Probability of Guilt

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Abstract

In legal proceedings, a fact-finder needs to decide whether a defendant is guilty or not based on probabilistic evidence. We defend the thesis that the defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We draw on Leitgeb’s stability theory for an appropriate notion of rational belief and show how our thesis solves the problem of statistical evidence. Finally, we defend our account of legal proof against challenges from Staffel and compare it to a recent competitor put forth by Moss.

Keywords. Legal Epistemology, Legal Proof, Statistical Evidence, Stability Theory of Belief.

1 Introduction

In a criminal trial, the accused is to be found guilty or innocent. The decision is rendered by the fact-finder – a judge or jury – who is governed by a burden of proof and the available and admissible evidence. A criminal conviction, for example, requires the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This means the evidence presented in court must be enough to remove any reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury or judge that the accused is guilty of the crime with which they are charged. It is far from clear, however, what the phrase ‘removing any

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1 A notable exception is Scottish law where not proven is an available verdict. In most other jurisdictions, the verdict may only be guilty or not guilty.
reasonable doubt in the mind’ means. A popular way to understand the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is to require a high confidence in
the guilt of the defendant. But consider this case:

One hundred prisoners are in a yard under the supervision of a
guard. At some point, ninety-nine of them collectively kill the
guard. Only one prisoner refrains, standing alone in a corner.
We know this from a video recording. The video shows that
the participation ratio is 99:1, but does not allow for the iden-
tification of the ninety-nine killers. There is no other evidence.
After the fact, a prisoner is picked at random and tried.

Should the randomly picked prisoner be found guilty? Well, it seems we
should be quite confident that the prisoner is guilty. Since 99 out of 100
prisoners killed the guard and the defendant on trial is one of the 100 pris-
oners, the probability of his guilt is 99%. If we understand the beyond
reasonable doubt standard probabilistically, it seems to amount to the fol-
lowing: the guilt of a defendant is proven if the fact-finder should have
a high degree of belief in his guilt. This probabilistic version of the evi-
dential standard is met in the example. And yet, there is something odd
about convicting this particular prisoner standing trial. A high probability
of guilt seems simply not enough for conviction. But, if a 99% probability
of guilt is not enough, what is?

Imagine we had no video recording but an eye-witness that testifies about
the randomly picked prisoner: “I saw him killing the guard!” The eye-
ewitness is very reliable but not perfectly reliable. Let’s say she raises the
probability of the prisoner’s guilt to 99%. For many, this eye-witness tes-
timony suffices for a conviction, while the statistics on its own does not.

Given that the probability of guilt is the same in the two cases, what makes

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2In the law, guilt is usually understood to imply an actus reus—or objective element of
a crime—and a mens rea—or criminal intent of a crime. For this paper, we put the intricate
issue of what constitutes a mens rea aside and focus on beliefs about actus reus.

3The example dates back to Nesson (1979). The wording is taken from Di Bello (2019).

4Haack (2014) and Smith (2020) level attacks on the thesis that standards of proof
are best understood in terms of probabilities. For a qualified defence of this thesis, see
Hedden and Colyvan (2019).
for the intuitive difference?\textsuperscript{5}

Fact-finders have a difficult task. They are forced to decide whether or not a defendant is guilty based on evidence that is probabilistic in one way or another. The prisoner cases illustrate that it is unclear how a high probability of guilt should translate into a binary verdict. Purely statistical evidence and individual evidence, such as testimonies, seem to differ in their support for a verdict of guilt, even if they make the defendant’s guilt equally likely. But, in light of the same probability of guilt, is it not irrational for a fact-finder to judge the two cases differently?

In this paper, we defend the thesis that legal proof is tantamount to rational belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty if and only if it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty.\textsuperscript{6} We understand this thesis as follows: a high credence of guilt is necessary but not sufficient for finding guilty; the intuitive difference between the cases can be traced back to what is rational to believe based on the given evidence; and so it is rational for a fact-finder to judge the two cases differently.

On the thesis we defend, rational belief is governed by norms for full belief and norms for credences. This notion of rational belief implies a probabilistic threshold view that solves the problem posed by statistical evidence.\textsuperscript{7} Notably, legal proof requires nothing more than rational belief of guilt. Unlike other accounts, we need not impose any further condition on legal proof.\textsuperscript{8}

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\textsuperscript{5}Many proposals for the intuitive difference have been put forth in philosophy and legal theory alike, e.g. Thomson (1986), Redmayne (2008), Smith (2010, 2018), Pardo (2018). For an overview and critical assessment, see Gardiner (2018).

\textsuperscript{6}A similar thesis has recently been suggested by Buchak (2014, see pp. 299-303): a rational agent blames a person just in case she fully believes the person is guilty. This thesis – legal proof is tantamount to justified full belief of guilt – is a “tempting proposal” according to Moss (2018, p. 206). Unlike Buchak, however, we think that belief is rational only if full belief and credences cohere.

\textsuperscript{7}This is big news because it is commonly thought that “threshold views of the relationship between licensed court verdicts and rational credence are false.” (Buchak, 2014, p. 291)

special cases of rational belief.

We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we show that a high degree of belief in a defendant’s guilt is not sufficient for rationally believing that the defendant is guilty. In Section 3, we explain what would be sufficient for a rational belief in guilt and observe that Leitgeb’s (2014) stability theory provides us with an appropriate notion of rational belief. We then apply our account, in Section 4, to the prisoner’s example. In Section 5, we defuse Staffel’s (2016) challenges against the stability theory and we analyse different standards of proof, beyond reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence. Our account of legal proof compares favorably to Moss’s (2021), or so we argue in Section 6.

2 High Credence of Guilt

A fact-finder is often in an unenviable position: a binary decision must be made. A fact-finder usually cannot hedge the decision, unlike private persons (Ross, 2021, p. 14). In particular, a finder must come to a verdict about the defendant’s guilt. And this is complicated by the fact that most evidence is probabilistic in one way or another. It is very rare – if not impossible – that a piece of evidence supports a belief without any possibility of revocation.

We said that a defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. Given that evidence comes in probabilistic form and a defendant is either convicted or else acquitted, the finder should have a rational procedure to translate her credences based on the available probabilistic evidence into an all-or-nothing belief required for the final verdict.

It is standard to represent a rational agent’s credences, or degrees of belief, by a probability distribution which satisfies the standard axioms of probability theory enriched by the ratio definition of conditional probability. On this picture, there is an obvious candidate for bridging credences and qualitative beliefs: an agent should believe a proposition just in case her credence in that proposition exceeds a certain threshold. More formally,
let the probability distribution $P$ represent an agent’s credences. A simple threshold view then says: a rational agent believes a proposition $A$ if and only if (iff) $P(A) > s$ for some fixed threshold $s$.

According to the simple threshold view, the fact-finder in our prisoner example should believe that each prisoner is guilty. To see this clearly, let us formalize the example. Let $w_i$ denote the possible world where prisoner $i$ is innocent and all the other prisoners are guilty. The fact-finder considers the set $W = \{w_1, ..., w_{100}\}$ of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible worlds as serious possibilities. The finder has maximal credence in the proposition that exactly one of the hundred prisoners is innocent. That is $P(W) = 1$. She believes that any one of the hundred prisoners may be innocent, and is certain that one is – even though she does not know which one. Having only the $99 : 1$ participation statistics available and no further evidence which would make a difference between the prisoners, her credence should be given by the uniform probability distribution $P$ over $W$: $P(\{w_1\}) = P(\{w_2\}) = ... = P(\{w_{100}\}) = 1/100$.

For $1 \leq i \leq 100$, $P(\{w_i\}) < s$ for any reasonably high threshold. So, on a threshold view, the finder should not believe that any one of the prisoners is innocent.

Should the fact-finder believe of each prisoner that he is not innocent? To answer this question, let us make explicit a standard propositional framework which includes a negation. A proposition is a subset of a finite set $W$ of possible worlds. A proposition $A \subseteq W$ is consistent iff $A \neq \emptyset$. A proposition $A$ is consistent with a proposition $B$ iff $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$. $A$ entails $B$ iff $A \subseteq B$. The negation $\neg A$ of a proposition is given by its complement $W \setminus A$, the conjunction of $A \land B$ of two propositions by their intersection $A \cap B$, and the disjunction $A \lor B$ by their union $A \cup B$. The proposition that prisoner $i$ is not innocent, or equivalently guilty, is then given by the set $W \setminus \{w_i\}$. In all worlds but $w_i$ prisoner $i$ is guilty. The credence $P(W \setminus \{w_i\}) = .99$ of guilt surpasses a reasonably high threshold.\(^9\) Hence, on the threshold view, the fact-finder should believe that each individual

\(^9\)Note that the number of prisoners could be increased and so the threshold could be even higher.
prisoner is guilty. But the finder is also certain that one of the prisoners is innocent. The threshold view then implies that the fact-finder should believe both at the same time: (i) each prisoner is guilty and (ii) one prisoner is not. But this implication casts doubt on the rationality of the threshold view. (ii) contradicts (i) if belief is closed under conjunction. And so it seems to be irrational if one and the same agent believes that prisoner 1 is guilty, and prisoner 2, and ..., and prisoner 100, but also that one of those 100 prisoners is innocent. A simple threshold view demands of the fact-finder to have all-or-nothing beliefs which are inconsistent.\(^{10}\)

Imagine a fact-finder who believes that only one person killed John, but she also believes that Jim alone killed John and that Mary alone killed John. Such a finder seems rather irrational because she violates a rationality norm of qualitative belief: beliefs ought to be closed under conjunction. If a rational agent believes \(A\) and \(B\), she should also believe \(A \land B\). We would be uneasy if our imagined fact-finder were to find guilty Jim and Mary based on her qualitatively irrational beliefs. As long as the finder believes that only one person killed John, the unease persists. Only if the finder gives up one of her qualitative beliefs so that her beliefs are consistent can we understand and accept her verdict. The finder’s all-or-nothing beliefs should thus at least be logically consistent to warrant a verdict.

We represent – as is standard for qualitative models of belief – a rational agent’s beliefs by (at least) a set \(\text{Bel} \subseteq \wp(W)\) of propositions the agent believes. A rational agent’s all-or-nothing beliefs are consistent and closed under logical consequence. We express closure under logical consequence as follows: for all \(A, B \subseteq W\), (i) if \(A \in \text{Bel}\) and \(A \subseteq B\), then \(B \in \text{Bel}\), and (ii) if \(A \in \text{Bel}\) and \(B \in \text{Bel}\), then \(A \land B \in \text{Bel}\). Hence, the conjunction \(B_W\) of all believed propositions is also in \(\text{Bel}\). \(\text{Bel}\) thus uniquely determines \(B_W\) and vice versa:

\[
A \in \text{Bel} \text{ iff } B_W \subseteq A.
\]

To sum up, our agent should, according to the threshold view, believe of each prisoner that he is guilty and that there is one prisoner who is innocent. As it is rational to close qualitative belief under conjunction, we

\(^{10}\)This is well known from the literature on the Lottery Paradox. See Kyburg (1961), Hempel (1962), and the more recent review by Wheeler (2007).
obtain a contradiction. Our agent believes $W \setminus \{w_i\}$ for $1 \leq i \leq 100$. By closing her beliefs under conjunction she believes:

$$(W \setminus \{w_1\}) \cap (W \setminus \{w_2\}) \cap \ldots \cap (W \setminus \{w_{100}\}) = \emptyset.$$ 

It is logically inconsistent to believe at the same time that all prisoners are guilty and one is innocent.\(^{11}\) To believe of each prisoner that he is guilty is thus irrational, even though the finder should have a high credence in the guilt of any individual prisoner. A high credence in guilt is thus not sufficient for rational belief of guilt.

We have said that a defendant should be found guilty iff it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We have seen that a fact-finder needs to convert her credences based on the available evidence into an all-or-nothing belief. It seems obvious that the finder should believe a defendant is guilty if her credence in the defendant’s guilt exceeds a certain threshold. On a simple threshold view, the finder should believe of each individual prisoner in our example that he is guilty and that one of them is innocent. Since the verdict of the finder is binary, the rationality norms of qualitative belief should apply. However, once we close the finder’s beliefs under conjunction – which is a rationality norm of qualitative belief – we obtain a contradiction: the finder would be required to believe that all prisoners are guilty and one is innocent. But this does not answer the question whether the fact-finder should believe that the particular prisoner standing trial is guilty. We will provide an answer in the next section.

### 3 Leitgeb’s Stability Theory of Rational Belief

In the last section, we have observed that a fact-finder should be doubly rational. She should have rational credences because evidence comes in probabilistic form and she should have rational beliefs because her binary

\(^{11}\)Note that $P(\emptyset) = 0$. On the threshold view, it is not rational to believe that all prisoners are guilty, even though it is rational to believe of each individual prisoner that he is guilty.
verdict should not be based on inconsistent all-or-nothing beliefs. In our
prisoner example, the fact-finder’s beliefs become logically inconsistent
and so irrational if her beliefs are governed by the standard rationality
norms for credences, for all-or-nothing belief, and a threshold view bridg-
ing her credences and her all-or-nothing beliefs. The finder has thus no
doubly rational belief about whether the prisoner standing trial is inno-
cent or guilty.

Is doubly rational belief in the guilt of a defendant simply asking too much
for finding a defendant guilty? We would not say so. Each set of rational-
ity norms are independently plausible for a notion of rational belief. In
fact, we have identified three desiderata for rational belief which come
into conflict in the prisoner example:

(i) All-or-nothing belief should be closed under logical consequence.

(ii) Credences should obey the axioms of probability theory and the ratio
definition of conditional probability.

(iii) An agent should believe a proposition just in case her credence in the
proposition is high enough.

It has long been thought that (i)-(iii) cannot be true together, and so at
least one of them must be given up. But then Leitgeb (2014, 2015, 2017)
has shown how the three desiderata give rise to a theory of rational belief.
The rough idea is that a rational agent believes \( A \) iff she still assigns \( A \) a
high enough credence when she conditions on any proposition she con-
siders possible. In brief, a rational agent believes \( A \) iff her credence in \( A \)
is *stably* high enough. What gives rise to Leitgeb’s theory is (i), (ii), and a
specification of the desideratum (iii), where high enough credence is un-
derstood as stably high enough credence. In this section, we sketch this
stability theory of belief and apply it in the next section to the prisoner
example.

What does it exactly mean for a credence in \( A \) to be stably high enough?
Recall that an agent’s credences are represented by a probability distri-
bution \( P \) over a finite set \( W \) of worlds. A proposition \( A \) is stably high
enough with respect to a credence function \( P \), or simply \( A \) is \( P \)-stable, iff
\[ P(A \mid B) > \frac{1}{2} \text{ for all } B \subseteq W \text{ such that } A \cap B \neq \emptyset \text{ and } P(B) > 0. \]  
P-stability demands that the probability of \( A \) remains higher than the probability of its negation when conditioning on each proposition \( B \) that is consistent with \( A \) and the conditional probability is defined. An agent’s credence in \( A \) is thus \( P \)-stable just in case it is more likely than not given each proposition consistent with it. Note that the \( P \)-stability of a non-empty proposition \( A \) entails that \( P(A \mid W) = P(A) > \frac{1}{2} \). For \( A \neq \emptyset \) is consistent with \( W \) and \( P(W) = 1 \). Furthermore, any proposition of probability 1 is \( P \)-stable.

Leitgeb’s theory allows us to determine what a ‘doubly’ rational agent believes given the agent’s credence function \( P \) and a \( P \)-stable proposition. That is, given an agent’s credences \( P \) and a non-empty \( P \)-stable proposition, one can determine \( \text{Bel} \) such that the given \( P \)-stable proposition is the strongest believed proposition \( B_W \). In fact, Leitgeb has shown that the other direction holds as well.\(^{12}\) We thus obtain:

\[ A \in \text{Bel} \iff B_W \subseteq A \text{ and } B_W \text{ is } P \text{-stable.} \]  
\( \text{(1)} \)

The \( P \)-stable proposition \( B_W \) is a subset of any proposition \( A \) the rational agent believes. Hence, the rational agent assigns any proposition she believes a credence at least as great as the credence in \( B_W \). And each proposition \( A \) she assigns an equal or greater credence than \( B_W \) is a superset of \( B_W \) due to \( P \)-stability. Where \( B_W \) is a \( P \)-stable proposition, Leitgeb’s theory thus entails a \textit{Lockean Thesis} with threshold \( P(B_W) \):\(^{13}\)

\[ A \in \text{Bel} \iff P(A) \geq P(B_W), \text{ for all } A \subseteq W. \]

What an agent believes thus depends on her credence function \( P \) and the choice of the strongest believed and \( P \)-stable proposition \( B_W \).

Here is a reading of Leitgeb’s theory geared towards our purposes. A rational agent comes equipped with a belief set \( \text{Bel} \) and a credal distribution \( P \). At any given time, her all-or-nothing beliefs must cohere with her credences according to (1). This synchronic constraint on her beliefs determines at each moment in time which propositions are logically consistent.

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\(^{12}\)See Leitgeb (2013, fn. 26).

\(^{13}\)We could also choose a threshold slightly below \( P(B_W) \).
with her qualitative beliefs. A proposition $A$ is logically consistent with her beliefs iff she does not believe $\neg A$.\footnote{A proposition $A$ is logically consistent with her beliefs just in case $B_W \cap A \neq \emptyset$. This formula is equivalent to $B_W \not\subseteq W \setminus A$. Since all believed propositions must be supersets of $B_W$, $\neg A \notin \text{Bel}$ iff $B_W \cap A \neq \emptyset$.} If so, let us say she considers $A$ to be possible, or equivalently $A$ is epistemically possible; if not, not. Now, she believes $A$ just in case she still assigns $A$ a credence over $P(B_W)$ when she conditions on any proposition she considers possible.

Titelbaum (2020) suggested that we may conceive of the propositions she considers possible as propositions she believes she might learn later. She has thus an all-or-nothing belief in $A$ only if, for any proposition she believes she might learn later, she still would assign $A$ a high credence if she were to learn that proposition. On this reading, a rational agent believes now a proposition if she is confident in it now and anticipates continued confidence in the future.

Titelbaum’s suggestion may be adapted to a preliminary notion of belief beyond reasonable doubt. A rational agent believes a proposition $A$ beyond reasonable doubt when she is confident in it now and she anticipates no relevant possibility that would lower her confidence below a certain threshold. We will come back to this notion later. But first we apply our reading of Leitgeb’s theory to the prisoner example.

## 4 The Prisoner Example Revisited

In the prisoner example, we have the evidence that 99 out of 100 hundred prisoners kill a prison guard. This 99:1 statistics says that each of the 100 prisoners may be innocent and we have no reason to believe of any one that he is more or less likely to be guilty than any of the others. That is, all 100 prisoners are serious candidates for killing the guard and the probabilistic evidence does not discriminate between those candidates. Crucially, we have a reference class of 100 prisoners whose members are all on a par concerning their probability of guilt. Hence, we formalised the fact-finder’s credences by a uniform distribution over the 100 mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities of innocence.
On Leitgeb’s theory, rational belief depends on how the serious epistemic possibilities are partitioned. A partition \( \Pi \) on \( W \) is a set of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets \( u_i \) of \( W \) such that \( \bigcup u_i = W \). Propositions are understood relative to a partition \( \Pi \): any proposition is a subset of \( \Pi \), and one can define a new probability distribution \( P_{\Pi} \) in terms of our uniform distribution \( P \). The probabilities of the partition cells and of their unions are determined by \( P \) that is – unlike \( P_{\Pi} \) – defined for all subsets of \( W \). Of course, given the 99:1 statistics, it is justified to choose the partition \( \Pi \) of serious possibilities which corresponds to \( W \). That is, in the prisoner example, the difference between \( W \) and \( \Pi \) is negligible, since we have picked the most fine-grained partition:

\[
\Pi = \{ \{ w_1 \}, \{ w_2 \}, ..., \{ w_2 \} \}.
\]

Now, the only \( P_{\Pi} \)-stable proposition is \( W \), and so \( B_W = W \). The belief, for instance, that prisoner 1 is guilty is not \( P_{\Pi} \)-stable. To see this, consider the probability that prisoner 1 is guilty given that prisoner 1 or prisoner 2 is innocent:

\[
P_{\Pi}(W \setminus \{ w_1 \} \mid \{ w_1, w_2 \}) = \frac{P(\{ w_2 \})}{P(\{ w_1, w_2 \})} = \frac{1}{2}.
\]

\( P_{\Pi} \)-stability requires that the probability of the proposition under consideration remains strictly over \( 1/2 \). But, on our reading of Leitgeb’s theory, if the fact-finder were to learn the possibility that prisoner 1 or prisoner 2 is innocent, her confidence that prisoner 1 is guilty does not surpass \( 1/2 \). A similar argument applies to each prisoner \( i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq 100 \). Hence, the finder should not believe of any prisoner that he is guilty.\(^{15}\)

Unlike the simple threshold view discussed above, Leitgeb’s theory says that the fact-finder should not believe that the randomly picked prisoner is guilty. More precisely, the fact-finder should believe that exactly one of the 100 prisoners is innocent and she should not believe that any prisoner is guilty.

\(^{15}\)In fact, only the belief in \( W \) is \( P_{\Pi} \)-stable. To see this, suppose for reductio that the fact-finder believes the proposition \( \{ w_1, ..., w_i \} \) for \( 1 \leq i < 100 \). The finder thus considers \( \{ w_i, ..., w_{100} \} \) to be possible. Now, the probability of \( \{ w_1, ..., w_i \} \) conditional on \( \{ w_i, ..., w_{100} \} \) is \( 1/(100-(i-1)) \). The latter term is less than or equal to \( 1/2 \). But by \( P_{\Pi} \)-stability the fraction should be strictly greater than \( 1/2 \). Contradiction.
is guilty relative to the partition $\Pi$. The probability $P_\Pi(W \setminus \{w_i\})$ of guilt for any prisoner is $99/100$, but none is rationally believed to be guilty. It is still a serious possibility that prisoner $i$ is innocent and there is nothing in the statistics that makes prisoner $i$ more suspicious than any other prisoner. Leitgeb’s theory thus recommends that the finder should not treat individuals of the same reference class differently based on a uniform distribution over this class.

Now, imagine prisoner 1 is standing trial and we have no statistical evidence except that some group of the one-hundred prisoners killed the guard. Instead a 99% reliable eye-witness comes forward and testifies that she saw prisoner 1 joining in to kill the guard. Unlike the 99:1 statistics, the eye-witness testimony is only about prisoner 1 – it is silent on the other 99 prisoners. This eye-witness evidence shifts the perspective. While the 99:1 statistics answers the question how likely it is that a randomly picked prisoner is guilty, the testimony answers the question whether or not prisoner 1 killed the guard. For the latter question, there are only two serious possibilities: prisoner 1 attacked the guard or else he did not. The testimony is either correct or not. This suggests that the testimony partitions all underlying possibilities in just two cells:

$$\Pi' = \{\{w_1\}, \{w_2, ..., w_{100}\}\}.$$

$\{w_2, ..., w_{100}\}$ represents that the witness’s testimony is correct and prisoner 1 attacked the guard, while $\{w_1\}$ represents that the testimony is incorrect and prisoner 1 is innocent. Now, there are two $P_{\Pi'}$-stable propositions, $W$ and $\{w_2, ..., w_{100}\}$. To see why the latter is $P_{\Pi'}$-stable, consider the probability that prisoner 1 is guilty given any proposition relative to $\Pi'$:

$$P_{\Pi'}(W \setminus \{w_1\} \mid B) > 1/2$$

for all $B \subseteq \Pi'$ such that $W \setminus \{w_1\} \cap B \neq \emptyset$ and $P(B) > 0$.

There are just two strict subsets $B$ of $\Pi'$. $\{w_1\}$ is inconsistent with $W \setminus \{w_1\}$ and $P(W \setminus \{w_1\} \mid W \setminus \{w_1\}) = 1$. On Leitgeb’s theory it is permissible to pick $B_W = \{w_2, ..., w_{100}\}$ and $P(B_W) = .99$ as a threshold for all-or-nothing belief. Hence, it is rationally permissible to believe that prisoner
1 is guilty. Based on the eye-witness evidence, the fact-finder may rationally believe that prisoner 1 is guilty, and so may epistemically treat prisoner 1 differently from prisoners 2-100.

We have seen that different kinds of evidence may point to different partitions of the underlying set of possibilities. The uniform probability measure $P$ over the fine-grained partition of the possibilities $W$ induces a symmetry between the prisoners: each prisoner is just as likely as any other to be innocent. The 99:1 statistics does not probabilistically discriminate between this or that possibility. The innocence of each prisoner is a serious epistemic possibility and the finder’s uniform credences do not break the symmetry. We suggest it is this symmetry why it feels so random to convict one of the prisoners based on statistical evidence alone: looking at the probability values, it could likewise have been any other prisoner.

The eye-witness testimony, by contrast, biases the fact-finder’s credences towards prisoner 1 being guilty. The reason is simply that the very coarse-grained partition allowing only the two possibilities that prisoner 1 killed the guard, or else he did not, gives a rather strong indication of what to believe about prisoner 1. The eye-witness evidence dissipates the air of randomness: the two possibilities are far from being equally likely.

Imagine we have a very but not perfectly reliable eye-witness. The witness says about prisoner 1 “he killed the guard”. The trier of fact finds prisoner 1 guilty. The witness says the same about prisoner 2. The trier finds prisoner 2 guilty. And so on. Given that the eye-witness is indeed very reliable, it seems rationally permitted to find all the prisoners guilty – independent of the size of the reference class and even though we know that innocent prisoners will sooner or later be found guilty.

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16 Leitgeb (2013) recommends picking the strongest $B_W$. On this recommendation, it is rational simpliciter to believe that prisoner 1 is guilty.

17 If the fact-finder has the 99:1 statistics as additional evidence, the finder should still believe that one of the prisoners 2-100 is innocent.

18 Pritchard (2018) explains the feeling of randomness thus: it is an easy possibility that the prisoner standing trial is innocent. Whereas he does not define what an easy possibility is, we may roughly stipulate it as a possibility that is at least as likely as any other relevant possibility. On this stipulation, it is an easy possibility that the prisoner standing trial is innocent given only the 99:1 statistics. Given only the eye-witness evidence, however, the prisoner being innocent is not an easy possibility.
Now, let us suppose we have in addition to our eye-witness also the 99:1 statistics. Again, the witness says about prisoner 1 “he killed the guard”. The trier of fact finds prisoner 1 guilty. The witness says the same about prisoner 2. The trier finds prisoner 2 guilty. This seems rationally permitted until prisoner 99. If the eye-witness proclaims the guilt of all one-hundred prisoners, however, something went wrong. After all, the 99:1 statistics makes us certain that one of the prisoners is innocent. The eye-witness testimony can bring up to 99 prisoners behind bars, but if the eye-witness testifies against all prisoners, the testimony – including the previous 99 testimonies – suddenly loses some of its bite. Leitgeb’s theory can explain this intuition: if we close our beliefs under conjunction after testimony 100, our beliefs become inconsistent.\footnote{Where $W \setminus \{w_i\}$ means that prisoner $i$ is guilty, closing our beliefs under conjunction after the 100 testimonies amounts to: $(W \setminus \{w_1\}) \cap (W \setminus \{w_2\}) \cap ... \cap (W \setminus \{w_{100}\}) = \emptyset$.} And if our beliefs are inconsistent, we have no good case for or against anything.

We have thus found the following relation between the 99:1 statistics and the eye-witness testimony. Against the backdrop that we know that there are only one-hundred prisoners and we are sure that one prisoner is innocent, the 99:1 statistics is like a very reliable eye-witness that says about each prisoner that he is guilty to the effect that his probability of guilt is 99%. In sum, these pieces of testimonial evidence are symmetric with respect to the prisoners. And this symmetry suffices for it being rational to not believe of any individual prisoner that he is guilty.

The prisoner example suggests a general distinction between statistical and individual evidence. Statistical evidence assigns uniform (or near uniform) probabilities to a certain partition of possibilities. The more uniform the probability distribution is, the more statistical the evidence. A completely uniform distribution is thus purely statistical. Individual evidence counteracts the uniformity of statistical evidence. It may do so by partitioning the underlying possibilities such that the (near) uniformity is broken. It induces thereby a probabilistic difference between partition cells. In brief, statistical evidence is uniform over certain possibilities and individual evidence discriminates between those possibilities.

Purely statistical evidence has it that all possibilities are on a par: no pos-
sibility is more likely than any other. This is behind the sentiment that all possibilities might be actual. And according to Leitgeb’s theory, purely statistical evidence alone should never give rise to qualitative beliefs.

Our simple account of probabilistic evidence explains the intuition that statistical evidence gives only general information about the members of a reference class and does not single out any member of the class as special. The 99:1 statistics, for instance, does not only pertain to the particular defendant standing trial but in the same way to any other prisoner in the yard. And so it would be a distortion if not any individual would be represented by its own partition cell. According to our simple account, individual evidence may break this uniformity over a partition. It may shift the focus on only a subset or even just one member against its wider reference class. This coarse-graining of the underlying possibilities may induce a probabilistic differential between the new partition cells. As a result of the coarse-graining, the probability distribution over the new partition may well become discriminatory. And so qualitative belief may become rationally permissible.

5 Staffel’s Uneven Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Fine-Graining

Staffel (2016) challenges Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief. She claims that it “is irrational to hold outright beliefs based on purely statistical evidence”, but observes that Leitgeb’s theory does not rule out rational belief based on uneven statistics (p. 1725). According to her, a statistics is even if the probability is uniformly distributed over the considered possibilities, and uneven if the distribution is not uniform. The 99:1 participation statistics of the prisoner example is even: it is equally likely that each prisoner is innocent. Of course, a statistics need not be even. Consider, for example, the following credences $P$ over only four serious possibilities:

$$P(\{w_1\}) = .6, \ P(\{w_2\}) = .3, \ P(\{w_3\}) = .09, \ P(\{w_4\}) = .01$$

The proposition $\{w_1\}$ is $P$-stable, and so it is rationally permissible to believe it on Leitgeb’s theory. Staffel’s observation is correct: stably high
credences can be based on uneven statistics.

The uneven statistics can be interpreted as a four-ticket lottery. Only one of the four tickets wins and the chances of winning are given by \( P \). In world \( w_i \), ticket \( i \) wins for \( 1 \leq i \leq 4 \). If we pick the strongest \( P \)-stable proposition \( B_W = \{w_1\} \), it is rational to believe that ticket 1 will win and the other tickets will lose. If we pick the next strongest \( P \)-stable proposition \( B_W = \{w_1, w_2\} \), it is rational to believe that ticket 1 or ticket 2 will win, and the other tickets will lose. And so on. Rational belief in an uneven ‘lottery proposition’ such as “ticket 1 will win” is thus not excluded on Leitgeb’s theory. And since “it is irrational to have outright beliefs in lottery propositions”, she thinks beliefs in uneven lottery propositions are irrational (p. 1725). Hence, the stability theory of belief does not provide a theory of rational belief, or so argues Staffel.

Staffel (2016, p. 1729) tailors an alleged case of statistical evidence based on an uneven statistics. Let us follow her and tailor a case of statistical evidence which fits the probability distribution \( P \). You face four people who have attended a soccer game. You believe for sure that one of the four people gatecrashed to watch the game, while the other three paid for their tickets. The only evidence you have is as follows: person 1 sat in section 1, where \( 60\% \) of the visitors were gatecrashers; person 2 sat in section 2, where \( 30\% \) of the visitors were gatecrashers; and so on. As the case is structurally indistinguishable from the uneven lottery, the stability theory allows to rationally believe that person 1 gatecrashed and the others did not. Staffel (2016, p. 1729) counters:

[I]t would be irrational for you to form any outright beliefs about which person is or isn’t the fence-jumper, since the only available evidence is statistical evidence about the percentage of fence-jumpers in the section in which each person sat.

As a consequence, Staffel concludes that the stability theory of belief, at least on its own, cannot explain why it is irrational to believe propositions ‘based on purely statistical evidence’.

We must wonder, however, whether there is anything wrong with rational belief based on uneven statistics. For Staffel, an uneven statistics provides
only ‘purely statistical evidence’. But an uneven statistics does not assign a uniform probability distribution to a certain partition of possibilities. So, on our account of evidence, an uneven statistics may count as individual evidence. To bring this point home, consider the following very simple and very uneven probability distribution $P'$ over only two serious possibilities:

$$P'(\{w_1\}) = .99, \quad P'(\{w_2\}) = .01$$

In abstracto, it does not seem irrational to believe the $P'$-stable proposition $\{w_1\}$. If we interpret $w_i$ as the world where ticket $i$ wins, you may believe of ticket 1 that it will win and ticket 2 that it will lose. In fact, we already considered a structurally indistinguishable case. The 99%-reliable eye-witness in the prisoner example induced a coarse-grained partition consisting of only two cells to which the same probability values were assigned. It is commonly agreed that this eye-witness evidence is individual.

Similarly, imagine you face two people who attended a soccer game and you believe for sure that one and only one of them gatecrashed. Person 1 sat in section 1, where 99% of the people were gatecrashers; person 2 sat in section 2, where 1% of the people were gatecrashers. Would we still say that it is irrational to believe that person 1 gatecrashed because the belief is ‘based on purely statistical evidence’?

Staffel gives no criterion for distinguishing between purely statistical and individual evidence. She cites no reason why her uneven statistics is ‘purely statistical’ and why our uneven two-ticket lottery is not. In the latter case, it seems rationally permissible to believe the proposition that ticket 1 wins (which is quite compatible with the stability theory). We do, therefore, not share Staffel’s conviction that it is always irrational to have all-or-nothing beliefs based on uneven probabilistic evidence. In fact, we would deny that the ‘two ticket lottery’ $P'$ represents purely statistical evidence. And if the uneven distribution $P'$ is not purely statistical, in which sense can we say that the uneven distribution $P$ in our four-ticket lottery is purely statistical?

On our simple account of evidence, both probability distributions, the ‘four ticket lottery’ $P$ and the ‘two ticket lottery’ $P'$, reflect individual evidence. They clearly discriminate between the probability of different
possibilities. With respect to $P$, the stability theory allows to believe that person 1 gatecrashed. But should you believe it? Or should you rather believe that person 1 or 2 gatecrashed? Or should you only believe that person 1 or 2 or 3 gatecrashed? All of these beliefs are rationally permissible. In terms of the stability theory, the question is what strongest $P$-stable proposition $B_W$ you should pick. And the choice of $B_W$ depends on which threshold is appropriate in certain contexts.

Gatecrashing is a matter of civil law, where the burden of proof is the evidential standard known as *preponderance of evidence*. It is typically interpreted thus: a plaintiff’s claim counts as proven in court just in case the claim is established to be more likely than not. A civil court should thus find a defendant liable if the probability that the defendant is guilty surpasses $1/2$ given the available and admissible evidence. Given the threshold $P(Guilt) > .5$ and that $Guilt$ is $P$-stable, it is rational to believe that the gatecrasher is guilty. Hence, the fact-finder should believe that person 1 is guilty of gatecrashing. The question is, of course, whether the threshold of $1/2$ is really appropriate for the situation.

Murder is a matter of criminal law, where the burden of proof is the evidential standard known as *beyond reasonable doubt*. Let’s say this standard requires the threshold $P(Guilt) > .9$ and that $Guilt$ is $P$-stable. Moreover, let’s suppose we know that there is exactly one murderer and the probability of guilt for the four suspects is given by $P$. Well then it is not rational to believe that person 1 is the murderer. In the context of murder, our evidential standard is too cautious for such an outright belief. Given the threshold, we can only say that it is rational to believe that person 1 or 2 or 3 is guilty of murder. This context-sensitivity between gatecrashing and murder seems far from implausible.\(^{20}\) We have just analysed two standards of legal proof in terms of stably high belief.

Staffel (2016, p. 1731) has another challenge for Leitgeb’s theory. The stability theory of belief is partition-sensitive. In fact, we have used this partition sensitivity to explain why it is not rational to believe a certain proposition based on our notion of statistical evidence, but it is rational to believe

\(^{20}\)There is a well-known argument that delivers the optimal threshold for belief depending on the stakes involved. See, for example, Cheng (2013, pp. 1259-61&1275-8) and Steele (ms., pp. 3-4).
this very proposition based on what we call individual evidence. Staffel 
tries to turn the partition-sensitivity against the stability theory. Recall that 
\{w_1\} is P-stable: it is rationally permissible to believe that person 1 gate-
crashed. But now, suppose that our fact-finder considers that the flip of a 
fair coin landed heads (h) or tails (t). Since the coin flip is irrelevant to the 
gatecrashing, it should not make any difference to what a rational agent 
believes, or so argues Staffel (p. 1732).

The coin flip is – by assumption – irrelevant to the fact-finder’s beliefs and 
thus independent of her credences in the other propositions. Still, merely 
considering the coin flip results in a new, more fine-grained partition:

\[
P(\{w_{1h}\}) = .3, P(\{w_{2h}\}) = .15, P(\{w_{3h}\}) = .045, P(\{w_{4h}\}) = .005
\]

\[
P(\{w_{1t}\}) = .3, P(\{w_{2t}\}) = .15, P(\{w_{3t}\}) = .045, P(\{w_{4t}\}) = .005
\]

\[
P(\{w_{1h}\}) = .3, \text{ for instance, denotes the probability that person 1 gate-
crashed and the coin landed heads.}
\]

The fine-graining results in a loss of rational belief. While \{w_1\} is P-stable, 
\{w_{1h}, w_{1t}\} is not. To see this, consider the conditional probability that per-
son 1 gatecrashed, given that person 1 did not gatecrash or the coin landed 
tails:

\[
P(\{w_{1h}, w_{1t}\} \mid W \setminus \{w_{1h}\}) = \frac{P(\{w_{1t}\})}{P(W \setminus \{w_{1h}\})} = \frac{3}{7} < \frac{1}{2}
\]

Considering the coin flip makes a difference: it is not rationally permis-
sible anymore to believe that person 1 gatecrashed. And so “the stability 
theory must reject the intuition that considering irrelevant propositions 
should not change our rational beliefs”, as Staffel (2016, p.1732) points 
out.

From a purely formal perspective, Staffel’s challenge of fine-graining 
stands. The stability theory of belief is prone to a loss of rationally per-
missible belief when moving to a more fine-grained partition – even if the 

fine-graining is merely a result of considering irrelevant propositions. On 
the other hand, it is intuitively questionable why a judge or jury would 
consider the possibility that person 1 did not gatecrash or the coin landed 
tails. After all, the coin toss is assumed to be irrelevant for the beliefs 
about gatecrashing. This suggests the following fix for the example at
hand: coarse-grain the underlying partition such that we are de facto back
to the ‘four ticket lottery’.

In general, we must wonder whether a purely formal notion of rationality
is enough in our legal cases. We have just seen that the two sets of rational-
ity norms can and should be complemented by a probabilistic threshold
which is appropriate to the more specific legal context. Perhaps, we need
to go beyond the notion of being doubly rational to a more substantive
notion of rationality.

On a more substantive notion of rationality, it becomes questionable why
a rational agent would consider possibilities (and propositions) irrelevant
for the issue at hand. Would we really consider a fact-finder – who in-
cludes an irrelevant fair coin flip in her deliberations about guilt – to be
substantively rational? We do not think so. It seems almost to be a con-
ceptual truth that a rational fact-finder should not consider propositions
that are irrelevant for the current deliberation. In fact, it seems rational
in a substantive sense to abstract away from any irrelevant proposition or
possibility. Typically, it is rational to deliberate on the most coarse-grained
level which does, however, not omit any relevant possibility. It is like-
wise prima facie substantively rational to compartmentalize a more com-
plex deliberation into many sub-deliberations which involve fewer propo-
sitions. Otherwise it is hard to see how we can, based on probabilistic
evidence, hold outright beliefs which, in turn, figure as explicit premises
in the argument following the current one. And without such a modu-
larized sequence of arguments, legal decision making will not be readily
intelligible to all.\footnote{We are not sure how far we go beyond Leitgeb’s (2017) notion of rational belief. He
speaks of “contextually determined partitions” of “salient” and “sufficiently similar” al-
ternatives (pp. 144-5). This can already be read as an answer to Staffel’s challenges. So it
might well be that what we call substantively rational belief is close to what Leitgeb had
in mind all along.}

It is, of course, hard to say when a possibility is relevant and when not.
But recall that Staffel assumes that the flip of the fair coin is irrelevant
for whether or not a person gatecrashed. So a substantively rational fact-
finder would abstract away from the coin flip and this particular instance
of the problem of fine-graining vanishes for the stability theory. More gen-
erally, the stability theory in conjunction with a more substantial rationality norm about considering only relevant possibilities would explain a great deal of arguments in a court of law. After all, disputes about which pieces of evidence and which possibilities are relevant often take center stage in legal proceedings.

In sum, we have defused Staffel’s challenges for the stability theory of belief. On our account of evidence, her ‘purely statistical’ evidence represented by uneven statistics may well be individual evidence, and thus allow for rational belief. Her complaint that merely considering irrelevant propositions may result in a loss of previously rational belief is correct. In response to this perhaps more serious worry, we have complemented the stability theory by a substantive rationality norm about relevance, roughly speaking: abstract away from irrelevant propositions and keep the deliberations simple. This solves the problem of fine-graining due to irrelevant propositions. The underlying idea is simply that a substantively rational fact-finder would not consider irrelevant propositions in the first place. The complemented stability theory explains why legal arguments about which possibilities are relevant or taken to be serious are commonplace. In conjunction with the substantive rationality norm about relevance and a contextually appropriate threshold, the stability theory of belief seems to be in a rather strong position: it can explain why we have our intuitions about statistical and individual evidence; and it gives rise to standards of legal proof in terms of rational belief.

6 Comparison to Moss’s Knowledge of Guilt

We have argued that legal proof is tantamount to rational belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We have spelled out how we understand rational belief. It is belief according to Leitgeb’s stability theory, plus a contextually determined threshold and a more substantive rationality norm on relevance. In brief, a rational agent believes a proposition \( A \) iff \( B_W \subseteq A \) and \( B_W \) is \( P_{11} \)-stable, where \( B_W \) is the agent’s strongest believed proposition and \( P_{11} \) her credence function defined over a parti-
Moss (2021) argues for a similar account. She defends the thesis that legal proof is tantamount to knowledge of guilt. “Conviction [in a criminal trial]”, she says, “requires proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, and this conclusion is proved if and only if the judge or jury knows it.” (p. 2) On her view, a defendant is to be found guilty just in case the fact-finder knows that the defendant is guilty.\footnote{Moss (2021, p. 23) modifies her account for civil lawsuits, where the evidential standard is preponderance of the evidence. This burden of proof does not require for conviction that the fact-finder knows that the defendant is liable. She rather claims that a civil penalty requires that the fact-finder knows that the defendant is probably liable (Moss, 2013, 2018). However, her account delivers only the desired results because of a substantive rule of consideration: “in many situations where you are forming beliefs about a person, you morally should keep in mind the possibility that they might be an exception to statistical generalizations.” (p. 221) So you do not even know that one of the prisoners is probably liable because you cannot rule out the possibility that this prisoner standing trial is ‘an’ exception to the statistical generalisation that 99 out of 100 prisoners killed the guard – you cannot rule out the possibility that he is 100% innocent. Our account has no need for such a rule. For further discussion of the rule of consideration, see Smartt (2020).}

According to Moss, it “is widely agreed that the merely statistical evidence in Prisoners cannot sustain a verdict of guilt.” (p. 1) But why should the randomly picked prisoner not be found guilty? We would say because it is not rational for the fact-finder to believe that he is guilty. And the belief is not rational because of the symmetry induced by the uniform probability distribution. On Moss’s account, by contrast, the fact-finder does not know that the randomly picked prisoner is guilty, and therefore he should not be found guilty. And the finder does not know because she cannot rule out the possibility that the defendant is the innocent prisoner.

What is knowledge according to Moss (2021)? Well, she neither defines knowledge nor explains how we come to know a proposition based on our evidence.\footnote{This is unsurprising because she adheres to the knowledge-first epistemology defended by Williamson (2000). The starting point of knowledge-firsters is that knowledge is unanalysable, more fundamental than belief, and more important than belief.} However, she draws on Lewis’s (1996) account of elusive knowledge. An agent knows a proposition \( A \) iff her truthful evidence eliminates any possibility in which \( \neg A \). \( \text{Any} \) possibility? Even the most far-fetched \( \neg A \)-possibilities which arise only from considering conspiracy
theories? There are virtually always uneliminated possibilities of error lurking. If those error possibilities were relevant, we would hardly ever know anything. But Lewis and Moss want to say that we know a lot. After all, Moss wants to say that every legal conviction in a criminal trial is based on knowing the accused’s guilt. Hence, we need to ignore a fair deal of the many uneliminated error possibilities. Lewis says that these ignored error possibilities “are outside of the domain” of any, “they are irrelevant to the truth of” A (p. 553). In an attempt to whisper that which must remain unmentioned, Lewis explicitly restricts the domain of any in his definition. An agent knows A iff her truthful evidence eliminates any possibility in which ¬A – Psst! – except for those possibilities we are ignoring.

Which uneliminated ¬A-possibilities may not be ignored? Which ones are the relevant alternatives? Lewis (1996, pp. 554-67) attempts to give a general account of relevant possibilities. Among other criteria, there is the Rule of Belief. A possibility is relevant if a rational agent assigns it a sufficiently high credence – and not just because the possibility is unspecific.

How high is ‘sufficiently high’? It depends on how much is at stake. As Lewis (1996, p. 556) puts it: “When error would be especially disastrous, few possibilities may be properly ignored. Then even quite a low degree of belief may be ‘sufficiently high’.” The stakes, and more generally the epistemic context, determine in part which alternatives are considered relevant. If you attend to an uneliminated ¬A-possibility, however far-fetched, you cannot know that A. I know, for example, that I have two hands. But consider the possibility that I am a brain-in-a-vat: my experience is just as it is, but I do not have hands. My knowledge dissolves in face of such a sceptical possibility. For knowledge is infallible: I know a proposition only if I am not aware of any error possibility. In general, consider previously ignored uneliminated possibilities of error and your (Lewisian) knowledge vanishes. It is elusive.

We have just seen that bringing far-fetched brain-in-a-vat possibilities into a deliberation risks a loss of Lewisian knowledge. Unlike Lewis, Moss uses a notion of knowledge which is protected against such unreasonable doubts. For her, knowledge is tantamount to a proof beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, proving a defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is what it means to know it. Her knowledge is thus only elusive in the
face of reasonable error possibilities, not in the face of unreasonable ones. The unreasonable ones may be properly ignored – even if we are aware of them.

The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is usually understood as a means to protect the accused against hasty conviction. Any reasonable doubt needs to be dispelled. Less salient but equally important is that the standard also deters the fact-finder from considering unreasonable possibilities. There will virtually always be far-fetched possibilities that a fact-finder should set aside, for instance brain-in-a-vat possibilities. The standard is meant to exclude such unreasonable doubts. Its function is to constrain the deliberation context of a fact-finder to those possibilities which are reasonable to consider.

In a court of law, advocates pursue sometimes the strategy to cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt by calling the fact-finder’s attention to far-fetched possibilities of error. The fact-finder has then a decision to make: is the error possibility reasonable? If not, the error possibility is disregarded; otherwise, it is considered to be relevant and thus casts reasonable doubt on the defendant’s guilt. Since there will virtually always be unreasonable error possibilities, the fact-finder will hardly ever know that the defendant is guilty. And yet, depending on the fact-finder’s decision, the beyond reasonable doubt standard either guards her deliberation against unreasonable error possibilities, or else protects the defendant from being too hastily convicted. But no matter how she decides, her Lewisian knowledge of guilt vanishes in light of the presented error possibilities. So, as long as an advocate pursues the strategy of pointing out such possibilities, Lewis must agree that a fact-finder cannot know whether or not a defendant is guilty. Like all Lewisian knowledge, knowledge of guilt is elusive and thus inappropriate as a criterion for conviction. By contrast, Moss’s knowledge is only elusive with respect to reasonable possibilities. As a consequence, her notion of knowledge is fallible: there may be uneliminated error possibilities, which have been classified as unreasonable but happen to be true, and she still speaks of knowledge.24

24This argument applies mutatis mutandis to Moss’s modified account for civil lawsuits, where legal proof requires knowledge of probable guilt.
Our Leitgebian rational belief is elusive just like Moss’s knowledge. As we have already seen in Section 3 and 5, if the underlying partition of relevant – or reasonable – possibilities is fine-grained, rational belief may vanish. But keep in mind that our substantively rational agent only considers a very fine-grained partition of possibilities when she considers a great number of distinctions to be relevant and she cannot abstract away from them. The greater the number of distinctions is, the more fine-grained the partition, and the higher the credence necessary for stably high belief. To be precise, suppose the strongest believed proposition $B_W$ is a union of many very fine-grained ‘partition cells’, or better possibilities, $w$. For any $w \in B_W$, the proposition $\{w\} \cup \neg B_W$ is then epistemically possible. Hence, a belief in some proposition $A \supseteq B_W$ would require to have a stably high probability in $A$ conditional on any $\{w\} \cup \neg B_W$. In such a context, where destabilising error possibilities are lurking everywhere, stably high belief requires (near) maximal credence.

In general, the higher the threshold of belief is, the more sceptical or cautious the rational agent will be about having outright beliefs. But it is also the case that the number of serious possibilities between which the agent may discriminate grows with an increasing threshold. If the considered possibilities form a sufficiently fine-grained partition, it is rationally permissible to believe only propositions of which one is virtually certain. As we have already seen, rational belief – just like knowledge – may vanish by considering more possibilities to be relevant.

We furthermore agree with Moss that high credence of guilt is not sufficient for conviction. From there, however, she jumps to the conclusion that the “criminal standard of proof cannot be defined in terms of any threshold notion of confidence.”25 (p. 11) Pace Moss, we have proposed such a schema for standards of proof in Section 5: a proposition $A$ meets a standard of proof iff $A$ is $P$-stable and $P(A) > s$, where $s$ is a threshold appropriate for the standard at hand. At the end of Section 3, we have already given a preliminary notion of believing beyond reasonable doubt: a rational agent believes now a proposition $A$ beyond reasonable doubt when she is confident in it now and she anticipates no relevant possibility that would lower her confidence below a certain threshold. The final

25 And Moss is not alone. Recall, for example, what Buchak (2014, p. 291) says in fn. 6.
notion just requires the substantive norm on relevance and to fix an appropriate threshold. To believe beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty is thus identified with having a rational belief in his guilt in a criminal trial. By adjusting the threshold, we obtain another evidential standard: to believe by preponderance of evidence that the defendant is liable is tantamount to rational belief in his liability in a tort case.

There is a problem for Moss’s account to which ours is not susceptible. Mossian knowledge is supposed to be factive – even though it is fallible. Only true beliefs may count as knowledge. If a defendant is in fact innocent, you can never know that she is guilty. Hence, an innocent defendant can never be convicted on Moss’s account. No wrongful convictions are conceptually possible. The impossibility of wrongful convictions is an absurd consequence. To see this, consider a legal case where the defendant is innocent and yet there is compelling but misleading evidence that the defendant is guilty. As unfortunate as it is, it is rational to wrongfully convict the defendant (Blome-Tillmann, 2015). And indeed, rational but wrongful convictions based on misleading evidence exist. So it is a major conceptual problem for Moss that she cannot account for wrongful convictions.

The criterion of rational belief allows, of course, for wrongful convictions. If the evidence clearly points to the guilt of a defendant, it is rational for a fact-finder to (falsely) believe that the defendant is guilty, and so to find the defendant guilty. And this is independent of whether the evidence is misleading or not, or whether the defendant is in fact guilty or innocent. In a way, the whole problem a fact-finder faces is that she cannot know whether or not the defendant under consideration is guilty. This is why Lewis (1996, p. 560) correctly points out that

what matters most to us jurors is not whether we can truly be said to know; what really matters is what we should believe to what degree, and whether or not we should vote to convict.

We have proposed an account which explains ‘what we should believe’

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26 Moss (2021, p. 28) points out that knowledge of probable guilt is also ‘factive’: “The civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is also factive, in the sense that a defendant cannot be proved probably liable unless the defendant is probably liable.”
based on ‘what we should believe to what degree’, and ‘whether or not we should vote to convict.’ As compared to knowledge, our account requires merely rational belief of guilt. Even if no unreasonable possibilities come up in a legal trial, knowledge of guilt requires ruling out all relevant possibilities in which the defendant is innocent. By contrast, our rational belief of guilt only requires a partition of relevant possibilities such that the defendant’s guilt is $P$-stable and above a contextually determined threshold.

In sum, our account shares many ideas and merits of Moss’s. However, ours is not susceptible to the conceptual problem of wrongful conviction. And while Moss is silent on how evidence that may come in probabilistic form relates to knowledge, we have – with the help of Leitgeb – worked out how probabilistic evidence relates to rational belief. Finally, a fact-finder may on our account rationally believe that a defendant is liable in a tort case, and yet not know it. So when Moss (2021, p. 21) says that “legal proof seems to require something that looks an awful lot like knowledge”, we are inclined to answer: “yes, it requires stably high belief”.27

7 Conclusion

We have defended the thesis that a defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. The fact-finder’s belief is understood to be doubly rational: she should have rational credences, because evidence comes in probabilistic form, and she should have rational all-or-nothing beliefs, because her binary verdict should be based on consistent beliefs. Such a notion of doubly rational belief has been put forth by Leitgeb (2014): rational belief is stably high credence. Where the probability distribution $P$ represents the fact-finders credences, she rationally believes a proposition $A$ iff $A$ is entailed by the strongest and $P_{11}$-stable proposition $B_W$.

On this picture, a high credence in the defendant’s guilt is necessary for rational belief of guilt, but not sufficient. A high probability of guilt may

27See also Moss (2018, pp. 206-8).
not be stable. One reason for instability is that the probability distribution is uniform over the relevant possibilities, which is the case in paradigmatic cases of statistical evidence. Furthermore, belief may be unstable – despite high credence – when the agent considers many distinctions to be relevant. A fine-graining of the underlying partition \( \Pi \) of possibilities may thus induce a loss of formerly rational belief. Rational belief is elusive.

Staffel (2016) takes the elusiveness of rational belief to challenge Leitgeb’s stability theory. We thus amended the notion of rational belief by a substantive norm of relevance: roughly, abstract away from irrelevant possibilities and keep the deliberations simple. Together with contextually determined probabilistic thresholds, the notion of substantively rational belief gives rise to an analysis of different standards of proof. Belief beyond reasonable doubt, for example, amounts to rational belief in a criminal trial. Belief by preponderance of evidence is rational belief in a civil trial. And so on.

Our account of legal proof justifies the following intuition: even if the probability of guilt is very high, a defendant should not be found guilty based on statistical evidence alone, while a defendant should be found guilty based on individual evidence alone. Blome-Tillmann (2017) thinks this intuition corresponds to extant legal practice. If so, our account can be read as a justification of the current standards of legal proof. Ross (2021), by contrast, argues that current legal practice sometimes allows for conviction based on purely statistical evidence. If he is right and shares our understanding of statistical evidence, our account can be read as a proposal to revise those standards.

In sum, we have examined the idea that legal proof is tantamount to rational belief in guilt. Along the way, we proposed a simple distinction between statistical and individual evidence and analysed evidential standards in terms of rational belief. While our account shares the merits of Moss’s (2021) account of legal proof, it avoids the pitfalls of hers. Rational belief of guilt is a weaker requirement than Moss’s knowledge of guilt, and it allows for the conceptual possibility of wrongful convictions. And we made explicit how the criterion of rational belief of guilt may be applied in practice. We therefore hope that we are rationally permitted to believe that rational belief is a better criterion for legal proof than knowledge. But
we will never know it.

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References


