St. Vitus’s Women of Color: Dancing with Hegel

Joshua M. Hall

To cite this article: Joshua M. Hall (2017) St. Vitus’s Women of Color: Dancing with Hegel, Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 9:1, 43-61, DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2017.1306918

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2017.1306918

Published online: 03 Apr 2017.
St. Vitus’s Women of Color: Dancing with Hegel

Joshua M. Hall

Department of Philosophy, Emory University, Oxford, GA, USA

ABSTRACT
In the first section of this essay, I offer a brief overview of Hegel’s dozen or so mentions of dance in his Lectures on Aesthetics, focusing on the tension between Hegel’s denigration of dance as an “imperfect art” and his characterization of dance as a potential threat to the other arts. In the second section, I turn to an insightful essay from Hans-Christian Lucas on Hegel’s “Anthropology,” focusing on his argument that the Anthropology’s crucial final sections (importantly connected to “magic” and “animal magnetism”) threaten to undermine Hegel’s entire philosophy. And in the final section, I offer my own reading of the Anthropology, connecting the threads of my previous two sections. More specifically, I attempt to show that Hegel has in effect quarantined dance in what he terms “the dark regions” of madness in “The Feeling Soul.” Overall, I suggest that this quarantining is ultimately as problematic for Hegel as it has been for dance. Because without dance, complete with its associations with people disempowered in their embodiment (such as women and people of color), this crucial transitional section in the Anthropology remains burdened with a corporeal remainder that problematizes the entire system. Put simply, Hegel must – by his own logic – learn to dance gracefully with those he would rather shun.

KEYWORDS
Dance; Hegel; madness; women of color; Hans-Christian Lucas

Hegel’s most famous reference to dance comes from The Philosophy of Right, when, after quoting an ancient Greek saying, Ἰδοὺ Ροδός, ἱδοὺ καὶ τὸ πιδίμα (in Latin, Hic Rhodus, hic saltus), Hegel makes the following observation: “With little change, the above saying would read (in German) ‘Hier ist die Rose, hier tanze,’” or in English, “Here is the rose, dance here.”¹ Hegel is punning here on the fact that “In Greek Rhodo means either ‘Rhodes’ or ‘rose,’ and in Latin, salta means either ‘jump’ or ‘dance.” Hegel elaborates as follows: “To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present – this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have received the inner call to comprehend …” (Hegel 1991, 22).²


²With regard to this “rose in the cross,” the footnote to the above passage suggests that it was “apparently suggested to Hegel by the name (and the visual emblem) of the ‘Rosicrucians,’ the secret religious society,” named after the “(alleged) founder of the society, Christian Rosenkreutz (fourteenth century)” but also with “doctrinal significance for Rosicrucians, associated with their proverb ‘No cross, no crown’: i.e. one reaches the ‘rose’ (the divine), only through the ‘cross’ (earthly suffering) …” (Hegel 1991, 22n).

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Hegel’s point here, put simplistically, is that philosophy should, rather than shouting
about how the state should function, instead merely describe how it actually functions.
But an implication of this passage, which is counterintuitive given Hegel’s exclusion of
dance from the five central arts, is that dance can serve as an image or metaphor for
his philosophy as a whole.3 Perhaps this is one reason for the pervasive tradition in
Hegel scholarship of using dance as a metaphor or figure for both Hegel’s philosophy
in general, and also his method of the dialectic in particular. (This is evidenced, in part,
by the frequent use in this literature of the phrase “dance of the dialectic,” which even
appears in the title of two such monographs.)4

Another reason for the prevalence of this dance metaphor, however, might be biogra-
phical, in that (according to one scholar) Hegel “as a teenager, enjoyed the company
of young women and loved to dance (though he was said by his sister to be a somewhat
awkward [linkisch] dancer).”5 A second moment in Hegel’s life that involves dance is
found in the following account from one of his philosophy students:

I remember that in 1812 a dancing-master came to Nürnberg, and, with Hegel’s permission,
opened a course of lessons at the gymnasium, for which the members were requested to put
down their names. … The dancing-master, skilful enough at his art, was, as is not unusual, a
coxcomb; the wearisome exercises, in mannerly deportment, the standing in stocks to turn
the toes outwards, etc., were not liked. … In short, some of the scholars planned to withdraw
from their engagement. … [Hegel, however] would not see the dancing-master lose the fees
guaranteed to him, and, in short, we were obliged to dance, stand in stocks, and make our
salutations till the end of summer. (Caird 2002, 53)

The word “coxcomb” (according to the OED) derives from the silly cap, similar in appearance
to the red growth on the top of a rooster (or cock/cox), and can denote a fool in general,
or “A fool, simpleton (obs.); now, a foolish, conceited, showy person, vain of his accomplishments, appearance, or dress; a fop; ‘a superficial pretender to knowledge or accomplishments’ (Johnson).” There is also, interestingly, an obsolete sense in which “coxcomb” is “applied to a woman” in particular, which would align with the tendency in Western culture to ridicule male dancers as prone to inappropriate femininity and/or homosexuality (Fisher and Shay 2009). Not only has this tendency been the subject of social scientific research, but it is also suggested by multiple moments in Hegel’s texts, as I will trace in detail below.6

---

3Incidentally, this quote itself is part of a strange story. It originates with a Latin translation of Aesop’s fable entitled “The Boastful Athlete,” in which an athlete who has bragged about a feat he once performed in Rhodes is challenged by an interlocutor to instead merely repeat the feat to prove his ability.


5This last point calls to mind Nietzsche’s observations in the Gay Science about the awkward movements of philosophers’ “feet,” which they therefore attempt to cover up by wearing “long robes” (or long, convoluted sentences); Nietzsche may have even been thinking here of Hegel in particular (Nietzsche 2001,160). According to the Oxford-Duden German Dictionary (Clark, ed. 2001), the root of this word, link, means “underhanded deal” or “underhanded deal” or “a shady customer,” a link (as in a chain), or “left,” “wrong, reverse,” and “Leftist” (503). Thus, this negativity of Hegel’s awkward dancing connects a race-connoting pejorative quality (since shady could suggest darker skin), connectedness in general, and progressive/liberal politics.

6See, for examples of this research, Doug Risner’s (2009) Stigma and Perseverance in the Lives of Men Who Dance: An Empirical Study of Male Identities in Western Theatrical Dance Training, and the anthology When Men Dance: Choreographing Masculinities Across Borders. Also, interestingly, as the word “coxcomb” derives from the body part of an animal
Also in the vein of embodiment, race/ethnicity figures prominently in one of Hegel’s few explicit references to dance, from the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. The context of this reference is Hegel’s defense of African slavery as a natural and logical consequence of the Africans’ “complete contempt” for human life (1981, 182). This contempt derives, according to Hegel, from what he views as their lack of a belief in the immortality of the soul, or consciousness of “anything universal” or of “a higher being” (182). “When the negro slaves have labored all day they are perfectly contented and will dance with the most violent convulsions throughout the night” (quoted in Kain 2005, 248). This “observation” (in the loosest sense of the word) follows Hegel’s preceding claim that even the Africans themselves have no objection to slavery, and thus he is attempting to offer empirical support. That is, Hegel is arguing that slavery cannot be as bad as it might seem, because after a full day of slavery the enslaved persons still have enough energy and happiness to dance “convulsively” all night long (248).

Thinking together these three moments – the rose-dance, the coxcomb, and the black slaves – what one finds is that dance is situated for Hegel at extreme ends of an axiological continuum, both idealistically, serving as a figure for his philosophy in general (and particularly his dialectical method), and also materialistically, found in the “external” world as a practice associated with people oppressed in their very embodiment (including women and people of color). Rather than view this as a mere contradiction in Hegel, it seems legitimate to instead explore this counterintuitive fact along dialectical lines. That is, perhaps these two seemingly discrete and opposed attributes of dance (ideal symbol and tarnished practice) are in truth merely two moments in the development of spirit. If so, it would be appropriate to attempt to see how these two moments might be transfigured into a third and more comprehensive moment unifying the subjectivity of dance-as-metaphor and the objectivity of the dance-as-art form. That is the admittedly ambitious goal of the present essay.

In the first section of this essay, I offer a brief overview of Hegel’s dozen or so mentions of dance in his Lectures on Aesthetics (all from Part 3), focusing on the tension between Hegel’s denigration of dance as an “imperfect art” and his characterization of dance as a potential threat to the other arts. In the second section, I turn to an insightful essay from Hans-Christian Lucas on Hegel’s “Anthropology,” focusing on his argument that the Anthropology’s crucial final sections (importantly connected to “magic” and “animal magnetism”) threaten to undermine Hegel’s entire philosophy. And in the final section, I offer my own reading of the Anthropology (and especially its middle section, entitled “The Feeling Soul”), connecting the threads of my previous two sections.

More specifically, in this final section I attempt to show that Hegel has in effect quarantined dance (albeit in disguise) in what he terms “the dark regions” of madness in “The Feeling Soul” – where corporeity is “the soul’s work of art,” where young and pregnant women are afflicted with the madness called “St. Vitus’s dance,” where the dialectical cure for such madness is habit (especially in the form of an “agility” concerned with “training,” “upright posture,” “gesture,” and above all “gait”), and where the ultimate mastery of corporeity manifests as having made one’s body into a “skillful instrument” – the ultimate

*(namely the “comb” or red growth on the “cock” or rooster), it also connotes non-human animality, another important locus of oppression in Western culture.*
“magical relationship” within which the movements of the soul immediately become those of the body.

Overall, then, I suggest that this quarantining is ultimately as problematic for Hegel as it has been for (the danger that is) dance. Because without dance, complete with its associations with people disempowered in their embodiment (such as women and people of color), this crucial transitional section in the Anthropology remains burdened with a corporeal remainder that problematizes the entire system. Put simply, Hegel must – by his own logic – learn to dance gracefully with those he would rather shun.7

Dance in the lectures on aesthetics

In the introduction to Part 3 of his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel notes – along with similar observations about poetry and music – that, although humans take pleasure in it, “leaping” is “not yet” dancing (Hegel 1994, 632). On a related note, the foundational text of dance studies, Letters on Dancing and Ballets, written by a contemporary of Hegel’s named Jean-Georges Noverre, refers to “Levantines” and “Africans” as examples of “races given to dancing or rather leaping, or other forms of vigorous exercise” (Noverre 2004, 117, emphasis added). Perhaps, in light of the extensive discussions of race in Hegel’s “Anthropology,” and of that discussion’s connections to race, this claim from Noverre is suggestive of the operation of race in Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics as well. I will return to Noverre near the end of this essay in reference to the connection between habit-as-skill and dance.

Despite thus connecting dance to his central five arts, however, Hegel makes a point, four pages later, of designating dance (along with gardening) as an “imperfect” art. “It is true that outside [poetry, music, painting, sculpture and architecture] there are other imperfect arts, such as gardening, dancing, etc., which however we can only mention in passing” (Hegel 1994, 627). Here, then, is a prima facie reason why practically nothing more has been said about Hegel and dance.8 Another reason, and a consequence of this perceived imperfection, is that Hegel assigns dance no separate section (as he does for the “big five” of poetry, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture). So to press on, one must look instead at the brief moments where dance manifests itself in these other five Hegelian realms.

Although dance appears once in the section on sculpture (in regard to naked fauns) and twice in the section on music (in regard to dance-music “getting into one’s feet” and the

---


8 627. This status of an imperfect art is taken up in an illuminating way in Francis Sparshott’s (1982) “On the Question: Why Do Philosophers Neglect the Aesthetics of the Dance?”
inappropriately mercurial swings in contemporary German drama), its only appearances beyond the word “dance” itself are found in the section on poetry (Hegel 1994, 745, 906, 948). First, there is the following passage regarding dramatic poetry in particular:

If gestures are carried artistically to such a degree of expression that words can be dispensed with, then we have pantomime which, in that case, turns the rhythmic movement of poetry into a rhythmic and pictorial movement of limbs. In this plastic music of bodily posture and movement the peaceful and cold work of sculpture is ensouled and animated into a dance, and music and plastic art are in this way unified. (Hegel 1994, 1039)

Note, first, the lyrical evocativeness of the description, “this plastic music of bodily posture and movement” in which “the peaceful and cold work of sculpture is ensouled and animated into a dance.” Additionally, sculpture is foregrounded here in a way that distances us from the actual human body; that is, it’s not that the body becomes musical, but rather that the body – frozen and reified into the lifeless object of sculpture – is reanimated by music. A more direct and phenomenologically accurate description (based in part on my 20 years of experience as a dancer and choreographer) would be that the always-already animated body fuses directly with music (as in Hegel’s aforementioned example of dance-music permeating the listener’s feet). That is, sculpture artificially freezes the body’s constant rhythms, while in real life those rhythms are simply modulated into those of a given piece of music (rather than the body beginning at stasis). At any rate, the upshot of this passage seems to be that pantomime marks for Hegel an infusion of the pictorial (from painting, sculpture and architecture) into the merely rhythmic (from music and poetry), which in effect fuses music and sculpture into a new art form.

Another positive mention of dance-within-poetry is found in Hegel’s description of the poetry of “the Anacreon songs,” in which

the poet depicts himself amongst roses, lovely girls and youths, as drinking and dancing, in cheerful enjoyment, without desire or longing, without duty, and without neglecting higher ends, for of these there is no question here at all; in short, he depicts himself as a hero who, innocent and free and therefore without restriction or deficiency, is merely this one man who he is, a man of his own sort as a subjective work of art. (Hegel 1994, 1121)

Here the claim is practically Nietzschean, in that the person makes his/her own life directly into an artwork, albeit a merely subjective and therefore deficient one (Nietzsche 2001, 171).

The third mention of dance in the poetry section, shortly after the previous block quote, appears as Hegel is distinguishing Greek lyric poetry from “romantic” poetry (in that the former is as interested in the external as it is in the internal):

[L]ike the inner life and its ideas, their external presentation is also of a rather plastic kind, because, so far as music goes, what is emphasized is not so much the inner and soulful melody of feeling as the perceptible sound of words in the rhythmic measure of their movement, and at last permits the entry of the complications of the dance. (Hegel 1994, 1150)

On the one hand, “complications” in general suggests a critical mood, particularly in light of the opposition to the positive adjectives “inner and soulful.” More specifically, dance introduces a complexity that is distracting, that takes away from the power of poetry. On the other hand, for Hegel in particular, “complications” is often a valorizing term, in connection with the increasing self-sophistication of the dialectic. The latter
interpretation, however, is less supported on the next page, in Hegel’s discussion of the Greek chorus. The “inner movement” of the chorus’ songs, he writes,

is not satisfied by the mere rhythm of speech and musical modulations, but, as a plastic element [in the Greek drama], summons in aid the movements of a dance, so that here the subjective side of lyric acquires a complete counterpoise through being illustrated by means of an external mode of execution. (Hegel 1994, 1151)

In other words, “what at first had worth only as an aid and an accompaniment becomes an end in itself and, in its own sphere, is shaped into having an inherently independent beauty – declamation becomes song, action becomes mimicry in dancing … ” (Hegel 1994, 1181–1182). This transformation is sufficiently important for Hegel that it occasions a tripartite division of dramatic poetry, into (a) that which “disregards the theatrical production of its works,” (b) that in which “poetic language may always remain the determining and dominant feature,” and (c) that which “uses every means of scenery, music, and dance and makes them independent of the poet’s words” (1182). While this third form, and thus the transformation through which it comes to be, might sound neutral, or even potentially positive, Hegel’s subsequent claims rule out such a possibility.

In the context of discussing “the actor’s art” in drama, which includes “calling on the aid of” dancing, Hegel warns us that “so soon as mimicry or singing and dancing begin to be developed on their own account and independently, poetry as an art is degraded to being a means and loses its dominion over these other arts which should be merely its accompaniment” (Hegel 1994, 1186). Hegel intensifies this criticism on the next page, through the following attempt at dance criticism: “We in Germany would consider [the Greek choruses’ dancing] frivolous in view of our contemporary style of dancing, while for the Greeks it was an essential feature in the whole spectacle of theatrical productions” (1187). This is not, though, any form of cultural relativism for Hegel, as indicated by his subsequent words of caution: “Yet speech suffers under music and dancing because it should be the spiritual expression of spirit, and so, after all, in modern times the actor’s art has been able to liberate itself from these things” (1187). In other words, dancing for Hegel here threatens a medium (dramatic poetry) which is superior to dance in terms of dramatic poetry’s capacity to express spirit, and so dance should be kept tightly in its place.

On the other hand, in “this emancipation during the course of the development of drama, it is music and dancing, as well as the special art of the actor, that have benefited” (Hegel 1994, 1190). Thus, although dancing’s liberation has been a bad thing for speech, it has at least benefited dance itself. This is not to be misunderstood, however, as liberation of the bodily as such (or of what belongs exclusively to dance) from aspects of the other arts. On the contrary, consider the following passage – also the longest passage on dance in the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy:

[T]hose who know about these things are captivated by the extraordinarily developed bravura and suppleness of the legs, and this always plays the chief part in dancing nowadays. But if some spiritual expression is to glint through this mere dexterity, which nowadays has wandered into an extreme of senselessness and intellectual poverty, what is required is not only a complete conquest of all the technical difficulties but measured movement in harmony with our emotions, and a freedom and grace that are extremely rare … the further that modern dancing has advanced in technical skill, the more has pantomime
sunk in value and disappeared. The result is that we threaten to see more and more disappearing from modern ballet what alone could lift it into the free realm of art. (1994,1192)

In short, it is dance as the excellence of bodily movement which actually threatens dance’s potential to be its own art form. Instead, dance must embrace pantomime and all the accoutrements of the “complete art” of the theater. Thus, even in dance’s alleged emancipation, the most dangerous possibility, not only for the other arts, but also for itself, is that dance might become more fully emancipated. And as it happens, this is exactly what has occurred in twentieth-century dance.

In brief, there were three stages in this twentieth-century evolution of dance. First, within classical ballet, choreographers such as George Balanchine moved ever further from the storytelling and narrative of ballet-qua-operatic-accompaniment, and toward abstract visual composition.9 Second, torsioning classical ballet into what we now call “modern dance,” choreographers such as Martha Graham moved ever further from the rigid postures of dance-qua-visual-composition, and toward dissonant gestures in service of internal expression.10 And third, torsioning modern dance into what we now call “postmodern dance,” choreographers such as Yvonne Rainer moved ever further from dance-qua-music-infused expression, and toward the silent performance of everyday movement (including the Judson Dance Group’s famous piece in which a dancer merely sits in a chair for the duration of the performance).11

Getting closer to the twenty-first century, however, some theorists have argued that this tendency has reversed, as I discuss elsewhere in a review of Noël Carroll’s Living in an Art-world (2014). In the latter collection of his early dance reviews and essays, Carroll traces the history of art dance (specifically New York concert dance) from the 1960s to the early 1980s. In an essay entitled “The Return of the Repressed: The Re-emergence of Expression in Contemporary American Dance” Carroll distinguishes “three phases of avant-garde choreography since the sixties” (Carroll 2012, 127). There is, first, the Judson Theater’s “free-wheeling revolt” against modern dance. Second, there is a shift to a “positive” program from 1971 to 1973, which Sally Banes (in her 1987 Terpsichore in Sneakers) calls “analytic postmodern dance.” And third, there is a “postmodernist … cluster of anti-minimalist tendencies” amounting to a “re-emergence of expression” (Carroll 2012, 128, emphasis original).

To return to Hegel, and utilizing his final reference to dance in the lectures, dance must, like Antigone, die “before enjoying the bridal dance” of its own maturity and independence (Hegel 1994, 1218). This also suggests the reason Hegel defines dance as an imperfect art: insofar as perfection requires independence, which dance can only gain by shedding its mimetic merit, then dance must either be a dependent good art or an independent bad art.

In the end, therefore, Hegel preaches what he has practiced throughout Part 3 of these lectures on aesthetics. Dance, an inferior and properly subordinate art, should not be – and is not – allowed its own separate place in the system of the arts. The reason is that dance, like those in the contemporary West associated with it – including women, people of color, children, and non-human animals – is not equal to its peers. Moreover, as has always been

---

9See, for example, Balanchine’s perhaps most celebrated piece, The Four Seasons.
10Fortunately, we have Graham’s (2010) own verbal articulation of her work in her famous essay, “I am a Dancer.”
11For an excellent account of postmodern dance, see Sally Banes’s (1987) Terpsichore in Sneakers: Post-Modern Dance.
the case with disempowered communities, one can detect in dance the beginnings of revolutionary movements, affirmations of the "bravura and suppleness" of bodies in all their denigrated materiality. 12

Lucas’s dance with the “the feeling soul”

Hegel’s Encyclopedia is a three-volume work that summarizes his entire philosophical system (in the form of short paragraphs). He also utilized it, augmented by elaborating commentaries, as the skeletal structure for multiple lecture courses over a number of years. Accordingly, most editions of the Encyclopedia include selections from various students’ lecture notes (known as Zusätze). The first volume is the Encyclopedia Logic (as distinguished from The Science of Logic), the second is the Philosophy of Nature, and the third, The Philosophy of Mind/Spirit. Triads proliferate within this third volume as well. To begin, the book is divided into three main sections, namely “Subjective Mind/Spirit,” “Objective Mind/Spirit,” and “Absolute Mind/Spirit.” Additionally, the, “Subjective Mind” section of the book is divided into “Anthropology,” “Phenomenology,” and “Psychology.” The Anthropology concerns “soul” in Aristotle’s sense, the Phenomenology duplicates in abbreviated form the content of the text entitled Phenomenology of Spirit, while the Psychology’s focus is more difficult to situate. The latter might be characterized, though, as the dialectical third term to the previous two sections, in which Hegel torsions Aristotle’s concepts of perceptive soul, imaginative soul, and rational soul into his own concepts of intuition, representation, and thinking, respectively. 13 And finally, the Anthropology subsection (of the Subjective Mind section of the book) is divided into “The Natural Soul,” the “The Feeling Soul,” and “The Actual Soul.”

The focus of both Lucas’s essay and the present article is “The Feeling Soul,” in part because it constitutes the transition between the end of the Anthropology and the beginning of the Phenomenology – and by substitution of “Jena” for “Berlin,” the developmental precursor to and foundation for the Phenomenology of Spirit. Lucas’s intent is “to make the construction of this part of the system and Hegel’s interest in a series of remarkable contemporary phenomena easier to understand, but also to inquire what, in the economy of sublation (Aufhebung) that is taking effect here, can actually remain of nature” (Lucas 1992, 134–135).

Lucas begins by noting that “the transition from natural philosophy to the philosophy of spirit (or from nature to spirit)” is “a critical hinge or seam in [Hegel’s] system” (Lucas 1992, 132). This transition, additionally, is one that Hegel describes as a transition “from the form of being to the form of essence” (mirroring a similar transition from the Encyclopedia Logic to The Philosophy of Nature). Importantly for Lucas, Hegel “interpreted this

---

12One example of this subversive potential in a (for Hegel) dance-related phenomenon involves The Philosophy of Nature’s discussion of “animal magnetism.” Hegel initially observes there that in “this magical relationship, the main point is that a subject acts on an individual subordinate to him in freedom and independence of will,” for which reason “strong men are particularly qualified to magnetize female persons” (Hegel 2004, 109). This is presumably the case for Hegel because he views men in general as freer and more independent of will, and thus a particularly strong man would be extremely more free and independent than the average woman. A few pages later, however, Hegel warns that the magnetizer that he “must not let himself on his part fall into a relationship of dependence on the magnetic person” (113). The point here is that what Hegel at first presents as naturally inferior, he later presents as dangerous, and thus in some sense (e.g. power) superior.

13In Hegel’s preferred sense, ‘Seele’ [soul] is closer in meaning to Aristotle’s word ‘psyche,’ which is what makes something alive” (Inwood 2007, xiv).
movement as one of liberation,” and “describes this path as one of struggle” (Lucas 1992, 134). Most importantly for my purposes, this critical junction for Hegel’s system is also, I wish to suggest, a critical moment for dance in Hegel, in that Hegel describes bodiliness “as the work of the art of the soul” (132).

Given the counter-intuitiveness of this claim, it perhaps bears repeating: the self’s embodiment is a work of art whose creator is the soul. And lest the reader conclude that it amounts to nothing more than one bizarre claim from an inaccurate Zusatz, it is worth mentioning that Lucas observes similar claims from Hegel’s summer lecture of 1825 in which he states: “The human form is at the same time the work of art of the soul and a natural body”; and in the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia, where he says: “Thus, corporeity is a work of art of the soul”; and yet again in the 1827–1828 lectures, wherein corporeity is described as “the shape of the soul” (Lucas 1992, 132, 133).

And if there is any art form which is centrally concerned with the corporeity of the human being, it is the same one that we have seen Hegel mention in the context of the reveling Anacreon poet – dance. Thus, one could meaningfully paraphrase this as saying that embodiment is the dance of the soul. In the last section of the essay, I will provide further textual support for this paraphrase; but assuming it now, for the sake of argument, suggests that every human being, as an embodied being, is not only an artist in general, but a dancer in particular – and necessarily a dancer in the ineluctable dialectical progress of mind/spirit from soul to consciousness, from the Anthropology’s animality to the Phenomenology’s humanity. That is, the art of corporeity is a kind of dancing (and whether that dancing is literal or metaphorical is unclear here) which marks and enables our transition to humanity.

At the first level, then, “The Feeling Soul,” which for Lucas is of central importance for Hegel’s system, is importantly connected to dance. At another level, I will now show that the strange phenomena discussed here, such as “magic” and “animal magnetism,” which for Lucas are of central importance to this section itself, are also importantly connected to dance. “Hegel directs his attention,” Lucas notes, “in what must be regarded as an excessive degree, to events and phenomena that we today would, at least at first sight, regard as being largely grotesque, and which, even in Hegel’s day, had a certain odor of charlatanry about them” (Lucas 1992, 133). More specifically, and importantly for my purposes, Hegel deals “in a completely serious way with so called ‘magical circumstances,’ as well as with phenomena like clairvoyance, the use of divining rods to find water, Mesmerism, and the theories of ‘animal magnetism’ and ‘madness’ in its various forms” (133).

As to why Hegel would have done such a thing, Lucas references one of Hegel’s letters, in which he claims that “this descent into dark regions” – that is, these passages from the Anthropology – “aroused his personal interest at a relatively early stage of his life” (Lucas 1992, 133–134.) One reason for this interest, Lucas suggests, might be that Hegel’s sister, Christiane, “suffered from mental illness” such that Hegel became “estranged” from her “as of the beginning of her illness” (Lucas 1992, 134). An even more intriguing suggestion from Lucas, however, is that “Hegel himself seems to have had psychological problems, as is shown by his letter to Windischmann:

---

14Lucas quotes all three of these passages from G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1978, 414).
15Lucas’s source here is Hegel’s May 27, 1810 letter to Karl Josef Hieronymus Windischmann (Hegel 1969, 314).
I have for a few years suffered to exhaustion from hypochondria. Everyone probably has such a turning point in his life, in which, at the nocturnal point of the narrowness of his nature’s contraction, he secured, for his own safety, the safety of the ordinary, everyday life. And if one has already been made incapable of this nocturnal point, then one is filled out by this everyday life’s safety, for the sake of nobler internal existence. (Lucas 1992, 134n, translation modified)

Thus, Hegel not only had significant experience with mental illness via someone in his nuclear family, but he also himself experienced a considerable struggle with mental illness. Should this affect a reader’s interpretations of his claims regarding madness, at least in regard to their neutrality? One must of course take precautions against biographical reductionism, but that does not mean that a thinker’s life is, necessarily, entirely irrelevant to her/his thought. At any rate, Hegel’s cure for himself consisted simply in conforming to the routine of a “normal” life, and this strategy dovetails (as I will explore below) with Hegel’s argument that habit – including the dance-connoting sub-genre of habit called “dexterity” – is the dialectical solution for mind/spirit in its struggle with the madness induced by its corporeity.

Moving from Hegel’s madness to his magnetism, Lucas notes that, although animal magnetism “was also a fashionable phenomenon which aroused a lot of interest” in Hegel’s era, Hegel’s contribution is distinctive in that he “almost entirely excludes the erotic element, which had made a considerable contribution to the coming into fashion of this parapsychological movement” (Lucas 1992, 141). Rather than dismiss Hegel’s extensive treatment of animal magnetism, Lucas urges that one must assume “that it was precisely systematic reasons that led Hegel to allow these phenomena the space we find devoted to them in the ‘Anthropology’ section” (Lucas 1992, 134).

Importantly for my purposes here, Lucas essay also notes that other aspects of embodiment, namely race and gender, figure prominently in “The Feeling Soul” as well, for example, in the following passage on whiteness:

The color white must be regarded as the most perfect in itself, not only as a matter of habit, but also because this color of skin is the result of the free activity of the blood and the sensations connected with the circulation of the blood can be represented by this color. The possibility exists that the inner sensations can produce evidence with it of them, and their play can be represented on it.17

It is important to bear in mind, when considering quotes like this one, that we are dealing, not with Hegel’s published writings, but with his students’ lecture notes (though the latter are fairly similar in multiple transcriptions). In reference to quotes like the above, Lucas observes the following paradox: on the one hand, “Incorporeity, as the last criterion of the

---

16To illustrate this point, Lucas quotes a sample contemporary text on animal magnetism:

With sexual desire, the whole nervous system enters into a plastic relationship. A completely new relationship develops between the brain and the sexual organs, a relationship which, as long as nature was preoccupied with individual reproduction, was bound to remain to a large extent unnoticed.

Quoted from Carl August Eschenmayer’s (1817) “Allgemeine Reflexionen uber den thierischen Magnestismus und den organischen Aether” (25–26).


18For philological support for this consistency in the students’ notes, see Robert Williams’s (2007) discussion in his translation of the Lectures on the Philosophy of History 1827–8. I am indebted for this insight and reference to an anonymous reviewer of this article.
'Natural Soul,' can neither remove nor purify any color of skin or type of hair or size of body or gender,” but on the other, “Non-Europeans remain excluded; women are not dealt with until later parts of the system, where they will admittedly still receive no adequate treatment” (Lucas 1992, 141). In other words, if aspects of embodiment such as race and gender do not disappear in the transition to consciousness and the Phenomenology, then why does Hegel’s subsequent account for the most part assume a white male subject position? Lucas’s essay concludes with the following observation: “Thus, corporeity is possibly a ‘remainder,’ which Hegel has left us as an unsolved problem, a ‘remainder’ in the sense that Jacques Derrida seeks in Hegel in Glas …” (Lucas 1992, 149). If so, Lucas claims, the Anthropology is, in the final analysis, a “failure” (150). And if the Anthropology is a failure, “then the result of this part of the system is a (perhaps secret) burden for all of the following parts of the system” (150). In other words, one reason that this passage constitutes such an important transition is that it lays the architectonic groundwork for the Phenomenology of Spirit – and thereby, the passage’s inadequacy ultimately threatens Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. The upshot of my consideration of Lucas’s essay is that the place where I am suggesting dance figures most prominently (albeit indirectly) in Hegel’s philosophy is not, as it might at first appear, in some irrelevant backwater of Hegel’s writings, but rather a crucial juncture in the system. To connect this back to my previous section (on dance in the Lectures on Aesthetics), Hegel has, perhaps inadvertently, quarantined dance on dangerous ground, where its movements – and those of bodily disempowered people with whom dance is already associated in Hegel’s era – threaten the well-being of the system. More importantly, this undermining takes the form of the very same graceful movements that, I would suggest, hold out the best hope for spiritualizing Lucas’s corporeal “remainder.” Put differently, the aspect of the corporeity that remains external and indifferent to spirit at the end of the Anthropology, needs to be taught to dance. Fortunately for Hegel, the materials for choreographing this dance can be found in the same place, to which I now turn.

**Dance in the “Anthropology”**

Animal magnetism, whose prevalence in “The Feeling Soul” Lucas observes, first appears much earlier in The Philosophy of Mind/Spirit. My reason for considering these sections in reverse order is to forestall the objection that magnetism (along with madness) is merely an irrelevant, minor phenomenon for Hegel. That is, having established that these phenomena play a significant role in a crucial moment in the dialectic, I can now proceed more sure-footedly in exploring their more detailed, earlier treatment. Initially, Hegel suggests that animal magnetism constitutes counterevidence to empirical psychology, insofar as its phenomena (such as clairvoyance) are a “stumbling-block to finite thinking” (Hegel 2010, §379, Zusatz, 6). In other words, there is something infinite-qua-non-discrete about what animal magnetism describes, which the discrete categories of associationist psychologies such as Hume’s cannot explain. That is, empiricist psychology relies on the proximity and contiguity of material bodies in order to explain any psychological phenomenon, whereas apparent phenomena like clairvoyance posit action at a distance. Hegel elaborates on this point later in the same section as follows: “In the visible liberation
of mind in those magnetic phenomena from the limitations of space and time and from all
finitie connexions, there is something that has an affinity to philosophy …” (8). Animal
magnetism for Hegel, therefore, involves in some sense transcending space and time.
More precisely, it suggests that space and time are not only (as in Kant) merely conditions
for a subject’s possible experience, but that space and time can even be overcome by a subject
in certain circumstances. The importance of this point for Hegel’s dialectic as a whole is that
unless something that is spatiotemporally transcendent like clairvoyance is possible, then
something remains free of spirit in the darkness of nature (with its raced and sexed bodies).

Madness too appears earlier in the Anthropology, more specifically in its first major divi-
sion, “The Natural Soul” (whereas “The Feeling Soul” is the second). The context of madness’s
first appearance is Hegel’s description of how the natural soul, qua natural, “takes part
in the universal planetary life, feels the difference of climates, the changes of seasons, the
periods of the day, etc.” but “only in occasional dark moods,” with the first two exceptions
being – and here is the specific site of madness’ appearance – “illnesses (including derange-
ment) and in the depression of the self-conscious life” (Hegel 2010, 36). The third exception,
however, in an apparent non-sequitur, is “among peoples less advanced in spiritual
freedom” (36). This connection, along with several more in “The Feeling Soul,” is of
central importance to my argument, so I will now explore this point at length.

Hegel elaborates on this madness-related nature/race connection in the next paragraph
(Hegel 2010, §393, Zusatz) as follows:

The universal planetary life of the natural mind particularizes itself into the concrete differ-
cences of the earth and breaks up into the particular natural minds which, on the whole,
express the nature of the geographical regions of the world, and constitute the diversity of
race. (39)

In contemporary terms, Hegel is operating with what is known as a climatic theory of race,
which holds that racial differences are to be explained as the effects of living in different
geographical regions.19 Race seems to offer no justification for enslavement for Hegel, in
that “Man is implicitly rational; herein lies the possibility of equality of rights for all men,”
whereas racial difference “is still a natural difference, that is, a difference that initially con-
cerns the natural soul”; however, the next passage problematizes any easy exonerations
(Hegel 2010, 40).

Negroes are to be regarded as a nation of children who remain immersed in their uninterested
and indifferent naïvete (sic). They are sold, and let themselves be sold, without any reflection
on whether this is right or not. Their religion has something childlike about it. They sense a
higher being, but they do not keep a firm hold on it; it passes fleetingly through their heads.
… Entirely good-natured and harmless when in a state of calm, they can become suddenly
agitated and then commit the most frightful cruelties. (41)

All of this follows for Hegel from his climatic theory of race, in that “Africa, taken as a
whole, appears as a mass belonging to compact unity, as a lofty mountain range shutting
off the coast” (Hegel 2010, 40). That black people “do not show an inner impulse toward
culture,” Hegel argues, can be understood in terms of the fact that “their mind is entirely
dormant, it remains sunk within itself, it makes no progress, and thus corresponds to the

19For more on such theories, in particular their origin in ancient civilization, see M. Frank Snowden’s (1971) Blacks in
Antiquity.
compact, *undifferentiated* mass of the African land” (41). As Hegel puts it shortly thereafter, in “the interior of Africa proper, surrounded by high mountains in the coastal regions and in this way cut off from this free element of the sea, the mind of the natives remains closed, feels no urge to freedom and endures without resistance universal slavery” (45).

As is the case with madness, so too race’s importance for *The Philosophy of Mind/Spirit* extends far beyond “The Feeling Soul,” as suggested in part by his invoking it on the very first page of the book, in the form of some derogatory remarks about “oriental” religion.20 Race’s second appearance in the book is found in the first Zusatz to the first major division of the Anthropology, in the context of Hegel’s discussion about how “subjective mind” involves “the qualitatively determined soul tied to its natural determinations (racial differences, for example, belong here)” (Hegel 2010, §387, 27). And in the very next sentence, Hegel brings up animal magnetism and madness. “Out of this immediate oneness with its naturalness,” Hegel writes, “soul enters into opposition and conflict with it (the states of derangement [a form of madness] and somnambulism [a form of magnetism] belong here” (27). The result of this “opposition and conflict,” in turn, is “the triumph of the soul over its bodiliness [or corporeity]” parsed as “the accomplished reduction, of this bodiliness to a sign, to the portrayal of the soul” (27).

Here, therefore, at what Lucas has observed is the transition from the Anthropology and into the Phenomenology, a transition on which much depends, Hegel describes the soul as having achieved “the negation of its bodiliness” (Hegel 2010, 27). But little in Hegel is as simple as it appears. Human beings remain, after all, embodied beings. In this way, one moves from an aspect of embodiment (race) to discredited pseudoscience (animal magnetism) and arrives at a major opportunity for dialectical progress (spiritualization of the body).21 I will return to this issue shortly, but first I wish to point out two more places where one finds an interesting intersection of different aspects of embodiment.

The first of these places, located a few pages later, links race to gender and sexuality. With regard to three moments in the development of soul, Hegel notes that the first involves “the entirely *universal, qualitative* determinations of soul. Here belong especially the *racial differences*, both physical and mental …” (Hegel 2010, §390, 34). In the second moment, “it is in the *sexual relationship* that the difference becomes *actual particularization*, real opposition of the individual to itself” (34). And again, just as in the previous mention of race, this discussion of embodiment is followed immediately (in this case in the next paragraph) by a critical claim about the dialectic of mind/spirit. “The soul,”

---

20Another interesting moment on race, this time in “The Feeling Soul” (in the Zusatz to §406), relates to the magical phenomenon of clairvoyance. “Abundant instances of premonitions of the future are found especially in the Scottish Highlands, in Holland, and in Westphalia … For its emergence therefore a particular stage of mental development seems to be necessary” (105). More specifically, this stage is “equally distant from a state of savagery and from a state of advanced culture … ” (105–106). Also in this section, in Hegel’s long catalogue of types of madness, he mentions “the journeys across whole countries made by Indians crawling on their stomachs can be pronounced a derangement,” and claims that “in strong muscular people with black hair, fits of rage are usually more violent that in blond persons” (§408, Zusatz, 118, 127). Finally, in regard to intersectionality, Hegel also invokes gender again pejoratively in this catalogue as follows: “in small towns one finds people, especially women, who are so absorbed in an extremely limited circle of particular interests and who feel so comfortable in this parochialism of theirs that we rightly call such individuals *crazy people*” (124).

21It is important to distinguish, however, between (1) animal magnetism as a discursive label and (2) the phenomena to which that label was applied, since at least a subset of such phenomena (including hypnotism and sleepwalking) remain legitimate areas of inquiry for mainstream psychology today.
Hegel writes, “stands midway between the nature which lies behind it, on the one hand, and the world of ethical freedom which extricates itself from natural mind, on the other hand” (§391, 35). In other words, given that the soul is a border-dweller, living half in nature and half in freedom, then on Hegel’s own terms, the concrete aspects of the soul’s nature, including race, gender, and sexuality, must be significant for the embodied being that is the soul.

The second place adds to this mix what would today be classified as ethnicity. More specifically, Hegel links the ethnic prejudice of one clause, namely that in “the south [of Europe],” especially in Italy, “individuality uninhibitedly emerges in idiosyncrasy,” to the gender prejudice of another clause, namely that such “a character is more appropriate to the feminine nature than the masculine” (Hegel 2010, 46). Thus, just as in the previous example of race, gender, and sexuality, Hegel here superimposes more than one axis of prejudice in one assertion. And right on their heels is dance. “Connected with this uninhibitedness,” Hegel writes, the Italian “mind spills over without reserve into its bodiliness” (46). To sum up this strange passage, for Hegel, one non-Germanic race/ethnicity manifests a kind of (magnetic?) connection with a non-male gender in such a way that the dance-like stylistics of embodiment constitute a symptom of inferiority.

Returning now to the issue of the soul’s relationship to embodiment, whether mere negation or something more subtle, note the following passage in the Zusatz, §401: “The vitality of this corporeal body of mine,” Hegel writes, “consists in this, that its materiality is unable to be for itself, can offer no resistance to me, but is subordinate to me, is pervaded through and through by my soul for which it is an ideality” (Hegel 2010, 78). Despite the starkness and apparent finality of this claim, however, one could argue that what is going on here – in a soul’s abstraction of its body into an ideality – is not an eliminating of the body, but rather a forgetting. And this suggests an independent reason for thinking that something like dance (and the embodiments still associated with it) are necessary for this vital transition.

First, the capacity to be pervaded by something indicates already a kind of independence. For example, one would not say that water has no being for itself, nor that water offers no resistance to salt, merely because their union results in saline/saltwater. Second, Hegel’s subsequent claim, that “the movements of my soul immediately become movements of my corporeality” also suggests some type of subsistence of the body, insofar as the movements have to become movements of a body after having originated as movements of a soul (Hegel 2010, 78). Third, there is the distinction he makes later in this same Zusatz between “embodiment occurring involuntarily,” on the one hand, and, on the other, “gesture” – which “presupposed that mind has already become master of its bodiliness” (79). Fourth, the same Zusatz later notes that, regarding the “man of character,” his mind “has made itself much freer of his bodiliness . . . ,” which would seem to suggest that there is a kind of spectrum or continuum of bodily independence, and that it is closely correlated with certain mental characteristics (80).

The fifth textual reason that dance is vital to this transition, finally, is a bit more complex. Still later in this same Zusatz, Hegel describes a continuum of laughter, at the preferable end of which lies “the gentle smile of the noble soul” in the movement (along the spectrum) toward which “laughter frees itself more and more from its naturalness until in smiling it becomes a gesture, thus something originating in free will” (Hegel 2010, 82). Even more preferable to such a laugh for Hegel, moreover, is any use of “the
voice,” through which “an ideal, a, so to say, incorporeal bodiliness, is generated” (82). But what can an incorporeal corporeity possibly mean? Hegel’s suggestion is that it is “reality which is immediately sublated in its arising, since the propagation of sound is just as much its disappearance” (83). Thus, as is so often the case in Hegel, spatial contradiction is resolved by temporal succession. The voice creates a bodiliness which disappears exactly in time with its appearance, like a person (such as, perhaps, a stillborn child), who is literally born and dies in the same instant.

I use the example of a fetus here because that is what Hegel, returning to the topic of animal magnetism, himself does just a few pages later. More specifically, the mother/fetus relationship for him is the paradigm of the “magical relationship” (Hegel 2010, §405, Remark, 89). More specifically, “Here are two individuals, yet still in undivided soul-unity: the one is still no self … the other is its subject, the single self of both. … The mother is the genius of the child; for by genius we commonly mean the selfish totality of the mind … ” (89). What is most important about this remarkable passage, for my present purposes, is not only that “woman” (as “mother”) occupies a privileged place here in Hegel’s favored example of magical relationships, but also that the language of “genius” invoked here has strong connections to art – of which, of course, dance is one form.

This latter point is buttressed by the end of Hegel’s clarification (in the subsequent Zustaz) as to what exactly he means by “magic,” namely “a mediation-free relationship of the inner to an outer or to an other in general. A magical force is one whose effect is not determined by the interconnection, the conditions and mediations of objective relationships” (Hegel 2010, 91). More specifically, “absolute magic,” defined as “the magic of mind as such” Hegel notes, “exerts a magical infection on objects, acts magically on another mind” (91). His favored example (after the influence on a child of “the adults it sees around it,” and that which “a superior mind exerts over a “weaker mind””) is what Hegel terms “the most mediation-free magic” of all, namely “that which the individual mind exerts over its own bodiliness … ” (91). In addition to dance being the art of the body as such, Hegel’s next mention of this privileged example, as I will show below, ties together a cluster of factors (including dexterity, training, upright posture, gesture, and gait) in such a way that dance seems more and more appropriate as the ideal figure of this, Hegel’s greatest magic. For now, however, I return to the former point, regarding the woman/magic connection.

Hegel’s additional examples of magical relationships, immediately following the aforementioned mother/fetus relationship, include the relationship “between friends, especially female friends with delicate nerves (a relationship which may develop into magnetic phenomena), between husband and wife and between members of the same family” (90). Thus, one finds here, all in the space of one sentence, a juxtaposition of magic, women, madness, and magnetism. A few pages later, similarly (in §406), Hegel again links, first magic to madness, and second, madness to women. If, Hegel warns, the magical way of being as evidenced in magical relationships becomes a fixed state of an individual, then that magical relationship constitutes instead a “disease” (Hegel 2010, 95). And although the primary example is “magnetic somnambulism … aroused chiefly by animal magnetism,” the next examples all involve gender, for example, diseases “connected with female development … ” (95, 96). Moreover, such dysfunction, Hegel insists, constitutes an “illness of soul” which is “more or less bound up” with “bodily
illness,” or even natural female bodily development, including “the onset of puberty in young women, the state of pregnancy, and St. Vitus’s dance” (99).

The latter, according to the OED, is another name for Sydenham’s chorea, “a self-limited disorder of childhood or pregnancy that is a neurological manifestation of rheumatic fever, affecting the motor activities of the nervous system and characterized by involuntary movements.” And according to the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, the disease “affects girls more often than boys and typically occurs between 5 and 15 years of age.” Moreover, due to “better sanitary conditions and the use of antibiotics” in the West, it can only currently be found “in developing nations.”

In accordance with Hegel’s emphasis throughout this section of the Anthropology then, this disease disproportionally affects females and people of color (the latter insofar as it only remains a problem in developing nations, most of whose populations are primarily non-white). The name “St. Vitus’s dance” derives, according to the OED, from “dancing-mania of the middle ages,” and the Oxford Dictionary of Saints (2011) explains that its namesake was a lone martyr from Lucania in Southern Italy, patron saint of people with epilepsy, nervous diseases, dancers, and actors, whose feast was associated with “cure from demonic possession,” medieval precursor to mental illness.

Thus, one finds again, even at the periphery of the web of Hegel’s text, a coming together of mental illness, women, and dance.

Moving now from the disease of Sydenham’s chorea to cures for “madness” in general, Hegel’s dialectical cure, perhaps surprisingly, is habit, understood as an incorporation of previously disruptive actions into unconscious routines. Most importantly, and as mentioned above, Hegel’s descriptions of habit also bring it very close to phenomenological accounts of dance, as in the following: “This self-incorporation of the particularity or bodiliness of the determinations of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them, and the production of habit appears as practice” (Hegel 2010, §410, 131, emphasis original). Dance, too, is arguably above all a matter of repetition, and it is certainly a consummately bodily practice.

Of particular resonance with dance here is the third kind of habit, Geschicklichkeit, which in this translation is “dexterity,” but for which the Oxford-Duden German-English Dictionary prefers “skill.” As I mentioned above, the concept of skill is also of central importance for Noverre’s foundational Letters on Dancing and Ballets. More specifically, and in sympathy with Hegel’s aforementioned claims regarding dance, Noverre discusses “skill” in the context of the technical aspects of dance, which Noverre believes to be an inferior aspect that poses a real danger to dance as imitation, with the latter representing the only way for dance to stop being – in the exact same words as Hegel – an “imperfect art” (Noverre 2004, 28). “When all these movements are not directed by genius,” Noverre writes, “and when feeling and expression do not contribute their powers sufficiently to affect and interest me, I admire the skill of the human machine … but it leaves me unmoved …” (19).


See Oxford Dictionary of Saints (528). Interestingly, according to the OED, the first mention of the historical phenomenon of St. Vitus’s dance comes from 1621, describing its sufferers as those who “can do nothing but dance till they be dead,” and the English poet Southey used the phrase in 1804 to describe another thinker who, like Hegel, was massively influenced by Kant: “His [Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s] mind is in a perpetual St. Vitus’s dance – eternal activity without action.” Given the similarities between Coleridge’s and Hegel’s thought, one might interpret this quote as evidence that Hegel and so many Hegel scholars chose well in using dance as a privileged metaphor for Hegel’s philosophy.
In this “skill” form, habit for Hegel “is imposed as a subjective purpose within bodiliness, which is to become subjugated and entirely pervious to it” (Hegel 2010, Remark, 132). In this way, corporeity is “made into an instrument in such a way that as soon as the representation (e.g. a sequence of musical notes) is in me, the physical body too, unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly” (132). Similarly, the dancer’s body is often referred to as the dancer’s instrument, and dancing, historically and colloquially, is nothing if not fluent bodily expression flowing from musical inspiration.

Four additional moments in this same Zusatz corroborate this dance-dexterity connection. First, Hegel begins the next paragraph by discussing posture, specifically the “upright stance,” which for him properly distinguishes humans from other animals, and which various thinkers have suggested is at the core of dance (134). Second, Hegel claims that, in dexterity, the soul “has made itself so at home in the content, that it moves about in it with freedom,” and the experience of accomplished dance certainly involves freedom (Hegel 2010, 134). Third, Hegel even mentions “athletes” and the “tightrope walkers” – in German, literally “rope dancers” – the justly famous example from Nietzsche’s (2006) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in regards to how the soul must “take possession of its body, form it into a pliant and skillful instrument of its activity” (135). Fourth, Hegel’s description of the “training” required for the mastery involved in dexterity could function as a verbatim description of traditional dance education. Initially one’s movements “are unsure and are given a strength that is now too great, now too small for the purpose at hand,” but when “often repeated, they acquire an even higher degree of adequacy,” and thus the soul becomes more and more at home in its expressions and consequently achieves a continually growing capacity for immediately embodying its inner determinations and accordingly transforms the body more and more into its own property, into its serviceable instrument; there thus arises a magical relationship, an immediate operation of mind on body. (Hegel 2010, 135–136)

This, I want to suggest, is the achievement of the accomplished dancer, corporeity as “the soul’s work of art” (Hegel 2010, §411, 136). In further support of this contention, Hegel goes on in subsequent pages to link this dance-like mastery to “gestures,” which are, like postures, located by many dance theorists at the core of dance. And perhaps most persuasively, Hegel also claims in this section that the “movement of the lower extremities, gait, is also very significant” (139). Putting it even more strongly, Hegel continues as follows: “Above all things, gait must be cultivated; in it the soul must betray its mastery over the physical body” (139).

Thus, and just as Nietzsche suggests in the *Gay Science*, what the “spirit of the philosopher” most wants to be is “a good dancer” (Nietzsche 2001, 246). Perhaps, then, dance too is, in Hegel’s poetic phrasing, “the lightning piercing through the natural soul and consuming its naturalness” (Hegel 2010, §412, Zusatz, 141). If so, then dance may in fact possess the power to transfigure the last remaining bodiliness at the end of the Anthropology, thereby empowering Hegel’s dialectic to a greater inclusiveness of women and people of color – and thus facilitating present-day social justice.

---

24 The foundational example here is the work of Rudolf Laban, as accessibly explicated, for example, in Jean Newlove’s (2007) *Laban for Actors and Dancers*.


26 See, for a particularly skillful example, Susan Leigh Foster’s (2010) *Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance*. 
Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

References


