and politics and where he introduces his two principles of publicity. As Wood shows, while politicians should not irresponsibly ignore prudence in the pursuit of even legitimate ends, they are obligated to pursue prudence within the bounds of principles of right (Recht). This ensures and protects a political condition in which everyone’s external freedom is compatible with the equal freedom of others. Kant’s two principles of publicity, one negative and one positive, provide a practical way for politicians and the wider public to assess whether a proposed political maxim or policy can (or cannot) conform to principles of right. Wood demonstrates the application of these two principles in practice by considering Kant’s denial of the right of revolution and his insistence on truthfulness in politics. This provides an excellent illustration of the important limitations that Kant places on the means that can be employed in the pursuit of political ends, and also emphasises the central role that publicity and public reasoning play in Kant’s political theory.
The importance of publicity and public reason as a motor for political progress is further interrogated in Susan Meld Shell’s paper, ‘Public Reason and Kantian Civic Education, or: are the humanities “dispensable” and if not, why not?’ Shell notes the prominent role that is given to a very narrow understanding of ‘public reason’ by contemporary defenders of political liberalism such as Rawls. Shell contrasts this with Kant’s expansive focus on civic discourse more generally, and the special civilising role that the humanities have in underwriting a civic discourse that is animated by a liberal spirit. The humanities have this role since they involve a cultivation of the ‘forces of the mind’ that allow us to become ‘more human’. However, Shell argues that Kant’s views about the nature and form of the humanities underwent significant development, from an early singular focus on the ancient Greek and Roman ‘classics’, to a broader focus that also incorporates the study of modern national languages and poetries. This allows the humanities to fulfil their indispensable role in the liberal state of promoting a ‘common civic language’ that allows for ‘reciprocal [civic] communication’ between the diverse citizens of modern states. Shell’s paper therefore provides a compelling analysis of the civilising role that the study of the humanities have to play in creating the sort of civic discourse that is needed to underwrite political stability and progress in liberal states. A broad liberal or humanistic education of all citizens is thus needed to help to fully realise the final end of history.

Kant’s understanding of citizenship is further examined in Sarah Holtman’s contribution to the volume. Holtman argues for an enriched reading of Kant’s political thought. Whereas some recent interpreters of Kant, such as Arthur Ripstein (2009), narrowly focus on concepts such as ‘action’, ‘external freedom’ and ‘coercion’, Holtman invites us to consider some further implications of Kant’s doctrine of right that go beyond justice’s
prohibition on injury. She argues that implicit in Kant’s political theory are accounts of civic attitudes toward the state and civic fellowship between citizens, and although Kant does not spell out these accounts fully, both are ‘in the spirit of his political theory carefully interpreted’. The interpretation that Holtman defends offers a reading of Kant’s account of juridical right (and its concern with our ‘external actions’ and not our maxims) that makes conceptual room for attitudes that citizens are to have both toward one another and toward their joint task of political self-legislation. According to Holtman, Kant’s notion of a ‘united will’ and its legislative sovereignty implies that citizens must view each other as partners in legislation and this in turns requires ‘both an active sense of shared community and a capacity to appreciate what is needed to support and realize civic agency’. Furthermore, Holtman argues that in order to understand what is required to form such a ‘shared community’ it is worth relating Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’ to his later ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. This is because the concept of civic unity that Holtman aims to spell out is closely related to the concept of friendship developed by Kant in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. For Kant, friendship rests on ‘mutual [moral] love’ and ‘mutual respect [for each other as persons]’ (MS, 6:471), which – as attitudes – are precisely what a shared political community requires of its citizens.

Tatiana Patrone considers the relation between Kant’s teleological claims concerning progress in human history and his normative arguments in the ‘Doctrine of Right’. Patrone argues that treating teleological claims concerning history in a way that can be helpful for grounding Kant’s practical project goes contrary to a coherent reading of his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective. Her main argument is that in his Idea essay, Kant explicitly says that nature’s ‘goal’ with respect to humankind – establishing a just civil society – is brought about in spite of (rather than due to) human efforts. Kant argues that there is a ‘mechanism’ at work in nature that is responsible for this progress, and this goal-
directed mechanism is entirely separate from the goals that humans set for themselves. Thus, even if we wanted to aid nature in bringing about its final end, it would be plainly impossible for us to decide which course of action would be most effective in bringing about this end. Therefore, teleological claims about human history cannot ground Kant’s claims concerning our specific political obligations.

Whereas Patrone’s contribution mainly focuses on Kant’s normative political philosophy taken domestically, Luigi Caranti considers Kant’s political philosophy in its global or international application. Specifically, Caranti looks at one of the most controversial tenets of Kant’s philosophy – the claim that nature guarantees the eventual achievement of perpetual peace among nations. Contrary to interpretations that downplay the significance of this claim and that tend to see Kant’s account of progress in human history as a residual of his pre-critical thought, Caranti defends the ‘guarantee thesis’ with respect to perpetual peace. Defending Kant’s ‘guarantee thesis’ from the main objections to it developed by Paul Guyer (2006) and Bernd Ludwig (2006), Caranti argues that Kant’s account of humanity’s progress toward perpetual peace is not ‘dogmatic’. Instead of being a poorly justified metaphysical assumption, Kant’s account rests on ‘very general and uncontroversial facts about the world’. Furthermore, Kant’s empirical argument for the conclusion that perpetual peace is ‘guaranteed’ is consistent with his moral theory and its claim that bringing about perpetual peace is our duty. The fact that in all likelihood we are gradually approximating a rightful condition through the ‘mechanism of nature’ does not absolve us from the duty to hasten this event and to remove the obstacles to it.

Thomas Fiegle argues for a similar conclusion: according to Fiegle, Kant’s teleological concepts (such as the ‘purposiveness of nature’) are merely methodological
devices and not metaphysical principles. These methodological devices are, for Kant, crucial for developing empirically grounded and yet philosophically charged sciences of history and politics. Thus, Kant is trying to develop empirically informed history and empirically sound political science in contrast to, on the one hand, merely speculative philosophical enterprises and, on the other hand, merely empirical inquiries that reduce humans to their animality. Importantly enough, while claiming that both Kant’s approach to history and his political methodology make use of teleological assumptions, Fiegle further argues that it is crucial to see that Kant’s ‘reflection on politics is part of the reflection on history – and not vice versa’. In other words, for Fiegle it is philosophy of history that informs Kant’s politics, rather than politics that informs his philosophy of history.

In contrast to Fiegle, Sharon Anderson-Gold argues that it is Kant’s politics that importantly shapes his philosophy of history. Thus in her paper, ‘The Political Foundations of Prophetic History’, Anderson-Gold brings both politics and history together and yet sees politics as playing the primary role. Anderson-Gold starts by looking into Kant’s claim that in order to discern a pattern of progression in history it is important to adopt a certain perspective or ‘point of view’. Choosing this point of view, she argues, cannot itself be an empirical matter. Instead, the choice has to be based on normative argument. To see why this is we can turn to Kant’s use, in his philosophy of history, of the example of the revolution in France as a sign of progress that attests to the political and ethical development of humankind towards a cosmopolitan condition. According to Anderson-Gold, to understand Kant correctly we need to see that the ‘sign’ of progress is not the reformation of the political institutions in France. Rather, it is the public sympathy that the revolution occasioned. This public attitude of sympathy attests to the fact that people value moral ideals and are ready for self-governance. However, such an analysis of empirical history, Anderson-Gold claims, is
possible only from within a particular normative point of view. Importantly, our very understanding of history as being in fact progressive requires us to make this judgment from a particular perspective, and this perspective itself is not given to us empirically but is rather developed out of what we take progress to be in the first place.

Fotini Vaki’s contribution continues this inquiry into the relationship between history and politics in Kant’s work. Vaki explores the relationship between Kant’s philosophy of history (broadly construed) and his normative political theory. While she too argues that the two are ‘interwoven’, her work explicitly relates Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective* to his later account of nature as a teleological system in the *Critique of Judgment* where Kant concludes with a discussion of teleology in politics. Vaki argues that Kant’s concept of the ‘hidden plan of nature’ in his account of history is best understood in terms of his argument in §§82-4 of the third *Critique* for a teleological politics. Vaki starts with the concept of nature’s ‘ultimate end [letzter Zweck]’, i.e., the ‘culture of man’ in the third *Critique*, and argues that the culture of skill is the mechanism underlying nature’s ‘cunning’ in the *Idea* essay. This analysis forces us to ask whether Kant’s understanding of nature (and of history) as a developing process that is propelled by men’s ‘culture of skill’ is essentially a version of the Enlightenment’s ‘heterogeneity of ends’ theory, according to which moral progress in history is achieved through non-moral actions. Against such a claim Vaki argues that it is important to turn to the *Critique of Judgment* once again, for in it we see the distinction between nature’s ultimate end (which is the ‘culture of man’) and nature’s ‘final end [Endzweck]’ (which is of *a distinct moral character*). Humans are the final end of nature insofar as they are considered as *noumena*, i.e., from the moral point of view, but their culture bespeaks only their *phenomenal* development towards their...
ultimate end, and so their political but not their moral telos. Vaki concludes that the republican state is merely instrumental to the further moral development of humankind.

Avery Goldman’s paper, ‘The Kantian Principle of Purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit]: from the beautiful to the biological and finally to the political in the Critique of Judgment’, returns to these suggestive concluding sections of the Critique of Judgment, emphasized by Vaki, concerning political teleology and investigates their place within the book as a whole. A book that begins with a discussion of the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful, proceeds to a discussion of teleological natural science, and concludes with a brief foray into the realm of human affairs is not easily construed. Following the lead of Kant’s originally unpublished introduction to the book, where he explains that the critique of taste that follows offers not ‘the improvement or confirmation of taste’ but the filling of a ‘gap [Lücke]’ in the system of our cognitive faculties, Goldman interprets the discussions that follow, those concerning aesthetics, natural science and finally politics, as modes of the newly introduced faculty of the reflective power of judgment. Holding these diverse inquiries together is their dependence on the regulative principle of the ‘purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit]’ of nature. Such a principle offers the promise of success for all reflective attempts to distinguish a universal from a group of particulars. Kant explains that without it we would be committed to neither our judgments of beauty nor our teleological claims concerning nature and politics, and yet the role that such a telos plays in each of these inquiries is distinct. By investigating such varied uses of the principle of ‘purposiveness’, Goldman is able to explain not merely the connection between aesthetics and teleology, the topics of the two halves of the book, but also how the turn to the political in an appendix at the end of the book is no mere aside. Rather, what such a political conclusion to a book about aesthetics and natural science shows is the priority of place that human political institutions hold within the variety of our
teleological inquiries, governed as they are by our moral natures as our ‘ultimate end [letzter Zweck]’.

In his contribution – ‘Perfected Humanity: Nature’s Final End and the End in Itself’ – Richard Dean further investigates the connection between Kantian politics and morals. Dean examines Kant’s claim that humanity’s end is not merely political, but also moral: we are to strive for moral perfection and it is our duty to promote this end. But, in addition to being a duty, the progress toward perfection is a ‘pattern’ that, Kant claims, can be observed in history. This pattern, he holds, is unintended in that it cannot be attributed to the efforts that human kind take to bring about this end of perfection. Thus, viewed from the standpoint of theoretical reason, humanity’s moral progress looks like the result of unintended forces, but viewed from the standpoint of practical reason, it looks like an end that we must each contribute to by developing our own moral character. And yet, Dean argues, Kant says little about our duty to ‘contribute where we can’ to the ‘rational and moral progress’ of humanity. This lacuna threatens to destroy the connection between Kant’s teleological politics and his moral philosophy, for why should we who strive to live morally necessarily be conceived of as pursuing at the same time the end of humanity? Dean’s ingenious answer is to find our commitment to the ‘rational and moral progress’ of others in the ‘humanity’ (die Menschheit) formulation of the categorical imperative, taken not as a list of qualities that should be developed but as a rational idea. In this way Dean argues that rather than opposing morality and teleological politics, what can be seen is that ‘nature’s end and the end required by morality are one and the same’.

Where Dean’s paper looks to locate Kant’s political impulse in his account of morality, Angelica Nuzzo, in her paper, ‘Kant’s Pure Ethics and the Problem of
“Application”, looks in the opposite direction for how it is that Kant returns from his pure ethics to the empirical realm. Nuzzo phrases her question in terms of the application of Kant’s ‘pure’ ethics to the realms of politics, history and anthropology. At stake is both the problem of the way in which pure morality is extended or, alternatively, transformed in its political, historical and anthropological ‘realization’, as well as the problem of the way in which these different practical spheres are themselves shaped by the principles of Kant’s moral philosophy. Nuzzo explains that the question of ‘application [Anwendung]’ in ethics concerns not the role of the categorical imperative, but instead an investigation of why it is that we often do not do what we know we ought to do, and thus is a question of ‘moral anthropology’. By this Nuzzo means an investigation into the subjective conditions that affect people’s ability to live according to the moral law, a question that Nuzzo argues is best addressed in Kant’s third Critique with its account of reflective judgment.

Conclusion

The contributions in the volume explore the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and a set of issue that belong broadly under the conceptual heading of teleology. The contributions to the volume cover a large set of primary sources. Expansive discussions are dedicated to virtually all of Kant’s political works: ‘Doctrine of Right’, Idea toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, ‘An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?’ (i.e., Part II of The Conflict of the Faculties), Toward Perpetual Peace, and Conjectural Beginning of Human History. These political works are also explicitly related to Kant’s third Critique, his moral philosophy in texts such as the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, as well as to his

Commented [P3]: Avery: I found this ending a little abrupt. Can you add in one more sentence that says something like: And Nuzzo concludes that…
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Thus, the contributions jointly cover a large part of Kant’s corpus.

Thematically, there are several main threads that run throughout these contributions. Of course, most articles explicitly discuss Kant’s central teleological concepts that pertain to his politics: the ‘purposiveness of nature’, ‘unsocial sociability’, ‘culture’, the ‘ultimate vocation of man’, progress in the history of humankind, and humankind as an ‘end of nature’. Several articles engage with the question of the relation between these concepts and Kant’s normative political arguments; of this set, some contributions argue that there is no or little conceptual links between Kant’s teleology and his politics, while others consider the two as fundamentally interconnected. On this last issue, however, there is a disagreement between the authors who judge teleological concepts to be primary and political ones secondary, and those who on the contrary argue that it is Kant’s politics that informs and shapes his views in the philosophy of history. A number of contributions engage with the question of the status of teleological principles in Kant’s political theory: some argue that teleological principles are mere ‘methodological devices’ that inform Kant’s philosophy of history and political thought, while some claim that teleological principles – since they cannot be action-guiding – have little to do with Kant’s normative arguments. Finally, many contributors bridge the gap between Kant’s political doctrine and his broader ethical theory, and they do this by highlighting Kant’s teleological commitments.

This volume, therefore, helps relate one of the fastest growing areas of the literature on Kant, namely exegetical and critical arguments on Kant’s political theory, to a relatively less explored part of his corpus, teleology. Since the latter is a concept that brings together a
set of issues that political theory inevitably touches upon but is not always explicitly related to it, this anthology will be especially helpful for those who are interested in situating political theory in the context of other social and historical sciences. The volume seeks to contribute to our understanding of Kant’s views on politics in relation to his views on history, progress, humankind, nationhood, and culture. Through a better understanding of Kant’s vision concerning these issues we will gain important new insights into the structure, and the contemporary practical implications, of a Kantian account of politics.

References


