It seems to me that the human-animal contrast serves at least two different functions in Husserl’s philosophy of other selves and intersubjectivity. One of these functions is related to the constitution of the natural world and the other related to the constitution of the cultural-historical world. In my reading, the fifth Cartesian Meditation involves both of these ideas but it only explicates the former, that is the one that concerns the constitution of the natural world. The other idea remains implicit and can only be illuminated with other Husserlian sources: we must turn to the Intersubjectivity volumes to see more clearly how the animal-human contrast serves Husserl’s account of the constitution of the cultural world.

The aim of this chapter is to offer explications of both lines of thought and a rational reconstruction of their interconnection. I will proceed by first explicating the analysis that we find in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. Here we encounter Husserl’s technical concept of empathy and need to clarify its role in his account of the constitution of the senses own lived bodiliness and alien lived bodiliness (Leiblichkeit) and the dependent sense of intersubjective nature. This is the task of the first part of the chapter (sections 1 and 2). The second part turns to the third Intersubjectivity volume and studies how the animal-human contrast functions in Husserl’s account of the constitution of the sense of the true world, that is the cultural-historical world (sections 3 and 4). At the end I hope to be able to put forward some claims about the relation between these two discourses and thereby clarify the nature-culture divide in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

1. The Constitution of Lived Bodies and Perceptual Nature
The fifth Cartesian Meditation begins with an analysis of the sense *alien lived body*[^1] (*Leib*) and with an account of the constitution of this sense. In order to understand the different ways in which bodies can appear to us as animated, that is, as belonging to conscious subjects or selves, Husserl suggests that we perform a special methodological operation of sense-isolation. He proposes that we abstract all sense of alien conscious life from our experience and all sense that depends on such life, and that we start by studying first how our own living bodiliness is constituted for us in artificial abstractive isolation (Hua 1, xxx; Hua 4, 81–82/86–87). Only after this preparatory step we can study the conditions under which other bodies, that is, bodies environing our own body, appear as experiencing and living to us. Husserl calls this move “the reduction to the sphere of ownness” (Hua 1, xxx).

The point is not to derive the sense of another living body from the sense of my living body nor to superimpose some subjective idea on objective being. The point of the abstractive isolation is to get clear about the multiple senses of alienness.

[^1]: The German word “Leib” that Husserl uses to refer to the living bodies of both animals and human beings is translated in several different ways. In Cairns’ translation of *Cartesiaischen Meditationionen* (Hua 1) from 1970, “Leib” is rendered into “animate organism.” In the English version of second volume of *Ideen* (Hua 4), the translators Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer use the term “Body” with capital “B”.

In contemporary phenomenology, these technical terms are often replaced by the term “lived body” in order to emphasize the fact that a living thing experiences its own body in a special way: the animal does not grasp its body as a perceptual thing among other things but as a means of manipulating perceivable objects and as the zeropoint of orientation and action in space.

Here I will use both “lived body” and “living body” interchangeably for Husserl’s concept of *Leib*. I choose to do so in order to keep in mind the essentially double character of the body as sensing and sensed, experiencing and experienced, accentuated by the phenomenon of double sensation.
and otherness involved in our experience of the world and to inquire into their mutual relations of dependency and independency.2

Within the solipsistic “universe”, I do not experience any living things as long as I refrain from touching myself. All thinghood belongs to external objects and all life belongs to me as the sole living operating subject that explores the objects (Hua 1, xxx; cf. Hua 4, xxx). But when I touch myself, for example, when I scratch my itching nose with my right hand fingers, then from the “point of view” of my operating organ, the scratching fingers, the pleasurable sensation belongs to the object touched, the nose. Thus my fingers are able to perceive a very peculiar kind of material object, an object that does not just appear with thingly qualities, such as smoothness and warmness, but is also furnished with sensations of its own, in this case, sensations of being touched and sensations of pleasure. Husserl summarizes: “If I speak of the physical thing (…), then I am abstracting from these sensations (…). If I do include them, then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead it becomes living body [Leib], it senses” (Hua 4, 145/152, cf. 151–153/158–159; Hua 14, 75).

The description given above delivers an important point about the necessary role of self-touching in the constitution of one’s own living body. However it somewhat misleading since it suggests a temporal dependency. This is not the case, so it must be emphasized that the relation is transcendental and not temporal: the capacity to touch oneself is a necessary condition for the constitution of the organs of one’s own lived body. Husserl argues:

\[
A\ subject\ whose\ only\ sense\ was\ the\ sense\ of\ vision\ could\ not\ at\ all\ have\ an\ appearing\ living\ body\ [Leib];\ in\ the\ play\ of\ kinesthetic\ motivations\ (which\ he\]

2 Several commentators have interpreted this sense-isolating operation as a fundamental ontological resolution and have argued that it severely weakens or perverts Husserl’s discourse on other selves and their bodily being. On such interpretations, Husserl would start from a solipsistic universe and would aim at construing the existence of other subjects on a hopelessly narrow ground. Husserl’s point, however, is not ontological or metaphysical but transcendental. It concerns the order of sense constitution and the dependences between different senses; and the method that he proposes is not constructive but analytical.
would not apprehend lively [leiblich]) *this subject would have appearances of things, he would see real things.* It cannot be said that this subject who only sees his living body, for its specific distinctive feature as living would be lacking him, and even the free movement of this ‘living body,’ which goes hand in hand with the freedom of the kinaesthetic process, would not make it a living body (Hua 4, 150/158).

This means that the phenomenon of double sensation, in which a perceiving body touches itself, is crucial to the constitution of the primary sense of living bodiliness: the living body is a material thing that entertains a system of sensations and sensory appearances. The constitution of such a thing requires kinesthetic sensations and touch sensations (as the constitution of any thing), but in addition to these, it also involves a double way of apprehending sensations. Some sensations have to be grasped as thingly qualities while other must at the same time remain subjective sensings:

The living body [Leib] constitutes itself originally in a double way: first it is a physical thing, *matter;* it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth (…). Secondly, I find on it, and I *sense* ‘on’ it and ‘in’ it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips. (Hua 4, 145/153, translation modified; cf. Hua 1, xxx/97; Hua 14, 75; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993, /92–93, /405–409, 1964, /133, /140–148, /254–257)

Husserl’s solution to the problem of other experiencing living bodies rests on two grounds: the primary constitution of my own living body and on the idea of transfer of sense. He argues that the experience of localized sensations and the primitive sense of living as sensing is transferred over from one’s own body to other bodies in the environing space (Hua 1, xxx/112–13; Hua 4, 164–166/172–174; Hua 14, 97). The transfer is motivated by the similarity of perceived movements. Some things that I detect and observe in space resemble my own living body and its organs in their perceived movements (Hua 1, xxx114; Hua 14, xxx). A body over there reacts to external stimulation, to the cold wind or the freezing rain, for example, in the same way as my own arms and hands: it shivers (cf. Hua 14, 118). And when it bumps into
another thing, it does not halt or bounce back but restores its balance and circumvents
the obstacle. Moreover, without any detectable causal influence by other material
elements or things, it spontaneously turns to this or that direction. And finally: it also
manifests the types of reflexive movements that are familiar to me from my own case.

Such behavioral similarities motivate a complex of synthetizing experiences
which terminates in an act in which the sense of sensing is transferred over to a body
perceived at distance. As a result, that body over there appears as a material thing
with its own systems of sensations and appearance-systems, sensations that I cannot
have or live through but that are expressed and indicated to me by the thing’s
movements and behaviors.

The living thing does not appear in perception as an amalgam or compound of
two separate realities, one psychic and the other physical, neither as a two-layered
psycho-physical reality. Such conceptualizations belong to the psychological and life
sciences, not to straightforward perception, and they depend on the goals, the methods
and the techniques of these sciences. Instead of manifesting itself a compounded or
layered structure, the living being appears as a uniform whole saturated with governed
movements, meaningful gestures and significant behaviors. The fifth Meditation

2. Pairing of Bodies and Perceptual Anomalies

Husserl argues repeatedly that the empathetic transfer of sense that he studies is not
any sort of reasoning or interpretation (e.g. Hua 1, xxx/111). The sense living is not
derived, deduced or induced in any manner from the perceived behavior. My
perception does not serve as a basis for an inference but motivates in me a new type
of apprehension, one that I already master in my own case but that I now can perform
also in another case similar to mine.

For example, when I clean the swimming pool by removing fallen leaves
from the water surface with a pool net, I suddenly detect a “quivering” movement
among the yellow and beige leaves that have fallen from the oak tree nearby. The
quivering stands out immediately in my perceptual field, and I switch from perception
of mere matter to perception of a living thing: a grasshopper or a noctuid. The shape
and the color of the insect merges with those of the leaves, and all these buoyant
entities are in motion on the rippling surface of the water. However, some of these
little brownish things move differently than others and in ways that resemble my own movements, and as such they attract my attention in a particular way. A contrary switch happens, for example, when I study angleworms contained in a bucket, in order to remove dead individuals (cf. Hua 14, 126). I can distinguish lifeless animals from living ones simply by their motions: in a small bucket, all bodies move, but the dead ones move in a different way than the living. Rather than being an inference, the change from one type of experiencing (“mere matter”) to the other (“living”), and back, resembles a gestalt switch.

In addition to mere sensings, we transfer also other types of consciousness to perceivable bodies, depending on the complexity of their behaviors (Gebaren) and their relations to the environment. Thus the class of living things is not identical with that of sensing things, but also includes feeling things as well as desiring and willing things (Hua 4, 164/172, 235/246–247, cf. 166/174–175). What is transferred is not any mental or psychic unit (such as a mental state, event, process) or a series of such units, nor any mental substance, but the sense lived body or conscious embodiment. This transfer is supported by a passive associative synthesis that links, pairs or couples, two (or several) bodies on the basis of resemblance or similarity and thus allows the transfer to happen between them. The validity of the sense is verified by the experience of harmony in the behavior of the body, or the bodies, perceived. Husserl writes:

The lived body [Leib] of another continues to prove itself as actually an lived body, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious behavior [einstimmig Gebaren]. Such harmonious behavior (…) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior. (Hua 1, 144/114, translation modified)

Merleau-Ponty’s more poetic characterization in Signs captures in a nutshell the anticipatory structure of the experience:

A woman passing by (…) is a certain manner of being flesh which is given entirely in her walk or even in the simple shock of her heel on the ground –
as the tension of the bow is present in each fiber of wood – a very noticeable variation of the norm of walking, looking, touching, and speaking that I posses in my self-awareness because I am incarnate. (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1998, 67–68/54)

Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) offers an illuminative example of how the anticipations implicated by such experiences may be disappointed. Husserl reports an experience of meeting a unknown woman on the stairs when entering the Panopticum Waxworks in Hamburg: When the person first enters the gallery he notices a woman standing on the stairs; he approaches the woman and prepares to greet her while passing, but when he come closer to the figure he realizes that he has been tricked by a wax sculpture. As long as we are tricked, Husserl argues, we experience a perfectly good percept: a person momentarily resting on the stairs. When the illusion vanishes, we see a statue that only represents a human person, a woman (Husserl [1901] 1984, 458–459/137–138; cf. Hua 11, xxx; Hua 14, 124).

The experience proceeds in stages and in accordance with the bodily movements of the perceiving subject: When he approaches the figure, new sensory materials “come in” and are “interpreted”. He associates the perceived object with other similar ones and ultimately with his own living body. Its visual shape and posture remind of the gestalt that is familiar to him from his own case. The association generates anticipations that the percept will move and comport itself toward the environment in certain ways. When he comes closer to the figure, however, his anticipations are disappointed, as new sensory material does not confirm the association but, on the contrary, conflicts with it. The figure stays motionless; more particularly, what remains absent are the vital movements that characterize living beings and the spontaneity, responsiveness and reflexivity that belongs to human and animal bodies. We realizes that the object resembles humans only in visual form but not in movement or comportment, and so the associative synthesis fails, and we see a dummy.

Two points must be emphasized concerning the associative passive synthesis and the pairing of the two percepts central to this synthesis:

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3 For the gendered aspects of this exemplary phenomenon, see Heinämaa 2011.
First, Husserl argues that the pairing that makes possible the transfer of sense needed for the experience of another conscious living being does not only involve the body over there perceived by me and my own body in its double form of givenness sensing-sensed. The transfer of sense living from my own body to the body perceived is mediated by a spatial variant of my own body. He writes:

I do not apperceive him as having (…) the spatial modes of appearance that are mine from here; rather, as we find in closer examination, I apperceive him as having the spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is. (Hua 1, 120/117, cf. 148–149/117–119; Hua 14, 83, 96–97).

So the transfer of sense necessary for the experience of another bodily subject or conscious body happens between my own body as I live it here and the other’s body as I see it over there but it is, as it were, “assisted” by a imaginative and counterfactual variant of my own body: my body as I would experience it if I stood where it stands and would orient myself as it orients itself.

The second thing to emphasize is that the resemblance between the two bodies does not have to be total or comprehensive but can be partial and focused. We do not just experience fellow humans as conscious living beings but also different types of animals, even biologically very simple creatures and animals that have a limited

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4 Several commentators argue that Husserl’s account is dominated by a model of visual perception and distorted by the limitations of this model. One complaint is that his idea of the transfer of sense from one percept to another presupposes that the two percepts are separated by a spatial distance, one standing “here” and the other over “there”, and that this implies that the two percepts must be captured visually since only vision, or some other distance sense (e.g. audition), can connect spatially distant objects. It seems to me that this is type of critique is based on a misunderstanding of the sense in which my own lived body is “here” and any other lived body is “there”: the two bodies can of course be in constant contact, can continually touch one another, and still be distinguished by the sensory chasm between “my here” and “its there”.
repertoire of operative sensory organs in comparison to us (Hua 14, 115–118).\(^5\) We can of course think and conceive of such beings as complicated machines, and Descartes’ famous descriptions introduced them as such to modern natural philosophy, but perceptually all these beings differ from falling stones, flying pieces of paper and floating plastic bottles by manifesting a distinctive way of responsive, spontaneous and reflexive movement.\(^6\) Even animals that hide and protect themselves by imitating vegetable shapes and ways of movement, such as the seahorse, the leaf fish or the praying mantis, stand out in the spatial-thingly environment. What betrays their conscious living-sensing character are, for example, their operating eyes, their tentacles or their fins. The possibility of experiencing such beings as living depends on the stratified or layered character of our own embodiment. We are able to dismantle (abbauen) complete horizons from our experiencing and transfer the remaining partial sense of experiencing to aliens bodies (Hua 14, 115–119).

The subjects that in empathetic apprehension intend one another as perceiving, experiencing beings with sensory-motor bodies constitute together the natural world (Hua 1, xxx; Hua 4 xxx; Hua 14, 101–103, 129). Animals belong here as subjects for whom this world is given with its multiple objects and thus also as members of the community of co-constituters (Hua 15, xxx). This is not the nature of the mathematized natural sciences composed of neurons, molecules, atoms and black holes, but is the perceivable nature that includes perceptive elements and substances and their qualities and types as well as the living beings that intend such entities (cf. Hua 4, 164–164/172–173, 191–197/201–207, 217–218/228–229; Hua 6, xxx).

Subject deprived of sense capacities, for example the blind and the deaf, take part in the constitution of the perceptual nature in so far they do not operate from within their deprivation (Hua 1, xxx; Hua 15, xxx). On the other hand, such subjects also broaden or deepen our grasp upon this world by their unaffected sense organs that compensate for their deprivations and may manifest intensified and over-developed performance.\(^7\) Similarly also sensorily anomalous animals, for example

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\(^5\) Husserl’s examples include insects, mammals and primates.

\(^6\) Descartes man as machine. Merleau-Ponty.

\(^7\) See, Jorge Luis Borges’ “Blindness” in *Ficciones* (1962, original 1944); cf. to fictional stories, e.g., “The country of the blind” (1904) by G.H. Wells and *Das Parfum* (1985) by Patrick Süskind.
star-nosed moles, take part in their specialized ways in the constitution of the world (e.g. Hua 14, 113). Animals with “superpowered” senses, such as the sharks and the microbats, add to our sensory-perceptive grasp upon nature (cf. Hua 14, 126; Hua 15, xxx). However, all such anomalous subjects take part in the constitution of perceptual nature thanks to their fundamental sensory-motor similarity with us (Hua 1, xxx).

3. Mortal Subjects and the Constitution of the Cultural-Historical World

Husserl discusses sensory deprivations explicitly in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. He introduces the topic under the headings “anomalous others” and “abnormal others” by writing:

It is implicit in the sense of successful apperception of others that their world, the world of their appearance-systems, must be experienced forthwith as the world of my appearance-system; and this involves the identity of the appearance-systems. But we know very well that there is something that is called abnormalities, blind, deaf etc., and thus that the appearance-systems are by no means always absolutely identical and that whole strata can differ (though not all strata). (Hua 1, 154/125)


The assumption here is that the reader belongs among sighted individuals. From the point of view of the blind person, the situation of course is the opposite: the sighted individuals are the abnormal ones.

Husserl operates with two different concepts of normality; on the one hand, he defines normality by harmony and concordance and, on the other hand, he defines normality by optimacy. An experience is normal in the first sense if it concords with other experiences; an experience is normal in the second sense if it adds to the richness, differentiation and completeness of experiencing. By using these concepts, we can say two things about sensory deprivations, e.g. blindness: in terms of harmony and concordance, blindness is just another norm of experiencing, parallel to sight; in terms of optimacy, blindness is an abnormality since it restricts the spatial richness
The main point here is that the transfer of sense, necessary for the experience of other experiencing subjects, does not imply a complete identity of the sensory-motor capacities of the subjects at issue but allows variance. In other words, I do not have to transfer the whole sense of my lived bodiliness with all sensory capacities involved but can transfer just parts of this sense, e.g. the auditory part, the tactile part or just parts of the kinestetic system (cf. Hua 14, 115). However, the transfer must result in a partial identity of appearance systems at a minimum and cannot establish completely different systems. In other words, another lived body with “completely different” sensory-motor capacities is a conceptual construction and not an experiential reality.

In order to highlight the variance of alien bodiliness in the fifth Meditation, Husserl brings in the case of the animals:

Among the problems of abnormality the problem of animality and that of the levels of higher and lower animals are included. Relative to the animal, man is, constitutionally speaking, the normal case – just as I myself am the primal norm [Urnorm] constitutionally for all men; animals are essentially constituted for me as anomalous variants [Abwandlungen] of my humanness, even though among them in turn normality and abnormality may be differentiated. (Hua 1, 154/126)

The parallel between sensory deprivation and animality suggests that the animal is abnormal in the very same sense as the blind or deaf fellow human: by differing partially from us by their appearance-systems. This reading is supported by many section that discuss animals as abnormalities in the Intersubjectivity volumes.

However, in the third Intersubjectivity volume, Husserl also develops another discourse on animals, one in which the animal is not paralleled with the deaf and the blind, that is with humans suffering sensory deprivations, but is paralleled with the infant.

I believe that this part of Husserl’s discourse on animality leads us away from the natural world that is constituted in perception and empathetic apperception and allows us to pose a series of questions concerning the constitution of the cultural-historical world. For Husserl, the cultural-historical world is the world in the true or genuine sense. This is the world that functions as the horizon for our scientific, religious, artistic and economic practices. It depends on the natural world in a specific sense but it also includes completely new types of objectivities and is characterized by a new temporal openness or endlessness that is absent from the natural world. Moreover, stepping into the world of culture changes one’s relation to nature since cultural practices are precisely practices of inspecting, manipulating and developing nature within the openness-horizon of the cultural.

We will see that, on Husserl’s analysis, taking part in the constitution of the cultural world requires a particular kind of self-awareness from the subject. In other words, not all subjects that participate in the co-constitution of the natural world of perception are able to take part in the constitution of the cultural world. In order to get to the philosophical core of Husserl’s discourse, I will compare his characterizations of animal with his comments on infants, and study the grounds on which he excludes both from the community that collectively constitutes the sense of the cultural-historical world.

3.1. A Question Concerning Constitution

At the end of the second part of *The Crisis*, in paragraph §55, Husserl puts forward a series of questions concerning the constitution of the world and the kinds of subjects involved in this collective undertaking. He writes:

But then new questions impose themselves in regard to this mankind [and the transcendental constituting subjectivity objectified in it]: are the insane also objectifications of the subjects being discussed in connection with the accomplishment of world-constitution? And what about children, even those who already have a certain amount of world-consciousness? After all, it is only from the mature and normal human beings who bring them up that they first become acquainted with the world in the full sense of world-for-all, that is, the world of culture. And what about animals? (Hua 6, 191/187, emphasis added).
In the third Intersubjectivity volume, Husserl develops an important argument according to which both animals and infants do not belong to the community that constitutes this full sense of the world. In secondary literature, this argument has not been given the attention that it deserves; Husserl’s statements about animals and infants as anomalous others, along with his whole discourse on anomaly, is usually rejected as an outdated or prejudiced approach with only marginal, if any, philosophical value. I believe that this is a mistake: even if Husserl’s discourse on anomalous others may prove problematic, the analyses that he provides are crucial to us insofar as we want to understand the difference between the natural and the historical-cultural order.

Husserl argues that both animals and infants are ego-subjects with egoic states (Hua 15, xxx) and both have a world in some sense of the term. At the same time he insists that neither of these subjects can partake in the constitution of the true or genuine sense of the world. The grounds on which he argues for this position are paramount to us because they reveal what Husserl takes to be the core of the world in the full sense of the term and because they correlative indicate what kind of consciousness is needed for having this world. Both aspects of the correlation concern time. We will see that the world in the true sense is distinguished from lesser senses on the basis of the world’s temporal structure and, correspondingly, that the type of consciousness that is able to participate in the constitution of this sense must relate to its own time in a particular way.


Both the animal and the infant are excluded by Husserl from the collective of co-constituators on the same grounds: neither experiences itself as a member of a generation which is connected to other generations and to an open chain of

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10 The commentary literature is largely influenced by Derrida’s (1962) critique that rejects Husserl’s concepts of normality as an unhappy mixture of empirical and transcendental concerns (Derrida 1962, 74–78/79–83; cf. Lawlor 2002, 112–113). More contemporary contributions divert from this general approach; e.g. Steinbock 1995; Zahavi 2003.
generations by the means of language. In this respect both the animal and the infant
differ from subjects with sensory deprivations who, despite of their deprivation,
consciously belong to generational chains of human subjects and to generations of
subjects with identical deprivations (cf. Hua 14, xxx).

Husserl contends that both the animal and the child consciously participate in
many different types of communities of contemporaries, and even in communities
which use signs for practical purposes. However, what he considers crucial is that
neither the animal nor the child experiences itself as a being who is born and who will
die. This implies that neither can grasp itself as a being who shares a communal past
and future with other similar beings that are not present and cannot become present in
flesh and blood.

The others that in our mature human experience are separated from us by our
birth and death are not just contingently absent for us but are absent in their very
essence: some will live after our demise and others have lived before we were born.
Neither can be intended by animal and infant subjects in so far as these subjects lack
the sense of themselves as natal and mortal beings, that is beings who are born and
who will die (Husserl Hua 15, 140, 168, 171, 184–185; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993,

In my reading, the crucial positive claim that Husserl makes while discussing
animals and infants as anomalous others is that we mature adults are constantly
consciously related to past and future others and to whole chains of generations of
such others, and that language is our means of intending perceptually absent subjects.
These absent others are of course not constantly in the thematic focus of our attention
but their existence is implied by the cultural-historical practices in which we engage
in our everyday and professional lives. We can bring these others in the thematic
focus of our intention and this can happen in several ways. For example, we may hear
or read stories about our ancestors and we may address such others in prayer or
orison. Moreover we can capture their very words as repeated by our older
contemporaries and we can also read their writing without any mediation by third
persons. Analogously we can address our successors by our own writing and we can
rehearse our younger contemporaries to repeat our words in the view not being
present for ever. All these activities are senseless for the animal and to the child in so
far as these subjects do not understand themselves as mortal and natal beings who
have generations of others behind and ahead of them in time. Husserl explains:
An animal (...) does not have a *unity of time which spans over generations* as historical time nor a unity of the world which continues through time, it does not “have” this *consciously*. We, we human beings, are the ones who have the chains, the successions and branching of ant generations etc. in our world as valid for us. The animal itself has no generative world in which it would live consciously, no conscious existence in an open endlessness of generations and correlative no existence in a genuine environing world, which we humans, anthropomorphizing, attribute to it (Hua 15, 181, emphasis added).

Several deprivations or lacks are implied by the fundamental lack of generative time and trans-generational communication. In so far as the child and the animal have no conscious membership in chains of generations, they cannot participate in transgenerational practices and cannot share the accomplishments of such practices. This deprives them of culture and tradition as a whole: cultural-historical goals that are shared with countless subjects in an endless openness of generations; cultural-historical tools and utensils that are retained, maintained and repaired in the view of a chain of successors; and ultimately the cultural-historical world with contains all this openness. This world includes all the products of our cultural practices, from the most basic ones, such as cooking, farming, raising cattle, building and mining, to the most advanced spiritual activities, essential to our religious, artistic and scientific lives.

Many familiar animals can of course use tools. We all have seen films and video clips in which primates use instruments, e.g. sticks and stones, for capturing food. Even some mollusks are known to manifest practical intelligence: while detecting an eatable object in a glass jar, an octopus is disposed to unscrew the cap. In Husserl’s analysis, such instruments are given, and can be given, to nonverbal animals only in a way that is temporally restricted compared to us, and thus their givenness is crucially different from the givenness of human tools. Animal and infantile tools are used merely, or at best, for present purposes and they are only shared with contemporaries (Hua 27, 97–98; cf. Hua 1, 141/111). They are not, and cannot be, experienced by animals and infants as objects inherited from predecessors nor as objects shared with successors, since the experience of permanently absent others – others that cannot be empathetically apperceived – is not articulated for these
subjects. In other words, animal and infantile tools do not, in their practical sense, imply asynchronous others who share goals with present users despite the fundamental separation in time.

Thus, Husserl argues that the senses of culture, tradition, and history go hand in hand, and that all these senses depend on the senses of death, birth and generations (e.g. Hua 15, 141, 168–189, 177–181, 280; cf. Hua 1, 169/142; Hua 6, 191/188). For him, no subject who lacks these fundamental senses can intend cultural objectivities as such. He makes this point by describing his own experiential condition as a child:

I had no notion of death and birth, even if I already had the words for these. I knew nothing about literature, science, art, nothing about historical culture in general, even if I already had an environing world with pictures, with utensils etc. The ontic sense \textit{world} that I had was under constant reconstruction of sense, and \textit{not by mere extension of sense} through possessed horizons. The world-horizon had no determinate delineation \[\text{Einzeihnung}\], at least no openly, \textit{endlessly continuing determinate delineation}, even if it already had a certain openness (Hua 15, 140, emphasis added).

The open endlessness of generations is necessary for the constitution of the sense of the world as an infinitely open whole. More limited senses of world, e.g. the world as an environment and the world as a perceptual or experiential field (e.g. Hua 15, 168, 626) are possible for non-generative subjects, but the \textit{full sense} of world as an open infinity requires for its constitution subjects who consciously connect to other subjects in an endless and endlessly branching chain of generations. Thus, the world in the sense of an infinite “metahorizon” of all horizons\(^\text{12}\) is the constitutive correlate of \textit{historical} self-conscious intersubjectivity. We read:

We, the subjects of world experience, have the endlessly open world completely according to its known realities and unknown possibilities, we each have it

\(^{11}\) For Husserl’s concept of pictorial presentation, see his \textit{Phäntasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwartigungen} (Hua 23).

\(^{12}\) Or “the style of all styles,” in Merleau-Ponty’s terms ([1945] 1993, 381/330).
completely starting from us, each starting from him or herself through the mediation of others and finally through their participation (Hua 15, 220).

So we can say that for Husserl, the most important and fundamental difference between mature human subjects, on the one hand, and infantile and animal subjects, on the other hand, is that the latter lack the experience of generations and the linguistic mediation which is implied in this experience. These lacks are mutually implicating since language is the means of intending others in multiple generations and in an infinite openness. Husserl discusses this under the heading “The function of language in the chain of generations” (Hua 15, 224, cf. 169, 181) and writes:

A communal life of humans becomes possible as life of a linguistic community which is of a completely different kind than the communal life of animals. The homeworld of humans, which is the fundamental element [Grundstück] for the structure of the objective world for <them> (...) is essentially determined by language. Only through [language] is established, not merely a sensible common world, a concrete world of presence (in an extended sense which also includes the horizons of co-presence and past, and in one part the living future), but a practical human homeworld with an incomparably extensive circle of experience which encompasses as operative also the linguistically mediated experiences of the comrades [Genossen], and not only [experiences] which are really fully intuitively understood according to others (...), but also linguistic knowledge-structures which are not understood intuitively at all (Hua 15, 224–225, cf. 181; see also Hua 6, 307/328).

As pointed out above, animal use many sorts of signals and indicative signs. They leave traces and they mark their territories, their orientations, and their states, and they are able to grasp the marks produced and used by other animals. Thus they consciously live social lives not just in the immediacy of perceptual bodily exposure but also in the mediation of sings and signals (Hua 15, 180). However, they lack the linguistic system of expressive signs which makes possible a peculiar way of sharing not by producing indications which point to intentions but by objectifying meanings
themselves. This involves two inseparable aspects. On the one hand, linguistic meanings are special sorts of objects shared, known and managed by all speakers of the language. On the other hand, these objects can be materialized in multiple ways; the very same sentence can for example be printed on paper or inscribed on a sheet of papyrus, it can burned into wood, hammered in stone, and drawn in sand. Transgenerational communication of linguistic signs requires some material means but is not dependent on any particular means. Moreover all human languages are able to express these objects and by the practice of translation human subjects are able to understand speakers of other languages, contemporary and past.

4. Generativity, Language and the Homeworld

We have seen that in Husserl’s analysis, the experience of generativity is necessary for the constitution of sense of the cultural-historical world, the world for all in the extended sense of chaining and branching generations. However, this alone is not enough to establish the most pregnant sense of us all and the related sense of the true objective world. Generativity only gives us a unified community that temporally opens onto two direction, the past and the future. For the universal sense all, more is needed. Husserl explains:

> Enchained communication would not give any tradition which would be a tradition for all, not any community of spiritual acquisitions which would be accessible for all, not “the real world” already horizontally outlined for all. What is missing is: Homeworld – alien homeworld, which is valid, not for us, but for them. From there a path to the relativization, but also the problem of the new world for all – all “humanities” (Hua 15, 169n1; cf. Hua 1, 159–162/131–135).

In effect, Husserl argues that a plurality of generative communities is implied in the pregnant sense of us all. A mere temporal historical openness to past and future is not enough, what is needed is also an open plurality of alien communities with alien practices, goals, and means and their temporal horizons. In order to account for this

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other type of openness, one that connects us to alien cultures and peoples, Husserl introduces the concepts of homeworld (Heimwelt) and alienworld (Fremdenwelt).¹⁴

He argues that our world of experience is disclosed to us as a limited field of culturally specific, habituated and inherited practices and interests only when it is exposed to us a set of alien practices and interests and to an alien practical community. In this disclosure, our world looses its absoluteness as the totality of all things and the horizon of all individual-personal horizons, and we realize and rearticulate it as one particular horizon among other horizons in a more encompassing horizon which also includes the communal experiences of alien others. Moreover, this is the only way in which our world of experience can loose its absoluteness and gain a more specific sense as a homeworld, i.e. by being compared to subjects and objects of alien practices. Husserl explains:

My homeworld, my people. The universe in the first form as homeworld only stands out [as such] when other homeworlds, other peoples are already in the horizon along with the homeworld. The lived environment [Lebensumwelt] in the horizon of alien lived environments, my people surrounded by alien people (Hua15: 176n1).

There is constituted an alien humankind, an alien humanity, as alien people for instance. Precisely thereby there is constituted for me and for us “our own” home fellowship, fellowship of our people in relation to our cultural environing world [Kulturumwelt] as the world of our human validities, our particular ones. So I have a change [Änderung] (…) of my world-experience and our world-experience and [a change of] the world itself. In “the” world are we, my people, and the other people, and each has its environing world of people (with its non-practical horizon). Environing world is distinguished from world (Hua 15, 214; cf. Hua 27, 186–188; Hua 39, 336–337).

¹⁴ Husserl’s concept of homeworld is wide since it is defined by shared activities and practices; it refers to ethnographically and religiously shared worlds but also to professional and literary worlds. For a comprehensive explication and discussion of these concepts, see Steinbock 1995.
This means that three different senses of world are constitutively stratified one upon the other, but in such a manner that each new layer of sense relativizes the prior one, encompasses it in a new, more inclusive and more complex whole, and thus shows its limits. Thus we proceed from (a) the natural world as the totality of all perceptual things, animate and inanimate, to (b) the world as the horizon of a temporally continuous and developing community, and finally to (c) the world as the horizon of all such communal horizons.

The natural world includes all subjects of perception, and they all are included in this world both as subjects of perception and as objects of perception. This world is thus given to all perceivers, both human and animal, and it is constituted collectively by them in relations of empathetic apperception. The cultural-historical world, on the other hand, only includes subjects who are conscious of their own natality and mortality and of similar subjects in past and in future. This world is the intentional correlate of the plurality of generative communities in mutual implication; it is organized in structures of generations and generative homeworlds and alienworld. Thus the sense of the world as the common ground and infinite field for different historical peoples is not a correlate of any conscious activities whatsoever, individual or communal, but is a complicated constitutional achievement which includes mutual recognition of communal subjects who are conscious of the temporal limits of their own lives (Hua 15, 430).

References


