The Development of Ontology and Epistemology in Plato’s Philosophy

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This is a draft book derived from my doctoral thesis in University of Tehran. I have prepared it for peer review to correct its probable problems to be ready to be published as a book. Thus it is not a published book yet.
Introduction

Investigating Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological status in each of his dialogues, this book is going to challenge the current theories of Plato’s development and suggest a new theory.

Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of the first two chapters is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’s ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and being of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period.

The first chapter entitled “Plato’s Onto-Epistemological Principles in the Early Dialogues” tries to draw out six principles out of Plato’s early dialogues specially Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Hippos Major and Euthydemus. We discuss that these principles present kind of a bipolar as well as split ontology and epistemology. The second chapter, “Revision of First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues”, aims to argue that the onto-epistemological principles of the early dialogues are being radically changed in three dialogues of Meno, Phaedo and Republic in the middle period dialogues. Not only the bipolar ontology and epistemology of the early dialogues give place to a tripartite ontology and epistemology but also their split being and knowledge are inclined to be replaced by bound being and knowledge.

Our next step in this book is to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato says that something both is and is not, he is applying difference on being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing Aristotle’s terminology, 'is is (estii) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s ontology in Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in general. Thence, chapter three, “Pollachos Esti; Plato’s Ontology in Sophist and Republic”, intends to
discuss that i) the theories of ‘being as difference’ and ‘being of a copy’, considered together in what we call the theory of *pollachos esti*, can well be compared to the structure of *pollachos legetai* in Aristotle when it is attached to the theories of *pros hen* and substance; and ii) the ontology of *Republic* V-VII is based on this theory and is, thus, almost the same as the ontology of *Sophist*.

Investigating the most famous chronologies of the last 150 years from Campbell on, the fourth chapter, “The Standard Chronology of the Dialogues”, is to argue that all of them have a somewhat fix and dogmatic arrangement of Plato’s dialogues in which *Meno, Phaedo* and *Republic* are located after some early dialogues and before *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, on the one hand, and all the so-called late period dialogues after *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* on the other hand. It is also reminded that all that the stylometric evidences can show is the lateness and homogeneity of the late period dialogues and, thence, nothing about the relation between dialogues like *Theaetetus, Parmenides* and *Republic*.

The standard chronology is the subject of many criticisms some of which are discussed in our fifth chapter, “Objections against the Standard Chronology”, in three groups. While the first group of objections criticizes the place of the middle period dialogues immediately after the early ones, the second group attacks the place of late dialogues after the middle ones. The third group includes objections against the place of *Parmenides* in the standard chronology and tries to show that it cannot be considered after the middle period dialogues.

The efforts of the first five chapters lead to a new theory of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological development in an onto-epistemological chronology of his dialogues in our sixth chapter, “An Onto-Epistemological Chronology of Plato’s dialogues”. Instead of three periods, this chronology includes four waves of dialogues, Socratic wave, ontological wave, epistemological wave and political wave, in which all the so-called middle and late period dialogues are to be interpreted based on the problems presented in *Parmenides I*. The main changes we suggest in the standard chronology include firstly that *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides I* must be posited before *Meno* and *Phaedo* and, secondly, *Republic* must be posited after *Sophist*. Based on this arrangement, we can find *Philosophos*, Plato’s promised but unwritten dialogue, inside *Republic*. 
Chapter One

The Onto-Epistemological Principles of the Early Dialogues

The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007)\(^1\) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists \(^2\) like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic.\(^3\)

In his well-known article, *Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO*, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to ‘elenctic’ (*Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I*) and ‘transitional’ (*Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno*) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos’ chronological order) *Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus* (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are ‘so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s’ (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses\(^4\) is

\(^1\) See also: Prior (1985, 10-37)
\(^2\) Gerson (2002, 85) distinguishes between three groups of antidevelopmentalists which include unitarists, those who take the dialogues protreptic and agnosticistic.
\(^3\) Being a unitarist, Cormack (2006, 15) thinks that the early dialogues are "protreptic". He (ibid, 9-10) points to the fact that the "historical interpretation" which tries to refer the distinction of the early and middle dialogues to the distinction between Socrates and Plato and the developmental interpretations are not mutually exclusive. By calling Plato’s thought 'the unity of growth and development', Allen (1970, 157), it seems, tries to reconcile the developmentalist with unitarist approach.
\(^4\) The ten theses point orderly to these differences: 1) a moral philosopher vs. a metaphysician; 2) separated Forms and Soul in the latter; 3) elenctical vs. demonstrative philosophy; 4) complex and tripartite model of the soul in second Socrates; 5) second Socrates' mastership in mathematics; 6) being populist vs. elitist; 7) second Socrates’ elaborate political theory; 8) second Socrates’ metaphysical grounding in love for the transcendent Form of beauty; 9) practical and ethical vs. mystical and contemplated religion and 10) adversative vs. didactic philosophy (1991, 47-49). Robinson (1953, 61) points to their difference in respect of method and methodology.
considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues.\(^1\) Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto.

Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones\(^2\) (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues\(^3\) (ibid, 59-60).

To show that the differences of the two Socrateses\(^4\) of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be

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\(^1\) Fine agrees with Vlastos that there are some 'genuine' differences, but she does not agree with such a wide difference: 'Plato is more of a Socratic than Vlastos allows' (1993, 83). She thinks that Vlastos 'overemphasizes' on differences (ibid, 68).

\(^2\) Allen, on the contrary, thinks that the difference between theories in the early and middle period dialogues is not between what is tentative and what is thought and came to a conclusion (1959, 174).

\(^3\) E.g., Kahn (1996, 339) thinks that the trio of Laches, Euthyphro and Meno 'is best read together as a well-planned essay on definition'. Therefore, the search of essence in dialogues is 'future-oriented' form the start. While there is some truth in Mackay’s view that we should substitute the pedagogical or mental growth with a dramatic and dialectical development, 'an elaboration of many themes within a single theme; the clarification of an original insight through opposition and new perspective' (1928, 14), I do not think it is enough for being a unitarist in Plato (ibid, 11). Even a developmentalists might share this view.

\(^4\) None of these Socrateses I take as historical Socrates. The first Socrates of this paper means only the Socrates of the early period dialogues especially that of Laches, Hippias Major, Euthyphro, Euthydemus and Charmides while the second Socrates is that of Meno, Phaedo and Republic. Contrary to Vlastos who takes the Socrates of the early dialogues as the historical Socrates (1991, 77), an idea in which many scholars like Silverman (2002,28) share with him, I think while we can be sure that the first Socrates is closer to the historical Socrates, there might arise many problems if we ascribe either the dramatic character or the suggested theories in the early dialogues to the historical Socrates. Therefore, my position is
explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues.

Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic ‘what is X?’ question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embarrassing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenches, therefore, is always connected with ‘what is X?’ (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; ‘what is courage?’ in the Laches, ‘what is piety?’ in Euthydemus, ‘what is temperance?’ in Charmides and ‘what is beauty?’ in Hippias Major. This question we call here ‘Socratic question’ and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenches. He

1 Kirkland notes that Socrates wants to bring about some kind of ‘non-epistemic but nonetheless true and properly human way’ of his question, thus, does not aim ‘moral knowledge’ (2012, 8), goes far from the overall epistemic spirit of the early dialogues.
2 Vlastos (1957, 229) thinks that it is not accidental since heretofore the investigation of knowledge is a dependency of ontological or cosmological inquiry. As Vlastos correctly points out, Charmides 165c is where Socrates comes so close to this investigation though still avoids it. About his reference to Euthydemus 282e, I cannot see any evidence. Euthydemus 288d-e is not as close as the mentioned passage of Charmides. The same can be said about 292d.
3 Cf. Euthyphro 6e3-4, Hippias Major 286d1-2, Laches 190a4, 191d9
4 It is generally assumed that this question was the very question historical Socrates used to employ which has also Aristotle (1078b27-30) as its evidence. Nonetheless, we are not to claim this by so calling the question. The doubt Weiss (2009) brings forth about the role of the Socratic question based on the absence of the question in Apology seems unnecessary either we take it about historical Socrates or Plato’s Socrates. Though hinting to the process of elenches (21-22), Apology is not to set a Socratic investigation and does not thus need to
disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τι ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements.

Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says:

I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν)2

Moreover, at 21d4-6:

None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know.

In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal ‘an account that is always the same’ (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7):

I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd.

At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of ‘what is X?’ this time about the fine:

I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν).

Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence1: ‘that to do use the Socratic question. This can be the reason why it does not mention it. We may reasonably assume that the elenchus he speaks there about must have the question in use.

1 E.g., Laches 186 d8-e2, 200e3-4 (εἰδός, ... μὴ εἰδότα) Hippias Major 286c-e, 304d7-8, Apology 21b 4-5, d4-6, 29b1-7, Gorgias 505e6-506a4, 509a4-7, Charmides 165b4-c2, 166d1-2, Euthyphro 5a1-2, Meno 71a6-7 (οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτέ ἐστι τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυχάνω εἰδός), 71b3 (οὐκ εἰδῶς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν), Symposium 216d2-4

2 Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally committed to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed.
wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admissible since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage:

And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἴδεναι) (Apology 29b1-6)

Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admissible here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4:

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1 He also mentions (1985, 7-10) some other texts like Republic 351a5-6, Protagoras 357d7-e1, Crito 48a5-7 and Gorgias 479e8, 486e5-6, 512b1-2.

2 Criticizing Vlastos’ distinction, Matthews (2006, 113) notes that Socrates neither does speak of two different senses of knowledge nor says 'I know and I don’t know'. The distinctions of expert and nonexpert or latent and manifest knowledge (cf., e.g., Woodruff (1995), Taylor (2008) and Matthews (2008)) does not essentially differ from that of Vlastos. The trouble with all such suggestions is that, as Richard Bett points out, Plato 'gives no indication of wishing to multiply senses of the various words translated by "know"'(2011, 226). Pointing to tekhnê as a kind of knowledge, he suggests the distinction of the subject matters instead of senses of knowledge.
I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδῶς λέγω ἂ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν).

The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic ‘what is X?’ question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates.

Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenus and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenches in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to ‘the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socractic elenchos'"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not1 is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates' conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge.

1 Gonzalez, for instance, thinks that in most of the early dialogues, protreptic is the only positive function of elenchus (2002a, 161-182).
He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (*Apology* 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well.

The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In *Hippias Major* (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἀδικαιοσύνη δίκαιοι εἰσίν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ὅ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At *Euthyphro* 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος) by which (ὅ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1:

Through one form (ποι ὑμᾶ ἵδεα) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious.

Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the *ousia* as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one:

I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν ‌... αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (*Euthp*. 11a6-9)

1. Knowledge of what X is

Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some

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1 Using the word "principle" for what I am going to discuss the ontology and epistemology of Socrates in both his early dialogues and his middle ones might be misleading. It is not to mean more than "ground" or "approach" and thus is not to be emphasized.

2 This does not give us, however, the permission to agree with Woodruff (1978, 101-102) that Plato’s early dialogues are 'innocent of metaphysics' or 'ontologically neutral' or with Vlastos (1991, 15) that "no epistemological theory at all can be ascribed to Socrates". Trying to refute such views, Benson (2000, 3, n. 1) provides a list of those who think that the historical Socrates or Socrates of the earlier dialogues is no epistemologist. The reason for the fact that Socrates must have had some kind of metaphysics is best suggested by Silverman (2002, 28-30). Despite the fact that Socrates is not interested in articulating a metaphysical theory, he thinks that Plato’s middle period metaphysics cannot have been emerged *ex nihilo* and must be considered as his reaction to the difficulties of the metaphysics of Socrates.
obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inquiry of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX):

**KWX**  
*To know X, it is required to know what X is.*

Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemology. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question.

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1 Fine, for example, asserts 'To know what F is is to know the answer to the question "what is F?", that is, to know the real definition of the nature of F-ness' (2003, 2) which she calls 'the principle of the priority of knowledge of a definition'(ibid). Indicating specifically to *Laches* 190b-c, calls it 'the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge’ (ibid, 25). Kahn articulates this priority of definition as such:If you do not know at all what X is, you cannot know anything about X’ (1996, 180-181).

2 Think that the answer of the Socratic question is definition, some scholars insist on its being a real definition, contrasting, for instance, with nominal definition (cf. Wolfsdorf, 2005, 24), while some others regard the meaning of the concept as the answer. Wolfsdorf (ibid, 21) thinks that when Socrates, for example in *Protagoras and Hippias Major*, asserts that X must be something (τί), it means that he seeks a real definition and its identity and not its meaning. Vlastos (1973) believes the question to be constitutive and not semantic and thus does not agree with meaning as the aim of search.
2. & 3. Bipolar Epistemology and Ontology

Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology’ (BE):

**BE**  
There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance.

BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is.¹

The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of ‘Bipolar Ontology’ (BO):

**BO**  
Being is and not being is not.

BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle:

The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ... ἀλλὸ τι ὤκ ἔστιν). *(Euthydemus 284b3-4)*

He continues (b4-5):

There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὔν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν).

That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate

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¹ *Euthydemus* 293c–294a can be considered as a problem related to KWX and BE principles. Socrates states that if you are knowing, then you know (οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἰ, εἶπεν ἐπίστασαι) (293c2-3) and concludes that you must necessarily know all things if you are knowing (οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμωνα γε ὄντα) (c4). The impossibility of being and not being the same (d4) is Socrates’ reason to conclude: ‘If I know one thing, I know all (εἶπεν ἐν ἐπίστασαι, ἀπαντᾷ ἐπίσταμαι) since I could not be knowing and not knowing (ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων) at the same time’ (d5-6).
The discussion of the problem of false belief in *Theatetus* that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in *Sophist* can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive.

4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being

The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK):

**SK** Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts.

This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in *Hippias Major*:

But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἰσοδέσθαι διαλέγονται). (301b2-4)

Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as ‘antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being’ (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Socrates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγονται). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἰσοδέσθαι διαλέγονται points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues.

At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such:

You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (καταστέμιοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις).

1 Thinking that *Hippias Major* does not commit Plato to the ontology of the middle period, Woodruff believes that from *Hippias Major* to the middle period dialogues there is some kind of proceeding from 'ontological neutrality toward a transcendental ontology' (1988, 212). As it will be discussed below, while we agree with the first point, the ontological neutrality in not tenable.
This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB):

\[ \text{SB} \quad \text{Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings.} \]

Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is \textit{en tois logos} that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before \textit{Hippias Major}) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in \textit{Hippias Major}, are cutting up to \textit{kalon} and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84).

The critique of \textit{Hippias Major} is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent.

What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said\(^1\) or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing \textit{sūma} to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cfl.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic principle.

6. Knowledge of Being

The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB):

\[ \text{KB} \quad \text{Knowledge is of Being.} \]

\(^1\) Kerferd (1981, 47) argues pro the idea. Rankin (1983, 55) does not agree with him. It is not, however, included in the fragments of Dielz’ collection. I think that if it is to be accepted, Plato’s use of the theory as a critique of Socrates’ onto-epistemology can be used more strongly in favor of our analysis.
This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in *Euthydemus*.1 In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge2, all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about ‘one of those things that are (ἐν μὴν κάκεινό γ’ ἐστιν τῶν ὄντων)’ (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible3 (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being.

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1 Most of the dialogues treating with this problem such as *Theatetus* and *Sophist* are observed as late dialogues in the 20th century chronologies. The case of *Gorgias* is different. It mentions the issue without discussing it. While it accepts that there can be false conviction besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδής καὶ ἀληθῆς) (454d5), false knowledge (ἐπιστήμη … ψευδής) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first simply by saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς.

2 The problems of: learning both what you know and what you do not know (276d), possibility of telling lies (283e), impossibility of speaking things that are not (285e-286a, 287a), impossibility of false speaking (286c), impossibility of false thinking and opinion (286d) and the problem of knowing nothing or all things. (293c-294a)

3 Ctesippus’ suggestion at 248c7-8 is surprisingly missed by Dionysodorus. He says that the problem could be solved if we accept that the one who tells lies speaks things that are in a way (τρόπον τινὰ) and not indeed as it is the case (ὡς γε ἔχει). This suggestion is close to what will be the final solution to the problem in *Sophist*. 
Chapter Two

Revision of First Socrates’ Principles in Middle Period Dialogues

Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, *Euthyphro*, *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Laches* and *Charmides*, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic II-X* are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them.

The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic* is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the *Socratikoi Logoi* genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion: a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of *Meno*, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone's' (οὐδενός ἢττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions.

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1 The only part in these dialogues that is constructed, like the early dialogues, based on Socratic circle is the first Book of the *Republic*. At 351a6, nonetheless, it is decisively said that 'no one can now be ignorant of this (οὐδείς ἂν ἐτι τοῦτο ἄγνοισελεν) that injustice is ignorance'.

2 Vlastos explains this difference in his third pair of theses by distinguishing between elenctic versus demonstrative knowledge; while the first keeps disavowal claim, the second is confident that he can find knowledge. (1991, 76)
The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal\(^1\) is *Meno* 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge:

And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα).\(^2\) (98b1-5)

This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from *Meno* on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things.\(^3\)

From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to

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\(^1\) We have some other less important passages where it seems that he avows knowledge of some truths. *Phaedo* 63c, though does not use the word 'knowing' is noteworthy. Socrates asserts that if he ever insists (δισχυρισαίμην) on anythings about the matters related to the after-death life, he insists on his going to his good masters, Gods, after death (63c2-4).

\(^2\) καὶ μὴν καὶ ἑγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων: ὅτι δὲ ἐπτίν τι ἄλλοιον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἑπιστήμη, σῶρον μοι δοκῶ τῶτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλʼ εἶπερ τι ἄλλο φαινὲν ἀν εἰδέναι—ὁλίγα δ′ ἀν φαίνει—ἐν δ′ οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ θείην ἀν ἄν οἶδα.

\(^3\) The subject of Socrates’ avowal, i.e. the difference between knowledge and true opinion, can explain why Socrates’ most considerable claim of knowledge is asserted here. This distinction will be not only the basis of all his later onto-epistemology but also his theory of Forms. *Timaeus* (51d-e), for instance, regards this distinction as what can be a sufficient proof for the existence of Forms.
reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive\(^1\) and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially *Phaedo* and *Republic*, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. *Meno* that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. *Phaedo* is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of *Republic* is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the ‘what is justice?’ question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested.

1. Knowledge of the Good

We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from *Meno* on. What makes it different in

\(^1\) Vlastos speaks of the 'demise of the elenchus' before the middle period dialogues and in three dialogues of *Euthydemus, Lysis* and *Hippias Major* (1994, 29-33) because of the 'abandonment of adversary argument as Socrates' method of philosophical investigation' (p.30). He thinks that Socrates is both the author and the critic of the theories of these dialogues and they are, thus, uncontested by the interlocutors.
the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG):

**KG**  
Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good.

Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discussion about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μὲν τί ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8).

What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Socrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge:
The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησεν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6)

Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy:

That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δι᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὐσίαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ώς γιγνωσκόμενης μὲν διάνοια). (508e1-4)

Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἄγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates.

The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c).

2. Tripartite Epistemology

BE is thoroughly rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemology' (TE):

TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance.

1 The relation of the Good on the one hand and being and truth on the other hand remains, I think, ambiguous at least in Republic. All that we hear from Plato here is that the Good is beyond them. I cannot understand what kind of evidence Cynthia Hampton had to conclude that truth in Republic is 'likewise a Form and a part of the Good' and also an 'ontological notion' (1998, 239).

2 One might agree with Politis that by the things that are capable of being known, Plato has in mind, 'at least primarily', the other ideas (2010, 102). Cooper's translation (ed.) of ὡς γιγνωσκόμενης μὲν διάνοια ('it is an object of knowledge') cannot be satisfactory.
BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’ discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialogues is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one.

Having examined the slave boy in *Meno* for the purpose of showing the working of recollection, it turns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion:

So, he who does not know (οὐκ ἐιδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ἄν μη ἐιδή)\(^1\) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθείς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ἄν οὐκ οἴδε) (85c6-7).

The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ..., ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in *Phaedo*, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (*Phaedo* 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in *Phaedo*, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in *Phaedo* and *Meno*, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at *Phaedo* 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and

\(^1\) While some of the translators do not translate περὶ ἄν μη ἐιδή (e. g., Cooper (ed.)) maybe because they think it does not add anything new to the meaning, I think it must be translated.
contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinion (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5).

The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7:

So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τὸ ὁνὸς εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἀν μὴ εἰδὴ ἔνεισιν ἀληθείς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν ὕκ oίδε). (85c6-7)

This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy ὁνὸς εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἀν μὴ εἰδὴ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν ὕκ oίδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ τούτων ὧν ὕκ if he did not want to emphasize.

3. Tripartite Ontology

The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, ‘Tripartite Ontology’ (TO):

TO There are things that both are and are not.

This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1):
Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τι) or nothing (οὐδέν)?

He knows something (τι).

Something that is (ὁν) or is not (οὐκ ὁν)?

Something that is (ὁν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἃν μὴ ὁν γέ τι γνωσθεῖη;)

Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὁν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὁν δὲ μηδαμή) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἀγνωστόν).

A most adequate one.

Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὁντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῆ ὁντος)?

Yes, it’s intermediate.

Then as knowledge (γνώσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὁντι), while ignorance (ἀγνώσια) is of necessity set over what is not (μη ὁντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing?

From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge.

The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being.

4. Bound Knowledges

In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK):

BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good.

We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers’ wisdom when he
was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοος ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμοῦν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good.

That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμοῦν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοοῦ εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τὸν γε νοοῦ κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind:

I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστον ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἀριστοτενον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5)
This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to ‘explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἀμεινον), and that it was better (ἀμεινον) to be so’ (97e1-3).

What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον

1 This is also clear from 98a1-b3:
If he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire any other kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way (οὕτω ... ὠσαύτως) about the sun and the moon and ...., how it is best (πῶς τοτέ ταῦτα ἄμεινον ἔστιν) that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring any other cause for them than that it was best for them as they are (βέλτιστον αὑτὰ ὀὕτως ἔχειν ἄμεινον ἔστιν). Once he had given the best for each (ἐκκάστω βέλτιστον) as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all (τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεται ἀγαθόν).

2 Politis, conversely, thinks it is not true to say Socrates introduced this new method of explanation because of the fact that they were not good-based. 'Socrates’ complaint against traditional explanation', he says, 'is independent of and prior to his becoming hopeful about good–based ones.' (2010, 99) If we have to accept that what he means by ‘good–based’ explanation is the same with what Socrates had in mind about Anaxagoras’ theory, Politis is misleading here. Socrates’ hope for Anaxagoras’ theory was, I believe, owing to the fact that he had been disappointed with natural philosophers’ explanations which justifies the suggestion to take that which is included in this new theory as the same with what was absent before. It is also misleading, I think, to call Socrates' theory teleological if we mean by this some kind of explanation that must be considered besides other kinds of explanation as, for example, Taylor thinks. (1998, 11) If we behold the essential relation between the Good and the knowledge and observe the fact that the good is here considered as the basis of explanation, we cannot be satisfied with putting it besides other kinds of explanations only as one kind.
συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle:

They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀλήθως τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδέν οἴονται). (99e5-6)

Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good ‘gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τό τήν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοίς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν),’ he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle’s assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστίν, 988b4-6: τό τί ἢν ἐἶναι) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable.

Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ γαθόν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis
starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not
directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other
subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the
'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν)
(511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm
but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological
principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and,
thus, unified by.

5. Bound Beings

The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB):

\[ \text{BB} \quad \text{Being of all things are bound by the Good.} \]

We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized
because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The
principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is
done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that
evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological
scene:

You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of
being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4)

This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to
being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role
in the intelligible realm (b6-10):

Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known
(γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ ἐἶναι) and their being
(οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and
power.

That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition
to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition
to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can
be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the
intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is
corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to
observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from
his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its
source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can
conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the
intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light.

6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge

Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK):

PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge.

This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ὧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡ γεσάμενος μετέχει) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4)

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From the six onto-epistemological principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly

\footnote{Socrates’ statement at 517c1-2 that the form of the Good ‘is the cause of all that is right and beautiful in everything (πᾶσιν πάντων) is also noticeable.}

\footnote{I do not insist on the word here. I used ‘class’ to avoid the possible interpretations which words like ‘level’ and ‘degree’ might arise.}
formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy.
Chapter Three

πολλαχῶς ἐστι; Plato’s Ontology in Sophist and Republic

The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being. The second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and ignorance (ἀγνοίας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects.

The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian distinctions between different senses of being. In the predicative reading, Annas, for

1 One may say, like Bolton, that Plato’s paradoxical phrase must be taken literally. 'All that Plato means to claim in Republic V', he says, 'is that beautiful sensible objects are not unqualifiedly beautiful' (1998, 124).

2 As Annas notes, this disjunction of the objects of knowledge and opinion, is the most controversial among Platonic theories because it puts the philosopher in a 'different cognitive world' (1981, 193).

3 Plato’s elaborate discussion of being in Sophist, besides Republic, provided the required ground for many (e.g., Gosling, 1973, 214; Brown, 1986, 68-69; Ackrill, 1957, 1-6; Bostock, 1984, 89-119; Owen 1971, 223-67; Runciman, 1962, 89-90; Cornford, 1935, 296; Grombie, 1963, 499) to find some evidences of some kind of distinction either between complete and incomplete senses of the verb or the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication or ... Challenging the distinction of the identity from predicative use of the verb, Crivelli (2012, 154-157) suggests that Plato is making the distinction between the different senses of the verb in its incomplete senset. As we will discuss, I prefer Jean
example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly (1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of ‘degrees of reality’ for ‘degrees of being/existence’ must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the basic sense of being for Plato is ‘something like propositional structure, involving both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of predication’ (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading, Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and thus does not imply TW. 2 Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that ‘it would be safer to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of existence’ (1970, 46).

Roberts’ idea that Sophist can ‘in no useful way’ be described as a distinguishing of different senses of being (1998, 142). Vlastos thinks that while Plato’s use of being in Sophist (regarding ordinary and Paulin predication) is ambiguous, he is himself unaware of the ambiguity (1973, 270-308).

1 One problem with Fine’s veridical reading is that it cannot be compatible with texts which are more suggestive of objects. As Gonzalez points out (1996, 262), Fine’s veridical reading means that when Plato says at 476e-477a that knowledge is of something (τί), he is suggesting that only true propositions are something and also the passage at 478b-c must entail that false propositions are nothing. The impossibility of believing what is not must imply, in Fine’s veridical reading, that it is impossible to believe what is false or absolutely false. Fine tries to solve this last problem with the distinction of false and ‘totally false’ or ‘very false’ belief (2003, 76). Fine’s answer to the problem of the meaning of both being true and not true about belief is that it is ‘partly true and partly false, or near the mark’ (ibid, 70). Fine’s claim that her veridical reading has its own privilege and makes the argument’s conclusion more attractive is challenged by Annas since it leads to degrees of truth which does not make any more sense than that of degrees of existence (1981, 198).

2 To escape TW, Fine tries to reduce the difference to contents and not objects. The prisoners’ inferior level of knowledge, she says, is not because they see the images of physical objects and not the objects themselves but because ‘they cannot systematically discriminate between images and the objects they are of’. (1998, 248)
1. Being, Not-Being and Difference

The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus, and specifically the first two we try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of "same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the same but different in every moment.\(^1\) The relation of being and sameness reaches to its highest point in Parmenides.\(^2\) What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being.

At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be without partaking (μετέχειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of being and one:

So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἕνος) which is not the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one would partake of it. (142b7-c1)\(^3\)

The fact that what is (ἐστι) signifies (σημαίνει) is other (ἀλλο) than what One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction.\(^4\) The conclusion

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\(^1\) The opposition of the same and difference can be seen in his famous words that ‘on those stepping into rivers staying the same (τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν) different and different (ἐτερα καὶ ἐτερα) water flow’ (Diels-Kranz (DK), Fr.39). The result is, for Heraclitus, a paradox: ‘into the same river we step and do not step, we are and are not (εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν)’ (Graham (2010), F. 65).

\(^2\) He asserts again and again that only being is and it is impossible for not being to be (DK, Fr.2.3, 5-6, 4.2, 6.1-2, 7.1, 8.2) and not being is unthinkable and unsayable (DK, Fr. 2.7-8, 3, 8.8-9) and it is all the same (ξυνὸν) (DK, Fr. 5.1).

\(^3\) Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally committed to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed.

\(^4\) Dancy (1991, 97) correctly points to Sophist 244b-245e as having the same echo.
is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor One but "difference":

So if being is something different (ἐτερον) and one something different (ἐτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other (ἐτερον ἄλλῃ ἄλλων) by difference (τῷ ἐτερῷ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6)

The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such:

For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in kind. (160e1-2)

Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for "difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the "difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being is still attached to the same:

For that which is the same is being (ὅν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταύτων) (162d2-3).

The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between being and becoming (247d8f., 248c4-5) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by adding:

You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ὁν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13)

That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e).
does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, like a child, for both and say being (τὸ ὄν) is both the unchanging and that which changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are (250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but different (ἐτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s clear that change is not being and also is being (ἵ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἔστι καὶ ὄν) since it partakes in being?’ (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement at Republic 477a about what both is and is not.

At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in which the same (ταὐτῶν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both (b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to get able to draw the relation of being and difference:

But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said (λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτά) but some are [are said] always referring to (πρὸς) other things (ἄλλα) (255b12-13)
The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸ δὲ ἄρα ἐτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐτερον) (255d1). It pervades all kinds because each of them should be different from the others and is so due to the *difference* and not its own nature (253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the same time, the issue that its version at *Republic* V made all those controversies we discussed above:

So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀναγκῆς τὸ μὴ ὄν). That’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that they are because they partake in being. (*Sophist* 256d11-e3)

Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to the difference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the contrary of being anymore but only different (ἐτερον) (257b3-4).

Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y', I totally disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X *is not* beautiful because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show how something can both be and not be the same thing. The difference is what makes

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1 At 259a5-6, both being and difference are said as what pervade all and each other.
2 Also cf. Hintikka (1973, 26): 'precisely a replacement of the idea of not-being by that of difference'.
3 Frede’s statement that 'Plato does not identify being with difference but with a particular Form or kind of difference' (1992, 408) is misleading. Plato does not take being as difference nor as the Form of difference. Being and difference are separated from each
one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference with the ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion of difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the simultaneous being and not being of a thing: ‘What we call \( \text{ἕτερον} \) from nothing other than \( \tauού \ \kappaαλού \ \phiύσεως \)' (257d10-11). The result is that not beautiful happens to be \( (συμβεβηκεν \ εἶναι) \) one single thing among kinds of beings \( (\tauι \ \tauοών \ \οντων \ \τινός \ \ενός \ \γένους) \) and at the same time set over against one of the beings \( (πρός \ τι \ \των \ \οντων \ \αύ \ \πάλιν \ \άντιτεθέν) \) (257e2-4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful \( (εἶναι \ τις \ συμβαίνει \ τὸ \ \μή \ \καλόν) \); a being set over against being \( (οντος \ δὴ \ πρός \ όν \ \άντιθεσις) \) (e6-7). Neither the beautiful is more a being \( (μᾶλλον ... \ \εστι \ \τῶν \ \οντων) \) nor not beautiful less \( (εἶνα \ τις \ συμβαίνει \ τὸ \ \μὴ \ \όν) \) (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are \( (όμοιος \ εἶναι) \) (258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again \( (a7-9) \), owes to \( \thetaατέρου \ \φύσις \) now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that are of the nature of the difference and set over each other in being \( (τῆς \ τοῦ \ \οντος \ \πρὸς \ \άλληλα \ \άντικειμένων \ \άντιθεσις) \) is being as being itself is being \( (άυτοῦ \ \τοῦ \ \óν \ \τοιούτοια \ \εστιν) \) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary of, each other \( (a11-b3) \). This is exactly \( τόμημον \), the subject of the inquiry \( (b6-7) \). Hence, not

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1 The word in use is \( \phiθεγγόμεθα \). Kostman (1973, 198) suggests reading it ‘is predicated’ instead of ‘is called’. We preferred, however, to use the less technical word ‘is called’ for the simple reason that it does not seem to be applied in a different sense than its normal use.

2 Kostman (1973, 198) takes this sentence as an evidence of rejecting the standard view (cf. Ross (1951, 115), Owen (1971, 238-240)) of reading \( \text{ἔτερον} \), based on which it means ‘non-identical’. The fact that Plato makes not-beautiful different from nothing but \( (ούκ \ \άλλον \ \τινός) \) the nature of beautiful shows that we cannot translate it simply to ‘non-identical’. It is actually non-identical with every other thing, but it is \( \text{ἔτερον} \) only from the nature of beautiful. Nonetheless, I cannot understand how this passage can be consistent with Kostman’s own translation of it as ‘incompatible’ (1973, 205-206). As I wish this paper show, the only acceptable interpretation of the word that can be applicable to all the passages, at least in \textit{Sophist}, is what will be suggested in this paper as \textit{pollachos esti}.

3 Some scholars make their endeavor to resolve the contradictories of Plato’s explanation of not-being by distinguishing between different senses of it, which, I think, might be of any assistance to the problem. Lewis (1977), for instance, considers an ‘essential’ dichotomy between the treatment of not-being in contexts of non-identity versus in contexts of \textit{NP} proper.
being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἴδος among the many things that are (b9-c3).

Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different from it (259a6-8).¹ Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἐτερὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὃν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1).

2. Difference and the Being of a Copy

We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem. Plato’s analogy of original²-copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational?

By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of "degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are some of Plato’s words in Republic³ as well as Plato’s words in some other dialogues¹

¹Cornford’s (1935, 295 n.2) distinction of two statements seems unnecessary. He distinguishes between two, i) that the difference is not the same as Being, but still is existent and ii) that the different is not a thing that is (viz. a certain existent) but is a thing that is. The second dilemma seems indeed to be a wrong one. It is not said that difference is not a certain existent. Its existence is, actually, what it insists on when it is said that the difference is.

²Tanner (2010, 94) notes that the translation of paradigm to original is problematic. The sense of pattern and example of paradigm is not implied enough by original.

³Words like παντελῶς ὅν (477a), τοῦ εὐλογικῶς ὄντος (477a, 478d, 479d), τελέως ὃν (597a), κλίνης ὄντως ὁστῆς (597d), μαλλὸν ὄντα (515d), μαλλὸν ὄντων (585d). What I think on the case is that Plato’s epithets like παντελῶς or μαλλὸν, capable enough to be taken as hinting to degree must be interpreted, as Cooper points out, based on the fact that Plato’s theory of being is so difficult to express without straining language to its limits’ (1986, 242).
When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, purely or perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable (1998, 229); an obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one. He thinks that when in *Republic* we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than its Form, it is because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being adulterated by contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain understanding of it (1998, 222).

Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology thinking that ‘to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"’ (1980, 213). He thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understood as being rather than reality, τὸ ὄν as "that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of being. Allen believes that a ‘purely epistemic’ reading of the passage in *Republic* is patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper suggests gets close to this paper’s solution:

Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are different grades of ontological status.⁴ (1986, 241)

A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to *Phaedo* where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be

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¹ He also refers to: εἰλικρινές at Sym. 211e, τὸ ὄν ὄντως at Phil. 59d, οὐσία ὄντως οὐσία at Phds. 247c, ὄντως ὄντως ὄντως ὄντως at Tim. 28a
² Vlastos agrees that his doctrine is 'a lucid consequence of Plato’s epistemology' (1998, 229).
³ From another point of view, as Cynthia Hampton (1998, 240) points, though the ontological and epistemological senses of reality might be distinguished, the epistemic sense ultimately depends on the ontological sense.
⁴ Actually, Vlastos himself opposes his view of degrees of reality that is 'a difference in degree between beings of the same kind' to what will somehow be our solution to the problem namely, 'a difference in kind between different kinds of being'. (1954, 340) What Allen says (1998, 63) is somehow the same.
like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. White (1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a doctrine of particulars as images and resemblances but come to such a view after Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, Timaeus and Republic VI-VII besides the last pages of book V.²

The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in Republic V can be reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist.³ We can find out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology.

In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-9). At 237c1-4, the problem of “not being” is noticed in a new way which shows some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being. Nevertheless, not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech (238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), the solution to the problem appears: the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς

¹White (1977, 200) insists on the fact that there is no mention of εἰκόνες, ὀμοιώματα or μιμήματα for particulars in Phaedo. He also (ibid, 201) denies the use of εἴδωλα at Sym. 212 as a reference to the reflection theory (1977, 201).

²Scolnicov’s claim (2003, 65) about an ontological difference between paradigm and what resembles it in Parmenides 132-133 has no textual evidence to rely on and the word he mentions, εἰκασθήματι, is not enough. Nonetheless, I believe that the ontological difference of a paradigm and its image is a developed version of the simple resemblance theory to which Plato was committed in Parmenides. Contrary to those like Runciman who think that 'asymmetrical resemblance is a contradiction in terms' (1959, 158), it seems not only possible but also the ground of one of the differences of Plato’s theory of paradigm with his previous theory of resemblance. That Plato’s theory in Parmenides was not based on the non-reciprocal relation is obvious from Coxon’s note. Referring to some texts including Parmenides 139e and 140b, Coxon (1999, 110) points that the fact that Plato brings τὸ ταύτων πεπονθός as the definition of "the like" shows that the concept of a non-reciprocal likeness was unknown to Parmenides of Parmenides besides the historical Parmenides.

³This is not claimed only here in this paper. Cf. Palmer, 1999, 144
τάληθινόν) but still is 'another such thing (ἐτεροντοιούτον)' (240a8).
Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In
answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing
(240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἄλλ’ ἐοικὸςμέν (240b2). A
copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a
resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it
is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely
and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικός is opposed to
ἀντως ὁν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like
(ἐοικός) is not really that which is (οὐκ ἀντως [οὐκ ὁν]). But still a copy 'is in a
way (ἐστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has
its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκών ἀντως) (b11). The
Stranger asks:

So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὁν ἀρα [οὐκ ἀντως ἔστιν) but it really is what
we call a likeness (ἀντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13)

This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being.
Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with
that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but
only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status
intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image,
in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and
really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as
follows:
i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρός τάληθινόν).
ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἐτερον).
iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινόν) as that of which it is a copy but only
that which is like it (ἐοικός).
iv) It is not really that which really is (ἀντως ὁν) but only really a likeness (εἰκόνων
ἀντως).
The conclusion is that:
v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of
interweaving being with not being.

This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that
which is not somehow is (τὸ τε μή ὁν ὡς ἔστι) and 'that which is, somehow is not
(τὸ ὁν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have
also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3).

In *Timaeus*, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιοῦτον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" (τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word τοιοῦτον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and separated from its image.¹

Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism of the relational theory. What we are being said in *Timaeus*, he thinks, cannot be explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following.

3. πολλαχῶς ἐστι

The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of *pollachos legetai* is a brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach

¹The explanation of the being of a copy and its difference with its original can be seen at 52c2-d1:

Since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the image, which is invariably appearance of something different (ἐτεροῦδέ τινος), it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in something else (ἐν ἐτέρω ... τινί), somehow clinging to being (οὐσίας ἀμφοτέρως ἀντεχομένης) or else be nothing at all (ἢ μηδὲν τὸ παράπλαν αὐτήν). But that which really is (ὄντως ὁντι) receives support from the accurate true account -that as long as the one is distinct from the other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at the same time become one and the same, and also two.

As far as it is related to our discussion, this passage aims to demonstrate that the copy must be different from its original, but it must, at the same time, be kind of being though it cannot be a real being as its original is.
to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works, is his resolution for some of the ontological problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense. Aristotle is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine.

1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic.

a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being:

Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by reference to one (πρὸς ἓν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ φύσιν). (Metaphysics 1003a33-34)

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1 E.g., Met.: 1003a33, b5, 1018a35-36, 1026a33-34, b2, 1028a10, 13-14 (τοσαυταχῶς … ὄντος), 1030a17-18 (τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται), a21 (τὸ ἐστὶν ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑμεῖς), 1042b25-26 (τὸ ἐστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται), 1060b32-33, 1089a7, Phy.: 185a21, b6, 206a21 (πολλαχῶς τὸ εἶναι).

2 At Metaphysics 992b18-19, Aristotle criticizes Presocratics asserting: ‘if we inquire the elements of existing things without distinguishing the various senses in which things are said (πολλαχῶς λεγομένον) to be, we cannot succeed’. In Physics, he criticizes Lycophron and his associates in the idea that the word ‘is’ must be omitted because they thought ’as if one or being are said in one sense (ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἕνου ἢ τοῦ ὄντος)’ (185b31-32). His attack to Parmenides (Phy. 186a22 ff.) is based on the same ground. Parmenides’ assumption that being is said without qualification (Ἀτλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὄν λέγεσθαι) is false because it is said in several senses (λεγομένου πολλαχῶς) (186a24-25). Parmenides’ hypothesis that ‘being means [only] one thing (τὸ ὄν στιμαίνειν ἕν)’ (186b4) is the basis of his problems (186a32-b3) and if we analyze his theory correctly, as Aristotle himself does (b4-12), it follows that being must have more than one meaning (b12).

3 I used Barnes’ translation (1991) for Aristotle’s texts, but I was not totally commited to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed.
The doctrine of *pros hen* which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of the same word. The *pros hen* implementation of being is to provide an alternative for the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being which says being is said in one sense (*kath hen*) (1060b 32-33). That both the *pros hen* and the *kath hen* implementation of a word has one thing (*hen*) as what is common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does not consider anything in common. Whereas both *pros hen* and *kath hen* assume a common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of relation, their difference is that while *kath hen* takes all the implementations of the word as the same with the common nature, *pros hen* makes them different.

Substance is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily:

> For as is (τὸ ἐστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way (οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way. So too τὸ ἐστιν belongs simply (Ἀπλῶς) to substance but in a limited sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23).

The word ἀπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (Ἀπλῶς) the ἔν, the common nature, τὸ ὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident.

The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (*pros*) the substance is said to be. The doctrine of *pros hen*, changing *kath hen* to *pros hen* in respect of *to on*, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of *pros hen* it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that:

> Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20)

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1See also at the beginning of Z (1028a10-13).
Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be *are said* only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of *pollachos legetai*, *pros hen* and the theory of substance.

b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (*Metaphysics* 1026b13-14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was ‘in a sense not wrong’ saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὕν) because the arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the beginning of book Λ, he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ' ὑντα λέγειν) in an unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22).

The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of *pollachos legetai*, *pros hen* and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents almost as not being, compared with substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call *Pollachos Legetai* (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (*pros*) to it. Adding Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to (*pros*) a model; it is different from (ἐτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὢντως ὕν) but only is in a way (πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the theory of *pollachos legetai* and *pros hen*, we can observe its fundamental similarity with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure.¹

Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is ‘something intermediate between univocity and full equivocity’ (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it *pros hen* (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the

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¹Cornford notes that Aristotle must have learnt his *pollachos legetai* from Parmenides II and its countless discussions (1939, 110-111). The view that Aristotle’s theory of categories developed as a result of his reflection on TM as suggested by some commentators like Vlastos (1954, 335) and Owen (1975) is not far from our comparison because I think Plato’s theory of original-shadow is itself developed because of TM. Aristotle’s theory might then be observed as a result of his reflection on Plato’s original-copy model which was Plato’s own solution to TM.
complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well.

Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many senses... It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' (1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἀπλῶς and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ῑ) which is directly linked with his distinction between κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then continues:

We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said simply (ἀπλῶς) to come from not being (μὴ ὄντος). But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὃ ἐστι καθ’ αὐτῷ λέγεται κακὸν, nothing can become.¹ (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25)

Our use of Aristotle’s theory as a prelude to explain Plato’s ontology does not intend to claim that their solutions are the same but only that they have the same structure with almost the same parts. There is still, among many possible differences, a fundamental difference between two theories: whereas Plato tries to solve the problem of Parmenidean being and not being by refusing Parmenides’ being through a new kind of being that both is and is not, Aristotle resolves the problem from a

¹Aristotle’s solution for the paradox of Meno by distinguishing two senses is also noteworthy (P. An. 71a29-b8).
different point of view. His solution does not need a third ontological status besides being and not being including things that both are and are not because he is still in a Parmenidean position: 'We do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is not' (Physics 191b26-27). Aristotle's criticism of those who bring the indefinite dyad besides one, can be admissibly accepted as a reference to Plato and the Academy. Their problem, from Aristotle’s point of view, was that they framed the difficulty in an old-fashioned way based on Parmenides’ saying that it is impossible for not being to be (Metaphysics 1089a4). They are under Aristotle’s criticism not because they kept Parmenides’ principle but because they thought they have to resolve the problem by rejecting it: 'they thought it necessary to prove that which is not is' (1089a5, cf. a19). This undoubtedly refers to Sophist where Plato rejects the principle. Aristotle’s solution is different from Plato in this very point. He does not think that the problem must be solved in an old-fashioned way trying to refuse Parmenidean being but by Pollachus Legetai without needing to present a third ontological status. Have I been able to show that Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is comparable with Plato’s solution; I call his solution Pollachos Esti.\(^1\) What this changing of legetai to esti is intended to show is not the change of a linguistic to an ontological theory since not only the former’s being linguistic is not to be claimed here\(^2\) but we are not going to claim that the latter’s theory is ontological in a merely existential sense.

\(^1\) Though this phrase we chose as the name of Plato’s theory is based on Aristotle’s phrase, it had been used somehow by Plato himself. In the previously mentioned passage about the relation of being and difference in Sophist (259a-b) we have Stranger saying:

Being (τὸ ὄν) has a share in the difference, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and is not all of the others except itself. So being (τὸ ὄν) indisputably is not millions of things and both is in many ways (πολλαχὴ μὴν ἐστὶ) each and all of them and is not in many ways (πολλαχὴ δ’οὐκ ἐστίν) [each and all of them] (259b1-6).

At 256e5-6 we are told that:

περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρὰ τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀπειροντλήθειδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν.

And at 263b11-12:

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασμενόντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναι ποῦ, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

\(^2\) Nonetheless, it is not wrong to say that Aristotle deals with the issue more from an epistemological point of view or at least not from a view as ontological as Plato’s. That either Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is linguistic (cf. Saches 1948. Ackrill (1963, 75f.) argues against linguistic reading), logical (cf. Kung 1999, 199-200) or ontological (cf. Fine 2003, 345), is out of the boundaries of this paper. What my short analysis can imply is only that the difficulty of Parmenidean being and not being is to be resolved by Pollachos Legetai from an epistemological point of view. I do not say linguistic because
Therefore, before Aristotle’s theory of different senses of being as the solution of his predecessors’ ontological problem, Plato had resolved the problem by a thoroughly different version of what Aristotle used later. His solution is based on the notion of difference: things that are something (F), are so in different ways. Suppose that we have three things, 1) $\Phi$ as the Form, 2) $\phi$ as one of the particulars and 3) $f$ as the shadow of that particular, all are called by the same name, F. All of these three things are thus F. Not only the Form of the beautiful ($\Phi$) is beautiful (F) but also one particular beautiful ($\phi$) as well as its shadow ($f$). The point is that while they all are beautiful (F), they are not so in the same way. The way in which $f$, the shadow of $\phi$ is F is different from the way in which $\phi$ is F as well as both of them are F in different ways from $\Phi$, the form of F. The Form of beautiful, a beautiful flower and its image in a mirror all are beautiful but not in the same way. Let’s consider the following statements:

i) The Form of the beautiful $IS$ beautiful.

ii) A flower $Is$ beautiful.

iii) Its image $is$ beautiful.

I used atypically three forms of the verb 'is' to show where the difference is relied on. We do not apply the 'is' in these sentences in the same way which is to mean that this 'is' is not the same in them. While $\Phi IS F$, $\phi Is F$ and $f$ only $is F$. These differences in the shape of the verb are supposed to imply that the difference is in being. All the things which are one thing, are so differently because their being F is it has its own entailments. Logical may be the best word, but nowadays’ understanding of it might be misleading. We can be sure, however, that Aristotle’s analysis from an epistemological point of view does not mean for him a non ontological attitude:

It is not because we think truly that you are white that you are white, but because you are white we who say that are saying the truth (Metaphysics 1051b6-9)

1Though Allen agrees that based on "the logic of Plato’s metaphor" the picture of, for example, a hand is a hand, he thinks it is absurd because the picture only resembles that of which it is the picture, but it cannot itself be that: 'it is clearly false that reflection [of a scarf] is a scarf'. He concludes then, using Aristotle’s language, that we must distinguish between substantial and accidental resemblances (1998, 61-2). While I draw the attention to his connection of Plato’s theory and Aristotle’s theory of substance-accident, I think he can be misleading in the central point. All Plato’s theory is to fulfill is the explanation of this: how can both a Form and its participant or an original and its copy be the same thing? The theory of Pollachos Esti has this explanation as its aim. It wants to explain how a hand and its picture can both be hands. The solution the theory brings forth is that though they both are hands, they are so in different ways. This is exactly what Allen himself points to (ibid, 62). Therefore, if we say that the picture of a hand is not a hand, we are far from understanding both Plato’s problem and his solution.

2As Nehamas points out, when we say that particulars are only imperfectly F in comparison to the Form of F-ness, the imperfection belongs to the "being" rather than to the "F" in "being F". (1998, 79)
not the same in them. Therefore, difference is extended to all the cases in which it is said that each of them '… esti X'. It is absurd then to think, as from Aristotle onward we are used to, that when we say about different things that each of them 'is' something, X, all of them are that thing in the same way. As Allen says, the function "… is X" is 'systematically ambiguous' (1998, 62). Based on Aristotelian understanding of universal, there is no difference in the way of using 'is' in all the cases of a universal when it is said that each of them 'is' that universal. Though maybe not explicitly stated, it is indeed in the basis of the definition of a universal to be applicable to its cases in the same way. Based on this view, no difference is allowed in 'is' between two sentences of 'man is animal' and 'horse is animal'. Each of them 'is' animal in the same way. This is what Plato’s new theory of Pollachos Esti intends to change. I think Plato’s new model of original-copy is theorized to provide an explanation how this can happen. Both the original and its copy are the same things, but they differ in their way of being that thing. While both Socrates and his reflex in water is Socrates, they are so in different ways, that is, by different ways of being Socrates. Any reduction of this difference to degrees or levels or anything like this does not, therefore, state Plato’s theory in its full and correct sense.

In Plato’s theory, thus, all things which are one thing are (not: are called as in Aristotle) so (a) not in the same way but in different ways and (b) by reference to (pros) the Form of that thing. All things that are, for instance, beautiful, are so in different ways and by reference to the Form of the beautiful. When Plato says then that the object of knowledge is what purely is (ειλικρινῶς ὄντος) (478d6-7) but the object of opinion which both is and is not οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὑφώς αὖ προσαγορευόμενον (478e2-3), what is intended is their difference in their being. Φ, the Form of F, φ, a particular F and f, an image of F, are differently F. This is applying difference and plurality not to the simple and absolute being but to being a certain thing. What Plato discovers here, which I think can be observed as his most innovative ontological discovery, is, if we are allowed to use Aristotle’s phraseology, finding difference and plurality in universality and the way each case of a universal is that universal. The concept of F which was a universal concept equally applicable to its instances, is now broken by difference to different ways of being F. This ontology seems to extend pluralism to its boundaries. Not only is the difference of

1 Gonzalez’ idea (1996, 261) is noteworthy:

To be fully F is to exist fully. On this view, what is absurd is not the notion of degrees of existence but the modern notion that a sensible object can be imperfectly beautiful and yet perfectly exist, that its beauty and existence can be kept so distinct that the imperfection of the one does not affect the other.

2 Plato’s remedy for this radical plurality includes i) his theory of Forms which tries to bind these different things and ii) his theory of the Good = One that is the binding bind of all things. The theory of difference breaks being more than ever to different parts, but it does not make problem for Plato because being is not anymore the guardian of unity. The
different things presupposed here, it expands the sphere of differentiation to the
difference of the same things: even the things that are the same thing, F, differ from
each other in their very being F.

Vlastos is right that Plato does not say that the objects that the lovers of sights
and sounds love, do not exist or only half exist (1998, 223) but it does not mean that
Plato, as he thinks, wants their reality to be the case. What is neglected by both
Vlastos’ theory of degrees of reality and Allen and others’ theory of particulars as
relational entities is Plato’s theory of "difference in being". The theory of degrees of
reality may be successful in escaping degrees of existence but not only goes far from
the ontological aspect of Plato’s solution but also neglects the notion of difference.
The relational theory, on the other hand, while does not focus sufficiently on
difference as the basis of Plato’s theory has an excessive stress on the relational
character of a copy in the original-copy model.

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As we could say in Aristotle that only substance can really be called 'being' and
all the accidents are called so only in favor of, and referring to, substance;it is right,in
Plato’s philosophy, to say that only Φ, the Form, really is F (IS F) and all the φs as
well as all fs are F only in favor of, and referring to, Φ. How should we interpret this
'is'? existential, predicative or veridical? This '… is', first, should not be understood
in an absolute and simple way but as being of something and as '… is X'. This means
that it cannot, at least at the first sight, be simply applied to existence. I say 'at the
first sight' because we cannot see Plato concerned with the simply existential use of
'is' when it is meant by it only that something exists. Nevertheless, we cannot say that
it is free from any existential sense because he has not excluded it from 'is X'.
Although it is right that when it is said that something 'is X' it does not mean directly
that it exists, it seems that it also implies the existence in Plato. Besides Plato’s way
of treating with the problem of false belief as an evidence of this, the fact that neither
Plato nor Aristotle distinguished the existential 'is' even when it is expected, for
example in Aristotle when he distinguished the different senses of being, shows that
we have to consider it as attached to other used of the verb.

Regarding the other senses of being like predicative and veridical sense, it can
be said that in spite of the fact that Plato does not distinguish between these senses,
Pollachos Esti applies difference to both of these senses of 'is'. Having some kind of
existential sense in itself, the 'is' can thus be considered propositional, predicative
and veridical at the same time but neither of them alone. The simultaneous being and
not being of a particular, φ, which is F, but, at the same time, is not F, will be
explained in this way: the predicate of F can be predicated on φ but it cannot be

relation of being and one is ruptured at least in Republic since the duty of unifying is
given to the One which is the Good and not the being but beyond being and superior to it
(Republic 509b).
predicated at the same time because while $\varphi$ is F, it is not F if we remind that only $\Phi$, the Form of F, IS F. The F-ness of $\varphi$ is true about it because it IS F, but it is false at the same time because it IS not F. The same can be said about TW. It does not matter whether we consider two worlds or one (cf. Perl, 1999, 351) only if we have in mind that the relation of them must be kept as the relation which is explained in the allegories of Sun, Cave and Line. Being the closest theory to the suggestion of this paper, Allen’s explanation of Plato’s theory is not yet Pollachos Esti. His interpretation, however, gets to almost the same point:

Though you may call the reflection of a red scarf red if you so please, you cannot mean the same thing you mean when you call its original red (1998, 62). (my Italic)

Plato’s use of the phrases παντελῶς ὄν(477a2) εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος(477a7, 478d-7) and τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς(479d5) in Republic should be read as making qualifications on being. Any effort to reduce Plato’s being in Republic to existential, veridical or predicative senses is anachronistic because these distinctions are mostly based on either modern ontology or Aristotle’s distinction which Plato never made. This is obvious even from Aristotle’s criticism that Plato tried to resolve the difficulty in an old-fashioned way trying to reject Parmenides. The theory of Pollachos Esti can be understood only on the basis of the absence of pollachos legetai and the theory of pollachos legetai when it is criticizing Plato, as we saw, can be understood only based on the fact that Plato, in Aristotle’s point of view, does not make distinctions in the senses of being.
Chapter Four

The Standard Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues

While the ancient philosophers, doxographers and commentators from Aristotle onward considered, more or less, the question of the date and arrangement of the dialogues (cf. Irwin 2008, 77 n. 69), they did not observe a firm necessity to consider the progress of Plato’s theories in dialogues, maybe because they did not think of any essential shift in there.¹ We might be able to say, nevertheless, that the most prominent feature of the ancient attitude to Plato was its peculiar attention to the Republic and the Timaeus as the most mature works² in his philosophy and also its consideration of Laws as a later work. This tendency can be discovered from the general viewpoint of the first chronologies of the early 19th century after starting to deal with the issue. That Schleiermacher observed Republic as the culmination of Plato’s philosophy and as one of the latest dialogues besides Laws and Timaeus could reflex the implicit chronology of the tradition in the first mirrors it found. Another tendency in Schleiermacher is taking the triology of Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus as relatively early.

From the last quarter of 19th century onward, stylometry helped scholars to establish a new framework to construct a new arrangement between the dialogues. Based on stylistic as well as literary findings, Campbell (1867, xxxff.) argued for the closeness of the style of Sophist³ and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Laws that, especially because of the certain evidence about this last dialogue’s lateness, led to the consideration of all as late dialogues. Almost every other stylistic effort after Campbell approved the similarities between Sophist and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Laws. The result of all such investigations led to a

¹ Plato first became familiar with Heraclitean doctrine of flux and the impossibility of knowledge of changing things, Aristotle says, and had the same idea in his later years (Met. 987a32-b1). Aristotle’s way of treating with the theory of Forms can be a good evidence for this. He thinks, it seems to me, that all the reasons Plato provides for his theory must be considered as coexistent efforts alongside each other, none of them substituting the other. Even when he criticizes the theory of Forms as paradigms which, I think, has the echo of implying its being a later solution (τὸ δὲλέγεινπαραδείγματαανταὐταῖναι ...Met. 991a20-22), he does not take the change serious.

² It is an irresistible tendency even in modern chronologists. Cf. e.g. Thesleff, 1989, 11 about Republic.

³ The abbreviations for the dialogues are so: Apology (Ap.), Charmides (Ch.), Clitophon (Clit.), Cratylus (Cra.), Critias (Cri.), Criton (Cr.), Epinomis (Epi.), Epistles (Eps.), Euthydemus (Euthd.), Euthyphron (Euthp.), Gorgias (Grg.), Hippias Major (H. Ma.), Hippias Minor (H. Mi.), Laches (Lach.), Laws (La.), Lysis (Ly.), Menexenus (Mene.), Parmenides (Par.), Phaedo (Ph.), Phaedrus (Phd.), Philebus (Phil.), Politicus (Pol.), Protagoras (Pr.), Republic (Rep.), Symposium (Sym.), Theaetetus (Tht.), Timaeus (Tim.)
new chronology that, despite some differences, has a fixed structure in all its appearances.

The current chronologies are mostly based on the arrangement of dialogues to three groups corresponding to three periods of Plato’s life, which became predominant after applying stylistic features in assessing the similarities between dialogues. The fact that all the stylometric considerations reached to the similar results about the date of dialogues while they were assessing different stylistic aspects helped the new chronology become prevailing not only among stylistic chronologies but also between those like Fine, Kahn and Vlastos who were inclined more to the content-based arrangements. Even this latter group could not neglect the apparently certain results of using the method of stylometry. This was the main reason, I think, that made what they called content-based chronology be under the domination of stylometry much more than they could expect. The division of the dialogues into three separate groups became something that most of the scholars took for granted so far as Kahn thinks this division ‘can be regarded as a fixed point of departure in any speculation about the chronology of the dialogues’¹ (1996, 44). Thereafter, all the chronologists are accustomed to divide the dialogues to three groups of early, middle and late corresponding to the three stages of Plato’s life. Nevertheless, some of them tried to make subdivisions among each group and introduce some of the dialogues as transitional between different periods and thus reached to a fourfold classification of the dialogues. Although they could never achieve to a consensus about the place of some dialogues, about which we will discuss soon, the whole spirit of their chronological arrangements is the same and thus compelling enough for us to unify all of them with the label of ‘Standard² Chronology of Dialogues’ (SCD). We brought together some of the most famous chronologies in the table below to make a comparison easier and to show how all are approximately of the same opinion about the place of some dialogues.

The following points must be noted about this table:
1. I divided the dialogues to eight groups of early, late early, transitional, early middle, late middle, post-middle, early late, and late. Although none of the chronologists applies this classification, it can be helpful to compare them. In this table, for example, if one of the chronologists beholds one of the dialogues as later than all the dialogues of middle group, it is considered here as late middle. Otherwise, if it is emphasized that it is after all of them, it is considered as post-middle. The same is true about the dialogues of the late group in which I regarded the first dialogues of that period as early late only in those who explicitly considered

¹ Mackay (1928) points to the danger of taking threefold division of the dialogues as a warranted chronological order.
² Regarding the label ‘standard’, as Irwin notes (2008, 77), it is a description of the new trend of arranging Plato’s dialogues used mostly by the scholars who want to criticize or reject it. Irwin, however, defends it.
some dialogues as earlier than others in the late group. Though, therefore, some of the dialogues might have not been considered as forming a distinct class, they are distinguished here.

### Table of the Different Chronologies of SCD

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### A. SCD’s Early and Transitional Dialogues

The first group of dialogues in SCD includes what is called early or Socratic dialogues. Campbell’s first group of dialogues includes Apology, Charmides, Cratylus, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippia Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Protagoras and Symposium. The first two groups
of Brandwood’s four groups corresponding to Campbell’s first group. He distinguished Cratylas, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias Major (which was absent from all Campbell’s groups), Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo and Symposium as the second group. Ledger (1989) also posits four groups. What is noticeable about histwo groups of 390s dialogues and 380s comparing Campbell and Brandwood’s, is that he extracts Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus from them and puts them besides Republic and other middle period dialogues. Meno and Phaedoare in his 380s dialogues.

When we move from stylometric to content-based chronologies, the homogeneity between the dialogues of each group is more understandable. Guthrie (1975, v. 4, 50) distinguishes three groups, the first of them includes Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Protagoras, Gorgias and Ion. In addition to Meno, Phaedo and Euthydemus, his first group does not include Cratylus and Menexenus. Unlike Guthrie, almost all the other content-based chronologies of our study desire to distinguish two categories inside the first group of which the latter must be considered as the transitional group leading to the dialogues of the middle period. Kahn distinguishes four groups of dialogues and arranges two of them before middle period dialogues. The first group including Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor, Gorgias and Menexenus he calls 'early' or 'presystematic' dialogues (1998, 124). The second group he calls the 'threshold', 'pre-middle' or 'Socratic' dialogues including seven: Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Meno. Based on Vlastos’ arrangement we must distinguish Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno as 'transitional' dialogues from the 'elenctic' dialogues that are the other dialogues of Kahn’s-mentioned first two groups plus the first book of the Republic. Fine also distinguishes 'transitional' dialogues from early or 'Socratic' dialogues, but her transitional dialogues are Gorgias, Meno, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Cratylus of which she thinks the last two dialogues are 'controversial' (2003, 1). Her Socratic dialogues are all the remaining dialogues of Kahn’s first two groups.

In spite of all the differences between the mentioned chronologies, it can be seen that all of them are inclined to arrange the early dialogues in a way that:

i) Besides the dialogues that are considered as late, it never includes Republic II-X, Theaetetus, Phaedras and Parmenides.

ii) It intends to consider the dialogues like Euthydemus and Hippias Major that look more critical as later among the earlier dialogues or as transitional group\(^1\).

iii) Those who do not consider Meno as a middle period dialogue place it in their second or transitional group.

iv) None of the content-based chronologies considers Phaedo and Symposium as early. Stylometric chronologies also intend to put them either as last dialogues among their early ones or as middle.

\(^1\) Maybe we have to neglect Campbell as the only exception.
B. SCD’s Middle Period Dialogues

Campbell listed Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus as his second group of dialogues, an idea that was accepted by Brandwood. Ledger’s middle period dialogues had Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus in addition to the dialogues that Campbell and Brandwood had mentioned as middle. Among content-based chronologies, Guthrie’s list of middle period dialogues did not include Parmenides but some dialogues which had been considered as early in stylometric ones: Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus and Cratylus. Insofar as I know, Euthydemus and Menexenus have not been considered as middle by other content-based chronologists and Guthrie is an exception among them. That Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium and Republic were middle period dialogues almost all the philosophical12 chronologists like Kahn, Fine, Vlastos (except Rep. I), Irwin and Kraut came along. The dialogues they do not string along about are Meno, Cratylus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. Those like Guthrie, Kraut and Irwin who did not consider Meno as early presumably posit it among middles. The same can be said about Cratylus in the suggested chronologies of Guthrie, Kahn, Vlastos and Kraut. Nonetheless, it is different in case of Parmenides and Theaetetus. Whereas all the mentioned stylometric chronologists like Campbell, Brandwood and Ledger set them among middle period dialogues, the philosophical chronologists, it might seem at first, did not arrive at a consensus about them. While Guthrie and Fine put them as the first dialogues of the late group, Vlastos and Kraut set them as the latest of the middle group, as well as Kahn who puts them as post-middle and amongst the late period dialogues. Regardless the way they classify their groups, their disagreement does not affect the arrangement of the dialogues: they all posit Parmenides and Theaetetus after the series of Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium and Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws. To sum up SCD’s arrangement of the middle period dialogues we can add:

v) Republic and Phaedrus have been considered by all the mentioned chronologists as dialogues of the middle period.

vi) All the philosophical chronologies have reached a consensus about setting Phaedo and Symposium alongside with Republic and Phaedrus as middle.

vii) While Stylometric alongside some philosophic chronologists arrange Parmenides and Theaetetus among their middle period dialogues and mostly as the latest among them, other philosophical chronologists put them as the early among the late dialogues. We can conclude then that SCD intends to locate these two dialogues at the boundary between the middle and late period dialogues.

1 Also Epistle 13
2 Here I use both the words content-based and philosophic as the same and as distinct from stylometric chronologies.
C. SCD’s Late Dialogues

SCD’s biggest consensus, both in style-based and in content-based chronologies is about the late dialogues. Campbell listed *Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias* and *Laws* as his late group. Brandwood’s list has *Epinomis* and *Epistles* in addition and Ledger’s has *Clitophon*.¹ That all the dialogues of Campbell’s list are late dialogues, all the mentioned philosophical chronologies are of the same opinion. The only difference is about locating *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* as the first dialogues among late group or the latest among middle group. We can then say that in SCD:

viii) *Sophist, Politicus, Philibus, Timaeus, Critias* and *Laws* are considered by all as late.

IX) All the above six dialogues must be dated after *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*.

Based on the above results out of a brief comparing of the chronologies, we are, I hope, permitted to draw the scheme of the standard chronology that can reflect the spirit of the current chronology. The aim of drawing this scheme is to determine the essential features of the current chronologies. We need SCD to be nearly determined because we need to have a fixed subject to challenge. We will try, however, to refer to the different ideas whenever it seems necessary. Now, let us draw a hypothetical scheme of SCD on the basis of the mentioned points of (i) to (ix) in the scheme (1) below.

The following points must be noted about this scheme: ²
1. I did not bring dialogues like *Alcibiades I* and *II, Clitophon* and some other dialogues their authenticity have been doubted by some of our chronologists.
2. The arrangement of the dialogues that are listed under column I shows the results of points (i) to (ix) above.
3. The dialogues mentioned in column II are those that have been considered by the scholars either as early or as transitional but never as middle or late.

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¹ Among *Epistles* Ledger mentions only Epistles seven, three and eight as late.
² Comparing with my SCD, Debra Nail’s (1998, cf. the table at p.173) endeavor to measure each of the style-based, Philosophy-based and content-based separately and to bring forth their uncontroversial results seems too stern. There are, in her conclusion, only three uncontroversial dialogues: *Apology* as early, *Phaedrus* and *Republic II-X* as middle. The reason for this conclusion is that she brings Thesleff’s arrangement in his comparison (cf. the table at p.169) and also Leskey’s as a philosophical chronology. Though Leskey’s chronology has much in common with both stylistic and content-based chronologies, when she combines it with that of Thesleff, the outcome of the comparison of philosophical chronologies become completely different and, thus, does not present notable similarities between all kinds of chronologies. If, therefore, we exclude Thesleff’s and compare Lesky’s with other chronologies, the similarities will show up. Another reason for the difference between my similarities with that of Nail is that whereas she takes the classifications too strict, I try to pay more attention to the arrangements and not to the fixed boundaries of different groups. In my attitude, then, if, for example, *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* are considered as the latest of the middle period in a chronology and as the earliest of the late period in another one, we took them as similar because this classification does not affect the arrangement. Consequently, the result of our categorizing is more about the place of some dialogues than the similarities between different groupings.
4. The dialogues of column III are those that have been taken either as early, transitional or middle but never as late.

**SCD's Scheme**

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Stylometric Evidences of the Standard Chronology

Both the scheme we drew out in the previous section and the fact that it is the result of the stylometric evidences are points almost agreed upon:

Since the advent of stylometry … all the parties to the dispute over the nature of Plato’s development would agree that the Euthyphro is an early dialogue; that the Phaedo and Republic are dialogues dating to Plato’s middle period, and that the Phaedo is the earlier of the two; that the Parmenides post-dates the Republic, and that the Sophist is among Plato’s latest works. (Prior, 1985, 168)

That there must be some kind of stylometric development in Plato’s writing through the dialogues is beyond doubt. Nonetheless, there is, I think, a reasonable doubt about the role the stylometric evidences play in supporting SCD. It is generally agreed that SCD owes much to the stylometric evidences as its first versions were suggested because of stylometric findings. This is what we are to examin here: How much SCD is right in relying on the stylometric evidences? I shall try to examine some of the stylometric evidences in this section emphasizing only on what each evidence alone implies, and not, necessarily, on what each scholar derives from every evidence.

i) By calculating the increased use of the technical terminology of Timaeus, Critias and Laws in Plato’s other dialogues, Campbell (1867) found that the number of occurrences of those technical words in Sophist and Politicus are close to them.

ii) Dittenberger’s examination of the use of μην with certain other phrases showed that while Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major, Euthydemus, Meno, Gorgias, Cratylus and Phaedo are free from any use of all three phrases of τι μην, ἀλλα ... μην and γε μην, the number of their use in other dialogues are as follows:

   a) τιμην: Ly.(1), Par.(6), Phds.(11), Sph.(12), Tht.(13), Pol.(20), Phil.(26), Rep.(34), La.(48)
   b) ἀλλα ... μην: Tim. and Criti.(0), Tht. and Phdr.(1), Sym., Par., Phil., Sph. and La. (2), Pol.(3), Ly.(4), Rep.(11)
   c) γε μην: Ly.(0), Sym., Phds., Tht. and Criti.(1), Rep.(2), Par. and Sph.(5), Tim.(6), Phil.(7), Pol.(8) and La.(24).

   These occurrences are not sufficient to authentize one to say that Sym., Ly., Phds., Rep. and Tht. make a group earlier than Par., Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. And La. Suppose that we accept his explanation that Plato took τι μην from Dorians in Sicily, what about Tim. and Criti.? Furthermore, the suggested order for Par. later than Phds., Tht. and Rep. cannot be consistent with these evidences.

1 Brandwood (1990, 249f.) distinguishes between ‘earlier’ stylistic development which was slow and gradual and a ‘later’ which was sudden and rapid happening when Plato was about sixty.

2 In doing this, I was benefited so much from Brandwood’s (1990 and 1992) tables and comparisons. Also cf. Dorter’s table (1994, 7).
iii) Dittenberger’s calculation of καθάπερ and its preference to ὥσπερ in some dialogues sounds conclusive because the use of this word in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. (orderly: 27,14,34,18,148) is incomparable with its use in other dialogues like Sym., Phds., Rep. and Tht. (orderly: 2,4,5,2) and might be reasonably as its preference to ὥσπερ. What is confusing for Dittenberger is the case of Parmenides in which there is no use of the word. Besides the problem of Parmenides that, I think, is due to the orthodox belief about its lateness which is more based on a need for a consistent story than stylometric evidences, all that the use of καθάπερ proves is that Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. are close to each other. This result is very close to the result of Campbell’s evidence, adding Phil.

While the occurrences of ἐως(περ) is seen in most of the dialogues, μέχριστερ occurs only in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. (orderly: 1,1,3,4,1,16) which approves the same result mentioned about καθάπερ. Though ignored by Dittenberger, this result, with two exceptions of Criti. in which there is no occurrence and Ap. where we have one occurrence, is approved again by the number of occurrences of τάχα ἵσως in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. (orderly: 3,2,3,1,11). To sum up Dittenberger’s evidence, while I think μήν-phrases does not prove anything, the occurrence of καθάπερ, μέχριστερ and τάχα ἵσως indicates that Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. must be considered as close to each other. This result is almost the result of Campbell evidence by the only difference of adding Phil. The surprising fact is that in spite of the abnormalities of Par., it is still considered by Dittenberger among the dialogues of the late group.

iv) Schanz’ calculation of τῷ ὄντι, ὄντως, ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀληθῶς, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ and ἀληθείᾳ showed that:

a) There is no occurrence of τῷ ὄντι in Phil., Pol., Tim. and La. where the use of ὄντως is considerable (orderly: 15, 11, 8, 50). If we add Sph. and Epi. where there is only one occurrence of τῷ ὄντι and a considerable number of occurrences of ὄντως (Sph.(21), Epi.(16)), we will have six dialogues of Phil., Pol., Tim., La., Sph. and Epi. as dialogues which are close to each other in this regard.

b) The case is a bit different with ὡς ἀληθῶς and ἀληθῶς. Besides Phil., Pol., Tim. and La., we have also H. Ma., Mene. and Meno as the dialogues where there is no occurrences of the former. While the number of occurrences of the latter in the first four dialogues (orderly: 7, 4, 3, 6) is more than all other dialogues (with at most two occurrences), save Sph. with six occurrences, the problem is that unlike those four, Sph. has also three occurrences of ὡς ἀληθῶς. None of the phrases occurs in Epi.. The result of this comparison is, thus, like the previous one but with a less certain conclusion.

c) The occurrence of τῇ ἀληθείᾳ has no significance except its more occurrences in Grg.(6) and the last books (VIII-X) of Rep.(9) besides its absence in Meno and
Phil. and some other early dialogues. The use of \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha\) in four dialogues of Phil.(1), Tim.(1), La.(3) and Epi.(1) (ignoring the 3 occurrences in Pr. because of being quotation) can bring forth only a very slight improvement of the previous results. The final conclusion we can draw out of Schanz’ evidence, however, is that Phil., Pol., Tim., La. and somehow Sph. and Epi. are closer to each other than other dialogues.

v) Ritter’s list of forty-three linguistic features of the late dialogues, mostly including reply formula in order to find how many of them have occurred in each dialogue, got to this arrangement: La.(40), Phil. and Pol. (37), Sph. (35), Rep. (28), Tht. (25), Phds. (21), Par. (17), Epi. (12), Cra. and Ly. (8), Phd.(7), Lach. (5), Euthd., Pr. and Mene. (4), Sym., Ch., Grg., H.Ma. and Ion. (3), Ap., Criti. and Meno (2), and Euthp.(1)

What this comparison is supposed to mean? How can we compare different dialogues on the basis of the number of reply formula used in them while not only are they different in their number of pages, but also in their being dialogical? Many dialogues like Sym. and Phds. as well as some books of Rep. do contain less questions and answers and thus less features and also many other considerations. The case is almost the same with Lutoslawski’s (1897) assessment using more than five hundred features.

vi) Janell’s examination of hiatus showed that the frequency of objectionable hiatus in La. (with the average of 4.7 per page), Epi. (2.8), Tim. (1.2), Criti. (0.8), Sph. (0.6) and Pol. (0.4) is extraordinarily lower than all other dialogues, e.g., Ly. (46), Euthd. (45.1), Phd. (41), Meno (38.3), Rep. (35.3), Tht. (32) and Phds. (23.9). Besides the first obvious conclusion that those six dialogues are close to each other, it can also mean that these dialogues are the latest dialogues since it is not understandable that Plato, who avoided the objectionable hiatus in them has forgotten to avoid them in the dialogues later than them. Comparing with the other evidences, Janell’s evidence is more authentic in considering the late dialogues as late.

vii) The investigation of the clausulae of Plato’s writing in Laws and comparing it with Pol., Phil., Tim. and Criti. on the one hand and Ap., Pr. and Cr. on the other hand in Kaluscha’s examination showed that the prose rhythm of La. is similar to that of the first group. This was another improvement of all past evidences of similarity between La. and late dialogues.

I hope this brief evaluation of the stylometric evidences can clearly show that all that stylometric evidences can prove is that the dialogues Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws and Epinomis must be close to each other and probably later than other dialogues. What stylistometry at most can do for the arrangement of the dialogues is, therefore, only assuring us of a late group that does

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1 That stylometric evidences are not sufficient to decide about chronology was noticed by many scholars. Cf., e.g., Cooper, 1997, xii f.; Kahn, 1966, 44-5; Young, 1998, 39; Arieti, 1998, 274.

2 Cooper (1997, xiv) says: ‘It is safe to recognize only the group of six late dialogues’
not include *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* both stylometrically far from other dialogues of SCD’s late group. What stylometry cannot construct is a middle group since none of the stylometric evidences can prove such a group of dialogues. ‘It is a fact often forgotten’, Tarrant says, ‘that the modern notion of a middle period in Plato’s work is an artificial construct that has no stylometric basis’ (2000, 140). Stylometric evidences, on the other hand, are strongly against SCD’s consideration of *Parmenides*¹ and *Theaetetus* as the dialogues close to the late dialogues.

¹ The anomalous style of the *Parmenides* was so unconceivable in SCD’s framework that made Ritter to doubt its authenticity.
Ten Objections against the Standard Chronology

The standard chronology of dialogues that we tried to articulate in the previous section, is the subject of many objections most of which have been presented by the same scholars who accepted the framework of SCD in their own versions. Here we are going to discuss some of the main, mostly ontological and epistemological, problems of the standard chronology under three groups of objections.

A. First group of objections: middle dialogues after early ones

To consider the middle dialogues like *Meno, Phaedo* and *Republic* immediately after the early dialogues has some epistemological and ontological problems. Our first group of objections, then, intends to show that there must be some problems with SCD’s tendency to put the middle dialogues immediately after the early ones.

Objection I: Emergence of Good in epistemology

What does happen there between the early and middle dialogues that the principle of 'knowledge of what X is' in the early dialogues becomes inferior to another principle, 'knowledge of Good'? This is an important difference between two groups of dialogues that SCD cannot explain.

Objection II: The distinction of knowledge and true belief

Contrasting to the early dialogues in which there is no serious hint to the distinction of knowledge and true belief, this distinction is strongly at work in the middle one as something already accepted or previously demonstrated. In the early dialogues, about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The Socrates of the early dialogues never lets anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. We can obviously see in the middle period dialogues that the distinction of knowledge and true belief is at work as an already demonstrated distinction (cf. *Meno* 85c6-7; 97b5-6 ff.; 97b1-2; 98b2-5; *Phaedo* 76b5-6, 76c4, 84a8).
A turning point between these two situations must be wherever true opinion is accepted as a distinct epistemological status from knowledge. Since the distinction of knowledge and opinion is an important result of *Theaetetus*’ long discussion about knowledge, it can be the best turning point. Socrates’ refusing of both the second suggestion that knowledge is true opinion (187bff.) and the third suggestion that knowledge is true opinion plus an account (201dff.) proves that knowledge and opinion must be considered as different things. *Meno* is another dialogue which discusses the distinction, but it more takes it for granted than proving it and, therefore, it is obviously after making the distinction. When it is said at 85c-d that the slave boy has true opinion about the same hings he does not know, the distinction is presupposed. The interrelated theories presented about the distinction with the use of the myth of Daedalus (97d-e) and the theory of anamnesis (98a) also presuppose the distinction. Even at 98b Socrates surprisingly says that if he can claim to know anything, which about few things he does, he claims that knowledge and opinion are different. Hence, we cannot regard *Meno* as the turning point when we have *Theaetetus* in which the distinction is demonstrated. While *Theaetetus* looks as the epistemological turning point here, the problem is that based on SCD, it cannot be posited amongst the early and the middle dialogues.

**Objection III: Immediate shift from bipolar to tripartite ontology**

How can we get to the principle of tripartite Ontology from bipolar ontology while moving from the early dialogues to the *Republic*? Based on SCD we do not have such permission. I think this can be considered a crucial objection that makes it necessary to assume some dialogues between the early and the middle dialogues.

**Objection IV: Possibility of being of not being**

While the Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is predominant in the early dialogues (e.g., *Euthydemus* 284b3-5, *Republic* 476-477) speaks of that which both is and is not.

The turning point must obviously be the acceptance of the being of not being. This occurs deficiently in the second part of *Parmenides* (hereafter: *Parmenides II*)\(^1\) and sufficiently in *Sophist*. At *Parmenides*161e-162b the being of not being is discussed and at 163c it is said that not being is the absence of being. It is, however, denied there and also at 164b. In *Sophist* (257b) it is strictly said that not being is not contrary to, but different from, being and at 258b-c the peculiar character of not being and also the Form of not being are discussed (cf. 258d). After explicitly rejecting the principle of 'father Parmenides' (258d), not being is connected, more obvious than before, with the notion of difference and introduced as each part of the nature of difference that is set over against being (258e). There is no contrary of

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\(^1\) By *Parmenides II* I mean the second part of Parmenides including the part from 137 to the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is discussed.
being and, thus, not being cannot be its contrary. At 260b not being is considered as a Form that is scattered on being. The problem is that while ParmenidesII and Sophist look as the ontological turning points here, based on SCD we must regard them as post-Republic dialogues.

B. Secondgroup of objections: Late period dialogues after middle ones

This group of objections aims to show how problematic it is to locate some of the SCD’s late group of dialogues like Theaetetus, Sophist and Laws after dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic.

Objection V: Problems of the lateness of Theaetetus

If we accept SCD’s arrangement for Theaetetus as a late or late middle dialogue after Meno and Republic, we cannot explain how Plato who had spoken before about belief as distinct from knowledge in Meno (85c-d, 97a-b, d-e, 98a-b) and had taken this distinction for granted in Republic V (477e-478e), upon which he relies the ontological distinction between Forms and particulars (476c-d, 477e-478e,479d), suddenly comes to the elementary state about the relation between knowledge and opinion in a later dialogue asking whether knowledge is distinct from opinion or not. How can we understand Theaetetus’ suggestion at 187b that knowledge is true opinion and Socrates’ all efforts to reject it and prove that knowledge is different from opinion as a later suggestion and effort?

Although Fine brings three reasons to call the revealing of the discussion in Theaetetus ‘surprising’ (2003, 19-23), the problems of considering Theaetetus as a late dialogues are best discussed in Sedley’s list of six problems (1996, 84-5):

1. While in Republic and Timaeus knowledge is distinguished by its objects, namely Forms, Theaetetus tries to treat with empirical objects and is far from observing Forms as the objects of knowledge.
2. That the strong contrast between epistēmē and doxa in Republic and Timaeus gives way in Theaetetus to the theory that knowledge is a kind of opinion. Even the way that the earlier suggestion (without adding logos) is rejected, Robinson (1950, 4-5) claims, seems actually to deny Republic’s view. What is said at 201b as the reason of the rejection of their identity, namely that jurymen can achieve a true opinion about the facts that only an eyewitness could know about. This implies that we can know through our eyes while Republic strongly held that knowledge is only of the invisible Forms. He also points to 185e and 208d as other evidences of this.

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1 Rickless (2007, 245) thinks that it is ‘of a shock’ and ‘of a puzzle’ to see Theaetetus’ three epistemic theories which, in his point of view, are all incompatible with two worlds theory. That Plato gives these theories at ‘the time of day in the Theaetetus’ and does not simply dismiss them is the cause of puzzle for him.
3- The theory of anamnesis that Plato had set out in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus is never invoked\(^1\) in the Theaetetus even when he theorizes different models for the acquisition of knowledge there. Sedley notes (p.85) that in the Aviary model, Plato has to accept that an infant’s mind is empty (197e) which is ‘apparently in flat contradiction of the innateness doctrine’ of anamnesis (cf. also: Robinson, 1950, 4. He calls it 'out of harmony' with the doctrine). Cornford (1935, 28) thinks that never abandoning the theory, Plato could not mention it there because it presupposes the answer to the question about knowledge.

4- Appearance of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge in Theaetetus after the long activity of a constructive Socrates in the middle dialogues.

5- Noting to the fact that Theaetetus fails in finding out what knowledge is, Sedley asks: ‘can this really be the same Plato who in the Republic made knowledge the distinguishing mark par excellence of the philosopher?’ (ibid)

6- Theaetetus fails even to mention Meno’s most admired theory of aitias logoismos.\(^2\)

Sedley presents three interpretations as possible solutions of the problem.\(^3\) According to the first interpretation, Theaetetus is silent about the middle-period doctrine.\(^4\) Whereas based on the second interpretation, unlike the epistemology of Republic and Timaeus which have Forms as their objects, Theaetetus does address only to the sensible world, the third interpretation tries to make the Meno the canonical text and interpret the Theaetetus accordingly (p. 93f.). The way Robinson (1950, 5-6) speaks about the problem of Theaetetus is noteworthy:

Is the inconspicuousness of the Forms in the Theaetetus due to Plato’s not having believed in them when he wrote it? The answer yes was easy to accept in the days before stylometry, when one could hold that the Theaetetus was an early dialogue, written before the theory of Forms was thought of and expressed in the Phaedo and the Republic.

Neither holding a dialogue as earlier than Phaedo and Republic can allow us to say it belongs to the period that the theory of Forms has not been thought; nor the

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\(^1\) Robinson (1950, 3-4) mentions Léon Robin (1939) notes that the only one who was claiming the existence of some evidences of the theory in Theaetetus, appealing to, for instance, 185c-d, 186b-c or 197e, was whose references he calls 'certainly wrong'. Kahn (2006, 127) thinks that some 'echoes or analogues' to anamnesis can be recognized in Theaetetus though he accepts that it 'makes no use of' the theory (p. 129).

\(^2\) Tarrant thinks that Meno 'allegedly supplies the answer to the question posed by the Theaetetus' (2000, 37).

\(^3\) Wolfsdorf’s suggestion (2014, 161-162) that Theaetetus supersedes Meno because while the latter does not intend to consider the 'epistemological status of the aetiological account itself', the former criticizes 'decompositional and differential accounts on epistemological grounds', seems at least convincing.

\(^4\) Nicholas P. White (1976, 157-8), for example, thinks that the epistemological question of Theaetetus, namely that what knowledge is, had occupied Plato since the beginning of his career, but it was only in 'muted form' in the middle dialogues.
stylometry, as we discussed, does say that its place after those dialogues is a more acceptable place.

The substantial problem with *Theaetetus*’ position as later than the middle dialogues, as the above-mentioned problems clearly show, is an epistemological one. While one might agree that from a modern point of view, it might be even more developed than the epistemology of *Phaedo* and *Republic*¹ but can it be still the case from Plato’s point of view? The fact that *Theaetetus* was a fresh start, as Vlastos (1991, 77) calls it so, after the *Parmenides*’ attacks against the theory of Forms, in which I am entirely in agreement with them, cannot justify SCD’s dating of it after middle period dialogues. *Theaetetus* can, however, be accepted as a fresh start after *Parmenides* but still prior to the *Meno, Phaedo and Republic*.²

Objection VI: Problem of taking *Sophist* and *Parmenides II* as later than *Republic*

While SCD’s arrangement for *Theaetetus* was epistemologically problematic, the place it gives to *Sophist* makes ontological problems. In the earlier parts of *Sophist* we are still committed to the Parmenidean principle (237a) and cannot find that which not being can apply to (237b) because not being cannot be applied to those that are (237c). This is the ontological side of the problem of false belief that is being discussed in *Sophist*, a long discussion which finally brings about an important ontological turn, namely its going beyond Parmenidean principle (258d), accepting the being of not being and considering not being as different and thus not as something contrary to being (258ef.). How can we understand now *Republic*’s admission of what both is and is not (476e-477a-b), which is obviously taken as something that has been proved before, prior to *Sophist*? The main reason based on which SCD is inclined to date *Republic* earlier than *Sophist* is that the stylistic features of *Republic* are far different from the so-called late dialogues to which *Sophist* is stylometrically so close. Before stylometry, it was almost a somehow agreed point that *Sophist* would have been before *Republic*.

The same objection is appliable, though not with the same strength, to the lateness of the second part of *Parmenides* where an incomplete version of solving the problem with the notion of ‘difference’ can clearly be seen (143b, cf.162d). *Parmenides II* is not as successful as *Sophist* in completing the solution and leads at the end to the absolute denial of the being of not being.

¹ I think it can be one of the reasons why the modern thinkers of 20th century were more inclined to accept *Theaetetus* as a late dialogue.
² SCD’s problem about the place of *Cratylus*is somehow related with its problem about *Theaetetus* (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While *Cratylus* looks close to the early dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to *Theaetetus*, which is considered by SCD far from the early and after the middle period dialogues.
Objection VII: Problem of Laws and Politicus after Republic

It might look strange, at first sight, to make this objection against SCD’s arrangement because it has always been admitted as the most evident that Laws must be set after Republic. Moreover, our only external evidences of the dialogues, the testimony of Aristotle (Politics II, 6) is in favor of this arrangement. The problem that Laws’ political theories are unacceptably neglecting, or unaware of, Republic’s philosopher-king and, as Sounders says, it is vanished in Laws ‘without trace’ (1992, 465). About onto-epistemological issues, the differences between two dialogues are so huge that leads Saunders to believe that:

It is very hard not to feel that one has entered a different world, in which the cutting edge of Plato’s political thought, metaphysics, has been lost. (ibid)

Owen thinks that the Laws ‘embodies no consistent reversion’ (1998, 264) to the political theories which we face in Republic. Although Laws is empty from the theory of philosopher-king, it has, however, some reference to other theories of Republic. The objection we brought forth is, then, the question that if Republic antecedates Laws, why Plato is neglecting the theory of philosopher-king in there? The only solution SCD can propose is that, as Owen for example says, Laws is ‘designed to modify and reconcile political theories which he had advanced at different times’ (1998, 264). Those parts of Republic which are neglected in Laws, namely the theory of philosopher-king and Republic’s ontology are from the same books of Republic, from the latest pages of the book V to the end of book VII, where the being of what both is and is not is admitted (the subject of objection II). Politicus is also devoid of the theory of philosopher-king though it says that rulers must have ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμων (293c5-7). This seems to be a more elementary, and the prior step, of the theory of philosopher-king of Republic and not vice versa.

C. Third group of objections: Parmenides

As we tried to show in the first part above, the position of Parmenides in SCD is a determined position in relation with some dialogues. It is definitely dated (i) after Meno, Phaedo and Republic (II-X) and (ii) before Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus and Critias. What our third group of objections is going to attack is only the first point that is SCD’s arrangement of Parmenides after middle period dialogues. These objections are more determinative than all other objections and are capable to prepare us for a new attitude towards Plato’s development and the chronology of his dialogues.

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1 Owen thinks that there is no evidence that any part of the Laws was written after every dialogue (1998, 277, n.76).
2 Barker considers Politicus hostile to Republic but ‘much less uncompromisingly hostile’ as Laws is (1918, 314). Owen thinks that Barker’s paradox ‘hardly needs refutation’ (1998, 271).
Objection VIII: Problems of considering *Parmenides* as referring to the middle period dialogues

The biggest presumption of all Plato’s commentators is that *Parmenides*’ objections against the theory of Forms refer to the theory that had been formerly offered in some or even all (cf. Prior, 1985, 51) of the middle period dialogues. Cornford (1939, 70-71), for instance, points to this general agreement about *Phaedo* as the subject of *Parmenides*’ problems. Palmer emphasizes that what Socrates is advocating in *Parmenides* is ‘a theory that in all essential respects is a version of Plato’s own middle period theory’ (1999, 180). Meinwald, on the other side, criticizes the traditional consideration of *Parmenides* 135 as Plato’s comment ‘on the status’ of the middle period theory of Forms. The portrait *Parmenides* draws of the middle period theory, Meinwald asserts, is not containing a ‘fully and adequately developed theory of Forms’ (1992, 372). The main problem, however, is that the middle period dialogues already contain the solutions of *Parmenides*’ problems. As Dorter says, *Parmenides*’ objections ‘are easily answered on the basis of the features of the theory which were prominent in the middle dialogues’ (1989, 200) and ‘not only the answers but the problems themselves' were anticipated in those dialogues\(^1\) (ibid). Gonzalez (2002b, 56-7) discusses several problems of the assumption that the critics are referring to the middle period dialogues focusing on the multiplicity of the theory both in the middle dialogues and in *Parmenides*.

Among those who take *Parmenides*’ objections valid, the general opinion about the relation of the theory of Forms in the middle period dialogues with *Parmenides*’ objections can be read in Kahn’s words (1996, 329):

> The classical doctrine of Forms, as developed in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, is subjected to rigorous criticism by Plato himself in the *Parmenides*; and the objections raised against it there are never answered.

We are not to claim thus that Plato answers directly to these objections in the middle period dialogues because such answers cannot be found anywhere in Plato’s corpus, neither in his middle nor in his late period dialogues. In fact, none of Plato’s dialogues directly discusses the issues of other dialogues. What we want to prove here is that the epistemological and ontological grounds of the theory of Forms as is represented in the middle period dialogues is deliberately constructed so as not to be broken by those criticisms anymore. We can find no answer to the objections because instead of providing answers to the problems, Plato changes, first, the epistemological and, then, the ontological grounds of the theory of Forms in order to be protected from the objections. We suggest, thus, that not only *Parmenides*’ problems are not referred to the middle period dialogues but they are intentionally resolved there. Before discussing the problems and the way they are resolved in the middle period dialogues, let me point to some notes about *Parmenides*.

\(^1\) Dorter claims that Plato recognized all these problems at the beginning but did not felt that they could vitiate his theory (1989, 200).
1) Based on SCD’s arrangement, Plato who had introduced an old or at least adult Socrates presenting and, if we are allowed to say, defending his theory in all those well-done dialogues including Republic, suddenly and for the first and last time, makes this character very young to answer to the problems caused by the theories of Socrates ‘in his maturity or even on his deathbed’ (Dorter, 1994, 19). The character of a young Socrates, one might say, is only a dramatic necessity because if Plato wanted to make Socrates part of the conversation with Parmenides, it could hardly has happened otherwise. Even if we accept this dialogue’s actual occurrence, to speak about the dramatic necessity about the dialogues that have Socrates as their character, is far from the spirit of Sokratikoi logoi genre. The youth of this character, on the other hand, is not mentioned only dramatically at the first part of the dialogue or by a slight reference somewhere in the dialogue, but is used specifically and purposefully with too much emphasis. Both of the indications at 130e and 135c-d show that the dialogue wants to emphasize the fact that the theory of Forms under consideration has been offered by a young man who, though is intelligent and able to present noble and divine arguments (135d2-3), has not yet been gripped (dvenetai) by philosophy or properly trained (135c8) as will be in the future (130e2).\(^1\) Having pointed to the possibility of attaching some kind of significance to Socrates’ youth, Gosling asserts that ‘it might be that we are being given a critique of either early arguments for the Forms, or arguments of neophytes’ (1973, 192).

2) Parmenides’ theory of Forms is a more elementary theory than that of Phaedo and Republic. Both the details of the theory and the way it is defended by Socrates, if we can call it defence, show that the theory is introduced as a not well-thought one. We are not to discuss the probable changes of the theory of Forms here. Either Plato tries to change the theory in its details or not, he changes the epistemological grounds of the theory in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus and the ontological grounds in Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus and Republic among the middle dialogues. These changes of the grounds are, as we will argue, because of the problems of the Parmenides. I categorize these problems first into six main problems:\(^3\)

1. Problem of Forms for all, even worthless, things (130c-d)
2. Problems of participation (131)
3. Problem of Third Man (132a-b)
4. Problem of considering Forms as thoughts (132b-c)
5. Problem of Forms as paradigms (132d)

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\(^1\) Guthrie (1975, 347) thinks that this dialogue must have happened about the year 450 B.C. Allen (1997, 72) dates it between 452 and 449 B.C., if ever happened. He notes (p.74), however, that the conversation reported in Parmenides is fiction.

\(^2\) Palmer notes that Parmenides’ young Socrates resembles the person described at Republic VII 534b3-4, someone who is ‘unable to give an account of something, either to himself or to another’, cannot be acceptable.

\(^3\) Though maybe not about the names, the classification of the problems to these six problems is something almost agreed. Cf., e.g. Gill 2006
6. Epistemological problems of taking Forms as separated from particulars (133a-135a)

Let put aside the first problem. Maybe we cannot show that Plato in the middle dialogues did not consider Forms for all things, as we cannot show this in his other dialogues\(^1\). Nonetheless, Aristotle’s criticism that from some of the proofs for the existence of the Forms, it follows that there must be Forms ‘even of those things of which they think there are no Forms’ (Metaphysics 1079a6-7) might be an evidence for the fact that either Plato or the Academy or both did not use to posit Forms for all things\(^2\). The fourth problem is also specific to the suggestion of Forms as thoughts and is not necessarily a problem related to Plato’s own theory of Forms\(^3\). There remain four problems. The third and the fifth problem has the same basis, namely the regress problem or the problem of Third Man. Since we think the Third Man difficulty arises from a certain relation between a Form and its participants, we will discuss the third and the fifth problems besides the second problem. We will therefore try to argue that i) the problem of participation and also the Third Man problem are not appliable to the theory suggested in Republic and thus the second, third and fifth problmesare resolved there; and ii) the epistemological problem cannot be applied to Meno, Phaedo and Republic as well as Phaedrus and, thus, the sixth problem is resolved in these dialogues.

i) Problems of participation and Third Man in the Republic

It has been taken for granted by a number of commentators that the Third Man problem (TM) as it is suggested in Parmenides and referred to repeatedly by Aristotle has Self Predication (SP) as its basis. If the Form of F is itself F, as all the participants of F are F, it will necessarily lead to TM. Based on this presumption, scholars made a direct and fixed relationship between SP and TM. On the contrary, what I will suggest is that though Plato accepts SP in all the periods of his philosophical life, it does not necessarily leads to TM in Republic while it can lead to it in the other dialogues of the middle period.

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1 What is said at Sophist 254c1-3, ‘Let’s not talk about all Forms. That way we won’t be thrown off by dealing with too many of them. Instead, let’s choose some of the most important (μεγίστων) ones’, might be observed as a try to avoid this problem.

2 Moreover, Aristotle points in several places that based on the arguments from the existence of sciences, there must be Forms at least for all things of which there are sciences (e.g. Metaphysics 990b12-14, 990b24-27, 1079a7-9) and thus even for non substances (cf. 990b22-24, 1079a19-21) which might have the same echo.

3 Because of the date of Parmenides in SCD, Allen’s suggestion (1997, 167ff.) that the theory of Forms as thoughts is the rejection of Aristotle’s answer is not compatible with SCD’s arrangement.
That Plato accepts SP is agreed by many commentators like Vlastos¹ (1954, 388), Fine (2003, 36), F. C. White (1977) and Ryle (1939, 138) so far as Meinwald calls SP 'one of the most evident and characteristic features' (1992, 363) of Plato's works. Vlastos says that Plato 'neither could convince himself that the Third Man Argument was valid, nor refute it convincingly' (1954, 342). Plato could not have thought of TM as valid because this is a problem that, as Vlastos says, destroys the 'logical foundations' of all his theory (1954, 349). The case is different with Cherniss: not only TM is invalid and thus harmless to Plato's theory but also Plato did know that it is invalid when he put it in Parmenides' mouth (1998, 294).² He thinks that Plato shows himself to be aware of TM in the Republic and Timaeus³ and he did not, undoubtedly, believe TM to be destructive (1944, 294-5) for if Plato considered TM fatal, he must have abandoned that theory at least as early as the Republic (1944, 294).

Allen argues that though, for Plato, the just itself is just and the beautiful itself beautiful, this does not imply SP because for this, the function "… is F" must be applied univocally to F itself and F particulars. This univocal application of F to F itself and F particulars, Allen says, can be correct only if both of them 'have identically the same character' (1998, 58) which obviously is not the case:

To say that justice is just and that any given act is just would be to say two quite different (though perhaps related) things and the difficulties inherent in self-prediction could not possibly arise. That is, the character of Forms would not be assimilated to that of particulars. (ibid)

While the function "… is F" for F itself is, in Allen's point of view, 'identity' statement⁴, it is for F particular only a 'relational' statement (ibid, 59). He points that

¹ Although he lists Ly.217d, Pr. 330c-d and H. Ma besides middle dialogues as places where SP is implied (1954, 388), he indicates that Plato never asserted it in his writing because if he ever did, Aristotole would have known it (1954, 339).

² What Cherniss says about the difference of being ζῷον in a Form and its participants in the Republic and Timaeus is noteworthy: 'In the language of the Republic they would have the idea but would not be ὦ ἐστι ζῷον' (1944, 296). He also refers to Timaeus 39e and 30c5-8 where the difference between having ζῷον and being ζῷον is persisted upon.

³ Owen (1998, 255) strongly disagrees with Cherniss on this point. Conford thinks that Plato’s statement at Republic 597c that the divine creator made only one 'Bed' might refute TM because 'the Form and the individual beds are not entities of the same order and alike. The Form, Bed, is not a bed; and it is not true that it has the character in the same way that individual beds have it' (1939, 90). By comparing Republic 597c with Timaeus 31a, Conford concludes, as we said about Cherniss, that Plato could not be blind that Parmenides' assumption that Largeness is a large thing is fatal (ibid). Cherniss names Taylor as the only one who denied that the passage in Timaeus (31a) could be a reference to the "regress argument" (1944, 295-6).

⁴ Allen argues that to say that F-ness is F is nothing but saying an identity statement. He concludes that 'Plato's apparently self-predictive language' does not result in SP (1998, 59). His reason is that, firstly, to say "F-ness is F" is not a predicative statement and, secondly, "… is F" function does not mean the same about the Form and its particulars.
for Plato, both in the early and middle dialogues, Forms are paradigms or standards, that is they are 'things characterized not characters' (ibid, 64) and Plato did not thought of them as common characters.\(^1\) It is, therefore, based on his rejection of univocal predication of F on F itself and F particulars that Allen rejects TM (1998, 68). He correctly points that the fundamental difficulty underlying TM is ontological instead of linguistic. 'Not only the regress arguments', he says, 'but all of the objections to participation in the Parmenides posit an identity of character between Forms and particulars' (ibid). The rejection of the identity of F in F itself and F particulars based on the theory of Forms as paradigms in the original-copy model is justified because Forms stand to particulars 'not as predicates stand to instances of predicates but as originals stand to shadows or reflections' (1961, 333 cf. 335).

We have then two related points: that (1) TM arises from taking the F of the Form and that of its particulars identical; and (2) in the original-copy theory of Forms they are not identical and, therefore, TM cannot be applied to it. F. C. White rejects the second point and thinks that the original-copy theory cannot be helpful in meeting TM\(^2\) (1977, 208). His reason is that if images are images at all, it is due to the fact that their properties are 'univocally in common with their originals' (ibid, cf.199). He points that appealing to the model of original-copy cannot be helpful to avoid SP\(^3\) while there are some 'independent reasons' that Plato was committed to it (ibid, p.211). White points to Phaedo and Republic where he thinks (1) the relation between Forms and particulars is not described as similar to the relation between originals and shadows, and (2) particulars are not seen as totally dependent on Forms or 'pure reflections' (1977, 211-212). He thoroughly, and I think appropriately, rejects any common theory in the middle dialogues concerning the nature of Forms and particulars or the relation between them (ibid). Sedley (2006) shows that even in Phaedo, the resemblance and 'striving to be like' is never crucial in Plato’s relationship between Forms and particulars. He notes (311) that even if we accept this as the correct relationship in Phaedo, it cannot be considered as an integral component of Plato’s philosophy.

My own point of view is that while TM is not appliable to Republic, it is appliable to all the other middle dialogues. I agree with White that i) there is no common theory in the middle dialogues about the nature of the relation between the Forms and their participants; ii) the original-copy model is not appliable to Phaedo\(^4\);
iii) the original-copy model cannot be helpful regarding SP. Nonetheless, I absolutely disagree with him about its help to TM. What I think is that while Plato has always been committed to SP, he tried in Republic to present the original-copy model, which is completely helpful against TM. Plato does not try to reject TM by rejecting SP as some think, but he tries to reject TM while maintaining SP. Because of the difference between original and its shadow, the original-copy model of the theory of Forms, as Allen noted, escapes TM. The reason is that by this theory, the nature of participation changes in a way that the identity of a Form and its participants is not the case anymore. We are not being said here of a character which is present in a Form and its participants but of a character which originally and really belongs to the Form but is applied in a different way and thus not univocally to its copy. Based on Plato’s ontology in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic, it is only a man who is really and originally a man and if we call his reflection in a mirror or his shadow a man and say "it is a man", we do not use this ‘is’ univocally. This ontology, amongst so called middle dialogues I confine to Republic, changes the nature of participation so that neither Parmenides’ problem of participation nor TM will be applicable anymore. Not only does not it reject SP but it even strengthen it. It is primarily and completely the Form of F which is F; a participant’s being F must be understood in a different way. White’s objections that participants are not totally dependent or ‘pure reflections’, is not the case about this ontology. Whether we consider them so or not, this ontology can work for it does not necessarily say that particulars are ‘pure reflections’. All that is being said here is that a Form and its participant are the same thing (F) but in different ways. Although Plato’s use of mimesis instead of metexis in Republic can correctly be interpreted based on this new ontology, I do not intend to take it so because to rely on Plato’s use of different words is neither possible nor convincing.

A paradigm of F is the perfect example of being F. The paradigm of F is not F-ness but F itself. The difference between F-ness and F itself can become evident if we examine SP about them: While SP is correct and meaningful about F itself, it looks bizarre and unacceptable about F-ness. Large itself, the paradigm of Large, its perfect example, is obviously large because it is nothing but this being large and thus SP is obviously meaningful here. But about F-ness: 'Largeness is large' or 'beauty is

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1 We know that Aristotle (Metaphysics 991a20-22) does not accept such a change and takes it only as poetical metaphors that change nothing.
2 Gosling (1962, 27-8) warns out the danger of such relying on terminology and passing from the similarity of terminology to the similarity of problems.
3 Bluck’s point about Parmenides is worth noting: Plato means us to infer from the Parmenides that the positing of a further Form is not necessary. All that is necessary is that there should be one Form to be the ‘standard’ even if we happen to be treating that Form as (qua an X) a member of the group of X things. (1957, 124)
beautiful' looks completely unacceptable because F-ness or the concept of F cannot itself be F. TM is also based on the assumption that Plato’s theory of Forms makes a Form necessary when there is a common thing between some things. It is only by understanding the Form of F as F-ness, a universal concept which is in common between a Form and its participants that the necessity of the existence of what is common between them is followed. If Forms are not universal concepts but originals of which all participants are shadows, there will be no necessity for a third thing to represent the common feature. Therefore, Plato’s original-copy model of his theory of Forms changes the relation between a Form and its participants in a way that none of the problems of participation and regress arguments of Parmenides can be effective anymore. The case is different about Phaedo because the original-copy model and the theory of Forms as paradigms are not yet theorized there.¹

(ii) The Epistemological Problem

Besides the distinction of knowledge and true belief that can clearly be helpful for the epistemological problem, Plato’s three famous doctrines, the theory of anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, as I hope to show, do substantially aim at solving the epistemological problem resulted from the chorismos between the Forms and their particulars.²

a) The theory of anamnesis in Meno, where it was introduced for the first time, does obviously intend to solve Meno’s paradox, the problem of knowing what one knows or does not know. It is Meno’s question, 'How will you search that thing when you do not know at all (ὅ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν) what it is? (80d5-6), that is formulated by Socrates as the paradoxical problem of searching either what one knows or does not know (80e2-3). After leading to the theory of anamnesis at 81bff, it resolvesMeno’s problem by the theory that 'the whole of searching and learning is indeed anamnesis' (81d4-5).

The first appearance of the theory is not about Forms but about all the things of both this world and the underworld (81c5-7) and leads to the result that there is nothing that the soul has not learned (c7). It is Phaedo, however, where this epistemologic function of the theory is straightly directed to the Forms. Allen’s view

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¹ Annas mentions Phaedo 74e (besides Republic, Euthyphro and Theaetetus (176e ?)) as one of the places in which Forms are considered as paradigms (1974, 278, n.50). Although it might be close to paradigm-based understanding of Forms, I am not certain about taking it so. That Form is something that participants want to be like (βούλεται ... εἶναι οἷον) but fall short, cannot necessarily mean that the Form is a paradigm here. Though the relation of Forms and participants in Phaedo might be directed towards what it will be in Republic, I do not think that we are allowed to assume them the same. About the mention of paradigm in Euthyphro 6e the best suggestion is, I think, that it is not, as Fujisawa (1974, 43) says, 'a case of genuine paradigmatism we find in later dialogues'.

² Listing the anamnesis in Meno, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and the non hypothetical principle in Republic as three answers to the question of the knowledge of the Forms, Sayre reasonably thinks that the first one is the simplest. (2005, 299)
in linking between the theory of anamnesis and the 'epistemological problem' entailed by the separation of Forms and particulars' worths noting. He thinks that if the theory is an answer to this epistemological problem, it is not reasonable to say that the theory in Meno is not directed to the problem.\(^1\) I admit Allen's note that the difference of the theory of anamnesis in the Meno and Phaedo is that the theory in the Phaedo solves problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which Plato, when he wrote the Meno, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated (1959, 174).

After distinguishing the equal itself (ἡ ἰσότητα) from equal things (αὐτα τα ἱσα) in Phaedo (74c1-2), Socrates says that deriving (ἐννενόηκας) and grasping (ἐιληφας) the knowledge of the equal itself from the equal things is anamnesis (74c6-d2). The prior knowledge of the Forms does obviously intend to solve the problem of knowing separated Forms.\(^2\) This theory, hence, can help us to bridge from the particular things to what is distinct and separated from them because 1) we understand that the particular things wants to be like (βουλεται... εἶναι οἶον) the Forms but fall short and cannot be like them and 2) we have prior knowledge (προειδότα) of the Forms (74d9-e4). These two points are essential parts of the theory of anamnesis by which Socrates tries to solve the problem of getting knowledge of the Forms from the particulars and knowledge of the particulars from the Forms. He continues:

Necessarily, then, we must know in advance (προειδέναι) the equal (τὸ ἱσον) before that time we first saw the equal things and realized that all these objects strive to be like the equal but are deficient in this. (74e9-75a2)

By this theory, our knowledge is not restricted to our own world anymore and it cannot be said, as is claimed at Parmenides 134a-b, that none of the Forms are known by us and thus the knowledge of Forms is not a problem any longer. They are not still in us and, therefore, do not have their being in relation to the things that belong to our world strictly as it is said at Parmenides 133c-d. Consequently, the theory of anamnesis suggests a solution to the problem of knowledge of Forms while keeping them separated. The gap between Forms and things is as complete and huge as it is in Parmenides 133e. Here they are even more separated than ever.\(^3\)

\(^1\) 'It would appear to be a highly unlikely view of Plato's development to hold that he accepted an answer, and only later found a question to fit it' (1959,172).

\(^2\) Allen (1959, 168) calls the filling of the gap the 'core' of Phaedo's argument for the theory of anamnesis at 74b ff. (1959, 168).

\(^3\) It is the big presupposition of many Plato's commentators that he must have tried to diminish or eliminate the χωρισμός had he wanted to resolve the epistemological problem of Parmenides. Based on this presumption, Plato should have chosen the first and most simple way of solving problem. So we can see while the theory of anamnesis is so much obviously directed to the epistemological problem, no one tends to take it as postParmenides thesis.
Phaedrus’ elaborate story of the companion of the soul with Gods through the world of truths that is indeed the story of the process of anamnesis, evidently proves the function of the theory in respect of knowledge of the Forms (133e-135a). Only those souls who have seen the truth in the upper world, Socrates says, can take a human shape because human beings must understand speech in terms of general Forms proceeding from many alike perceptions to a reasoned unity (249b5-c2).

b) As the doctrine of anamnesis presented as a solution to Meno’s problem, the method of hypothesis is suggested as another solution to the problem:

It seems we must inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which we do not yet know (ἔοικε οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποιῶν τί ἐστιν ὁ μήπω ἵσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν). However, please relax your rule a little bit for me and agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως); I mean the way geometers often carry on their investigations. (86d8-e5)

After an example of how geometers make use of the method in their investigations (87a-b), Socrates continues:

Since we do not know either what it is (οὐκ ἵσμεν οὐδ’ ὅτι ἐστίν) or what qualities it posses, let us investigate it by means of a hypothesis whether it is teachable or not. (87b3-4)

The relation of the method with Meno’s paradox in the mentioned passages is obvious enough. Phaedo’s more complicated and better-constructed method which is not simply applying geometrians’ method as it was in Meno, but a more philosophical and specified one, is still related with the problem of investigating something that is out of the region of our knowledge. Socrates’ warning about the danger of watching directly an eclipse of the sun (99d-e) before discussing the method (100a f.) can throw light on this relation. Socrates who is searching for the causes is afraid of his soul completely being blind if he looks at things directly as someone who watches an eclipse of the sun might become blind in his eyes. As the one who wants to watch the eclipse must first see its reflection in water and similar things, Socrates who wants to find the aitiai, i.e. Forms, must use the hypotheses. Therefore, the method of hypothesis is to be, firstly, a method of getting the knowledge of the Forms (100a6). Immediately after the definition of the method at 100a, its relation with Forms becomes apparent at 100b f.

The use of the method in the allegory of Line in Republicis also related with the Forms, though, contrary to Meno and Phaedo, it has nothing to do with anamnesis. While this method is not used in the dialectical proceeding from images to sensible things and then to the mathematical objects, the hypotheses are needed to proceed from them to the Forms and then to the first principle. Socrates’ reference to the method of geometers saying ‘they make these their hypotheses and do not think it
necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone' (510c6-d1), indicates his intention, i.e. using Forms in an epistemological construction which, though has knowledge as its result, is not forced to explain Forms themselves. This is strictly directed against the epistemological problems arisen in Parmenides 134a-c.¹

c) Phaedo’s theory of Forms as causes has clearly the epistemologic function of the Forms as its purpose. Forms are the only things that can be the aitiai of things (101c2-6) but the problem is that to take Forms as explanation may be misleading because one thing can share in opposite Forms (102b3-6). Referring to the Forms, therefore, cannot necessarily result in the explanation of things because everything can share many Forms and it cannot be meaningful to say something is so and so because it shares a Form and it is such and such because it shares another Form, the opposite to the first one. Things might happen to have (τυγχάνει ἔχειν) some characters that are not due to their own nature (102c1-4). It is only tallness that has tallness as its nature as it is only shortness that has shortness as its nature (102d6-8). The opposites themselves (and not what have them by accident) cannot accept each other while they are themselves. This gets to a crucial point: only what that shares in a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite while it is itself. It means we can explain a thing by not only a Form but also what always has its character (103e2-5). Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot ’admit that Form which is opposite to that which it is’ (104b9-10). This helps him to reach to some kind of necessary opposition between things that are not the opposites (105a6-b1) which enables him to extend his previous safe and foolish theory of explanation by Forms to another another not foolish but still safe theory of explanation (105b6-c6). Socrates’ effort to show how Forms, without themselves being the explanation, can help us to reach to a safe explanation of things is against Parmenides’ problem (133c-134a) that Forms cannot help to the knowledge of particulars.

Objection IX: Problem of considering Parmenides’ objections as invalid

Parmenides’ objections against the theory of Forms can be considered either as serious and fatal or as invalid.² Let us see the problem of the latter first. Based on this

¹ Rickless’ opposite viewpoint about the theory of hypothesis seems to me an oversimplified view. He thinks that the method of hypothesis in the middle period is ‘perhaps’ because of Plato’s all negative method in the early period dialogues and Plato wants to ‘repair’ this defect of those dialogues (2007, 11).

² Believing that the disjunction 'valid or invalid' is unsatisfactory in its consequences, Allen (1997, 108) thinks that the criticism are put as aporiai which ’must be faced and thought through if philosophy is to be pursued'. He mentions Parmenides 129e, 130b, c and 135e as evidence where the criticisms are referred as aporiai and not as refutations. I actually agree that they must be taken as aporiai but I think that aporiai in any sense of the term in Plato and even Aristotle,
alternative, while Plato might have been aware of the fact that his theory had some problems, all or the majority of Parmenides’ problems were fallacious and thus unable to damage the theory. As, for example, Cornford says, ‘it is naïve to conclude that Plato himself regarded the objections as seriously damaging his theory’ (1939, 95). Referring to Republic 596a, 597c and Timaeus 31a, he asserts that since both of the dialogues are later than Parmenides and the Forms are posited in both of them, Plato undoubtedly did not believe TM as destructive of his theory (1944, 294-5). Referring repeatedly to Philebus 15b-c as restatement of the dilemma of participation in Parmenides, Allen concludes that at least one of the criticisms is not to be regarded as valid (1997, 106).

Thinking that though the arguments raise serious problems, they are not fatal (1989, 184), Dorter brings some reasons for his opinion (ibid, 199-200). As Dorter himself objects, if Plato did not consider the arguments fatal, why did he change his way of treating with the theory and even put aside his favorite personage, Socrates, in the dialogues which, based on SCD, immediately follow Parmenides, namely Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus? In these dialogues, as Dorter points out, Plato seems to be ‘exploring alternatives' for his theory (ibid). Robinson (1950, 5) notes that the general empiricist and even subjective atmosphere of Theaetetus’ tone in the absence of the religious tone to which we have been accustomed in the middle period dialogues, is ‘unfavorable' to the theory of Forms. Cornford (1935, 28) believes that Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them… [that] without them there is no knowledge’.

Moreover, not taking the problems as valid, Plato’s odd way of speaking about the friends of the Forms at Sophist 246b-d f. cannot easily be understood. Most importantly, if the problems were not valid, what on the world Plato meant by them? If they are to be considered as invalid, why should Plato choose Parmenides, the most respected figure to present it? Why at Theaetetus 183e and Sophist 217d, as Allen notes (1997, 107), he is praised for the noble depth he displayed and the magnificence of the arguments he employed on the occasion?

Objection X: Problems of taking Parmenides’ objections as valid

There are, on the other hand, some commentators like Ryle (1939, 129-130) who think that the arguments of Parmenides against the theory of Forms must be taken as serious and valid. Based on this view, Plato who might have been aware of the difficulties from the beginning manifested these problems in Parmenides and changed his direction from the middle period dialogues, which were based on the theory of Forms to the late period dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus, as is used in the Book Beta of his Metaphysics, are serious problems that must be resolved and, thus, will be fatal if not solved.

1 This can be tenable only if we observe no difference between the situation of the two dialogues as SCD maintains. A problem can be fatal in one and resolvable in another dialogue if they do not belong to the same period and, thus, there be the possibility of a later resolution.
obviously far from the previous predominance of the theory. This interpretation does not necessarily imply that Parmenides’ objections are correct objections, but that Plato took all or some of them as valid and thus became somehow disappointed with his theory of Forms as the dialogues after Parmenides show. If we agree with this interpretation and accept its general conclusion, as Runciman (1959, 151) does, the following problems will rise.

1. The first problem is that the theory of Forms is seen, as Dorter notes, ‘still intact’ (1989, 183) in some of the later dialogues like Timaeus and Philebus which in SCD are generally taken as post-Parmenides dialogues. Burnet (1928, 44) claims that except ‘in a single sentence of the Timaeus’, ‘there is no other words about the "forms" in any dialogue of later date than the Parmenides’. Reminding that the text in Timaeus (51c) is ‘a long and emphatic paragraph’ instead of a sentence, Cherniss (1962, 5) asserts that even this single text would be an exception ‘important enough’ to invalidate the general negation of the theory after Parmenides. He also points to Laws, Philebus1 and two of the Epistles where the theory appears.

If Plato did revise his theory of Forms, how could he restate the theory in the dialogues after Parmenides? Timaeus and Philebus cannot consistently be dated after Parmenides if we regard the objections valid.2 I think this was one of the main reasons for Owen who tried to change what Cherniss later called an opinion ‘as old as Plutarch’ (1998, 273) namely the opinion that Timaeus was one of Plato’s latest works. Owen thinks that Parmenides must be read ‘as following and not as paving the way for the Timaeus’ (1998, 251).

Though I might agree up to a point3 with Owen that 1) Timaeus must be regarded as the ‘crowning work not of the later dialogues but of the Republic group’ (1998, 253); 2) it represents the culmination of a period of growing confidence (ibid, 266); and hence 3) must be posited at the end of the Republic group, I am not to accompany him in his final conclusion that Timaeus antecedates Parmenides. What Owen’s survey shows is, most of all, that SCD’s arrangement is problematic about the position of Parmenides in between two groups of the middle period and the late period dialogues. It implies the fact that we cannot put Parmenides unproblematically between Republic and Timaeus.

2. The second problem with considering Parmenides’ arguments valid is that Aristotole (and even the Academy) read Plato as if he has not criticized his own

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1 Dorter (1994, 4) mentions 15b, 58a, 61d-62a, 64a as passages in Philebus that ‘recapitulate earlier dialogues’ assertions about the theory of forms’.

2 One might say that what is said in our last section namely that Parmenides’ objections are resolved in the middle period dialogues must be applicable to Timaeus and Philebus. Though this is not wrong to say that the problems are already resolved in these dialogues, the difficulty is that they do not have anything to do with the solutions. Neither the original-copy model nor theories like anamnesis, hypothesis and the distinction of knowledge and true belief are initiated in and belong to them.

3 I say ‘to a point’ because the place Owen considers for Timaeus I give to Republic but I think, however, that Owen is right in that Timaeus is more similar to Republic.
theory of Forms. That Aristotle’s first years in Academy must have been passed as a faithful adherent of the theory of Forms or, as Cornford says, under ‘overwhelming influence of his master’ (1939, 109) is something we can be sure about.¹ His numerous critiques of the theory in his works², some of which were not directed only against Plato but to the Academy also, shows, on the other hand, that there is some problem with dating Parmenides as later than Republic and still taking its critiques valid. If we accept the general opinion about the date of Aristotle’s joining, i.e., 366 or 367³, we should agree that at least until some years in which Aristotle became able to write his first works, Plato and Academy were still supporting the theory. Based on SCD, Plato must have published Parmenides before Aristotle’s joining or at least before his first writings.⁴ The problem is that we cannot admit that Parmenides’ arguments were written as valid arguments in these years that must reasonably be considered as Plato’s faithful years to the theory.

The emergence of Plato’s theories in Aristotle has always been a matter of confusion. Just as some of the doctrines Aristotle ascribes to Plato cannot be found in Plato’s works (e.g., the relation of Forms and numbers or the theory of great and small), Aristotle’s way of criticizing the theory of Forms is such that it seems none of the difficulties were mentioned by Plato himself, while some of Aristotle’s objections are drawn out in Parmenides.⁵ Not only does Aristotle neglect Parmenides neither mentioning nor referring to Plato’s self-criticism, but he does not consider any development or change in Plato’s philosophical life.

¹ Though the sustained fragments from Eudemus and Protrepticus approve Plato’s influence on Aristotle, they have no sign of Aristotle’s approval of the theory of Forms having nothing against it too (cf. De Vogel, 1965, 261-298; Lloyd, 1968, 28-41). These works could not, however, belong to Aristotle’s first years in Academy though not impossible to belong to the period before Plato’s death.


³ This date is the best consistent date with the famous story that Aristotle was Plato’s pupil for 20 years. The Academy must then have been founded before 367. Ryle (1966, 8) thinks that its date must be before 369 when Theaetetus, one of its teachers, perished.

⁴ Kahn (1996, 81) thinks that it ‘probably’ must have ‘recently’ been completed before Aristotle arrived. In his suggestion, amongst the dialogues that have Socrates as their main speaker, only the Philebus was composed after his arrival. (ibid)

⁵ Some of the resemblances are not deniable: e.g., the problem of Third Man at Par. 132a-b and at Met. 990b15-17, 991a1-8, the problem of complete distinction of knowledge of Forms with that of sensible things at Par. 134c and Met. 991a9-19, the problem of third pattern at Par. 132d with the problem of several patterns at Met.991a26-29, 1079b33-1080a2.Cherniss (1944, 9) points to the resemblance of Topics 113a24-32 and Par. 132b-c.
Chapter Six

The Development of Plato’s Metaphysics

There are many determinative factors regarding the chronology of the dialogues about which our information is terribly deficient. There is no certain evidence about the date of each of the dialogues, nor any reliable information about the beginning and ending time of Plato’s writing. The most determinative issue among all chronological matters, I am inclined to insist, is the question that if did Plato use to manipulate or, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus said (1808, 406), polish, comb and curl his previously written dialogues and, if so, to what extent?¹ That there is almost no answer to this most crucial issue shows how far deficient, indefinite and inconclusive the chronological plans can be.² The fact that we do not even have enough information to decide, in case of Socratic dialogues, to what extent they are reporting or reflecting the actual dialogues of historical Socrates, and to what extent they are Plato-made stories so that even now we have a schizophrenic character between Socrates and Plato, can be good evidence for this deficiency. There are, nevertheless, some more certain informations that can be contributive in case of the arrangement of some dialogues.

a) The only external evidence provided by Aristotle that Laws was written after Republic (Politics, II, 6) which was repeated by others³.

b) Few internal evidences provided by references in dialogues themselves including: i) the cross references in the Sophist 217a and Politicus 257a and 258b which indicate the prior composition of Sophist; ii) Timaeus 27 which hints to Critias as its sequel; iii) Theaetetus 183e where Socrates says he met Parmenides when he was young which has been taken as a reference to Parmenides; iv) a similar reference to the discussion of young Socrates with Parmenides this time in Sophist 217c; v) Sophist 216a refers to a previous discussion which has been thought to be referring to Theaetetus, and vi) the Timaeus 17b-19b in which Socrates tries to summarize his previous dialogue about the structure of cities, and the kind of men these cities must

¹Thesleff says that in spite of the fact that the only evidence from which we can infer the chronology is the internal evidence, ‘the value of such evidence is open to the general criticism that many, if not all, may have been re-written' (1989, 7). ‘There is no reason’, he continues, ‘to suppose that Plato left his writing in exactly the same state in which they were first composed'. (ibid)

²There are some issues about Plato’s life that can overally change any chronological order. What Grombie calls 'the most critical event' (1969, 363) in Plato’s life, namely his probable being prosecuted for defamation and being forbidden to teach at 372 can be one of these issues.

³E.g.DiognesLaertius (Lives, III, 37), Olympiodorus (Prol. VI, 24)
bring up to become the best people and so on which, among the dialogues we have now, must refer to Republic.

1. An onto-epistemological chronology of plato’s Dialogues

These few internal and external references are not of course sufficient to offer an arrangement among more than thirty dialogues. In such a poor situation about information and the possibility of later manipulation of the dialogues, it seems the best criteria of presenting a chronology, if it can be possible at all, should be those which are the most fundamental on the basis that what is more fundamental must be the subject of change at last. Now, what kind of criteria can be chosen for an arrangement better than the ontology and the epistemology of the dialogues?

Since the arrangement I am going to suggest here is to be based on the onto-epistemological status of the dialogues, I shall call it the Onto-Epistemological Chronology of the Dialogues (OECD). Although it is, of course, more of a philosophical chronology than a style-based one, while trying not to violate both the referential and stylometric evidences, it does not focus on other features of the content of the dialogues. In fact, the arrangement that is suggested here comes closer, I believe, to the evidences. Nonetheless, it is still a revolutionary chronology, not only in its main differences with other chronologies in respect of the place of some key dialogues, but also in its formulation of the whole corpus. Whereas I am not to divide the dialogues into different periods as all the various chronologies are used to do, I classify them in different groups I call "waves"; a name I borrowed from Plato himself. When he gets to the theory of philosopher-king in Republic, he calls it the biggest wave which must be overpassed:

I have now come to what we likened to the greatest wave (κύματι).\(^1\) (473c6-7)

As each problem is like a wave for Plato that he has to overpass, each wave of dialogues focuses on resolving a main problem. Plato’s philosophy can best be imagined as an ocean. That his philosophy is as widespread, vast and deep as an ocean, maybe more than any other philosophy during all the history, is something that many would agree upon. It is not, nonetheless, the great and glorious character of his philosophy which is the intention of this poetical resemblance, but the characters of the waves of an ocean. Plato’s dialogues can best be divided to groups that behave like waves. Like each group of his dialogues, a wave in the ocean has a pushing force, a rising path, a high point and a fall. Each wave, independently identifiable, makes the movement of another wave possible and so the next wave has the power of its previous waves leading it to go forward to do the same for its next wave. This interwoven character of dependence-independence of each wave is what I

\(^1\)This kind of naming is also compatible with Plato’s own way of theorizing as he always makes use of entangible things as models trying to explain complicated matters.
have in mind about Plato’s dialogues. Each group/wave of dialogues has a pushing force, a problem or paradox that is to be resolved in its way by some new theories and methods. The wave, thus, rises upward making both the problem and the need of its solution as radical as possible until it gets to the highest point by resolving the problem and getting to the favourite results. Nevertheless, no solution is completely acceptable in Plato’s philosophy and there are always new problems and issues. Therefore, every wave has a fall that can be the starting point of the next wave. The suggestion of waves of dialogues says indeed that Plato’s dialogues cannot be treated altogether by taking all the dialogues as a whole nor each of the dialogues singly and independent from all the other dialogues. The best is to treat couples of them as a chain that though is somehow independent has a special relation with couples of other dialogues. I distinguish four waves in Plato’s dialogues as follows.

i) **Socratic Wave** including: Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology, Clitophon, Crito, Hippias Minor, Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major and Parmenides I.\(^1\)

ii) **Epistemological Wave** including: Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Cratylus, Meno and Phaedo.

iii) **Ontological Wave** including: Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos (Republic 473-541)

iv) **Political Wave** including: Politicus, Ideal State (Republic 357-473), Laws, Epinomis, Critias.

Besides some maybe dubious or at least less important dialogues, I dismissed Philebus, Phaedrus and Symposium from taking part in this chronology. In spite of some obvious resemblances with the dialogues of the ontological wave especially Timaeus, both in its ontological approach and even in its stylometric features, Philebus cannot be emplaced in the overall project of the waves. The ont-epistemological chronology, to be honest, is unable to read Philebus in Plato’s corpus as I think none of the other chronologies could get at an acceptable explanation of its relation with the other dialogues. We have problems also to emplace Symposium and Phaedrus in our plan. They seem to belong, nevertheless, more to the period between the epistemological and ontological waves or even coexistent with some dialogues of the latter wave. Phaedrus in which we are encountered with probably last serious echo of theory of anamnesis,\(^2\) on the one hand, shows its close connection with Meno and Phaedo while its presenting of the method of collection and division, on the other hand, associates it to Sophist and

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\(^1\) By Parmenides I, I mean the first part of the dialogue which is discussing the problems of Socrates’ theory of Forms and lasts till 137. Parmenides II consists the part from 137 to the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is being discussed.

\(^2\) The mentions of the theory in Philebus (342b) and Laws (732b) appear to be, as Sayre (2005, 193) notes, ‘entirely removed’ from the sense it had before. I am not convinced with Kahn’s (1996, 367) appealing to Politicus 277d and Timaeus 41e-42d as the passages in which the theory is alluded or implied.
**Policus.** Contrary to most of the scholars who date the *Phaedrus* quite late in Plato’s career and after *Symposium*, Moore (1973) insists on the converse relation of the two dialogues taking *Phaedrus* as earlier. Whatever their relation might be, the similarities between the two dialogues besides their incompatibility with the epistemological and ontological waves may call for a different wave.

Except the first wave, of the order of its dialogues we discuss below, the dialogues of all the other three waves are arranged chronologically. When a dialogue is located after another dialogue and before a third one in the epistemological and ontological waves, it means that either its epistemological or ontological status, is between those dialogues. The case is the same about the order of the dialogues between different waves, except the last wave in which the order of the dialogues of the political wave must be considered parallel to, or interwoven with, the dialogues of the ontological wave.

**a) Socratic wave**

The first and longest wave, includes a) a group of ten dialogues (ordered alphabetically): *Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology, Clitophon, Crito, Hippias Minor, Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages*, b) a second group of four dialogues: *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major*, and c) the first part of *Parmenides*. I distinguish these last five dialogues from all the other ones which are called Socratic dialogues ordered alphabetically. *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major* must be considered, without chronological order between themselves, after the Socratic dialogues and before the first part of *Parmenides*. It is not difficult to guess how surprising it looks for the reader to see the first part of the *Parmenides* here in the first wave after Socratic dialogues and before all the other ones. This is the most revolutionary suggestion of OECD.

The leading problem of the wave is historical Socrates’ problem of acquiring knowledge reshaped by Plato in Socratic dialogues. It is this problem that leads to the theory of Forms in the Socratic dialogues and especially in *Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major* and *Parmenides I*. While *Hippias Major* (301b2-6) criticizes the onto-epistemological grounds of Socratic dialogues, *Parmenides*

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1 Kahn (1996, 373) points to some evidences of *Phaedrus* referring to *Republic* (cf. Hackforth (1952, 3-7)). Irwin believes that *Phaedrus* must be considered as a ‘revision’ or ‘development’ of the views of both *Republic* and *Symposium* and not an anticipation of them (1995, 12).

2 Being certain about *Symposium*’s posterior date, Moore asserts that while writing *Symposium*, Plato must have ‘firmly’ had *Phaedrus* in mind. Mostly based on *Phaedrus’* more sophisticated logic represented in its method of collection and division, Dillon (1973) argues against him.

3 By so calling them, I do not mean, of course, that they are the real dialogues of historical Socrates.
I criticize the theory of Forms as it is formulated in them. I agree that there is not enough material in there to be called a 'theory' of Forms to be criticized in *Parmenides* I, but where else can such a theory be found? The poor discussion of the theory in the early dialogues is the main reason that, as far as I know, no one has suggested that *Parmenides* I is criticizing the theory of Forms of the early dialogues by now. As we will discuss below, the theory of Forms in those dialogues is indeed constructed in a way to escape those attacks.

b) Epistemological wave

This wave includes a) *Pratogoras, Gorgias* and b) *Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Cratylus*, *Meno* and *Phaedo*. While I guess that *Gorgias* is probably later than *Protagoras*, I cannot be certain about their relation with the other six dialogues that are chronologically arranged. I called this wave epistemological because I believe that it includes Plato’s epistemological endeavor to solve the epistemological problem arisen in *Parmenides I* (133b-135a).

The backbone of this wave, however, is Plato’s epistemological project from *Theaetetus* to *Phaedo* where 1) by the distinction of knowledge and true opinion, (a) the epistemological problems of the early dialogues are resolved and (b) the epistemological ground for the theory of Forms is provided (cf. *Tim.* 51d3-5); 2) by the doctrine of *anamnesis*, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as

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1 Cf. Fine, 2003, 29

2 The relation of *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus* is a problem with which the current chronologies do not know what to do (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While *Cratylus* looks close to the early dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to *Theaetetus*, which is considered far from the early and after the middle period dialogues. While OECD resolves this problem easily considering *Theaetetus* as early, about the order between *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus* I cannot be certain at all since there cannot be found any certain ontological or epistemological priority between them. All that can be said is that they are close to each other as some of their main themes, especially the problems of flux, Protagoras’ relativism and false belief might bring to mind. Never holding a ‘confident opinion’, Runciman, however, dates *Cratylus* ‘somewhere before’ *Theaetetus* (ibid).

3 *Gorgias* mentions the distinction of knowledge and true opinion without discussing it, a distinction proved in *Theaetetus* and used in *Meno*. While it is accepted that there can be false conviction besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής) (454d5), false knowledge (ἐπιστήμη...ψευδῆς) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first simply by saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Ωδαμώς. It shows, though not strongly, that they might have been composed after *Theaetetus* and before *Meno*. While, on the other hand, the problem of teachability of virtue seems to indicate that both *Gorgias* and *Protagoras* may belong to the period of *Meno*, there might be some indications of their priority. I found Jane M. Day’s (1994 cf. 10) points about the priority of *Protagoras* tenable though maybe I am not as certain as she appears to be. She dates *Gorgias* later than *Protagoras* and closer to *Meno*. 

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causes, the epistemological problem resulted from the separation of the Forms and their participant as it had been drawn out at Parmenides 133b-135a, is resolved. The epistemological wave includes, thus, some essential modifications in Plato’s theory of knowledge to save the theory of Forms as well as to solve some of the epistemological problems of the early dialogues. This means that this wave is an epistemological project, a doctrine that may not be accepted by some scholars. Charles Kahn, for instance, thinks that in what he calls the 'series of dialogues from the Meno to the Phaedrus', not only is not any sign of linear development, in which different epistemological theories replace each other, but 'different concepts of knowledge are used in different contexts for different purposes' (2006, 130). Although the epistemological wave does not say that there actually is a unique theory, it emphasizes the unity of a project or process. Moreover, some kind of a linear development from Theaetetus to Republic through Meno and Phaedo can be recognizable, but not a development of replacing different theories but a development of theory that gets enriched and more sophisticated. The complicated epistemological theory of Republic as is construed in the allegory of line can reasonably be taken as the development of the theory of the distinction of knowledge and belief in Theaetetus and Meno.

c) Ontological wave

The four dialogues of Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos construct the ontological wave. These four dialogues have in themselves Plato’s brilliant endeavor to solve the following problems by presenting a new ontology:

i) The ontological problems of the early dialogues which was itself the ontological aspect of the problem of false belief needed a change of approach to being. This shift was done by accepting the being of not being based on the creative theory of 'difference' that is initiated in Parmenides II and attains to its fulfillment in Sophist and Timaeus and is used in Timaeus and Philosophos.

ii) The problems of participation (131a-e) and Third Man (TM) (132a-b, 132d-133a) in Parmenides I that are resolved by the new theory of being in Sophist and the new theory of Forms in Philosophos.

The ontological wave, therefore, is to make Plato’s main modification in his understanding of being that results in the refutation of Parmenides’ principle and Plato’s achievement to a new notion of being that cannot be the subject of the previous problems, neither the problems of Hippias Major (301b-6) nor Parmenides I.

As it will be discussed in detail, what I call as an independent dialogue is nothing but Republic 473-541 where the philosopher is the subject of discussion.

The epistemological aspect of the problem had been resolved by the distinction of knowledge and true belief in the epistemological wave.
4. Political wave

This wave is not chronologically separated from the ontological wave but gets along it as a somewhat synchronous wave. Although the dialogues of this wave, *Politicus, Ideal state*¹ (*Republic*II-V), *Laws, Epinomis* and *Critias* are arranged chronologically after one another, their dates can be neither before nor after the ontological wave, save the publication of *Laws* which is almost certainly the last one of all the dialogues and after Plato’s death. *Politicus* was certainly written after *Sophist* and probably before *Ideal state* which itself must have been composed before

¹That the books II-V of the *Republic* is mostly the same as the famous *Ideal State* has been suggested before. Cf., e.g., Ryle (1966)
both the *Laws* and *Timaeus*,*Epinomis*, if it has been written by Plato himself that is strongly dubious, must be dated after the composition of *Laws*. The order of the dialogues of the two ontological and political waves, considered together, must be something like this: *Parmenides II*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Ideal state*,*Laws* (composition),*Epinomis*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Philosophos/Republic*,*Laws* (publication). The overall scheme of Plato’s dialogues based on our arrangement of them is drawn in scheme 1 above.

The development of Plato’s philosophy based on our onto-epistemological investigation will be something like scheme 2 below. Plato who had started the Socratic wave with Socrates’ search of knowledge as the motivating force of the wave provides a theory of Forms that is referred to in dialogues like *Laches*, *Euthyphro*,¹*Charmides* and *Hippias Major*. This theory is the very theory which Allen (1970) calls the 'earlier theory of Forms'; a theory that cannot be identified with the theory of Forms presented in the dialogues of the so-called middle period. The onto-epistemological grounds of these dialogues turn out as problematic in *Hippias Major* (301b2-6), as the theory of Form turns out to be problematic in the first part of *Parmenides*. Here is the first and biggest turning point of Plato’s philosophy where based on those critiques, he tries to reconstruct his philosophy by changing the epistemological and ontological principles of his philosophy.

The first effort is an effort in the theory of knowledge. In spite of the problems related to the false belief in *Euthydemus* and *Theaetetus*, knowledge turns out to be distinct from opinion in *Theaetetus*. This is, I think, the main goal of *Theaetetus*.² This distinction provides the epistemological grounds for the theory of *anamnesis* and the method of hypothesis in *Meno* and *Phaedo*, theories that are to resolve the epistemological problem of *Parmenides*. Since besides the ontological aspect of the problem of false belief, the problems of participation and TM are still annoying not received their answers in the epistemological wave, the ontological wave tries to resolve them.

These problems made Plato launch another wave, this time trying to change the theory of being. The starting point of the wave is the second part of *Parmenides* where the Parmenidean notions of being and unity are to be attacked. This attack has at least three important results: i) separating oneness from being in *Parmenides*’ 'One Being', ii) accepting that Parmenidean One and Being are problematic and finally iii) introducing the notion of 'difference'. Plato makes use of these results in *Sophist*, *Timaeus* and *Philosophos*. The points (i) and (ii) lead in *Sophist* to the rejection of

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¹Prior (1985, 9) insists that the theory of Forms is 'as explicitly present' in *Euthyphro* as it is in *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

²Cornford’s suggestion that the aim of the dialogue is to examine and reject the experimental approach to knowledge is not compatible with the place he and others dedicate to *Theaetetus*. It is not a suitable time, to reject the experimental approach after *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic* since they are already out of the approach and need no rejection.
Parmenidean absolute being and provides a new relation between being and difference which makes resolving the problem of false belief possible. The new relation of being and difference helps to resolve the problems of participation and TM. Therefore, at the end of the ontological wave, the onto-epistemological problems of the early dialogues and the problems of the theory of Forms in *Parmenides* are all resolved. The development of Plato’s thought based on our thesis is shown in Scheme 2 below.

**Scheme 2. Plato’s Onto-Epistemological Development**
Now it is time to defend the place of the dialogues that made the main changes in the current chronologies and turned it to OECD, namely *Parmenides I, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Republic* and *Laws*.

2. *Parmenides I*

The place of *Parmenides* in the current chronologies is the cause of many problems. Not only the problems of *Parmenides I*, on the one hand, cannot be correctly applied to the middle dialogues, but there are problems either to observe its problems as invalid or valid. The main problem out of the place of *Parmenides* in the current chronologies, generally speaking, is that they cannot provide a consistent story of Plato’s development in which *Parmenides* can have its deserving role. By the new place of this dialogue in OECD, we are not only to make the story consistent, but to dedicate the most prominent role to the dialogue. All Plato does in the so-called middle and late dialogues is going to be interpreted in OECD as Plato’s two efforts in the theories of knowledge and being to resolve the problems of *Parmenides I*.

To set *Parmenides I* at the end of the early dialogues and before all the other dialogues is the most astonishing and, at the same time, the most vital decision of OECD. In fact, what changes the current chronologies to OECD is a new story of the development of Plato’s thought based on the problems of the theory of Forms in *Parmenides I*. The new place of *Parmenides* in OECD can, I think, be explained well regarding what happens in the dialogues both before and after it. In relation to the other dialogues of the Socratic wave its place is so dramatic. Having challenged the Athenian interlocutors, Socrates (the wisest man of Athen), and his theory of Forms (the very instrument by which he used to refuse his interlocutors because they were not able to explain what a thing itself, i.e., the Form, is) are now the subject of the attacks of Parmenides, a non-Athenian, in almost the same way of the dialogue. Respecting the dialogues after it, what is done in Plato’s other dialogues from *Theaetetus* to *Phaedo* in the epistemological and from *Parmenides II* to *Philosophos* in the ontological waves is nothing but Plato’s effort to reconstruct his theory of Forms with his new doctrines and methods in epistemology and ontology. The best reason for accepting OECD’s place for *Parmenides I* is what happened in the dialogues of both the epistemological and the ontological waves.

i) There appears to be a problem about OECD’s place for *Parmenides*: where is that theory of Forms that is to be observed as the subject of *Parmenides’* problems? Since it is as long as a history that we are accustomed to recognize Plato’s theory of Forms with what is suggested in *Phaedo* and *Republic*, it might then be wondrous to hear that *Parmenides* is criticizing the theory as it is in *Euthyphro, Laches* and *Hippias*.

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1 That the first part of *Parmenides* has the appearance of a work complete in itself, is something can hardly be denied even by those scholars, like Meinwald, who do not believe it as distinct from the second part and written at a different time (1991, 5-6).
Major alongside some other Socratic dialogues and not as is proposed in Phaedo and Republic. First, if we mean by a theory a doctrine fully and completely 'constructed', I agree that there cannot be found such a theory in the early dialogues as it cannot be found anywhere else in the other dialogues as well. It is somewhat related to Plato’s way of introducing his theories but is more, I think, related to the theory of Forms itself. Comparing with the theory of Forms, the doctrine of anamnesis, for example, as it is introduced and articulated in Meno and Phaedo or, even more obviously, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and Republic are far better theorized and constructed. It shows that Plato was able to construct a theory of Forms in some of his dialogues instead of reminding the theory dispersedly here and there. It indicates, I think, that he was hesitant to theorize it from the beginning. It is not, therefore, reasonable to expect him to provide such a theory at the outset and in his early dialogues when he is wavering about it even at his much later dialogues.

Second, besides Plato’s oral tradition, there actually exists a theory of Forms in the early writings- the dialogues that have been considered by OECD as earlier than Parmenides- if we do not expect a fully constructed theory. This theory which is called by Allen (1970) as the 'earlier theory of Forms', differs in some essential features from the theory of Forms as construed in some of the dialogues of the epistemological and ontological waves (the so-called middle period dialogues). While the 'earlier' theory has some features that make it vulnerable to the attacks of Parmenides, the theory of the so-called middle period dialogues tries to resolve them. The way in which the theory tries to resolve the problems is discussed in the next section below. Nonetheless, the main point is that the universal and unequipped Forms of the early dialogues turn to the Forms which became much more equipped (by new theories) and even considered as paradigms (especially in Republic).

Thirdly, the naive and elementary way of discussing and defending the theory by young Socrates who is ready more to suggest different views than defending one firm and fixed theory, approves that there is no such theory yet. Thus, I take Socrates’epithet, "young", in Parmenides as functional because Parmenides refers to it as a cause of the naivety of the theory (e.g., 130e, 135c-d). The critics of Hippias Major (301bf.), thirdly, can indicate how Plato did criticize his own theories in the Socratic wave. In spite of the fact that we cannot find anywhere in the dialogues before Hippias Major where Socrates be saying that he is cutting up things in words and so on, this attitude of Socrates is criticized in there. This shows that Parmenides’ critiques can be read in the same way and there may be no necessity of finding more than what we have about the theory of Forms in the written works of the Socratic wave.

1In his second letter (314c3-4), Plato asserts that his written works are not the works of Plato but of a Socrates 'made fair and young (καλούκαι νέουγεγονότος). This younghoodmust of course be considered as compared to the reral Socrates who was adult and old and, thus, does not mean as young as is represented in Parmenides.
3. Euthydemus

I am not personally satisfied with OECD’s place for Euthydemus. It must probably placed after Parmenides, maybe before Theaetetus or during the time between Theaetetus and Meno. From an epistemological point of view, its discussion of false belief belongs to the period that is engaged with the problem of false belief, that is, in OECD, between Theaetetus and Sophist. The problem of learning either what one knows or what one does not know (276d) resembles Meno’s paradox. Euthydemus, however, seems to be, epistemologically, close to Theaetetus and before it but ontologically prior to Sophist. The problems of the possibility of telling lies (283e), impossibility of false speaking (86c-d) and the paradox of knowing or not knowing (293c-d) all belong, epistemologically, to the period of the Theaetetus and Meno. Moreover, the definition of knowing as having knowledge (ἐχειν ἔπιστημη) at 277b9-c1 can be considered as related with the same theory at Theaetetus 197b1 and prior to the distinction of having and possessing knowledge that follows it. Nonetheless, Euthydemus has neither any clear discussion of the distinction of knowledge and belief nor of the theory of Forms. All these can allow us to consider it epistemologically close to Theaetetus and prior to it1. Furthermore, this place does not affect the current attitudes insofar as they consider it either as an early or transitional dialogue that is prior to Meno. The difference is then about its place regarding Parmenides I and Theaetetus.

4. Theaetetus and Sophist

Both the current chronologies and OECD agree upon positing Theaetetus after Parmenides, but they differ in a) the place of Parmenides and b) Theaetetus’ distance from Sophist. By bringing Parmenides to an earlier period while keeping Sophist closer to the place it had before, the OECD’s plan makes a long distance between Theaetetus and Sophist considering at least Meno and Phaedo in between. Here are our proofs for this arrangement:

i) We believe that Meno’s discussion of the distinction of knowledge and opinion (97a-b, 97d-98b) must be posterior to Theaetetus’ distinction (187bff., 201dff.) simply because while it is demonstrated in the latter, it is only used in the former. Phaedo highly resembles Meno and, as it is generally agreed, belongs to the same period.

ii) Meno and Phaedo intend to resolve a) the problem of false belief as it was drawn out in Euthydemus and Theaetetus and b) the epistemological problem of Parmenides I, both epistemologically. The interrelated doctrines of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis try to solve those problems by a new theory of knowledge. Sophist, on the contrary, intends to deal with the problems ontologically. While the theory of anamnesis explains how we can

1 In spite of all these points, Euthydemus’ way of talking about dialecticians at 290c sounds surprisingly like Republic.
have such a thing as true belief distinct from knowledge, which itself is kind of resolving the problem of false belief, it cannot explain how false belief can ontologically be possible because it needs that the being of not being be accepted first, a thesis that is not accepted before *Sophist*. We also noted that besides the second part of *Parmenides*, *Sophist* cannot be later than *Republic* because it is in *Sophist* that the being of not being is accepted before to be used in *Republic*. Now, a careful consideration of this fact besides the above discussion of the epistemological mission of *Theaetetus*, *Meno* and *Phaedo* to resolve the problems of (a) and (b) epistemologically, lead us to the important result that these last three dialogues, being unable to resolve the problems ontologically, tried to present epistemological solutions. This means that they were prior to the *Sophist-Republic* solutions because the ontological solution does not require the epistemological solution. OECD seems to be, therefore, right to make the epistemological wave prior to the ontological one. An evidence of this is the absence of the theory of *anamnesis* in *Republic*. Why it never appears in there? Mentioning the myth of Er at 619bff. and the later incarnation at 498d as evidence, Kahn (2006, 130) thinks that 'something like' *anamnesis* is actually presupposed in *Republic*. Nonetheless, he agrees that it does not appear in an epistemological context. Our question, nonetheless, is exactly about the absence of the epistemological role of the theory in *Republic*. Kahn (ibid) thinks that the omission of the theory in *Republic* is not because Plato changed his mind about knowledge. He notes that at 518c Plato is clearly a kind of innatist. Having the allegory of Cave in mind, his suggestion is that it has some rhetorical and artistic instead of conceptual and philosophical reasons. He thinks that the theory does not fit with exactly the same part of the *Republic* we departed as *Philosophos*, i.e., from the end of the book V to the end of the book VII. I hope my discussion about Plato’s development can show why the theory is not needed anymore in *Republic*. This is an onto-epistemological and thus, contrary to Kahn, a philosophical reason. The omission of the theory in *Republic* is simply because by the new metaphysics suggested in the mentioned books of *Republic*, there is no need to the theory of *anamnesis* anymore. The classification of being and knowledge as it is drawn in the allegory of Line and the dialectical search of knowledge from the lower classes to the upper ones which is itself based on *Republic*’s specific theory of hypothesis can provide the knowledge of Forms without having them before, i.e. without *anamnesis*.

iii) What is the reason for considering *Sophist* immediately after *Theaetetus*? What is the reason for considering *Theaetetus* with *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Parmenides* as Eleatic dialogues as, for instance, Dorter (1994) does except that their characters are from Elea? It is obvious that *Theaetetus*’ reference at 183e and *Sophist*’s at 217c to *Parmenides* do not prove anything more than that they are post- *Parmenides* dialogues. Even *Sophist*’s reference at 216a to *Theaetetus* cannot mean more than that it is a later dialogue. The distance between these two dialogues can easily be shown by the obvious stylometric differences of *Theaetetus* on the one hand, and *Sophist* and *Politicus* on the other hand. While *Sophist* obviously belongs to the late
period dialogues, *Theaetetus*, as Tarrant notes, 'approximates less to the style of the late dialogues as measured by stylometry than do the later books of the *Republic* (2000, 37). All the time references of the dialogues that yesterday we had such a discussion (*Sophist* 216a) or tomorrow will continue the other one (*Theaetetus* 210d) are, I think, only dramatic considerations and cannot be taken as exact chronological time distances.¹ What these references can at most signify is that one dialogue has the other dialogue in mind either dramatically or philosophically by intending to continue the issue or resolvethe problems that had been drawn in those dialogues, as *Sophist* continues the issues of both *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides II*. To say that some times after writing *Theaetetus*, Plato decided to write another dialogue with some of the same characters especially *Theaetetus* and as its sequel, probably because he wanted to pursue the same problem,² namely the problem of false belief, but this timewith a new ontological attitude, is quite more acceptable than Ryle’s suggestion (1966, 284) that Plato kept *Sophist* and *Politicus* in his shelf, a suggestion that was mostly based on the stylometric evidence. The generally agreed supposition that *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* are sequel or, as Ryle says, ‘a sort of sequel’³ (1939, 316) has even more problems. *Theaetetus*, firstly, is clearly a more close to the Socratic dialogues and is far less complicated than *Sophist*. Secondly, the method of collection and division to which *Sophist* is so bounded is almost absent in *Theaetetus*. The trilogy of dialogues promised at *Sophist* 217a3, thirdly, discussing sophist, stateman and philosopher starts with *Sophist* and not *Theaetetus*.⁴ The

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¹ The allusions to the historical events that occur occasionally in some dialogues can be interpreted merely as dramatic or, as Mackey says, ‘later interpolations’ using past events (1928, 11). As Maccabe (2008, 96) points out, even the dialogues making vigorous claims to historicity ‘bear the marks of fiction’. The writer of the dialogues, like a play writer, designs the scene, chooses the most suitable location and time and to make it appear more real, uses some real events of that time and location. It cannot be denied that the dramatic features of the dialogues are not negligible for Plato. We will not thus rely on the allusions to the historical events.

² Thinking that the reappearance of *Theaetetus* in *Sophist* is a ‘clear reminder of continuity’ of the same project (2013, 94), Kahn accepts that ‘a considerable lapse of time’ might have occurred between their composition.

³ He thinks that the two dialogues were composed after the *Parmenides* ‘as a whole’ (1939, 316-317).

⁴ Gill’s suggestion (2012, 1) of a tetralogy opening with *Theaetetus* is not tenable. Besides the cross references of which we discussed above, I cannot understand how she can take the similarity of characters as an evidence whereas the difference of *Theaetetus* with those two in this respect is obvious enough. The change of Socrates as the main speaker in *Theaetetus* to a visitor from Elea as the leading character in the other two dialogues does not let us agree with her. Suppose we accept that the change of Socrates with a visitor from Elea in *Sophist* might be related to the duty of the dialogue in criticizing *Parmenides*: to guarantee, as Kahn (2013, 94) suggest, ‘an atmosphere of intellectual sympathy’. What then about *Politicus*? Gill thinks, however, that ‘Plato substantially
ontological status of *Sophist*, fourthly and most importantly, is incomparable with that of *Theaetetus* that means they must belong to different periods.

iv) Unlike *Sophist* and *Republic* that are inclined to distinguish between the objects of knowledge and belief, *Theaetetus*’ epistemological theories like the theories of *Meno* and *Phaedo* do not make distinction between the objects. In the analogy of block of wax, the difference of two men, one judging truly while the other falsely, are explained in their waxes (194c-e). Whereas the wax of the soul of one man is deep, abundant and smooth and hence the signs that are imprinted on are lasting, it is vice versa in another one: hard, shaggy, rugged and without depth which in not well imprintable and hence does not have distinct impressions making it liable to false judgment. The problem of false belief is to be treated here in this analogy by a subjective analysis trying to make the difference in the knower and not in the object of knowing. The analogy of Aviary is also the same in this respect: possessing (κεκτήθατι) and having (ἔχειν) are distinct but not by their objects. It is the same object, a coat, that you have when you are wearing it, but you possess when though you have bought it, you are not wearing it now (197b8-10). A man who has birds in his aviary possesses them but he does not have them in his control and his hand unless he will (c1-5). So is the knowledge (197e).

The birds are the same whether you have or possess them. What is different is the knower’s situation and not the known. It is exactly this kind of difference in the side of the knower that is to be taken as the explanation of the distinction of knowledge and true belief in *Meno*. True opinions are resembled to the statues of Daedalus that run away and escape if not tied down: true opinions become knowledge (ἐπιστήμων ἐγγονται) after being tied down (98a5-6) because knowledge differs from true opinion in being tied down (διαφέρει διεσμός ἑπιστημοφθέγγασις) (a7-8) which is itself done by theaiτίασλογισμῷ (a3-4). The fact that there is obviously no distinction between the objects of knowledge and true opinion in *Theaetetus* and *Meno* keeps them far from *Sophist* and *Republic* where the being of not being makes a third status, ἔοικος, which is taken as the object of opinion and distinct from the object of knowledge.

The case of *Cratylus* is much the same as *Theaetetus*. The explanation presented there about the word *doxa* based on *toxon* meaning shooting a bow (420b), has a sign of its closeness to *Theaetetus*. Moreover, false speaking is still impossible (429c, 430c). So it can be said that while *Theaetetus, Cratylus* and *Meno* have distinguished between knowledge and true belief, they have not yet reached to its ontological correspondent.

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revised an earlier version of the *Theaetetus* to fit into a series with the *Sophist* and *Statesman*’ (p.3, n. 8).
5. Parmenides II

The second part of Parmenides that Palmer rightly calls 'the most puzzling and controversial text in the Platonic corpus' (1999, 148) is the only part in a dialogue that is totally different from its complementary part. Nowhere else can we make such an apparent distinction between parts of a dialogue. From Parmenides 137ff. we have a long chain of arguments hypothesizing various propositions regarding Parmenides’ "One" and again hypothesizing their opposites making an inescapable labyrinth. Its obvious difference from the first part of the dialogue makes the idea of Parmenides as an assembled dialogue more probable; an idea that has been suggested by some commentators.¹

i) The second part of the Parmenides is the initiating point of a new effort to save the theory of Forms. What Plato had tried to do in the epistemological wave was to provide solutions for the epistemological problem of Parmenides, but the problem of participation and TM are still fatal at the end of the epistemological wave. He had to start thus from the same point, i.e., Parmenides. This was not, nevertheless, his only reason to choose Parmenides as Socrates’ interlocutor to attach this new writing to the previously written dialogue with him but there was a more principal reason. He needed to go beyond Parmenides’ notion of One Being and this, I believe, was his main reason. What were to be reassessed was (1) Parmenides’ principle of the tight attachment of "one" and "being" as the cause of his famous principle that 'being is one' and (2) Parmenidean understanding of "being" which was the cause of his principle of the impossibility of being of not being. In agreement with many commentators, I think Parmenides II is the first step of Plato’s going beyond these two notions, and this can be observed as a major purpose of the dialogue. It is in this passage that Plato criticizes the relation of being and the same (162d) which can be considered both as the basis and the necessary result of Parmenides’ principle, 'Being is one'. This criticism that makes use of the notion of difference (143b) is only the preparatory step of his use of this notion in Sophist (255d ff.) by which the Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is rejected. If we read Parmenides II and Sophist the sequel steps of an ontological project, we can see how the project of rejecting Parmenidean notions of One and Being leads to the notion of difference which itself is the basis of Plato’s new ontology in Sophist and Republic. This ontology has the solution of Parmenides I’s problems of participation and TM and, at the same time, the problem of false belief. The second part of the Parmenides must then be dated after the epistemological wave and as the starting point of the ontological wave. Why can't we, one might ask, observe this ontological wave parallel to, or interwoven with, the epistemological wave? My main reason for the chronological order of two waves is that the dialogues of the epistemological

¹ Ryle, for example, thinks that these two parts were composed at 'considerably' different dates (1966, 216). Also cf. Thesleff (1989, 19) and Tarrant (2000, 140-141)
wave, or at least *Meno* and *Phaedo*, are still unaware of the ontological wave’s solution.

ii) The place of *Parmenides II* in OECD differs in two main regards from its place in the current chronologies: *Theaetetus* and *Republic*; while the contemporary chronologies are accustomed to consider *Parmenides*, and consequently its second part, before *Theaetetus* and after *Republic*, we are suggesting its contrary in OECD. The change OECD implements regarding the place of these three dialogues is mostly because *Parmenides II* must ontologically be considered between *Theaetetus* and *Republic*. *Theaetetus*’ all epistemological efforts to answer the question ‘what is knowledge?’ (145a) with theories like knowledge is perception (151e ff.) or true judgment (147b) or true judgment plus an account (201d) besides the analogies of block of wax (191c-e), the Aviary (197b ff.) and the analogy of knowledge to bird and the explanation of getting knowledge as hunting, all still are Plato’s epistemological efforts and do not think about the ontological solution. Regarding ontological issues, they are still faithful to Parmenides and are not to challenge his principles as *Parmenides II* does. It is directly asserted at 180e-181a that Socrates got stuck between Parmenidean and Heraclitean theories and wants to put a fight and escape. This effort, however, does not bring it to the point of *Parmenides II*. At *Theaetetus* 167a7-8 we are being said that ‘it is impossible to opine what is not (οὐτεγράταμηνταόντονδοξάς)’ and at 189a10: ‘opining not being is opining nothing (μὴόντοξαξωνούδενδοξάζει’).

In *Parmenides II*, we have not still gone out of Parmenides’ dominance but the first step is taken. At 160e, we are encountered with the necessity of dealing with not being with some adjectives like "this" or "that" and so on. Though still unable to be, not being must necessarily partake of many things:

> The One indeed cannot be, if it is not, but it is necessary that nothing prevents it from partaking of many things. (160e7-161a1)

The whole of the sophisticated arguments of *Parmenides II* can show how much the Parmenides’ understanding of being is problematic. What is said, for instance, at 162a can be a good example: If the one -which is not- is to be not being, it must have being a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as what is must have not-being what is not, if it is to be completely. Although the Parmenidean being is not overpassed in *Parmenides II*, these discussion shows that it is not accepted as before. *Theaetetus*’ attention to the problem of Parmenidean being is confined to its contradiction with Heraclitean notion of flux. This understanding, I believe, is much more elementary than *Parmenides II*’s attention to the problems

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1There is an explicit shift from epistemology to ontology at 188c-d saying that perhaps the problem of false belief is better to be dealt with the notions of being and not being rather than knowing and not knowing which immediately leads to the problem of the impossibility of thinking about not being (188d ff.).
arisen from Parmenides’ understanding of the concept of being. If our arguments are sound, *Parmenides II* cannot be prior to *Theaetetus* because of its ontological status. This status, on the contrary, makes it prior to *Sophist* and *Republic*. The incomplete achievement to the being of not being in *Parmenides II* must antecedate its full achievement in *Sophist* and its implementation in *Republic*.

iii) Being dominant in *Sophist* and *Politicus* and absent from *Theaetetus*, the method of collection and division has a predominant role in the second part of *Parmenides* while cannot be seen in the first part of this dialogue. This is fully consistent with OECD’s arrangement. While the first part of *Parmenides* and the *Theaetetus* are dated as prior to the dialogues of the epistemological wave, all unaware of the method of collection and division, the second part of *Parmenides*, the *Sophist* and *Politicus* are engaged with this new method.

iv) Almost all the stylistic evidences are pro the antecedent date of *Parmenides* regarding *Republic*. Insofar as stylometry suggests anything, Tarrant says, it strongly suggests that both works [i.e. *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*] were begun far earlier than the *Republic* finished (2000, 141).

### 6. Republic and Laws

The place of the *Republic* is the most confusing in the arrangement of the dialogues. We have the following evidences:

a) Based on ontological features, it must be dated after *Sophist* and *Parmenides II*.

b) Because of its ontological solution of the problems of participation and TM, it must be dated after *Parmenides I*.

c) Based on Aristotle’s testimony (*Politics*, II, 6), it is prior to *Laws*.

d) *Laws* is unaware of philosopher-king theory of *Republic* which implies that its place after the final version of *Republic* might be problematic.

e) Stylistic evidences strongly suggest that *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias* and *Philebus* belong to the same period of *Laws*.

While the ontological evidences, (a) and (b), ask us to consider *Republic* after *Sophist* and *Parmenides*, the political evidences, (c) and (d), alongside the stylistic evidences, (e), do.

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2. Nails (1998, 174) notes: ‘We have perhaps less hope of accurately dating the *Republic* than of any other dialogue in the corpus’. Cherniss’ phrases like ‘orthodox opinion’ (1998, 293) about the place of *Republic* is interesting.

3. I am not convinced with Thesleff’s note that the opening of the *Parmenides* suggests that the *Republic* was finished at the time. He accepts, however, that the book X and ‘some passages’ in the earlier books might have been added later (1989, 19).

4. Moreover, as Lane (2006, 185) mentions, the book IX of the *Laws* implicitly suggests that the city drawn out in this dialogue is a second-best city as comparing not to the city of *Republic* but to that of the *Politicus*. 

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evidences (e), tells that it must be prior to the so called late dialogues. The only solution is what has been suggested by some scholars that Republic is not a simple dialogue but a later composition of some dialogues. Except Republic its separation and being early is a more accepted fact, the passage 473-571 is also a later attachment. Our reasons for its attachment are as follows.

i) After first book’s aporetic ending like a Socratic dialogue, being unable to find what justice is, the second book starts by Socrates’s statement that: ‘when I said this [referring to his last sentences in the first book, namely that he could not find what justice is and soon], I thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to have been only a prelude’ (357a). The discussion continues with the goodness or badness of injustice pursuing the first book’s discussion. The search of finding individual justice transfers to a search for justice in a city by Socrates’ suggestion that they might be more successful to find it if they search it in a larger thing, a city (368d), which leads them to construct a city in order to find justice there. This is the directing line of the argument which tends to be exclusively treating with many political issues about all the details of constructing a city. After more than 65 Stephanus pages, we are given the result of this investigation of justice in the city, the larger object of investigation, in the middle of the fourth book (433). The discussants then try to find the justice in the individual by applying the result they got from their investigation of justice in the city (434e ff.). This leads to the tripartite structure of the soul based on the structure of the city and finally to the result that the justice in an individual is just the same as it was in a city, that is, when each of its parts does its own work (441d ff.). They then look for injustice (444a ff.) and try to answer if justice is profitable or not (444e ff.) which leads itself to the comparison between types of souls and types of political constitutions (448c ff.). This topic is, however, postponed because of Polemarchus’ demand for the explanation of what was said before, namely the question that how possessions can be held in common, which is at the very beginning of the fifth Book (449a). This topic, then, runs the discussion and brings some marginal discussions by 471d where the question of possibility of such an ideal city arises. In his first answer to the problem, Plato points to the fact that what he had drawn out was only a theoretical model that does not need to be proved as a possible city (472). I think this can be the end of the story of the Ideal State that had been started from the beginning of the second Book.

What is said from 473c on is completely a new project and, I think, is attached to the Ideal State (357-472). The cities we have, Socrates says, is able to make the ideal state possible if the 'greatest wave' can be passed. This greatest wave is nothing but the theory of philosopher-king. Socrates is afraid of being ridiculed and laughed because of the theory (473c7-9) which shows both its importance and

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1 That Aristotle’s evidence is in a political text discussing political issues might allow us to take it more as a political evidence though it is not a political evidence but a chronological one.
Socrates’ understandable hesitation about it. Socrates’ own statement can approve this:

Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize ... Glaucon! cities will have no rest from evils nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we have been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It is because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long...

(473c11-e4)¹

Although this long time hesitation may hint that what we are being said is something that had been doubted to be written or published, we are not going to rely only on this. What happens after this and its overall difference from Ideal State can be more decisive. The theory of philosopher-king brings forth the question that: who are the true philosophers? (475e3) This question turns the discussion to a discussion of the philosopher from 473c on. Besides the fact that all of these pages are discussing onto-epistemological issues that are related to the subject of philosopher, "philosopher" is itself the subject of the discussions. The question of "who are the philosophers?" leads to the passage (476e-479e) that distinguishes knowledge as what is set over being from opinion as what is set over what both is and is not. As the lovers of the objects of knowledge, i.e., what is, philosophers are distinct from the lovers of sights and sounds who love the objects of opinion (479e-484a). Philosophers are those who are able to grasp what the lovers of sights and sounds are not able, namely, what is always the same (484b). It is the nature (φύσιν) of philosopher which is the subject of inquiry (485a5, at 485a10: φιλοσόφων φύσιν) and is described at 492a1-5 and is again connected with things themselves at 493e.. Socrates then says that the philosophic nature is altered in the constitutions of his time and thus links the discussion of philosopher to that of the Ideal State (497b ff.) and concludes that philosophers are the best guardians of the city (503b) and they must exercise in many subjects (503e) most importantly the Form of the Good (504a-505a). This leads to the allegories of Sun, Line and Cave in the sixth and seventh books. After a full discussion of the way guardians must be brought about with different sciences in their careers to become philosophers, those who survived all the tests and saw the Form of the Good can order the city and become the philosopher-kings (540a f.). It is the end of the search for philosophon and the way the philosopher must be brought about in the city and also the end of the seventh book (541b). Therefore, it can be said that the passage from the last pages of book V to the end of book VII, i.e., 473c-541b, has the philosopher as its subject.

In addition to the unity of this passage of which we tried to provide a very short and thus insufficient review, what makes its attachment to the Ideal Statemore

¹ See also: 499a
probable is that this discussion of philosopher is in the middle of the discussion of common possession in the city; a discussion that had been started from the beginning of fifth book (449) and continued till 471d where the problem of the possibility of the ideal state directs the discussion to the topic of the philosopher at 473c. By the end of the discussion about philosopher, we immediately fall into the same discussion at the very beginning of book VIII, even without any introduction or a linking paragraph:

Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following: If a city is to achieve the height of good government, wives must be in common, children and all their education must be in common… (453a1f.)

After his long diversion from the previous topic, Socrates needs the beginning topic to be recalled and Glaucon, reminding the topic, says: 'you were talking as you had completed the description of the city' (543c7-8). If I am right in my consideration of the part we distinguished as an attachment, having in mind its topic, philosopher, and its place in OECD, after Sophist and Politicus, the first probability will be that this later attachment is so similar in its topic as well as its order, to the unwritten third part of the trilogy of sophist, statesman and philosopher that though had been promised at Sophist 217a3, has never been published. This motivated me to suggest that this passage that I cut up from the Republic might be the Philosophos, the third part of the trilogy. Plato never published the third part maybe because he was afraid, as he himself says, of its theme, namely that philosophers must be the kings, besides the fact that he got stuck in another project and thus tried to reshape what he had in mind, or maybe even had somehow written, as the third part of the trilogy and emplace it in the larger plan of Republic. In her book, Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue (2012), Gill believes that based on the fact that it is not included in the ancient survived list of Plato's dialogues, 'we can be fairly sure that the dialogue was not written and lost' (p.1). She thinks that Plato left it on purpose and 'deliberately withholds' it to stimulate his audience to combine the pieces about the subject in the other dialogues. Focusing on Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist, she does not let, of course, Republic to take part in this combining because, based on SCD Republic must be prior to all of them.

OECD's arrangement of the ontological and political waves can explain why Plato who was thinking of that trilogy fell into the political wave. Suppose that at the time of composing Sophist, Plato was thinking that after writing about it, he will write a dialogue about statesman and then another one about philosopher as the culmination of the trilogy. It is not strange to imagine that this path was deviated to a political inquiry when he became engaged with political issues in Politicus. Instead of continuing it with a dialogue about philosopher, he became thus busy with Ideal State and Laws. Maybe it was only after Timaeus and with the use of all the hierarchical models he had discovered from Ideal State onward that he decided to assemble what he had in mind, or maybe in his shelf (!), about philosopher with his search for the Ideal State and based on the question of 'what is justice?' in Republic.
I, which had been composed long time ago. If I am right in this suggestion, both the posterior date of the Philosophos and its difference from Ideal State can be more acceptable.

ii) The epistemological difference between the Philosophos and Ideal State also worths remarking. What is said in the third book at 402b, that to know the copy, knowledge of original is necessary, seems prior to and even inconsistent, though not necessarily, with what is said in the sixth book and in the theory of hypothesis by which one goes upside from copy to original without having the knowledge of the original. The difference of 473-571 from the other passages of Republic and specially Ideal State is also clear from its mostly metaphysical content that is definitely separable from its previous passage dealing exclusively with political issues. This content is the very one which we considered as the evidence of Republic’s being later than Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus. Therefore, if we accept that Republic II-X has at least two assembled parts, we will become able to manage the confusion arisen from the arrangement of Republic and Laws. It is the political part of Republic.Ideal state, which is prior to Laws and is referred there and, probably, was in Aristotle’s mind when said that Laws is after Republic. The later date of the Philosophos, the very passage the idea of philosopher-king is drawn out there can also suggest a solution to the problem of Law’s negligence of the philosopher-king doctrine that had surprised commentators.

iii) 'Before stylometry', as Prior asserts, 'almost all scholars would have placed the Republic after the Sophist' (1985, 168). This was due to the stylometric evidences that Republic is dated now in SCD as middle and prior to many dialogues. Nonetheless, the assembled character of Republic suggests a sound solution for the biggest problematic decision of OECD regarding stylometric evidences. Suppose that Plato who had composed the first book of Republic much earlier and most probably in his early period of writing and the Ideal State in another time, now decides to compose the Republic which includes not only those dialogues but what was in his mind or even written, the Philosophos, as the third part of the trilogy. It is not then of a shock to say that since he wanted to rewrite them as the continuation of Republic I, he tried to keep a unified style as for as possible. Lutoslavski also approves a later date for the books VI and VII of Republic.

1Aristotle’s statement in Politics II 1264b39 that Socrates filled up the Republic with ‘extraneous discourses’ can be noteworthy. Reminding that the ‘three résumés of the original Ideal State’ shows that it contained nothing about justice, theological fables or the dispensability of Homer, dialectic and so on, Ryle adds that our version of the Republic was not assembled until Plato returned from Sicily (1966, 244-245).

2That Aristotel tells this in a political passage (Politics II, 6) makes this more probable. However, the reason can simply be the date of Law’s publication which is surely later than Republic.

3There are some other reasons that might be taken as evidence for the lateness of the Philosophos like its Pythagorean spirit, its discussion of the Good that seems to be the
7. Timaeus

By the suggestion of the distinction of the Philosophos from the Ideal State, the date OECD considered for Timaeus becomes more acceptable. The passage in Timaeus (17a, 18b) which has always been taken as referring to Republic, is indeed referring to Ideal State. This helps us consider it as a prior dialogue to Republic because it seems that its ontological status indicates its place between Sophist and Philosophos. Owen’s main reasons for dating Timaeus after Republic and before Politicus (1998, 260-261) are these:

a) The opening of the dialogue (17a) refers to a dialogue that had occurred the previous day that most probably is Republic.
b) At Timaeus 18b the idea that guardians must have no gold or silver or any private property refers to Republic 417a and 547b-548b.
c) The Politicus (at 292a, c and 293a, c-d) insists four times (?) that whether the ruler has any wealth is completely irrelevant to the quality of his governance. Owen thinks that this is said as a novel doctrine.
d) The system of marriage of the guardians in Republic (457c-465c) echoed in Timaeus (18c-d) is abandoned in Politicus (310c-311c).

These evidences can lead to another arrangement between the dialogues if we accept Republic II-Xas having two parts, the Ideal State and the Philosophos: (a) and (b) are clearly referring to the Ideal State and not to the Philosophos. Moreover, not only (c) and (d) are not problematic regarding OECD’s arrangement but they can even be supportive because the more elementary status of Politicus’ political discussion regarding Ideal State is thoroughly consistent with OECD’s later date for Ideal State and Republic. Unlike Owen, I think what is said about the rulers’ wealth (293c8-d2) can be more of an evidence supporting the priority of Politicus’ theory than presenting a new theory against the past theory. Unlike Owen who thinks that this is a novel doctrine, I think it might equally mean that Plato is not yet achieved to his more complicated theory of propertyless rulers. Moreover, that Plato does not speak in Politicus of the marriage of the guardians can similarly be out of the fact that Politicus is still unaware of the idea. Owen, however, agrees that neither Timaeus nor Critias seem to know anything about Republic’s doctrine that ‘a state may be saved by the supremacy not of immutable laws but of an ανηφορεμος above the law’ (1998, 264). Owen and Nicholas P. White (1976, 91)

closest passage among Plato’s dialogues to his famous lecture ‘On the Good’ and also Philebus.

1 Ryle notes that the discussion of pleasure at Republic 583b ‘presupposes’ and advances ‘a long way beyond’ Timaeus (1966, 249).

2 Lane (2006, 180) speaks of two points in Politicus that went unnoticed in Republic; (1) the knowledge of the Good ‘in time’ (2) which must be made authoritative over the requirements of fixed laws. These, however, cannot prove anything about the order of the dialogues.
are right that *Timaeus* is closer to *Republic* than the late dialogues¹ but Cherniss is also right that it is later than *Parmenides*.

¹Rickless also prefers to agree with Owen mostly because of the theory of Forms in *Timaeus* which resembles that of *Republic* (2007, 8).
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