INTUITION: AN INTEGRATED ACCOUNT

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Abstract: This paper is a defense of the evidentiality of epistemic intuitions. To that end, I will first briefly discuss both experimentalists’ and some salient forms of reliabilists’ accounts of intuition, showing that they bring us up to a stalemate. To find a way out of this standoff, I will argue that reliabilists’ accounts pave the way for experimentalists’ challenge to the epistemic value of intuitions in two ways. First, each of reliabilists’ accounts leaves enough space to be occupied by normativity. Second, their foundationalism being established on an intuition-perception analogy also does so. Subsequently, I will argue that reliabilists’ line of argument overlooked what I call as the metaphysical necessity of epistemic intuitions. Keeping in mind this necessity, I say, allows us to eliminate the standoff and to draw the boundaries between two distinct kinds of intuition which, I will conclude, should be isolated but also fit together in a unified and inclusive model.

Keywords: Contingency, Evidentiality, Intuitions, Metaphysical, Normative, Necessity.

Introduction: Intuition is one of the central issues around which contemporary analytic philosophy revolves. Intuition was frequently described as “some sort of spontaneous mental judgments” [1]. Here are some examples: believing both p and not-p at the same time is necessarily false, Killing in principle is an evil deed, 1 + 1 = 2 is necessarily true, etc. However, the discussions on the epistemic status of intuition have never shown patterns of convergence: reliabilists consider intuition being based on a priori base as a sufficiently reliable source of epistemic evidence, but experimentalists reject to grant an epistemic status as such to intuitions, because intuitions are instable and accordingly uneviendental.

In this paper I am going to discuss some forms of reliabilists’ as well as experimentalists’ account of intuition, showing how they bring us to a deadlock. Next, I will attempt to break the deadlock by arguing that reliabilists’ accounts give the chance for experimentalists’ challenge to the epistemic value of intuitions in two ways: they grant enough space for normativity, and their shared foundationalism that depends on an intuition-perception analogy also does so. At this point, I shall argue that reliabilists’ approaches overlook the metaphysical necessity of intuitions. Emphasizing this necessity allows us to remove the standoff and to draw the boundaries between two distinct lands of intuition which, I will conclude, should be isolated but also fit together in a unified and inclusive model.

Some Forms of Reliabilism: What is meant by reliabilism about intuition is that intuition has the feature of being trustworthy; it can be depended on as an evidential source of knowledge. In this section, I will be discussing some of the key forms of this view.

In a series of his publications, Ernest Sosa defends the epistemic status of intuitions. To that end, he compares three models: the perceptual, introspective, and competence model. He rejects the first two, and argues in favor of the third.

The perceptual model, which is defended mainly by George Bealer, holds that “intellectual seeming is ... a state of awareness with a mediating role analogous to that of visual experience in visual perception” [2]. This assumption of a mediatious state in case of intuition is what explains quite clearly why, for Sosa, this analogy is misguided. He writes: “a sensory experience ... mediates between object seen and perceptual belief” [3]. But this is not the case in intuition, where “nothing ... mediate[s] ... between facts known intuitively and beliefs through which they are known” [5]. Intuition, then, unlike perception, is defined by him as being absolutely free of a mediatious role as such. Related to this is the problem that intuitions, according to this model, are “promoted from being only prima facie to being a resultant, all-things-considered attraction” [2]. For example, Muller-Lyer lines seem to someone as prima facie or
“one-thing-considered” incongruent, but they ultima facie seem congruent after measurement. What is supposed to justify the intuitive belief here is the prima facie seeming, where there is no reasoning, perception, inference, etc. But what really justified it is the ultima facie seeming, where one is motivated by reasoning, inference, etc. It seems here that he wants to assert the spontaneous character of intuition. Sosa glosses this statement with a declaration that the same is true for the claim that “an attraction is intuitive or direct when it is exerted by the bare understanding of the proposition involved” [2]. For grasping such kind of intuition consists of a series of connected steps, starting from prima facie to ultima facie. As a result, Sosa concludes that this model is not satisfactory for intuition, which he defines as “a conscious state with propositional content that can serve as a justifying basis for belief while distinct from belief, not derived from certain sources, and possibly false” [3].

He criticizes the Cartesian model, according to which “a propositional content about a present state of consciousness can attract assent through its sheer truth” [2]. One is intuitively justified by grasping a fact quite clearly and distinctly. Sosa holds that this appeal to truth shares a problem with the earlier model of perception. He writes: “truth per se is no less ludicrous as a source of justification than is understanding per se” [2]. Both have the nature of being episodic. Also, this model does not specify any condition “that in combination with truth would plausibly explain foundational justification” [2]. A Cartesian might respond to this criticism by saying that what Descartes meant is that “only real intuitions can justify” [2]. The intuition which seems to be clear and distinct is quite different from the one which is really clear and distinct. What appears as true intuition, but it is not so, cannot be justified. Yet, this view, for Sosa, does not deny the justification to “the epistemology of fallacious reasoning,” as in one’s affirming the consequent in the form “that, necessarily, if q, and p → q, then p” [2]. The word “necessarily” indicates that the intuition is really (not apparently) clear and distinct and accordingly true, but it is not so.

Having questioned and accordingly refuted both the perceptual and introspective model, Sosa introduces his alternative account for intuition that is the competence model, according to which “what denies justification to the fallacious reasoner might just be his carelessness or inattention or blundering haste” [2]. Thus, the false intuitions are assumed here just as one’s “performance errors ... by contrast with deliverances of a competence” [2]. That is, intuitions can be fallible as performance errors due to one’s carelessness, inattentiveness, etc. But then again they are reliable or epistemically justified, because they are competent. They are reliable regardless of sometimes being false due to inattentiveness or the like. The case is not the same for the other two models. For example, in the perceptual illusions such as the Muller-Lyer, “our error is not just due to carelessness, moreover, nor to inattention or the like,” but it is relative to our visual system itself, simply because “the attraction is a deliverance of our visual system itself” [2]. Unless we follow the competence model, our understanding of intuition’s epistemic efficacy is inappropriate.

Similarly, Laurence BonJour addresses the question of how a priori intuitions are justified, stating that “external factors are irrelevant to their epistemic status” [5]. On his account, a priori intuition is a product of a cognitive state, and can be mistaken only due to “unclarity of confusion or some other problem intrinsic to the cognitive state itself” [5]. Still, these mistaken intuitions “can always be corrected by exercising greater care” [5]. BonJour, like Sosa, gives special importance to attention or care in setting the false intuition right.

BonJour’s and Sosa’s accounts were understood by Alvin Goldman as follow. They consider intuition to be universal placing great weight on its content in determining its truth. Contrary to that, Goldman holds that content is not the only determiner of truth value of intuition, and emphasizes the importance of particular intuitions. For him, intuitions have first and second order evidential status. The former i.e. the first order may be a priori depending on “what cognitive science tells us about the cognitive processes underlying classification intuitions;” but the latter i.e. the second order is empirical [6]. The question of whether intuitions qualify as evidence is an example of the first, and the question of whether there is an evidence for the evidential status of intuitions is an example of the second. Goldman constructs his account of intuition on psychological grounds in the individual sense. Hence, intuition is
a mental representation in the head of the individual who bears it. He makes use of two psychological approaches to defend this idea. One is "the modularity path ... [that] divide[s] sources of belief in terms of the mental modules from which they emanate" [6]. The other is "the recent 'dual-process' model of the mind ... [that] seek[s] to understand different epistemic statuses in terms of the distinction between automatic versus controlled levels of processing" [6]. Based on these two approaches, he concludes that intuitions "are a clear example of a priori cognition" or "non-experiential and ratiocinative cognition" [6]. Now, is it possible to move from the personal psychological intuitions to socially shared ones? Regarding this question, he holds that if a person's intuition is reliable indicator of its contents' truth, then his chance of being right is more than ½. And, if others are minimally competent in this sense, then their intuitions have a collective probability of being massively evidential. It is true that "no individual has ... such a collective intuitional fact. But nothing precludes an individual from justifiably believing that there is such a collective intuitional fact" [6]. Thus, intuitions qualify as evidence both for their individual and communal content. The second is empirical and derived from the first which in turn is a priori and a starting point for the second.

Elijah Chudnoff in turn tries to situate his "view of intuition as intellectual perception" within the scope of the a priori theory of knowledge [7]. His main argument can be formulated as follow: like perceptual experiences, intuition experiences possess presentational phenomenology with respect to their content. An intuition can be justified in virtue of its having a special phenomenology. Therefore, he writes: "intuitions put us in a position to gain knowledge in virtue of their phenomenology being veridical" [7].

Experimentalists' Criticisms: In response to reliabilists' approach to intuitions, an interesting movement has recently come into view namely, the new movement of experimental philosophy. I will call this movement as the normativist view, the view that intuition is contingent. By 'contingent intuition' I mean the intuition which its truth value is committed to something other than necessity, which is experience in general sense. Thus, there are folk-physical intuitions, folk-psychological intuition, moral intuition, etc. The intuition that 'the sun revolves around the earth' is true, is an example of folk-physical intuitions. Normative intuition is the one which is committed to normative experience namely, when its truth value is related to or based on unstable norms such as culture, morals, folk-psychology, folk tales, religion, etc. The intuition that 'there are supernatural creatures' is true, is an example of folk tales' intuitions.

The proponents of this movement look for something epistemically promising through putting intuition as used in epistemology and its trustworthy in question. They make great efforts to show that there is variation in intuitions and accordingly they reject confessing the evidential status reliabilists like Sosa and others habitually used to grant to them. To do so, they conduct studies and make use of what is known as methods of experimental psychology, surveying people's intuitions about a subject matter or the other. They produce an imaginary test case to a number of subjects who have to answer whether or not the protagonist in the test case knows or what he/she should do in a situation as such.

Experimentalists claim that their findings show that people have no agreement of intuitions. Some examples can be shown here: In "The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions," Stacey Swain and others contend that their researches assert that "intuitions vary according to factors irrelevant to the issues thought-experiments are designed to address" [8]. They claim that intuitions "vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first" [8]. Hence, they arrive at a judgment that such variations in intuitions form a direct challenge to their epistemic evidentiality. Also, in "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions," Jonathan M. Weinberg and others emphasize that their researches "elicited different intuitions in different cultures" [8]. For example, according to their results, "there are large and systematic differences between East Asians and Westerners" in the sense of intuitions about the subject matter [8]. Sometimes in addition to culture, some experimentalists add some other irrelevant factors such as educational background, socio-economic situation, age, ethnicity, gender, native language, etc. Accordingly, it is unsurprising to know that in "Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy," Joshua Alexander and Jonathan M. Weinberg refuse "the suitability of intuitions to function in any evidentiary role" [10]. The ultimate conclusion they assert is that what
present epistemologists should do is to bring the routine of appealing to intuitions in their argumentative activities to end. Philosophers should no more place reliance on intuition as evidence when epistemically theorizing.

**A Standoff:** Well, what is the problem? The problem is that the reliability of intuition is at stake, according to experimentalists. They say that if intuitions vary, then they are unreliable, and accordingly one cannot rely on them as evidence in philosophical theorizing. They, skeptics or experimentalists, rely on empirical data in order to show that reliabilists' appealing to intuitions depending on a priori grounds can no longer securely happen.

Reliabilists, on the other hand, struggle to rescue the reliability of intuition. Here are some attempts. Some consider intuition as indispensable ground for philosophers in establishing the conclusions they commonly aim at. That is, "without admitting intuitions as evidence, we cannot construct a coherent epistemology" [11]. Surely this cannot be considered as a plausible response to the skeptical challenge against intuition. To this credit, Hume should have believed that there was no problem of induction, and that the sun will definitely rise tomorrow from the east.

Others suggest that not every intuition should be taken into consideration. That is, "only expert intuitions should be consulted" [12]. The problem with this view is that it treats intuition as a system in which people are ranked one above the other according to their status in the professional competence hierarchy. Apart from that, this response just supports the claim of experimentalists whose level of education is one among many factors which make variation in intuitions happen.

Therefore, should we adopt a form of relativism? No. At least this is not what I am going to argue in favor of. At the end of the day, experimentalists cannot keep disregarding the role of intuition in philosophical activities, since justified true belief theory of knowledge has died in virtue of Gettier's argument based on mere intuitions. What's more, "what is true ... is one thing; whether people intuit what is true ... is another, completely different thing" [13]. 'A thing is equal to itself' is true regardless of what people think about it. Perhaps empiricists should admit that not all intuitions are normative.

In light of the above, it becomes clear that each of the previous accounts form a counterexample for the other. Thus, we have a standoff. From this arises the question: Is there a way out of this predicament? And, how is it possible that reliabilists' approaches facilitate the claims of normativists?

**Foundationalism As A Ground For Normativists' Claims:** To my mind, the starting point in order to get a way out of this dilemma is to realize where it came from. The issue starts from the side of reliabilists through two ways. In what follows, I will first explain how each of their accounts on its own leaves a window for the normative interventions. Second, which is more important and shared among them, I will show how their foundationalism based on the intuition-perception analogy does also give room for normative intervening as such.

**Reliabilists' Window for the Normative Interventions:** In this section, I will discuss the first way through which each of reliabilists' accounts leaves room on which experimentalists' criticisms against intuition's evidential status turns out to be possible.

Sosa, for example, does not show why illusion in the case of perception is relative to the perceptual system itself, but this is not true in the case of the intuition. If the case is same for the two models, then the competence of intuition is not immune and accordingly the fallibility of its intuitions also cannot be avoided by exercising more attention. Also, it is true that what Sosa talks about in his account is a priori intuition, and he rejected to include enculturation intuitions within the scope of this account. Yet, he did not say whether or not enculturation intuition is derived from the same epistemic virtue from which a priori intuition is derived. They can be derived from this virtue and later on got encultured. If so, if they are derived from the same virtue, he must forgive the fallibility of both of them on the basis of one's carelessness, inattentiveness, etc. This point can also be said about BonJour's idea that the mistaken a
priori intuitions can be corrected by more care. Additionally, the very idea of care and attentiveness is very much tied to what is normative. What makes me careful and attentive is different from what makes other so.

Moreover, the great weight which Goldman places on the individuality gives rise to subjectivity and accordingly to variation in intuitions, and his emphasizing the community content can be considered as a window into normativity in them. He also gives too much importance to the agreement on intuition as a standard for its second-order epistemic status. This is clear when he tries to move from a person’s intuition being, υι, evidential to a collective evidential status. An agreement as such is important even within philosophical community. “Philosophers often presume that if their own and their colleagues’ intuitions point to a certain conclusion about a concept, that’s all the evidence needed” [12]. This forms a clear point of intersection between him and empiricists.

Chudnoff in turn tries to produce an account of intuition as evidence depending only on phenomenological considerations, and at the same time he is not clear whether or not normative intuitions have this phenomenal character. If no, if a posteriori intuitions do not share this character with a priori intuitions, then he is required to explain why. If yes, then they share the same level of reliability. Or maybe they have phenomenal character which is different from that of a priori intuitions. In this case, he is required to explain how this phenomenal difference affects their epistemic status. Indeed, he did not discuss these issues at all, at least not to my knowledge in his work I have read.

**Foundationalism and Intuition-Perception Analogy**: Reliabilists tried to establish a moderate rationalism, according to which “appeal to rational intuition is epistemically justified only if a form of foundationalism is true” [11]. But they try to establish their foundationalist views on the basis of a supposed analogy between intuition and perception.

If I understood reliabilists’ arguments correctly, then they can be formulated as follow: X’s intuition that p is true, if and only if it is, for Sosa, derived from an epistemic competence; or it can be seen, for Bealer, as intellectual seeming in analogy with perceptual one; or it is, for BonJour, produced by a cognitive state; or it is, for Goldman, constructed on individual psychological ground; or it has, for Chudnoff, a veridical phenomenological character. To my mind, these attempts succeed in defending the idea that there is a foundation for a priori intuition more than they did in arguing in favor of its truth.

The reason behind that, I think, is that all these foundationalist figures tried to defend their accounts of intuition through comparing it with, analogizing it with, or distinguishing it from perception. For example, Chudnoff defends his phenomenological account of intuition based on the principle that intuition is analogous to perception. That is, both intuition and perception are experiences. While perception shows us “how matters stand in concrete reality by making us sensorily aware of that reality,” intuition shows us “how matters stand in abstract reality by making us intuitively aware of that reality” [7].

Following this kind of procedure is not limited to Chudnoff. Other reliabilists did that as well in some form or the other. Sosa holds that just as we keep considering the faculty of perception as reliable although it can be mistaken sometimes, the competence of intuition is reliable even if it may perform wrongly sometimes. While the fallibility of the former affects the faculty itself, the false intuition can be corrected through paying more attention. BonJour shares the last point with Sosa, as we have seen. Also, I have already mentioned how Bealer defends the perceptual model of intuition. Just as in perception one sees through one’s eyes, in intuition “it is through the mind’s eye that we gain insight” [3].

This amounts not to capture the uniqueness of the a priori intuition. The main difference between perception and a priori intuition is that the realm of perception is the one of causality, and the realm of intuition is the one of necessity. In perception, something should be a foundation or a reason for something else, and some sensory mediator should mediate between the perceived object and the perceptual belief as it was mentioned above. In BonJour words, “the believer must always have a reason
for everything justifiably believed in the case of empirical beliefs," because we are in the realm of cause and effect [5]. The same is true for intuition, according to these foundationalists. For example, although Sosa criticizes Bealer's idea of intellectual seemings as a mediator between the intuition and its object with analogy to the mediating role of sensory experience between the object and perceptual belief, what Sosa really did is just substitute the intellectual seemings for the epistemic competence.

Well, what is the result of this way of arguing? The result is that both intuition and perception now belong to one realm. Foundationalists' intuition-perception analogy eliminates the boundaries between the two different realms to which intuition and perception belong. Experimentalists were thus encouraged to claim that their results are also true for something which does not belong to their scope of study namely, the intuitions of normative contingency.

A Way Out: That being so, I think that we can now put our leg out of the aforesaid standoff by pointing out to what was missing from foundationalists' line of argument which in turn will help us to delineate territorial boundaries of two kinds of intuitions along with their nature of truth.

Metaphysical Necessity: There was something missing from foundationalists' line of argument namely, what I call as metaphysical necessity of necessary intuition. This is not to say that such intuitions are not there. Nor does it mean that they are not the most "conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking" [14]. How then one can do better to save them from experimentalists' challenge?

If something was caused by some reason, this does not mean that the reason necessitates the truth of the caused thing. X's being caused by Z is a thing, and X's truth value being necessarily determined by Z is a different thing. So regardless of whether or not necessary intuition is really caused by these foundations which reliabilists talk about, its truth does not necessarily rely on them. The truth of necessary intuition relies on nothing out of it itself. Whether it is competent or not, it can be seen as intellectual seeming or not, it is derived from a cognitive state or not, it is constructed on individual psychological ground or not, or it has a veridical phenomenological character or not; since a necessary intuition like '2 + 2 = 4,' for example, comes into being, it is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If its truth value should rely on something, then it does rely on nothing other than its metaphysical necessity. 'If p then not not p' imposes itself to be accepted as nothing but necessary true and firm, simply because it cannot be otherwise. This necessity necessitates the invariability of necessary intuition for all cultures, levels of education, ethnicities, languages, etc.

One might object here that I do not differentiate between the necessity of intuition and the necessity of its being true or false. That is, I am not aware of the difference "between knowledge of the truth value and knowledge of the _a priori_ intuition" [15]. This objection is true and welcome. A necessary intuition and its truth value simultaneously impose themselves as necessary. Take, for example, 'one is odd' is necessarily true. There is no disjunction between 'one is odd' and 'is necessarily true.' This is what was always missing in the foundationalists' approaches. They think for example that an intuitor intuits 'one is even,' and after that goes to find whether it is phenomenal. If not so, then it is 'necessarily false.' Or that an intuitor intuits 'one is odd' is necessarily true, because it is competent. Intuition by definition is spontaneous and immediate. And, to my mind, the spontaneity includes both the intuition and its truth value. Otherwise we are talking about proposition-judgment relation, inference, etc., which has nothing to do with intuition and its spontaneous aspect.

It can be said that only proposition can be necessary, but intuition cannot be so. Intuition may ground necessity, but it cannot possess it. So, my claim of metaphysical necessity overlooks the difference between intuition and proposition. On my view, grounding is enough. Nevertheless, intuition comes in form of proposition, but the major difference between them is the spontaneous aspect of their truth value. While the truth value of intuition is immediate, it needs steps of further reasoning in case of proposition.
But not every intuition is necessary. It can be normative, for example. How is the case for normative intuitions?

**Normative Contingency:** As I have mentioned earlier, the truth value of normative intuition is committed to normative experience i.e. unstable norms such as culture, morals, folk tales, religion, and so on. Accordingly, in one clear sense, the case is not the same for normative intuitions, simply because they lack the kind of necessity which necessary intuitions have. Normative intuitions are part of the empirical realm. So they vary from people to people, from culture to culture, etc. They are intuitions of contingency, and their variation is what we intuitively expect. We intuitively know that people's intuition vary about whether the protagonist of "Trolley Dilemma" should have killed one and saved five people or the other way around. I think that if experimentalists make a thought experiment on 'whether or not normative intuitions vary,' then most, if not all subjects, will reply yes.

But the problem with experimentalists is that they seem as if they are not aware of the limits of the realm of contingency. They seem as if they are taking it for granted that what is true for the realm of contingency is true for the realm of metaphysical necessity as well. This assumption itself is unempirical. "Since experimentalism is an a posteriori enterprise, it seems odd for it to be making such a large generalization from very limited studies" [16]. That is, they make few surveys on normative intuitions, but they make a transition to a very huge statement that their results are correct for the necessary intuitions.

One may object that this is not fair. They also made many thought experiments on epistemic intuitions, simulating Gettier's cases. For example, they made a test case which is widely known as True Temp Case: One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it? [9].

If one just takes a look at the question to which the subjects are asked to respond, one will come to realize that the room for a normative maneuver is still very much there. The main two words of the question are 'know' and 'believe' which are not neutral. Their meanings are not only variable, but these two words themselves may be used as synonyms in ordinary language. For example, the word "know" may have many senses. It may mean "knowing something consists in being completely confident of it," "to believe something truly," "the justified-true-belief-plus sense of knowing," and so on [5]. The language of the question of the thought experiment is not like is/ isn't '1 + 1 = 2.' This means that what experimentalists talk about is not a disagreement about the same content. It seems that the more abstractness, the less normative intervention. Perhaps this is the reason why they never wondered to conduct any survey of these intuitions like 'if p, then not not p;' for instance.

If intuitions vary, then the relevant "variation must pertain to the same contents" [17]. But usually, while responding, the subjects, in addition to their cultural and socio-economical differences, import a lot from their imaginative construction, and then they "may not after all disagree about the very same content" [17]. Nor can anyone be sure that they exactly respond to the very same question. Likewise, if, according to the normative approach of intuition in the terms of linguistic analysis, "across the divide we find somewhat different concepts picked out by terminology that is either ambiguous or at least contextually divergent," then "why not explain the disagreement as merely verbal?" [17]. If so, if it can be explained as a normative issue, then it is better for epistemologists not to concern with it, because "the normativity of a good gun or a good shot ... is restricted to the sphere of guns and shots" [17]. While the scope of epistemology "is the nature, conditions, and extent of knowledge" [17]. If so, then the supposed normative disagreement, variation in intuitions, etc. is not within the scope of epistemology even. Therefore, there is no reason for epistemologists to concern with a line of argument as such.
Conclusion: An Integrated Approach: We have seen that emphasizing metaphysical necessity and normative contingency led us to two different kinds of intuitions whose truth values are also totally different. By so doing, each of them can no more be a counterexample for the other. Thus, we no more have a standoff. Now a reliabilist can confess that there is variation in intuitions in the land of normativity, without being scared that this confession will make any negative impact on the truth value of necessary intuition. Likewise, an experimentalist can now admit that necessary intuition is firm and accordingly qualifies as epistemic evidence, without any need to stop his claim that intuitions vary but in the land of contingency only. Since we no more have the aforesaid dilemma, we should celebrate both of these two lands of intuition by constructing a comprehensive view of intuition. What I am suggesting here is an inclusive view of intuition, according to which there are two kinds of intuition: necessary and normative intuition.

The truth of the first is free from being subject to any further conditions, such as inference, memory, culture, etc. It is free from any foundations, simply because it is the foundation itself, because it is the stopping point of an infinite regress of epistemic foundations. Its truthfulness does not depend on any of these further processes, but only on the intuition itself. It has non-evaluative, self-evident body of truths that do not need to be demonstrated. “If it were not so that 1 + 1 = 2, one would not believe it to be so” [4]. Epistemology is the proper land of non-normative intuitions as such. Epistemologists are not interested in socially constructed intuitions; they are interested in “something more objective” that is “where the truth lies” [8]. Here true intuition is so regardless of what people think about it. Its truth lies in its own right. The second is dependent intuition, one which is subject to change. It is expected to be influenced by further conditions, such as inference, education, culture, etc. These conditions determine the truth of this type of intuitions. The last point itself seems intuitive. It is expected for normative intuitions and their truths to be different from culture to culture, from linguistic group to another, from socio-economic system to another, and so on. For example, few days ago I discussed with someone the issue of violence. For me it was intuitive that killing is killing. No justification for an action as such, because the right of life is one of the basic human rights. No one has the right of ending the life of someone else. For the other person, killing was permissible if there is a good reason! By “a good reason” he meant to disturb the social harmony. The disagreement between our intuitions leans on our grounds of culture, interests, education, reasoning, etc. Hence, “the set of truths one accepts this way is not the same for everyone; much less is it the same for every conceivable subject” [3]. Ethics is the most effective factor of these intuitions. Here true intuition is so depending on what people think about it. Otherwise it is not normative.

The suggested theory aims at accepting both kind of intuitions, but separately. It treats each one with what fits to its nature and scope of field. Unless and until we do that, the ongoing heterogeneous mixture between these two kinds of intuitions, their probative force and their relation to truth will go on. For that reason, such theory of intuition is not exclusively tied to any of the two previous kinds.

References:


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