In a recent article, Timothy L. Smith has offered an interpretation of the theological method employed by Thomas Aquinas in *Summa Theologiae* 1. Smith offers his interpretation in an attempt to «extricate Thomas from the tangled web of trinitarian criticism and historiography» (136) which has allowed many, under the influence of Régnon and Rahner, to find a theologically suspect «monoperson-alism» in *de Deo*. While I am sympathetic to Smith's overall project, I believe he fails in his attempt to identify Thomas de Vio Cajetan as the historical source of the modern hermeneutic mistake. Smith considers in particular Cajetan's commentary on two articles (q. 3 a. 3, and q. 39 a. 4), in which Smith finds evidence that Cajetan «posited an existing divine nature apart from the Persons» (152). According to Smith, «Having defined a concrete, subsistent *Deus* distinct from the Persons, Cajetan has unwittingly established an absolute divinity that falls into the category of a fourth divine thing. This posited absolute divinity in Cajetan’s commentary is the chief source of the ‘monopersonalism’ read into the *Summa*» (pp. 149-150). Smith’s argument is that Cajetan is led to this mistaken position by misreading Thomas’s logical distinctions as metaphysical ones. However, read in the light of the semantic principles that Cajetan assumes, Cajetan’s commentary admits to a much different interpretation than Smith gives it. Cajetan, I argue, makes no such metaphysical claim as Smith attributes to him, and it is in fact Smith’s interpretation of Cajetan that is guilty of confusing logical and metaphysical distinctions.

The bulk of Smith’s criticism of Cajetan is directed against Cajetan’s commentary on q. 3 a. 3. According to Smith, Cajetan

«broached the subject of distinguishing Person and essence thirty-six questions earlier than Thomas does. Not until q. 39 does Thomas directly address the grammatical rules for speech about essence and Person. There he enunciates a number of rules by which we might clarify our language, taking into account the distinction between Persons and essence and between the Persons themselves. Cajetan uses Thomas’ own distinctions, but changes them from being logical to metaphysical. Thus, by introducing a precision that is not

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needed in q. 3, he unknowingly turned this theological text into a metaphysics allowing a grammatical distinction from the second section to define the subject of the first questions. That is to say, the God of revelation—the God who is Three Persons discussed as a unity in the early questions—becomes for Cajetan an absolute, concrete subject with its own subsistence (not identical with the subsistence of the three Persons) and accessible to natural reason» (p. 148).

The basis for Smith's charge is the fact that Cajetan's commentary makes much of the different ways in which the name Deus can signify. Smith believes that this leads Cajetan to give Aquinas' text an interpretation that is contrary to the mind of Aquinas (and, he could have added, obviously heretical):

«Commenting on the question of “whether God is the same as His Essence”, Cajetan focuses on the signification of the name Deus. In doing so, Cajetan raises a question not in the text; namely, whether divinity has a concrete existence or subsistence apart from the Persons [...] Deus, he says, “signifies a concrete individual of divine nature”, not the Person of the Father, Son or Holy Spirit, but hic Deus. This hic Deus is the divine nature subsisting as an absolute unity» (p. 149).

So Smith's criticism is based almost entirely on Cajetan's discussion of the signification of Deus in question 3, article 3, «Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura». In response, I wish to offer a more plausible reading of that discussion, based on Cajetan's own semantic principles. First, Cajetan's words (with my interpretive italics):

«Ad hoc est dicendum, quod ly Deus potest tripliciter sumi. Primo, ut significat concretum quasi specificum naturae divinae, idest habens deitatem; sicut homo significat habens humanitatem. Secundo, ut significat concretum individuale naturae divinae, idest hunc habentem deitatem, seu hunc Deum; sicut homo potest supponere pro hoc homine. Tertio, ut significat suppositum naturae divinae, idest hunc incommunicabiliter habentem deitatem, idest hunc personam divinam; sicut homo potest supponere pro Socrate. Sed hoc interest inter Deum ex una parte, et hominem et aliarum naturarum concretum ex alia parte, quod in aliis non distinguitur individuum naturae in concreto a supposito (non enim distinguitur hic homo ab humano supposito, aut e converso): in Deo autem distinguitur individuum naturae in concreto, idest hic Deus, a supposito divino, idest Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto. Et ratio est, quia hic Deus est simul terminus singularis, et communis tribus suppositis: quod est impossible convenire individuo aliarum substantiarum.


This passage is difficult to follow because it depends heavily on logical or semantic terminology. However, I think we can begin by noticing that, whatever else may be

2 Thomas de Vio Cardinalis CAJETANUS, Commentaria in Summam Theologiam Divi Thomae, la q. 3 a 3 n. II.
involved with the «three ways» outlined in the first paragraph, it is at least clear that the first of the three ways of taking the word «God» is as specific, as opposed to particular. Smith, however, maintains that the first way is specific in the sense of signifying a determinate or definite individual. Thus, for example, Smith says, «First, there is a specific instance or thing having divine nature» (152). And in a footnote, Smith asserts that «there is no difference between saying a specific thing having divine nature and a supposit of divine nature» (152, n. 160). So when Smith explains why Cajetan does not think that in the present question «Deus» should be taken in the first way, he says that Cajetan «argues that the name Deus cannot signify a specific suppositum (or habens divinitatem) because this name signifies something common to all three» (p. 149). Smith’s explanation here only makes sense if he is opposing «specific» to «common».

But «specific», understood as concerning species, is not opposed to «common»; and in fact Cajetan’s own reason for rejecting the first use of the term «Deus» is quite different from the one Smith gives. Cajetan says: «...as is clear in the body of the article, that for which the word ‘God’ supposits, contains in its ratio the principles of individuating God, insofar as they are individuating. But these are not signified to be contained in the word God as suppositing specifically». That is, «habens deitatem» does not indicate in its signification anything individuating, whereas «hic Deus» does. Cajetan’s reason for rejecting the specific reading of «Deus» is not, as Smith claims, that «Deus» here needs to be common to three different supposita. Rather, it is that «Deus» here needs to refer to what is individuated, and what is specific is, as such, not individuated.

Again, while granting that it is difficult to understand Cajetan’s distinctions in the long passage quoted above, it is at least clear that key to understanding them is that Cajetan emphasizes successively species, individual, and incommunicable supposit. The emphasis on species and individual, and the sense of «specific» employed, may be partially obscured because Cajetan calls both of these first two senses of «Deus» concrete. In this context, however, «concrete» should be understood, not as opposed to general or specific, but as opposed to abstract. This makes sense, first, just because the word «Deus» is a concrete term. Cajetan says that both of the first two senses of the term «Deus» are «concrete» because, regardless of whatever other factors are involved in the various different uses of «Deus» in propositions, we must still recognize that «Deus» signifies its nature (deitas) in the way that concrete terms signify natures, which is different from the way that abstract terms signify the same natures.

1 [...] ut in corpore articuli patet, id pro quo supponit il Deus, claudit in sua ratione principia individuantia Deum, inquantum individuantia sunt: quae non significantur claudi in il Deus quasi specifice supponente (Ibid.).

4 Elsewhere Cajetan explains that a concrete term like «homo» can supposit for man in general, or for an individual man (a feature of language which is all the more apparent in Latin, which lacks definite and indefinite articles). In both cases, it is a concrete term, and so it signifies humanity per modum totius; that is, it signifies humanity as it is in (because individuated by) the subject having it. (This is as opposed to humanity as signified by the term «humanitas», which, as an abstract term, signifies per modum partis.) Because it signifies per modum totius, «homo» always includes the matter along with the form. However, in one case, when «homo» supposits for man in general, it signifies the form humanity together with undesignated matter; in the other case, when «homo» supposits for a particular man, it
Now the difference between the second and third way of taking the word «Deus» is especially difficult to understand. This should not surprise us, however, because, as Cajetan says, in created natures, the individual is not distinguished from the incommunicable supposit. However, as Cajetan insists, in God they are distinguished, because the phrase «hic Deus» (or the word «Deus» taken in a sense in which it means the same as this phrase) is at once a singular term, and common to three suppositis (namely the three divine persons). This peculiarity is due to the central mystery of faith, according to which it is true to say of God both that He is One, and that He is Three. It is fair to conclude from this metaphysical or theological peculiarity that there is a peculiarity in the way that the term «Deus» signifies.

Now if this is a proper interpretation of Cajetan’s discussion of the significations of «Deus», I do not see that we need to follow Smith in accusing Cajetan of confusing logical and metaphysical distinctions. Indeed, Cajetan’s (logical) distinctions between the different significations of the word «Deus» just do not entail the (metaphysical) thesis Smith attributes to him, namely, that «divinity has a concrete existence or subsistence apart from the Persons» (149)^5.

Now it is true, as Smith says, that the three divine persons do enter into Cajetan’s commentary on q. 3 a. 3, while Thomas himself does not discuss them until later. But surely Smith does not want to say that mentioning something in a commentary before it is mentioned in the commented text is itself illicit. The real interpretive question must be: why does Cajetan introduce a discussion of the divine Persons in his commentary on this article? The answer is that Cajetan brings up the three divine supposita, in order to explain his own and Thomas’ usage of the term «suppositum» in q. 3 a. 3. Cajetan notices that Thomas rests his argument on the assertion that nature and supposit do not differ in separate substances («in eis [quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma] non differt suppositum et natura»). Cajetan rephrases the argument of the article:

«In the body is one conclusion, an affirmative response to the question: God is the same as his essence or nature. It is proved: the reason of difference between nature and supposit, is the distinction of nature from material individuals; therefore in simple forms, which are individuated by themselves, the supposit does not differ from the nature; therefore God is his divinity, and his life, etc.»^6.

signifies a particular act of humanity, existing in, and individuated by, designated matter. This is why it is true to say that the essence of man includes not just form, but matter—not any particular matter, but matter in general; while in the essence of Socrates, is included his particular matter. Cf. Commentaria in De Ente et Essentia, ed. Laurent (Taurini: Marietti, 1934), § 27-32; 84.

5 Of course, metaphysically it is odd to distinguish nature and individual in God, but logically or grammatically it is appropriate. Cajetan is probably acknowledging this when he uses «quasi» twice in the passage quoted above («significat concretum quasi specificum naturae divinae» and «non significatur claudi in ly Deus quasi specifiche supponente»), as well as the modifying phrase «inquantum individuatia sunt»; these qualifications acknowledge that even these grammatical distinctions only imperfectly apply to our speaking about God. Metaphysically speaking, God has no «specific» nature which is individuated. Nonetheless, we can’t help but refer to God with either concrete or abstract terms—both of which improperly apply to God—and we can’t help but think of his concrete or abstract essence as in some way specific, and in some way individual, though we recognize that in truth these categories cannot properly apply to God.

6 «In corpore est una conclusio, responsive quaesito affirmative: Deus est idem quod sua essentia seu natura. Probatur: Ratio differentiae inter naturam et suppositum, est distinctio naturae a materia indivi-
I think Cajetan has prepared us properly to understand this argument by clarifying that "supposit" here is not one of the three persons of the Trinity, insofar as taken to be signified in terms of an incomunicable individual nature; this is a fair clarification, because "divina supposita" is established technical terminology for the three divinae personae. Cajetan discusses the three divina supposita only to warn us that in the present article he and Thomas use the term "suppositum" in the more general sense derived from logic and grammar. "He uses the names "supposit" and "nature" as in common speech; and the question is determined from the common rule of the identity or distinction of supposit and nature". In fact, Cajetan's introduction of the three divine persons is meant to clarify exactly the point that Smith thinks he has ignored, namely, that concerns peculiar to the discussion of three divine persons, and their relation to the divine essence, are out of place in this question. So in his commentary on q. 3 a. 3, Cajetan has not clumsily "broached the subject of distinguishing Person and essence thirty-six questions earlier than Thomas does"; he has carefully clarified the distinction between suppositum and natura, in the very question in which Thomas himself makes that distinction the basis of argument.

Now admittedly, in the subsequent discussion of how, in God, the supposit and the nature are one, Cajetan considers details that Thomas did not himself consider in q. 3 a. 3. In particular, Cajetan introduces a sense in which the divine supposit is different from the divine nature: namely, secundum modum significandi. Why does Cajetan do this? Doesn't it only confuse matters? Cajetan must think that it clarifies matters for those readers he might expect to remember apparent complications introduced by other discussions of the difference between supposit and nature. Of such other discussions, the relevant ones are not those that Smith mentions, pertaining to the trinitarian concerns of q. 39 a. 4. Rather, they are basic logical and metaphysical discussions which Cajetan could reasonably predict his readers to have in mind and to regard as bearing on the argument of q. 3 a. 3. Note that Thomas has claimed that there is no difference between supposit and nature in separate substances. But there is some sense in which there is a distinction between nature and supposit in God; and, as Cajetan points out, Thomas himself has said elsewhere that there is a distinction between nature and supposit in created separate substances. Cajetan writes:

«Indeed this talk of difference is not secundum rationem only: since the supposit and nature are so distinguished [i.e., secundum rationem]. For God and divinity are distinguished, by reason of modus significandi, insofar as this is heretical: «Divinity generates divinity» [...] Nor indeed is this talk of a real extrinsic difference: since then the antecedent [of the main argument summarized in n. iv, quoted above] would be false; and it would be false that in immaterial substances the supposit does not differ from the nature. Indeed in separate [created] substances, the supposit differs from the nature extrinsically, because the supposit, as such, includes subsisting (which is being per se), not intrinsically, duali: ergo in formis simplicibus, quae per seipsas individuantur, non differt suppositum a natura: ergo Deus est sua deitas, et sua vita, etc." (Commentaria in Summam Theologicam Divi Thomae, Ia, q. 3 a. 3, n. iv).

7 «Utur nomine suppositi et naturae, in communi loquendo: et ex communibus regulis identitatis aut distinctionis suppositi a natura, quaestionem determinat» (Ibid., n. iii).
but in some way as if a proper act, according to which somehow it ought to be defined, if it were defined, but this is not the case where the nature is concerned. And for this reason Saint Thomas, in *Quodlibet*. II, q. II, a. 2, speaking of such a difference, said that in angels the supposit differs from the nature*.

In this passage, Cajetan is *not* bringing up problems peculiar to the trinity of *supposita* in God, though he is considering many issues that are not explicitly brought up by Thomas in q. 3 a. 3. To even better see what issues Cajetan is considering here, let us introduce another discussion, from Cajetan’s commentary on Thomas’ *De ente et essentia*. There Cajetan also characterizes supposit and nature, and their distinction:

«[...] it is to be noted, that by the name «nature» is understood *that which is signified by the definition*, while by the name «supposit» [is understood] *the individual having that quiddity*. Corresponding to the three grades of substances, a difference of supposit from nature is found in three ways in the universe.

«For in material substances the supposit differs from the nature in two ways *secundum rem*, and beyond this [it differs in a third way] *secundum rationem*. It differs in the first way *intrinsic*ly, because the supposit includes something real intrinsic to itself which the nature does not include, namely the principle of individuation. For if [the supposit] Socrates were defined, in his definition would be posited *this matter* which is not posited in the definition of human nature. It differs secondly *extrinsically*, because the supposit includes something real extrinsic to itself, namely the being of actual existence which the nature does not include; for existence is the first act of the supposit, to which coming-to-be pertains, but which would [not] fall in the definition of Socrates if he were defined. It differs thirdly *secundum rationem*, as is clear.

«However in separate substances (other than the first [i.e. God]), the supposit differs from the nature in only two ways, namely *extrinsically secundum rem*, and *secundum rationem*. For the supposit in them includes nothing real intrinsic to itself that the nature does not include, because it is not individuated by something positive contracting the specific nature, which would be like an intrinsic difference of the individual supposit, as in material substances. But because in it, as will be clear [i.e. later in *De ente et essentia*], existence differs really from nature, which [existence], as was said, is the first act of the supposit, therefore the supposit in them differs extrinsically from the nature; for it adds extrinsically the reality of existence. It differs secondly *secundum rationem*, as is clear.

«Now in glorious God the supposit differs only in one way, namely *secundum rationem*, because the divine nature is neither individuated by an addition, nor is its existence really distinct from its essence**.

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8 «Non enim est hic sermo de differentia secundum rationem tantum: quoniam suppositum et natura in omnibus, etiam in Deo, sic distinguuntur. Deus enim et deitas, ratione modi significandi, distinguuntur intantum, quod ista est haeretica, deitas generat deitatem [...] Nec etiam est hic sermo de differentia reali extrinsec; quoniam falsum esset antecedens; at falsum esset quod in substantiis immaterialibus non differt suppositum et natura. In substantiis enim separatis, suppositum a natura differt extrinsec; quia suppositum, ut sic, includit subsistere (quod est esse per se), non intrinsec, sed quoddammodo quasi ut proprium actum, ad quem quoddammodo debeter definitur si definetur; natura autem, non. Et propertia S. Thomas, in *Quodlibeto* II, qu. II, art. 2, de tali differentia loquens, dixit quod in angelis differt suppositum a natura» (Ibid., p. VIII).

9 The correction is made in light of the sense of the paragraph, and a parallel discussion later in the text (§ 90): «[...] esse est extra essentiam Sortis, non enim ponetur in ejus diffinitione si diffiniretur».

10 «[...] est notandum, quod cum nomine naturae intelligatur id quod per diffinitionem significatur, nomine autem suppositi individuum habens illam quiditatem; secundum triplicem gradum substantiarum, in universo tripliciter inventur differentia suppositi a natura.»
In one sense, this passage simply describes the traditional metaphysical account of the hierarchy of beings: **material substances** are composites of matter and form; **separate created substances** have no matter but have composition insofar as there is in them a real distinction between being and essence; and God only is truly simple, with no composition, because in God the act of being is the same as the essence. The twist is that Cajetan has given this account in terms of the logical/grammatical vocabulary of nature (id quod *per diffinitionem* significatur) and *supposit* (individuum habens illam quiditatem). These can be considered *secundum rationem* or *secundum rem*, and if taken in the latter way, we can consider intrinsic or extrinsic differences. So sup­­posit and nature differ:

* in material substances:  
  - *secundum rationem*, *secundum rem* intrinsically, and *secundum rem* extrinsically
* in separate created substances:  
  - *secundum rationem*, and *secundum rem* extrinsically
* in God:  
  - *secundum rationem*

If we keep this discussion in mind, Cajetan’s commentary on q. 3 a. 3 becomes much more perspicuous. In clarifying the argument which he has summarized in n. IV (quoted above), Cajetan says:

»About the terms taken in the antecedent, and consequently in the whole of the argument, distinguish first the word «nature» and the word «suppositum». Indeed they can be taken in two ways: one way, only *secundum rem*; the other way, *secundum modum significandi*. Nature and suppositum are taken *secundum rem* only, when they are taken according to the proper ratios — of the *thing* which nature signifies, and of the *thing* which the suppositum signifies — abstracted from the *modus significandi*. For example, when human nature is taken according to its proper definition, and Socrates according to his proper ratio, it is not to be reasoned whether the nature is signified in *abstracto* or in *concreto*, etc. However they are taken *secundum modos significandi*, when they are taken as they stand under names of first intention, such as «humanity», «man», «Socrates», «Socrateity, etc.».

»The present talk is of nature and suppositum *secundum rem*, and not *secundum modum significandi*; the latter indeed is more the business of logic, the former of metaphysics.

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11 I.e. when they are taken as they stand under terms about which it is proper to ask whether the nature is signified in *abstracto* or in *concreto*.

12 Here I offer «the latter» and «the former» as glosses of *hoc* and *illud* respectively, against Smith’s decision to regard the passage as evidence that Cajetan is confusing metaphysical and logical
And therefore all arguments and responses should stop which mix *signifying per modum partis*, or excluding from signification, or neither excluding nor including, and similarly; which regard a difference between these *ex modis significandi*, and not *ex rebus*.

Why is Cajetan making this clarification? Because Thomas has said that there is a difference between supposit and nature only in composite substances—this is the key premise to the central argument of the article. But, as we have seen, there is a sense in which there is a difference between supposit and nature in *all* things, even in separate substances—namely, when considered *secundum modos significandi* (as Cajetan calls it first in his commentary on q. 3 a. 3), or *secundum rationem* (as he calls it in the commentary on *De ente et essentia*), and later on in his commentary on q. 3 a. 3). Moreover, in created separate substances, there is also an *extrinsic* difference *secundum rem*. And this is exactly the complication that Cajetan addresses in his commentary on q. 3 a. 3. So Cajetan is concerned to clarify Thomas’s claim that there is a distinction between nature and supposit only in material substances; this claim is only true when considered *secundum rem intrinsecus*. By ruling out of consideration other kinds of differences which are not at issue—*secundum rem extrinsecus* and *secundum rationem* (or *secundum modum significandi*)—Cajetan hopes to do nothing more than explain the proper sense in which Thomas’ argument should be taken.

Thus Cajetan ends this main part of his commentary on q. 3 a. 3:

...
And if you carefully examine what has been said, you will comprehend the order of all things as to the identity and distinction between supposit and nature are concerned [...] You have it [...] that supposit and nature in composite substances are distinguished intrinsically, and extrinsically, and secundum rationem [...] You have it [...] that in immaterial substances, nature and supposit are distinguished not intrinsically, but extrinsically secundum rem, and secundum rationem [...] You have it [...] that in God Deus and deitas are distinguished in no way secundum rem, but only by reason of modus significandi. You have both the consistency of the claims of Saint Thomas, and the understanding of those who have written of this matter in diverse places.15

Reading Cajetan's commentary on q. 3 a. 3, in light of Cajetan's own semantic assumptions essentially clears Cajetan of the mistakes Smith tries to convict him of in his paper. However I also want to touch on what Smith says about Cajetan's reading of q. 39 a. 4. Smith has what appears to be a damaging quotation from Cajetan, in which Cajetan seems to espouse something close to the heretical view that Smith suspects him of: «divine nature subsists from itself not deriving [literally, «begging»] its subsistence from the supposit, but on the contrary, conferring it on them» (quoted on p. 154). I think Smith unfairly takes this quotation out of context. Read in context, Cajetan's point is the very one made above: in God there is no extrinsic difference secundum rem between nature and supposit, but in all other things there is such a difference, for in all other things the supposit includes existence but the nature does not. Cajetan means to make no radical claim about the relation of the divine persons to some separate divine nature. Here is what Cajetan says in its larger context:

«It must carefully be noted that between God and the other substances there is this difference, that in the rest these two —namely nature and [the thing] having nature— necessarily have themselves so that [the thing] having nature is the supposit, while nature is the essence itself; in God however [the thing] having nature is found in two ways, namely the supposit, as Father or Son, and the individual, i.e. this God. And so in the divine, three things must be considered, namely essence, this God, and the divine supposita (namely Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). In the rest however, only two are found, such as humanity and Socrates; for this man is not other than Socrates. However this God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and generates and is generated, etc.; concerning which it is written (Exodus 15): «This is my God, and I will glorify him», as Thomas expounds at the end of the last article of this question.16»


16 I.e. ST 1a, q. 39 a. 8: «Unde et grammatico loquendo, essentia divina, secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc pronomine, iste; secundum illud: Iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum». 
The reason of the diversity is because the divine nature subsists by itself, and does not derive subsistence from its suppositos, but rather confers it [subsistence] on them [the suppositos]; other natures however do not subsist except in suppositos. However since it is most natural for each concrete term to supposit for [the thing] having the signified form, consequently «God» primarily suppositos for this God. And because «this God» signifies the individual of the divine nature, therefore it is said that [it stands] for the nature concretely. And because this individual is common to three suppositos, therefore sometimes it is said that it stands for [all] the persons indistinctly. And because it is the same for whatever supposit, and it signifies concretely, therefore it can stand for individual persons.17

The point about the subsistence of God is part of a larger clarification of how the term «Deus» suppositos and signifies, a clarification made on the basis of the same kind of observations that Cajetan made in his commentary on q. 3 a. 3 (especially n. II). This is not a purely metaphysical discussion. It is more aptly understood as a discussion of the uniqueness of the signification and supposition of the word «Deus», which uniqueness is admittedly based on the metaphysical uniqueness of God (indeed, on two metaphysical uniquenesses: one, known from natural theology, that God is simple, and so admits no real distinction between being and essence; the other, known from revelation, that there is a trinity of Persons in God). Cajetan’s commentary on the Summa, read in light of his own semantic principles, can not be a source for the distorted «monopersonalism» of later interpreters. Indeed, in these key passages Cajetan is shown to side with Smith in reminding us of Aquinas’ insistence that in theology we must be diligent to consider «not only the thing signified but also the mode of signifying»18.

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18 «Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus significandi» (ST Ia, q. 39 a. 4c). «[..] ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet considerare res significata, sed etiam modum significandi» (ST Ia, q. 39 a. 5c).