Guillaume Fréchette

Marty on Abstraction

Abstract: The varieties of accounts of abstraction in the school of Brentano seem to be a function of the different views adopted on ontology, by Brentano himself but also by his students. The line going from conceptualism to empiricism, realism, and later to reism in Brentano’s works is therefore a good guide to understand the evolution of the accounts of abstraction in the school of Brentano. Independently of the views adopted in ontology however, and in contrast with Husserl for instance, it seems that Brentano remained constant in his rejection of the view that abstracting and intuiting should be considered as two distinct modes of consciousness. Husserl addressed an important objection to Brentano’s empiricist account of abstraction in the second Logical Investigation. Brentano never answered to this objection directly. But Marty did. In the following paper, and in order to appreciate Marty’s reply, I offer a reconstruction of Brentano’s and Marty’s early conceptions of abstraction, which serves as the basis for an exposition of Marty’s late account of higher abstraction. I argue that this late account, partly based on Brentano but also developing ideas to which Brentano was opposed, offers a fruitful alternative to Husserl’s view on abstraction in the Logical Investigations.

1 Abstraction and the essence of thought

Do we present ordinary and singular objects like chairs in the same way as we present the same shade of brown in two different chairs? Is there, between my presentation of the sound and my imagination of the sound, a simple (graduated) difference, as Hume would have it? If there is more than a graduated difference of vividness, does the same hold for the distinction between my presentation of this triangle and of triangles in general? And, if there is more than a graduated difference of vividness, is this distinction based on an ontological distinction between concrete (or real) and abstract (or ideal) objects, or on two modalities of presenting?

Such questions were intensively debated in the School of Brentano. Besides the wholesale rejection of nominalist accounts of abstraction, which is common to all Brentanians, the scope of positions defended by them seems too large and too diversified for us to identify a clear and definite position regarding the nature of abstraction and abstract objects. Brentano himself often changed his mind concerning abstraction, alongside the evolution of his views on ontology, mov-

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ing from conceptualism to empiricism, realism, and later to reism. Husserl first accepted the empiricist account defended by many Brentanians in the 1880s in his conception of arithmetic, but rejected it a few years later. His *Logical Investigations*, especially the 2nd *Investigation*, give a detailed account of the motives for this rejection. In a nutshell, the core motivation is based on the idea that empiricism is ‘blind to the nature of thought’, as Smith puts it. If empiricism were true, says Husserl,

[w]e should [...] fail to set up a single proposition: we should have only representative individual ideas, but no thinking. Does anyone think that a conglomeration of such individual items can give rise to a predication? (Husserl 1901: 185; Husserl 2001: 286)

Husserl’s point against empiricism is that predication, as a function aiming at generality, is the essence of thought. This conception of thought quite directly opposes Brentano’s conception, at least as it is formulated in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*:

That predication is not the essence of every judgment emerges quite clearly from the fact that all perceptions are judgments, whether they are instances of knowledge or just mistaken affirmations. (Brentano 1876: 232; 1995: 218)

Does the rejection of predication as a fundamental feature of judgments (and by extension of thought) confine Brentano’s position to a view similar to Berkeley’s, where abstraction takes place when concrete presentations with their intuitive contents simply become general through their substitutional function, ‘standing for all other particular ideas of the same sort’? Although he doesn’t mention Brentano at this point in his critique of empiricist accounts, Husserl seems to target Brentano—at least indirectly. Brentano didn’t reply to this objection directly, at least not in his published writings. Marty however discusses this objection at length in numerous publications and in his correspondence with Husserl. While he remained true to most of Brentano’s insights on the nature of abstraction, Marty developed an original reply to Husserl’s objection. In order to appreciate Marty’s reply, I will first offer a reconstruction of Brentano’s early conceptions of abstraction, insofar as they correspond to Marty’s conceptions. I will then show how Marty later supplements these conceptions and develops his own account

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3 For the relevant passages, see Husserl 2001: 283 sq. His letter to Husserl of the 7th June, 1901, shows that Marty recognized that he and Brentano, among others, were the target of this attack. See Husserl 1994: 71 sq.
of abstraction, and show how this account is able to fruitfully address Husserl’s objection.

2 Brentano’s early account of abstraction (1867 – 1875)

Brentano is often said to be an empiricist, at least to the extent that in his view philosophy should take experience as its starting point. As a mental operation, abstraction is considered from this perspective to be a way of perceiving objects and of operating on these perceptions. Perceiving the red table in front of me as falling under the general concept of a table in this context implies an operation realised on the presentation itself. The result of this operation, the abstract concept, is just one kind of presentation content among others; it doesn’t have any distinctive ontological status. At least in its main lines, this is the account of abstraction at play in Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874).4

This account, advocated by Brentano, and —for some time— by one of his students, Anton Marty, is called a ‘monist’ account.5 “Monism” is not used here in the metaphysical sense, but in the more specific sense according to which intuition and abstraction form a single and unitary mental category. Following this view, sensations and concepts are not *two* distinct modalities in one’s mental life but belong to a single faculty.

As is commonly known, Brentano held the view that judicative and emotional mental acts are based on more primitive (and basic) mental acts: presentations. These presentations include various acts, ranging from sensations to imagination, memory, and abstract or conceptual presentations. When I judge that the Eiffel Tower exists, my judgment is based on a presentation of the Eiffel Tower. This presentation is a complex presentation, composed of different sensory parts (e.g. partial presentations of colours) and of spatial properties that form the physical phenomenon in which the Eiffel Tower is given to me. Therefore, for an ordinary object such as the Eiffel Tower to become the proper content of an act of presentation, different acts of sensation are necessarily involved. Now, if I want to isolate the specific content of some of these acts of sensation, this is where abstraction comes into play: the full intuitive content of my presentation of the Eiffel Tower is impoverished by the abstraction, which leaves behind, to speak metaphorically, an underdetermined content with empty place holders: instead of intuitively presenting the Eiffel Tower, I focus, e.g., on its

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4 See for instance his discussion of the abstract concept of existence in Brentano 1874: 277 sq.
5 See for instance Marty 2011.
grey-brown colour tone and shape, leaving aside all other elements. This operation of focusing (sometimes called ‘attention’ (Aufmerksamkeit) is what abstraction performs on intuitive contents.

In his early years, Brentano developed a so-called ‘monistic’ account of abstraction, involving both a psychological and an ontological version of the account. According to the psychological account, abstraction is a psychological function belonging to the class of presentations; according to the ontological account, the product of abstraction is not a real category in Brentano's ontology. On his early account, abstract objects are mere fictions.

Brentano doesn't say much about the psychological version of the monistic account, i.e. about the kind of psychological processes involved in an abstract presentation. Stumpf (1873), which was written in close collaboration with Brentano,6 gives a few insights into the psychological version of Brentano's early account. Following Brentano’s nativistic conception of space perception, Stumpf defends the idea that sensory contents are generally presented ‘together’ (zusammenvorgestellt). According to this view, we cannot for instance present colour independently of some extension. We might, however, present colour ‘in abstraction’ of extension or space, but this abstract presenting is not a proper presenting. Following Stumpf and Brentano, spatial and colour elements of sensory contents are fused in presentations: ‘there is a visual space, i.e. a particular sensory content which is sensed directly, in the same way as colour qualities and as a consequence of optical nervous processing, and which possesses all the characteristics we attribute to space’ (Stumpf 1873: 272). The process of abstraction seems therefore to be a virtual one:

General concepts only designate something which understanding makes with the individual presentations, or more precisely, the possibility, from the side of the latter, to sustain this operation. (Stumpf 1873: 137)

The decomposition of the content itself is therefore only virtual (scheinbar), although it is not arbitrary, but necessary, since every similarity and every distinction is imposed upon us by the content itself. We operate—to quote an expression of the Scholastics—a distinctio cum fundamento in re. (Stumpf 1873: 139)7

Brentano had more to say about the ontological version of the account, especially in his lectures on metaphysics. The account defended in these lectures is developed as a part of his theory of parts and wholes, in which he proposes a distinction between three kinds of parts influenced by Aristotle (Met. 1034 b32).

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7 Here and elsewhere, English translations are mine when the work quoted is in German.
Brentano distinguishes there between 1) physical parts, like single corns (parts) in a heap of corn (whole); 2) logical parts of an object, which are parts of the definition of its concept (for example, colouredness is a logical part of something red, virtue is a logical part of courageousness, etc. In his 1867 lectures on metaphysics, Brentano uses the locution ‘...is a logical part of...’ interchangeably with ‘...can be predicated of...’); and finally, 3) metaphysical parts, which are non-physical parts, and are the determinations of an object: its substance, space, time, thinking, accidents, etc. are metaphysical parts of the object.⁸ In contrast with physical parts, which themselves are physical, metaphysical parts are *abstracta.*⁹ Socrates for instance is a metaphysical whole composed of different metaphysical parts that are not detachable from the whole. You cannot have Socrates without his whiteness, or without his being located in Athens at some specific time.¹⁰

Following this account from the *Metaphysics* lectures, Brentano says that an abstract presentation is obtained by taking a metaphysical part in isolation from the metaphysical whole, like the abstraction of (the substance of) Socrates without his being white, i.e. taken in abstraction from the metaphysical whole. Nothing much is said here on the psychological operation of abstraction: Brentano is simply saying that abstract objects, like virtue, courageousness, or Socrates’s courageousness, are abstract in virtue of being isolated and non-autonomous parts of metaphysical wholes. Brentano calls such metaphysical parts *abstracta,* but sometimes also *essences, species, praedicamenta, or divisiva.*¹¹ These so-called essences or species are in his view simply *fictiones cum fundamento in re: abstracta,* the metaphysical parts, ‘are posited as different things only through a fiction of the mind’,¹² they do not really belong to the ontology. This is why this account is often labelled as a conceptualist account of abstraction.¹³

## 3 Early Marty on abstraction

Like Brentano’s, Marty’s account of abstraction evolved significantly over the years. While he followed the evolution of Brentano’s account in many respects, it must be stressed that Marty initially developed his conception of abstraction

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⁸ See Brentano, M96: 32011 (§691).
⁹ See Brentano, M96: 31766 (§56).
¹⁰ On this topic, see also Baumgartner 2013: 236.
¹¹ See Brentano, M96: 31969 (§464).
¹² See Brentano, M96: 31972 (§478).
¹³ See for instance Chrudzinski and Smith 2004.
quite independently of Brentano, as shown in his first work, Marty (1867). Marty’s first work in philosophy remained unknown until it was recently rediscovered in the Masaryk Archives. In this work, Marty’s starting point is the Augustinian conception of abstraction as discussed by Aquinas. With Augustine, Marty argues for the view that knowledge is the result of the cooperation of two factors: the cognizing subject and the object cognized. The visible object is said to beget vision, but for this it needs an animated subject. Augustine also calls the relation of begetting an informatio, along the lines of the metaphor of the seal’s impression in the wax used by Aristotle and the Stoics. The relation of cooperation that holds between the cognizing subject and the object cognized, and which presupposes informatio, he often calls intentio. In accounting for this relation, Augustine often appeals of the notion of a similarity between the cognizing subject and the object cognized. Marty summarizes and appropriates this idea in the following way:

Subject and object work together thanks to the concursus of God, such that priority remains however with the subject. Apriori elements connect themselves here with aposteriori elements thanks to the link that the Creator originally initiated. Even the rights of the word, which traditionalism saw as the source of ideas, are thereby acknowledged—not as mother, but as “foster-mother” of the newborn ideas. (Marty 1867: 3)

With Aquinas, Marty suggests that abstraction consists in abstracting the intelligible content from sense images. In the case of abstraction by division, i.e. in isolating things that are not physically separable—similarly to Brentano’s isolation of metaphysical parts—the result of the abstraction process is an intelligible species (what Marty calls, with Aquinas, an idea). We cognize through these intelligible species, whose natures ‘have existence only in individual matter—not as they are in individual matter, but as they are abstracted from that matter through the consideration of the intellect’ (ST: 1a, 12.4c).

14 Marty 1867. The work is mentioned and shortly discussed in Kraus 1916: 3.
15 See Summa Theologiae, I, 85: 1–3
16 Marty 1867: 3; Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, 12, 18: “ab utroque... notitia paritur a cognoscente et cognito”.
19 Compare this with Marty’s description of Aquinas’ ‘true realism’: “his true realism affirms: the general is fully in the things (essendo, not simply praedicando), but not according to its gen-
However, Marty’s main concern in his dissertation is the role of God in our knowledge of abstract ideas. Following Augustine and Aquinas, he accepts that ‘the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing other than a participated likeness of the uncreated light’, but stresses that the reunion (Vereinigung) between the intellect and the object occurs independently of the act of God.

Although it doesn’t belong, properly speaking, to the works of the School of Brentano—Marty wrote this dissertation before his first encounter with Brentano in Würzburg—this early work by Marty contains the seeds of three basic ideas that are central, not only to Marty’s conception of abstraction, but to many conceptions of abstraction defended in the school of Brentano. This is not altogether surprising, since in their early years, both Brentano and Marty were influenced by Aquinas. Therefore, at least two of the three basic ideas involved here have their roots in Aquinas:

1) The relation of information (Marty and Augustine) going from the object to the subject is what Brentano calls the relation, mediated by physical phenomena, between reality and psychical phenomena. Physical phenomena are ‘signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them’ (Brentano 1995: 19). This relation was dealt with extensively as early as Brentano (1867): in an Aristotelian and Thomaskan sense, the form of the object exists in the subject like the form of the stone in the soul (forma lapidis in anima: De Veritate: 8, 11, 3).

2) The intentional relation from the subject to the object, which operates on the basis of relation (1) and which is described in terms of similarity. Following Aquinas it is the form of the stone in the soul inasmuch as it ‘represents the form existing in the material stone’ (forma lapidis in anima inquantum repraesentat formam lapidis in materia) (De Veritate: 8, 11, 3).

3) The nativist framework in which the general account based on relations (1) and (2) is settled, i.e. the idea that perception depends upon the inherited properties of the organism. In the last quote, this nativism is expressed by the idea that God allows for the (otherwise autonomous) connection between apriori and aposteriori elements. Furthermore, it also includes the seed of an element

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21 See Marty 1867: 138: “the finite knowledge [comes] from the power of the infinite mind, but not in him: rather, it occurs through him, such that mind [and] object unite not in God, but autonomously “ (German original: “die endliche Erkenntnis [erfolgt] wohl in Kraft des unendlichen Geistes, nicht aber in ihm, [sondern geschieht] unmittelbar durch ihn, sodass sich Geist [und] Objekt nicht in Gott, sondern selbstständig vereinigen”).
which will become central to Marty’s original contribution to the psychology of
the school of Brentano, namely that abstraction is not a product of linguistic de-
vices, as nominalism would have it; rather, abstraction is realized at least in part
with the help of linguistic devices, which act as mediators or as the ‘foster-moth-
er’ (Amme) of abstract ideas. This point will be dealt with in more detail in sec-
tions 6 and 7 of this paper.

4 Ennoetism (1875–1886)

The psychological version of Brentano’s early account of abstraction left many
questions unanswered. Partly as a way of addressing these issues, in 1875/76
Brentano proposed a ‘new hypothesis’ concerning the process of abstraction.22
On this new hypothesis, abstracta can only be presented distinctly as parts in
concreta, but not as such outside them. Considering the official target of Hus-
serrl’s objection to empiricism in the 2nd Logical Investigation, it is interesting to
note that Brentano also refers to Berkeley in support of the view.23 More gener-
ally, he underlines that there are no authentic (or autonomous, or proper, i.e. im
eigentlichen Sinn) abstract presentings. This is the first formulation of the view
that Marty later calls ‘monism’ of presentations. This view will be held, some
modifications notwithstanding, between 1875 and 1886 by both Brentano and
Marty; and they call this view ‘ennoetism’ (Ennoetismus).24

Brentano says that ennoetism shares with nominalism the idea that there is
only one kind of presenting activity for both concrete and abstract presentations,
but that this one activity is guided by a more or less important degree of interest,
which can allow the subject to focus on parts of the presentation and their con-
tents.25 Such an account bears similarities with Mill’s conception of abstraction,
according to which

23 The hypothesis is presented in Brentano’s letter to Stumpf of 10th February, 1876 (Brentano
1989: 63 sq.) and connects directly to Berkeley. See Berkeley 1734/1878: §10: “Extension, Figure,
and Motion, abstracted from all other Qualities, are inconceivable”. The same passage is also
discussed favourably against Kant’s understanding of space in Stumpf 1873: 24.
24 The label is used by Brentano at many points in the Vienna Logic from 1878/79 (catalogued
as EL 72).
25 See for instance EL 72: 12340: “[T]here is only one mode of presenting activity, [...] but
through the detaching and unifying force of a particular interest, directed exclusively upon
one or certain parts of the complete presentation, these parts of presentation can become medi-
ators of nomination and the presentational basis of judgings and emotional activities” (German
original: “Es gibt nur eine Weise der vorstellenden Tätigkeit...[aber] durch die lösende und eini-
we have, properly speaking [no general concepts]; we have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea; and by that exclusive attention, we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts. (Mill 1979: 309)

Following Mill’s and Brentano’s theories, I can form the general concept of the colour red by focusing my attention on parts of a concrete presentation of a red object. This doesn’t mean that I have a general or abstract presentation of red *stricto sensu* (or that I am presenting red under a different mode) when I think about what is shared in general by red things. In his Vienna lectures on logic from 1878/79 (EL 72), Brentano explains his theory in the following way:

> [In relation with the question of universals, it appears that when I have no presentations other than individual presentations, in a certain way, I do have them [i.e. universals]—namely as partial presentations circumscribed through a particular interest—and this is sufficient to give to the general name not simply a plurality of equivocal individual meanings, as the nominalists wanted, but rather a unitary, truly general sense.]
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> (Brentano EL 72: 12349)

Following ennoetism, there is a sense in which we can say that you and I both form the *same* general concept of red, provided that we focus our attention and our interest on the same relevant partial presentations in our respective presentations, e.g. of the red table. However, since presentings as mental acts do not have proper modalities (unlike, e.g., judgments, which are either acknowledgments or rejections), we focus our interest on partial presentations by actually focusing it

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26 Compare Brentano (EL 72: 12005): “Ennoetism is satisfactory. Without assuming a multiple mode of presenting, ennoetism gives an account of the difference between intuition and concept and an account of conceptual abstraction and combination” (German original: “Der Ennoetismus genügt. Ohne Annahme eines mehrfachen Modus des Vorstellens gibt er von dem Unterschied von Anschauung und Begriff un von Begriffsabstraction und Combination Rechenschaft”).

27 German original: “[E]s zeigt sich in Bezug auf die Universalienfrage, dass, wenn ich auch und eigentlich keine anderen als individuelle Vorstellungen habe, ich in gewisser Weise [—] nämlich als durch ein besonderes Interesse abgegrenzte Teilvorstellungen [—] sie [d.h. Universalien] doch habe, und diese Weise genügt, um den allgemeinen Namen nicht bloß, wie die Nominalisten wollten, eine Vielheit äquivok er individueller Bedeutungen zu geben, sondern ihnen einen einheitlichen, wahrhaft allgemeinen Sinn zu geben.”
on the parts of the presented content. In this way, the abstract name ‘colour’ is not merely the name of a simple fiction, as it was in Brentano’s first account of abstraction in the *Metaphysics* lectures. It has instead a ‘truly general sense’, which is attributed to it on the basis of the direction of attention and interest towards the same features of presented objects. In this way, abstract objects become part of Brentano’s ontology, namely as intentional objects, on the proviso that they only are to be conceived of as objects of partial presentations, i.e. as incomplete intentional objects.

Therefore, although we don’t have abstract presentations properly speaking, we still have improper abstract presentations, insofar as we have acts of interest that are directed towards some parts of the presenting (making these parts partial or abstract *presentings*) *via* the direction of our interest towards some parts of the presentation content, making these parts *abstracta* in the sense of intentional objects. In this sense, redness becomes an abstract intentional object of presentation thanks to the act of interest focusing on the relevant part of the *Gesamtvorstellung* *via* its actual focusing on the partial presentation content. These partial presentation contents are concepts—and thereby act as mediators for further psychical activities—on the sole basis of the act of interest directed towards them. Therefore, no parts of presentings are intrinsically conceptual (there is no ‘abstractive faculty’ in this sense); but since we actually focus our interest on some parts of the presentation content, these parts are made conceptual (or abstract) by an act of interest:

[T]here is only one mode of presenting activity, [... but] through the detaching and unifying force of a particular interest, directed exclusively upon one or certain parts of the complete

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28 See for instance EL 72, 12342: “The unitary complete presentation is separable in partial presentations only with regard to the parts of the presented, which we use to call (although they are by no means complete presentations in themselves) simply presentations, as we do for complete presentations” (“Die einheitliche Gesamtvorstellung lässt also nur in Rücksicht auf Theile des Vorgestellten Theilvorstellungen unterscheiden, die wir dann auch schlechtweg (obwohl sie keine ganzen Vorstellungen für sich sind) ebenso wie die ganzen Vorstellungen zu nennen pflegen”).

29 It might be helpful here to underline that at this point of his career, Brentano held the view that acts of presentation don’t occur in isolation, but are always accompanied by a judgement (which acknowledges or reject the existence of the presented object) and by an act of emotion (or interest, in this case), which is a loving or hating of the presented object. It is of course on this basis that abstraction can be understood as involving an act of interest that forms a unity with the presentation. See Brentano (1874: 202 sq. and 346). Along with the later abandonment of the idea that abstraction involves an act of interest, but also for further reasons, the idea that a mental act (e.g. a presentation) always occurs with its two counterparts (i.e. a judgment and an emotion) will be partly abandoned around 1907; see for instance Brentano 1911: 128.
presentation, these parts of presentation can become the mediator of nomination and the presentational basis of judgings and emotional activities.\textsuperscript{30}

According to this account, when I see a red table, and when I am presenting redness, this latter presenting is a partial (improper) presentation, which in itself is not a separate moment of the Gesamtvorstellung—after all, it is only in virtue of abstracting parts of the presentational content that one can isolate parts of the presenting. When seeing a red table, what I really see is the object and its determinations, which together constitute a metaphysical whole whose parts are not detachable. The partial presentation and its content are isolated or abstracted from the Gesamtvorstellung (and its content) thanks to the noticing of and interest in the red colour of the table. The focus thus bestowed upon the partial presentation of the red of the table ‘elevates’, so to speak, the partial presentation to the level of a mediator (Vermittler) or a sign used, among other things, for naming, but also as a basis for other classes of mental acts.

There is thereby no ‘infection’ (Infektion)\textsuperscript{31} by another mode of presenting, in the original intuitive presentation of red: parts of the presenting are so to speak highlighted by the act of interest—e.g. the parts presenting a specific intensity, a specific brightness, etc. Concepts, like the concept of red, are then composed by a combination of these abstract parts, which Brentano sometimes calls ‘atoms of concepts’ (Begriffsatome) and these concepts mediate between the intuitive presentation of red and the judgement expressed by ‘the red table exists’. This mediation can also occur through more complex combination, which Brentano calls ‘molecules of concepts’ (Begriffsmoleküle).\textsuperscript{32} Concepts are to be considered modified intuitions: they are modified thanks to the focus bestowed upon them by specific judgments or acts of interest or attention.\textsuperscript{33}

As suggested by Brentano’s ‘molecular’ theory of concepts, interest also applies to multiple partial presentations. Such an interest ‘can be directed unitarily towards multiple particular parts of a presentation’ (EL 72, 12350). I can hear and enjoy or take interest in a series of tones unitarily (einheitlich), and this enjoyment or interest is distinct from the enjoyment or interest taken in the tones in-

\textsuperscript{30} See Brentano, EL 72: 12340. Interestingly, we find the exact same sentence in Marty 1894/2011: 125.
\textsuperscript{31} See Brentano, EL 72: 12375.
\textsuperscript{32} See Brentano, EL 72: 12352. For this reason, he sometimes speaks of ennoetism as a ‘molecular’ theory of concepts (Begriffsmolekulartheorie). See EL 72: 12375.
\textsuperscript{33} See also Marty 2011 (1904), where it is said that ‘we have concepts not because there is a second mode of presenting, but rather because of a certain concentration of noticing, of judging and interest’ (ibid., 426).
dividually, although at no point does it involve something like a ‘fusion’ (*Verschmelzung*) of presentations: ‘that which “fuses” is the particular unitary interest’ (see EL 72: 12350). I can also have a *unitary* interest in the multiple tones of a chord, which would make the presentation of the chord (or the melody) an abstract presentation. Finally, and more generally, the ennoetist theory can also account for compound concepts, like disjunctive, reflexive, or contradictory concepts. In this way, the unitary interest directed towards multiple parts of presentations serves as an *explanans* for the fact that abstract presentations are not obtained through the mere sum of single intuitive presentations, without introducing a second mode of presenting, and correlative, without having to accept universals—which would be the objects of such a mode of presenting. The price we have to pay for this is the introduction of these problematic ‘abstract partial presentings’ as dependent parts of intuitive presentings, whose role is unclear since the real abstractive work depends on the act of interest.

5 1886: Rejection of ennoetism

In the 1880s and the 1890s, it seems that Marty followed the main lines of Brentano’s account. Like Brentano, he endorsed ennoetism until the mid 1880s. In 1884, he still thought of abstraction as the product of a concentrated act of attention (Marty 1884: 71). However, Brentano (and later Marty) encountered problems with ennoetism. Already in early 1886, Brentano was dissatisfied with his existential theory of judgments, among other things because it implied a double standard for the interpretation of negation: negative universal judgments, like ‘there are no blue swans’, were reduced to ‘a swan being non-blue is’, with internal negation, while negative existential judgements like ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ were reduced to ‘somebody being Sherlock Holmes is not’, with external negation. This becomes clear in a letter from Brentano to Marty of the 15th February, 1886, where the abandonment of the existential theory (and the first introduction of the double judgment theory) coincides with the introduction of a new view of abstraction:

If one says: “if there were a particular presenting of the general, it would be possible to present it without presenting a concretum”, we should answer: this doesn’t seem right. There are also cases of particular judgings that are inseparable from other judgings, e.g.

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34 See Brentano EL 72: 12357.
35 On Brentano’s dissatisfaction with his own existential theory of judgment, see Brentano 1966: 202.
a man is not healthy. I think I justified this to you verbally—it is the expression of a multiple judgment: 1) a man is acknowledged and 2) health is negated of him. This negation is inseparable from the acknowledgment. If you try to separate it, you get a general judgment and not the particular negative judgement that we have here.

In a similar way, I say that there are also, in presentings, cases of double presenting, where one part is possible without the other (and this also where a presenting presents explicitly what the other presents implicitly, e.g. in the case of an explicit presenting of a physical part). 36

This letter explicitly presents the theory of double judgments (and double presentings) as a solution to the problem of abstraction: in a nutshell, Brentano suggests that we have presentations of abstract properties, like heaviness, on the basis of a second judgment. In ‘copper is heavy’, there is first the acknowledgement of the existence of copper (the thetic judgment), and then the predicative connection of heaviness with copper. I can think or represent heaviness on the basis of a synthetic operation, which happens in the predicative judgment, which is superposed on the thetic judgement.

Even if the first mention of double judgments by Brentano was made in 1889, in the first publication of Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis—actually in an addendum to the reprint of Brentano’s review of Miklosich, which was published for the first time in 1883—the idea was being discussed by Brentano and Marty already in 1886.

Five months later, on the 25th July, 1886, Marty summarizes Brentano’s (and his own) change of view regarding abstraction in one of his notebooks, recalling a discussion he had with Brentano:

[W]hat has been (Gewesenes) [is not obtained] through reflection on the mode of judgment—the modification comes immediately into the predicate.

Reply: then a completely new kind of concept emerges

Answer: No: concept is predication

There is already a rupture with the ancient theory of presentation, through the fact that it

36 Letter from Brentano to Marty, 15th February, 1886. German original: “Sagt man: Wenn ein besonderes Vorstellen des Allgemeinen gegeben wäre, so müsste es möglich sein, es vorzustellen ohne ein Concretum vorzustellen, so ist zu antworten:

Dies scheint nicht richtig.


was realised that synthesis is not the task of presentation, but of judgment. And so began
the absorption of presenting through judgment.\textsuperscript{37}

Marty’s lecture on descriptive psychology from 1894/95 also gives a clear state-
ment of this view:

The key to our as yet unsolved problem of conceptual synthesis lies in the particular phe-
nomena of predicative judgements. [Predicative judgments] are nothing other than predica-
tive syntheses, produced through reflection on those syntheses, which are operated in judg-
ment by the one who predicatively judges. The so-called synthesis in understanding is first
and foremost a synthesis in judgment. (Marty 2011: 140 sq.)

The introduction of double judgements by Brentano in 1886 and adopted by
Marty at the same time therefore seems to play two roles: not only is it the an-
swer to an ontological malaise concerning the acceptance of curious entities
(like a ‘non-blue swan’, which has to be non-blue in some relevant sense), it
also gives an account of abstraction without introducing, as in ennoetism, the
problematic category of abstract partial presentings that are otherwise fused
with the intuitive presenting at its base. In this new theory, predication comes
back into the picture as a function of synthesis proper to judgments, but only
in the context of a derivative kind of judgment, which is imposed on full-fledged
existential judgements.

6 Marty’s own development after 1886 I: Superposed
presentings and lower abstraction

With the introduction of double judgments, and with it the introduction of pred-
ication as a phenomenon obtained through synthesis in judgment, Brentano sets
the scene for Marty’s later account of abstraction, in which this synthetic func-
tion of judgment is described as a linguistic function of higher abstraction.

Marty started lecturing on descriptive psychology in Prague in 1888/89, one
year after Brentano’s first lectures on the topic, and spoke regularly on the topic
until his retirement. In one early version of these lectures from 1894/95 (publish-

\textsuperscript{37} Marty Br42. German original: “Gewesenes nicht erst durch Reflexe auf dem Urteilsmodus—
gleich kommt die Modification ins Prädikat hinein.

Contra: dann ganz neue Art des Begriffes entsteht
Antwort: Nein: Begriff ist ja Prädikation.

Alte Vorstellungslehre schon durchbrochen. Indem gesehen, dass Synthese nicht Sache der
Vorstellung, sondern des Urteils. Damit fing die Absorption des Vorstellens durchs Urteil an”.
ed as Marty 2011), Marty discusses the ennoetistic conception in detail, but finally rejects it on the grounds that it involves a *hysteron proteron*. The reason for this is the following: according to ennoetism, when I see a red table, the presentation of the redness is a partial presentation, which in itself is not intuitive. As we have seen, the partial presentation and its content are isolated or abstracted from the *Gesamtvorstellung* (and its content) thanks to the noticing of and interest in the red colour of the table. This maintains the monism of presentations, but the abstraction is then possible only with the help of attention and interest, which are distinct acts. An *hysteron proteron* therefore emerges because if there is no judgment that ‘x exists’ without a presentation of ‘x’, as the Brentanian conception of acts has it, then this must also be the case for the judicative act of attention (and furthermore for the act of interest) that focuses on the partial presenting. Therefore, if, following ennoetism, abstraction is a concentration or focus of one’s judging, this judgment (and the act of interest itself) is not possible without a modification of the presentation at its base. In other words, there must be some abstractive operation at the level of the presentation in order for the judgment to focus on it. Therefore, ennoetism cannot really avoid the idea that there is some kind of abstraction involved at the level of presentations.

What, then, is Marty’s solution to the *hysteron proteron* of ennoetism? In his 1894/95 descriptive psychology lectures, Marty bites the bullet and defends the idea that abstraction operates directly at the level of presentations. However, analogously to the distinction between existential judgments and predicative judgements, which are in a relation of one-sided detachability (one can have existential judgments without predicative judgments, but one can’t have predicative judgments without existential judgments), abstract presentations are so-called ‘superposed presentations’ (*supraponierte Vorstellungen*). The idea behind the superposed presenting is that we allow for a double presenting—a intuition and an abstraction—which are in a relation of one-sided detachability: the intuitive part of the double-presentation is one-sidedly detachable, which means that concepts are distinct from intuitions, but still they are as such inseparable:

We assume with Aristotle a double presenting, i.e. besides the intuitive presenting, there is an abstract one; but we consider the second to be not simply in a causal relation with the first, but in such an inner connection that only one-sided detachability holds... Therefore, in our case too, we can call conceptual thinking a superposed presenting. Thanks to the assumption of such a superposed presenting, the phenomena of analysis and abstraction are explained in their peculiarity. (Marty 2011: 132)

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38 Compare Marty 2011: 125 sq.
Superposed presenting describes the way in which we proceed to a specific kind of abstraction, namely the abstraction that is involved strictly at a presentational level. It does not describe the kind of abstraction involved in predicative judgments: in Marty’s view, the synthesis of elements of the presentation is possibly only realized thanks to judicative synthesis.

We still have to explain the phenomena of synthesis, and this is indeed the more important complement that is required by Aristotelian conceptualism. But we can’t provide or understand such a complement before getting acquainted with the domain of judgments. (Marty 2011: 132)

For the Munich congress of psychology in 1896, Marty prepared a paper that addressed the relation between the abstraction involved in judicative synthesis, which occurs with the help of linguistic tools, and the more primitive kind of abstraction, which occurs in superposed presentings:

The phenomena of so-called abstract thinking can’t be understood without something like a real abstraction, a grasping of the non-intuitive elements of an intuition, and the capacity to connect these elements autonomously and in new ways. However, experience clearly shows that this is not a proper detaching thereof (such that the intuition would become no longer necessary); and it remains an open question whether we have here a concentration of our judgment and interest or if this exclusive engagement with a trait of the concretum is at the basis of a new phenomenon in the domain of presentations, a particular modality of presentings (conceivable only in the most inner connection with the intuition, but still distinct from it). But even for processes conceived in this way, we could consider linguistic signs to be indispensable tools. (Marty 1897/1920: 104)

In other words, for Marty the question of whether the abstractive processes of conceptual thinking are correlated with the corresponding entities, i.e. judgment contents, propositions or states of affairs, seems to be secondary at this point. It is sufficient to say that they are correlated with linguistic signs:

Piecewise, words can literally function as a substitute for abstract thinking and are as such for certain very complicated conceptual structures completely indispensable. But this symbolic thinking too can’t be universal... as a result: the most primitive acts of abstraction are independent of any language. (Marty 1897/1920: 104)

Lower abstraction, based on the idea of superposed presentings, is also at play in processes like comparison or recognition of similarities:

Children learn with and through language to build concepts and to proceed to classifications. Abstraction of concepts and constitution of classes, under which we grasp the multi-
plicity of objects, is not an easy thing. The task comprises comprehensive observation of the similarity and disparity of objects. (Marty 1904: 57)

As Marty puts it elsewhere (Marty 1892), comparing a and b involves the presentations of a and b and a further operation of distinguishing. This operation of distinguishing is superposed on the single acts of presenting a and b.

In short, while lower abstraction simply involves superposed presentings, higher abstraction involves the active contribution (with the help of linguistic tools) of judicative and predicative synthesis. This distinction is also involved in Marty’s distinction between intuitive concepts (which rely on lower abstraction) and predicative concepts (which are construed with the help of higher abstraction):

Concepts are in part abstracted from an intuition—the intuitive concepts (e.g. the concept of something red)—, but they are also composed of elements that are abstracted from many different intuitions. We will call these ‘predicatively united concepts’. In this case, traits that have been taken from different objects are united predicatively. Contradictory concepts belong to these concepts. In this predicative way, I can also unite the concepts ‘round’ and ‘square’, though this can’t be done in one intuition. Most of the concepts expressed in language are simply composed predicatively, even when the name [of the concept] is simple... “something red and something warm” is connected only in a predicative way. (Marty 1904: 78 sq.)

While predicative synthesis is essentially realized linguistically, and thereby does not necessitate an objectual correlate of the synthesis—I can present a round square without having any objectual correlate of that presentation—lower abstractions, being dependent upon the concrete intuitions on which they are based, do rely on the properties of the objects presented.

39 German original: “Das Kind lernt mit und durch die Sprache die Begriffe bilden und die Classificationen vornehmen. Die Abstraktion der Begriffe und die Bildung der Klassen, unter welchen wir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Gegenstände auffassen, ist keine leichte Sache. Es gehört dazu eine umfassende Beobachtung über die Ähnlichkeit und Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände”.

7 Marty's own development after 1886 II: Higher abstraction

An important aspect of the transition from ennoetism to its rejection was the introduction of a superposition of abstractive presentations over intuitive presentations. Both ennoetism and its rejection stipulate that no further activity is required to get from the intuitive presentation of a red spot to the concept of red. The motivation for this view is to support monism, that is the view that all mental activities are ultimately based on one single, unitary, and homogeneous faculty of the mind: presentations. This view is a central tenet of the kind of empiricism defended by Brentano and adopted by Marty. It has its limitations, however: if lower abstraction is superposed on (and thereby inseparable from) intuitive presentations, and if intuitive presentations are determined by their concrete contents, how can we explain the fact that the same content is shared by the speaker and the hearer in situations of communication? If speaker A wants to share a visual content (of e.g. a Bordeaux-red colour spot) in communication with hearer B, he will necessarily try to communicate the general features abstracted from the intuitive presentation content, since only these are reproducible (e.g. in imagination) as identical by hearer B.\(^\text{41}\) Intuitive presentations are not communicable linguistically, claims Marty:

> It is precisely because we can’t speak of linguistic communication in the strict sense, but only to the extent that, through such a communication, the same mental experience is produced at the same time in the hearer and in the speaker, that intuitions of the physical, which are infinitely variable, are excluded from the domain of linguistic communication. (Marty 1908: 433)

Relying on lower abstraction to explain how we form (for ourselves) general concepts and how we identify a shade of red seen now with another seen earlier seems to be unproblematic. It does not seem fully satisfying, however, if one wants to account for the fact that the same mental contents are shared by speaker A and hearer B. Marty became aware of this shortcoming of Brentano’s empiricism applied to acts of language very early in his career, when he was preparing his PhD dissertation. In a letter to Brentano from the 28\(^{th}\) May, 1873, he presents the problem in the following way, which prefigures Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s context principle (Frege 1884; Wittgenstein 1921):

> On the question concerning the meaning of the words, I tried not to go from the names to the statements, but rather the other way around. In this, I was driven by the reflection that only statements are actually complete linguistic expressions. The function [of expressing]

\(^{41}\) See Marty 1908: 434 sq.
and the “act of meaning” (Bedeuten) which belongs to [the expression], is precisely the ‘act of meaning’ (Bedeuten) as we must expect it of a linguistic expression according to the essence and goal of language, i.e.: it is the indication of something (Kundgabe von etwas). By contrast, the name doesn’t communicate anything, it signifies (zu erkennen geben) nothing and the way in which it means something is conceivable only as a part of the function of assertion.

However, I do not have complete trust in this. It is maybe simpler and more natural to go the other way around. Certainly, it doesn’t seem right to consider names as prior to statements in analogy with the consideration of presentations as essentially prior to judgments —since the presentation is thinkable without the judgment, while by contrast names do not seem thinkable in language without being a part of a statement. For the goal of language is communication, indication, and this is not conceivable without judging creatures and through statements. But since the judged content is the same as the presented content, it seems more natural and simpler to speak first of the presented and the named.42

The same idea is developed later in Marty (1908):

When a simple presentational suggestive (Vorstellungssuggestiv) [i.e. a name, GF] is expressed, the communication of the presentational activity, which is immediately given in it, is not intended as a means to awaken something analogous [in someone else’s mental life], but is rather only a parergon. Indeed, names are expressed only as components of statements and emotives (Emotiven). (Marty 1908: 490–91)

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Doch trau ich der Sache nicht vollkommen. Vielleicht ist es doch einfacher und natürlicher den umgekehrten Weg zu gehen. Zwar scheint es nicht richtig, dass wie man naturgemäss die Vorstellung betrachtet vor dem Urteil, in derselben Weise die Betrachtung des Namens vor der Aussage natürlicher erscheine. Denn die Vorstellung ist denkbar ohne das Urteil; dagegen die Namen in der Sprache scheinen nicht denkbar ohne als Teil der Aussage. Denn der Zweck der Sprache ist Mitteilung, Kundgabe und dies ist nicht denkbar ausser unter urteilenden Wesen und durch Aussagen. Aber da das Beurteilte dasselbe ist wie das Vorgestellte erscheint es doch natürlicher und einfacher, zuerst vom Vorgestellten und Genannten zu sprechen”. Brentano and Marty will later reject the view that the content of judgment is identical with the content of the presentation upon which it is based. For Marty in particular, this rejection was highly beneficial for the conception of language defended throughout his career. See below. In later Austro-German philosophy, Bühler rejected the strictly linguistic version of the context principle in favor of a practical or symphysical version of the principle. See Bühler 1934 and Mulligan 2012, ch. 5 on this.
The idea presented here is that we can’t construct a theory of linguistic meaning solely on the basis of the Brentanian tripartition of acts, since the one-sided detachability of presentations from judgements has no equivalence in the case of names and statements; rather, with regard to their function (which is the standpoint one should adopt when concerned with a theory of linguistic meaning), statements and names are in a peculiar relation of interdependence: a statement is constituted among other things by names, but names are functionally dependent upon statements.

It seems therefore that in real situations of communication, speaker A doesn’t simply share the abstract content expressed by ‘red’ with hearer B by simply saying ‘red’ to B. Rather, it is in the context of an assertion that the abstract content expressed by ‘red’ is communicated from A to B, e.g. in the context of ‘human blood is red’. In order for B to understand the meaning of the assertion, lower abstraction is simply not sufficient. This is why higher abstraction, which involves predicative synthesis, plays a central role in communication for Marty.

Relying on this distinction between lower and higher abstraction, he distinguishes in 1908 between four kinds of presentations: 1) intuitive or perceptive presentations, which are presentations of something real and which are not general through abstraction or individual through synthesis; 2) imperceptive presentations, which are obtained through the lower abstraction of perceptual presentations (like the presentation of ‘something that is coloured’, ‘someone who loves’, etc.); 3) comperceptive presentations, which are presentations of non real objects, like the presentation of a relation of similarity between red and orange; here also, lower abstraction is at play, but only on the imperceptive level: it is only involved in the formation of the individual imperceptive presentations of red and orange. The presentation of a given similarity somehow supervenes on the imperceptive presentations of the relata, so there is no need here for a further process of abstraction other than that involved in the imperceptive presentations. Finally, there are 4) presentations constituted by the synthesis of different elements. These might be imperceptive or comperceptive. The kind of abstraction involved in (4) is higher abstraction.

If one were to recognize co-inherence with superposition (as involved in cases of lower abstraction) as the only kind of abstraction, one would have to say that a presentation of the morning star and a presentation of the evening star are presentations of different objects, since the abstracted features in each presentation do not correspond with one another. It is only thanks to the judicative synthesis of higher abstraction that one can say that the predicates ‘...is the morning star’ and ‘...is the evening star’ apply to the same object. This is, I think, the gist of the following idea formulated in Marty (1908):
It seems to belong to the essence of presenting as the most fundamental class of mental attitudes that they exhibit an assimilation (Verühmlichung) with a quod and therefore that they only exhibit object differentiations, or in other words, that their modes are primarily and constantly founded on differences in the object. If the quod is something different, the quo of the attitude towards it is also different, but only because it conforms to another quod. A presenting can’t conform to the same quod in different ways. If the adequate presenting is different, then the presented must also be different.

Synthesis results from reflection on predications... This is not a particular mode of presenting: rather, as we have stressed many times, it is a particular mode of the judgment, an attributive or predicative acceptance (Zuerkennen\textsuperscript{43}), and its content becomes an object in the synthesis of presentations. (Marty 1908: 444).

In other words: on the level of presentings, and presentings alone, my presentation of the birthplace of Mozart and of the former Roman colony Juvavum are said to be presentings of something on the sole basis of their similarity with what they present. In this case, strictly speaking, we have to say that they present two different objects, since the respective object differences (Objektdifferenzen) are different (‘a presenting can’t conform to the same quod in different ways’). The work of lower abstraction is of no help in determining whether the same object is given here under different descriptions. What allows us to say that the same object is given under different descriptions is the predicative synthesis (higher abstraction), which is a particular mode of judgment, and from which the content of judgment (Urteilsinhalt) results. The judgment content is not the result of a generalization: it has its own existence, which grounds the truth of judgments (see Marty 1908: 295). My presentations of the birthplace of Mozart and of the Roman colony Juvavum are directed towards the same object only because the predicates ‘...is the former Roman colony Juvavum' and ‘...is the birthplace of Mozart’ are applied to the same accepted object (are zuerkannnt to the same object). Here, this means that although ‘the Roman colony Juvavum exists’ and ‘the birthplace of Mozart exists’ express different judgment-matters (Urteilsmaterie), the truth of these two judgments is grounded by the same judgment-content (Urteilsinhalt).

\textsuperscript{43} ‘Zuerkennen’ is a technical term from Brentano’s theory of double judgments. According to this theory predicative judgments like the one expressed by ‘Socrates is wise’ are 1) the acceptance (Anerkennen) of the existence of Socrates, and 2) the attributive or predicative acceptance of wiseness to Socrates (dem Sokrates Weisheit zuerkennen).
8 Final remarks

Taken partly as an answer to Husserl’s point against empiricism, the development of Marty’s account of abstraction offers a fruitful compromise between Husserl’s strong realist account of generality and Brentano’s empiricist view of abstraction. From early on, Husserl rejected the monistic account of presentations and favoured the view that between the intuition of some sensory content and the presentation or representation (Repräsentation) of an abstract intentional content, there was an important change in the mode of consciousness. Against Husserl, Marty preserves Brentano’s monistic account: intuitive and abstract presentations belong to a single, unitary, and homogeneous faculty of the mind, namely presentations. Following Brentano on this point, Marty also preserves Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental, since for him, and pace Husserl, sensings also belong to the realm of presentations, that is, they are intentional phenomena. Following Brentano in his rejection of ennoetism also brought Marty to the acceptance of double judgments, and with this to the acceptance of predication as playing a role in abstract thinking. While Brentano defended a view along these lines until around 1903 and later rejected it, Marty developed the view further and adapted it successfully into his account of linguistic communication, which was already formulated in his main lines in 1873 and presented to Brentano (see sect. 6). Following this account, the objective and identical mental contents transmitted in linguistic communication are products of higher abstraction, understood as the result of predicative synthesis. The contents of the presentations of speaker A and hearer B are not, strictly speaking, identical; but the predications performed on these contents by A and B are synthetized in the same way, i.e. in the judgment and with the help of linguistic tools. If we want to say, in a loose way of speaking, that A and B share the same mental content expressed by ‘red’, we should understand by this that A has to utter a sentence (to B) that expresses a judgment in which a predicative acceptance (Zuerkennen) of the redness of something or someone takes place (as in ‘human blood is red’). Therefore, if we can speak in some way of the sameness of content in A and B, it is thanks to the fact that A and B perform the same predicative acceptance. Marty’s theory of communication explains how this is possible: when A utters to B ‘human blood is red’, A is not only expressing (ausdrücken) a statement, he is also manifesting or in-

45 Brentano’s account of abstraction between 1886 and 1903 is exposed in detail in Brentano 2013.
indicating (*Kundgabe*) a mental content he has, but he also wants to influence B’s mental life. The latter is the meaning function of A’s statement:

The meaning function [in the broad sense] (*Bedeutung*) of the statement is to awaken in the hearer a judgment of a specific kind. Another way to put this: the statement means (*bedeutet*) “that the hearer should render a certain judgment”. (Marty 1908: 288)

In a successful situation of communication, A therefore awakens in B the same mental content as the content he is indicating in asserting ‘human blood is red’ to B. In successful situations of communication, the abstract contents of the speaker and the hearer are identical not on the basis of a mere generalization, like the one criticized by Husserl in the 2nd *Logical Investigation*, but not on the basis of subsisting identical meaning species either, as Husserl will himself suggest in the same book. Rather, according to Marty, this identity is provided by the fact that A and B perform the same predicative acceptance.

Marty’s account opens up a middle way between Husserl’s and Brentano’s accounts, rejecting Husserl’s strong realist view that there are abstract objects independently of our thinking of them, and that these are directly accessible to us, without rejecting abstract objects as such. His way of doing so is by providing a concept of higher abstraction that is in line with the normative or pragmatic meaning function of assertions, opening up Brentano’s descriptive psychology to the philosophy of language without having to rely on some of the strong realist assumptions of Husserl’s ontology.⁴⁶

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