

DURAND OF ST.-POURÇAIN AND THOMAS AQUINAS ON REPRESENTATION

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In his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Thomas Reid writes that

all philosophers, from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in this: that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to the mind. (*Essay 2*, ch. 7)

Reid is, to be sure, wrong when he tells us that *all* philosophers from Plato to Mr. Hume defied common sense and subscribed to the theory of ideas and, as a result, were in one form or another representationalists as opposed to direct realists about perception. Indeed, most philosophers in the High Middle Ages agreed that what we immediately perceive *are* external objects and that the immediate object of perception must *not* be some image present to the mind. Yet most philosophers in the High Middle Ages *also* held, following Aristotle, that perception is a process wherein the perceiver takes on the likeness of the external object. This likeness—called a *species*—is a representation by means of which we immediately perceive the external object. But how can perception be at once immediate or direct and at the same time mediated by way of a representation?

Thomas Aquinas defended this thesis. According to Aquinas, all forms of cognition, from vision on up, require *species* as representations.¹ Even though cognition is in some sense mediated by such representations, Aquinas also held that it is direct: what we immediately perceive is the external object and not its representation in us by means of which we perceive it.² Durand of St.-Pourçain, his Dominican confrere, rejects this view. During direct acts of perception, he argued, a *species* is not at all necessary to represent the object, for the mere presence of the object to the percipient is sufficient. Indeed, if a *species* were to mediate as a representation, then we would be aware of it, which we evidently are not.³

Durand's attack raised the ire of proponents of the *species* theory of cognition well into the early modern period. One criticism of it, recently reiterated by Robert Pasnau in his book *Theories of Cognition*, is that Durand misrepresents the theory. A *species* is not a representation *in which* an external object is perceived but rather a representation *by means of which* it is perceived, and we need not be aware of such representations.⁴

In what follows, I want to reevaluate the success of Durand's criticism of representational *species*. I will first (§1) examine the charge that he misrepresents the theory, showing that he does not misunderstand the distinction between two kinds of representations. Quite the contrary, Durand recognizes that very distinction. I will then (§2) put forward a new interpretation of his criticism of the *species* theory of cognition (henceforth: STC).

1. DURAND'S PURPORTED MISINTERPRETATION OF THE STC

1.1. Dialectical Context:

The Causal versus the Representational Role of Species

In the present article, I will limit myself to just one aspect of Durand's criticism of the STC, namely, his refutation of the thesis that *species* are representations. Durand, in common with his contemporaries, recognizes two roles attributed to *species*. On the one hand, *species* are understood to be necessary in our account of the causation, or coming-to-be, of cognitive acts: a *species* is an item that somehow causes, or contributes to the causation of, a cognitive act.⁵ On the other hand, *species* are understood to be necessary in our account of the "aboutness" or representationality of cognitive acts: a *species*, so to say, directs or leads the cognitive agent to the cognition of some other item, and this inasmuch as it is taken to be a kind of likeness or representation of it.

While Durand does raise a number of interesting arguments against the first, causal role associated with *species*, we can set these aside, for, regardless of whether a *species* is necessary to bring about a cognitive act, there is still a further question as to whether it is a representation. As Durand puts it at the close of his discussion of the causal role of *species*:

But through what is the sense object presented to the sense or the intelligible object to the intellect? Is this through a *species* or through something else? An answer will not be given here since I intend to take up this topic elsewhere. However, this alone should be held based upon what has been said: a *species* isn't required as what elicits the act *per se* but only, if it is even required at all, as what represents the object.⁶

1.2. Durand's Purportedly Bad Argument against the STC

One argument Durand adduces against representational *species* does seem to invite the criticism that he misunderstands his opponents' position. In *Sent.* 2-C.3.6, he writes,

Such a *species*, if it were to lead one to the cognition of something else, would do this as a likeness . . . and so it would have the nature of an image. But an image that leads one to the cognition of that of which it is an image is cognized first, which can't be said about such *species*.⁷

Durand's argument is simple. For an image to represent what it represents, it must be apprehended before what it represents is apprehended, for, in general, representations are objects of cognition. As he puts it in the passage that precedes this one, "Everything through which a cognitive power is led to [a cognition of] something else as through a representative is cognized first."⁸ For instance, the word "Hercules," the statue of Hercules in the courtyard, and his reflection in the pond each represent Hercules; and for them to do so, they must at least be apprehended beforehand: Socrates hears the word "Hercules" or sees his statue or reflection in the pond and *then* he thinks about Hercules. Hence, a *species*, were it a representation, would be cognized before what it represents is cognized. But, evidently, when I perceive an external object, I do not do so by way of a prior apprehension of a *species*.

According to a common objection to Durand's criticism, Durand misrepresents the theory he aims to attack, for he fails to recognize that there are two sorts of representations: ordinary representations that, when looked upon or cognized, lead one to the cognition of some other item and special ones, like a *species*, that lead one to the cognition of some other item despite the fact that they are not cognized at all. For instance, John Capreolus, a fifteenth-century author known during the early modern period as the *princeps thomistarum*, writes in his *Defensiones theologiae diui Thomae Aquinatis* that Durand

was deceived by an equivocation in the terms "image," "likeness," or "medium of cognition," for each of these is said in many ways, for there is a medium of cognition in which (*medium in quo*), a medium of cognition by means of which (*medium quo*), and a medium of cognition under which (*medium sub quo*). In the case of the sense of sight, the medium of cognition under which is light, the medium by means of which is a *species* impressed upon the sense, and the medium in which is a mirror or some other object outside the one who is seeing which, when looked upon, leads the sense to the cognition of some other item. And just as I distinguish here between many media, so also one can draw these distinctions in the case of [the term] "image."

For an impressed *species* is an image by means of which (*imago qua*) a thing is seen and a mirror or a statue is an image in which (*imago in qua*) that item is seen. Hence, it is answered [to Durand's argument] that an image in which a thing is seen is seen before [the thing is seen], but an image by means of which a thing is seen is not.⁹

More recently, Robert Pasnau has reiterated this charge, telling us that Durand's argument is a good example of a bad argument against Aquinas because Durand fails to recognize "that the following situation is perfectly conceivable: X represents Y to A, and A thereby perceives Y without A's perceiving X" (*Theories of Cognition*, 18).

According to Capreolus and Pasnau—and Aquinas, too, as they interpret him—a *species* is a representation, but it is not an ordinary representation. There are two kinds of representations: ordinary ones *in which* something else is apprehended (*a medium in quo*), like statues, and special ones *by means of which* something else is apprehended (*a medium quo*), such as *species*. An ordinary representation is apprehended before what it represents is apprehended, whereas a special representation is not. A *species* is a special representation, so it is not itself cognized before what it represents is cognized.¹⁰

2. DEFENSIO DURANDI: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF DURAND'S CRITICISM OF THE STC

It would be an embarrassment indeed if Durand did glide over the scholastic distinction between a representation conceived of as a *medium quo* and one taken to be a *medium in quo*. But, fortunately, Capreolus is mistaken when he tells us that Durand was unaware of this distinction. In another text (*Sent.* 4-C.49.2), Durand recognizes that very distinction, noting that

there are three media involved in vision, namely, a medium by means of which (*medium quo*), such as a *species* in the eye or an intelligible *species* in the intellect (according to those who postulate these); a medium under which (*medium sub quo*) . . .; and there is a third medium, a medium in which (*medium in quo*) the thing is said to be seen, such as, in the case of corporeal vision, a mirror in which or by the mediation of which someone sees their own face, or, in the case of intellectual vision, an effect through which its cause is cognized or something like this. But this latter kind of medium is not a mere means of cognizing something else (*solum ratio cognoscendi alterum*), which is what a *species* is said to be, but it is rather a cognized medium (*medium cognitum*).¹¹

Durand here admits that a representational *species* is understood to be a *medium quo* and not a *medium in quo*: it is a representation by

means of which someone sees something else, and it is not itself seen or apprehended.

Durand is fully aware that his opponent believes that a *species* is a special and not an ordinary representation. How, then, are we to understand his argument against the view? Durand's overall criticism of representational *species*, I submit, is best viewed as having two parts. On the one hand, Durand seems to think that the STC is committed to a rather strange and uncommon notion of what it means for one thing to represent another, for ordinary cases of representation involve representations *in which* and not representations *by means of which*. Indeed, Durand does not think there is such a thing as a special representation. Hence, there is a kind of burden on the theory to establish the notion of special representation. Call this *the burden-of-proof argument*. Durand's purportedly bad argument quoted above falls into this first part. On the other hand, Durand reasons, either the going attempts at cashing out the notion of a special representation are entirely mysterious, or they land us with the thesis that *species* cannot represent what they are supposed to represent, namely, mind-independent features of reality. Call this *the inadequacy argument*. In this section, I will first go over the burden-of-proof argument (§2.1), and then turn to the inadequacy argument (§2.2).

2.1. The Burden-of-Proof Argument

The burden-of-proof argument is simple, although, to my knowledge, Durand does not come out and state it explicitly. Recall from our discussion of Durand's purportedly bad argument one of the assumptions that it makes, namely, that all representations are objects of cognition. Durand does not provide much by way of a defense of this thesis. He tells us that a representation "stands in the place of" what it represents, so if what it represents is an object of cognition, so too the representation must be an object of cognition.¹² Now, one might well object that this thesis is false. But the question is this: Whose burden is it to establish the truth or falsity of the thesis that all representations are objects of cognition? Indeed, Aquinas and the proponent of the STC are *admittedly* committed to a special or uncommon notion of representation, the common notion being, as Capreolus points out, that of an entity that functions as an object of cognition, such as a statue or a mirror. Hence, so it would seem, it is *Aquinas's* burden to establish the falsity of this assumption, namely, by clarifying how representations represent something to a cognizer without being cognized.

The idea that the burden is on Aquinas and not Durand gains some added traction once we recognize the broader dialectical situation. *Pace* Reid, both Durand and Aquinas are committed to direct realism about

perception—that is, the view that external objects and not their representations are the immediate objects of perception.¹³ But granted this shared commitment, it would seem that Aquinas and not Durand bears some special burden to explain why appeal to representation is required at all. Hence, the idea is this: Aquinas is appealing to a rather mysterious notion of representation, so the burden is his to explain it—*especially since* there are other ways of preserving direct realism in perception than by appeal to mysterious types of representation—namely, Durand’s own antirepresentationalist proposal.

2.2. The Inadequacy Argument

The burden-of-proof argument is that, as Durand sees it, there is a burden on the STC to explain what it might mean for a representation to represent some item to the mind while remaining, all the while, unperceived. The inadequacy argument attacks the STC from a separate front. Either a *species* is an ordinary representation (in which case it is perceived before what it represents is perceived), or it is a special representation (in which case it is not). However, a *species* cannot be a special representation since, in virtue of the fact that it is not at all perceived, it will not be able to represent what it is supposed to represent, namely, substances and corporeal accidents. A *species*, in other words, conceived of as a special representation, is inadequate, incapable of doing the job it was supposed to do.

Here’s how Durand puts the argument in *Sent.* 2-A.3.5:

If there were *species* representative of things in an angel, then they would be representatives in the manner of either (1) a cognized medium (*medium cognitum*) or (2) a mere [that is, uncognized] means of cognizing (*solum ratio cognoscendi*). (1) Not in the manner of a cognized medium, first of all, because this is not how we usually use the term “*species*.” . . . (2) Nor can a *species* be a mere [that is, uncognized] means of cognizing, since any such *species* representing something and the form immediately represented by it are the same in specific kind, although they might differ in how they exist. However, nothing existing in the mind of an angel can be the same in species (much less in genus) with the quiddity of a thing, since the latter is a substance whereas the *species* is an accident.¹⁴

What I have been calling the inadequacy argument is (2): a *species*, conceived of as a special or uncognized representation, cannot represent certain extramental features of reality that it is supposed to represent.

Consider the following question: In virtue of what does a *species* represent whatever it represents? In virtue of what, for instance, does a *species* of cats represent cats rather than dogs?¹⁵ Now, the fact that

a *species* is a special and not an ordinary representation puts certain constraints on what our answer to this question might be. Indeed, Durand argues, as we will see in a moment, that the only plausible answer available to the proponent of the STC is that a *species*, conceived of as a special representation, represents X (and not Y) owing to the fact that it bears a relation of what I will call *formal sameness* with X (and not Y). As he puts it in the quote above, the “*species* representing something and the form immediately represented by it are the same in specific kind, although they might differ in how they exist.”

However, Durand argues, the formal sameness thesis seems to be problematic, for an intelligible *species*, at least, is an incorporeal accident, so it cannot be formally the same as a substance or a corporeal accident.¹⁶ Hence, if what a thought is about is a matter of a formal sameness that obtains between a *species*—an incorporeal accidental quality in the mind¹⁷—and some other item, then none of our thoughts can be said to be about substances or corporeal accidents. A *species*, conceived of as a special representation, just cannot represent what it is supposed to represent.

But why should we believe Durand when he tells us that a *species* must be formally the same as whatever it represents? While Durand adduces a number of different arguments aimed at showing that the proponent of the STC is committed to this thesis,¹⁸ the argument I wish to look at here bears upon the thesis that the *species* is an uncognized representation. In *Sent.* 2-A.3.5, Durand writes,

An item which is a mere [that is, uncognized] means of cognizing and not, properly, a cognized medium does not lead [the mind] to a cognition of some other item except because it is a perfect likeness (*perfecta similitudo*) of it. . . . A cognized medium, by contrast, can lead [the mind] to a cognition of some other item because of whatever relationship, for instance, as its cause or its effect, as like it (*simile*) or its opposite, or in whatever other way, but a *species* because of likeness alone, as was said. However, a perfect likeness does not obtain between two items that are distinct in kind.¹⁹

In *Sent.* 4-C.49.2, he adds,

Representation, since it is a relationship between the thing representing and that which is represented, has a foundation by reason of which “represents” is true of it [that is, the representing thing]. But this can’t be anything but the nature of a *species*, not *qua* effect, since “represents” isn’t true of many effects. If one were to run through all the other [options], one would never find a ground (*ratio*) or foundation for such representation. For it is not found in all things, but just in those items that are univocal effects, albeit effects that fall short

of the perfection of their kind, effects which do not terminate the act of a [cognitive] power and so are not objects of cognition (as opposed to items that are like [*simile*] each other). Rather, a *species* is a mere means of cognizing some other item as a likeness (*similitudo*), for if it didn't belong to the same kind as the thing which it represents, then it couldn't be a means of perfectly representing some other item.²⁰

These arguments are a bit compressed, but I take it that part of what Durand has in mind here is the following. A *species* must be a perfect likeness (*perfecta similitudo*) of what it represents since it, unlike an ordinary representation, is able to represent whatever it represents without being itself the object of perception. Hence, it must be the same in specific kind (at least) with what it represents, for if it were of a different kind, then we would have to perceive it in order for it to represent what it represents. Ordinary representations, like statues and words, are able to represent items that differ in kind precisely because we perceive such representations and make an explicit inference to what they represent based on one or more of their features. Hence, a painting of a sheep can represent a real sheep, even though the painting is not itself a sheep. Likewise, an incorporeal quality (such as a *species*) *could* represent a corporeal quality, but this would require us to be aware of the incorporeal quality.

However, if we are not aware of the representation, as the STC supposes, then, Durand reasons, the representation and what it represents must be the same in kind. We might suppose that what Durand has in mind is the concession that one item of a certain kind can perfectly represent another item of the same kind with regard to the feature that makes it a member of that kind such that I am all the while unaware that I perceived the latter by means of the former: one red item might be said to represent some other red item with respect to its redness such that I am all the while unaware that I perceived the latter by means of the former. Now, we might be able to put to use such a strict notion of representation in our theory of mind. Indeed, we might suppose that, if sensible *species* are corporeal qualities, then they can perfectly represent external corporeal qualities that are the same in kind as them. But we will not be able to put to use any notion of representation other than this, for any other sort of representation would require us to be aware of the representation.

Hence, we are stuck between two horns. On the one hand, we can claim that a *species* is formally the same as what it represents, so we can also claim that a *species* is an uncognized representation; but then *species*—at least intelligible *species*—will be unable to represent what they are supposed to represent (substances and corporeal accidents). On the other hand, we can reject the claim that a *species* is formally the same as what it represents, so we can claim that *species* can rep-

resent what they are supposed to represent (substances and corporeal accidents); but then *species* will not be unrecognized representations!

2.2.1. *The Primitivist Thesis*

Durand's inadequacy argument is that, if the *species* is formally the same as that of which it is a *species*—a thesis to which he thinks the proponent of the STC either implicitly or explicitly is committed—then it just cannot represent what it is supposed to represent. While most commentators and defenders of Aquinas do, with Durand, take Aquinas to have been committed to the antecedent of this argument, namely, the claim that a *species* bears a relation of formal sameness with what it represents, at least some defenders of Aquinas have opted to abandon this claim.²¹

For instance, this seems to be what Hervaeus Natalis, Durand's erstwhile teacher and a well-known advocate of the Angelic Doctor, does in his quodlibetal question dedicated to Durand's *Sent.* 2-A.3.5. There, he tells us that Durand wrongly assumes that a *species* is a "likeness in being" (*similitudo in esse*); quite the contrary, it is a "representational likeness" (*similitudo secundum esse repraesentatiuum*), and a representational likeness does not need to be really formally the same as what it represents (*Quodl.* 3.8, 67–68, ed. J. Koch [Münster: Aschendorff, 1935]). John Capreolus (*Defensiones* 2.3.2, f. 304a) makes much the same point, and he cites as support several passages from Aquinas, including this one from *De ueritate* (2.3 ad 9):

A likeness obtaining between two things can be understood in two ways. In one way, as an agreement in nature, and this sort of likeness isn't required between cognizer and cognized. . . . In another way, as representation, and this sort of likeness is required between cognizer and cognized.

More recently, Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland have put forward a similar interpretation of Aquinas, citing this passage from *De ueritate* among others. Motivated, in fact, by the failure of the formal sameness thesis—in light of precisely the sort of objection that Durand raises against it, although they do not cite Durand—and, as well, motivated by the principle of charity, Brower and Brower-Toland argue that a *species*'s capacity to represent is irreducible, unanalyzable in terms of something more familiar to us, or, as the case may be, Aquinas's contemporaries, namely, formal sameness.²²

This position—which we might, following Brower and Brower-Toland, call *the primitivist theory*—is one that, in fact, Durand considers. And he rejects it. In *Sent.* 4-C.49.2, he characterizes the view as follows:

It isn't true that because a *species* represents the nature of a specific thing as a mere means of cognizing it, a *species* therefore belongs

to the same species as the thing. This is because it is not necessary that a representing *species* bear a specific agreement with the thing represented in terms of its natural being but rather merely as a matter of representation, for, obviously, it does represent the nature of the thing both with regards to its universal conditions and also with regards to its proper and specific nature.²³

Durand finds this proposal “empty,” “frivolous,” and a “mere dodge.” In trying to make sense of it, he writes,

If a representing *species* is said to be of the same species with the thing represented as a matter of representation, then (1) this means that the identity is attended to at the level of the representations such that just as one item represents a thing, so too another item represents the same thing in species . . . ; or (2) this means that one item represents and another item is represented.²⁴

The problem with the first option, he tells us, is that we have no reason to suppose that the relation between two representations of the same thing is also the relation that obtains between a given representation and that thing, or, in other words, such an answer still does not provide us with an answer to the question: In virtue of what does this representation (or set of representations) represent cats, say, rather than dogs?²⁵ As to the second option, Durand tells us that such an answer is absurd, for no matter how much a *species* and the thing represented by it might differ in terms of their natural being, we will still be able to say that, as a matter of representation, a *species* is formally the same as what it represents. But this sort of answer is not very informative. Indeed, it is not an answer at all to the question: Why does a *species* representing X (cats, say) represent X (cats) and not Y (dogs, say)?

Neither answer, in sum, is an answer to our original question. Since a *species* is uncognized, it cannot represent cats in the way that a picture of cats represents cats—that is, in terms of pictorial resemblance—nor in the way that an effect represents its cause, since both of these solutions would require us to be aware of the *species* (which we are not). Nor does it represent cats owing to the fact that it is formally the same as cats. So, in virtue of what does a *species* of cats represent cats and not dogs? We have not been given an answer to this question.²⁶

Indeed, if we take a moment to step back from the inadequacy argument and consider the overall dialectical situation, such a primitivist position does not seem satisfying. Granted, in other words, the alternative—that direct forms of cognition *do not involve representations at all*—it can hardly be a welcome move to insist that all forms of cognition do involve representations albeit representations of a special, totally unanalyzable variety. Should we not rather conclude, with Durand, that direct cogni-

tion, since it does not involve ordinary representations, does not involve representations *tout court*?

3. CONCLUSION

Let us sum up. First things first: Durand does not make the *bad* argument against *species* that his opponents have taken him to make. He does not simply appeal to the fact that we do not *see species* in order to debunk the theory, nor does he, like Thomas Reid, suppose that the *species* theory of cognition wants to be committed to representationalism as opposed to direct realism. Quite the contrary, the STC is committed to the thesis that cognition about external objects is direct. Yet, despite this, cognition about external objects is, according to the STC, mediated by a representation, called a *species*. A *species* is neither that which is seen nor a representation in which the external object is seen: it is an uncognized representation by means of which the external object is directly seen. A *species* is not an ordinary representation but a special representation, and one thing this means is that it is able to represent X to P, and P is able to thereby perceive X without perceiving the *species*.

The STC looks to be committed, in other words, to a rather strange and uncommon notion of what it means for one thing to represent another, for ordinary cases of representation involve representations *in which* and not uncognized representations *by means of which*. Hence, there seems to be a kind of burden on the theory to tell us what such a concept of special representation amounts to, and, moreover, why we should talk about special representations at all. Further, either the going attempts at cashing out the notion of a special representation are no explanation at all (primitivism), or they land us with the thesis that a *species* cannot represent what it is supposed to represent (the formal sameness thesis).

A *species* might still be countenanced in our theory of perception for some other reason. For instance, the STC supposes that a *species*, in fact, carries out two essential functions: it represents the object, and it also, somehow, causes the mental act. Durand, as mentioned, has independent arguments against this second, causal role attributed to a *species*, but, to switch around the order of his sentiments in the passage from *Sent. 2-A.3.5* quoted above (§1.1), this alone should be held based on what has been said: a *species* is not required as what represents the object but only, if it is even required at all, in order to cause the act. To be sure, Durand's direct realist alternative will face its own mysteries, but it is a start, I think, if we get straight on what he sees wrong with the *species* theory of cognition first.²⁷

NOTES

1. See, for instance, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (*Sent.*) 1.36.2.3, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929): “Omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam cogniti in cognoscente”; *Summa contra gentiles* (*SCG*) 2.77: “Omnis enim cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscenti”; *Summa theologiae* (*ST*) 1.88.1: “requiritur ad cognoscendum ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius.” See also *Sententia libri De anima* (*DA*) 1.4, *De ueritate* (*DV*) 2.5, and *ST* 1.85.2. Aquinas allows for two notable exceptions to the rule that cognition involves a *species*: the beatific vision (*Sent.* 4.49.2.1) and, perhaps, self-knowledge (*DV* 10.8–9). Henceforth, I take this proviso as assumed. Aquinas’s texts are quoted from *Sancti Thomae Opera omnia*, Leonine ed. (1882–) unless otherwise noted in the first quotation of the particular work.

2. See, for instance, *ST* 1.85.2: “Vnde similitudo rei uisibilis est secundum quam uisus uidet; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. . . . Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo.”

3. Durand’s most extensive criticism of the *species* can be found in the first (“A”) and third (“C”) redactions of his commentary on the second book of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*: *Sent.* 2-A.3.5, ed. Josef Koch (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), and *Sent.* 2-C.3.6 (Venice, 1571; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1964). The best analysis of Durand’s criticism of *species* remains Maria Fumagalli, *Durando di S. Porziano. Elementi filosofici della terza redazione del Commento alle Sentenze* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 65–76, who limits herself to Durand’s printed third redaction (“C”).

4. Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 17–18. The most complete source of information on Durand’s life and career remains Josef Koch, *Durandus de S. Porziano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1927). However, see also, more recently, Chris Schabel et al., “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,” *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001): 183–300.

5. There were several different ways of understanding its causal role. The view Durand treats at length in his first redaction (*Sent.* 2-A.3.5), which he attributes to Aquinas, holds that the *species* is an active principle by means of which the cognitive agent elicits its own cognitive act, at least in the case of intellectual cognition. This is the view that Hervaeus Natalis explicitly defends in, for instance, *Sent.* 2.3.4.1, ff. 212b–3a (Paris, 1647; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1966).

6. *Sent.* 2-A.3.5, 23: “Per quod autem praesentetur sensibile sensui et intelligibile intellectui, utrum per speciem uel per aliquid aliud, non dicitur modo, quia alias per intentionem agatur de hoc. Sed hoc tantum ex dictis habeatur,

quod species non requiritur ut eliciens actum per se, sed solum ut repraesentans obiectum, si tamen umquam requiritur.” See also *ibid.*, 24.

7. n. 11, f. 139va: “Talis species, si duceret in cognitionem alterius, hoc faceret ratione similitudinis . . . et sic haberet rationem imaginis. Imago autem ducens in cognitionem illius cuius est imago est primo cognita, quod non potest dici de tali specie.”

8. n. 10₂, f. 139va: “Omne illud per quod tamquam per repraesentatum potentia cognitiva fertur in alterum est primo cognitum.”

9. 2.3.2, f. 300b, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues (Turin: Alfred Cattier, 1900–1908; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967). Cf. Aquinas, *Sent.* 4.49.2.1 ad 15.

10. For further discussion on the *medium quo/medium in quo* distinction in Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind, see Dominik Perler, “Things in the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies over Intelligible Species,” *Vivarium* 34 (1996): 231–53; Claude Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation,” in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. D. Perler (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), 185–203; Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 8; and Robert Pasnau, “Id Quo Cognoscimus,” in *Theories of Perception from Antiquity to Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 131–50. In Aquinas, see *ST* 1.12.5, 1.85.2; *Sent.* 4.49.2.1; and *DV* 20.2.

11. n. 9, ff. 412vb–3ra: “Cum enim sit triplex medium in uisione, scilicet medium quo, sicut species in oculo uel in intellectu species intelligibilis secundum ponentes ipsas, et medium sub quo. . . Est autem tertium medium in quo dicitur res uideri, sicut in uisione corporali ponitur exemplum de speculo in quo uel mediante quo uidet aliquis faciem suam; in uisione uero intellectuali est tale medium quando cognoscitur causa per effectum, uel aliquid huic simile. Tale autem medium non est solum ratio cognoscendi alterum, sicut de specie dicitur, sed est medium cognitum.”

12. *Sent.* 2-C.3.6, n. 10₂, f. 139va: “Probatio maioris: quia quidquid se habet obiective ad potentiam cognitivam ut est cognitiva est ab ea cognoscibile seu cognitum. Sed omne quod repraesentat aliquid potentiae cognitivae se habeat ad eam obiective, supplet enim uicem rei quam repraesentat, quae si secundum se praesens esset, haberet se obiective ad potentiam cognitivam. Ergo, omne tale est cognoscibile uel cognitum, et cum ducat in cognitionem alterius est prius eo cognitum tempore uel natura.” In the next paragraph, Durand adds (n. 11, f. 139va): “Et sine dubio de se uidetur absurdum quod potentia cognitiva ducatur in cognitionem alicuius per talem repraesentatum, quod est sibi totaliter incognitum, contrarium enim uerissimum est, uidelicet quod per notum ducitur in cognitionem ignoti.”

13. See, for instance, Norman Kretzman, “Philosophy of Mind,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Aquinas*, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 138–39 (the section is titled “Intellect—Aquinas’s Direct Realism”); G.E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, *Three Philosophers* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963); John Haldane, “Brentano’s

Problem,” *Gazer Philosophische Studien* 35 (1989): 1–32; Joseph Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Aquinas*, 38–59; and Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993).

14. 27: “Si in angelo essent species repraesentatiuae rerum, ut medium cognitum, uel solum ut ratio cognoscendi. Non ut medium cognitum: Primo, quia sic non consueuimus uti nomine ‘species.’ . . . Item species non potest esse solum ratio cognoscendi, quia omnis talis species aliquid repraesentans et forma per ipsam immediate repraesentata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem licet differant in modo essendi. Sed nihil existens in mente angeli potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum quidditatibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum illae sint substantiae, haec autem quaedam accidentia.”

15. The issue that this question bears upon is sometimes called *the special problem of intentionality* (in virtue of what does a representation represent this rather than that) as opposed to *the general problem of intentionality* (in virtue of what does one state of the world represent some other state of the world *at all*). For some recent discussions of these two problems and the medieval debate, see Giorgio Pini, “Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in *Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. G. Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, forthcoming); Peter King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Representation,” in *Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. H. Lagerlund (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 81–100; and Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality,” *The Philosophical Review* 117 (2008): 193–243.

16. Regarding substances, see also *Sent.* 2-C.3.6, n. 17, f. 139vb: “Species repraesentans rem aliquam et res cuius est species sunt eiusdem rationis specificae licet differant in modo essendi. Sed nulla species existens in intellectu angeli, cum sit accidens, potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum substantiis rerum, tam spiritualium quam corporalium, quas angelus intelligit. Ergo saltem angelus non intelligit per species substantias spirituales uel corporales. Minor de se patet, quia substantia et accidens non possunt esse eiusdem rationis specificae, cum differant genere.” See also *Sent.* 1-A.19.3, §3.1, ed. M. von Perger, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff nach Durandus von Saint-Pourçain mit der Quästion ‘Utrum veritas sit in rebus vel in anima’ aus In *Sent.* I, Fassung A, und darauf bezogenen Texten,” *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 74 (2004): 127–224: “Omne, quod est subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in essendo, cum sint diuersorum generum.” Regarding corporeal accidents, see *Sent.* 2-C.3.6, n. 20, f. 139vb: “Et per eamdem rationem non intelligit accidentia rerum corporalium per speciem, quia in angelo, qui est substantia mere spiritualis, non potest esse aliquod accidens eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus corporalibus.” See also *Sent.* 1-C.19.2.5–6, §3.2, ed. von Perger, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff”: “Omne, quod est subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis, uel, si sit accidens, est accidens corporeum; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas

in essendo, cum sit diuersorum generum.” In *Sent.* 4-C.49.2, n. 13, f. 413rb, he applies the same line of reasoning to the beatific vision.

17. Aquinas clearly holds that the *species* is an accidental quality of the mind. See, for instance, *SCG* 1.46: “Species intelligibilis in intellectu praeter essentiam eius existens esse accidentale habet.” See also *ST* 1–2.53.1 and *De potentia* 10.5.

18. For instance, Durand argues that Aquinas is committed to this thesis in his argument to the effect that the beatific vision is an exception to the rule that each cognitive act involves a *species*. See Durand, *Sent.* 4-C.49.2, n. 19, f. 413vb; cf. Aquinas, *Sent.* 4.49.2.1 and *DV* 2.3.

19. *Sent.* 2-A.3.5, 28: “Illud quod est solum ratio cognoscendi et non proprie medium cognitum non ducit in cognitionem alterius nisi ratione perfectae similitudinis. . . . Medium autem cognitum potest ducere in alterius cognitionem ratione cuiuscumque habitudinis, sc., ut causa uel ut effectus, ut simile uel ut oppositum, et qualitercumque aliter, sed species ratione solius similitudinis, ut dictum est. Perfecta autem similitudo non est differentium secundum speciem.” See also *Sent.* 4-C.49.2, n. 13, f. 413rb.

20. n. 18, f. 413va-b: “Repraesentatio, cum sit habitudo rei repraesentantis ad illud quod repraesentatur, habet aliquod fundamentum ratione cuius conuenit ei ‘repraesentare’, et illud non potest esse nisi natura speciei, non quatenus est effectus rei absolutae, quia multis effectibus non conuenit sic ‘repraesentare’. Deducendo etiam in omnibus aliis numquam inuenitur ratio et fundamentum talis repraesentationis. Non enim inuenitur in omni re, sed in illa tantum quae est effectus uniuocus, deficiens tamen in tantum a perfectione speciei quod non terminat in actum potentiae, et ita non est obiectum cognitum, ut simile, sed est solum ratio et medium cognoscendi alterum, ut similitudo. Si enim talis species non esset eiusdem rationis cum re quam repraesentat nullo modo posset esse ratio repraesentandi perfecte alterum.”

21. It is worth remarking that, for the most part, the formal sameness thesis is the one that is defended in the *contemporary* literature on Aquinas. See, for instance, Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas”; Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956); Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas: Intentionality,” in *Philosophy through Its Past*, ed. T. Honderich (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 87–89; Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind”; Dominik Perler, “Essentialism and Direct Realism: Some Late Medieval Perspectives,” *Topoi* 19 (2000): 111–22; and John O’Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).

22. Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 205. They propose “what appears to be the only alternative—namely, an interpretation that takes Aquinas’s notion of intentional likeness as primitive or basic.”

23. n. 14, f. 413va: “Tertio, quia illud quod dicitur quod ex quo species repraesentat naturam rei specificae ut sola ratio cog<nosc>endi, ideo uidetur esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsa re, non ualet, quia non oportet quod species repraesentans habeat conuenientiam specificam cum re repraesentata quantum

ad esse naturae, sed solum in ratione repraesentandi, quia, sc., repraesentat naturam rei non solum secundum conditiones uniuersales, sed etiam secundum rationem propriam et specificam.”

24. n. 18, f. 413va: “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesentata in repraesentando, aut intelligitur quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem, ita, scilicet, quod sicut unum repraesentat aliquam rem, ita aliud repraesentat eandem rem secundum speciem (FOR: spaciem) . . . aut intelligitur quod unum repraesentat et aliud repraesentatur.” See also *Sent.* 2-A.3.5, 28.

25. *ibid.*: “et ista identitas non potest ponitur inter speciem repraesentantem et rem repraesentatam per ipsam.”

26. *ibid.*: “sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et e conuerso etiam in aequiuocis et in multis aliis, quantumcumque genere uel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.” See also *ibid.*, n. 19, f. 413vb.

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