Heidegger on Kant, Time, and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality

Abstract

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, and his 1929 monograph *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the *Critique*? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument (section 2), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics (section 3). I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought (section 4). Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.

Keywords: Kant; Heidegger; Transcendental; Horizon; Intentionality; Form.

References are to the Gesamtausgabe edition (Frankfurt: Klostermann) with the exception of SZ, where I follow the pagination of the standard German edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957). Ga3, Ga25 and Ga41 are largely, or exclusively, devoted to Kant. Important treatments of Kant also appear in Ga21, G31, and in SZ itself. For Kant’s texts, these abbreviations are used:

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>KrV</td>
<td><em>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</em> (Ak., vol. 4)</td>
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<td>Ga3</td>
<td><em>Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik</em> (6th Ed., 1998)</td>
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<td>Ga9</td>
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<td>Ga21</td>
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<td>Ga31</td>
<td><em>Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit</em> (2nd Ed., 1994)</td>
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<td>Ga41</td>
<td><em>Die Frage nach dem Ding</em></td>
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1 I use the following abbreviations for Heidegger’s texts:
Critical system on Heidegger’s own early thought is pervasive; to take a single example, he credits Kant as ‘the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality’ (SZ 23). This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the first Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument (section 2), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics (section 3). As the two questions indicate, I intend primarily to establish conclusions regarding Heidegger’s reading of Kant, or ‘HK’ for short. In section 4, however, I sketch the broader consequences of my results given the premise that certain assumptions made in HK are also present in Heidegger’s own work. Whilst I regard that premise as plausible, I do not defend it here. Ultimately, I argue that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.

1. MOTIVATING THE TWO QUESTIONS

I want to begin by motivating the two questions raised. To do this, I show that, whilst the concepts of the transcendental and the horizonal are central to HK, there are serious difficulties in understanding them.

The concept of the transcendental underpins Heidegger’s appropriation of the Critical system: this is evident from his equation of it with the ontological. Ga25, for example, states that:

The phrases ‘transcendental aesthetic’ and ‘transcendental logic’ mean the same as ‘ontological aesthetic’ and ‘ontological logic’ (Ga25 76).

The same move is present throughout Heidegger’s early work; indeed, he claims that ‘transcendental philosophy denotes nothing but ontology’ (Ga24 180). There is, however, an obvious tension between standard Kantian conceptions of the transcendental and Heidegger’s approach to Kant. Consider, for example, the idea of a transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments, at least in their most familiar form, are a priori claims, intended to establish that if some mode of experience is to be possible then certain facts about the world

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References are to Kants gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902- ). In referring to KrV, however, I employ the A/B pagination. Whilst guided by the standard translations, I have often modified them.
must obtain or, more weakly, must be assumed to obtain. Such transcendental arguments typically possess three features. First, they are anti-sceptical in intent: they aim either to validate conclusions about the world threatened by some brand of scepticism or, more weakly, to show that even the sceptic must assume the very beliefs she purports to question. The view that Kant is engaged in this type of anti-sceptical project meshes neatly with the textbook reading on which the Second Analogy aims to prove, contra Hume, that every event has a cause (KrV B232-4), whilst the Refutation aims to prove, contra Descartes, that I have experience of objects ‘outside me’ (KrV Bxl). Second, to be effective, such transcendental arguments must take as their premise a comparatively thin mode of experience, one which the putative sceptic accepts or can be brought to accept. Again, this chimes with Kant’s own procedure: the Second Analogy, read as a response to Hume, begins from the capacity to perceive events (KrV A192/B237), and the Refutation, read as a response to Descartes, from a bare awareness of my own mental states passing in time (KrV B275). Third, such transcendental arguments usually aim to establish some connection between necessity and warrant. For example, Kant seeks to demonstrate not only that the possibility of experience necessitates that I hold certain beliefs about the world, but also that those beliefs are thereby justified – as opposed to simply unavoidable. This justificatory issue, the famous quid juris, is of particular importance in the Critical context (KrV A84/B116); this is because Kant understands Hume as holding that, whilst we necessarily employ concepts such as causality, we have no right to do so (Prol 258-9).

What is striking is that none of these features are present in HK’s use of the term ‘transcendental’. First, HK shows no interest in constructing this type of transcendental argument as a reply to Descartes or to Hume; Heidegger’s commentary does not even mention the latter. This parallels SZ, which argues explicitly that transcendental proofs, such as Kant’s Refutation, are precisely the wrong way to respond to the sceptical threat (SZ 205). Second, whereas Kant’s Analogies, say, begin from a comparatively thin premise, namely the capacity to represent basic temporal relations, and move from that premise to the conclusion that the objects of experience are causally ordered substances, HK appears to take this conclusion as its starting point. Thus, at least prima facie, Heidegger presents Kant as beginning from the assumptions both that the objects of experience are ‘present-at-hand’ and that they are so independent of any facts about the human mind (Ga25 63,19). Third, HK denies bluntly that the question of justification has any role to play in understanding the transcendental; indeed, Heidegger dismisses the quid juris as ‘the most disastrous segment of Kant’s teaching’ (Ga25 309). In short, HK’s use of ‘transcendental’ cannot be understood in terms of the familiar Kantian model of a transcendental argument. The question thus naturally arises: what alternate role does this central concept play within HK?

The other aspect of HK to be investigated is the concept of a horizon. This concept is central to the phenomenological tradition: Husserl held that recognition of ‘the horizon structure belonging to every mode of intentionality will prescribe methods of a totally new kind’ from those employed by earlier philosophers. Within HK, the importance of this concept is again clear. First, Heidegger frequently analyses the main Kantian structures in...
terms of it; for example, he equates Kant’s ‘object in general’ with the ‘horizon of objectivity in general’ [Horizont der Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt] (Ga3 119). Second, HK inter-defines the concept of a horizon with the principal components of Heidegger’s own thought: it is ontological knowledge which makes the horizon accessible (Ga3 123). This mirrors SZ, which begins by asking after ‘the possible horizon for any understanding of being’ (SZ 1). Third, Heidegger stresses the relation between the horizon and those aspects of Kant’s theory, namely its emphasis on time and on the transcendental, and of Kant’s text, namely the Schematism, which he believes connects Kant’s philosophy to his own.5 Ga24, for example, identifies time as ‘the primary horizon of the transcendental science of ontology’ (Ga24 460). But while the importance which HK ascribes to ‘the horizon’ is obvious, its function is far from clear. How does talk of the ‘horizon of the objectivity’ generate a position any different from an orthodox Kantian one? If it does not, why does Heidegger attach such weight to it? If it does, how do the resultant differences connect, for example, to HK’s distinctive claim that all Kantian faculties can be reduced to the imagination (Ga3 138)? I have shown that the two questions with which I opened this article need answers. I will now attempt to provide some.

2. THE ROLE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITHIN HEIDEGGER’S KANT

To understand the role of the transcendental within HK, one needs to distinguish the basic framework of a transcendental argument from the more specific, often anti-sceptical, uses to which that framework can be put. By the ‘basic framework’, I understand an argument which seeks to establish, a priori, certain necessary conditions on the possibility of a given mode of experience (KrV A11-2/B25, Ga25 106). Now, there is no necessity for arguments with this basic framework to exhibit any of those features, noted in section 1, which seem at odds with HK’s approach. Consider what, following Cassam, I label ‘self-directed transcendental arguments’.6 The label is intended to indicate a contrast with the more familiar transcendental arguments discussed in section 1: those more familiar arguments are ‘world-directed’ in the sense that they move from facts about experience to facts about the world or, at least, to facts about the way we must assume the world to be. In contrast, self-directed transcendental arguments seek to establish conclusions about the cognitive capacities of particular agents. Suppose, for example, that I experience objects as standing in causal relations. One question which then arises is this: what intentional capacities must I possess in order to represent objects in this way? Someone might argue, on a priori grounds, that I must possess the ability to represent counter-factual situations; if this argument holds, then, given the original premise, it follows that I do indeed possess such an ability. This pattern of inference exhibits what I called the ‘basic framework’ of a transcendental argument: it offers an a priori analysis of the conditions of possibility for experience. However, it is obviously not anti-sceptical in its intent: it entails nothing about the world itself. Furthermore, it is compatible with a robust realism: the argument is unaffected if one assumes that the causal relations which I represent obtain independently of my doing so. Finally, there is no attempt to address Kant’s quid juris; my use of the concept of causality is a given premise rather than a conclusion to be legitimated. Such self-directed arguments are, prima facie, very different from those in texts such as the Transcendental Deduction. But they are not entirely un-Kantian. As Hatfield

5 Ga21 294, for example, describes the Schematism as the ‘real centre’ of KrV.
6 Cassam (1999 85).
observes, for example, the Transcendental Aesthetic employs this pattern when arguing from the synthetic a priori knowledge of geometry to the conclusion that space and time are pure forms of intuition; the premise is one few sceptics accept and the result concerns our cognitive capacities. The same pattern of argument is explicitly employed in the Prolegomena (Prol 275). I will now argue that Heidegger understands KrV as an extended, self-directed transcendental argument. I employ the term ‘self’ here in a broad sense. It is possible that, in unpacking the conditions on experience, such arguments will show that the relevant agent has little in common with the self as traditionally understood. Indeed, this, unsurprisingly, will be Heidegger’s conclusion.

The basic transcendental claim which Heidegger attributes to Kant concerns the conditions for what Heidegger calls ‘ontic cognition’.

The Copernican revolution states simply that ontic cognition of entities \( \text{ontische Erkenntnis von Seiendem} \) must be guided in advance by ontological cognition (Ga25 56).

Thus, for Heidegger, Kant’s theory of transcendental conditions amounts to the view that:

What makes comportment towards entities, ontic cognition, possible is the preliminary understanding of the constitution of being, ontological cognition \( \text{das vorgängige Verstehen der Seinsverfassung, die ontologische Erkenntnis} \) (Ga3 11).

More bluntly:

What Kant wants to say is this: ‘Not all cognition is ontic and where there is such cognition it is made possible only through ontological cognition’ (Ga3 13).

Let me unpack these remarks. HK uses ‘ontic’ to qualify the status of intentional content: a given piece of content is ‘ontic’ just if it is derived from ‘sensation’. ‘Sensation’ refers to the effect which an object has on an agent: a ‘finite’ or ‘receptive’ agent, such as Dasein, is one whose experience depends on such sensation (Ga25 85-6). ‘Ontological’, likewise, is used by HK to denote a certain type of content; for the moment, this can be defined simply as content which is non-ontic. The result, as Heidegger emphasises, is that the distinction between ontic and ontological content is co-extensive with Kant’s distinction between empirical content, which contains material derived from sensation, and pure content, which does not (KrV A50/B74). In HK’s terms, the form of temporal intuition, for example, thus constitutes ‘pure ontological cognition’ (Ga3 51).

The next question is what is the basis for this supposed dependency of ontic content on ontological content? HK’s answer again mirrors Kant’s own. Given HK’s alignment of the

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7 Hatfield (1990 79-80).
9 Compare KrV A19-20/B34.
10 I suppress certain complications here – these are discussed later in this section.
ontological with the pure, and Kant’s own equation of the pure with the ‘form’ of experience, HK moves naturally to the conclusion that ontological cognition explains the ‘form’ of intentionality; ‘form’ here refers to that capacity which allows the manifold to be represented as standing in certain relations (KrV A20/B34). To put the point in Heidegger’s terminology, such forms are the ‘wherein’ or ‘in terms of which’ of any ‘possible ordering or disordering’ (Ga25 122). Thus, the ‘pure form of space’, for example, is that which is not derived from sensation but which allows the manifold to be represented as standing in spatial relations (Ga25 127-8). Spatio-temporal relations, however, are not the only ones recognised by HK; this is because HK holds that ontic cognition is conceptual. More specifically, whilst HK allows the possibility of a non-conceptual experience, it is axiomatic for Heidegger that KrV is exclusively concerned with adult human intentionality (Ga3 171, Ga25 75). With respect to such agents, HK is insistent that ‘we never just intuit’ (Ga3 28n); instead, adult, human experience always contains ‘thought-determinations’ [Denkbestimmungen] (Ga25 101). The definition of conceptuality which HK is using has two components. First, conceptual experience represents entities as falling under generic representations.

[S]o, for example, this intuited particular – this piece of chalk – must allow itself to be determined as chalk or rather as a body … In such a determining, what is represented in accordance with intuition is further represented with a view to what it is ‘in general’ … Kant names this representing in general ‘representing in concepts’ (Ga3 27).

Second, conceptual experience includes the representation of normative connections obtaining between these various generic properties: to recognise an object as falling under the concept <body>, for example, is to recognise that I am obliged to apply various other concepts, such as <impenetrability>, to it (KrV A106). Conceptual experience thus implies ‘a normative unification’ (Ga3 83). Exactly as in Kant, HK identifies this ability to represent norms with an ability to generate self-imposed restrictions on the way in which I combine intentional contents (Ga25 370). In summary, ontological cognition constitutes a transcendental condition on ontic cognition for HK because the former makes possible a capacity operative in the latter: namely, the capacity to represent the manifold as standing in certain relations. Given HK’s further claim that human experience is conceptual, ontological cognition must explain the capacity not simply to represent one thing as next to another, but also the ability to represent norms: in Heidegger’s terms, the ability to ‘regulate by providing a standard’ (Ga3 118).

HK thus identifies an overarching transcendental condition on what Heidegger calls ontic cognition; such cognition assumes the ability to represent relations, both the spatio-temporal and, in the human case, the normative. HK’s transcendental claim is that there exists some prior capacity, dubbed ‘ontological cognition’, which explains this ability. For Heidegger, however, the investigation of ontological cognition is not an end in itself. Rather,

11 HK motivates this by arguing that intentionality must be conceptual if communication of any sophistication is to be possible (Ga3 28). Let me stress, I am not claiming that HK holds that all experience, or even all intentionality, must be conceptual. On the contrary, HK allows the possible separation of the ability to represent spatio-temporal particulars from the more advanced capacities of the understanding (Ga25 138). But HK’s point is that adult, human intentionality necessarily employs both. Indeed, as shown in section 3, HK holds that, within such agents, these two abilities are aspects of one single capacity: transcendental imagination (Ga3 138).
the ultimate goal of his commentary is to prepare for a broader inquiry into the nature of the agent who possesses this capacity. It is in this sense, HK claims, that the Critical project culminates in the question ‘what is man’ (Ga3 207), or, in Heideggerian terms, in fundamental ontology (Ga3 232-3). Indeed, it is precisely because his reading of KrV implies that Kant’s ultimate purpose was to establish conclusions about the self in the broad sense of that term that Heidegger in propria persona is so puzzled by Kant’s refusal to offer a detailed account of Dasein (Ga24 206-7).

Taking stock, the account I have given of HK contains three key components. First, there is the initial premise: the premise that we possess conceptual experience in which entities are represented as causally ordered, spatio-temporal substances. Second, there is the transcendental claim that such representation depends on a particular capacity, namely ontological cognition. Third, there is the methodological claim that in analysing ontological cognition one should aim to achieve a deeper understanding of the agent who possesses this capacity. The basic structure of HK thus mirrors exactly that of a self-directed transcendental argument. Unlike in world-directed transcendental arguments, no attempt is made to prove that entities are independently existing causal substances. Rather, the direction of inference is not from representation to world but from representation to representational capacities, and thus to the structure of the agent. So, for example, Heidegger states that the Transcendental Deduction constitutes an ‘analytical opening up of the basic structure of synthesis’ (Ga3 69). ‘Analytical’ here does not mean pertaining to the definition of concepts or linguistic expressions; rather, Heidegger uses it as Kant does in the Prolegomena where an analytical argument is one that:

[R]ests upon something already known as trustworthy from which we can set out with confidence and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources (Prol 275).

The Transcendental Deduction is thus ‘analytic’ for HK, because, as in the Prolegomena, Kant supposedly assumes a given class of experience in order to investigate its subjective conditions; as Heidegger himself immediately emphasises, there is no necessary connection at all between such an investigation and the more familiar justificatory reading on which Kant’s aim is to legitimise some class of experience by showing that it either is, or must be believed to be, veridical (Ga3 69).

If HK’s structure is so clear, why has it not been recognised previously? The answer lies in part with Heidegger’s appropriation of the most famous piece of Kantian terminology. As Heidegger emphasises, one core aim of his commentary is to explain the possibility of ‘synthetic a priori judgments’ (Ga3 13-4). Yet for Kant, such judgments are designed precisely to justify the type of claim, for example that entities are substances, which I have argued that HK takes for granted. HK’s emphasis on the synthetic a priori thus creates the misleading impression that Heidegger’s commentary is concerned, after all, with defending the type of familiar world-directed transcendental argument. In addition to the considerations outlined above, one can see why this impression must be misleading by noting that neither Ga3 nor Ga25 contains any real discussion of the Analogies, the texts in which Kant seeks to demonstrate such claims. The only plausible conclusion is that HK uses ‘synthetic a priori’ in some unusual sense. This is precisely the case: Heidegger equates the synthetic a priori with
the ontological (Ga3 13-4). But this implies that the synthetic a priori, as HK uses the phrase, is not a set of claims about causally ordered substances; that would render it merely ontic in the terms defined above. Instead, it is a set of claims concerning the:

[C]ognition which is already in each case necessarily presupposed by all cognition of beings as the ground which enables the experience of beings … Every cognition of beings or ontic cognition already contains a certain cognition of the ontological constitution, a pre-ontological understanding of being. The problem [of the synthetic a priori] for Kant is the possibility of this knowledge of ontological constitution (Ga25 81).

To investigate the ‘synthetic a priori’, as HK understands that phrase, is not therefore to prove that the objects of experience are substances or that they are governed by causal laws. Rather, HK’s tactic is to assume that this is the case in order to then address what is for Heidegger the prior question: how are we able to represent the fact that entities stand in such relations; how are we able, as Heidegger puts it, to experience an entity as an entity? This fits perfectly with the self-directed model.

I close this section by tying up a loose end: the issue of idealism. HK starts from the premise that we possess a conceptual intentionality in which objects are represented as spatio-temporal, causally ordered substances. I have focussed on the question of the conditions of possibility for this premise; i.e., assuming that we do represent objects this way, what capacities enable us to do so? But there are two other questions that one might also raise. First, why do we represent objects as spatio-temporal or causally ordered as opposed to in some other way? Second, is this experience veridical? These questions are, for HK, closely related. Consider what, again following Cassam, one might label the ‘subjective origin thesis’. This thesis states that the fact that an agent represents objects in some particular way is sufficiently explained without appeal to facts about the objects themselves, but by and solely by appeal to facts about that agent’s mind. This is the view normally attributed to Kant with respect to space and time; as Allison puts it, Kant’s view is that we represent entities as spatio-temporal solely because of the ‘structure and operations of the human mind’ rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself. Now, consider Heidegger’s reading: why, for HK, do we represent entities as spatial or causal or substantial? I believe that it would be extremely uncharitable to read HK as accepting the subjective origin thesis. The reason is as follows. The subjective origins thesis is only plausible if one combines it with another

12 Whilst I say that claims about causally ordered substances would be merely ontic, without qualification this is not quite correct. For example, to debate whether entities should be understood, say, in mechanistic or Aristotelian terms is an exercise in regional ontology; this is what Heidegger is engaged in during his discussion of Kant in Ga41. But the point is that HK’s avowed aim is to ‘unfold the idea of a fundamental ontology through the interpretation’ of KrV (Ga3 5). Fundamental ontology, however, aims to establish conclusions only about one unique entity: Dasein (SZ 11-2). Thus, if HK’s aim, in discussing the synthetic a priori, were to establish conclusions about the present-at-hand, it would not, contra Heidegger’s claim, constitute a piece of fundamental ontology; so HK must use ‘synthetic a priori’ in some non-standard sense.

13 Another way to see the point is to recall that HK identifies the ontological with the pure. But ‘synthetic a priori’ claims in Kant’s sense may be impure (KrV B3).

14 Cassam (1999 89).

Kantian claim: that there are either two ontological domains or worlds or, more minimally, that there are two fundamentally distinct aspects or perspectives which one can take on a single ontological domain. To see the connection, suppose that one does not draw either distinction and is thus willing to talk straightforwardly about a single set of objects. The subjective origin thesis would then entail that we represent those objects in a certain way because and solely because of facts about our minds. In other words, we represent those entities in this way irrespective of their actual properties. But this entails either that our most fundamental views about the world are simply false (if the entities do not exhibit those properties) or, at best, that they are true purely by chance, as in rationalist models of pre-established harmony (if the entities happen to possess the very properties we would attribute to them in any case). Within a Kantian context, the standard basis for resolving this difficulty is to distinguish, in one or other of the ways noted, between objects as they are for me and objects as they are in themselves. But the two-world variant of this strategy can be immediately discarded as a potential reading of HK. This is because it cashes the idea of two sets of objects by drawing a distinction between mind-independent things in themselves and appearances defined as mental states or constructions from such states.\(^{16}\) HK, however, repeatedly rejects any identification of appearances with mental states or constructions from such states (Ga3 31-4, Ga25 98-9). We can therefore confine our attention to the second variant of the tactic, i.e. to two aspects/perspectives accounts of the type defended by Allison. The problem is that whilst HK does recognise a single domain of objects which can be regarded as either appearances or things in themselves (Ga25 98-9), Heidegger treats the distinction between these two aspects/perspectives as optional; he holds, specifically, that no genuine philosophical problems arise if one discards this distinction (Ga25 99-100). The reason for this is as follows. HK recognises a single ontological domain and uses the term ‘appearances’ to refer to the objects within that domain (Ga25 98, Ga3 31, 34-5).\(^{17}\) HK defines ‘things in themselves’ as referring to those same entities when experienced by a divine intuition, i.e. an agent able to create an object merely by thinking of it (Ga25 99-100). Reasonably enough, HK then simply denies that this ‘deus faber’ has any ‘philosophical legitimacy or usefulness’ (Ga25 99). The result is that Heidegger is happy to dispense with it and, by extension, with the idea of there being two aspects/perspectives on the one set of objects (Ga25 99). If, however, one accepts the ‘subjective origin thesis’, then the two aspects/perspectives distinction cannot be so easily abandoned; this is because it is motivated not by any theological commitments but by the need to avoid an invidious choice between an error theory and pre-established harmony. In short, once one sets aside the two-world model, the subjective origin thesis leads to absurdity unless one holds that there is a necessary two aspects/perspectives distinction to be drawn. But whilst HK draws such a distinction, Heidegger considers it optional, not necessary. Thus, on grounds of charity, one should not attribute the subjective origin thesis to HK. This leads back to the questions raised at the start of this paragraph: why, according to HK, do we represent entities as causally ordered, spatio-temporal substances, and is that experience veridical? With the subjective origin thesis discarded, one can give a simultaneous answer to both. For Heidegger, Kant held that we represent entities in this way simply because Kant also held that entities possess those properties. In other words, for HK it is not a necessary fact that we represent objects as substances or as governed by causal laws; rather, we do so only given the assumption that

\(^{16}\) Van Cleve (1999 Ch10) contains an influential, recent defence of this reading of KrV.

\(^{17}\) I touch on why Heidegger thinks Kant chose this term in section 3.
this is the way they truly are, coupled with the natural desire to get things right.\textsuperscript{18} Two potential confusions should be avoided here. First, to say that we do not necessarily represent entities in this way is compatible with the fact, noted above, that in employing concepts, HK assumes that we do represent necessary connections between, say, the concepts <impenetrability> and <body> or between a cause and its effect. From the perspective of the agent, with which HK as a self-directed argument is primarily concerned, it is a contingent fact that we represent objects as standing in such relations; we do so only because we believe the relations to genuinely obtain. Second, there is a complication arising from the different notions of time in Heidegger’s system. HK, like Heidegger himself, holds that all human intentionality is necessarily ‘temporal’ where this means ‘characterized by means of time’ (Ga21 199, SZ 18). I do not want to give a positive account of this claim here – I return to it in sections 3 and 4. What matters is simply that as Heidegger emphasises, it does not imply that we necessarily represent entities as ‘within time’ [\textit{innerzeigt}] (Ga21 199, SZ 18). This is important, since were it the case that we necessarily represent objects ‘within time’, it would follow that we would represent them as such even if they were not, and thus leave Heidegger facing the same trilemma (error theory, pre-established harmony, or two aspect theory) that arose from the subjective origin thesis. In conclusion, HK should be treated as a robustly realist account: one on which we represent entities in a particular way only given the assumption that they genuinely possess those properties, and one on which we possess the flexibility to change that mode of representation if some source should prompt a change in our beliefs about the world.

3. THE ROLE OF THE HORIZON WITHIN HEIDEGGER’S KANT

My concern in section 2 was with the overall structure of HK’s argument. I now want to focus on one of its core claims. As detailed above, Kant defines the ‘form’ of experience as that which allows the manifold to be represented as standing in various relations (KrV A20/B34, A50-1/B74-5). HK makes the claim that such ‘form’ should be analysed in terms of the concept of ontological cognition. The natural question is thus: how should we understand the concept of ontological cognition? In Heidegger’s own work, he talks, of course, not of the ‘cognition’ [\textit{Erkennen}] of being but of a prior ‘understanding’ [\textit{Verstehen}] of it (SZ 12). Nevertheless, what is striking is that, in both cases, Heidegger explains this ontological awareness via the notion of a horizon.

What is it that makes this understanding of being possible at all? Whence – that is from what antecedently given horizon – do we understand the like of being? (Ga24 21)

The similarity to HK is striking:

\begin{quote}
Ontological cognition ‘forms’ [\textit{bildet}] the transcendence: this forming is nothing other than the holding-open of a horizon in which the being of the entity is initially visible (Ga3 123).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} It is this point which explains what Zuckert called ‘Heidegger’s striking deletion of “necessity” terms (including “laws” or “lawfulness”) in his characterization of Kant’s project’ – Zuckert (2007 230).
The claim made in section 2, namely that ontological cognition makes possible ontic cognition, leads to the question of the nature of ontological cognition. Since Heidegger explains this phenomenon, at least in part, through the concept of a horizon, one arrives at the second question with which this article began: how should we understand the concept of a horizon in HK? I will argue that HK’s use of this concept marks a fundamental break with orthodox Kantian models of experience. To explain this I need to introduce what HK calls ‘formal logic’ [formale Logik] (Ga3 252).

As observed in section 2, Kant holds that rational agents are conscious of normative relations between their representations; this consciousness is enabled by the understanding, ‘the faculty of rules’ (KrV A126). Kant further states that the understanding may be explained in terms of the capacity to judge (KrV A69/B94). This capacity is itself then analysed via ‘pure, general logic’; such logic establishes the various forms of judgment and thus defines the ‘universal grammar’ of the understanding (Log 12-3). I want to highlight one feature of this ‘pure, general logic’.

General logic abstracts … from all content of cognition … and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another (KrV A55/B79).

This claim is naturally formulated by stating that Kant’s pure, general logic is a ‘formal logic’: as Kant emphasises, its laws are ‘without all content and merely formal’ [bloß formalen] (KrV A152/B191). This formulation is attractive because it allows one to capture a key difference between Kant and Frege. Unlike in Kant, Fregean quantifiers, say, are simply second-order concepts; any logic which includes the quantifiers cannot therefore abstract from all intentional content. As a result, Fregean logic ‘is not at all formal’. For Kant, in contrast, the forms of judgment – ‘some’, ‘all’ ‘is’ – are not themselves pieces of intentional content, second order or otherwise; this follows from Kant’s twin assumptions that they can be defined in abstraction from space and time, and that content must be intuitive, i.e. spatio-temporal (KrV A239/B298, A51/B75). To avoid confusion, it will be important to mark this Kantian sense of ‘formal’. I therefore introduce the following definition:

\[
\text{Form}^1 = \text{X is formal}^1 \text{ only if X is defined in abstraction from all intentional content.}
\]

Kant’s view that pure, general logic and its constituent forms of judgment are formal underpins almost every aspect of the Critical system. Consider his rejection of rationalism. It is because pure, general logic is formal that ‘nobody can dare to judge of objects and to assert anything about them merely with logic’ (KrV A60/B85): taken by itself, logic cannot even generate a proposition, let alone verify it. The formality of logic thus undercut the basic premise of systems such as Wolff’s, namely that logic and ontology are inseparable. To

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19 MacFarlane (2002) provides an influential treatment of these issues.

20 Frege (1906 426).

21 It is the second assumption, of course, that Frege denies.
take another example, Kant distinguishes himself from rationalism by denying innate content while accepting innate capacities; the fact that pure, general logic ‘abstracts from all content’ allows Kant to separate the latter from the former (ÜE 223). Finally, consider ethics: it is obviously crucial for Kant that there should be some capacity for normative self-obligation, or spontaneity, which can be defined independently of space and time. ‘Pure, general logic’ provides exactly that.

If one combines the previous paragraph with section 2, something extremely important becomes apparent: there are, prima facie, two very different conceptions of ‘form’ in play within KrV. On the one hand, there is the concept just introduced. On the other, there is the concept, which I also now mark with a numeral, discussed in section 2.

\[
\text{Form}^2 = \text{A capacity } C \text{ possessed by an agent } A \text{ is the form}^2 \text{ for a relation } R \text{ only if } C \text{ enables } A \text{ to represent the manifold as ordered by } R.
\]

Form\(^1\) and Form\(^2\) are logically distinct. For example, KrV holds that the ‘pure form of space’, the capacity which allows the representation of spatial relations, is itself ‘an infinite given’ extended magnitude (KrV A25/B39-40). Obviously, such a representation is not formal\(^1\).

However, whilst the two concepts are distinct, for Kant they are far from incompatible. Suppose I am able to represent entities as standing in primitive spatio-temporal relations: I can represent, for example, an empirical particular as being to the left of me. Now consider this question: what further capacity, what form\(^2\), do I need in order to represent those particulars as, say, causally ordered? Kant’s answer is that the form\(^2\) for the categories is the capacity to judge; that is, I can represent objects as standing in categorical relations only if I consider intuition ‘as determined with respect to one of the logical functions of judgment’ (KrV B128). Thus, as Allison recently put it, ‘we can be in possession of a given category only because we are capable of judging under the corresponding form’.\(^{22}\) In the case of causality, for example, I can represent causal relations among my perceptions only if I represent them as connected by the hypothetical form of judgment (KrV A200-1/B245-6). But this means that, assuming sensibility has supplied some intuitive content, the further factor, the form\(^2\), necessary for representing the categories is itself formal\(^1\) (KrV A79/B104-5). Let me be clear here: the point I am making is not that the logical forms of judgment generate what are sometimes called the ‘unschematised categories’; for example, substance construed as that which is always the subject and never the predicate. The point is rather that given some intuitive content, it is the logical forms of judgment which define the inferential framework that allow me to represent the ‘schematised categories’; for example, causality construed as the succession of one thing after another in accordance with a rule.\(^{23}\) The move here is a characteristically Critical one. Whereas rationalism sought to respond to empiricist attacks on properties such as substance by relocating those properties to some domain beyond space and time, Kant accepts the empiricist equation of content with the spatio-temporal, and argues instead that we can still generate the relevant properties insofar as we subject our representations to certain ‘rules’, certain inferential constraints (KrV A79/B104-5). The logical forms of judgment define the basic patterns which such rules may take. Heidegger is acutely aware of this strand of Kant’s thought. Indeed, perhaps more than any commentator

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\(^{22}\) Allison (2004 156).

\(^{23}\) KrV: A193/B238.
prior to Longuenesse in her hugely influential *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Heidegger undertakes the exegetical work necessary to elaborate it, in particular by establishing the identity of the forms of judgment and the ‘*conceptus reflectentes*’ (Ga3 55-8, Ga25 240).\(^{24}\) As I will now show, however, the fact that HK analyses form\(^2\) in terms of the concept of a horizon has a far-reaching implication: the implication is that nothing which is formal\(^1\) can also be formal\(^2\). This negative conclusion will ultimately force HK to construct a unique, alternative account of the form\(^2\) for the categories; it is this alternative account which drives HK’s distinctive emphasis on the imagination and on time.

The issues are best introduced via Heidegger’s work on Kant and the Greeks. ‘Greek ontology’, Heidegger claims, was decisively influenced by a particular example – that of artefacts and their production. This is significant, he suggests, because that example embodies a distinctive understanding of what Heidegger calls ‘forming’. Heidegger summarises the Greek model as follows:

> The potter forms a vase out of clay. All forming [*Bilden*] ... occurs by using an image [*Bild*], in the sense of a prototype [*Vor-Bild*], as a guiding thread and standard. The object is produced by looking to the anticipated look [*Aussehen*] of what is to be produced through the shaping or forming. It is this anticipated look of the object, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by *eidos*, idea. The shaped product, which is shaped in conformity with the model, is, as such, the exact likeness of the model (Ga24 150).

This account has several important features. The potter is able to mould, or in Kantian terms ‘synthesise’, matter into a certain order only because of his prior familiarity with an ‘anticipated look’ or ‘image’. This is because that ‘image’ serves as the ‘guide and standard’ for the synthetic process; in short, this image acts as the ‘prototype’ [*Vor-bild*] after the pattern of which the manifold is combined. The properties of this prototype are thus transferred onto the ‘shaped product’ – the result is that the latter is the ‘exact likeness’ of the former (Ga24 215). Heidegger views this treatment of ‘forming’ as central to both Plato and Aristotle (Ga31 69-73). My concern, however, is with its connection to the Critical project; for Heidegger, ‘Kant’s basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks’ (SZ 26). In both ‘Greek ontology’ and Kant’s work, Heidegger claims:

> The being of things is understood as being-produced. In Kant this is present as a self-evident axiom, but it does not receive explicit expression (Ga24 214).

The reference to ‘being-produced’ here is precisely to the Greek model just sketched. Thus, Heidegger suggests that KrV’s talk of ‘appearances’, for example, is partly motivated by the assumption that for an entity to be represented is just for that entity to come ‘into the presence of an image’; in this, Heidegger claims, ‘Kant has the same understanding of being as Greek philosophy’ (Ga31 71).

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\(^{24}\) As Longuenesse (1998 203) observes, ‘on several points my analysis is closer to [Heidegger’s] than to any other I am acquainted with’.
It is these supposed connections between Kant and Greeks which explain the role played by the concept of a horizon in HK. Specifically, Heidegger takes Kant to accept the following claim: I can represent an object as standing in certain relations if and only if I possess a prior ‘image’ or ‘look’ in which I see those same relations exemplified and which thus serves as a ‘prototype’ onto which I can ‘project’ that object (Ga21 274, Ga3 154). How should one understand the idea of ‘image’ or ‘look’ here? After all, a ‘pure’ or ‘ontological’ image will, even granting that such a thing exists, obviously be very different from an empirical or ontic image, such as the potter’s mental picture of the vase (Ga3 102-3). As Heidegger makes it clear, what the two classes of image are supposed to share is ‘perceivability’ or ‘intuitability’; that is, they consist in pieces of spatial or temporal content (Ga3 90, Ga21 370). HK refers to such images as the horizon (Ga3 90). Bringing these points together, one can summarise the significance of the concept of the horizon within HK as follows. Heidegger takes Kant to endorse this claim:

Horizon = An agent $A$ possesses the form $^2$ for a relation $R$ only if $A$ has a representation of a piece of intuitive content or ‘image’ $I$ where $I$ ‘portrays’ $[^{\text{darstellt}}] R$, and where $I$ can thus serve as the ‘prototype’ for ordering the manifold in terms of $R$ (Ga21 360).

It is this emphasis on ‘images’ which explains, in large part, the centrality which HK allots to the imagination:

It is no accident that Kant, for whom the concepts of form $[\text{Form}]$ and matter, $\text{morphe}$ and $\text{hule}$, play a fundamental epistemological role, conjointly assigns to imagination a distinctive function in explaining the objectivity of knowledge. The $\text{eidos}$ as the look, anticipated in imagination, of what is to be formed gives the thing with regard to what this thing already was and is before all actualisation (Ga24 150-1).25

What Heidegger is doing here is to radicalise the traditional definition, found in Wolff or Baumgarten, of imagination as the ability to generate images in the absence of an entity by reading ‘absence’ in ontological, rather than merely ontic, terms; the ‘pure imagination’ is thus the capacity to produce images whose content is not only not dependent on entities but which make representation of those entities possible by allowing the agent to represent the relations in which they stand (Ga3 128-9, 131). ‘Pure form’ $[\text{reine Form}]$ is thus explained via the interconnection of $\text{Bild}$, $\text{Einbildungskraft}$ and $\text{bilden}$ (Ga25 414-5). Most important, however, is the link between the horizon claim and the distinction between form$^1$ and form$^2$. As shown in section 2, Heidegger understands KrV as an attempt to show how ‘ontic cognition’ presupposes ‘ontological cognition’. As noted in the same section, HK explains this dependency by equating ontological cognition with form$^2$. What has now been added is the fact that Heidegger analyses form$^2$ in terms of the notion of a horizon which is itself analysed in terms of the concept of an image or look which is itself analysed as a piece of spatial or temporal content. To be formal$^1$, however, is just to be defined in abstraction from

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25 The other motivation for HK’s emphasis on the imagination is that by identifying it as the root of the other faculties, the various capacities which make possible experience are no longer distinct, as in KrV, but equiprimordial, as in SZ (Ga3 37-8).
all such content. Thus, within HK’s model, nothing which is formal\(^1\) can be formal\(^2\). It is Kant’s supposed reluctance to recognise this conclusion which leads Heidegger to accuse him of ‘shrinking back’ by rewriting the Deduction, in the B Edition, in order to play down the imagination and to play up judgment and logic (Ga3 160-1). By returning to the A Edition, however, and, above all to the Schematism, one can still locate, HK holds, the true core of the Critical system: an account on which ontological cognition, and by extension Dasein’s capacity for intentionality, is dependent on the ‘look of the horizon of objectivity formed by the imagination before the experience of entities’ (Ga2 131).

The claim labelled ‘Horizon’, however, leaves us facing an obvious question: in what sense can an image ‘portray’ a relation (Ga2 360)? This brings me to the last step in HK’s account, a step that leads back to Hume’s attack on metaphysics. This is because the reason that Kant analysed the form\(^2\) of, say, causality in terms of a formal\(^1\) capacity was precisely that he accepted Hume’s verdict that there can be no intuitive representation of this property; as Kant emphasises, in direct contradiction to HK, the pure concepts ‘can never be reduced to any image whatsoever’ (KrV A142/B181).\(^{26}\) Heidegger’s final task, therefore, is to explain why he believes that Kant ultimately abandoned this assumption and, more fundamentally, how HK proposes to find an ‘image’ for the categories. As I will show, it is here that time takes centre stage: time for HK is nothing less than the ‘pure image of … objectivity’ (Ga3 104).

HK’s term for the process whereby an image, or intuitive representation, is generated for some given relation is ‘Versinnlichung’ or ‘making-sensible’ (Ga3 92). In illustrating HK’s response to Hume’s original challenge, I will take the example of what HK calls the ‘pure image [Bild] of substance’ (Ga3 107). As Heidegger sees it, Kant explains the source of this image in two steps. First, he analyses the ‘pure form of time’ as consisting of an immediate awareness of succession, or what Heidegger calls an experience of the ‘pure succession of the sequence of nows’ (Ga3 175). The idea of such a sequence is familiar from SZ, where Heidegger refers to it as ‘now-time’ [Jetzt-Zeit] (SZ 422-4). The second step is to claim that this ‘pure succession’ constitutes the image which makes possible the experience of objects as ‘substances’, i.e. as enduring through change (KrV A144/B183). Heidegger takes his cue from this puzzling remark:

> All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum (as permanent form of inner intuition), simultaneity as well as succession can alone be represented. Time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, remains and does not change (KrV B224-5).

As Guyer notes, the striking feature of this passage is that ‘permanence is introduced … not as a property or determination of any objects in time but of time itself’.\(^{27}\) This is crucial to Heidegger: he takes Kant to be saying that to represent the pure image of time, i.e. the ‘pure succession of the sequence of nows’, just is to represent the property of substantiality. The reasoning is as follows. On the one hand, every part of that pure image is itself a ‘now’; thus,

\(^{26}\) Heidegger is aware of this text: he claims that Kant’s point is simply that the categories must be represented by a pure, or ontological, as opposed to empirical, or ontic, image (Ga3 102).

\(^{27}\) Guyer (1987 217).
to represent that image is to represent permanence.\(^{28}\) The idea here is that pure time, i.e. the pure passing of seconds considered in abstraction from any objects or events, would be entirely undifferentiated, with each moment identical to the last; it would thus be unchanging.

Time, as a pure sequence of nows, is always now. In every now it is now. Time thus shows its own permanence. As such, time is ‘non-transitory and abiding’, it does not itself pass (Ga3 107).\(^{29}\)

As Heidegger puts it in his work on Aristotle, ‘[t]he ever different nows are … always exactly the same, namely now’ (Ga24 350). On the other hand, however, there is a straightforward sense in which to represent pure time is to represent constant change: each second constantly gives way to another.

Time… is a sequence of nows precisely because in every flowing now it is a now, even another now (Ga3 107).\(^{30}\)

HK concludes that the pure image of time offers both ‘the look of what endures … and the pure image of change’ (Ga3 107). But if the pure form of time offers an image of both endurance and change, it follows, HK claims, that substance, defined simply as that which endures throughout change, can itself procure ‘a pure image [\textit{Bild}] a priori in time’ (Ga3 107). The capacity to represent an entity as a substance can therefore be analysed in terms of my familiarity with this pure ‘prototype’ [\textit{Vor-Bild}]: to experience an entity as a substance is just to ‘project’ it onto pure time (Ga3 131-2). It is in this sense that time is the horizon of being.

This argument completes my presentation of Heidegger’s Kant and explains two of HK’s most distinctive features. First, one sees how HK re-analyses intentional capacities, which Kant explains by reference to judgment in temporal terms instead. Heidegger eulogises the Schematism because he believes that it contains precisely this re-analysis.

The pure making-sensible occurs as a ‘Schematism’. The pure power of imagination gives schema-forming in advance the look (‘image’) of the horizon of transcendence (Ga3 91).

Second, HK allots time a unique double role. As in orthodox Kantianism, it is one of the pure forms\(^{\ast}\) of intuition and so enables the representation of basic temporal relations such as succession. However, it is also the pure image of the categories which serves as the horizon onto which entities may be ‘projected’ as substances, causes etc. Time thus plays both the

\(^{28}\) As Heidegger puts it in SZ, the now sequence model of time treats past and future as ‘now-no-longer’ and ‘now-not-yet’ (SZ 422-4).

\(^{29}\) The text cited is KrV A144/B183.

\(^{30}\) Similarly SZ 423.
role allotted to it by mainstream Kantians and that traditionally reserved for the understanding; as Heidegger puts it, ‘time is the schema-image and not just the form of intuition’ (Ga3 104). HK’s response to Hume’s original challenge regarding the impression of the substance or the impression of causality thus rests precisely on Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘horizon of objectivity’ in terms of the ‘pure image of time’ (Ga3 131). From Kant’s perspective, empiricism poses a placement problem: if one looks at the spatial or temporal content of our intentional states, certain fundamental properties, for example causation, do not appear to be represented. One possible response to this problem is the rationalist one: employ an expanded definition of ‘content’, a definition which runs beyond the spatial or temporal, and locate the relevant representations in this new domain. Kant’s response, in contrast, is to accept the identification of content with space and time; the Critical claim is that even given this, one can still generate the missing properties by subjecting our representations to certain inferential restrictions, restrictions made possible by the forms of judgment. What was originally a placement problem (where do we locate causation?) thus becomes a justification problem (what warrants us to impose the relevant restrictions?). HK, as noted in section 1, rejects this move: Heidegger rejects the famous quid juris. He is able to do this precisely because HK has a unique, alternative tactic in mind: contra empiricism, temporal content can suffice to represent properties such as substantiality without appeal to judgment provided that it is treated as a prototype in the manner outlined.

4. FROM HEIDEGGER’S KANT TO SEIN UND ZEIT

My aim in this article has been to provide a new account of both HK’s overall structure, that of a self-directed transcendental argument (section 2), and of one of its key premises, the explanation of the capacity to represent relations in terms of the horizon of time (section 3). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that my reading is correct. It is unclear by what standard Heidegger’s commentary should then be judged. Whilst HK is an avowedly ‘violent’ reading, Heidegger believes that this violence is not arbitrary but that in unearthing the link between the Schematism and the concept of a horizon he has exposed the ‘concealed, inner passion’ of Kant’s thought (Ga3 202). Heidegger is surely mistaken in this belief. The role which Kant grants to formal1 logic, for example, in explaining the form2 of experience is fundamental to the Critical system because it underpins the responses both to Hume, by showing how we can represent properties of which there is no impression, and to Wolff and Leibniz, by showing why that ability does not suffice to yield knowledge of a supersensible reality. What if HK were evaluated purely philosophically? Here again the reliance on the concept of a horizon appears to undermine the work. For example, HK holds that the type of argument given in the case of substance can be generalised to the other categories (Ga3 104). But this seems unlikely. When Heidegger attempts, for example, to replicate the argument with respect to causality, he is forced to conflate the definitional connection between the concepts of earlier and later, a property which the now sequence might be said to ‘portray’, with a causal connection between earlier and later states of affairs, a property which is clearly quite different (Ga31 185-6).

I close by indicating the type of argument one would expect to find in SZ if my reading of HK were used as a guide. Obviously, I cannot defend the resultant vision of SZ here, but it has some prima facie plausibility and I will indicate where certain key passages might fit in. First, SZ would consist in a self-directed transcendental argument. This argument would begin from the premise that we experience entities as standing in certain relations (SZ
86). As in HK, these relations would include normative connections; unlike in HK, explanatory primacy would be given to a teleological rather than a causal order (SZ 67-8). Second, Heidegger would infer from that experience certain conclusions about the intentional capacities that make it possible (SZ 13). In particular, he would argue that the ability to represent, or ‘discover’, a set of entities as ordered by teleological relations assumes a prior familiarity, an ontological understanding or ‘disclosure’, of such relations (Ga24 102). This prior familiarity would be supplied by a ‘horizonal schema’ which acts as a prototype for the various relations that SZ groups together under the label ‘world’ (Ga24 419).

‘Dasein transcends’ means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, ‘forming’ [bildend] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a prototypical image [Vor-bild] for all manifest beings (Ga9 158).

On this approach, whilst Heidegger undoubtedly believes that the Greek emphasis on production entrenched certain mistaken assumptions about the objects of experience (Ga24 160-1, SZ 171), his own account bears at least some similarities to the supposedly Greco-Kantian model: notably the reliance on prototypes. Third, Heidegger would argue that the various prototypes or horizonal schema must be analysed in terms of various pieces of temporal content (SZ 364-5). Fourth, whilst one would expect the account to be conceptual in the sense defined in section 2, one would look for negative arguments intended to remove judgment from any fundamental role in the analysis of experience. Since the tactic by which this is done in HK hangs entirely on the formal’ status of Kant’s ‘pure, general logic’, broader arguments would be needed to combat accounts, such as Frege’s, which do not share this assumption (SZ 157-8). Fifth, one would expect to find a realist view of the natural sciences: objects possess their spatio-temporal, casual properties entirely independently of our representation of them. This sketch, of course, raises countless further questions. But it is clear that it is significantly closer to some existing interpretations than to others. It fits well, for example, with Carman’s robust realism and his foundational emphasis on the conditions which enable intentionality.31 In contrast, it is in tension with idealist accounts such as Blattner’s.32 If my reading of HK is correct, there is a new onus on those who see Heidegger as a transcendental idealist to explain why he did not see Kant himself as one.33

32 Blattner (1999 238-251).
33 I should like to thank Raymond Geuss, Nick Jardine, Wayne Martin, and Joseph Schear for discussion of these issues. I am also greatly indebted to the editor and the anonymous referees of this journal for a number of extremely helpful comments and suggestions.
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