An Onto-Epistemological Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues

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Abstract
This paper aims to suggest a new arrangement of Plato’s dialogues based on a different theory of the ontological as well as epistemological development of his philosophy. In this new arrangement, which proposes essential changes in the currently agreed upon chronology of the dialogues, Parmenides must be considered as criticizing an elementary theory of Forms and not the theory of so-called middle dialogues. Dated all as later than Parmenides, the so-called middle and late dialogues are regarded as two consecutive endeavors to resolve the problems drawn out in there; an effort in the theory of knowledge through Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo and another in ontology through the second part of Parmenides, Sophist and Republic.

Key Words: Plato; chronology; development; ontology; epistemology

Introduction
There are many determinative factors regarding the chronology of the dialogues about which our information is terribly deficient. There is no certain evidence about the date of each of the dialogues, nor any reliable information about the beginning and ending time of Plato’s writing. The most determinative issue among all chronological matters, I am inclined to insist, is the question that if did Plato use to manipulate or, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus said (1808, 406), polish, comb and curl his previously written dialogues and, if so, to what extent?¹ That there is almost no answer to this most crucial issue shows how far deficient, indefinite and inconclusive the chronological plans can be.² The fact that we do not even have enough information to decide, in case of Socratic dialogues, to what extent they are reporting or reflecting the actual dialogues of historical Socrates, and to what extent they are Plato-made stories so that even now we have a schizophrenic character between Socrates and Plato, can be good evidence for this deficiency. There are, nevertheless, somemore certain informations that can be contributive in case of the arrangement of some dialogues.

a) The only external evidence provided by Aristotle that Laws was written after Republic (Politics, II, 6) which was repeated by others³.
b) Few internal evidences provided by references in dialogues themselves including: i) the cross references in the Sophist 217a and Politicus 257a and 258b which indicate the prior composition of Sophist; ii) Timaeus 27 which hints to Critias as its sequel; iii) Theaetetus 183e where Socrates says he met Parmenides when he was

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young which has been taken as a reference to Parmenides; iv) a similar reference to the discussion of young Socrates with Parmenides this time in Sophist 217c; v) Sophist 216a refers to a previous discussion which has been thought to be referring to Theaetetus, and vi) the Timaeus 17b-19b in which Socrates tries to summarize his previous dialogue about the structure of cities, and the kind of men these cities must bring up to become the best people and so on which, among the dialogues we have now, must refer to Republic.

1. An onto-epistemological chronology

These few internal and external references are not of course sufficient to offer an arrangement among more than thirty dialogues. In such a poor situation about information and the possibility of later manipulation of the dialogues, it seems the best criteria of presenting a chronology, if it can be possible at all, should be those which are the most fundamental on the basis that what is more fundamental must be the subject of change at last. Now, what kind of criteria can be chosen for an arrangement better than the ontology and the epistemology of the dialogues?

Since the arrangement I am going to suggest here is to be based on the onto-epistemological status of the dialogues, I shall call it the Onto-Epistemological Chronology of the Dialogues (OECD). Although it is, of course, more of a philosophical chronology than a style-based one, while trying not to violate both the referential and stylometric evidences, it does not focus on other features of the content of the dialogues. In fact, the arrangement that is suggested here comes closer, I believe, to the evidences. Nonetheless, it is still a revolutionary chronology, not only in its main differences with other chronologies in respect of the place of some key dialogues, but also in its formulation of the whole corpus. Whereas I am not to divide the dialogues into different periods as all the various chronologies are used to do, I classify them in different groups I call "waves"; a name I borrowed from Plato himself. When he gets to the theory of philosopher-king in Republic, he calls it the biggest wave which must be overpassed:

I have now come to what we likened to the greatest wave (κύματι). 4 (473c6-7)

As each problem is like a wave for Plato that he has to overpass, each wave of dialogues focuses on resolving a main problem. Plato’s philosophy can best be imagined as an ocean. That his philosophy is as widespread, vast and deep as an ocean, maybe more than any other philosophy during all the history, is something that many would agree upon. It is not, nonetheless, the great and glorious character of his philosophy which is the intention of this poetical resemblance, but the characters of the waves of an ocean. Plato’s dialogues can best be divided to groups that behave like waves. Like each group of his dialogues, a wave in the ocean has a pushing force, a rising path, a high point and a fall. Each wave, independently identifiable, makes the movement of another wave possible and so the next wave has the power of its previous waves leading it to go forward to do the same for its next wave.
interwoven character of dependence-independence of each wave is what I have in mind about Plato’s dialogues. Each group/wave of dialogues has a pushing force, a problem or paradox that is to be resolved in its way by some new theories and methods. The wave, thus, rises upward making both the problem and the need of its solution as radical as possible until it gets to the highest point by resolving the problem and getting to the favourite results. Nevertheless, no solution is completely acceptable in Plato’s philosophy and there are always new problems and issues. Therefore, every wave has a fall that can be the starting point of the next wave. The suggestion of waves of dialogues saysindeed that Plato’s dialogues cannot be treated altogether by taking all the dialogues as a whole nor each of the dialogues singly and independent from all the other dialogues. The best is to treat couples of them as a chain that though is somehow independent has a special relation with couples of other dialogues. I distinguish four waves in Plato’s dialogues as follows.


ii) Epistemological Wave including: Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Cratylus, Meno andPhaedo.

iii) Ontological Wave including: ParmenidesII, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosopheros (Republic 473-541)

iv) Political Wave including: Politicus, Ideal State (Republic 357-473), Laws, Epinomis, Critias.

Besides some maybe dubious or at least less important dialogues, I dismissed Philebus, Phaedrus and Symposium from taking part in this chronology. In spite of some obvious resemblances with the dialogues of the ontological wave especially Timaeus, both in its ontological approach and even in its stylometric features, Philebus cannot be emplaced in the overall project of the waves. The ont-epistemological chronology, to be honest, is unable to read Philebus in Plato’s corpus as I think none of the other chronologies could get at an acceptable explanation of its relation with the other dialogues. We have problems also to emplace Symposium andPhaedrus in our plan. They seem to belong, nevertheless, more to the period between the epistemological and ontological waves or even coexistent with some dialogues of the latter wave. Phaedrusin which we are encountered with probably last serious echo of theory of anamnesis, on the one hand, shows its close connection with Meno and Phaedo while its presenting of the method of collection and division, on the other hand, associates it to Sophist and Politicus. Contrary to most of the scholars who date the Phaedrus quite late in Plato’s career and after Symposium, Moore (1973) insists on the converse relation of the two dialogues taking Phaedrus as earlier. Whatever their relation might be, the similarities between the two dialogues besides their incompatibility with the epistemological and ontological waves may call for a different wave.
Except the first wave, of the order of its dialogues we discuss below, the dialogues of all the other three waves are arranged chronologically. When a dialogue is located after another dialogue and before a third one in the epistemological and ontological waves, it means that either its epistemological or ontological status, is between those dialogues. The case is the same about the order of the dialogues between different waves, except the last wave in which the order of the dialogues of the political wave must be considered parallel to, or interwoven with, the dialogues of the ontological wave.

**a) Socratic wave**

The first and longest wave, includes a) a group of ten dialogues (ordered alphabetically): *Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology, Clitophon, Crito, Hippias Minor, Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages*, b) a second group of four dialogues: *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major,* and c) the first part of *Parmenides*. I distinguish these last five dialogues from all the other ones which are called Socratic dialogues ordered alphabetically. *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro and Hippias Major* must be considered, without chronological order between themselves, after the Socratic dialogues and before the first part of *Parmenides*. It is not difficult to guess how surprising it looks for the reader to see the first part of the *Parmenides* here in the first wave after Socratic dialogues and before all the other ones. This is the most revolutionary suggestion of OECD.

The leading problem of the wave is historical Socrates’ problem of acquiring knowledge reshaped by Plato in Socratic dialogues. It is this problem that leads to the theory of Forms in the Socratic dialogues and especially in *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major* and *Parmenides I*. While *Hippias Major* (301b2-6) criticizes the onto-epistemological grounds of Socratic dialogues, *Parmenides I* criticizes the theory of Forms as it is formulated in them. I agree that there is not enough material in there to be called a ‘theory’ of Forms to be criticized in *Parmenides I*, but where else can such a theory be found? The poor discussion of the theory in the early dialogues is the main reason that, as far as I know, no one has suggested that *Parmenides I* is criticizing the theory of Forms of the early dialogues by now. As we will discuss below, the theory of Forms in those dialogues is indeed constructed in a way to escape those attacks.

**b) Epistemological wave**

This wave includes a) *Pratogoras, Gorgias* and b) *Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Cratylus*, *Meno and Phaedo*. While I guess that *Gorgias* is probably later than *Protagoras*, I cannot be certain about their relation with the other six dialogues that are chronologically arranged. I called this wave epistemological because I believe that it includes Plato’s epistemological endeavor to solve the epistemological problem arisen in *Parmenides I* (133b-135a).
The backbone of this wave, however, is Plato’s epistemological project from *Theaetetus* to *Phaedo* where 1) by the distinction of knowledge and true opinion, (a) the epistemological problems of the early dialogues are resolved and (b) the epistemological ground for the theory of Forms is provided (cf. *Tim.* 51d3-5); 2) by the doctrine of *anamnesis*, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, the epistemological problem resulted from the separation of the Forms and their participant as it had been drawn out at *Parmenides* 133b-135a, is resolved. The epistemological wave includes, thus, some essential modifications in Plato’s theory of knowledge to save the theory of Forms as well as to solve some of the epistemological problems of the early dialogues. This means that this wave is an epistemological project, a doctrine that may not be accepted by some scholars. Charles Kahn, for instance, thinks that in what he calls the 'series of dialogues from the *Meno* to the *Phaedrus*, not only is not any sign of linear development, in which different epistemological theories replace each other, but 'different concepts of knowledge are used in different contexts for different purposes' (2006, 130). Although the epistemological wave does not say that there actually is a unique theory, it emphasizes the unity of a project or process. Moreover, some kind of a linear development from *Theaetetus* to *Republic* through *Meno* and *Phaedo* can be recognizable, but not a development of replacing different theories but a development of theory that gets enriched and more sophisticated. The complicated epistemological theory of *Republic* as is construed in the allegory of line can reasonably be taken as the development of the theory of the distinction of knowledge and belief in *Theaetetus* and *Meno*.

c) Ontological wave

The four dialogues of *Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos*\(^1^3\) construct the ontological wave. These four dialogues have in themselves Plato’s brilliant endeavor to solve the following problems by presenting a new ontology: i) The ontological problems of the early dialogues which was itself the ontological aspect of the problem of false belief\(^1^4\) needed a change of approach to being. This shift was done by accepting the being of not being based on the creative theory of 'difference' that is initiated in *Parmenides II* and attains to its fulfillment in *Sophist* and *Timaeus* and is used in *Timaeus* and *Philosophos*. ii) The problems of participation (131a-e) and Third Man (TM) (132a-b, 132d-133a) in *Parmenides* that are resolved by the new theory of being in *Sophist* and the new theory of Forms in *Philosophos*. The ontological wave, therefore, is to make Plato’s main modification in his understanding of being that results in the refutation of Parmenides’ principle and Plato’s achievement to a new notion of being that cannot be the subject of the previous problems, neither the problems of *Hippias Major* (301b2-6) nor *Parmenides I*. 

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4. Political wave

This wave is not chronologically separated from the ontological wave but gets along it as a somewhat synchronous wave. Although the dialogues of this wave, \textit{Politicus}, \textit{Ideal state}\textsuperscript{15} (\textit{Republic}\textsuperscript{II-V}), \textit{Laws}, \textit{Epinomis} and \textit{Critias} are arranged chronologically after one another, their dates can be neither before nor after the ontological wave, save the publication of \textit{Laws} which is almost certainly the last one of all the dialogues and after Plato’s death. \textit{Politicus} was certainly written after \textit{Sophist} and probably before \textit{Ideal state} which itself must have been composed before both the \textit{Laws} and \textit{Timaeus, Epinomis}, if it has been written by Plato himself that is strongly dubious, must be dated after the composition of \textit{Laws}. The order of the dialogues of the two ontological and political waves, considered together, must be something like this: \textit{Parmenides II}, \textit{Sophist}, \textit{Politicus}, \textit{Ideal state, Laws} (composition),\textit{Epinomis, Timaeus, Critias, Philosophos/Republic, Laws} (publication). The overall scheme of Plato’s dialogues based on our arrangement of them is drawn in scheme 1 below.

\textbf{Scheme 1. Waves of Dialogues}
The development of Plato’s philosophy based on our onto-epistemological investigation will be something like scheme 2 below. Plato who had started the Socratic wave with Socrates’ search of knowledge as the motivating force of the wave provides a theory of Forms that is referred to in dialogues like *Laches, Euthyphro*, *Charmides* and *Hippias Major*. This theory is the very theory which Allen (2013) calls the ‘earlier theory of Forms’; a theory that, as Allen argues (ibid, 67ff.), cannot be identified with the theory of Forms presented in the dialogues of the so-called middle period. The onto-epistemological grounds of these dialogues turn out as problematic in *Hippias Major* (301b2-6), as the theory of Form turns out to be problematic in the first part of *Parmenides*. Here is the first and biggest turning point of Plato’s philosophy where based on those critiques, he tries to reconstruct his philosophy by changing the epistemological and ontological principles of his philosophy.

The first effort is an effort in the theory of knowledge. In spite of the problems related to the false belief in *Euthydemus* and *Theaetetus*, knowledge turns out to be distinct from opinion in *Theaetetus*. This is, I think, the main goal of *Theaetetus*. This distinction provides the epistemological grounds for the theory of *anamnesis* and the method of hypothesis in *Meno* and *Phaedo*, theories that are to resolve the epistemological problem of *Parmenides*. Since besides the ontological aspect of the problem of false belief, the problems of participation and TM are still annoying not received their answers in the epistemological wave, the ontological wave tries to resolve them.

These problems made Plato launch another wave, this time trying to change the theory of being. The starting point of the wave is the second part of the *Parmenides* where the Parmenidean notions of being and unity are to be attacked. This attack has at least three important results: i) separating oneness from being in *Parmenides’ ‘One Being’, ii) accepting that Parmenidean One and Being are problematic and finally iii) introducing the notion of ‘difference’. Plato makes use of these results in *Sophist, Timaeus* and *Philosophos*. The points (i) and (ii) lead in *Sophist* to the rejection of Parmenidean absolute being and provides a new relation between being and difference which makes resolving the problem of false belief possible. The new relation of being and difference helps to resolve the problems of participation and TM. Therefore, at the end of the ontological wave, the onto-epistemological problems of the early dialogues and the problems of the theory of Forms in *Parmenides* are all resolved. The development of Plato’s thought based on our thesis is shown in Scheme 2 below.
Now it is time to defend the place of the dialogues that made the main changes in the current chronologies and turned it to OECD, namely *Parmenides I, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Republic* and *Laws*. 
2. Parmenides I

The place of Parmenides in the current chronologies is the cause of many problems. Not only the problems of Parmenides I, on the one hand, cannot be correctly applicable to the middle dialogues, but there are problems either to observe its problems as invalid or valid. The main problem out of the place of Parmenides in the current chronologies, generally speaking, is that they cannot provide a consistent story of Plato’s development in which Parmenides can have its deserving role. By the new place of this dialogue in OECD, we are not only to make the story consistent, but to dedicate the most prominent role to the dialogue. All Plato does in the so-called middle and late dialogues is going to be interpreted in OECD as Plato’s two efforts in the theories of knowledge and being to resolve the problems of Parmenides I.

To set Parmenides I at the end of the early dialogues and before all the other dialogues is the most astonishing and, at the same time, the most vital decision of OECD. In fact, what changes the current chronologies to OECD is a new story of the development of Plato’s thought based on the problems of the theory of Forms in Parmenides I. The new place of Parmenides I in OECD can, I think, be explained well regarding what happens in the dialogues both before and after it. In relation to the other dialogues of the Socratic wave its place is so dramatic. Having challenged the Athenian interlocutors, Socrates (the wisest man of Athens), and his theory of Forms (the very instrument by which he used to refuse his interlocutors because they were not able to explain what a thing itself, i.e. the Form, is) are now the subject of the attacks of Parmenides, a non-Athenian, in almost the same way of the dialogue. Respecting the dialogues after it, what is done in Plato’s other dialogues from Theaetetus to Phaedo in the epistemological and from Parmenides II to Philosophos in the ontological waves is nothing but Plato’s effort to reconstruct his theory of Forms with his new doctrines and methods in epistemology and ontology. The best reason for accepting OECD’s place for Parmenides I is what happened in the dialogues of both the epistemological and the ontological waves.

i) There appears to be a problem about OECD’s place for Parmenides: where is that theory of Forms that is to be observed as the subject of Parmenides’ problems? Since it is as long as a history that we are accustomed to recognize Plato’s theory of Forms with what is suggested in Phaedo and Republic, it might then be wondrous to hear that Parmenides is criticizing the theory as it is in Euthyphro, Laches and Hippias Major alongside some other Socratic dialogues and not as is proposed in Phaedo and Republic. First, if we mean by a theory a doctrine fully and completely constructed, I agree that there cannot be found such a theory in the early dialogues as it cannot be found anywhere else in the other dialogues as well. It is somewhat related to Plato’s way of introducing his theories but is more, I think, related to the theory of Forms itself. Comparing with the theory of Forms, the doctrine of anamnesis, for example, as it is introduced and articulated in Meno and Phaedo or, even more obviously, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and Republic are far better.
theorized and constructed. It shows that Plato was able to construct a theory of Forms in some of his dialogues instead of reminding the theory dispersedly here and there. It indicates, I think, that he was hesitant to theorize it from the beginning. It is not, therefore, reasonable to expect him to provide such a theory at the outset and in his early dialogues when he is wavering about it even at his much later dialogues.

Second, besides Plato’s oral tradition, there actually exists a theory of Forms in the early writings— the dialogues which have been considered by OECD as earlier than Parmenides— if we do not expect a fully constructed theory. This theory which is called by Allen (2013) as the ‘earlier theory of Forms’, differs in some essential features from the theory of Forms as construed in some of the dialogues of the epistemological and ontological waves (the so-called middle period dialogues). While the ‘earlier’ theory has some features that make it vulnerable to the attacks of Parmenides, the theory of the so-called middle period dialogues tries to resolve them. The way in which the theory tries to resolve the problems is discussed in the next section below. Nonetheless, the main point is that the universal and unequipped Forms of the early dialogues turn to the Forms, which became much more equipped (by new theories) and even considered as paradigms (especially in Republic).

Thirdly, the naive and elementary way of discussing and defending the theory by young Socrates who is ready more to suggest different views than defending one firm and fixed theory, approves that there is no such theory yet. Thus, I take Socrates’ epithet, "young", in Parmenides as functional because Parmenides refers to it as a cause of the naivety of the theory (e.g., 130e, 135c-d). The critics of Hippias Major (301bf.), thirdly, can indicate how Plato did criticize his own theories in the Socratic wave. In spite of the fact that we cannot find anywhere in the dialogues before Hippias Major where Socrates be saying that he is cutting up things in words and so on, this attitude of Socrates is criticized in there. This shows that Parmenides’ critiques can be read in the same way and there may be no necessity of finding more than what we have about the theory of Forms in the written works of the Socratic wave.

ii) Resolution of Parmenides’ problems in the middle period dialogues

The chronologists’ biggest assumption that Parmenides’ objections must refer to the middle dialogues (e.g., Cornford, 1939, 70-71; Palmer, 1999, 180; Kahn, 1996, 329) cannot be accepted because both the problems and their answers are already worked upon there (for example cf. Meinwald, 1992, 372; Dorter, 1989, 200). We are not to claim that Plato answers directly to the objections of Parmenides in the dialogues of the second and third waves for such answers cannot be found anywhere in Plato’s corpus even in his so-called late period dialogues. What we insist upon is that the epistemological and ontological grounds of the theory of Forms as is represented in the middle period dialogues is deliberately constructed so as not to be broken by those criticisms anymore. We suggest, thus, that not only Parmenides’
problems are not referred to the middle period dialogues but they are intentionally resolved there.

Of the six main objections, i) the problem of Forms for all, even worthless, things (130c-d), ii) the problems of participation (131), iii) the problem of TM (132a-b), iv) the problem of considering Forms as thoughts (132b-c), v) the problem of Forms as paradigms (132d) and vi) the epistemological problems of taking Forms as separated from particulars (133a-135a), putting aside the first and the fourth, we consider the third and the fifth as one, the regress problem or the problem of TM. Since TM difficulty, it seems, arises from a certain relation between a Form and its participants, all the second, third and fifth problems have the same basis. Therefore, if it can be shown that a) the problem of participation and also TM problem and b) the epistemological problem are resolved in some of the dialogues of the middle period, OECD’s place for Parmenides will be better justified.

1) Problems of participation and Third Man in the Republic

Allen argues that though, for Plato, the just itself is just and the beautiful itself beautiful, this does not imply SP because for this, the function "… is F" must be applied univocally to F itself and F particulars. This univocal application of F to F itself and F particulars, Allen says, can be correct only if both of them 'have identically the same character' (1998, 58) which obviously is not the case. He points that for Plato, both in the early and middle dialogues, Forms are paradigms or standards, that is they are 'things characterized not characters' (ibid, 64) and Plato did not think of them in the way he used to in the early dialogues and as common characters.21 'Not only the regress arguments', he says, 'but all of the objections to participation in the Parmenides posit an identity of character between Forms and particulars' (ibid). The rejection of the identity of F in F itself and F particulars based on the theory of Forms as paradigms in the original-copy model is justified because Forms stand to particulars 'not as predicates stand to instances of predicates but as originals stand to shadows or reflections' (1961, 333 cf. 335).

F. C. White thinks not only that the original-copy theory cannot be ascribed to all the dialogues of the so-called middle period dialogues but also that it cannot be helpful in meeting TM22 (1977, 208). His reason is that if images are images at all, it is due to the fact that their properties are 'univocally in common with their originals' (ibid, cf.199). My own point of view is that while TM is not applicable to Republic, it is applicable to all the other so-called middle dialogues. I agree with White that i) there is no common theory in the middle dialogues about the nature of the relation between the Forms and their participants; ii) the original-copy model is not applicable to Phaedo23; iii) the original-copy model cannot be helpful regarding SP. Nonetheless, I absolutely disagree with him about its help to TM. What I think is that while Plato has always been committed to SP, he tried in Republic to present the original-copy model that is completely helpful against TM. Plato does not try to reject TM by rejecting SP as some think, but he tries to reject TM while maintaining
SP. Because of the difference between original and its shadow, the original-copy model of the theory of Forms, as Allen noted, escapes TM. The reason is that by this theory, the nature of participation changes in a way that the identity of a Form and its participants is not the case anymore. This ontology, amongst so-called middle dialogues I confine to Republic, changes the nature of participation so that neither Parmenides’ problem of participation nor TM will be applicable anymore. Not only does not it reject SP but it even strengthen it. It is primarily and completely the Form of F which is F; a participant’s being F must be understood in a different way.

A paradigm of F is the perfect example of being F. The paradigm of F is not F-ness but F itself. The difference between F-ness and F itself can become evident if we examin SP about them: While SP is correct and meaningful about F itself, it looks bizarre and unacceptable about F-ness. Large itself, the paradigm of Large, its perfect example, is obviously large because it is nothing but this being large and thus SP is obviously meaningful here. But about F-ness: 'Largeness is large' or 'beauty is beautiful' looks completely unacceptable because F-ness or the concept of F cannot itself be F. TM is also based on the assumption that Plato’s theory of Forms makes a Form necessary when there is a common thing between some things. It only by understands the Form of F as F-ness, a universal concept which is in common between a Form and its participants, that the necessity of the existence of what is common between them is followed. If Forms are not universal concepts but originals of which all participants are shadows, there will be no necessity for a third thing to represent the common feature. Therefore, Plato’s original-copy model of his theory of Forms changes the relation between a Form and its participants in a way that none of the problems of participation and regress arguments of Parmenides can be effective anymore. The case is different about Phaedo because the original-copy model and the theory of Forms as paradigms are not yet theorized there.²⁴

2) The Epistemological Problem

Besides the distinction of knowledge and true belief which can clearly be helpful for the epistemological problem, Plato’s three famous doctrines, the theory of anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, do substantially aim at solving the epistemological problem resulted from the χωρισμός between the Forms and their particulars.²⁵

a) While the first appearance of the theory of anamnesisin Meno (81) is not about Forms, it is Phaedo, however, where the epistemological function of the theory is straightly directed to the Forms. Allen’s view in linking between the theory of anamnesis and the ‘epistemological problem entailed by the separation of Forms and particulars’ worths noting. He thinks that if the theory is an answer to this epistemological problem, it is not reasonable to say that the theory in Meno is not directed to the problem (1959, 172). I admit Allen’s note that the difference of the theory of anamnesis in the Meno and Phaedo is that the theory in the Phaedo solves problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which Plato,
when he wrote the *Meno*, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated (ibid, 174). The prior knowledge of the Forms does obviously intend to solve the problem of knowing separated Forms. By this theory, our knowledge is not restricted to our own world anymore and it cannot be said, as is claimed at *Parmenides* 134a-b, that none of the Forms are known by us and thus the knowledge of Forms is not a problem any longer. They are not still in us and, therefore, do not have their being in relation to the things that belong to our world strictly as it is said at *Parmenides* 133c-d. Consequently, the theory of anamnesis suggests a solution to the problem of knowledge of Forms while keeping them separated. The gap between Forms and things is as complete and huge as it is in *Parmenides* 133e. Here they are even more separated than ever. It is the big presupposition of many Plato’s commentators that he must have tried to diminish or eliminate the chōrismōs had he wanted to resolve the epistemological problem of *Parmenides*. Based on this presumption, Plato should have chosen the first and most simple way of solving problem. Thence we can see while the theory of anamnesis is so much obviously directed to the epistemological problem, no one tends to take it as a post-*Parmenides* thesis.

b) As the doctrine of anamnesis is presented as a solution to Meno’s problem, the method of hypothesis is suggested as another solution to the problem (*Meno* 86d8-e5 cf. 87a-b). The relation of the method with Meno’s paradox in the mentioned passages is obvious enough. *Phaedo*’s more complicated and better-constructed method which is not simply applying geometrians’ method as it was in *Meno*, but a more philosophical and specified one, is still related with the problem of investigating something that is out of the region of our knowledge. Socrates’ warning about the danger of watching directly an eclipse of the sun (99d-e) before discussing the method (100a f.) can throw light on this relation. Socrates who is searching for the causes is afraid of his soul completely being blind if he looks at things directly as someone who watches an eclipse of the sun might become blind in his eyes. As the one who wants to watch the eclipse must first see its reflection in water and similar things, Socrates who wants to find the *aitiai*, i.e. Forms, must use the hypotheses. Therefore, the method of hypothesis is to be, firstly, a method of getting the knowledge of the Forms (100a6). Immediately after the definition of the method at 100a, its relation with Forms becomes apparent at 100b f. The use of the method in the allegory of Line in *Republic* is also related with the Forms, though, contrary to *Meno* and *Phaedo*, it has nothing to do with anamnesis. While this method is not used in the dialectical proceeding from images to sensible things and then to the mathematical objects, the hypotheses are needed to proceed from them to the Forms and then to the first principle. Socrates’ reference to the method of geometers saying ‘they make these their hypotheses and do not think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone’ (510c6-d1), indicates his intention, i.e. using Forms in an epistemological construction which, though has knowledge as its result, is not forced to explain Forms themselves. This is strictly directed against the epistemological problems arisen in *Parmenides* 134a-c.
c) Phaedo’s theory of Forms as causes has clearly the epistemological function of the Forms as its purpose. The result Socrates gets to about the role of Forms in explanation, that only what shares in a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite while it is itself, means that we can explain a thing not only by a Form but also by what always has its character (103e2-5). Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot ’admit that Form which is opposite to that which it is’ (104b9-10). This helps him reach to some kind of necessary opposition between things that are not the opposites (105a6-b1) which enables him to extend his previous safe and foolish theory of explanation by Forms to another not foolish but still safe theory of explanation (105b6-c6). Socrates’ effort to show how Forms, without themselves being the explanation, can help us reach to a safe explanation of things is against Parmenides’ problem (133c-134a) that Forms cannot help to the knowledge of particulars.

ii) That Plato wants to restart his search of knowledge in Theaetetus due to the previous arisen problems of knowledge in Parmenides I, is what was somehow agreed upon also in the other chronologies. In this respect, its place in OECD is the same, the beginning of a wave that is to resolve the problems of knowledge by redefining what knowledge is. The main step of the dialogue, I think, is the conclusion that knowledge is not true belief (187b ff.), nor true belief plus account (201d ff.) which has the distinction of knowledge and beliefs as its result. The vital role of this distinction for the theory of Forms is obvious enough from Timaeus 51d3-5: if understanding and true opinion are two kinds, then Forms must exist.

That Theaetetus must be posited after Parmenides is something almost all the current chronologies agree with. The difference is that OECD considers it as the starting point of an epistemological effort proceeding to Meno and Phaedo and thus a hopeful effort that gets to its own goals namely establishing the epistemological grounds for the theory of Forms. It is Theaetetus’ distinction of knowledge and true opinion that is restated in Meno (85c-d, cf. 97a-98b) which is related to the case of the slave boy and the doctrine of anamnesis; a doctrine that has the duty of resolving the problem of knowledge of the separated Forms in Parmenides I (133b-135a). This doctrine is reformulated in Phaedo (72e ff.) and gets to its, what we may be allowed to call, cosmological explanation in Phaedrus. The method of hypothesis has the duty of making us capable of getting the knowledge of what we do not know (Meno 86ef.), the knowledge of particulars out of the hypothesized knowledge of the separated Forms (Phaedo 101df.) and the knowledge of the separated Forms and the first principle out of the opinions we have of the sensibles (Republic 510bf.). Therefore, the epistemological wave is a project of resolving the epistemological problem of Parmenides using the interrelated doctrines of the distinction of knowledge and belief, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis. The theory of Forms as causes in Phaedo can be interpreted in this way as well.

ii) After the absence of the theory of Forms in Theaetetus, Cratylus and Meno, surprisingly we see in the other dialogues of both the epistemological and ontological
waves that Socrates asks his interlocutors to accept the existence of the Forms only as a hypothesis. At *Phaedo* 100b4-8\(^{28}\) after recalling that he has never stopped speaking about the Forms, Socrates says:

> I turn back to those often mentioned things and proceed from them taking as hypothesis the existence (ὑποθέτεμον εἶναι) of the beautiful, itself by itself, and Good and Great and all the others. If you grant this and agree (ἀεὶ μοι δίδωσι τε καὶ συγχωρεῖσε εἶναι ταῦτα) I hope to show you the cause….

It is of the highest importance to ask why Socrates who used to take the existence of the Forms for granted in the early dialogues (e.g., *Euthyphro* 6d, *Hippias Major* 287, 289d, 292e, 294d, *Laches* 191e-192a)\(^{29}\) now is demanding that we accept it only as a hypothesis?\(^{30}\) Is it not simply because their existence had been seriously attacked in *Parmenides*? If we agree with OECD that the first part of the *Parmenides* had been composed before such hypothesizings of Forms, it can be more understandable. Now, what OECD says provides a more consistent story: solutions provided in those dialogues are purposely directed to the problems that had been drawn out before.

iv) With OECD’s arrangement, we do accept that the problems of *Parmenides* were valid in Plato’s point of view and hence we are not subject of the objection IX. OECD is safe regarding the objection X since:

a) Aristotle’s ignorance of Plato’s self-criticism as it is shown in *Parmenides*’ problems, are lot more understandable by OECD’s arrangement than by the theory of those who take the problems valid. Considering *Parmenides* as prior to the dialogues like *Phaedo* and *Republic*, where the theory is discussed more than anywhere else, could make Aristotle’s inadvertence more understandable because *Parmenides* goes farther\(^{31}\) from them in time and thus more negligible and Plato’s Forms-defending dialogues of the two waves after the Socratic wave provides no room to doubt that he believes in his theory. Even if Aristotle, who never mentions any development in Plato’s thought, had seen *Parmenides* (something we are not sure about), he must have taken it either as an old dialogue without any significant importance because there was no sign of rejection in Plato’s actual way of treating with the theory or as a pedagogic dialogue. Whatever the relation of Aristotle and *Parmenides* might have been, having in mind Aristotle’s attacks against the theory of Forms, we can be almost sure that he did not see Plato as a self-criticizing philosopher. It might be the same about the Academy.

V) None of the stylometric evidences agrees with the current place for *Parmenides* and the irregularities of *Parmenides’* style regarding so-called late dialogues has always been surprising for many scholars. The case is totally different with OECD because most of the stylometric evidences show that *Parmenides* is closer to the early or middle dialogues than the late ones.
3. Euthydemus

I am not personally satisfied with OECD’s place for Euthydemus. It must probably placed after Parmenides I, maybe before Theaetetus or during the time between Theaetetus and Meno. From an epistemological point of view, its discussion of false belief belongs to the period that is engaged with the problem of false belief, that is, in OECD, between Theaetetus and Sophist. The problem of learning either what one knows or what one does not know (276d) resembles Meno’s paradox. Euthydemus, however, seems to be, epistemologically, close to Theaetetus and before it but ontologically prior to Sophist. The problems of the possibility of telling lies (283e), impossibility of false speaking (86c-d) and the paradox of knowing or not knowing (293c-d) all belong, epistemologically, to the period of the Theaetetus and Meno. Moreover, the definition of knowing as having knowledge (ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην) at 277b9-c1 can be considered as related with the same theory at Theaetetus 197b1 and prior to the distinction of having and possessing knowledge that follows it. Nonetheless, Euthydemus has neither any clear discussion of the distinction of knowledge and belief nor of the theory of Forms. All these can allow us to consider it epistemologically close to Theaetetus and prior to it32. Furthermore, this place does not affect the current attitudes insofar as they consider it either as an early or transitional dialogue that is prior to Meno. The difference is then about its place regarding Parmenides I and Theaetetus.

4. Theaetetus and Sophist

Both the current chronologies and OECD agree upon positing Theaetetus after Parmenides, but they differ in a) the place of Parmenides and b) Theaetetus’ distance from Sophist. By bringing Parmenides to an earlier period while keeping Sophist closer to the place it had before, the OECD’s plan make a long distance between Theaetetus and Sophist considering at least Meno and Phaedo in between. Here are our proofs for this arrangement:

i) We believe that Meno’s discussion of the distinction of knowledge and opinion (97a-b, 97d-98b) must be posterior to Theaetetus’ distinction (187bff., 201dff.) simply because while it is demonstrated in the latter, it is only used in the former. Phaedo highly resembles Meno and, as it is generally agreed, belongs to the same period.

ii) Meno and Phaedo intend to resolve a) the problem of false beliefs as it was drawn out in Euthydemus and Theaetetus and b) the epistemological problem of Parmenides I, both epistemologically. The interrelated doctrines of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis try to solve those problems by a new theory of knowledge. Sophist, on the contrary, intends to deal with the problems ontologically. While the theory of anamnesis explains how we can have such a thing as true belief distinct from knowledge, which itself is kind of resolving the problem of false belief, it cannot explain how false belief can
ontologically be possible because it needs that the being of not being be accepted first, a thesis that is not accepted before *Sophist*. We also noted that besides the second part of *Parmenides*, *Sophist* cannot be later than *Republic* because it is in *Sophist* that the being of not being is accepted before to be used in *Republic*. Now, a careful consideration of this fact besides the above discussion of the epistemological mission of *Theaetetus*, *Meno* and *Phaedo* to resolve the problems of (a) and (b) epistemologically, lead us to the important result that these last three dialogues, being unable to resolve the problems ontologically, tried to present epistemological solutions. This means that they were prior to the *Sophist-Republic* solutions because the ontological solution does not require the epistemological solution. OECD seems to be, therefore, right to make the epistemological wave prior to the ontological one.

An evidence of this is the absence of the theory of *anamnesis* in *Republic*. Why it never appears in there? Mentioning the myth of Er at 619b ff. and the later incarnation at 498d as evidence, Kahn (2006, 130) thinks that 'something like' *anamnesis* is actually presupposed in *Republic*. Nonetheless, he agrees that it does not appear in an epistemological context. Our question, nonetheless, is exactly about the absence of the epistemological role of the theory in *Republic*. Kahn (ibid) thinks that the omission of the theory in *Republic* is not because Plato changed his mind about knowledge. He notes that at 518c Plato is clearly a kind of innatist. Having the allegory of Cave in mind, his suggestion is that it has some rhetorical and artistic instead of conceptual and philosophical reasons. He thinks that the theory does not fit with exactly the same part of the *Republic* we departed as *Philosophos*, i.e., from the end of the book V to the end of the book VII. I hope my discussion about Plato’s development can show why the theory is not needed anymore in *Republic*. This is an onto-epistemological and thus, contrary to Kahn, a philosophical reason. The omission of the theory in *Republic* is simply because by the new metaphysics suggested in the mentioned books of *Republic*, there is no need to the theory of *anamnesis* anymore. The classification of being and knowledge as it is drawn in the allegory of Line and the dialectical search of knowledge from the lower classes to the upper ones which is itself based on *Republic*’s specific theory of hypothesis can provide the knowledge of Forms without having them before, i.e. without *anamnesis*.

iii) What is the reason for considering *Sophist* immediately after *Theaetetus*? What is the reason for considering *Theaetetus* with *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Parmenides* as Eleatic dialogues as, for instance, Dorter (1994) does except that their characters are from Elea? It is obvious that *Theaetetus*’ reference at 183e and *Sophist*’s at 217c to *Parmenides* do not prove anything more than that they are post-*Parmenides* dialogues. Even *Sophist*’s reference at 216a to *Theaetetus* cannot mean more than that it is a later dialogue. The distance between these two dialogues can easily be shown by the obvious stylistic differences of *Theaetetus* on the one hand, and *Sophist* and *Politicus* on the other hand. While *Sophist* obviously belongs to the late period dialogues, *Theaetetus*, as Tarrant notes, 'approximates less to the style of the late dialogues as measured by stylometry than do the later books of the *Republic*.'
(2000, 37). All the time references of the dialogues that yesterday we had such a
discussion (Sophist 216a) or tomorrow will continue the other one (Theaetetus 210d)
are, I think, only dramatic considerations and cannot be taken as exact chronological
time distances.\textsuperscript{33} What these references can at most signify is that one dialogue has
the other dialogue in mind either dramatically or philosophically by intending to
continue the issue or resolve the problems that had been drawn in those dialogues, as
Sophist continues the issues of both Theaetetus and Parmenides II. To say that some
times after writing Theaetetus, Plato decided to write another dialogue with some of
the same characters especially Theaetetus and as its sequel, probably because he
wanted to pursue the same problem,\textsuperscript{34} namely the problem of false belief, but this
timewith a new ontological attitude, is quite more acceptable than Ryle’s suggestion
(1966, 284) that Plato kept Sophist and Politicus in his shelf, a suggestion that was
mostly based on the stylometric evidence. The generally agreed supposition that
Theaetetus and Sophist are sequel or, as Ryle says, ‘a sort of sequel’\textsuperscript{35} (1939, 316) has
even more problems. Theaetetus, firstly, is clearly a more close to the Socratic
dialogues and is far less complicated than Sophist. Secondly, the method of collection
and division to which Sophist is so bounded is almost absent in Theaetetus. The
trilogy of dialogues promised at Sophist 217a3, thirdly, discussing sophist, stateman
and philosopher starts with Sophist and not Theaetetus.\textsuperscript{36} The ontological status of
Sophist, fourthly and most importantly, is incomparable with that of Theaetetus that
means they must belong to different periods.

iv) Unlike Sophist and Republic that are inclined to distinguish between the objects of
knowledge and belief, Theaetetus’ epistemological theories like the theories of Meno
and Phaedo do not make distinction between the objects. In the analogy of block of
wax, the difference of two men, one judging truly while the other falsely, are
explained in their waxes (194c-e). Whereas the wax of the soul of one man is deep,
abundant and smooth and hence the signs that are imprinted on are lasting, it is vice
versa in another one: hard, shaggy, rugged and without depth which in not well
imprintable and hence does not have distinct impressions making it liable to false
judgment. The problem of false belief is to be treated here in this analogy by a
subjective analysis trying to make the difference in the knower and not in the object
of knowing. The analogy of Aviary is also the same in this respect: possessing
(κεκτήθαι) and having (ἔχειν) are distinct but not by their objects. It is the same
object, a coat, that you have when you are wearing it, but you possess when though
you have bought it, you are not wearing it now (197b8-10). A man who has birds in
his aviary possesses them but he does not have them in his control and his hand
unless he will (c1-5). So is the knowledge (197e).

The birds are the same whether you have or possess them. What is different is
the knower’s situation and not the known. It is exactly this kind of difference in the
side of the knower that is to be taken as the explanation of the distinction of
knowledge and true belief in Meno. True opinions are resembled to the statues of
Daedalus that run away and escape if not tied down: true opinions become
knowledge (ἐπιστήμημα γίγονται) after being tied down (διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμης ὀρθῆς δόξης) (a7-8) which is itself done by the αἰτια λογισμῷ (a3-4). The fact that there is obviously no distinction between the objects of knowledge and true opinion in Theaetetus and Meno keeps them far from Sophist and Republic where the being of not being makes a third status, ἔοικος, which is taken as the object of opinion and distinct from the object of knowledge.

The case of Cratylus is much the same as Theaetetus. The explanation presented there about the word doxa based on toxon meaning shooting a bow (420b), has a sign of its closeness to Theaetetus. Moreover, false speaking is still impossible (429c, 430c). So it can be said that while Theaetetus, Cratylus and Meno have distinguished between knowledge and true belief, they have not yet reached to its ontological correspondent.

5. Parmenides II

The second part of Parmenides that Palmer rightly calls 'the most puzzling and controversial text in the Platonic corpus' (1999, 148) is the only part in a dialogue that is totally different from its complementary part. Nowhere else can we make such an apparent distinction between parts of a dialogue. From Parmenides 137ff. we have a long chain of arguments hypothesizing various propositions regarding Parmenides’ "One" and again hypothesizing their opposites making an inescapable labyrinth. Its obvious difference from the first part of the dialogue makes the idea of Parmenides as an assembled dialogue more probable; an idea that has been suggested by some commentators.\textsuperscript{37}

i) The second part of the Parmenides is the initiating point of a new effort to save the theory of Forms. What Plato had tried to do in the epistemological wave was to provide solutions for the epistemological problem of Parmenides, but the problem of participation and TMar\textasciitilde;e still fatal at the end of the epistemological wave. He had to start thus from the same point, i.e., Parmenides. This was not, nevertheless, his only reason to choose Parmenides as Socrates’ interlocutor to attach this new writing to the previously written dialogue with him but there was a more principal reason. He needed to go beyond Parmenides’ notion of One Being and this, I believe, was his main reason. What were to be reassessed was (1) Parmenides’ principle of the tight attachment of "one" and "being" as the cause of his famous principle that 'being is one' and (2) Parmenidean understanding of "being" which was the cause of his principle of the impossibility of being of not being. In agreement with many commentators, I think Parmenides II is the first step of Plato’s going beyond these two notions, and this can be observed as a major purpose of the dialogue. It is in this passage that Plato criticizes the relation of being and the same (162d) which can be considered both as the basis and the necessary result of Parmenides’ principle, 'Being is one'. This criticism that makes use of the notion of difference (143b) is only the preparatory step of his use of this notion in Sophist (255d ff.) by which the
Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is rejected. If we read Parmenides II and Sophist as the sequel steps of an ontological project, we can see how the project of rejecting Parmenidean notions of One and Being leads to the notion of difference which itself is the basis of Plato’s new ontology in Sophist and Republic. This ontology has the solution of Parmenides I’s problems of participation and TM and, at the same time, the problem of false belief. The second part of the Parmenides must then be dated after the epistemological wave and as the starting point of the ontological wave. Why can't we, one might ask, observe this ontological wave parallel to, or interwoven with, the epistemological wave? My main reason for the chronological order of two waves is that the dialogues of the epistemological wave, or at least Meno and Phaedo, are still unaware of the ontological wave’s solution.

ii) The place of Parmenides II in OECD differs in two main regards from its place in the current chronologies: Theaetetus and Republic; while the contemporary chronologies are accustomed to consider Parmenides, and consequently its second part, before Theaetetus and after Republic, we are suggesting its contrary in OECD. The change OECD implements regarding the place of these three dialogues is mostly because Parmenides II must ontologically be considered between Theaetetus and Republic. Theaetetus’ all epistemological efforts to answer the question ‘what is knowledge?’ (145a) with theories like knowledge is perception (151e ff.) or true judgment (187b) or true judgment plus an account (201d) besides the analogies of block of wax (191c-e), the Aviary (197bff.) and the analogy of knowledge to bird and the explanation of getting knowledge as hunting, all still are Plato’s epistemological efforts and do not think about the ontological solution. Regarding ontological issues, they are still faithful to Parmenides and are not to challenge his principles as Parmenides II does. It is directly asserted at 180e-181a that Socrates got stuck between Parmenidean and Heraclitean theories and wants to put a fight and escape. This effort, however, does not bring it to the point of Parmenides II. At Theaetetus 167a7-8 we are being said that ‘it is impossible to opine what is not (οὐτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι)’ and at 189a10: ‘opining not being is opining nothing (μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει)’.

In Parmenides II, we have not still gone out of Parmenides’ dominance but the first step is taken. At 160e, we are encountered with the necessity of dealing with not being with some adjectives like “this” or ”that” and so on. Though still unable to be, not being must necessarily partake of many things:

The One indeed cannot be, if it is not, but it is necessary that nothing prevent it from partaking of many things. (160e7-161a1)

The whole of the sophisticated arguments of Parmenides II can show how much the Parmenides’ understanding of being is problematic. What is said, for instance, at 162a can be a good example: If the one -which is not- is to be not being,
it must have being a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as what is
must have not-being what is not, if it is to be completely. Although the Parmenidean
being is not overpassed in Parmenides II, these discussion shows that it is not
accepted as before. Theaetetus’ attention to the problem of Parmenidean being is
confined to its contradiction with Heraclitean notion of flux. This understanding, I
believe, is much more elementary than Parmenides II’s attention to the problems
arisen from Parmenides’ understanding of the concept of being. If our arguments are
sound, Parmenides II cannot be prior to Theaetetus because of its ontological status.
This status, on the contrary, makes it prior to Sophist and Republic. The incomplete
achievement to the being of not being in Parmenides II must antecedate its full
achievement in Sophist and its implementation in Republic.

iii) Being dominant in Sophist and Politicus and absent from Theaetetus, the method
of collection and division has a predominant role in the second part of Parmenides
while cannot be seen in the first part of this dialogue. This is fully consistent with
OECD’s arrangement. While the first part of Parmenides and the Theaetetus are
dated as prior to the dialogues of the epistemological wave, all unaware of the
method of collection and division, the second part of Parmenides, the Sophist and
Politicus are engaged with this new method.

iv) Almost all the stylometric evidences are pro the antecedent date of Parmenides
regarding Republic. ‘In sofar as stylometry suggests anything’, Tarrant says, ‘it
strongly suggests that both works [i.e. Theaetetus and Parmenides] were begun far
earlier than the Republic was finished’ (2000, 141).

6. Republic and Laws

The place of the Republic is the most confusing in the arrangement of the
dialogues. We have the following evidences:
a) Based on ontological features, it must be dated after Sophist and Parmenides II.
b) Because of its ontological solution of the problems of participation and TM, it
must be dated after Parmenides I.
c) Based on Aristotle’s testimony (Politics, II, 6), it is prior to Laws.
d) Laws is unaware of philosopher-king theory of Republic which implies that its place
after the final version of Republic might be problematic.
e) Stylometric evidences strongly suggest that Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias
and Philebus belong to the same period of Laws.

While the ontological evidences, (a) and (b), ask us to consider Republic after
Sophist and Parmenides, the political evidences, (c) and (d), alongside the
stylometric evidences (e), tells that it must be prior to the so called late dialogues.
The only solution is what has been suggested by some scholars that Republic is not a
simple dialogue but a later composition of some dialogues. Except Republic its
separation and being early is a more accepted fact, the passage 473-571 is
also later attachment. Our reasons for its attachment are as follows.
i) After first book’s aporetic ending like a Socratic dialogue, being unable to find what justice is, the second book starts by Socrates’ statement that: ‘when I said this [referring to his last sentences in the first book, namely that he could not find what justice is and soon], I thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to have been only a prelude’ (357a). The discussion continues with the goodness or badness of injustice pursuing the first book’s discussion. The search of finding individual justice transfers to a search for justice in a city by Socrates’ suggestion that they might be more successful to find it if they search it in a larger thing, a city (368d), which leads them to construct a city in order to find justice there. This is the directing line of the argument which tends to be exclusively treating with many political issues about all the details of constructing a city. After more than 65 Stephanus pages, we are given the result of this investigation of justice in the city, the larger object of investigation, in the middle of the fourth book (433). The discussants then try to find the justice in the individual by applying the result they got from their investigation of justice in the city (434e ff.). This leads to the tripartite structure of the soul based on the structure of the city and finally to the result that the justice in an individual is just the same as it was in a city, that is, when each of its parts does its own work (441d ff.). They then look for injustice (444a ff.) and try to answer if justice is profitable or not (444e ff.) which leads itself to the comparison between types of souls and types of political constitutions (448c ff.). This topic is, however, postponed because of Polemarchus’ demand for the explanation of what was said before, namely the question that how possessions can be held in common, which is at the very beginning of the fifth Book (449a). This topic, then, runs the discussion and brings some marginal discussions by 471d where the question of possibility of such an ideal city arises. In his first answer to the problem, Plato points to the fact that what he had drawn out was only a theoretical model that does not need to be proved as a possible city (472). I think this can be the end of the story of the Ideal State that had been started from the beginning of the second Book.

What is said from 473c on is completely a new project and, I think, is attached to the Ideal State (357-472). The cities we have, Socrates says, is able to make the ideal state possible if the 'greatest wave' can be passed. This greatest wave is nothing but the theory of philosopher-king. Socrates is afraid of being ridiculed and laughed because of the theory (473c7-9) which shows both its importance and Socrates’ understandable hesitation about it. Socrates’ own statement can approve this:

Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize ... Glaucon! cities will have no rest from evils nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we have been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It is because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long...

(473c11-e4)
Although this long time hesitation may hint that what we are being said is something that had been doubted to be written or published, we are not going to rely only on this. What happens after this and its overall difference from Ideal State can be more decisive. The theory of philosopher-king brings forth the question that: who are the true philosophers? (475e3) This question turns the discussion to a discussion of the philosopher from 473c on. Besides the fact that all of these pages are discussing onto-epistemological issues that are related to the subject of philosopher, "philosopher" itself is the subject of the discussions. The question of "who are the philosophers?" leads to the passage (476e-479e) that distinguishes knowledge as what is set over being from opinion as what is set over what both is and is not. As the lovers of the objects of knowledge, i.e., what is, philosophers are distinct from the lovers of sights and sounds who love the objects of opinion (479e-484a). Philosophers are those who are able to grasp what the lovers of sights and sounds are not able, namely, what is always the same (484b). It is the nature (φύσις) of philosopher which is the subject of inquiry (485a5, at 485a10: φιλοσόφων φύσεως) and is described at 492a1-5 and is again connected with things themselves at 493ef.. Socrates then says that the philosophic nature is altered in the constitutions of his time and thus links the discussion of philosopher to that of the Ideal State (497b ff.) and concludes that philosophers are the best guardians of the city (503b) and they must exercise in many subjects (503e) most importantly the Form of the Good (504e-505a). This leads to the allegories of Sun, Line and Cave in the sixth and seventh books. After a full discussion of the way guardians must be brought about with different sciences in their careers to become philosophers, those who survived all the tests and saw the Form of the Good can order the city and become the philosopher-kings (540a f.). It is the end of the search for philosopher and the way the philosopher must be brought about in the city and also the end of the seventh book (541b). Therefore, it can be said that the passage from the last pages of book V to the end of book VII, i.e., 473c-541b, has the philosopher as its subject.

In addition to the unity of this passage of which we tried to provide a very short and thus insufficient review, what makes its attachment to the Ideal State more probable is that this discussion of philosopher is in the middle of the discussion of common possession in the city; a discussion that had been started from the beginning of fifth book (449) and continued till 471d where the problem of the possibility of the ideal state directs the discussion to the topic of the philosopher at 473c. By the end of the discussion about philosopher, we immediately fall into the same discussion at the very beginning of book VIII, even without any introduction or a linking paragraph:

Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following: If a city is to achieve the height of good government, wives must be in common, children and all their education must be in common... (453a1f.)
After his long diversion from the previous topic, Socrates needs the beginning topic to be recalled and Glaucon, reminding the topic, says: 'you were talking as you had completed the description of the city' (543c7-8). If I am right in my consideration of the part we distinguished as an attachment, having in mind its topic, philosopher, and its place in OECD, after Sophist and Politicus, the first probability will be that this later attachment is so similar in its topic as well as its order, to the unwritten third part of the trilogy of sophist, statesman and philosopher that though had been promised at Sophist 217a3, has never been published. This motivated me to suggest that this passage that I cut up from the Republic might be the Philosophos, the third part of the trilogy. Plato never published the third part maybe because he was afraid, as he himself says, of its theme, namely that philosophers must be the kings, besides the fact that he got stuck in another project and thus tried to reshape what he had in mind, or maybe even had somehow written, as the third part of the trilogy and emplace it in the larger plan of Republic. In her book, Philosophos: Plato’s Missing Dialogue (2012), Gill believes that based on the fact that it is not included in the ancient survived list of Plato’s dialogues, 'we can be fairly sure that the dialogue was not written and lost' (p.1). She thinks that Plato left it on purpose and 'deliberately withholds' it to stimulate his audience to combine the pieces about the subject in the other dialogues. Focusing on Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist, she does not let, of course, Republic to take part in this combining because, based on SCD Republic must be prior to all of them.

OECD’s arrangement of the ontological and political waves can explain why Plato who was thinking of that trilogy fell into the political wave. Suppose that at the time of composing Sophist, Plato was thinking that after writing about it, he will write a dialogue about statesman and then another one about philosopher as the culmination of the trilogy. It is not strange to imagine that this path was deviated to a political inquiry when he became engaged with political issues in Politicus. Instead of continuing it with a dialogue about philosopher, he became thus busy with Ideal State and Laws. Maybe it was only after Timaeus and with the use of all the hierarchical models he had discovered from Ideal State onward that he decided to assemble what he had in mind, or maybe in his shelf (!), about philosopher with his search for the Ideal State and based on the question of 'what is justice?' in Republic I, which had been composed long time ago. If I am right in this suggestion, both the posterior date of the Philosophos and its difference from Ideal State can be more acceptable.

ii) The epistemological difference between the Philosophos and Ideal State also worths remarking. What is said in the third book at 402b, that to know the copy, knowledge of original is necessary, seems prior to and even inconsistent, though not necessarily, with what is said in the sixth book and in the theory of hypothesis by which one goes upside from copy to original without having the knowledge of the original. The difference of 473-571 from the other passages of Republic and specially Ideal States is also clear from its mostly metaphysical content that is definitely
separable from its previous passage dealing exclusively with political issues. This content is the very one which we considered as the evidence of Republic’s being later than Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus. Therefore, if we accept that Republic II-X has at least two assembled parts, we will become able to manage the confusion arisen from the arrangement of Republic and Laws. It is the political part of Republic, Ideal state, which is prior to Laws and is referred there and, probably, was in Aristotle’s mind\(^{46}\) when said that Laws is after Republic. The later date of the Philosophos, the very passage the idea of philosopher-king is drawn out there can also suggest a solution to the problem of Law’s negligence of the philosopher-king doctrine that had surprised commentators.

iii) 'Before stylometry', as Prior asserts, 'almost all scholars would have placed the Republic after the Sophist' (1985, 168). This was due to the stylometric evidences that Republic is dated now in SCD as middle and prior to many dialogues. Nonetheless, the assembled character of Republic suggests a sound solution for the biggest problematic decision of OECD regarding stylometric evidences. Suppose that Plato who had composed the first book of Republic much earlier and most probably in his early period of writing and the Ideal State in another time, now decides to compose the Republic which includes not only those dialogues but what was in his mind or even written, the Philosophos, as the third part of the trilogy. It is not then of a shock to say that since he wanted to rewrite them as the continuation of Republic I, he tried to keep a unified style as far as possible. Lutoslavski also approves a later date for the books VI and VII of Republic.\(^{47}\)

7. Timaeus

By the suggestion of the distinction of the Philosophos from the Ideal State, the date OECD considered for Timaeus becomes more acceptable. The passage in Timaeus (17a, 18b) which has always been taken as referring to Republic, is indeed referring to Ideal State. This helps us consider it as a prior dialogue to Republic because it seems that its ontological status indicates its place between Sophist and Philosophos.\(^{48}\) Owen’s main reasons for dating Timaeus after Republic and before Politicus (1998, 260-261) are these:

a) The opening of the dialogue (17a) refers to a dialogue that had occurred the previous day that most probably is Republic.

b) At Timaeus 18b the idea that guardians must have no gold or silver or any private property refers to Republic 417a and 547b-548b.

c) The Politicus (at 292a, c and 293a, c-d) insists four times (?) that whether the ruler has any wealth is completely irrelevant to the quality of his governance. Owen thinks that this is said as a novel doctrine.

d) The system of marriage of the guardians in Republic (457c-465c) echoed in Timaeus (18c-d) is abandoned in Politicus (310c-311c).

These evidences can lead to another arrangement between the dialogues if we accept Republic II-X as having two parts, the Ideal State and the Philosophos: (a) and
(b) are clearly referring to the Ideal State and not to the Philosophos. Moreover, not only (c) and (d) are not problematic regarding OECD’s arrangement but they can even be supportive because the more elementary status of Politicus’ political discussion regarding Ideal State is thoroughly consistent with OECD’s later date for Ideal State and Republic. Unlike Owen, I think what is said about the rulers’ wealth (293c8-d2) can be more of an evidence approving the priority of Politicus’ theory than presenting a new theory against the past theory. Unlike Owen who thinks that this is a novel doctrine, I think it might equally mean that Plato is not yet achieved to his more complicated theory of propertyless rulers. Moreover, that Plato does not speak in Politicus of the marriage of the guardians can similarly be out of the fact that Politicus is still unaware of the idea. Owen, however, agrees that neither Timaeus nor Critias seem to know anything about Republic’s doctrine that ‘a state may be saved by the supremacy not of immutable laws but of an ἀνῖχθος φρόνιμος above the law’ (1998, 264). Owen and Nicholas P. White (1976, 91) are right that Timaeus is closer to Republic than the late dialogues but Cherniss is also right that it is later than Parmenides.

Notes

1 Thesleff says that in spite of the fact that the only evidence from which we can infer the chronology is the internal evidence, ‘the value of such evidence is open to the general criticism that many, if not all, may have been re-written’ (1989, 7). ‘There is no reason’, he continues, ‘to suppose that Plato left his writing in exactly the same state in which they were first composed’. (ibid)

2 There are some issues about Plato’s life that can overall change any chronological order. What Grombie calls ‘the most critical event’ (1969, 363) in Plato’s life, namely his probable being prosecuted for defamation and being forbidden to teach at 372 can be one of these issues.

3 E.g. Diognes Laertius (Lives, III, 37), Olympiodorus (Prol. VI, 24)

4 This kind of naming is also compatible with Plato’s own way of theorizing as he always makes use of intangible things as models trying to explain complicated matters.

5 By Parmenides I, I mean the first part of the dialogue which is discussing the problems of Socrates’ theory of Forms and lasts till 137. Parmenides II consists the part from 137 to the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is being discussed.

6 The mentions of the theory in Philebus (342b) and Laws (732b) appear to be, as Sayre (2005, 193) notes, ‘entirely removed’ from the sense it had before. I am not convinced with Kahn’s (1996, 367) appealing to Politicus 277d and Timaeus 41e-42d as the passages in which the theory is alluded or implied.

7 Kahn (1996, 373) points to some evidences of Phaedrus’ referring to Republic (cf. Hackforth (1952, 3-7). Irwin believes that Phaedrus must be considered as a ‘revision’ or ‘development’ of the views of both Republic and Symposium and not an anticipation of them (1995, 12).
Being certain about *Symposium*’s posterior date, Moore asserts that while writing *Symposium*, Plato must have ‘firmly’ had *Phaedrus* in mind. Mostly based on *Phaedrus*’ more sophisticated logic represented in its method of collection and division, Dillon (1973) argues against him.

By so calling them, I do not mean, of course, that they are the real dialogues of historical Socrates.

Cf. Fine, 2003, 29

The relation of *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus* is a Problem with which the current chronologies do not know what to do (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While *Cratylus* looks close to the early dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to *Theaetetus*, which is considered far from the early and after the middle period dialogues. While OECD resolves this problem easily considering *Theaetetus* as early, about the order between *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus* I cannot be certain at all since there cannot be found any certain ontological or epistemological priority between them. All that can be said is that they are close to each other as some of their main themes, especially the problems of flux, Protagoras’ relativism and false belief might bring to mind. Never holding a ‘confident opinion’, Runciman, however, dates *Cratylus* ‘somewhere before’ *Theaetetus* (ibid).

*Gorgias* mentions the distinction of knowledge and true opinion without discussing it, a distinction proved in *Theaetetus* and used in *Meno*. While it is accepted that there can be false conviction besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδής καὶ ἀληθής) (454d5), false knowledge (ἐπιστήμη…ψευδής) (d6-d7) is strongly prohibited. *Gorgias* accepts the first simply by saying Νάι and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς. It shows, though not strongly, that they might have been composed after *Theaetetus* and before *Meno*. While, on the other hand, the problem of teachability of virtue seems to indicate that both *Gorgias* and *Protagoras* may belong to the period of *Meno*, there might be some indications of their priority. I found Jane M. Day’s (1994 cf. 10) points about the priority of *Protagoras* tenable though maybe I am not as certain as she appears to be. She dates *Gorgias* later than *Protagoras* and closer to *Meno*.

As it will be discussed in detail, what I call as an independent dialogue is nothing but *Republic* 473-541 where the philosopher is the subject of discussion.

The epistemological aspect of the problem had been resolved by the distinction of knowledge and true belief in the epistemological wave.

That the books II-V of the *Republic* is mostly the same as the famous *Ideal State* has been suggested before. Cf., e.g., Ryle (1966)

Prior (1985, 9) insists that the theory of Forms is ‘as explicitly present’ in *Euthyphro* as it is in *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

Cornford’s suggestion that the aim of the dialogue is to examine and reject the experimental approach to knowledge is not compatible with the place he and others dedicate to *Theaetetus*. It is not a suitable time, to reject the experimental approach after *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic* since they are already out of the approach and need no rejection.

That the first part of *Parmenides* has the appearance of a work complete in itself, is something can hardly be denied even by those scholars, like Meinwald, who do not believe it as distinct from the second part and written at a different time (1991, 5-6).
Referring to *Euthyphro* (5d) and *Hippias Major* (300a-b), Allen notes that the Forms in the early dialogues are universal, which is the same (ταὐτόν), common (κοινόν) in them and something identical (τίταὐτό) in all its cases (2013, 69-70).

In his second letter (314c3-4), Plato asserts that his written works are not the works of Plato but of a Socrates ‘made fair and young (καλοῦκαὶ νέουγεγογοντος).’ This younghood must of course be considered as compared to the real Socrates who was adult and old and, thus, does not mean as young as is represented in *Parmenides*.

Thinking that there is a ‘partial or relative’ identification of universals and paradigms, Gerson (1998, 138) criticizes their complete distinction.

He even points that appealing to the model of original-copy cannot be helpful to avoid SP while there are some ‘independent reasons’ that Plato was committed to it (White, 1977, 211).

Allen (1997, 106) mentions *Phaedo* 74b-75d as an evidence for the theory of paradigm in this dialogue. About *Republic* V, which White thinks is not committed to the theory, I am not convinced since I think there are not enough about the case in this book. White brings the use of μετέχεινοικονομίαι the use of πράγματακαὶμετέχοντα as evidence (1977, 201-2) which, I think, prove nothing.

Annas mentions *Phaedo* 74e (besides *Republic, Euthyphro and Theaetetus* (176e ?)) as one of the places in which Forms are considered as paradigms (1974, 278, n.50). Although it might be close to paradigm-based understanding of Forms, I am not certain about taking it so. That Form is something that participants want to be like (βούλεταὶ μὲν τουτο ... εἶναι οἶνον) but fall short, cannot necessarily mean that the Form is a paradigm here. Though the relation of Forms and participants in *Phaedo* might be directed towards what it will be in *Republic*, I do not think that we are allowed to assume them the same.Regarding the mention of paradigm in *Euthyphro* 6e the best suggestion is, I think, that it is not, as Fujisawa (1974, 43) says, ‘a case of genuine paradigmatism we find in later dialogues’ (cf. Lutoslawski 1897, 199-200).

Listing the anamnesis in *Meno*, the method of hypothesis in *Phaedo* and the non-hypothetical principle in *Republic* as three answers to the question of the knowledge of the Forms, Sayre reasonably thinks that the first one is the simplest. (2005, 299)

It is generally agreed that some uses of εἰδός or ἰδέχθην *Theaetetus* (e.g., 184d3, 203c6, 203e4, 204a1, 205d4-5) are not in the same technical sense.

Besides *Meno* 72b-c, 75a can also correctly be taken as a reference to the theory though the word εἰδός at 72c7 is not repeated here again. These do not, nonetheless, refuse Fine’s correct assertion that the theory of Forms is ‘muted’ in *Meno* (2003, 44).

There are some other passages where Plato puts question mark in front of the existence of Forms. Cf. e.g. *Phaedo* 65d, 74a, 76e-77a, *Protagoras* 330c, *Cratatus* 439c-d, *Timaeus* 51b-c.

Nicholas P. White, on the contrary, thinks that in the early dialogues Plato talks ‘as if’ he believed in Forms (1976, 6).

Vlastos (1991, 58f.) points to this difference between so-called early and middle dialogues.

29
Kahn argues that we have no reason that Aristotle had any evidence for the development of Plato’s thought in his early period (1996, 81) especially if we observe that the date of Aristotle’s arriving at the Academy is when Plato was at least sixty years old.

In spite of all these points, *Euthydemus*’ way of talking about dialecticians at 290c sounds surprisingly like *Republic*.

The allusions to the historical events that occur occasionally in some dialogues can be interpreted merely as dramatic or, as Mackey says, 'later interpolations' using past events (1928, 11). As Maccabe (2008, 96) points out, even the dialogues making vigorous claims to historicity 'bear the marks of fiction'. The writer of the dialogues, like a play writer, designs the scene, chooses the most suitable location and time and to make it appear more real, uses some real events of that time and location. It cannot be denied that the dramatic features of the dialogues are not negligible for Plato. We will not thus rely on the allusions to the historical events.

Thinking that the reappearance of Theaetetus in *Sophist* is a 'clear reminder of continuity' of the same project (2013, 94), Kahn accepts that 'a considerable lapse of time' might have occurred between their composition.

He thinks that the two dialogues were composed after the *Parmenides* 'as a whole' (1939, 316-317).

Gill’s suggestion (2012, 1) of a tetralogy opening with *Theaetetus* is not tenable. Besides the cross references of which we discussed above, I cannot understand how she can take the similarity of characters as an evidence whereas the difference of *Theaetetus* with those two in this respect is obvious enough. The change of Socrates as the main speaker in *Theaetetus* to a visitor from Elea as the leading character in the other two dialogues does not let us agree with her. Suppose we accept that the change of Socrates with a visitor from Elea in *Sophist* might be related to the duty of the dialogue in criticizing Parmenides: to guarantee, as Kahn (2013, 94) suggest, 'an atmosphere of intellectual sympathy'. What then about *Politicus*? Gill thinks, however, that 'Plato substantially revised an earlier version of the *Theaetetus* to fit into a series with the *Sophist* and *Statesman*'(p.3, n. 8).

Ryle, for example, thinks that these two parts were composed at 'considerably' different dates (1966, 216). Also cf. Thesleff (1989, 19) and Tarrant (2000, 140-141)

There is an explicit shift from epistemology to ontology at 188c-d saying that perhaps the problem of false belief is better to be dealt with the notions of being and not being rather than knowing and not knowing which immediately leads to the problem of the impossibility of thinking about not being (188d ff.).


Nails (1998, 174) notes: 'We have perhaps less hope of accurately dating the *Republic* than of any other dialogue in the corpus'. Cherniss’ phrases like ‘orthodox opinion’ (1998, 293) about the place of *Republic* is interesting.

I am not convinced with Thesleff’s note that the opening of the *Parmenides* suggests that the *Republic* was finished at the time. He accepts, however, that the book X and 'some passages' in the earlier books might have been added later (1989, 19).

Moreover, as Lane (2006, 185) mentions, the book IX of the *Laws* implicitly suggests that the city drawn out in this dialogue is a second-best city as comparing not to the city of *Republic* but to that of the *Politicus*. 
30

43 That Aristotle’s evidence is in a political text discussing political issues might allow us to take it more as political evidence though it is not a political evidence but a chronological one.

44 See also: 499a

45 Aristotle’s statement in Politics II 1264b39 that Socrates filled up the Republic with ‘extraneous discourses’ can be noteworthy. Reminding that the ‘three résumés of the original Ideal State’ shows that it contained nothing about justice, theological fables or the dispensability of Homer, dialectic and so on, Ryle adds that our version of the Republic was not assembled until Plato returned from Sicily (1966, 244-245).

46 That Aristotle tells this in a political passage (Politics II, 6) makes this more probable. However, the reason can simply be the date of Law’s publication which is surely later than Republic.

47 There are other reasons that might be taken as evidence for the lateness of the Philosophos like its Pythagorean spirit, its discussion of the Good that seems to be the closest passage among Plato’s dialogues to his famous lecture ‘On the Good’ and also Philebus.

48 Ryle notes that the discussion of pleasure at Republic 583b ‘presupposes’ and advances ‘a long way beyond’ Timaeus (1966, 249).

49 Lane (2006, 180) speaks of two points in Politicus that went unnoticed in Republic; (1) the knowledge of the Good ‘in time’ (2) which must be made authoritative over the requirements of fixed laws. These, however, cannot prove anything about the order of the dialogues.

50 Rickless also prefers to agree with Owen mostly because of the theory of Forms in Timaeus which resembles that of Republic (2007, 8).

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