A recent debate considers the question of the first philosophers—who were they and where did they come from? Citing a long history of written documentation, a Western tradition of philosophy claims the pre-Socratics, Greek thinkers of the sixth and fifth centuries BC, were the first philosophers. Some modern philosophers believe that the first philosophers came from Egypt. A dearth of evidence of Egyptian philosophy from the pre-Socratics’ time period, however, is not due to an absence of thought, but from a lack of recorded literature. How can the role of Egyptian scholars in early Greek thinking be determined if there are no remaining Egyptian philosophy texts?

This chapter will address a question of interrelation between philosophy from ancient Greece and philosophy from ancient Egypt. I argue this relation was Egyptian and Greek at the same time, forming a transnational philosophical community that was not joined by national or social identity, but by philosophy. This would mean Greek philosophy and Egyptian philosophy are not separate, based on identity or difference. It rather de-emphasizes separation and identity. In approaching this question, I will use a close reading of pre-Socratic texts, which reveal a harmony and connection in Heraclitus fragments that is key to traditional African philosophies such as *ubuntu*.

With little surviving textual output from Egypt during this time, it is not possible to speculate on the community this may have formed in respect to the sociocultural conditions of the day. My close reading of pre-Socratic texts will illuminate what evidence for a transnational philosophical community is detectable at the textual-exegetical level.

I will question a notion of European self-understanding that presupposes a culture and philosophy founded in Greece. These questions challenge a unitary theory of European identity as well as hybrid views, in which a
non-European tradition contaminates a European one. This will engage debates about identity in response to global community.

The problem with opposing Eurocentric and non-Eurocentric views, I argue, is that both approaches presuppose a mono-genealogy of European intellectual and cultural origin. In this chapter, global community is not based on identity, unity, or difference, but on relation and harmony.

Reading pre-Socratic fragments as harmony and relation reveals an ancient philosophy not focused on separating community into one thing or another. The Heraclitus fragments I will discuss express interrelationship and connectedness by creating opposition. Whereas in current debates about global community and Western values, opposition is a struggle in which one side dominates the other, in my reading of Heraclitus fragments, there is “hidden harmony” instead of struggle. This harmony forms a type of relation in which two things can be separate and together at the same time.

**BLACK SOCRATES AND BLACK ATHENA**

Simon Critchley, in his article, “Black Socrates? Questioning the philosophical tradition,” engages a vexed and intricate debate over philosophy’s indigenousness to Europe. Critchley agrees with the unpopular position that philosophy was not founded exclusively in Greece as is upheld in the philosophical tradition. Asserting that Greek history rather traces its philosophy to ancient Egyptian wisdom traditions and citing Martin Bernal’s tendentious three volumes entitled, *Black Athena*, Critchley challenges a tradition of philosophy that places Greece as its origin and the Greeks as the first philosophers.

Critchley considers Bernal’s argument, which holds that in Europe, up until the early nineteenth century, the philosophical tradition accepted Greek philosophy was imported from Egypt. This narrative was systematically suppressed in the late 1800s and disappeared from European historiography. This is linked, says Bernal, to nineteenth-century European colonialism. In this way, he draws a connection between “the dismissal of the Egyptians and the explosion of Northern European racism in the nineteenth century.” The book and its author were attacked by academics for its “Afro-centrism” and condemned for lacking in evidence and rigor. The debate, however, continues.

Ample discussion can be found in the Africa-centric literature about the interrelation between ancient Egypt and ancient Greece, which claims Greek philosophy’s traceability to Africa, particularly Egypt. Henry Olela maintains ancient Greek philosophy is a product of an Egyptian tradition, which is rooted in the traditions of sub-Saharan Africa, mainly Ethiopia, Nubia, and Sudan. Innocent C. Onywuenyi argues pre-Socratic philosophers were
influenced by and taught by priest-philosophers of the Egyptian Mystery System. This system of education, run by Egyptian priests, taught a number of disciplines known collectively as “the wisdom of the Egyptians.” These mystery schools taught philosophy, religion, medicine, law, mathematics, geometry, and astronomy to students from Egypt and other parts of Africa, Greece, and Asia Minor. Mystery schools, Onywuenyi posits, created the prototype for Greek philosophy. He refers to Aristotle, writing in *Metaphysics*, about Egypt as the place where philosophy began. In the *Timaeus*, Plato refers to Greek philosophers traveling to Egypt for the purpose of education. Although ancient Egypt is intimated in Aristotle, most scholarship based in a philosophical tradition of Europe does not emphasize an actual relation between Egypt and Greece. Onywuenyi urges for this scenario to change and demands that the history of philosophy be rewritten to the effect that Egyptians were the first philosophers and the pre-Socratics studied in Egypt.

While scholars are at odds over an Africa-centric or Europe-centric foundation of philosophy, Critchley develops one way of overcoming this problem by employing a “contrapuntal criticism.” He borrows this phrase from Edward Said, which Said borrows from classical Western music’s “counterpoint.” A contrapuntal reading takes into account different perspectives and considers how these differences are enmeshed, entwined, and interdependent, forming a hybrid culture or “hybrid ensemble” as Critchley states. Said explains what he means by contrapuntal and hybridity in *Culture and Imperialism*: “All cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated and unmonolithic.” What emerges as a result of a contrapuntal reading is a hybrid philosophical tradition. An extended, contrapuntal reading of philosophical texts would bring together the tradition of a Greek origin of philosophy, as nineteenth-century imperialism inaugurated, with Bernal’s resistance to this, in which he holds Egypt as the birthplace of philosophy. Critchley’s “deconstructed tradition” questions the exclusion of that which is not excludable and asks that the tradition face its own hybridity, thus accepting “the failure of its demand for exclusivity.”

I believe this notion of counterpoint among differences implies hybridity of what are not necessarily separate identities, but Egyptian and Greek at the same time. I will now consider how this relation forms a transnational philosophical connection.

**DIUNITIAL RELATION**

Critchley focuses on the interchange between two opposing views in which the contamination of a European tradition by a non-European one constitutes a hybrid tradition. The approach I propose is based on relation and questions
identity. This relational way does not emphasize origin, purity, or hybridity. I challenge a presupposition that philosophy was founded exclusively in Greece and did not share a philosophical connection with Egypt. I suggest rather that philosophers from Egypt and Greece were connected in a transnational philosophical community. Philosophy, then, can be Egyptian and not Egyptian, Greek and not Greek or European and not European all at the same time.

This is consonant with a concept of reality in the context of a worldview connected with some African cultures to which I will now turn.

Economist Vernon J. Dixon discusses *diunital* logic, in which things can be separate and indissociable; sensory experience is fixed and neutral, but also nonfixed and nonneutral. In diunitality, something is divided and undivided simultaneously. Dixon constructs the term, *di-unital* out of “di” or apart and “unital,” the adjectival form of unit, to mean that something can be apart and united at the same time, where “at the same time” means indissociably. Rather than intertwining differences, as in Critchley’s deconstructed hybridity, in Dixon’s diunital frame, differences are indissociable. Something can be in one category and not in that category; a thing can be both A and not A at the same time.

Did Egypt and Greece diunitaly form a philosophical community by way of oral distribution of ideas shared among participants in the Egyptian Mystery System? Secondary texts do discuss early Greek philosophers’ interaction with Egypt, yet I have not found interpretations of pre-Socratic works that link these readings with a tradition from Africa. My response to this gap in the knowledge is to comb the surviving work of pre-Socratic Greek philosophers that studied in Egypt, such as Thales, Pythagoras, and Democritus for traces of evidence. In lieu of texts written by or about Egyptian priest-philosophers and what they taught, the only evidence we might have is in philosophical texts attributed to Greek pre-Socratic philosophers. These texts hold important clues as to an Egyptian Mystery System. This leads to the discovery of a transnational philosophical connection between ancient Egypt and ancient Greek philosophers.

Edward Said advises against the replacing of missing narrative from history. The new reading I propose could potentially become “a mirror opposite the writing whose tyranny it disputes.” A reading mirroring a Europe-centric or Africa-centric interpretation would attach a single identity. My aim, however, is not to replace Europe-centric readings with Africa-centric readings, but to displace traditional approaches with a concern for Greece and Egypt’s shared relation that appears absent from the literature. This is not a critique of European philosophy, but an attempt to expand understanding of the very tradition. I will explore the fragments of pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus and how this work has been interpreted.
Heraclitus lived during the fifth century B.C. in Ephesus in Ionia on Asia Minor. The only biography on Heraclitus was written by Diogenes Laertius in the third century A.D.\(^2\) According to this biography, Heraclitus wrote a book entitled, *On Nature*. No book, however, remains. T. M. Robinson explains Heraclitus’ works vary from direct quotations to personal accounts reconstructed from memory.\(^2\) Originally, the work of Heraclitus may have been spoken and then written down at a later time. What we have are fragments of his work that are removed from their original context. Their context, argue John Sallis and Kevin Maly, may have been “a further written discourse. . . a further spoken discourse, or merely a situation in which the saying was uttered.”\(^2\) Classical scholar G. S. Kirk observes Heraclitus fragments do not appear to be extracted from a written work, but as “oral pronouncements put into . . . an easily memorable form.”\(^2\) T. M. Robinson explains Heraclitus’ works vary from direct quotations to personal accounts reconstructed from memory. Kirk sees the fragments mainly as “isolated statements.” “It is possible,” says Kirk, “that Heraclitus wrote no book, in our sense of the word.”\(^2\)

A fragment, like a proverb, is a quotation of an author’s spoken words. Like African proverbs, which form part of an oral literature, rooted in the proverbs, folksongs, folktales, art, and rituals,\(^2\) fragments are transmitted by word of mouth, and not by the written word. Others recounted the fragments one by one. Sources of the fragments are found in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cratylus, and Theophrasus. Later, authors such as the Stoics, Christian writers and neoplatonists were dependent upon the earlier sources. These later authors include Sextus Empiricus, Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Diogenes Laertius, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus.\(^2\)

**HARMONY IN OPPOSITION**

I will focus on Heraclitus fragments B50 and 51, which discuss *logos* in the context of Heraclitus’ recurring theme, the “unity of opposites.” In the unity of opposites, knowing something’s opposite begets knowledge of the thing. In fragments B50 and B51, Heraclitus’s unity of opposites converges with the theme of harmony. In harmony, opposites have a special connection. As Kirk explains, opposites are connected in that they are not really disconnected.\(^3\)

For instance, Heraclitean fragment 10, sourced from Aristotle’s *De Mundo* states, “Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune: out of all things can be made a unity, and out of a unity, all things.”\(^3\)

Kirk discusses the unity of opposites as a balance between the opposites.\(^3\) Aristotle posits a balance between opposites in his citation of Heraclitus
fragment B8, “Heraclitus said that what opposes unites, and that the finest attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and that all things come about by strife.”33 In this interpretation of fragment B8, Aristotle mentions making opposites harmonious, paraphrasing another fragment—Heraclitus fragment B51.

In order to examine the harmony of opposites Heraclitus sets forth, I will discuss fragments B51 and B50, in particular. These two specific fragments, I argue, suggest a musical lineage that has not been explored in previous interpretations.34 Fragments B50 and B51 are part of a group of fragments sourced from Hippolytus, Book 9 of Refutation of All Heresies. Fragments B50 through B67 come from this one source by Hippolytus. I have chosen to focus my examination on two fragments from this source because they provide cogent depictions of the harmony of opposites. Other fragments from this source address a similar theme. For instance, fragment B60 states, “The road up [and] down [is] one and the same [road]” and fragment B59, “The way of writing is straight and crooked.”35 Fragments B50 and B51 make similar observations about opposites in unity, however, they deal specifically with harmony and attunement.

Counter to Heraclitus, Plato, in Symposium,36 considers harmony as referring to agreement and not to things that are varying. “It is perfectly absurd to speak of a harmony at variance, or as formed from things still varying.”37 Read from Plato’s perspective, what is different cannot be the same and agreement at variance does not make for a reasonable argument, thus rendering Heraclitus fragments B50 and B51 nonsensical. In providing alternative readings of the two fragments, I will reveal an unknown musical relation in Heraclitus based on harmony and antiphony that recalls some African worldviews based on harmony and community. This discussion will begin with existing interpretations of logos in Heraclitus fragment B50.

RETHINKING LOGOS

I connect Heraclitus fragment B50 with the theme of antiphonic dialogue or “call and response” and antiphony, used in traditional African worldviews as discussed by Charles Hersch and Geneva Smitherman. This investigation will begin with several interpretations of the same short piece of text, Heraclitus’s Fragment B50.

Here is the fragment interpreted by Kirk:38

> Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree. . .that all things are one

T.M. Robinson’s version is as follows:39

AQ: Please confirm whether the quoted text ‘Listening not to ...’ could be run-on with the text ‘Here is the fragment’.
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Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account, one does wisely in agreeing (homologein) that all things are (in fact) one (thing), [says Heraclitus]

John Burnet interprets Fragment B50 by: 40

It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.

Logos can mean account, word, meaning, reason, truth, law, statement, assertion, discourse, or Being. 41 Some interpreters such as Burnet translate logos as the “word” of or the discourse of Heraclitus himself. 42 This interpretation poses difficulty when considering Fragment B50, because, as G. S. Kirk observes, logos is distinguished from the speaker here. According to Kirk, logos is not a reference to Heraclitus’s own word or discourse. When Heraclitus says not to listen to him, this “should not of course be taken as prohibiting men from listening to Heraclitus, rather it implies that his words have an absolute authority from outside.” 43 Logos involves something external to himself, which a closer reading of Heraclitean fragments B50 and B51 will reveal.

Martin Heidegger and Eugene Fink give these two alternative interpretations: 44

If you have heard not me but rather the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly, “all is one.”

When you have listened, not merely to me (the speaker), but rather when you maintain yourselves in hearkening attunement, then there is proper hearing.

Heidegger deals at length with Heraclitus and early Greek thinking. In an early discussion, Heidegger posits logos has an affinity to legein, to speak or to say, whose original meaning is, “to disclose and make manifest.” 45 In an essay written in 1954, he approaches the riddle of logos by investigating the possible meanings of legein. Heidegger asks how the meaning of legein as “the laying-down and laying-before, which gathers itself and others” comes also to mean saying and talking. He asks, what lies in legein as laying? To examine this question, Heidegger summons the image of a plantation of grapevines at harvest time, when grapes are gathered and laid down in shelter. In his investigation, he determines that to lay “is concerned with retaining whatever is laid down as lying before us.” 46 What lies together is sheltered (the grapes are stored securely) in unconcealment. The letting-lie-before, laid in unconcealment, comes together into presence. 47 Then, leaving the vineyard, Heidegger answers the question, what actually lies in the laying? What lies in the laying is “everything present in unconcealment.” Since everything unconcealed is saying, what lies in the laying is what arises when language is spoken.
Although Heidegger makes the case that the unconcealment of what is concealed, the presencing of what is present brings about the speaking of language, there are, however, meanings of the root of \textit{legein}, \(\lambda \varepsilon(\gamma)\omega\), that he does not consider. He focuses on the meaning of \textit{legein} as talking or saying and as laying. He sees \textit{legein} as holding the key to the meaning of \textit{logos}: “What \textit{logos} is we gather from \textit{legein}” and \textit{logos} means \textit{legein} “as a saying aloud.” Yet, he does not consider the meanings of \(\lambda \varepsilon(\gamma)\omega\): to say, tell; recite, sing; call, name. Does Heidegger overlook this meaning? Thinking of the \textit{logos} as a song, a call, or a recitation, reveals a musical thread running through Fragment B50, which could provide further clues to understanding Heraclitus’s fragments. This root meaning of \textit{logos} is not merely musically oriented; it is specifically a calling or singing.

Though Heidegger gives no explanation for why he chooses the grape gathering metaphor to propound his theory that “saying is a letting-lie-together-before which gathers and is gathered,” his reference to the harvest is indicative of an enduring relationship between agriculture and song. Singing has accompanied cultivation ever since early farming practices. Ted Gioia’s research on work songs reveals that agricultural work songs are “the oldest surviving secular songs from ancient Egypt.” Greek farmers sang work songs while toiling in the vineyards and grain fields. In the \textit{Iliad}, for instance, Homer describes the shield of Achilles, which depicts a vineyard with grape gatherers working while a youth plays the harp (or lyre) and sings. They are depicted toiling, singing, dancing, and whistling to the music. This supports both the grape gathering metaphor and my assertion that Fragment B50 has musical undertones. Thus, \textit{logos} has a musical connotation, as the work song that laborers sing together. This musical, oral, rather than written aspect in pre-Socratic work could be an important clue as to how a community of philosophers formed in ancient Egypt and Greece. In my reading of Fragment B50, this group singing involves a back-and-forth movement in a mutual interaction of call and response.

\textbf{CALL AND RESPONSE}

In antiphony, a type of polyphony also known as “call and response,” speaker and listener’s voices alternate back and forth in a conversational pattern (Hersch 2007:139). The Greek, \textit{antiphon}, \(\acute{o}r\acute{i}f\varphi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\), means “sounding in answer, responsive to.” The \(\acute{o}r\acute{i}\) denotes opposition, opposite situation, replacement, reciprocation, equivalence, negation, posteriority. \(\varphi\omicron\nu\dot{\iota}\) means voice, cry, or shout. The communication depicted in the fragment is antiphonic in that Heraclitus describes a movement connecting speakers and listeners through call and response.
and response. Fragment B50 emphasizes a call to hearkeners, asking them to listen to and respond to something that will culminate in a sense of unity. In call and response, a speaker calls out and listeners respond directly to the call. It is a process that involves “spontaneous verbal and non-verbal interaction between speaker and listener in which all of the speaker’s statements (‘calls’) are punctuated by expressions (‘responses’) from the listener.”

In a call and response scenario, two distinguishable phrases are uttered. One phrase is a call coming from a speaker and one phrase is a response to the call by listeners. I propose that in Fragment B50, the call is the *logos*. The connection between the root meaning of *logos* and a call or a sung recitation supports this argument. This is not to say that *logos* cannot also mean word, speech, or assertion, but that in Fragment B50, the *logos* operates as a call. *Homologein* is translated in this fragment as “agree” “agreement,” or “say accordingly.” In this call and response scenario, *homologein* refers to the responding *logos* by the listeners, saying together: “All is one.” Heraclitus advises listeners to respond “all is one” as the speaker completes his call. The listeners respond together with the speaker.

According to Smitherman, call and response seeks to synthesize speakers and listeners in a unified movement, embodying communality rather than individuality. Individual roles, however, are important, as calls are issued from individuals to a group of responding speakers. Paul Gilroy describes an “ethics of antiphony,” in which the performer becomes one with the audience, establishing a relationship of identity. Gilroy’s theory is not a reduction in which all players are the same. Performer and audience are not identical in this scenario. Hersch tells us in West African culture, art blurs the distinction between artist and audience, “making listeners as much a part of the performance as the musicians themselves.” Therefore, art and community are inseparable and working in harmony.

The antiphony in Heraclitus Fragment B50 is a unity of opposites, in which call and response are connected in harmony. Though not disconnected, *logos* and *homologein* are in agreement and in variance at the same time. When *logos* is considered as a call, the difference between *logos* and *homologein* in fragment B50 is a movement between a call and a response. The different voices are opposed in antiphony, yet connected in harmony.

Interpreters of Heraclitean *logos*, such as Kirk, assert Heraclitus founds *logos* upon the unity of opposites. In listening to the *logos* as fragment B50 relates, explains Wheelright, *logos* “is at once other than and yet one with the individual self.” In my reading of the fragment, it is the *logos* and *homologein* that are at variance. Heraclitus delineates a scene in which the calling, responding and saying together create opposition and harmony.

In existing interpretations, what connects fragments B50 and B51 is an “opposite tension” that at once draws things apart in different directions and
maintains balance. This balance or “hidden harmony” keeps things together and apart at the same time. Vlastos refers to a principle of hidden harmony as well, citing fragment 54, “An unapparent connection is stronger. . .than one which is obvious.”

In my interpretation of fragments B50 and B51, harmony is neither hidden nor unapparent. Like fragment B50, I read B51 about the bow and lyre as an ongoing dialogue between differing things that move in harmony. In B50, a “hearkening attunement” denotes harmony of opposites. Similarly, “palintro-pos harmonie” in B51 refers to the coming together of movement in opposite directions. In B51, a back-and-forth movement in opposite directions works in harmony much like the varying call and response works in B50.

HARMONY

Hippolytus cites Heraclitus fragment B51 in Refutation of All Heresies, Book 9. Robinson states this as follows:

They do not understand how, while differing from (or: being at variance) (it) is in agreement with itself. (There is) a back-turning connection, like (that) of a bow or lyre.

And in Briggman’s version of the same fragment from Hippolytus:

[People] do not understand how, what is diverse. . .is in agreement. . .with itself: a back-turning harmony. . .like that of the bow and lyre.

The back-turning connection or harmony in these readings is translated from palintropos harmonie. In Greek, palintropos or “back-turning” also means contrary or “changing in the opposite direction.” Mention in Fragment B51 of the phrase, “back-turning harmony” conjures the image of a lyre that is played with a strung bow. This is contrary to most interpretations that see the bow as representing a weapon used to shoot arrows and the lyre as the strings of the lyre. When referring to “the bow and the lyre” and a back-turning connection and harmony, I believe Heraclitus is speaking about the bowed lyre rather than a plucked lyre. With the bowed lyre, the bow moves in two opposite directions, thus exhibiting a back-and-forth movement indicative of the unity of opposites. In oppositions, “the former by their changing become the latter, and the latter in turn are changed and become the former.”

“Any one thing following a given line of change will be found to turn in the opposite way sooner or later.” Gregory Vlastos posits opposites are not differences, but the same thing with “modifications.” In Vlastos’ “sameness
of opposites,” the bow would move in the same way across the lyre in each different direction. This movement of change in direction of the bowing is what he would call a modification. In Fragment B51, I see the modification as the *palintropos* or back-turning—a movement that is not one direction or its opposite, but the coming together of their change in direction.

Similarly, the dialogue in Fragment B50 is also a *palintropos harmonie*, in which *logos* is a facet of two-way discourse or dialogue, and not a monologue to be heard. This entails connection between the call of the response of the other. The call comes, is listened to, and then is responded to. The response is then listened to and the call comes again, and so on.

**ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS**

In the scenario put forth in Heraclitus Fragment B50, *homologein* refers to the saying together of the response, *hen panta*, meaning “all is one” or “all things are one.” I argue this phrase expresses harmony and connectedness. The meaning of *panta* is “all things” or “the universe.” *Hen*, considered *panta*’s counter-concept, means “the one.” Vlastos considers the double role of “one” in Heraclitus’s “unity of opposites” theory, “It is itself one of the opposites, yet it explains the unity in all opposites, it is both one among the many and the one which is the many.”

In most existing interpretations, such as Jaspers’s and Burnet’s, Heraclitus’s theory of the unity of opposites, the coming together of opposites in struggle is conveyed through *logos*. Nietzsche, in his early work, also interprets not just polarity in the unity of opposites, but an eternal war of opposites. A thing diverges into two independent opposing things that constantly try to reunite. “A quality is set continually at variance with itself and separates itself into its opposites: these opposites continually strive again one towards another.”

Heraclitus profoundly influenced Marx and Hegel, who concentrate on a dialectics based on contradicting thesis and antithesis. Out of this conflict comes synthesis. Jaspers goes further to say the whole of Western dialectic traces its roots to Heraclitus and the pre-Socratic philosophers that came after Parmenides and Anaximander.

In Nietzsche’s interpretation of the unity of opposites, things are at variance with themselves. In this scenario, inward tension and harmony create a tug of war in which each side has a turn gaining dominance over the other. Nietzsche’s reading responds to the problem of Becoming that he identifies in pre-Platonic philosophy beginning with Anaximander. “Out of the war of opposites all Becoming originates; . . . momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with that the war is not at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity.”
In his Heraclitus lecture at the University of Basel in the 1870s, Nietzsche concentrates on fragment B51. In Nietzsche’s reading of fragment B51, diverging parts must turn back on themselves.\(^2\)

For Heraclitus, “back-turning” is when anything moving in a given line of change will eventually turn in the opposite way.\(^3\) Tension keeps this movement turning in opposite directions. This is what Hegel and Nietzsche refer to as Heraclitus’s Becoming. In my reading, however, the bow and the lyre do not form synthesis out of antithesis, but harmony out of a back-turning change in direction. If it were a struggle between opposing sides, then there would not be harmony, but domination of one over the other.

In his early writings, Nietzsche contemplates Becoming out of oppositional struggle. Writing later in Human All-Too-Human, A Book for Free Spirits (1886), he argues things are not opposites, but different modes. Whereas Marx and Hegel’s reading of Heraclitus supports their dialectics, in which truth and Becoming come out of contradiction, Nietzsche develops out of Heraclitus, his theory of eternal Becoming and harmony.

In my interpretation, the state of constant back-turning and flux that Heraclitus bases on the unity of opposites does not indicate a dialectics. Nor does it refer to internal conflict. I argue fragments B50 and 51 do not describe a battle of opposing things or ideas, but of continuous movement in opposite directions via palintropos harmonie or back-turning agreement. Heraclitus fragments that contain his unity of opposites theme illustrate a palintropos harmonie.

In this reading, the fragments are relational and diunital. For instance, in fragment B50, the call and response are intertwined and separate at the same time. They are not polarities in conflict, as a back-turning of each call and response keeps them in harmony much like the movement in fragment B51, in which the harmonie of the bow and lyre work through palintropos. If the bow did not turn back in palintropos and instead carried on in the same direction, it would not produce harmonie.\(^4\)

In the second part of fragment B50, homologein hen panta is an instruction to listeners and speakers to say something together all as one. This is much like the “A-men” in the call and response of the gospel church, as Smitherman discusses. In call and response, speakers and listeners seek “a state of balance or harmony, which,” she argues, “is fundamental to the traditional African world view.”\(^5\)

These notions of antiphony and harmony have similarities with the culture of ubuntu, in which all people are interdependent, or “A person is a person through other persons.”\(^6\) The meaning behind ubuntu is umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, which translates to, “Each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed in relationship with others, and, in turn, individuality is truly expressed.”\(^7\) Does the phrase, hen panta “all is one” recall some
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traditional African worldviews such as *ubuntu*, which are based on balance and harmony.88

The antiphonic dialogue and harmony that I interpret in this fragment points toward a joint interest in philosophy and shared common knowledge among pre-Socratic scholars of Greece and Egypt. This rules in the existence of a transnational philosophical community in the work of pre-Socratics such as Heraclitus that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.

SQUARE CIRCLES

What constitutes African worldview or philosophy is a much debated and politically weighted topic of discussion. There are thousands of cultures in Africa, which makes isolating an African worldview out of these problematic and risks cultural essentialism. Stephen C. Ferguson II, however, contests this: “Though we speak of Greek philosophy, German philosophy, and even American philosophy, Africana philosophy is seen as a semantic monstrosity bordering on self-contradiction.”89 The idea of African philosophy, Ferguson says is received as “sort of like a square circle.”90 Yet, phrases such as “European philosophy” and “Western philosophy,” which are no less broad and general, are adequately received.91

The aim of this chapter is not to exoticize or to generalize. African philosophy is not an essential idea of what it means to be African. Have past tendencies to form generalizations and to promote negative stereotypes attached to African cultures caused “African philosophy” to be considered essentialist, whereas “European philosophy” is very widely and unapologetically applied? This avoidance of discussion of philosophical thought connected to Africa, I argue is in effect epistemic violence.92 The proscription of any discussion of a particular branch of philosophical thought is a form of epistemic violence that ultimately wrecks knowledge of ways of understanding.

This knowledge, as revealed here, is essential to a Western philosophical tradition in which early Greek philosophy was not conceived in isolation, but via close contact with Egyptian scholars. To deem discussions of African philosophical thought as mere essentialism is to eschew a relation between Greek and Egyptian scholars and what knowledge they shared.

As I have cited Olela as saying, ways of knowing moved through sub-Saharan Africa to Egypt.93 An indigenous African worldview paradigm emphasizes harmony, interrelationship, connectedness, and connection to nature and to each other.94 Spirit and matter are connected. There is interrelation and not separation. In a European worldview paradigm, humans are separate, distinct individuals.95 Knowledge of the universe means one is separated from it. There is compartmentalization, control, and materialism.96
This opposition, however, and the very language describing this paradigmatic split are based on separation.

Definitions that attempt to explain African worldview, as author R. Sambuli Mosha argues in *The Heartbeat of Indigenous Africa*, are pointless because the use of divisive words and phrases such as religion, spirituality, and politics implies that “each of these is a separate entity that can be viewed, studied, and even lived independently of the others.”

Mosha means life is an integrated experience with no place for distinctions and compartmentalization because “all aspects of life and universe are interconnected and interdependent.” Mosha manages to clarify the two perspectives without crystallizing a distinction. The harmony, interrelationship, and connectedness that Mosha describes are difficult to articulate. I believe the Heraclitus fragments discussed here do so elegantly, with no need for divisive or compartmentalizing terms. The fragments express this harmony using the song-related elements of call and response and group singing.

Averring one should be cautious in ascribing different classifications to African culture, musicologist Simha Arom explains: “In Africa, mental categories are never as radical as they are in Western culture.” Categories may not be opposed to one another, necessarily. “Two categories may converge to the point where they overlap to some extent, cross each other, reinforce each other, rather than exclude each other.” I hold that European philosophy is not as separated as the paradigm prescribes. In order to understand this, more research should be undertaken on the common communication shared among philosophers around the fifth century BC in Greece and Egypt. Greek philosophy and Egyptian philosophy are not necessarily separate single identities, nor are they intertwined differences forming a hybrid tradition. In this case, a transnational community is not based on identity, unity, or difference, but on a relation. In a diunital relation, as I have discussed, the foundation of philosophy can be Greek and Egyptian at the same time. Greece and Egypt formed a transnational community, not a single identity or unity and not as two separate or intertwined single identities, but a community of philosophers that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.

Robert Bernasconi suggests in an essay entitled, “African Philosophy’s Challenge to Continental Philosophy,” “Continental philosophers should be opened to critique from African philosophy. They would ‘learn more about their own tradition seen from ‘the outside’.” Researching the links between ancient Greek philosophy and African philosophy could help philosophers today to achieve greater understanding of our own tradition. Likewise, Chancellor Williams sees Greek texts as a rich source for this connection. Williams commends early Greek writers “who had included much of our ancient history with their own and passed it down through the centuries.” Thinking this way about pre-Socratic philosophy can add to our understanding
of European philosophy by considering a broader picture in terms of how ancient Greek philosophy was influenced and inspired by Egyptian thinkers.

Can we dismiss Egyptian pre-Socratic philosophers on the grounds that they did not produce written texts? Early Greek philosophers such as Heraclitus and Socrates did not write. As philosophers of that time wrote nothing, all we have are accounts written by later ancient Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, who refer to Heraclitus and Socrates in their work. Without written evidence of the pre-Socratics’ work, theirs would have been an oral tradition like the Egyptians’. Reading the pre-Socratics in a new way that can reveal a transnational philosophical community not based on national or continental identity. In this way, ancient Greek philosophy was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have considered the accepted belief that philosophy originated in ancient Greece, supported by the argument that Greek philosophers happened to write down their ideas. A debate in the late 1980s and 90s between this Europe-centric view and an Africa-centric origin remains unresolved. I have argued ancient Greek philosophers might well have studied with Egyptian scholars, forming an African-European-Asian community of philosophers around the Mediterranean basin. Although I cannot solve the problem of the origin of philosophy here in this chapter, reading pre-Socratic works with this in mind and re-considering how African philosophies had an influence on these Greek authors, I instead suggest an alternative to what are called the “first philosophers.” In this alternative reading, I argued pre-Socratic philosophy was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.

With a lack of remaining texts from Egypt in pre-Socratic time, the role of Egyptian scholars in early Greek thinking has not been discussed in interpretations of pre-Socratic thinkers. I have argued for neither an Africa-centric nor a Europe-centric origin of philosophy. By examining the surviving pre-Socratic literature, such as Heraclitus fragments, I have developed an interpretation that has not previously been considered. This research reveals some fragments allude to a musical background in Heraclitus, evident in Fragment B50 for example, in which antiphonic and harmonic motifs emerge. Such themes connect with themes from African philosophies like ubuntu, suggesting that both a purely European and a purely African origin are false. This also supersedes a theory of hybridity in which separate identities are enmeshed. In my interpretation, these ancient philosophical texts exhibit a connection that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time based not on divisive categories such as national or continental identities, but on a transnational
relation. In this close reading of Heraclitus fragments, an oral, musical connection implies a different relation that has been overlooked—one in which Greek philosophy did not develop either in isolation or in hybridity, but in a transnational philosophical community.

Arguments for an exclusively European or African history of philosophy turn a blind eye to possibilities of community on a global scale. Before the late 1700s, philosophy from non-European parts of the world existed in harmony with European philosophy. This idea of global community in ancient Europe did not survive the eighteenth century. The history of philosophy became the exclusive story of Europe, the Greeks and the West. This monogenealogical history of philosophy is upheld today.

My reading of Heraclitus implies that coinciding with nineteenth-century imperialism, an obsession with oppositional struggle and separation obscured the harmony and diunital relation Heraclitus was speaking about in the fragments. In light of this reading, modern theorists of global community could consider points in the past when history was recast to exclude whole parts of the world, thereby closing off the possibility of global community.

The concept of global community in a philosophical context challenges the restricted vision of philosophers who fail to see more than one continent—Europe. Overcoming these barriers would give philosophy a fuller understanding of its very own tradition.

NOTES


2. Critchley, Ethics, 126.

3. In addition to the provinces of Greece, this includes Iona, Sicily, Macedonia, and Thrace.


5. Bernal’s data was philologically based and the work was discredited on grounds of a lack of evidence and distorted data. Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy Maclean Rogers, Black Athena Revisited (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

6. A comprehensive discussion of the debate that ensued in the years after Black Athena’s publication is beyond the scope of this chapter.

7. It is important to note that, in this chapter, Egypt is considered a part of Africa. Chancellor Williams, as well as Asa G. Hilliard III insist on Egypt’s “black


14. Counterpoint is when different melodies are played in conjunction with one another.


20. As discussed above, Aristotle *Metaphysics* (1.1 981b)


25. Sallis and Kevin Maly, Heraclitean Fragments, viii.


30. Robinson, Heraclitus, 41.


32. Robinson, Heraclitus, 41.


34. Plato, Symposium, 187b.


37. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 132.


Community in Fragments

47. Ibid, 62.
48. Ibid, 63.
49. Ibid, 60.
51. Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 64.
54. One example of a Greek agricultural work song is the Lityerses, a reaping and threshing song in *The Iliad Book 18*, 561–572:

In time of vintage: youths and maids, that bore not yet the flame
Of manly Hymen, baskets bore of grapes and mellow fruit.
A lad that sweetly touch’d a harp, to which his voice did suit,
Center’d the circles of that youth, all whose skill could not do
The wanton’s pleasure to their minds, that danced, sung, whistled too.

55. Hersch explains, “Call and response is just as it sounds, one melody answered by another in a kind of conversation. Polyphony, with two or more melodies sounding simultaneously, takes call and response one step further, each melody signifying on the other. Charles Hersch, *Subversive Sounds: Race and the birth of jazz in New Orleans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 139.
69. The lyre of Greece during Heraclitus’s time was plucked with the fingers (as seen with Apollo in Greek mythology). The instrument derived from similar instruments of North Africa, such as the rebab, meaning bowed instrument, or “played with a bow.” The Persian version of the instrument is the rubab.
70. These interpretations of Fragment B51 cite a two-way tension in the strings of the lyre, pulled taught by the lyre’s arms and in the string of a stretched bow. Kirk translates *palintronos* as “back-tension”—rather than *palintropos*. Tension is a theme in Kirk’s interpretations. However, as Vlastos observes, tension is not stated anywhere by Heraclitus in the fragments. Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, 136:137. Kirk describes the unity in opposing tensions in these two objects as “the two-way tension that exists between the frame and the string in bow or lyre is said to resemble the way in which something which is being carried apart is simultaneously drawn together.” Kirk, *Heraclitus*, 215:216.
73. Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, 71, 149.
77. He covers this topic in a lecture on Heraclitus at the University of Basel and in an 1873 essay, “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.”
80. Nietzsche’s term for early Greek philosophers is ‘pre-Platonic’, rather than ‘pre-Socratic’.
84. Ibid, 138.
85. Smitherman, *Talkin and Testifyin*, 104.
89. In some philosophical circles, the idea of Africana philosophy is seen as a semantic monstrosity sort of like a square circle. Even today, questions continue to be raised about the legitimacy and necessity of Africana philosophy. And the continuing response of the philosophical guild to
its presence confirms that its legitimacy is still not generally accepted. The universal character of philosophy, it is said, has no room for ethnic particularity. Though we speak of Greek philosophy, German philosophy, and even American philosophy, Africana philosophy is seen as a semantic monstrosity bordering on self-contradiction. Many Africana philosophers have argued that such criticisms rest on questionable presuppositions concerning the nature of philosophy, its method, and its analysis. (Ferguson 2011:462)


Richards, Yurugu, 97–99.

95. With Plato’s Republic, separation of self as a thinking subject becomes the way to knowledge and to understanding the world.


98. Ibid.


100. Arom, African Polyphony, 29.


103. Williams, The Destruction, 297.

104. An oral versus literate distinction seems like a Eurocentric hierarchical opposition, an inversion of which, however, might create further confusion.

