Abstract

We spend a good deal of time thinking about advising, but philosophical discussions of advising have been scattered and somewhat disconnected. The most focused discussion has come from philosophers of language interested in whether advising is a kind of assertive or directive speech act. This paper argues that the ordinary category of advising is much more heterogeneous than has been appreciated: it is possible to advising by asserting relevant facts, by issuing directives, and by asking questions and other kinds of adviceless advising. The heterogeneity of advising makes speech act-theoretic accounts of advising look like accounts of special cases, and motivates us to look elsewhere for an account of what advising is. Instead, I suggest that we think about advising as a kind of joint practical thinking—collaborative deliberation—, which answers to our need to pool various kinds of deliberative resources.

Introduction

We spend a good deal of time thinking about advising. We seek out get good advice about relationship problems, household maintenance, and how to write well. We worry how to give good advice to our friends, and how to manage the tension when our parents’ advice slides into telling us what to do. There are formal roles for scientific, legal, and financial advisors, which are regulated and professionalised. Government advisors play a central role in shaping policies, and are notoriously the first people held responsible when something goes wrong. During the COVID-19 pandemic, people have radically altered their lives in response not only to legal restrictions, but also to government and scientific advice.

Despite its practical and ethical significance, philosophical discussions of advising have been scattered and somewhat disconnected.¹ Extant accounts are largely motivated by the observation that advising occupies a curious position in the family of speech acts, with connections to both directive and assertive speech acts. Like commanding, advising often involves the use of the imperatival mood to propose courses of action to the hearer. But, like asserting, advising also involves the use of the declarative mood to make claims about questions which are relevant to a

¹ See (Nowell-Smith 1954), (Gauthier 1963), (Stewart 1978), (Wiland 2000b, 2021), (Hinchman 2005)
hearer’s decision. In the literature there are two positions which have been taken up to explain this position between asserting and commanding.

The **directive approach** takes advising to be a directive speech act—like commanding, instructing, and exhorting—whose authority is based in knowledge of the hearer’s good (Hobbes 1998, 2012) (Vendler 1972 p.41), (Austin 1975 pp.40-42, 141-2, 155), (Stewart 1978), (Searle and Vanderveken 1985 pp.202-3), (Bach and Harnish 1979 pp.40-7), (Hamblin 1987 pp.10-23), (Wiland 2000a, 2000b, 2021). The best case for the directive approach comes from advising involving a bare imperative, such as:

1) Brush your teeth before you go to bed!²

By contrast, the **assertive approach** takes advising to be a assertive speech act—like telling, hypothesising, and announcing—which involves the assertion of a proposition relevant to the hearer’s decision (Searle 1969), (Hinchman 2005), (Sliwa 2012). Although on this picture advising is a kind of assertion, it can retain a connection to action, either by functioning as an invitation to treat the act of advising as a reason (Hinchman 2005), or by indirectly functioning as directive speech act (Nowell-Smith 1954, pp.146-7). The best case for the assertive approach comes from advising which involves the assertion of normative claim, or facts that are relevant to the hearer’s decision, such as:

2) You ought to brush your teeth before bed.
3) If you brush your teeth before bed, you won’t need fillings.

The directive and assertive approaches share a commitment to what we might call a **deference model** of advising. According to the deference model, in the central case advising is the response of a wise advisor whose judgement has been requested by an ignorant advisee, with the expectation that the advisee will defer to the advisor, either in forming their belief or choosing what to do (see Locher 2006 pp.5-6).

The goal of this paper is to argue that neither the directive nor the assertive approach does justice to the ordinary category of advising, which includes not only directions, and assertions from (purportedly) wise advisors, but also the asking of questions, and advising between people who are equally knowledgeable. I will argue that the heterogeneity of advising across asserting, directing, and asking precludes an analysis of advising as a kind of speech act. Instead, I propose that we think of advising as a distinctive kind of joint practical thinking, in which the advisor treats the advisee’s practical problem as if it were a shared concern, whilst leaving it to the advisee to make up his mind. I will call this kind of joint practical thinking **collaborative deliberation**.

We start from a hypothesis about the function of our talk and thought about

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² I will reserve exclamation marks for grammatically imperative sentences, and question marks for interrogative sentences.
advising: that it answers to our needs as deliberators to pool our deliberative capacities (1.1.). This hypothesis is used to motivate the proposal that advising is a distinctive kind of joint practical thinking in which an individual practical problem is treated as if it were a shared concern (1.2). We then consider the diversity of advising (2.1), including the possibility of advising without giving advice (2.2.), before showing how the hypothesis that advising is collaborative deliberation allows us to explain this diversity (2.3). We then turn to the claim that advising is not a kind of speech act, considering the way in which speech act theorists have understood advising (3.1), before arguing that on all available typologies of speech acts, advising spans the core distinction between assertives, directives, and askings (3.2), meaning that the directive and assertive accounts are mistaken, and more generally that advising cannot be unified under using the tools of speech act theory (3.3.).

A couple of points before we get going.

On the difference between ‘advise’ and ‘advice’. ‘Advise’ is a verb that marks the activity which is the topic of this paper. ‘Advice’ is a noun which has two meanings, referring either to the act of advising, or to the object advised. The sentence ‘Katy’s advice is always so thoughtful,’ can mean either that the way in which she advises is thoughtful, or that what she advises is thoughtful. ‘Advice’ in its act sense is sometimes used as a generic noun to refer to the activity of advising. (I might have started this paper with ‘we spend a good deal of time thinking about advice.’) Although this act/object ambiguity is largely harmless, slippage between the two meanings can create the impression that the act of advising is just the giving of advice. This obscures both the syntactic fact that ‘advise’ can occur without a grammatical complement specifying what was advised (‘Alex advised me’), and the non-linguistic fact that we can perfectly well advise without giving any advice (as I will argue in 2.2.). To avoid this slippage, I will use ‘advice’ only in its object sense, and use the gerund ‘advising’ to refer to the type of activity.

The connection between advising, asserting, directing, and asking means that we need to have a basic model for different kinds of speech acts, and their associated grammatical moods and types of content. Following (Roberts 2018), I will work with the following picture: Sentences in the declarative mood express propositions, and are standardly used to assert, with a view to changing the hearer’s beliefs and getting propositions in the common ground. Sentences in the imperative mood express tasks directed towards the hearer, and are standardly used to perform directives, with a view to changing the hearer’s intentions and getting tasks on their

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3 Throughout I will gender advisors female and advisees male.
4 One might worry that English is an outlier language in this respect. For example, the French ‘conseiller’ is anomalous without a complement clause specifying what was advised. 1) is weird, perhaps ungrammatical:

1) ?Alix m’a conseillé.

However, using a cleft construction we can get the following, which is acceptable:

2) C’est Alix qui m’a conseillée.
to-do list. Sentences in the interrogative mood express questions, and are standardly used to ask, with a view to putting a question on the shared inquisitive agenda. Uttering a sentence in the declarative mood will be the standard way to assert, but it is also possible to assert indirectly (for example by asking a question in a sarcastic tone), and the same goes for directives and askings.

1. Advising and Joint Practical Thinking

1.1. What’s the Point of Advising?

It is often helpful to begin philosophical inquiry into the question what is X? by asking the a further question: what is the function of our concept of X?. Functional approaches to philosophical analysis have a long history, but have become increasingly popular following Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. Craig proposes that the point of our concept of knowledge is to allow us to pool information between people, and uses this functional hypothesis to illuminate a number of features of knowledge.

What is the function of our concept of advising? In his discussion of advising in Practical Reasoning, David Gauthier offers us a picture:

Men [sic] give advice, make recommendations, to assist their fellows with their practical problems. A bread-knife is a device to cut bread; advice is a device to bring one person’s judgement to bear on the problems of another; recommendation is a device to transmit one person’s practical experience to another. (Gauthier 1963 p77)

This passage is about the point of advising itself, but with Craig’s story about knowledge in mind we might suggest a picture of the function of our thought and talk about advising. Just as we need to be able to pool information between people, and thus develop concepts which allow us to facilitate and regulate our information-pooling practices, we need to be able to pool our deliberative capacities and resources, and thus develop concepts which allow us to facilitate and regulate our pooling of deliberative resources. Craig suggests that we think about the knowledge from the perspective of an inquirer into a factual question, and I want to suggest that we think about advising from the perspective of a deliberator who is trying to resolve a difficult practical question.

What might a deliberator need? Allan Gibbard makes a helpful suggestion:

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5 We should distinguish between the function of a concept, the function of the thing, and the function of the speech acts used in talking about the thing. Following (Habgood-Coote 2019) I take functional approaches to focus on the functions of concepts, reflecting the fact that our conceptual schemas are answerable to our practical needs.
When I ask you for advice, we can say, I try to get you to help me with my thinking, to join with me in thinking what to do. (Gibbard 2003 p275)

Keeping things deliberately vague for the moment, let’s propose that a deliberator is after someone who can think through his problem with him. If advising is the kind of activity which answers to the need of deliberators, then we should think about advising as a kind of joint practical thinking.

1.2. Collaborative Deliberation

This idea is suggestive, but we need to sharpen it up: advising is not just any kind of joint practical thinking

Following de Kenessy (2020), let’s think about the standard case of joint practical deliberation which leads to joint action (Bratman 1992, Gilbert 2009) as a joint activity with three features:

i. It is aimed at producing a joint decision;
ii. That joint decision involves a question about what both agents should do;
iii. The reasons which are relevant to the joint decision are shared reasons.

This kind of thinking is familiar: we engage in it when we decide together what route to take for a Sunday run, taking into account everyone’s preferences, and planning to go on a run together.

Prototypical joint deliberation primarily addresses a question about what we ought to do, and questions about what individuals ought to do as part of this joint project. By contrast, the deliberator seeks someone to join with him in thinking what he should do in light of his reasons. This suggests that we might think of advising as a kind of joint practical thinking which concerns what the advisee should do as an individual, which is resolved by individual rather than shared reasons.

Advising often, involves joint thinking about individual questions, but this is not a distinguishing feature. Consider a situation in which we go for dinner every Thursday at a different restaurant, alternating who gets to choose the restaurant which meets both of our preferences. One week, I’m finding it difficult to make a decision, and I ring you up to ask for some help deciding between Pho and Root. You talk me through the decision, but leave the decision up to me. Is this a situation in which you’ve advised me? I think that the right answer is yes: we’ve certainly pooled our deliberative resources, and you haven’t ordered, threatened or made any other kind of directive speech act. However, given the set up of the example, the decision that you’ve advised me on is a shared one, as are the reasons I’ve deployed. If you had got bored and stated ‘Let’s go to Root!’ meaning to express a decision, you would have not been advising, but taking my decision into your hands. This example suggests that what is distinctive about advising is not that it concerns individual questions or the advisee’s reasons, but that it involves a kind of joint thinking which leaves the responsibility for coming to a conclusion up to the
advisee. Gauthier expresses this point nicely:

To advise, or to recommend, is to assist someone in making a decision or choice, in solving a practical problem. The decision, and the problem, belong to [the] advisee. If the speaker seeks to make the decision, and to impose it on [the] advisee, then he is no longer advising, for he is no longer (just) assisting. He is treating the problem as a joint one, to be faced collectively, rather than the advisee’s own problem. (Gauthier 1963 p70).

There are two ways we can elaborate this idea.

The first is to say that advising involves the off-line deployment of the advisor’s deliberative capacities to deal with another person’s practical problems without either the authority to make up their mind (as in the case of ordering), or the ability to make a joint decision about what he will do (as in the familiar case of joint deliberation).

The second is to say that advising involves a pretence of joint deliberation (see Portner 2018, 310). The advisee invites the advisor into a fictive context in which they treat his decision as if it were a joint problem, deploying their deliberative capacities together in a kind of make-believe of shared deliberation (Walton 1993). This fictive context is deliberatively insulated: within the fictive context, joint deliberation aims at a joint intention about the advisee’s problem, but neither advisee nor advisor is committed to that plan outwith the pretence. There is a further step for the advisee to take in deciding to follow the advice, and as we shall see below the advisor should come away without any intentions (although she might have a belief about what the advisee should do in light of his reasons). It is also circumscribed in its basis: the relevant beliefs and preferences for this deliberation are the advisee’s, although there is space within the pretence for the advisor to try to persuade the advisee to change his mind.

Let’s call the kind of joint practical thinking in which the advisor deploys her deliberative capacities off-line as part of a pretence of joint deliberation that aims to help the advisee reach an individual decision collaborative deliberation.

The kind of collaborative deliberation involved in advising should be distinguished from both joint practical deliberation and from merely talking about a practical problem

Consider a case where collaborative deliberation shifts to joint practical deliberation. Tariq asks Hannah about the best way to train for a marathon, she writes up a training and nutrition plan for him, and he decides to follow the plan. However, to Tariq’s surprise, Hannah keeps popping up to make sure he follows the

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6 The importance of locutions like ‘if I were you...’ to advising might make one suspect that the advisor is engaging in a pretence of individual deliberation. This idea does make some mileage to make sense of cases in which the advisor works through the advisee’s in her head before offering her judgement, but it is less useful as a way to understand cases in which there is an extended back-and-forth between advisor and advisee.
plan: ringing him early in the morning to ensure he wakes up for sessions, dropping off meals that are on the nutrition plan, and swapping out his shoes when they are worn out. All of this might be very helpful, but by taking on the normative obligations that would be associated with a joint decision that Tariq would follow the plan, Hannah has shifted out of advising mode into joint planning, and Tariq can tell her to back off. Unlike both proposals in joint action (in which both parties form an intention to do something), and orders (in which the speaker at least takes on an obligation to not interfere), in collaborative deliberation the advisor should come away from advising without any commitments.\footnote{This case is close to the Joey/Ross storyline in the Friends episode The One with the Inappropriate Sister.}

Next, consider the difference between merely talking about a practical problem and engaging in collaborative deliberation. Many of us will have encountered the following kind of conversation: Zahir is complaining to Marta about one of his work colleagues. As a good friend, Marta chips in with suggestions about how Zahir might manage his colleague. Rather than welcoming these suggestions, Zahir rebuffs her by saying that she should stop trying to problem solve. Zahir expects to have a conversation about how difficult his colleague without trying to resolve any problems: he’s only venting. Marta oversteps by introducing an additional conversational goal, treating Zahir’s problem as if it was a joint issue to be resolved. In venting, there is no goal to solve the practical problems under discussion; by contrast in advising, the goal is to help someone solve their practical problem.

We’re now in a position to offer an account of advising:

**COLLABORATIVE DELIBERATION:** advising is a species of joint practical thinking which involves two or more people engaging in a pretence of joint deliberation about a practical question facing a proper subset of those people, whilst leaving the responsibility for making this decision up them. Those who have responsibility for making the decision are the advisees, and everyone else who contributes are the advisors, who deploy their deliberative capacities offline.

Our interest in pooling deliberative resources means that it would be useful to have a concept to talk about (request, offer, evaluate) collaborative deliberation, but there is no guarantee that our talk and thought about advising tracks it. Section 2 takes up this argumentative burden, showing that identifying advising with collaborative deliberation explains the diversity of advising, and a number of advising’s central features.

\footnote{Eric Wiland proposes that in some cases merely by means of the advisee following advice, the advisor and advisee are engaged in a form of shared activity (Wiland 2021, C7). Although we might talk about advising in connection cases of genuine shared activity (and Wiland points out that a number of legal statutes appear to do this), I take the Tariq/Hannah case as evidence that this is a fringe usage which ought not to be central to our understanding of advising.}
2. The Diversity of Advising

In this section, we shift to consider what advising itself is actually like. We first survey the diversity of kinds of advising reports (2.1.), before defending the claim that it is possible to advise without offering any advice (2.2.). We then show how the hypothesis that advising is collaborative deliberation can explain the diversity of advising, and several distinctive features (2.3.).

2.1. Advising Reports

In English, the first person performative ‘I advise …’ is reserved for strong recommendations (Diedrich and Holn 2012), so to get a sense of the ordinary extension of ‘advise’, we’re better off starting off with third-person reports. There are four basic kinds of report:

4) Laura advised Robin to take up running.
5) Ruth advised Mark that shares in Gamestop were falling.
6) Katy advised Jack where to get a sourdough pizza.
7) Heather advised caution.

In 4) the complement of ‘advise’ is an infinitival phrase. This kind of report would be appropriate if Laura had uttered a bare imperative—‘take up running!’—an ought claim which had the force of an imperative—‘you should really take up running’—or a performative sentence involving ‘advise’ together with either an imperative, ought claim, or infinitive—‘my advice is: take up running!’; ‘I’d advise that you ought to take up running’, ‘my advice is to take up running’.

In 5) the complement is a declarative phrase. This kind of report would be appropriate if Ruth had uttered a simple declarative phrase—‘shares in Gamestop are falling’. Although this assertion may indirectly function as a recommendation (Nowell-Smith 1954, 146-7) it need not. If Mark is new to stocks, and has come to Ruth—a r/WallStreetBets aficionado—for advice about what stocks to buy, this assertion will require further unpacking to get to a recommended course of action.⁹ Some writers claim that all advisory assertives indirectly recommend—see (Wiland 2021, 117-18)—but if we look at linguistic data, it should be pretty clear that there is plenty of advising that involves assertions without indirect recommendations.

In 6), the complement is an interrogative phrase. This kind of report would be appropriate either if Katy asserted a proposition which answers the question of where to get a sourdough pizza, or if Jack asked where he could get a sourdough pizza and Katy responded with an imperative in response—‘go to Flour and Ash!’.

Although advising typically concerns practical questions both information, and

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⁹ The pattern we find in 5 is perhaps less acceptable cross-linguistically. Oikonomou (2021) suggests that in modern Greek ‘σιμβουλεύω’ can only take indicatives involving priority modals. It would be a good question what pattern of complementation emerges with a wider sampling of languages.
recommendations are appropriate responses.

In 7) the complement is an abstract noun. This kind of report would be appropriate if someone had gone to Heather for advice, having settled that they were going to do something (say: climb Death Mountain), but without having formed a fine-grained plan about how. Heather’s advice thus concerns the best way to climb Death Mountain, which might either be expressed in a declarative—‘you must be cautious’—or imperative—‘be cautious!’.

It is notable that advising can be reported with both infinitival and declarative complements (see Vendler 1972 pp.20-1). Although there are some other verbs—notably ‘tell’—which pattern in this way, this makes it somewhat of an oddity. Following a number of authors in this literature, we might distinguish two kinds of advising: advising-that (advising where the advice can be reported with a declarative complement), and advising-to (advising where the advice can be reported with a infinitival complement). Note that these categories overlap: a modal statement which is made with the force of an imperative—‘you must take up running’—could be reported in either way, as could a non-modal statement which functioned as an indirect directive—‘Corfu is lovely at this time of year’. Despite this, the categories are not identical: the provision of information without an explicit or implicit recommendation is advising-that without advising to, and a bare imperative without any justification is advising-to without advising-that.

The fact that advising seemingly spans assertion and direction has been recognised for quite some time in philosophical discussions. Nowell-Smith (1954 C11) distinguishes between advising involving what he calls Aptness-words—such as ‘the film is entertaining’—and Gerundive-words—such as ‘the film is worth seeing’—suggesting that the former merely contextually entails a recommendation, whereas the latter explicitly commends a course of action. Gauthier (1963, 50, 53-5) and Hamblin (1987, 11) both point out that advising can take the form of either imperatives or declaratives, and observe that the latter need not recommend a course of action. Searle is the first to point out that advising can have the illocutionary point of both assertive and directives, proposing that this corresponds to the distinction between advising-that and advising-to (1979, 28-9). This paper (originally published in 1975) plausibly inspires Stewart (1978, 204) and Raz (1979 fn 14), although neither directly reference it.

Sociolinguists have also noted the difference between advising using directive and assertive speech acts, including both in their typologies of advising. Heritage and Sefi (1992) studied health visitors in England working with first-time mothers, a context in which advising tends to be explicit, directive, unsolicited, and concerned with projecting authority. They distinguish between advising involving overt recommendations, the use of imperatives, deontic modals, and factual generalisations (1992 pp.368-9). In a study of district nurses in Sweden, Leppänen (1998 p223) classified recommendations given using imperatives, deontic modals, presentations of proposed actions as alternatives, and descriptions of future actions as advising. Similarly, Locher’s classification of types of advising includes declaratives, questions, imperatives, referrals to other experts, general information,
descriptions of one’s own experience, explanation, and metacommentary (Locher 2006 63-69).

2.2. Advising without Advice

Besides advising by uttering imperatives and declaratives, it is possible to advise merely by uttering sentences in the interrogative mood (see Gauthier 1963, 50). One might think about an episode of advising composed entirely of interrogatives—without any indirect assertions or directions—as an instance of adviceless advising (bearing in mind our pernickety use of ‘advice’ to mark the object of advising).

Consider the following case:

MOVING AWAY: Fred is considering moving away from his hometown for an unspecified number of years, and his partner is committed to staying. Fred is worried about whether they should stay together. He goes to his friend Alex for help. She asks him a number of questions, inquiring about various aspects of his relationship, whether he has thought about the different ways of handling a long-distance relationship, and what his partner thinks about the move. However, at no point does she either explicitly or implicitly offer any recommendation about what to do or assert any propositions relevant to his practical situation.

Does Alex offer any advice? Plausibly not. Asking a question can only be giving advice when it indirectly recommends a course of action to be fulfilled (‘what about coming up with a schedule for alternating visits?’), or conveys some relevant information (‘have you thought that Fred’s job allows sabbaticals?’). Alex does neither: she poses questions simply as suggestions for issues which Fred might consider. These cases are not merely hypothetical: see (Locher 2006 p.65) for some real-life examples.

Should we think about what Alex is up to as advising? Fred has come to Alex for help with a practical question, she has offered her help, and it’s easy to imagine Fred finding her interventions useful. For sure, Alex’s advising has taken a hands-off style, but this doesn’t mean that what she does isn’t advising. Alex is not just asking questions about Fred’s problem; she is asking questions in order to help him with his decision.

Another case: consider Sartre’s description of his response to his student’s swithering between staying with his mother and joining the Free French: “vous êtes libre, choisissez, c’est-à-dire inventez.” [you are free; choose! Which is to say invent!] (Sartre 1946, p.47). Although Sartre employs the imperatival verb form, he doesn’t really offer any advice here: maybe his point is that it’s impossible to offer honest advice with respect to existential choices. Nonetheless, I think we should think of Sartre as advising his student.

I expect there to be some resistance to the idea that Alex has advised Fred. In
part, this resistance is generated by our habit of treating ‘advise’ as a transitive verb, forgetting that it can quite happily occur in intransitive sentences. To be fair, it does sound awkward to say:

8) Alex advised me, but she didn’t give any advice.

However, similar sentences for activities close to advising are unproblematic. Consider counselling (in its non-therapeutic sense):

9) Alex counselled me, but she didn’t offer any counsel.\(^{10}\)

There are plenty of ways to counsel someone without offering them counsel: going through the options, telling stories, applying decision-making heuristics, and so on. If we can admit counselless counselling, I think we should accept adviceless advising.

Adviceless advising is not only possible; it is desirable.

In some domains it is important that we are able to make decisions for ourselves. Although offering advice doesn’t impugn autonomy in the same way as commanding, it runs the risk of sliding into a kind of joint decision-making which would be inappropriate for (say) relationship decisions.

We also care both about making right decisions, and about improving our decision-making abilities. Correct advice gives us a shortcut to the right action, but doesn’t help us to learn in the way that non-directive advising does (Locher 2006, 193).\(^{11}\) When an advisor works through a decision with an advisee by laying out the relevant practical issues—perhaps withholding their knowledge of the answers, and only nudging if the advisee gets confused—it provides both a rich resource for observing the good habits involved in practical deliberation, and an opportunity to practice good deliberation through joint activity.\(^{12}\)

Adviceless advising can also avoid social awkwardness. Ordinarily we want issues about our personal lives to be at the core of our epistemic territory: those topics which we are authoritative and competent about (see Nagel forthcoming). Soliciting or accepting directive advice or even assertions about intimate topics presumes that an advisor knows more than we do about our business. Heritage and Sefi unpack this dynamic in the analysis of interactions between new parents faced with the directive advice of a health visitor (Heritage and Sefi 1992, 410). Non-directive, or even adviceless, advising can function as a face-saving device which allows an advisor to get her message across without undermining the social-epistemic

\(^{10}\) (Stewart 1978 p.207 fn 17).

\(^{11}\) Here I am not suggesting that following advice is morally deficient (see Hills 2009), just that we should care both about doing the right thing, and being able to work out what the right thing to do is.

\(^{12}\) In general, joint activity has an important role to play in developing skills which i) require practice to learn, and ii) require knowledge to practice. On the puzzle of learning by doing, see (Piñeros Glasscock 2021).
standing of the advisee (Locher 2006 C6, C9).

Several studies in sociolinguistics treat question-asking is an important advisory strategy. Silverman et al. (1992) studied HIV counselling in England and the United States, finding both information-delivery and interview styles of advising. They found that counsellors often switched between these styles, but give a number of examples of discourse fragments in which counsellors only asked questions (1992, 75-78). In her corpus of 280 online advice columns, Locher classified 31% of advisory moves as imperatives inviting future action, 5% as imperatives inviting introspection, 2% as interrogatives inviting actions, 9% as interrogatives inviting introspection, and 52% as declaratives (Locher 2006, 88). Although her category of interrogatives inviting actions plausibly involves a lot of indirect direction, the category of interrogatives inviting introspection is non-directive (except in the sense that asking any question is a proposal to answer it).

2.3. Explaining the Diversity of Advising

We’ve seen that our ordinary notion of advising is much more diverse than we might have thought. On the face of it, advising spans assertive, directive, and asking-type speech, involving advising-that, advising-to, and adviceless advising. On the face of it, neither the assertive or directive approaches are well-placed to explain this diversity, but let’s leave their attempts to account for it until the next section, and consider how the view that advising is collaborative deliberation might account for the diversity of advising.

Above we said that the deliberator is after someone to help them with a practical problem. What kinds of help might he be after. First, the deliberator might be in a situation where he is out of his depth and responsible deliberation is beyond him. He will be after a bare recommendation and will face the problem of ensuring that the person issuing the recommendation is trustworthy and has his interests at heart. Secondly, the deliberator might be in an ignorant situation, lacking factual information relevant to his decision, in which case, he will need someone to provide him with information about what his options are, what their outcomes will be and so on. This deliberator is rather like the Craigian inquirer. Thirdly, he might be in a high-stakes situation, in which he has information, and deliberative capacities but is in need of someone to work through the decision with him. Fourthly, he might be in the position of the novice who is interested in developing his deliberative skills in the future.

Given the different kinds of practical problems, deliberators are after different kinds of help: deliberators who are out of their depth need recommendations (advising-to), ignorant deliberators require information (advising-that), and high-stakes deliberators and novices require someone to think through a decision with them (adviceless advising). These cases neatly predicts both the existence and the importance of these different kinds of advising. These four kinds of deliberators are ideal cases, and in any real-life case an advisee will face a mix of different problems, requiring a mix of different kinds of advising. The ability to explain this puzzling diversity of advising is a crucial explanatory virtue of the view that advising is
collaborative deliberation.

Seeing advising as a kind of pretence of joint deliberation also helps to explain three further puzzling features of advising: its distinctive modal force, and the fact that advisory imperatives do not create reasons, and the possibility of advising between equals.

First, consider the modal force of advising. We’ve seen that advising involves imperatives and modal claims which are reported using an infinitival construction (which has an implicit modal operator). It is only appropriate to call an utterances advising if it articulates a distinctive kind of modal force. An imperative or ought-claim which appeals to a hierarchical social system, or exclusively to the desires and goals of the advisor is not advising (Portner 2007, 356). Characteristically, advising involves either bouletic modality indexed to the advisee’s desires (‘given that you love aerobic exercise, take up running!’), teleological modality indexed to the advisee’s goals (‘given that you’re trying to get fit, take up running!’), or deontic modality associated with a system of rules that the advisee is antecedently committed to (‘given that school requires you to take a sport, take up running!’).

The fact that advising is primarily indexed to the advisee’s desires and goals does not mean that all advising exclusively takes place from within the advisee’s belief and preference sets (see Nowell-Smith 1954, 155-7, Gauthier 54-6, Andreou 2006). Advisors can attempt to persuade advisees to change their beliefs or preferences, and may issue directives which presuppose beliefs or preferences which the advisee does not have as a means to do so. If these attempts are unsuccessful (or the attempt is viewed as futile), then an advisor may well issue advice which is indexed to beliefs or preferences which she does not share.

The idea that advising is collaborative deliberation can neatly explain the normative landscape of advising. If advising is a kind of pretence in which advisor and advisee treat a problem of the advisee’s as if it were a joint problem, then the reasons that are relevant to the solution of that problem will not be the advisor’s or shared reasons, but the advisee’s alone. Collaborative deliberation involves an extension of deliberative capacities, but leaves the advisee’s choice alone (modulo persuasion).

Second, consider the relation between advising and the reasons it invokes. Unlike ordering, which creates normative facts through the exercise of authority, imperatival advising—like warning and recommending—is answerable to prior normative facts. Hobbes makes this point nicely:

\[\footnote{I take this terminology from (Portner 2007).}

\[\footnote{Hinchman’s account of advising (Hinchman 2005) is built around a special case of persuasion in which the advisor tries to add a new reason to the advisee’s situation by inviting him to trust her.}

\[\footnote{The acceptability of persuasion is contextual and may be limited by role responsibilities: it would be surprising for a legal advisor to try to persuade you to care more about your family.}
“Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it, is taken from the thing itself which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander. For it is not properly said, Thus I will, and thus I Command, except the will stand for a Reason.” (Hobbes 1998 S XIV 1).

The fact that imperatival advising rests on prior normative facts means, advising can be subject to epistemic challenges. Consider a parent uttering 10 and 11 to a teenager going to a party in a situation where curfew is under the scope of the household rules, and drinking is not:

10) Be home by 10.30! [ORDER]

11) Don’t drink more than two beers! [ADVICE]

The teenager can only challenge (10) by appealing with his parents to change their mind. By contrast, he can legitimately challenge (11) by asking what would be so bad about drinking more than two beers. If he can argue the point, then his parent would be obliged to retract their imperative in a way that they wouldn’t have to with an order. Relatedly, it is quite possible to order someone to do something when it is common knowledge that it is not the best thing to do (‘just do what I say and come home by 10.30!’), but advising must be done under the guise of the good, at least in its presentation to the advisee.

This difference between advising and ordering is neatly predicted by the idea that advising is collaborative deliberation. Although advisors may employ the linguistic markers of orders or joint decisions in certain cases, in entering into collaborative deliberation, the bounds of the pretence are set up the practical problem faced by the advisee.

Thirdly, consider the deference model of advising which is shared by both the assertive and directive accounts of advising. There are certainly cases in which we go to advisors because we need knowledge (the situations of the deliberators who are out of their depth, ignorant, and novices), but in other cases we seek out advising from people who are just as knowledgeable as us, or who might know less than us. In MOVING AWAY, Fred need not think that Alex is an expert on relationship matters, and she doesn’t need to present herself as such to offer useful contributions. Recall the high-stakes situation: sometimes we just want someone to think through a problem with, and it does not matter if they know more, or are more deliberatively skilled than us. This possibility is neatly predicted by the idea that advising is collaborative deliberation.

Reflections on ordinary language, and sociolinguistics suggests that advising is surprisingly heterogeneous, including advising-to, advising-that, and advising by

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16 For disagreement about the significance of this distinction see (Raz 1979), (Hamblin 1987 pp.10-14), (Wiland 2000b, 2004) (Darwall 2006 pp.12-13), (Mcmyler 2011 C.5)

17 This opens up the intriguing possibility that advisors might learn from advisees through the enterprise of joint deliberation.
asking questions. Thinking about the normative role of advising also suggests that it has some distinctive normative features: being indexed to the advisee’s prior practical situation. These features, and the diversity of types of advising can be neatly predicted by the view that advising is collaborative deliberation. With the positive case for the view in place, we will now turn to the treatment of advising by speech act theorists to argue that the directive and assertive views are mistaken because advising is not a kind of speech act.

3. Is Advising a Speech Act?

Following Austin, speech act theorists have assumed that English verbs which take the performative formulation—‘I hereby V…’—correspond to kinds of speech acts. The goal of this section is to argue that ‘advise’ is an exception, because it is not a kind of speech act (see Searle 1979 pp.28-9). This means that the assertive and directive views of advising are based on a false assumption about what kind of thing advising is and will only end up distorting the ordinary category.

We start off by surveying the way that speech act theorists have classified advising (3.1.), before showing that whatever theory of speech acts is correct, advising spans the distinction between the three principal types of speech act (3.2.), and arguing that this fact presents a knock-down argument against the assertive and directive accounts of advising (3.3.).

3.1. Speech Act Typologies and Advising

Austin’s classification of illocutionary acts, which focuses on the performative uses of speech act verbs, groups advising with exercitives, which he glosses as “the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy” (Austin 1975 p154). Vendler adds grammatical criteria to Austin’s typology, keeping advising in the category of exercitives on the grounds that performative sentences involve an infinitival complement (or a declarative ought) (Vendler 1972 pp.20-1).

Bach and Harnish’s Gricean typology of speech acts groups speech acts according to the kind of mental state they express. They group advising with advisories, which they classify as directives on the grounds that they communicates an attitude toward a prospective action. They offer a pocket definition of this category (see Hinchman 2005):

“As for advisories, what the speaker expresses is not the desire that H do a certain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in H’s interest. S expresses also the intention that H take this belief of S’s as a reason to act. The corresponding perlocutionary intentions are that H take S to believe that S actually has the attitudes he is expressing and that H perform the action he is being advised to perform.” (Bach and Harnish 1979 p49)

In a footnote (1979 fn3), they note that advising can be performed by either imperatives or declaratives, and contend that in the latter case, advising involves an
indirect speech act.

Searle classifies speech acts based on their constitutive rules. An early time-slice of Searle uses advising as an example of his typology, and classifies it as an assertive speech act. He gives the following rationale:

Contrary to what one might suppose advice is not a species of requesting. It is interesting to compare “Advise” with “Urge” “Advocate” and “Recommend.” Advising is not trying to get you to do something in the sense that requesting is. Advising is more like telling you what is best for you. (Searle 1969 p67).

Later time-slices change their mind. First he distinguishes between advising-to and advising-that as distinct acts which are assertive or directives respectively (Searle 1979, 28). He then classifying advising as a directive that can take direct imperatival, or indirect declarative forms (Searle and Vanderveken 1985 pp.202-3).

The disagreement among speech act theorists about how to classify advising is no surprise if advising in fact involves both assertive and directive speech acts, providing examples to illustrate both kinds of view. Although this diversity speaks in favour of a different view, Searle and Bach and Harnish’s appeal to indirect speech acts suggests a strategy for the supporters of the assertive and directive pictures to maintain a speech-act theoretic account of advising. The idea would be to unify advising not through primary illocutionary acts, but through a combination of primary and indirect speech acts. The assertive picture will want to maintain that cases of advising-to are indirectly assertions of an underlying normative fact which supports the course of action (which we might think of as making as if to direct (Harris 2014 pp.106-11, 2021 fn4)), and interrogative advising is indirectly an assertion of a relevant normative or non-normative fact. Similarly, the directive picture will want to maintain that both cases of advising-that and interrogative advising involve indirect recommendations about what to do.

3.2. The Speech Act theoretic Features of Advising

Our strategy will be to argue that whichever categorisation of speech acts is correct, advising displays features of the fundamental types of speech act. Typologies of speech acts appeal to the following kinds of properties to make their basic classifications:

1. Illocutionary point (what the speaker is trying to do in making the speech acts);
2. The direction of fit of the content expressed by the speech act (whether that be mind-world as in the case of assertives, or world-mind as in the case of directives);
3. The kind of content expressed by the sentences uttered in making the speech act (whether that be propositional content, imperatival content, or interrogative content);
4. The effects of the speech act on the conversational scoreboard (assertives update the common ground propositions, directives update the audience’s to-do list, askings update the questions under discussion);

5. The mental states expressed by the speech acts (with assertives expressing belief, directives desire or intention, and interrogatives expressing the desire to know, or the intention to discover).

No single author appeals to all of these features, and which they rely on depends on their views of what speech acts are. I associate 1. with the taxonomies proposed by Austin (1975), Searle (1979), and Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 2. is relied upon heavily by Searle (1979), 3. is appealed to by Roberts (2018), 4. is a combination of the work of Stalnaker (1978), Portner (2006), and Roberts (1996/2012), and 5. is associated with Bach and Harnish (1979).

Let’s go through these accounts in turn, considering how advising displays all of the features which these views associate with assertives, directives, and askings.

3.2.1. Illocutionary Force

Illocutionary force corresponds to what the speaker is up to in uttering a particular sentence, which is essential to the performance of that kind of act. If a speaker is asserting, she might be trying to get the hearer to believe some proposition, or expressing her belief in that proposition. If she is directing, she might be trying to get the hearer to do something, or expressing her desire that the speaker do it. If she is asking, she might be trying to get her hearer to answer the question, or expressing her desire to know the answer.

Advising involves elements of all three kinds of illocutionary point. Advising-that involves the expression of belief, and the attempt to influence the hearer’s beliefs. Advising-to is a little more tricky: although it involves the attempt to influence the hearer’s actions, it expresses not the desire that the speaker does something—an advisor might be disinterested, or might advise the hearer to do something which is against her self-interest—but rather the belief that the recommended course of action promotes the hearer’s goals, desires, or is in line with the demands of morality. Interrogative advising is also a little unusual. Normally asking a question is either a request that the hearer answer a question immediately, or a proposal to jointly answer the question. In either case, the speaker expresses a desire to know the answer to the question. In the case of advising, the point of asking a question is often not to facilitate the advisor coming to know the answer, but rather to get the advisee to consider it. Hence, interrogative advising involves attempt to get the hearer to answer the question, but not the expression of a desire to know its answer.

The differences between different kinds of advising preclude the unification of advising at the level of primary illocution, but what about the illocutionary points of indirect speech acts? In 3.1 we noted that it is possible that every instance of advising-that and advising by asking involves an indirect speech act which recommends a course of action to be pursued, which would allow the supporter of the directive picture to unify advising via a combination of direct and indirect
illocutionary points (ditto for indirect assertions and the assertive picture). Although these pictures are neat, it is unclear why we should think that every instance of advising—that involves an indirect recommendation. If I ask you to advise me about a possible career change, and you ask me ‘what parts of your job do you like?’ and tell me that ‘the job market is tough everywhere’, neither piece of advising necessarily involves a recommendation. To make this strategy work, we would either need to find evidence that we are systematically engaged in one or other indirect speech acts whilst advising, or drastically restrict the category of advising.

3.2.2. Direction of Fit

The direction of fit associated with a sentence corresponds to way sentence relates to the world (Anscombe 1957, Searle 1979 C1). Some sentences function to represent the world, meaning that a mismatch between word and world is associated with a fault in the sentence. Other sentences function to change the world to bring it into line with words, meaning that a mismatch involves a fault in the world. Assertives have word-to-world direction of fit, and directives and world-to-word direction of fit. As above, advising-to involves world-to-word direction of fit: advising someone to do something functions to get them to pursue the course of action recommended, and if the advice is not taken, the fault lies (primarily) with the advisee, not with the advisor. By contrast, advising-that involves word-to-world direction of fit: advising of a pertinent fact functions to represent a relevant part of the world, and if there is a mismatch between word and world, the fault is with the advisor’s word, not the world.

3.2.3. Kind of Content

Although there is a long tradition of assimilating all meaning to propositional content (Belnap 1990), there is an emerging paradigm within philosophy and language and linguistics—synthesised in the work of Craige Roberts (Roberts 2018)—which claims that different grammatical moods track different kinds of content. If we take declarative sentences to express propositions, imperatives sentences to express directed tasks (Portner 2006), and interrogatives to express questions (which we might think of as sets of answers (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984)), the fact that advising involves all three grammatical moods means that it involves three different kinds of content.19

3.2.4. Scoreboard Effects

We might think about different kinds of speech acts in terms of the various

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18 It is a complicated question what direction of fit askings involve: the presuppositions of a question represent the world, as does its answers, but asking a question plausibly involves the proposal to answer it.

19 There are views of imperatives and interrogatives which predict that both express propositions (see Kaufman 2012 in the case of imperatives, and Karttunen 1977 in the case of interrogatives), which would open up the possibility of an assertive account of advising, view of advising would rely on some heavy-duty claims about meaning.
ways in which they update conversational context, understood as a complex of shared mental states. Craige Roberts (2018) develops this view into a typology of speech acts, suggesting that the basic categories are assertions, which are proposals to update the common ground of accepted proposals, and suggestions, which are proposals to adopt intentions. Suggestions break down into directions, which are proposals to adopt intentions to do things in the world, and interrogations, which are proposals to answer a question. According to this view, advising would split between the major categories: advising—that is a proposal to update the common ground with information relevant to the advisee’s decision, advising-to is a proposal to update the advisee’s to-do list with a particular action in response to his practical situation, and interrogative advising is a proposal to consider a question.

One issue that will be important later on is whether speech acts are always proposals to symmetrically update the mental states of speaker and hearer. In the case of assertion, Christine Gunlogson (2004) argues that declaratives with falling pitch (‘It’s cold out ↑’) proposes speaker commitment, whereas declaratives with rising pitch (‘It’s cold out↓’) proposes hearer commitment. This proposal suggests that context contains both the common ground of jointly accepted propositions, and sets of propositions representing individually accepted propositions. We might adopt a similar model of directives and askings. A directive speech act might be addressed to both speaker and hearer (as in the case of proposals for shared action), to the hearer (as in the case of orders), or even self-addressed to the speaker (Portner 2018). The asking of a question might be a proposal to answer the question together (this is the use which Roberts focuses on), a proposal for the hearer to answer it (think of the use of questions in a quiz show), or perhaps even a proposal for the speaker to answer the question (think of self-directed questions in speeches).

3.2.5. Mental States Expressed

Following Bach and Harnish, we might want to distinguish speech acts via the mental states they express. The standard way to test which mental states are expressed by a speech act is by combining a performative speech act with a denial of the expression of a mental state. If the conjunction is strange in the same way as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it is’ (anomalous, but not inconsistent), then this is evidence that the speech act expresses the relevant mental state. The use of Moore-style sentences goes back to Nowell-Smith (1954, p154), who suggests the following sentence is bad in the same way:

12) You ought to climb it [the mountain], but I don’t advise you to.

Gauthier concurs, suggesting that in 13) “the speaker is advising both for and against in the same breath” (1963, p153).

Our interest is in a slightly different Moore-style sentence which combines advising with the denial of the distinctive mental states associated with assertive and directive speech acts. I’ll take it that assertive speech acts express belief, and directive speech acts express either desires or the belief that the direction will be
successfully followed (or both).

Focusing on advising-that and advising-to, and the omissive version of the paradox gives us six sentences to consider:

13) #I advise you that the train is leaving in ten minutes, but I don’t believe that it will.
14) I advise you that the train is leaving in ten minutes, but I don’t want you to catch it.
15) I advise you that the train is leaving in ten minutes, but I don’t believe you are going to catch it.
16) #I advise you to go to Dotori, but I don’t believe that you ought to go.
17) I advise you to go to Dotori, but I don’t want you to go.
18) #I advise you to go to Dotori, but I don’t believe that you will go.

13) combines a (fancy) assertion with the denial of belief in the proposition asserted, and is weird in the same way as the original Moore sentence for belief. This is unsurprising, given the suggestion that advising-that is a kind of assertion. 14) and 15) combine advising-that with desires and beliefs relating to a putative indirect recommendation. Neither of these sentences are strange. If the first conjunct is a simple assertion without any associated indirect speech act, it would be completely reasonable to combine it with the statement of desire, or disbelief in another proposition. 16) appears weird in the Moorean way. It is quite possible to advise someone to do something that you don’t believe they ought—third person reports of this form would be sensible—but uttering this sentence is very strange. This is the converse of Nowell-Smith’s example: it combines a recommendation with a denial of belief relating to the normative grounding of that recommendation. If, as we suggested in section 2.3., advising-to is a directive grounded in knowledge of the advisee’s good, we can explain the oddness of 16) by thinking of it as combining a speech act with the denial that one is properly positioned to undertake that act.

I suggest that sentences like 16) will be weird for all directive speech acts, although the explanation for the weirdness will be slightly different. Consider orders:

19) # I order you to take a seat, but I don’t believe that you ought to.

19) is odd, because the expected upshot of the order in the first clause is that the

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20 In support of the idea that some assertions do not involve indirect recommendations, consider:

1) I advise you that the train is leaving in ten minutes, but I wouldn’t take it if I were you.

This sentence is not weird in the way that the following sentence is:

2) #I advise you to take the train in ten minutes, but I wouldn’t take it if I were you.

21 See Williamson on the knowledge rule of assertion (Williamson 2000, C11)
task of taking a seat is added to the hearer’s to-do list, making it the case that he ought to take a seat. So, although the explanation for 17) goes through some distinctive features of advising, the general pattern occurs for all directives.\footnote{A caveat: weak imperatives (‘take an Oyster’) which are used to make suggestions or to change option spaces do not determine normative facts in this way. This will be true both for weak imperatives in ordering and advising.}

17) is not odd. although we normally expect advisors to desire our good, it is absolutely possible for an advisor to recommend a course of action which promotes the advisee’s goals, but it contrary to the advisors (‘Given that you want to see the world, take the trip to Rwanda, but I don’t want you to go’). Advising is not unusual in this respect: warnings, exhortations, and suggestions are all indexed to the hearer’s goals and desires, opening up the possibility of a divergence between a direction and the desires of the speaker. One might take this as evidence that the mental states expressed by directives are more complicated than simple desires.

At first pass 18) does seem odd, especially if we replace the first clause with an imperative:

18*)? Go to Dotori, but I don’t believe that you are going to go.

The modified 18*) is related to what Mandlekern (2021) calls practical Moore sentences: sentences which combine an order with an indicative that leaves it open whether the order will be followed (see Ninan 2005).

20) # You must close the door, but I don’t know whether you will.

Although it is tempting to assimilate 19) and 19*) into this category, there are cases in which they are. Consider a case in which 19) is uttered by a foodie giving unsolicited advice to her persistently disorganised friend. If we imagine her uttering the second half of the sentence under her breath, 19) is perfectly comprehensible. This is not a massive surprise: practical Moore sentences involve orders, and we’ve seen that advising is rather different to other kinds of directive speech act. Underlining this difference, note that merely leaving open whether an order will be followed is odd, but analogous sentences for advising are fine:

21) I advise you to go to Dotori, but you might not go.

Insofar as there is residual weirdness around 19) and 19*), I suggest that it owes to the fact that it is usually not going to be helpful to advise someone to do something that they are not in a position to do. These sentences are weird because they give bad advice, not because they involve pragmatic contradictions.

This data is a little complicated, but the underlying pattern is that advising displays Moorean sentences which are distinctive of both assertive (14) and directive (17) speech acts, suggesting that it can express both belief in the proposition asserted, and a belief about what the hearer ought to do.
3.3. Advising is not a speech act

What should we make of the combination of speech act theoretic features displayed by advising? I think that there are three possibilities:

i. Advising is not a unified category; ‘advise’ is ambiguous;
ii. Advising is a unified speech act, but it is systematically pursued in an indirect way;
iii. Advising is not a unified activity, but it is unified by some other feature.

The view that ‘advise’ is ambiguous seems to be the option favoured by Searle’s 1979 timeslice. However, if ‘advise’ was ambiguous between an infinitival and that-clause embedding instances, then 23) would be zeugmatic ((Zwicky and Sadock 1975), which it is not:

22) Jane advised Harry that he was going to be late, and to take a Taxi.

Perhaps we should think about this as a backstop option in case no account of advising is forthcoming.

The view that advising is unified through indirect speech acts can appeal to some supporting evidence: we do advise by using assertions to recommend courses of actions (for example). There are two problems with this kind of view. The first is the one pointed out in 3.2.1. — it is a substantive claim that all assertive advising involves indirect recommendations, meaning that this view either takes on a substantial linguistic burden, or restricts the category of advising. The second problem is that prima facie the linguistic evidence will equally support the view that advisory assertives and askings involve indirect recommendations (the indirect directive account), and the view that directives and askings involve indirect assertions (the indirect assertive account). If both the indirect assertive and indirect directive views can appeal to broadly similar kinds of evidence, we are unlikely to gain further insight into the nature of advising by painstakingly arbitrating this evidence.

I think that the right conclusion to take away from both the ordinary diversity of advising, and the seemingly futile disagreement about classification is that advising is simply not a speech act. It is an activity which we typically pursue via the means of speech acts, but it is a kind of joint practical thinking. Rather than sifting through the various complex indirect forms of advising to determine what advising is, we should see these complex speech acts as illustrative of the diversity of forms which advising can take, combining the deliberative needs we isolated in our prototypical situations. The tools of philosophy of language are useful for mapping out the complexity of advising; we need to look to the theory of joint practical deliberation.

Can we advise without engaging in any kinds of speech acts? Perhaps certain kinds of exemplary behaviour might count as advising.

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23 Can we advise without engaging in any kinds of speech acts? Perhaps certain kinds of exemplary behaviour might count as advising.
to understand what unifies it.

Conclusion

We started by considering what the point of our talk and thought about advising might be, framing the hypothesis that our concept of advising answers to our need to pool deliberative resources. The pooling of deliberative resources turns out to be a surprisingly complex activity, involving the provision of propositions, directions, and of questions, and this complexity is reflected in the diversity of forms which advising can take: advising-that, advising-to, and adviceless advising. Recognising the diversity of forms of advising is itself an important advance in our understanding, but we’ve also seen that we can unify these diverse forms of advising using the idea that advising is collaborative deliberation. Thinking of advising as involving a certain kind of pretence of joint deliberation helps us to not only explain the diversity of advising, and the possibility of adviceless advising, but also to understand the distinctive modal force involved in advising, the relation between advising and prior normative facts, and why advisors are often, but need not always be wise. I don’t think that we need to throw out the previous work on advising in ethics and philosophy of language, but I think that we should think about it as concerning special cases of a pretty diverse form of activity.

In closing I want to note two issues for future research. We have been focusing on advising in general, the majority of high-stakes advising—government advisors, financial advisors, lawyers—involves complex role responsibilities which shape and limit the way in which they can advise, and place responsibilities which make offering certain kinds of advice non-discretionary. It would be interesting to try to understand what the norms of professional advising are, and how they might shape distinctive forms of collaborative deliberation. There is also a rich connection between advising and friendship: we evaluate friends by the quality and quantity of their advising, and there is a sense that seeking out a friend’s advice is a way to deepen that friendship. If advising involves treating someone else’s practical situation as your own, then advising will have connections to the Aristotelian ideal of friendship as treating someone as an other self.

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