On Hybrid Expressivism about Aesthetic Judgments

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Abstract

Contextualist accounts of aesthetic predicates have difficulties explaining why we feel that speakers are disagreeing when they make true and compatible but superficially contradictory aesthetic judgments. One possible way to account for the disagreement is hybrid expressivism, which holds that the disagreement happens at the level of pragmatically conveyed, clashing contents about the speakers’ conative states. Marques (2016) defends such a strategy, combining dispositionalism about value, contextualism, and hybrid expressivism. This paper critically evaluates the plausibility of the suggested pragmatic mechanisms in conveying the kind of contents Marques takes to explain disagreements. The positive part suggests an alternative account of how aesthetic judgments are sources of information about speakers’ conative aesthetic states.

Keywords

aesthetic judgments – hybrid expressivism – contextualism – dispositionalism – aesthetic predicates – aesthetic disagreements
1 Introduction

Subjectivism about aesthetic value holds that which aesthetic values there are depends on subjects, for example individuals’ “faculties of taste”, or the aesthetic sensibilities of groups or cultures. For the sake of simplicity, let us say that aesthetic values are relative to “standards of taste” – how they are determined depends on the particular theory. If the theory allows for several incompatible standards of taste, two speakers might make apparently conflicting aesthetic judgments which nevertheless are both true if they refer to different standards.

There are many ways to account for the relativity of aesthetic judgments to aesthetic standards. A popular option is contextualism, i.e. the view that the semantic value of aesthetic expressions is determined by the context of utterance. (See e.g. Glanzberg 2007, Lopez de Sa 2008, Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, Schaffer 2011.) However, contextualist theories of aesthetic judgments face a well-known issue regarding how to explain the impression of disagreement such cases exhibit. (See e.g. Köbel 2004, Lasersohn 2005.)

The debates on the meaning of aesthetic judgments parallel discussions on the meaning of moral judgments. Hybrid expressivists argue that moral judgments express two types of contents: truth-conditional content, determined by the sentence used, and expressive content, which is pragmatically conveyed by the utterance. (See Barker 2000, Copp 2001, Finlay 2005, Schroeder 2009.) Recently, Marques (2016) adopts the hybrid expressivist strategy for aesthetic judgments. She applies Lewisian dispositionalism about values (Lewis 1989) to aesthetic values and defends contextualism about aesthetic judgments. Her contextualist proposal is that the content of an aesthetic judgment refers to “aesthetic standards” of a contextually determined group consisting of the speaker and those relevantly similar to him/her. That is the subjectivist element of her theory.

The explanation of disagreement comes from the expressivist element in her theory, which holds that an aesthetic judgment pragmatically conveys further contents. They express that first, the speaker has certain aesthetic attitudes towards the object under discussion, and second, that she wants those interlocutors who do not share her standards to come to share them. In a disagreement over aesthetic values, the truth-conditional contents do not contradict but the pragmatically conveyed contents do, allowing for an explanation of the impression of disagreement. Marques argues that the pragmatic mechanism responsible for the conveyed content is either presupposition or conversational implicature.

This paper evaluates the plausibility of the suggested pragmatic mechanisms in conveying the kind of contents Marques takes to explain disagreements and
suggests an alternative. The structure of the paper is the following. Part I presents the background for our discussion: Section 1 introduces dispositionalism about values and contextualism about aesthetic judgments, Section 2 presents the pragmatic contents that constitute the hybrid element of Marques’ view, and Section 3 discusses related hybrid proposals. Part II discusses Marques’ suggested mechanisms behind the pragmatically conveyed contents. Section 4 focuses on whether they could be presuppositions, and 4.1. and 4.2. distinguish between pragmatic and semantic presuppositions. Section 4.3. goes through various tests for presuppositionality. Section 5 considers whether the pragmatic contents could be either generalised or particularised conversational implicatures. Part III sketches an alternative account of how aesthetic judgments are sources of information about speakers’ conative aesthetic states.

2 Marques’ Hybrid Dispositionalism

2.1 Dispositionalism about Aesthetic Value

Marques adopts Lewis’s dispositionalist account of value and applies it to aesthetic values. Lewis identifies valuing with desiring to desire and holds that something is a value if ‘we’ (who that consists of is discussed below) are disposed to value (i.e. desire to desire) it in conditions of full imaginative acquaintance. The theory is subjectivist in the sense of making the existence of values depend on human responses. Whether the view is subjectivist in the sense of relativizing values to different types of people depends on who is included in ‘we’, i.e., whose dispositions are relevant. Lewis himself leaves the question open and calls his view conditional relativism. Since Lewis is open to the possibility of relativism, he also describes an unconditionally relative version (1989, 127):

A relative version says that ‘we’ in the analysis is indexical, and refers to a population consisting of the speaker and those somehow like him. [...] Then for speaker S to call something a value is to call it a value for the population of S and those like him; which means that S and those like him are all disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it.

1 “The theory is conditionally relativist: it does not exclude the possibility that there may be no such thing as value simpliciter, just value for this or that population. But it does not imply relativity [...] It leaves the question open.” (Lewis 1989, 114)
Now, Marques says she adopts conditional relativism too (Marques 2016, 728), but her examples show that she actually adopts the unconditionally relative view described above. Since Marques opts for the unconditionally relative version of aesthetic values, she combines it with contextualist semantics. Thus, an aesthetic predicate denotes the property of being aesthetically valued by the speaker and those relevantly like him/her, i.e., they are disposed to value it under ideal conditions (Marques 2016, 724, and Marques 2016, 746, respectively):

A predicate like ‘is beautiful’, or ‘is a good painting’, uttered in context C, denotes a property such as beautiful for the perceivers relevant in context C under the appreciation circumstances relevant in C, or simply beautiful for the standard relevant in C.

In a hybrid contextualist dispositional theory like the one sketched, the extension of ‘we’ that determines the aesthetic value property expressed is not the speaker and his audience. Rather, ‘we’ refers to the class of people that are constituted or disposed like the speaker in the relevant respects.

The context varies from one speaker to another, allowing for two apparently contradicting aesthetic judgments to be true. Marques (2016, 728) illustrates this with an example of two fully trained art critics A and B who differ in what they take to be the highest values in painting. We assume that their tastes in painting are as educated as can be and that they know all the relevant facts. They are discussing whether William Turner is better than the Pre-Raphaelites:

\textit{Turner 1}

A: Turner is a better painter than the Pre-Raphaelites.
B: Turner is not a better painter than the Pre-Raphaelites; the Pre-Raphaelites are better.

\footnote{Lewis actually isn’t very clear about what conditional relativity is. In addition to the previous quote he says the following about conditional relativism: “So what version should we prefer, absolute or relative? – Neither; instead, I commend a wait-and-see version. In making a judgment of value, one makes many claims at once, some stronger than others, some less confidently than others, and waits to see which can be made to stick. I say X is a value; I mean that all mankind are disposed to value X; or anyway all nowadays are; or anyway all nowadays are except maybe some peculiar people on distant islands; or anyway ... ; or anyway you and I, talking here and now, are; or anyway I am. How much am I claiming? – as much as I can get away with.” This passage gives the impression that Lewis is putting forward a theory of conditional relativity of values in a context, which is how Marques interprets conditional relativity. However, what Lewis himself meant doesn’t matter in the current context.
According to contextualism, the propositions their utterances express can be paraphrased as follows (Marques 2016, 729):

**Turner 2**

A: Turner is a better painter than the Pre-Raphaelites, given A's standard.
B: Turner is not a better painter than the Pre-Raphaelites, given B's standard.

Given the values of each of them, each utterance is true, and there is no disagreement between them. However, Turner 1 gives an impression that the speakers are disagreeing. That is the main problem with contextualism about aesthetic value – it construes apparently contradicting judgments as compatible and true, but we nevertheless get the impression that the speakers are disagreeing. Moreover, contextualists need to explain why the impression of disagreement vanishes when the implicit relativisation is made explicit as in Turner 2; after all, the view holds that the speakers in Turner 1 and Turner 2 express the very same propositions.

Marques adopts ideas from hybrid expressivists in order to account for the impressions of disagreement in dialogues like Turner 1. Hybrid expressivists hold that when we make a value judgment, we make a claim that is true or false, but we also convey information about our conative states (see e.g. Barker 2000, Copp 2001, Finlay 2005, Ridge 2006, Schroeder 2009). Marques thus argues that when we make judgments about aesthetic values we do two things: we make a truth-evaluable value judgment, and we pragmatically convey that we have certain conative attitudes. The claim is that in a dialogue like Turner 1, the speakers express compatible doxastic states (as made explicit in Turner 2). However, they convey conative attitudes that are in conflict, and that results in the impression that they are disagreeing, or shows how they are disagreeing. (Which way one goes depends on one's views of what constitutes disagreement. We won't elaborate on that issue in this paper). Marques takes the explanation for the impression of disagreement to be the core advantage of her theory over other contextualist accounts for aesthetic judgments. Let us next look at the particular conative attitudes that Marques takes to be conveyed in an aesthetic discourse.

### 2.2 The Aims of Aesthetic Discourse

According to the dispositionalist, who relativizes aesthetic values to varying aesthetic standards, by making aesthetic judgments, we make claims about aesthetic values *given the standards of ourselves and those relevantly similar to us*. For example, in the case above, the art critics are stating how Turner ranks
compared to the Pre-Raphaelites according to the standards they and others relevantly similar to them have. But as mentioned above, a contextualist theory of the contents of aesthetic judgments cannot by itself explain the impressions of disagreement that such dialogues give. Marques (2016, 745) argues that there are two additional, pragmatically conveyed contents (i) and (ii):

If U asserts the sentence ‘x is good’, then U expresses a dispositional property we desire to desire x in way w in ideal conditions by ‘good’ and asserts that x has that property (where ‘we’ refers to the group of relevantly similar people).

(i) In asserting ‘x is good’, U conveys that she desires x (in way w).

(ii) U conveys that she desires that we desire to desire x (where ‘we’ refers to the participants in the conversation).

Adopting an idea from Egan (2010), Marques (2016, 743) argues that (i) is a consequence of the speaker expressing a conative attitude and (ii) a consequence of the “connection-building role” that aesthetic discourse has:

Now, let us assume, with Egan, that aesthetic discourse serves to communicate beliefs about the aesthetic value of certain objects, and that aesthetic discourse plays ‘a sort of connection-building role’ (Egan 2010, 260). This requires that aesthetic discourse serves to communicate: (a) beliefs about aesthetic value and (b) what [sic; that] the speaker enjoys, appreciates or despises things with relevant aesthetic value. Finally, it requires, (c), that aesthetic discourse has a ‘connection-building role’.

In other words, an aesthetic judgment expresses the truth-conditional content that the speaker and the people relevantly similar to her aesthetically value the object in question, which is a second-order desire towards a first-order aesthetic attitude. (b) states that the speaker also has the first-order attitude. For example, if judging x beautiful means desiring to desire x, by stating “x is beautiful” the speaker also conveys “I desire x”.

What about (c), that aesthetic discourse has a connection-building role? Marques argues that the conveyed content, whose purpose is the connection-building role, is that the speaker desires that the participants to the conversation come to share her aesthetic values. Presumably this only happens when the speakers realise that they do not share their aesthetic values. If they did, they would already have the relevant aesthetic connection. In other words, the speaker is stating something about aesthetic values according to her and people like her. Since aesthetic discourses are connection-building, the interlocutor should grasp that the point of the assertion is to convey that she should come to adopt the values of the speaker.
To summarise, an aesthetic judgment states that the speaker (and those relevantly like her) values the object in question, and conveys that the speaker has a first-order aesthetic attitude towards the object, and that she wants the hearer to come to share her view (if they do not already share it). As we have seen, the motivation for positing the pragmatic contents is to explain the impressions of disagreement we get in cases like Turner 1, where the truth-conditional contents expressed are compatible. Marques (2016, 746–747) argues that the impression of disagreement results from a conflict of attitudes that the pragmatically conveyed contents reveal:

This means that in that conversation, speaker and audience don’t really disagree doxastically. But they can have a conflict of attitudes if the speaker implicates that she desires that the conversational participants share her standards, and if it becomes clear that this desire will not be satisfied. [Italics added.] A hybrid theory of this kind can explain why they have a conflict of attitudes, even if A and B both speak truly in the conversation, and are aware that they do not share aesthetic standards. This is some progress with respect to other theories that aim to defend semantic contextualism. Other accounts of this sort, like Sundell (2011) or Huvenes (2012), do not explain where the conflict of attitudes comes from or how it arises.

The explanation of disagreement thus seems to rely essentially on the pragmatic contents of type (ii); the speaker conveys that she desires that the interlocutors come to value the object, but they don’t. That is supposed to explain why we (and the speakers themselves in such a case) feel that they disagree.

That is the broad picture in a nutshell – the next question is how the pragmatic contents (i) and (ii) are conveyed. However, before we look at the possible mechanisms, we need to modify the examples we use as there are several issues with Marques’ examples which can interfere with our linguistic intuitions. First, in the schema quoted earlier, she uses as an example a sentence “x is good”. Good is not an ideal adjective to use: we need an example of a clearly aesthetic judgment, but good has a much broader meaning (e.g. as in a good car, a good person or a good philosopher).

Second, Marques uses “x is good” and “x is a good painting” interchangeably, but arguably they are not: the former is a so-called predicative use, the latter an attributive use. Many philosophers and linguists hold that the two uses behave in different ways (see e.g. Geach 1956). Third, in her core example, Turner 1, she uses “Turner is a better painter than the Pre-Raphaelites”. Here good is in a comparative form, which behaves differently from the positive form. For these
reasons, we prefer to introduce a simpler example, which is also a prototypical aesthetic judgment: “*Last Judgment* is beautiful”. The case is otherwise exactly like Marques’ Turner 1. Here is the case; let us call it *Giotto*.

Suppose we have two contemporaries of Giotto, Andrea and Bonavento, who come to see Giotto’s *Last Judgment*. Both are experienced art critics but their tastes differ; Andrea is very impressed by Giotto’s work and judges “*Last Judgment* is beautiful”. Bonavento finds it too modern and colourful, and thus judges that the work is not beautiful. That their tastes thus differ is known to both. We need to also replace the attitudes that Marques uses, i.e. desiring as the first order attitude, and desiring to desire as the second-order attitude. Desiring just isn’t right as a first-order aesthetic attitude, and desiring to desire isn’t anything that anyone outside philosophy contexts would say. The latter point matters, since the attitude we use should be one that we can refer to with an ordinary language expression since we will be relying on intuitions about the felicity and infelicity of sentences and what we can infer from them. However, unfortunately there are no attitude verbs specific to aesthetic conative states. Therefore we will use liking as a place-holder for a more specific state of aesthetic liking. What we mean by aesthetic liking is a positive conative state caused by an aesthetic experience; the relevant kind of state is described in more detail in part iii. Thus, here is our case and the analysis of the contents expressed and conveyed following Marques’ model:

**Giotto**

By asserting the sentence “*Last Judgment* is beautiful”, Andrea asserts that *Last Judgment* has the dispositional property we desire to like it (where ‘we’ refers to the group of relevantly similar people).

(i)  In asserting “*Last Judgment* is beautiful”, Andrea conveys that he likes *Last Judgment*.

(ii) Andrea conveys that he desires that Bonavento desires to like *Last Judgment*.

Thus, we have a truth-conditional content:

(a)  *Last Judgment* is beautiful.

Furthermore, we have pragmatically conveyed contents:

(b)  Andrea likes *Last Judgment*.

(c)  Andrea desires that Bonavento desires to like *Last Judgment*. 
2.3 Other Hybrid Accounts
Before we move on, it is worth mentioning that Marques’ account is not the only proposal which considers evaluative expressions to systematically trigger presuppositions. Most notably, Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) defend a hybrid account of evaluatives, in particular thick terms and slurs. According to them, these expressions are descriptive at the level of truth conditions, but they semantically (lexically) presuppose evaluation. For example, the descriptive content of “lewd” is “sexually explicit” but it triggers the presupposition that things that are sexually explicit are bad because of being sexually explicit. Similarly, “generous” means “being disposed to give without expectation of compensation” and triggers the presupposition that people who are so disposed are good because of that. There are some important differences between this analysis and the account proposed by Marques. In the first place, the presuppositions that Marques’ account envisages are not universal or generic. The presuppositions triggered by uttering: “x is good” are: “the speaker desires x” and “the speaker desires that the participants in the conversation desire to desire x” and not: “things that are good are to be desired” (or “when the speaker says that x is good, then the speaker desires x because it is good”) and “things that are good are such that the speaker desires that the participants in the conversation desire to desire x in virtue of its being good”, respectively. To use our formulation, the universal rendition of the presuppositions that Marques proposes would be: “if the speaker judges x to be beautiful, then she likes x” and “if the speaker judges x to be beautiful, then she desires that the participants to the conversation desire to like x”. These presuppositions do project and therefore it may seem that construing them as universal improves Marques’ proposal, but such a move makes hybrid expressivism unable to explain disagreement data. Universal or generic presuppositions of this sort do not yield a conflict of attitudes, unlike expressing conflicting likes or desires.

Another view that bears some similarities to Marques’ one is defended by Väyrynen (2013). According to Väyrynen’s theory, the evaluative parts of thick terms are pragmatic contents which arise conversationally. The main difference between his theory and Marques’ proposal is that according to the former, the contents cannot be conversational implicatures because of a difference in projectability, nor can they be semantic presuppositions, because of the fact that the evaluations are usually not taken for granted. According to Väyrynen, they belong to a type of implications which is not generally recognized. Hence, the two views are not similar enough regarding the mechanisms they invoke.

What is distinct about Marques’ view and what in an important respect makes her account different from those of Cepollaro and Stojanovic and of
Väyrynen is the expressivist component. The pragmatically conveyed contents that Marques postulates are conative in nature. By saying that something is beautiful, she argues, the speaker expresses her desire (aesthetic liking) directed at the object, and a desire that her interlocutors desire to aesthetically like it. In contrast, most theorists of thick terms believe that the pragmatically conveyed contents are propositional universal or generic claims about values. The only feature that Marques’ view has in common with them is the purported mechanism by which the extra content is conveyed. Our critique is aimed at the formulation of this content itself.

Let us now move on to evaluate Marques’ arguments to the effect that a discourse like Giotto can give rise to (b) and (c) as either presuppositions or as generalised conversational implicatures. We’ll consider the presuppositional view first.

3 The Mechanisms Behind the Pragmatically Conveyed Contents

3.1 Presupposition
Presupposition is the information that the speaker assumes in order for her utterance to be meaningful. Traditionally, there are two approaches to the phenomenon of presupposition – it can be understood as a semantic notion or as a pragmatic one. There have been numerous attempts to show that one is more basic than the other. For example, Stalnaker (1974) argues that “all of the facts can be stated and explained directly in terms of the underlying notion of speaker [pragmatic] presupposition” (50). On the other hand, Chierchia (2004) and some other proponents of dynamic semantics believe that the compositional treatment provides a better way of understanding the phenomenon.

However, Karttunen (1973) stated that there is no conflict between these concepts as – even though related – they are different notions. We are going to follow Karttunen in this approach and speak of semantic presuppositions and pragmatic presuppositions without much further reflection on whether the former should be explained in terms of the latter or the other way round.

3.1.1 Pragmatic Presupposition
Pragmatic presupposition is considered to be something that the speaker, rather than the sentence which she utters, has (hence its other name speaker presupposition). It is the information that the speaker (a) takes for granted in a conversation, or (b) acts as if she took it for granted, or (c) presents as uncontroversial, while knowing that it would be new information for the
audience. What is usually pragmatically presupposed in a conversation is that
the speaker and the hearer speak the same language, the choice of register,
and certain norms governing conversation such as turn taking. These kinds of
presupposition cannot be easily traced to the use of any particular lexical
items.

3.1.2 Semantic Presupposition

Semantic presuppositions are carried by certain expressions and syntactic
constructions called *presupposition triggers*. Some examples of semantic pre-
suppositions are:

- **Aspectual predicates:**
  - Mike has stopped eating lactose.
  - Presupposes: Mike used to eat lactose.

- **Factives:**
  - Mary knows that Mike has stopped eating lactose.
  - Presupposes: Mike has stopped eating lactose.

- **Definite determiners:**
  - The present king of France is bald.
  - Presupposes: There is currently a unique king of France.

Other triggers are, for example: additive particles (e.g. “too”, “again”), implica-
tive verbs (e.g. “manage”), temporal clauses headed by “after” or “before”, cleft
sentences and possessives.

3.1.3 Presupposition Tests

Various tests have been proposed to determine whether a given piece of com-
municated information is a presupposition. First, we will describe one of The
family of sentences tests – *Holes* – proposed by Karttunen (1973) and use it to
see if the not-at-issue content postulated by Marques behaves like a presup-
position. In the following sections, we present some tests that examine the
behaviour of presuppositions in a discourse and run it on this content as well.

To repeat, the hypothesis that we are going to test here is that Andrea’s utter-
ance of (1) presupposes (b) and (c):

(1) *Last Judgment* is beautiful.

(b) Andrea likes *Last Judgment*.

(c) Andrea desires that Bonavento desires to like *Last Judgment*.
3.1.3.1  *The Family of Sentences Test*

A semantic operator (an expression or construction) is a *hole* if and only if “it allows the presupposition to slip through it, even as that operator targets the at-issue content” (Potts 2015). In other words, holes let the presupposition of the embedded sentence project to the matrix sentence. Hole operators include unmarked negation, factive verbs, modals, and antecedents of conditionals.

Consider example (4), which presupposes that Mike used to take drugs. Embedding the proposition expressed in (4) under holes does not prevent this presupposition from projecting:

(2) Mike stopped taking drugs.

(3) Mike didn't stop taking drugs.

According to Karttunen and Potts, if *p* is a presupposition, then *p* necessarily exemplifies the kind of projective behaviour as presented in (5) under any semantic operator which is a hole. This behaviour is not, on its own, sufficient to call *p* a presupposition.

Now, let us test (b) and (c). If “*Last Judgment* is beautiful” presupposes (b) or (c), then (4) must also presuppose (b) or (c) respectively:

(4) It's not the case that *Last Judgment* is beautiful.

But it is obvious that (4) does not presuppose:

(b) I like *Last Judgment*.

or

(c) I desire that you desire to like *Last Judgment*.

The test shows that the additional content postulated by Marques does not project under negation which is a necessary condition for presuppositionality.

3.1.3.2  *Discourse-Related Tests*

*Test 1: Backgrounding* (Potts 2015) – Backgrounding consists in adding the explicit statement of the presupposed information to an utterance including the vector of this presupposition, e.g.:

(5) Mike used to eat lactose and he stopped eating lactose.
A presupposition, unlike an entailment, is not going to sound too redundant and therefore, infelicitous. Here is an example of backgrounded information which is not a presupposition but logical consequence of the constituent proposition:

\[(6) \quad \# \text{Mike was killed and he is dead.}\]

A rule can be formulated that if a given piece of not-at-issue content is a presupposition, it can be explicitly stated in an utterance containing a sentence which carries it without it sounding redundant. Let us see how Marques’ not-at-issue content does in backgrounding:

\[(7) \quad ? \text{I like } \text{Last Judgment} \text{ and it is beautiful.}\]
\[(8) \quad ? \text{I desire that you desire to like } \text{Last Judgment} \text{ and it is beautiful.}\]

Now, what shows that “I like Last Judgment” is not likely to be a presupposition is that in (7), it does not seem to background the information that Last Judgment is beautiful. Similarly for (8). Even though the sentences in (7) and (8) are not infelicitous, there is a radical difference between them and (6) – or as one can verify, backgrounding with other items of bona fide presuppositions: e.g. France has a king and the king of France is bald, or Mike is married and he’s going to bring his wife.

When an utterance has a presupposition, there is a clear relation between that presupposition and the utterance content. Backgrounding sounds as if the speaker is stating a piece of information because they don’t know whether their interlocutors know it. If the hearer does not know that Mike is married, it might sound a bit odd to say out of the blue that he is going to bring his wife. However, there is no such relation between the pragmatic contents (b) and (c) and the utterance content. An utterance of “Last Judgment is beautiful” is perfectly fine even if Andrea does not know whether Bonavento knows that he likes the painting, or that he wants him to value it. Thus, the felicity results of the test do not as such go against (b) and (c) being presuppositions, but they do not resemble presuppositions since adding them does not actually provide any background for the utterance.\(^3\)

\[^3\text{It may seem that the oddity of “I like Last Judgment and it’s beautiful” has to do with weird subject coordination, rather than from the fact that (a) is not a presupposition. (We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.) We would like to point out, however, that improving subject coordination does not help much. Consider, for example:}\]
Test 2: ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ (Shanon 1976) – Another way to evaluate what is communicated pragmatically is the ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ device. For example:

(9)  
A: Mike has quit smoking.  
B: Hey, wait a minute, Mike never smoked.

or alternatively:

B: Hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know Mike smoked.

Potts (2015) writes: “Shanon’s generalisation [the test] is a necessary condition for presuppositionality: if p is a presupposition, then p can be denied with ‘Wait a minute’-style devices.” (10). The rule can thus be formulated as follows: if a given piece of not-at-issue content is a presupposition, it must be possible to felicitously deny it with the ‘Hey, wait a minute’ device. Marques argues that the pragmatic contents she posits pass the ‘Hey, wait a minute’ test. Here are her examples (Marques 2016, 746; italics added):

[7] A: x is a good painting.  
[8] B: Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know you were into this kind of art.

It would seem that (ii) also satisfies the test:

[9] A: x is a good painting.  
[10] B: Hey, wait a minute! You can’t expect us to find this valuable.

The fragments in italics are what she takes to be presupposed by “x is a good painting”. However, they are not accurate instantiations of the presuppositions which Marques proposes originally. In her schema, she states that it is a presupposition of the utterance “x is good” (or a presupposition of the speaker of “I like Last Judgment and I think it is beautiful” or “I like Last Judgment and to me it is beautiful” – in both cases adding the purported presupposition sounds like providing extra information rather than saving the conversation from the speaker’s ignorance of the relevant presupposition. Another worry is that “I like Last Judgment. It’s beautiful” is perfectly felicitous, so it seems that all the weirdness disappears when the utterance is divided into two sentences. However, “Mike was killed. He’s dead” is acceptable too (while put in one sentence it sounds very odd), so perhaps replacing conjunction with a full stop merely serves a rhetorical purpose.
this sentence) that the speaker desires (likes/is into) x. That the speaker likes x is not the same, nor does it presuppose or entail, that the speaker likes the kind of things x belongs to. Secondly, she adds expect and find in the second case, but clearly the truth-conditions of expecting to A are very different from A:ing, as well as finding x F from x is F. Therefore, we would like to scrutinize the way the test applies to the contents postulated by Marques.

We should note here that the “Hey, wait a minute!” test is considered problematic when the tested material consists in evaluation. Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) observe that even though the phrase is successful at rejecting presuppositions which convey information, it works differently when the content at stake is evaluative. Consider their example (467):

(10) A: You finally realize you were dating a loser.
   B: # Hey, wait a minute, I didn't know I was dating a loser.

The presupposition that B was dating a loser is not accepted by B. It is not the question of whether this information was already in the common ground or not, and therefore “Hey, wait a minute, I didn't know I was dating a loser” would not be a felicitous continuation. A natural reaction preventing from adding the negative evaluation to the common ground, according to Cepollaro and Stojanovic, would be: “Hey, you shouldn't talk like that about my ex”. From this observation, they conclude that “Hey, wait a minute! I didn't know that” is not the best way to reject presupposed evaluative content. We agree with this analysis up to this point, but we would like to notice that it tends to be a problem for only some presupposition triggers, e.g. factives such as “to realize”. If we were to inspect a regular thick term to see if its evaluative content passes the test for presuppositionality, it would pass. Consider “lewd”:

(11) A: Madonna's show was lewd.
   B: Hey, wait a minute! I didn't know you consider sexually explicit things to be bad because of being sexually explicit. / I didn't know you were so prudish.

The new information obtained by B in this conversation is that A subscribes to a certain value (which shows in her choice of words) and she is surprised by this fact. It is true, however, that unlike in the case of non-evaluative presupposition, the perspective of the previous speaker needs to be incorporated. Admittedly, the test should be run carefully when evaluation plays some part somewhere in the utterance, but we should remember that in the case of Marques' account, unlike in Cepollaro and Stojanovic's, it is not the purported
presupposition that is responsible for conveying evaluation – instead “what is genuinely evaluative is still the dispositional property denoted by the aesthetic predicate” (Marques 2016, 4).

Having these considerations in mind, let us use the test with our Giotto example.

(12) A: *Last Judgment* is beautiful.
    B: Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know you like *Last Judgment*.

(13) A: *Last Judgment* is beautiful.
    B: Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know you desire me to desire to like *Last Judgment*.

Again, the problems come from the fact that (b) and (c) really do not act like presuppositions. What we would expect from the second sentence uttered by B in each case would be the information which makes A’s judgment acceptable, understandable and unsurprising in the discourse (for instance: “Wait a minute. I didn’t know you’ve seen *Last Judgment*”). However, in a default conversation, we can imagine A’s utterance to be understandable without any knowledge about whether A likes the painting, let alone whether she wants others to value it.

Test 3: ‘and what’s more’ – Another way to test for presuppositionality is to check if adding an explicit reiteration of a presupposition after the ‘and what’s more’ phrase makes the utterance infelicitous. For example:

(14) # Mike quit smoking, and what’s more, he used to smoke.
(15) # Mary kissed Mike again, and what’s more, she had kissed him in the past.
(16) # The present king of France is bald, and what’s more, France has a king.

Many other types of not-at-issue content will not behave this way, e.g. some conversational implicatures:

(17) (A professor in a recommendation letter) P: x is punctual and has a beautiful handwriting, and what’s more, he is a bad philosopher.

The expectation is, therefore, that if a given sentence carries a presupposition, stating this presupposition after ‘and what’s more’ makes it too redundant to be felicitous. Here is how the contents (b) and (c) behave in the ‘and what’s more’ test.
(18) *Last Judgment* is beautiful, and what’s more, I like it.
(19) *Last Judgment* is beautiful, and what’s more, I desire you to desire to like it.

Both sound felicitous and informative, and hence, the contents proposed by Marques do not pass the ‘and what’s more’ test for presuppositionality.

To conclude this section, we have reviewed a number of tests for presuppositionality, and, basing on their results, argued that the pragmatic contents Marques posits are not likely to be presuppositions.

### 3.2 Conversational Implicatures

The second possibility described by Marques is that pragmatically conveyed contents are conversational implicatures. Conversational implicatures, described first by Grice (1989), result from pragmatic inference. In opposition to other forms of inference like entailment or semantic presupposition, implicatures are not determined by the meaning of a given utterance alone but also by the context of utterance. Conversational implicatures can be divided into generalised conversational implicatures (GCI) and particularised conversational implicatures (PCI). Here is Levinson’s take on how they differ from each other (2000, 16):

> An implicature i from utterance U is *particularised* iff U implicates i only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain. An implicature i is *generalised* iff U implicates i unless there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it.

Levinson (ibid.) gives the following examples of a PCI (20) and a GCI (21); the implicated contents are in brackets:

(20) A: Can you tell me the time?
    B: Well, the milkman has come [it is after 8 a.m.]
(21) B: Some of the guests are already leaving. [Not all of the guests are already leaving.]

Generalised conversational implicatures are created by the sentence used, though they can be cancelled. In (21), the use of *some* is responsible for the implicature. In contrast, PCIs do not depend on the meaning of the sentence used but on the context. In (20), if we consider only the literal meaning of the utterance, B’s answer is puzzling. However, in the right context, e.g.
one in which A knows that the milkman arrives every day at 8 a.m., the exchange makes perfect sense. According to Grice, such conversations can be explained by the ways we use natural language. The characteristic of a cooperative nature of the linguistic practice is given by Grice’s cooperative principle (1989, 26):

*The cooperative principle*: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The principle is constituted by more specific maxims of Quality, Relation (or Relevance), Quantity, and Manner. The maxims should be understood as regulatory norms for all kinds of cooperative behaviour, including conversation. This means that when we speak, we try to obey the maxims, and we expect that our interlocutors do so as well. Now, in the case of an exchange like (20), we expect the speaker’s utterance to be relevant. If the literal meaning of her contribution is not relevant, we use our common knowledge and the expectation of relevance to infer from her response to our question: e.g. B knows that the milkman arrives every day at 8 a.m., and A wants to make a relevant contribution to the conversation; therefore, B can infer that it is after 8 a.m. The implicature in (20) is thus triggered by the expectation of relevance, but an implicature can be triggered by the expectation that a given utterance satisfies any other maxim as well.

Now, for our purposes it is important to point out that a GCI cannot normally be triggered by a violation of the maxim of relation. As we’ve seen, a GCI does not depend on the context where the sentence is uttered, and therefore, it doesn’t matter whether it is a relevant response to the conversation, which is a contextual factor. Usually, as in (21), the maxim of Quantity is used during the computation of the GCI.

Marques suggests that the pragmatically conveyed contents of aesthetic judgments are either presuppositions or implicatures. We have already assessed the former option and dismissed it. When it comes to the latter, Marques suggests that if the contents in question are implicatures, they are likely to be generalised conversational implicatures. (Marques 2016, 743–744). However, we will see that her description of how (b) and (c) are computed suggests that she has in mind PCIs. Therefore we will consider both options.

First, we should note that the two standard tests for conversational implicatures, the cancellability test and the detachability test, are useful only in distinguishing conversational implicatures from conventional ones. However, they cannot be used to test whether a given content is conversationally
implicated by some utterance. In order to evaluate that, we have to rely on a third well-known feature of both generalised and particularised conversational implicatures, namely their calculability (Grice 1989, 31):

The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature. To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

For every conversational implicature it is thus possible to demonstrate how it was computed. Marques (2016, 744–745) proposes such a story for the pragmatic contents that she postulates. Here is her account of how content of type (i) is created (content type (i) in her words is “that the speaker desires the object”):

On a dispositional theory, in order to understand the critic who says that a painting is beautiful, we must take her to ascribe to a painting the disposition to cause in observers (we) a desire to have certain aesthetic responses to it. To understand the critic as making a relevant contribution to the aesthetic conversation, we ought to understand her as desiring that we (the people sharing her aesthetic standard) have those aesthetic responses to that painting. Thus, her utterance conversationally implicates that she desires that the people who share her standard have a certain response to the painting. Since she is one of those people, she is implicating that she herself desires to have the relevant aesthetic responses to the painting – that she values it. Since desires are motivating, and we are assuming that she is rational, we can also infer that she strives to satisfy her desire to have the relevant responses to the painting. So, we can calculate (b) – by saying that Turner’s painting is beautiful, or is a great painting, A communicates that she has the right aesthetic response towards it.
The above paragraph is puzzling. According to it, when a critic makes an aesthetic judgment she “implicates that she desires that the people who share her standard have a certain response to the painting”. But why? According to Marques’ theory, something similar is the truth-apt content of the critic’s utterance. As we have already seen, the truth-apt content of the critic’s utterance is that she and those aesthetically alike value the painting. Because of the dispositional interpretation of values she adopts, the truth-apt content is that she and those aesthetically alike desire to have a certain response to the painting. If so, even if we grant that all the steps from Marques’ reasoning are valid, (b) is a consequence of the critic’s utterance rather than its implicature. More importantly, the paragraph gives no clue concerning which maxim’s apparent violation triggered the calculation of (b). As emphasised, if no maxim was violated, then the supposed content cannot be a conventional implicature. In light of that, it is doubtful that (b) is a conventional implicature.

Let us next look at Marques’ (2016, 745–746) explanation for how content (c) is conveyed by an implicature (first and last italics added).

Can we calculate (c), an implicature that serves a ‘connection building role’? Again, let us assume that a critic is cooperative and rational, and follows the conversational maxims, namely relation. The critic may find herself in conversations like Turner 1, where she is aware that her interlocutor does not share her aesthetic standards, i.e. does not desire to have aesthetic response \( w \) to Turner’s painting, but rather desires to have response \( u \). A says that Turner’s is a great painting, thereby saying that we (the set of people that share her standard) are disposed to aesthetically appreciate it. She cannot be conveying that her interlocutor is a member of the group referred to with ‘we’, since she knows that she and her interlocutor know that is false. But, given that it is common knowledge that there is no shared standard, the connection building purpose of aesthetic discourse, A’s insistence in making the assertion, and that we have no reason to believe that she does not conform to the maxim of relation, we can infer that she desires that she and her interlocutor come to share the same aesthetic standard.

First of all, according to Marques, the maxim of relation takes part in calculation of (c). If this is so, (c) cannot be a GC1. But let’s set that aside, and consider the possibility that (c) is a PC1. First, it is implausible to claim that the literal meaning of A’s utterance does not conform to the maxim of relation in the context of a discussion about art. Even if A knows that B generally does not share her taste, it does not follow that in this particular case, they necessarily judge
The claim about relevance is easily tested though. Let us consider again the milkman case, where the hearer fails to grasp the implicature:

(22) A: Can you tell me the time?
   B: The milkman has come.
   A: I don't see how that's relevant.

Compare that to the following dialogue:

Giotto 2
A: Last Judgment is beautiful.
B: I don't see how that's relevant.

B's response is certainly weird. Thus it is implausible that B would be surprised by the literal meaning of A's judgment in Giotto and therefore resort to a computation of an implicature. The story seems to be problematic in at least one more way.

Let us offer another disanalogy between clear cases of conversational implicature and the cases discussed by Marques. The maxims play an essential role in the calculation of PCIs. However, if one explicitly states that one does not comply to a particular maxim, then the utterance will not create an implicature. There are natural ways to indicate that we suspend one of the maxims; e.g. the implicature in (20) – i.e., the milkman case –is calculated with the use of the maxim of relation. If we explicitly warn the hearer that our contribution will not be relevant, nothing will be implicated:

(23) A: Can you tell me the time?
   B: Well, it's not relevant at all, but the milkman has come.

Here is an analogous case with an aesthetic judgment:

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4 This brings up questions about how standards of taste are determined. For example, suppose that A and B judged the same in this particular case, but generally would not. There are two ways to understand the situation: (1) Regarding Pre-Raphaelites and Turner, their standards are the same, or (2) their standards differ overall, but there is some overlap regarding the judgments that follow from their standards. The way one goes clearly has ramifications regarding agreement and disagreement. These issues are not crucial here, but a theory which relies on standards of taste needs to offer an account.
Giotto 3

B: Which painting should I try to see?
A: I know this isn’t relevant, but Last Judgment is beautiful.

Again there is a notable difference between the above cases. Moreover, A’s response is difficult to understand; why would it not be relevant that he thinks that Last Judgment is beautiful? These considerations show that we cannot compute (b) and (c) from A’s answer with the use of the maxim of relation, because the evidence points to the maxim not being violated in the first place. The same goes with the other maxims.

4 Evaluative Aesthetic Attitudes

Now, we’ve seen reasons to suspect that (b) and (c) are neither presupposed nor conversationally implicated. However, the core of Marques’ proposal is the claim that (b) and (c) are conveyed in aesthetic discourses and they explain why we get an impression of disagreement in certain aesthetic discourses. In this section, we consider the nature of evaluative aesthetic attitudes and offer a tentative alternative picture for explaining how hearers can infer contents of type (b) from aesthetic judgments.

Let us now step back from the details of Marques’ view and ask more general questions about applying Lewis’ dispositionalist approach to aesthetic values. As we’ve seen, Lewis (1989) takes valuing to be a second-order attitude desiring to desire. According to the analysis, if one values equality, then roughly, they desire to desire that everyone is equal, or if one values a tranquil life, they desire to desire that everyone lives a tranquil life. Now, there is a clear difference between first- and second-order desiring. As Lewis points out, a drug addict desires to be high, but it doesn’t follow that he desires to desire being high. Likewise, a first-order desire does not necessarily follow from a second-order desire. For example, one may desire to desire to live an active life, but all they desire is to stay in bed all day. Alas, our values need not line up with our desires—and indeed, they very often do not. The good thing is that sometimes they do, and Lewis’ theory can thus explain why values tend to motivate us: when our second-order desires are in sync with our first-order desires, we act according to our values.

5 We’re simplifying the picture by setting aside Lewis’ (1989) distinction between values de dicto and de se, which is not relevant for our concerns.
The idea of a second-order attitude theory of valuing is that it is a conative state whose object is a conative state. In other words, values (valuing) reduce to conative states, with the difference that they are directed to the subject’s own states, whereas first-order conative states are directed towards objects. Suppose that in a particular context one thinks it is bad to eat more pizza, because they’ve already eaten six slices and they do not want to gain weight, but they nevertheless want to eat more pizza. The Lewisian account holds that they have a first-order conative state (the desire to eat more pizza), but they do not desire to have that desire, i.e. they have a second-order conative state towards the first-order state. 

Now, in order to have an account of aesthetic valuing along the model provided by Lewis, one needs to have a story in which conative states play the relevant first- and second-order roles. Marques doesn’t provide one and talks instead of aesthetic responses as the first-order attitudes and desires to have aesthetic responses as the second-order attitudes. Let us next suggest an account of first-order aesthetic attitudes which could explain how contents of type (b) can be inferred from aesthetic judgments without relying on pragmatic mechanisms. The account suggested could be used in a Lewisian framework, and in that sense it is perfectly compatible with the bigger picture under consideration.

One special feature of aesthetic experiences is their affective dimension. When we have aesthetic experiences, e.g. see a beautiful view, hear a disturbing piece of contemporary classical music, or smell a magnificent perfume, we are in an affective state. Recent philosophical and empirical research on aesthetic experiences emphasises affective and conative states as a core feature of aesthetic experiences – let us call them by the umbrella term aesthetic emotions. So what are aesthetic emotions, and what do they do? Menninghaus et al. (2018) provide the following four mandatory features of aesthetic emotions in their comprehensive review of empirical studies on aesthetic emotions. First, all aesthetic emotions include an aesthetic evaluation or appreciation of the object or event under consideration. Second, aesthetic emotions correlate with aesthetic virtues of objects or otherwise put, with the aesthetic appeal

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6 Which experiences count as aesthetic experiences is a difficult question to which there is no universally agreed answer. As is usual, we will proceed with an intuitive understanding based on prototypical cases such as our examples. See Shusterman (1997) for an influential overview of the dimensions of experience that make an experience aesthetic, and the papers in Shusterman and Tomlin (2008) for a more recent discussion.

7 For philosophical accounts of aesthetic emotions, see Robinson 2005, Schellekens and Goldie 2012, pt. 11.
of those objects. To illustrate, we ascribe to objects aesthetic virtues such as beauty or being moving when we have the correlating aesthetic emotions of feeling beauty or feeling moved. Third, aesthetic emotions are associated with subjectively felt pleasure or displeasure during the emotional episode. Fourth, aesthetic emotions are predictive of liking or disliking the object in question.

Let us suppose that a normal aesthetic experience includes the experiencer’s having an aesthetic emotion, as defined above. Now, one interesting feature of aesthetic judgments is that they are generally held to require first-person aesthetic experiences as their grounds; let us call it the traditional view. The traditional view holds that a judgment is not an aesthetic judgment unless the speaker has had the relevant kind of first-person experience of its object. Hence, testimony is not enough for a person to make an aesthetic judgment. A consequence of the first-person experience requirement is that a hearer can infer from an aesthetic judgment that the speaker has had acquaintance with its object (Ninan 2014). That is one possible explanation for why it is normally infelicitous to make judgments like “Last Judgment is beautiful but I’ve never seen it”.

If the traditional view is correct, then a hearer can infer from a judgment of taste that the speaker has had an aesthetic experience of the object of the judgment. Now, let us bring together the ideas stated above. An aesthetic judgment requires first-person aesthetic experience. An aesthetic experience includes having aesthetic emotions. Thus, it is a condition for making an aesthetic judgment that one has had aesthetic emotions caused by the object of the judgment. That is common knowledge to all language users, and hence, when one hears an aesthetic judgment, one can infer that the speaker has had an aesthetic emotion of a certain type.

Let us now return to contents of type (b) in Marques’ view, whose contents indicate that the speaker has a first-order aesthetic response which is a conative state. In the view sketched above, the conative state can be inferred since it is a necessary condition for an aesthetic judgment. However, Marques points out that there is no contradiction in saying “x is a good painting, but I don’t like it.” and takes that as evidence for contents of type (b) being implicatures due

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8 Kant (2000), Sibley (2001), and Korsmeyer (2001) are among the influential defenders of the view. See Meskin and Robson (2015) for a comprehensive list of references; they criticise the traditional view, but only as applied to gustatory judgments.

9 Note that similar judgments are not always infelicitous since there are contexts where it’s clear that the judgment is made from the point of view of someone else than the speaker; see Lasersohn (2005) for these exocentric uses. For alternative explanations for the infelicity of such judgments, see Franzén (2018).
to their cancellability (Marques 2016, 746). However, the felicity of the example doesn’t show that the speaker *aesthetically dislikes* the painting, in other words, that the “I don’t like it” states that they don’t have the first-order *aesthetic conative* state. For example, one can judge a painting to be beautiful but nevertheless not like it because it depicts a rape or a genocide. But according to the account we’ve sketched in this section, in such a case, the speaker nevertheless has a positive aesthetic emotion regarding the beautiful-making aspects of the painting, e.g. its harmonious composition and vivid colours.

As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, when we introduced the examples we’ve been using, ordinary language doesn’t have specific vocabulary for aesthetic states or emotions besides constructions like *feeling beauty*. We describe our aesthetic conative states with the usual generic verbs such as *liking, enjoying, being pleased, and so on*. Moreover, we can like one aspect of an object and dislike another without any contradiction. But the lack of more specified aesthetic vocabulary does make our task a little bit more complicated. However, we can test our hypothesis that a judgment of beauty is always accompanied by a positive aesthetic conative state by simply trying to rule out all positive conative states:

(24) #*Last Judgment* is beautiful but it doesn’t please me in any way.

The result seems infelicitous, which can be taken as evidence that judging something beautiful requires that the object aesthetically pleases one.\textsuperscript{10}

Due to lack of space the view we’ve just presented is a mere sketch and must be worked out in detail. But it offers an alternative to the accounts relying on pragmatic mechanisms for explaining how aesthetic judgments provide information about the speakers’ conative states.

5 Conclusions

In this paper we have examined a hybrid expressivist account of aesthetic judgments proposed by Teresa Marques. Its main claim is that aesthetic judgments

\textsuperscript{10} As emphasised earlier, we are using *pleasing* as a place-holder, since we don’t have specific vocabulary to refer to positive aesthetic states. An anonymous referee pointed out that this seems to suggest that we are assuming that any positive aesthetic emotion involves pleasure. We are not assuming that, but it is hard to avoid giving that impression, given the linguistic connections between *pleasure* and *pleasing*. Perhaps *liking* conveys slightly better the elusive positive state we are after. The nature of the positive aesthetic states is an extremely interesting question, but unfortunately there is no space to address it here.
typically convey three pieces of information: the truth evaluable, evaluative proposition expressed is that the object in question has a certain dispositional property (denoted by the aesthetic predicate), the pragmatically conveyed expressive content that the speaker has a certain conative attitude towards the object, and the pragmatically conveyed expressive content that the speaker desires that her interlocutors desire to like x as well. The two latter pragmatically conveyed contents are, according to Marques, presuppositions or conversational implicatures. We have argued that given their behaviour, it is very unlikely that they are either of the two. Finally, we have sketched an account according to which aesthetic judgments require aesthetic experiences, and aesthetic experiences always include aesthetic emotions. If that is the case, a hearer can infer from an aesthetic judgment information regarding the conative states of the speaker. The sketch offers a new direction which might be helpful for future work in understanding aesthetic judgments and aesthetic disagreements.

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