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1 A Bit of History

It is still not widely known that shortly after their publication in 1900-01, and thanks to their early discovery by Johannes Daubert, Husserl’s *Logical Investigations (LI)* received a particularly enthusiastic reception among the students of Theodor Lipps in Munich. Through their discussion of Husserl’s work in the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*, an academic circle for psychology founded by Lipps, the Munich students were soon led to form their own phenomenological circle, trying at the same time to find a position liberated from what they recognized, thanks to Husserl, as Lipps’ psychologism, but also to contrast their own position with Husserl’s conception of phenomenology.

This position is interesting and important at least for two reasons: first of all, it is the first natural and direct descendant of the phenomenology developed in the *Logical Investigations*. Indeed, the Munich phenomenologists expanded Husserl’s analyses to vast domains of philosophy in general and ontology in particular: emotion theory, social ontology, action theory, aesthetics, the philosophy of perception, self-consciousness, intentionality. This expansion was made possible by the central role attributed by them to essences in phenomenological analysis. Correlatively, the position defended by the Munich phenomenologists also shows that the transcendental reduction is not a real part of phenomenological analysis, a fact that, if not forgotten, still remains highly debated today.²

Who were the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists? Since the first discussions of Husserl’s *LI* in the *Akademischer Verein*, many different orientations had come to be represented among the Munich phenomenologists. At the time of the “Munich Invasion of Göttingen”³ in 1905, at least two different groups must

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1 See, for instance, (Schuhmann 1977: 72).
2 I discuss this point in (Fréchette 2013).
3 See (Spiegelberg 1959: 157).
be distinguished: on the one hand, those who to a large extent remained relatively faithful to Lipps, such as August Gallinger, Aloys Fischer, Fritz Weinmann and Max Ettlinger.⁴ On the other hand, another group of philosophers from the Akademischer Verein was showing more than a mere interest in phenomenology already in 1905 and progressively abandoned most of the Lippsean conceptions after 1906. Among the members of this group were Theodor Conrad, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach and Moritz Geiger.⁵

Again, these two groups shouldn’t be confused with a third group, namely Husserl’s own students in Göttingen, who found their domain invaded by the Munich phenomenologists in the summer of 1905: among them, we find Wilhelm Schapp, Karl Neuhaus, Alfred von Sybel, Alexander Rosenblum, Dietrich Mahnke, Heinrich Hofmann, David Katz and Erich Heinrich.⁶ Remembering the encounter between the members of these three groups in the summer semester of 1905, Wilhelm Schapp sketches an interesting picture of the “Munich Invasion”:

One day, it must have been in 1907, the Munich people were there, the Munich invasion of Göttingen. I think it was a summer semester. They were Reinach, Conrad and the young Hildebrand. Geiger appeared occasionally. We used every opportunity, day and night, to engage in philosophical discussions with the Munichers. In our opinion, they were much ahead of us in every aspect. They did not have the devoutness that we had. Reinach blamed Husserl for his turn to the Marburg School, a turn that was already noticed in Munich. [...] We formed at that time a phenomenological association, which met every week and which was led for a while by Conrad. I remember that he tried to get more clarity about things by investigating the “meaning” of words, certainly in connection with the Munich investigations. Again and again, we were investigating word complexes, such as red wine, a wine being red,

⁴ On August Gallinger (1871-1959), see (Schorcht 1990: 134ff.); on Aloys Fischer (1880-1937), see (Kreitmair 1950); on Fritz Weinmann (1878-1905), see (Schuhmann 1973: 130); on Max Ettlinger (1877-1929), see (Smid 1982: 115).

⁵ Theodor Conrad (1881-1969) was one of the first of the Munich phenomenologists to go to Göttingen. He published very few articles. Among them, see (Conrad 1911), which was well received in the Munich circle. On Conrad, see (Scaramuzza 1998). Johannes Daubert (1877-1947) was definitely considered as the Husserl-man in Munich (see the letter of Otto Schultze to Aloys Fischer from 17 July 1903, quoted in [Leijenhorst & Steenbakker 2004: 291]). On Adolf Reinach, see (Mulligan 1987). On Geiger, see, among others, (Zeltner 1960). I leave aside here the case of Max Scheler, which would need a treatment of its own.

⁶ For recent works on Wilhelm Schapp (1884-1965), see (Joisten 2010). Karl Neuhaus was Husserl’s first doctoral student. He completed his degree in 1908. According to Theodor Conrad, he was the Leiter of the Philosophische Gesellschaft in Göttingen from 1910 to 1912, but very little is known about him. See (Avé-Lallemant & Schuhmann 1992). On David Katz, see (Spiegelberg 1972: 42-52). Dietrich Mahnke was an early follower of Husserl, but got his PhD only later in the twenties. On Mahnke’s later works, see (Biller 1987: 691-692). On von Sybel, Rosenblum, Hofmann and Heinrich, see (Schuhmann 1977).
the wine is red. We looked for the relationship between word and meaning, concept and object. Sometimes, a word was said about the Munich standpoint, about the way they focused on the Platonic doctrine of *metexein*, the doctrine of participation in concepts, about the way they boldly advanced the doctrine, in continuation of Husserl, that there is not only the “two” as ideal object, as Husserl taught at that time, but that there must be many, infinitely many twos.

The Munich people did not believe anymore in the sensation as constituent of perception and declared all such statements as constructions; they still believed in acts and psychology, those weren’t called into question. (Schapp 1959: 21)

Schapp underlines here three important aspects of Munich phenomenology: its specific manner of philosophical investigation, wherein the analysis of meaning, of what we *mean* (*meinen*) by an expression, is put at the forefront;\(^7\) its particu-

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\(^8\) Compare Schapp’s report with Daubert’s notes on phenomenological and critical investigation (*Phänomenologische und kritische Fragestellung*) from December 1905 in MS A I 1/34: ‘*in der phänomenologischen Fragestellung kehrt immer wieder die Frage: ‘Was meinen wir damit’ oder ‘Was meinen wir, wenn wir sagen’. …*” The importance of MS A I 1/34 was already shown by Smid (1982, 140). Besides his reflections on the topic in his published words, Reinach’s focus on the *Meinen* is also apparent in a letter to Conrad on 14 April 1904, quoted here in Schuhmann and Smith’s translation: “[t]he question: how does the child know that grown-up people ‘mean’ something by their words, is answered by Lipps thus: it sees how they point to something and simultaneously hears a complex of sound. [But] the problem was: how does the child come to understand an expression, and more specifically the expression of words? To this one surely cannot give an answer which involves appeal to another form of expression, to ‘pointing’. For then of course the question still remains: How does the child know that by moving the arms etc. something is meant?” See (Schuhmann & Smith 1987: 7). Another good example can be found in August
lar conception of ideal objects and, finally, its conception of perception, in which sensations are considered irrelevant to phenomenological analysis.

Kevin Mulligan has discussed the first aspect in numerous papers. In (Fréchette 2013), I deal with the third aspect of Munich phenomenology according to Schapp. In the present paper, I will try to shed some light on the second aspect pointed out by Schapp, namely the Munich-Göttingen conception of essences, laws of essence, and ideal objects. I will first start with a preliminary account of their conception of the synthetic a priori at the basis of their conception of essence (§2); I will then offer a first characterization of this conception, which I will label as metaphysical realism (§3), highlighting its key concept: foundation (§4). In the last four sections (§§5-8), I discuss different outcomes of this conception of essences: the nature of laws of essences (§5), different categories of essences (§6) and anumericity (§7). Since the accounts dealt with in the present paper are barely known, even to phenomenological circles, the aim of this paper is merely descriptive. The point here is to grasp the ‘essence’ of the Munich and Göttingen account of essences in phenomenology.

2 Synthetic A priori

Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact is often understood as an ancestor of the distinction between the necessary connections between meanings or concepts and the absence of such connection between the elements of the world. However, this is not exactly what Hume had in mind, when we look for instance at his account of the interrelations among our ideas of color:

> It is evident, that even different simple ideas may have similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; though their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. (Hume 1978: 675)

In other words, the truth of a proposition about the relations between our ideas of colors cannot be established on the basis of an analysis of ideas, since our ideas of

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9 Some of them are available in French in (Mulligan 2012).
colors are simple ideas and hence cannot be analyzed. Following Reinach’s reading of Hume, “no point of view is conceivable from which one could say that two colors and their dissimilarity contradict each other in the logical sense.” (Reinach 1911a/1976: 176) Such propositions, as Smith puts it, are seen by Hume as “reflecting objectively existing interrelations among the phenomena themselves.” (Smith 1986: 7) Hume does leave room for necessary truths that are not analytic, but contrary to Kant, these necessary truths which are not analytic are not exclusively propositions about our knowledge. Rather, they stand somewhere in between epistemological and ontological propositions.

This understanding of Hume’s synthetic a priori particularly championed by Adolf Reinach, who criticizes Kant for having erroneously taken Hume’s standpoint on the analyticity of mathematical judgments to be concerning Kant’s own concept of analyticity, is a central element in the Munich-Göttingen conception of the a priori. The root of this error, according to Reinach, was Kant’s assimilation of Hume’s “ideas” to his “concepts”, thereby missing the real sense of the a priori developed by Hume.

In other words, we know about relations of ideas without matter of facts. How does Reinach interpret this claim by Hume?

In our vocabulary, this means that he knows essential structures. He thereby knows what we found to be the basis of the a priori. (Reinach 1911a: 176)

What is the specific sense of the Humean synthetic a priori which Reinach tries to disclose? The main distinction which is made here by Reinach is between what he calls material and modal necessity. According to Kant, Hume inquired exclusively into modal necessity, while Reinach believes that Hume was interested solely in material necessity. Following his reading of Hume, Reinach means that when I feel heat and conclude that there must be fire, the inference I am making is not grounded on modal necessity, but on material necessity, that is on the necessary connection “of such a sort that heat always requires fire.” (1911a: 184). The material necessity characterizes the succession from fire to heat as causal and is a grounding relation. In other terms, the state of affairs that the oven is hot holds in virtue of the state of affairs that there is some fire in it. Following Hume and Reinach, the necessary connection involved here is determined exclusively by the essence of the terms of the connection exactly in the same sense as similarity between colors is determined by the essence of colors. But Kant missed that point:
According to Kant, Hume saw only two possibilities. Either the foundation of the causal judgment in pure reason, or the explanation of it from experience, i.e. from the mechanism of association and the “subjective necessity arising from it”, which is falsely taken to be objective. That for Hume there is a third possibility – the immediate grounding of necessity through experience – is overlooked by Kant and, from Kant’s standpoint, must be overlooked. (Reinach 1911a: 186)

The distinction between the so-called modal and material necessity and the concomitant focus made on the latter kind of necessity are inherited by Reinach from Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, where the concept of necessity relevant for Husserl is an “ideal or *a priori* necessity grounded in the essences of things.” (Husserl 1913: vol. II, 1: 240/2001: vol. 2: 1210)

What is the kind of necessity involved here and why doesn’t it have the epistemological implications of the Kantian synthetic *a priori*? As for the second question, the answer is relatively simple: Kant postulates an undeterminable X which is the ground on which pure reason identifies a judgment as synthetic *a priori*. A law such as “Every event has a cause” is a true synthetic *a priori* judgment in virtue of our ability to construct the world according to this law. Reflection on the conditions of possibility of our experiences furthermore gives us a way of identifying these true synthetic *a priori* judgments: for instance, it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which some events would fail to have a cause. Following that line, the question of the grounds for our true synthetic *a priori* judgments is transformed into a question on the conditions of possibility of our experiences.

The focus made by Reinach on material necessity is precisely going *against* Kant’s idea of grounding true synthetic *a priori* judgments in modal necessity. The distinction is central: while Kant thinks of necessity as a feature conditioning the structure of our experiences, Reinach and the Munich phenomenologists see necessity as grounded directly in the essences of things. The concept of necessity central to Husserl, Reinach and the Munich phenomenologists is sometimes called “metaphysical necessity” nowadays, and the strong distinction advocated today by Kit Fine between essence and modality clearly belongs to the early phenomenological tradition.

What does it mean for a conception of material (or metaphysical) necessity to be “grounded in the essence of things”? First, it means to identify the most basic relations concerning objects. In this respect, the Munich phenomenologists are continuing the tradition inaugurated by Brentano’s metaphysics: they identify these relations as the ones between the whole and its parts. Every object is a (real

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10 English translation modified.
or possible) part, i.e. there are (real or possible) wholes, which include it.¹¹ Such relations hold for any kind of object whatsoever: take for instance the blue color of that book on my desk: it doesn't exist without some extension or shape of which it is the color. In that sense, not only that specific shade of blue wouldn't exist without being the color of that specific book, but any color wouldn't exist without being extended. The relation here expressed is a relation of ontological necessitation between dependent species, but these relations between dependent species can hold as one-sided or mutual dependence relations. According to the Munich phenomenologists, we find many such relations not only in the field of perception (for example between color hue and brightness, or between a tone and its height, which are relations of mutual dependence), but also in the field of social institutions (every promise brings an obligation with it, which is a relation of one-sided dependence: you might have an obligation without promising anything, but you can't promise anything without being in the obligation of fulfilling your promise) and in many other fields. As a matter of fact, most, if not all, Munich phenomenologists and Husserl's Göttingen students acquainted with them conceived their contribution to phenomenology as investigations into the sphere of material necessity: this is the case for instance in the field of emotion theory with Scheler, Kolnai, Voigtländer, Geiger, in the field of aesthetics with Waldemar Conrad, Geiger, Schapp and Ingarden, in the field of social philosophy with Stein, Walther and Conrad-Martius; in psychology with Pfänder, Conrad and Beck, or in logic and ontology proper with Reinach, Pfänder, Héring, Ingarden and Spiegelberg.

Another important characteristic of the conception of the synthetic a priori defended by Munich phenomenologists is the specific status they give to the synthetic a priori. Between 1901 and 1908, Husserl still seemed hesitant as to whether the proposition judged or the state of affairs was to be regarded as the bearer of the truth and necessity. In 1906, he considered this question as a matter of perspective: from the perspective of judgment, equivalent propositions denote different states of affairs, but from an ontological perspective, taking states of affairs to be objective complexes which are independent from the acts, equivalent proposition do express the same state of affairs.¹² This ambivalence was strongly criticized by Reinach.¹³ For him, and for most of the Munich and Göttingen phenomenolo-

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¹¹ See (Husserl 1913: 226).
¹² See (Fréchette 2003) on this question. In A I 10/69, Daubert gives an account of a discussion with Husserl from August 15th 1906 where he defends the perspective account of states of affairs. The account developed two years later in 1908 (Husserl 1987: 28f) seems to be based on that earlier account.
¹³ See (Reinach 1989: 116 and 526).
gists, the bearers of necessity, possibility, subsistence, etc. are always — and only — states of affairs. Therefore, synthetic *a priori* judgments like ‘every promise entails an obligation’ are true in virtue of the laws of essence concerning promises and obligations. These laws being nothing but “general principles expressing relations between states of affairs” (Reinach 1911b/1982: 339), the ultimate bearers of the material necessity expressed in such judgments are states of affairs.

### 3 Metaphysical Realism

An obvious objection against the kind of account of logic championed by Reinach and other Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists would be to say that the position advocated here is merely a nominal variation on the position defended by logical realists like Bolzano for instance. After all, both Bolzano and Munich phenomenologists agree that propositional attitudes like “Anne thinks that the door is closed” have an objectual correlate as object, namely the “proposition” or “state of affairs” expressed in the that-clause.¹⁴ Propositions (or states of affairs) are also said to be standing in relation of ground and consequence¹⁵, they are conceived of as bearer of modalities¹⁶, they (and not judgments) stand in relation of contradiction. While truth and falsity are typically properties of *propositions*, metaphysical realists like Reinach like to think that a judgment like “the door is closed” is not correct because it expresses a *true* proposition, but because the state of affairs corresponding to it *subsists*:

A judgment is correct if the state of affairs corresponding to it subsists; and two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both subsist. The law relating to judgments thus obtains its foundation from the corresponding law relating to states of affairs. (Reinach 1911b/1982: 376)

Does that mean that Reinach would agree to say, with Meinong, that truth and falsity are nothing but subsistence and non-subsistence, i.e. properties of states of affairs? Reinach doesn’t agree with Meinong in that respect:

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¹⁴ On the side of logical realists, see for example (Bolzano 1837: I, 154) for the conception of objective propositions as content (*Stoff*) of judgments. On the side of metaphysical realists, see (Reinach 1911b/1982: 336).

¹⁵ On the side of logical realists, see (Bolzano 1837: I, §168, 177). On the side of metaphysical realists, see (Reinach 1911b/1982: 338).

¹⁶ On the side of logical realists, see for example (Bolzano 1837: 563). On the side of metaphysical realists, see (Reinach 1911b/1982: 339).
We acknowledge freely the difference between judgment and “proposition in itself”; but just as the proposition must be separated from the judgment, so also must it be separated from the state of affairs. A proposition is true when the state of affairs which is correlated with it subsists. And two contradictory propositions cannot both be true because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both subsist. (Reinach 1911b/1982: 376)

Still, the reason for this disagreement is unclear: which conceptual role is left to propositions? Because of his untimely death, Reinach didn’t have the opportunity to offer a detailed account of the conceptual role of propositions. In his Logic from 1921, Pfänder offers a more detailed account of the relation between propositions – which he calls judgments¹⁷ – and states of affairs:

To each particular judgment there corresponds a state of affairs. To the judgment, “Sulfur is yellow”, there corresponds a state of affairs that consists of the material species, sulfur, and its being-yellow. The judgment projects this state of affairs out of itself. [...] It is also true that no judgment can be formulated without projecting a state of affairs. But the projected state of affairs is not for that reason identical with the formulated judgment. Rather, the state of affairs is the counterpart, the “intentional correlate” of the judgment that projects it. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 35)

In his lectures on logic and theory of knowledge, Pfänder presents the distinction in the following way:

The proposition is made up of words, and words are made up of letters [...] the judgment is not made up of words or letters [...] the judgment may be true or false [while] the proposition can only be true or false in a metaphorical sense, or in another sense... One can make a judgment without constructing a proposition. [...] In the proposition, the judgment comes to expression [...] the expression relation is not a mere association. The judgment is the sense [Sinn] of the proposition, the thought construction [Gedankengebilde] inserted in it. (Pfänder 1912/1913: 18 November 1912)¹⁸

In other words, propositions express judgments which project states of affairs, which are the intentional correlates of judgments. But judgments are not ontolog-

¹⁷ Pfänder distinguishes between proposition (Satz) and judgment (Urteil) in a different way than Husserl, Bolzano, and Reinach himself. For Pfänder, propositions (Sätze) are purely linguistic entities, they are composed of words and they are not the bearer of truth or falsity. The real bearers of truth and falsity are judgments.

¹⁸ “Der Satz besteht aus Wörter, die Wörter aus Buchstaben [...] das Urteil besteht nicht aus Wörter oder Buchstaben [...] Das Urteil kann wahr oder falsch sein, der Satz kann nur in übertragenem Sinne, oder in einem anderen Sinne wahr oder falsch sein. [...] Man kann Urteile fällen, ohne Sätze zu bilden. [...] Im Satz kommt das Urteil zum Ausdruck. [...] Die Ausdrucksbeziehung ist keine bloße Association. Das Urteil ist der Sinn des Satzes, das ihm eingelegte Gedankengebilde.”
ically independent of their bearers: the judgers. They are “thought constructions” (*Gedankengebilde*). On the other hand, if the state of affairs is the intentional correlate of the judgment, you can’t have a state of affairs without having a judgment. The projection metaphor also supports this mutual dependence.

We find in Pfänder a sensibly different setting than the one found in the Bolzanian model, according to which propositions in themselves are independent of actual thoughts, sentences etc. about them. Contrary to Bolzano, Pfänder and Reinach see the truth-bearers as dependent on actual judgers. Bolzano doesn’t use the term “truth-making” to describe the relation between the world (objects and their properties) and the propositions.¹⁹ A proposition is true, according to him, if the object designated by the subject-idea (*Subjektvorstellung*) has the property that the proposition ascribes to it. Propositions, concepts (*Vorstellungen*), objects and properties are necessary for this account, but states of affairs are not. In other words, Bolzano, Pfänder and Reinach attribute very different ontological properties to truth-bearers. Furthermore, according to Pfänder, the analogy between propositions and states of affairs would not do since the state of affairs is the intentional correlate of the judgment. An analogous statement concerning propositions would be unacceptable for Bolzano.

The features highlighted here might certainly help putting some flesh on the label of “metaphysical realism” as a characterization of the orientation defended by Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists, but there is more to say in this respect. Mulligan (2006) stressed another particular aspect that plays a central role in the Bavarian metaphysical realism: the concept of foundation.²⁰ This aspect is discussed extensively in Pfänder’s *Logik* of 1921:

> It lies in the essence of every judgement to make a claim to truth. Truth, as we have seen, is, according to its very essence, something which cannot attach to a judgement all by itself but only in a certain relation to something else, namely in the relation of agreement with the objects dealt with by the judgement. Only if this relation obtains can the judgement be true. But this relation requires necessarily in order to obtain two foundations, namely the judgement on the one hand and the behaviour of the objects the judgement deals with on the other hand. [...] Thus if a judgement is not only to lay claim to truth but also to have truth then the corresponding behaviour of the objects is absolutely necessary as a ground. The truth of a judgement, according to its essence, only obtains...if this reason is a sufficient

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¹⁹ Interestingly, Bolzano holds that the variation of ideas (*Vorstellungen*) contained in propositions make given propositions true relative to specified variables. But here, the truth making relation holds between ideas and propositions. This is the only use of “*wahrmachen*” found in Bolzano. See (Bolzano 1837:II; §155, 114, 122 and §156, 133).

²⁰ See also (Mulligan 2008).
reason. It follows that every judgement, in order to be true, stands necessarily in need of a sufficient reason. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 231-232)

Not only is truth not to be confused with subsistence, but the different relations of foundation show that in order for the judgment to be true, there must be a bearer of the judgment on the one hand – as we already said, no judgment without judgers – and, on the other hand, the subsistence of a state of affairs. This difference might be illustrated and contrasted with a Bolzanian example: according to Bolzano, there is a true proposition stating the number of grapes that grew on the Italian soil in 1837, although there is no record of any sort giving the right number. The truth of that proposition is not dependent on any knowledge or piece of evidence concerning that number. Pfänder and Reinach would interpret this example in a different way. Although, for some contingent reasons, there is no true judgment about the number of grapes which grew on the Italian soil in 1837, there are (there were) grapes and a relation between them, in short: there could have been a state of affairs that could have grounded a true judgment about these grapes. A judgment is true, according to Pfänder, if the “relation of agreement with the object dealt with by the judgment obtains”. Since there is no relation of agreement in that context, there is no true judgment. In fact, there couldn't be any true judgment about the number of such grapes since these grapes were never counted and don't exist anymore.

The important concept here at play is the concept of grounding or foundation. That a truth “attaches” to a judgment thanks to a “relation of agreement with the objects dealt with by the judgment” is what Pfänder and many other Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists call a law of essence. What this law expresses is a grounding relation: the judger (and his judgment) and the state of affairs judged both ground the true judgment.
4 Grounding and Essences: Logic and the Theory of Object

Bolzano offers a semantic account of grounding, understood as a relation between true propositions.²¹ The Munich phenomenologists have a different take on this issue.

We have seen in the last section that the state of affairs that \( p \) and the judging that \( p \) are both grounding the true judgment \( p \). If that true judgment exists, “there must necessarily be a sufficient reason for its existence” (Pfänder 1921/2009: 260). What is then the ground for the principle of sufficient reason? This is where essences and grounding are brought into close connection:

Its own sufficient reason lies, accordingly, in the *nature of the judgment* and the *nature of truth*. The truth of the principle of sufficient reason follows not from concepts (therefore, *not* from the *concept* of the judgment and the *concept* of truth), but from the characteristic essence of the judgment and of truth itself. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 260)

In this respect, Pfänder departs significantly from the Bolzanian account already discussed. According to Bolzano, and as it is stressed by Mulligan (2004: 413):

As far as our *knowledge* is concerned, an object is no more than what we represent in our minds, whenever we believe we represent it. Thus in logic its *idea* constitutes its *essence*. (Bolzano 1837/I: §111)

In other words, what Bolzano calls “essences” are nothing but the concepts of objects, a position that Pfänder rejects. The reason for his rejection of foundation through concepts is similar to the one behind his conception of judgments as bound to real judgers. The same kind of relation holds between concepts and objects as between judgments and states of affairs: the latter is the intentional correlate of the former (Pfänder 1921/2009: 144). Analogously to states of affairs that are projected by judgments, objects are *projected* by concepts. Such objects are called by Pfänder *formal objects*, while the objects in themselves are called *material objects*.

Interestingly, Pfänder traces the line between logic and ontology precisely to that distinction: the objects dealt with in logic are purely formal objects, which

²¹ But as Mulligan pointed out, Bolzano uses the terminology of “folgen, herleiten, ableiten, vermöge des bloßen Begriffes, etc.” not exclusively for relations between true propositions. In fact, in §502, he appeals to the relation between ground and consequence to account for the concept of essence. See (Mulligan 2004: 414f.)
one also could call intentional correlates, while ontology deals with material objects. Also, formal (or intentional) objects are defective by nature:

If, for example, the concept “quadrilateral” means nothing but a plane figure described by four intersecting lines, then it does not belong to the intentional correlate of the concept “quadrilateral” to have four interior angles. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 144)

This point is interesting because it shows that the nature of concepts is to mean something in a particular way. Not only are concepts necessarily linked to thinkers, but they also are linked with defective objects: in a similar way, Pfänder should be bound to say that the concept expressed by “creature with a heart” has neither human nor any animal whatsoever as its formal object (and doesn’t have the same extension as the concept expressed by “creature with a kidney”) but only some of the following defective objects having only these two properties: having a heart and being a creature.

This is of course an important departure from the more standard theory of concepts found in Bolzano for instance, according to which the objects of concepts are their extension. The difference is so important that one wonders if Pfänder is not thinking of the formal object of concepts simply as another term for their intension. This is not the case: one shouldn’t confuse the content of a concept with the sum of the characteristics of the object (Pfänder 1921/2009: 147). This distinction is basically an ontological distinction, in the sense that one shouldn’t confuse what belongs to the content or intension of a concept with what is the formal object. According to his view, the intension of the concept expressed by “triangle” is “object with three angles” and it is a semantic category, while the formal object is an object with three angles: it is an ontological category.

Of course, there are many objects with three angles that are not triangles, but this doesn’t represent a problem for Pfänder’s account, since the formal object, as we said, is thoroughly determined by the concept.

Another point should be added here: Pfänder distinguishes between implicitly and explicitly compound concepts. For instance, the concept expressed by “gold” has implicitly the parts “shiny, yellow metal”. These parts have correlates in the formal object. But what tells us that they belong to the formal object and not simply to the material object? Pfänder answers:

Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that only those partial concepts can be implicitly contained in an object-concept that are really found there; only those, therefore, that posit their objective correlate in the corresponding formal object – and not those concepts that posit something that is found only in the material object, but is not at all co-intended by the object-concept. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 150)
But then, how to draw the line between partial concepts that are implicitly contained in an object concept and simply different concepts that don’t belong to it? The line is difficult to trace since Pfänder is advocating for a conception of extension *qua* formal object. In the case of the concepts expressed by “equiangular triangle” and “equilateral triangle”, for example, these can’t be said to be equivalent since they have different formal objects. Here, it seems that relations of identity of extension between concepts depend only on their material object, and not on their formal objects. Even the absence of an extension (as in the case of the concept expressed by “round square”), it seems that the formal object just depicts the structure of the content of the concept, while the being or non-being of a material object in this case is simply left aside.

The distinction between the formal and the material object is a central distinction. It is on the basis of this distinction that Pfänder dissociates logic (as a theory of the formal object) from phenomenology understood as a theory of the material object:

> If it is certain [...] that the being S of an object, *according to its essence*, cannot exist without involving the being P of the object, then all objects that are really S are necessarily also P, and the universal judgment is an assertoric-categorial one. The epistemological question of how it is possible to recognize whether or not the being S of an object necessarily, or according to its essence, involves the being P of the same object, lies outside the circle of logical problems. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 399)

Logic investigates thought-structures not only in themselves, but also purely for their own sake; while phenomenology considers thoughts only as the ideal content of certain acts of thinking, directing itself to the essential relationship of the act of thinking to other acts of thinking, to object-consciousness and to intentional objects. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 28)

Logic is therefore to be distinguished from a theory of essences. As a matter of fact, Pfänder holds that even the law of identity is itself not a real *logical* law:

> This principle *is not* at all a genuine logical principle. It tells us nothing directly about any logical object – except, of course, that, insofar as logical entities are objects, they are as such (according to this principle) identical with themselves. This is because the principle of identity as given above refers to objects in general, and no logical investigation is needed to recognize it as true. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 207)²²

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In that sense, there is no co-extensivity between logic and object theory. Moreover, the law of identity is a law of object theory that is deprived of logical content: “[a]ll that is required for its validity is the universal and formal nature of objects in general, not the specific nature of logical objects.” (Pfänder 1921/2009: 207).

The law of identity is a law of formal ontology and not a law of logic.

That every object is identical with itself is, of course, immediately evident; for its self-identity is grounded immediately and finally in the nature of the object in general. The principle that declares this, however, is not a logical principle but, as already noted, a principle from the general theory of objects or formal ontology. Nevertheless, the state of affairs it posits forms the ultimate basis for the truth of the logical principle of identity. For only if this state of affairs obtains is the logical principle also correct. To this state of affairs one must necessarily return if the truth of the logical principle is to become evident. Because of this relationship of grounding between the formal-ontological state of affairs and the logical principle, it is understandable that traditional logic usually only refers to the ontological principle and forgets to formulate the genuine logical principle expressly. (Pfänder 1921/2009: 216)²⁴

Spiegelberg, a student of Pfänder, also disapproves of Husserl conception of the relation between ontology and logic. Ontology, he holds, is not a “pure logic”: “logic is based on ontology and is basically impossible without it” (Spiegelberg 1930: 6).

²³ “Der Satz von der Identität ist also weder ‘unmittelbar evident’ noch durch psychologischen Erkenntnisse noch durch inductive Verallgemeinerung aus untersuchten einzelnen Beispielsurteilen als wahr zu erweisen. Seine Wahrheit muß vielmehr in anderer Weise ersichtlich gemacht werden” (Pfänder 1921: 190).

5 Laws of essence

What do realist phenomenologists understand as laws of essences? Essences are at the core of what Reinach calls an “axiom of phenomenology”:

To every objectual domain is assigned a sphere of aprioric content, an a priori regularity of essence. This sphere must be investigated prior to any empirical observations. (Reinach, 1989: 440)

At least in Reinach’s works, the expression “regularities of essence” (Wesensgesetzlichkeit) is often used and is more often used than the expression “law of essence” (Wesensgesetz). There is one obvious reason for this: laws are propositions. If the way essences relate to one another is regulated by propositions, then propositions are more fundamental than essences, and this would of course go against the point made by the realist phenomenologists. The term “regularity of essence” designates here not a proposition but a state of affairs that has essences as parts and which can be expressed by a law of essence. States of affairs being, according to the realist phenomenologists, more fundamental than propositions, the “laws of essence” formulate relations between essences. The expression of these “laws” gives us a way to grasp the relations between essences.

Regularities of essence are based on a grounding relation between the predicate and the subject expressed in the proposition designating this regularity (Reinach 1989: 363). Red and blue are different. According to Reinach, the sentence “red and blue are different” expresses an essential law, which has the form “being-\textit{b} grounded in \textit{A} and \textit{C} is ascribed to it” (where \textit{b} is the predicate “different”, \textit{A} is the essence and \textit{C} is “red and blue”). In other terms, if properties are the ontological pendant of predicates, these are not the essence of the object. The essence is what grounds (gründet) the property of being different, or being a color, etc.

Interestingly, the importance of laws of essence for Munich and Göttingen phenomenology comes from Husserl’s Logical Investigations, especially from his explanation of the relation of dependence: Hue, saturation and brightness are for instance properties that every color necessary has. There is no specific blue color which hasn’t a specific hue, a degree of saturation and of brightness. As Husserl writes in the third Logical Investigation:

The inability-to-exist-by-itself of a non-independent part points therefore to a law of essence, according to which the existence of a content belonging to the parts’s pure species (e.g. the species of color, form etc.) presupposes the existence of contents of certain pertinent pure species.... Non independent objects are objects belonging to such pure species as are
The relation of dependence illustrated here by Husserl is what Brentano calls the metaphysical parts of a whole. Metaphysical parts like the hue, brightness and saturation of a color (here the whole) were called by Brentano the essences (Essenzen) already at the end of the 1860s.²⁵

Do synthetic a priori law necessitates instantiation? According to Reinach, these laws don’t need a single instantiation. A single example suffices to illustrate a law of essence:

It is intuitively graspable, from one example (of conviction), that every judgment can only have one state of affairs, one being-such, as correlate, according to its essence. Similarly, it belongs to the essence of moods that they don’t need an intentional correlate; it belongs to the essence of genuine questions that they don’t have their source in certitude, but that they are rather grounded in incertitude. (Reinach 1989: 439)²⁶

6 Essences, Ideas, Eide, Morphes

Jean Héring (1890-1966), an Alsatian student of Husserl in Göttingen, developed an account of essences that has been very influential on the later developments of the Munich and Göttingen phenomenology, particularly in (Ingarden 1925; 1928; 1964-1965), (Stein 1950), (Conrad-Martius 1957) and (Spiegelberg 1930).

Héring (1921) distinguishes between five central categories: the individual object, its essence (Wesen), the essentiality (Wesenheit, eidos), the quiddity (Washaftigkeit, Morphe) and the idea (Idee). According to him, every individual object has only one essence, which it doesn’t share with any other individual object. The set of two white coffee cups on my table is composed of two objects

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²⁵ See (Brentano 1867a: 137). Husserl had a transcription of these lectures. The importance of the influence of Stumpf’s concept of partial contents (Teilinhalte) in (Stumpf 1873: 109) is certainly undeniable, but since Stumpf himself was influenced by Brentano’s 1867 lecture on metaphysics, it just seems more to the point to link Husserl directly to Brentano in this respect. In his Descriptive Psychology, Brentano will change the name of these parts for sich durchwohnenden Teile but the concept remains quite the same. See (Brentano 1982 [1891]/1995).

and, belonging to them, two different essences. Héring says that the essence of the individual object is its Sosein. It belongs to the essence of a feather to be able to write finely, but it doesn’t belong to this essence to be a feather that lies on my table. Such essences are also individual in themselves. Héring distinguishes further two relations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{x belongs to the essence of y (rel1)} \\
\text{x follows from the essence of y (rel2)}
\end{align*}
\]

Rel1 is involved in the case of the capability for a feather to write. In that sense, it seems that even dispositions would be categorized as essences. What belongs to the essence of something is its essence kernel (Wesenskern).

Rel2 is involved in cases like the one of a sphere of one meter of circumference. It follows from the essence of that sphere that it is smaller than the blue coffee cup on my table. In the case of rel2, X seems to be a state of affairs, while in the case of rel1, it might be a state of affairs, but it also may be a disposition.²⁷ Therefore, necessary properties of an object are not parts of its essence: a 50m² apartment is necessarily smaller than a 100m² apartment, but it only follows from the essence of the 50m² apartment, it doesn’t belong to its essence to be smaller.

According to Héring, not only general objects (like kinds or sorts) have essence, but individual objects as well. And both general and individual objects can be ideated, or put into ideas.

Another feature of Héring’s concept of essence (Wesen, which he sometimes calls the Sosein of objects) is that it belongs to its object in such a way that it ceases to exist when the object ceases to exist. This is of course not the case with the idea. The Wesen has to be distinguished from the Washaftigkeit, or its quiddity. If this wine stain has an essence (to which for instance it belongs to be a stain on some surface that absorbs liquid to a minimal extent), it also has its morphe, something like “wine-stainness”, which makes the wine stain what it is. The morphe is the morphe of a specific object, the object’s morphe. In that sense, Héring’s morphes are quite similar to what it usually called today a trope.

But it also makes sense to speak, according to Héring, of the “wine-stainness” not of a specific stain, but “an und für sich genommen”, or of “the winestainness as such”. In such cases,

we then mean something which is in itself completely free of any relation to objects, something which “is what it is”, independently of the existence or not of real or ideal worlds of objects. We can think them [= the essentialities] without the world [...] they are autonomous and rest in themselves. (Héring 1921: 510)

²⁷ See here also (Ingarden 2007: 50f.)
The winestaininess as such is what Héring calls the essentiality (Wesenheit, eidos). Finally, the fifth category in Héring’s ontology is called the idea. I may have bought twice a specific lamp sold by Ikea, once for the bedroom, the other for the living room: but there is only one idea of the lamp, its model so to speak. This is what Héring calls an idea.

Héring’s ontology of essences could be schematized in the following way:

Fig. 2

Eide (Wesenheiten) are realized in morphes thanks to the object (here the red stain 1), which is also called its realizator (Héring 1921: 510). It is of course problematic to have a distinction between ideas and eide, at least from a strictly terminological point of view. But there are fundamental distinctions to be made here: ideas have what Ingarden (2007: 56) calls variables (Veränderliche) in their content. For instance, the idea of a red stain may be subject to different variations, such as “red stain of wine”, “red stain on the carpet”, etc. This is not the case with the eidos: eide are in contrast with ideas completely determined. Furthermore, morphes are realizations of eide on the basis of the object which is then said to be the realizator (Héring 1921: 510). Also, ideas are conceivable from two different points of view: from the point of view of their ideal mode of being, but also from the point of view of the objects they exemplify.²⁸

It is also important to stress here that ideas are not concepts (Héring 1921: 533). Concepts are unintuitively intendent meaning units, while ideas can at least

²⁸ See (Héring 1921: 530).
in principle be intuited. Another difference between idea and concepts is for In- 
garden (2007: 63) that there are “contradictory concepts”, or as Bolzano would 
call them, “objectless notions” (gegenstandlose Vorstellungen). But there are no 
“objectless ideas” in Ingarden’s and Héring’s understanding of the term.

The distinction between object, essence (and essence kernel), morphes, eide, 
and idea is a relatively complex one. The relation between the morphe and the 
eidos corresponds, in Husserl’s terminology, to the relation between the moment 
and the species. So what is the role played by Héring’s essences (Wesen), if this 
role is not precisely played by morphs? Morphs are moments (or instanciations, or 
tropes) of eide, or in other terms, one could say that they are particularized prop-
erties, in the sense that they are realizations (as Héring puts it) of properties qua 
universals (redness as such, for example). As such, one single object can partici-
pate in different eide, which are then instantiated by different morphs. In the case 
of essences, it is different. Essences are individuals of a slightly different kind: 
they attach directly to objects, they are not instantiations of universals and are in 
no relations with universals. As a matter of fact, they are Unikate, insofar as there 
is for each individual object one single individual essence.

Interestingly, Héring calls essences also the Sosein of objects, in a sense that 
might remind us of Meinong. Indeed, Meinong proposed to distinguish between 
the being (Sein) and the being-so (Sosein) of objects, the first being correlative to 
acts of judgments, while the second being correlative to assumptions. In 1904, 
Meinong formulated the principle of independence of being-so from being, ac-
cording to which the being-so of an object is not affected by its non-being.²⁹ Héring 
would obviously reject that principle since essences are correlates of objects and 
 cease to exist when their object cease to exist. Furthermore, Meinong’s talk of the 
Sosein in the sense of “an object’s having properties” goes in another direction 
than Héring’s account of essence. Essences are not properties (even not particu-
larized properties) of objects but rather seem to be some kind of set of traits (Züge) 
belonging to the object. As the result of a glass of wine accidentally falling on the 
carpet, the red stain has an essential trait (Wesenszug) of being caused by the 
falling of the glass. This trait might or might not be an essence kernel of the red 
stain,³⁰ But the existence of the set of these traits (as of each of them individually), 
though dependent upon the existence of the object, is not to be understood 
extactly as a trope, in the sense of morphes. In that sense, essences are not tropes 
of the red of the stain, but a trope of the object tout court. Essences seem more to

²⁹ See (Meinong 1904: 8).
³⁰ Hering’s point on essence kernels is not clear, since his examples are using only ideal objects, 
and not concrete objects. See (Hering 1921: 499).
be like some kind of perspectival or subjective objects, which adapt to our knowledge of the objects they are the essence of, while these objects themselves are as they are independently of our perspective on them. Phenomenological analysis understood as a *Wesenschau*, or intuition of essences, would simply mean here that what we describe is the essence of the object, which is in itself variable. In that sense, the empirical discovery of Metis and Thebe, the two moons of Jupiter discovered by Voyager 1 in the 1970s, changes nothing about the system of Jupiter as an object, but it completes, or *add more traits* to its set of essential traits, or its essence.

### 7 Anumericity

Héring’s article influenced many early phenomenologists to go against Husserl’s use of “*Wesen*” (essence) and “*Idee*” (idea) as synonyms.\(^\text{31}\) One of the outputs of these criticisms is that Husserl comes to the knowledge of ideas by making abstraction of the individuality of the object’s essence.\(^\text{32}\) But Spiegelberg is not satisfied with this conclusion. He asks the question of the foundation of the character of idea. In other words: what is then the principle of ideality? Abstracting from the essence of individual objects will only give us individual parts. And to say simply that an idea has no reality is not enough, since not only ideas don’t have reality — illusions, fictions, etc. do lack reality as well. Even numbers, which have no individuality, cannot be considered as ideas.

According to Héring, as we have seen, ideas are general in the sense that they are undetermined. That ideas allow variation in their content is precisely a sign of this generality. In his 1930 dissertation, Spiegelberg also focuses on this distinction, insisting not only that ideas are undetermined, but also that they in fact are anumerical:

> The difference between idea and essence in the sense of an essence kernel doesn’t really need a further specification of its own. The essence kernel is an exceptional group of inner elements which are distinguishable similarly in the idea and in the exemplars. The essence kernel of an individual is individual, the essence kernel of an idea is materially anumerical. The essence kernel of an individual can’t be an anumerical idea. This is completely excluded by both essences. (Spiegelberg 1930: 222)\(^\text{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) See for example (Spiegelberg 1930: 2199) and (Pöll 1936: 31).

\(^{32}\) See (Spiegelberg 1930: 214f.)

\(^{33}\) “Der Unterschied von Idee und Wesen im Sinne des Wesenskerns braucht kaum noch eigens herausgestellt zu werden. Der Wesenskern ist eine ausgezeichnete Gruppe von inneren Ele-
Comparing ideas with essences, or even with objects, Spiegelberg notes

Regarding such a question [whether they are numerically one or many], ideas behave with a complete indifference, because they are numerically without any quantity, anumerical, without any number. [...] Two-in-general is [not] numerically determined, in contrast with the individual twos. (Spiegelberg 1930: 99)34

We find here the point addressed by Schapp in his remarks about the “infinitely many twos”: there are infinitely many twos: as a matter of fact, the essence of being two comes to every set of two objects which is considered as a composed object. Since essences are individual, the object composed by the reunion of the table and the coffee cup has the essence of being two. When this object will cease to exist, the essence of being two (as the essence of this specific object) will cease to exist as well. On the other hand, the idea of the two (die Zwei-überhaupt) has no quantitative property. As Héring and Ingarden underlined first, ideas are undetermined and have variation places in their content, what Spiegelberg, Pöll and Beck call anumericity.35 According to Spiegelberg, it is precisely because ideas are undetermined that they are multiply realizable. Therefore, the standard Platonic conception of ideas is not optimal:

There is nothing in principle to prevent replacing a “model” (paradeigma) with a whole group that is formed by it in the same way. Only in this way can multiplicability be ruled out if the foundation of all multiplication, the numerical one-hood, is absent [...] [The idea] is the one object in whose case it remains undetermined whether it is internally structured like one or however many exemplars. Only the qualitative aspect is fully developed in it as in the case of other numerical objects, whereas the numerical aspect is altogether absent in it. (Spiegelberg 1930: 100)36
An idea is what Spiegelberg calls “unidividuelles und anumerisches Quale”. In this sense, Schapp is right when he says that there are “infinitely many twos” according to the Munich phenomenologists. But this is possible only on the basis that ideas are purely qualitative objects and by definition (or rather by essence) deprived of numericality.\(^{37}\)

### 8 Final remarks

The early phenomenologists attributed a central importance to the notion of essence and its related family members: laws and regularities of essences and ideal objects. I showed first that this importance was directly dependent upon their conception of the synthetic \emph{a priori}. According to them, material necessity is at the basis of the synthetic \emph{a priori}, and not the modal necessity, as Kant understood it. Causal connections are in this sense not grounded in pure reason or in subjective necessity, but in the essence of things. Therefore, synthetic \emph{a priori} judgments like “every promise entails an obligation” are true in virtue of the laws of essence concerning promises and obligations, and not in virtue of modal necessity. These laws are nothing but “general principles expressing relations between states of affairs.” (Reinach 1911b/1982: 339)

I also distinguished this position, which I labeled a “metaphysical realism”, from the logical realism championed by philosophers like Bolzano, according to which propositions are the bearer of truth, modalities, and are standing in relation of ground and consequence. This distinction presupposes that propositions and states of affairs are to be distinguished, as proposed by Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists. For them, while truth and falsity are genuinely properties of \emph{propositions} (they agree with logical realists on that respect), the ground for the correctness of propositions is to be found in the subsistence of states of affairs. Therefore, subsisting states of affairs are the foundation of true propositions. This position, according to which ontology is the foundation of logics, was particularly defended by Pfändler, as we have shown.

In the last four sections of the paper, I discussed different elements of the metaphysical realism exposited in the first part. The first element is the relation

\(^{37}\) Pöll, a student of Geyser and Pfänder in Munich, followed Spiegelberg’s insight according to which the lack of numericality should count as the principle of ideity (\emph{Ideitätsprinzip}) (see Pöll 1936: 94). The idea is, according to its essence, external to the order of numbers.
of foundation advocated by the early phenomenologists between ontology and logics: Ontology provides the ground for logics. The second element is the distinction between essence (Wesen) and idea (Idee). On this point, early phenomenologists are in disagreement with Husserl. Finally, the last aspect was the property of anumericity, a property possessed exclusively by ideas. This is the reason why there are “infinitely many twos” according to the Munich phenomenologists, as Schapp pointed out: the two white cups participates in the essence of being two white cups, but they exemplify the two ‘in general’ which, in its turn, is said to be anumerical.

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