Did Aquinas Answer Cajetan's Question?
Aquinas’s Semantic Rules for Analogy and the Interpretation of De Nominum Analogia

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Abstract: Cajetan's analogy theory is usually evaluated in terms of its fidelity to the teachings of Aquinas. But what if Cajetan was trying to answer questions Aquinas himself did not raise, and so could not help to answer? Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia can be interpreted as intending to solve a particular semantic problem: to characterize the unity of the analogical concept, so as to defend the possibility of a non-univocal term's mediating syllogistic reasoning. Aquinas offers various semantic characterizations of analogy, saying it involves, for instance: signification per prius et posterius; or a ratio propria which is only found in one analogate; or diverse modi significandii with a common res significata. Examined in turn, it is clear that none of Aquinas's rules for analogy solve the semantic problem described. Cajetan thus cannot be reasonably expected to have intended his analogy treatise primarily as an interpretation or systematization of Aquinas's teaching on analogy.

1. Introduction: Interpreting De Nominum Analogia

The theory of analogy advanced by the Dominican Thomas de Vio Cajetan in his treatise De Nominum Analogia (1498) is usually interpreted and evaluated in light of what Aquinas wrote about analogy. Differences between Cajetan's systematic teaching on analogy and Aquinas's occasional remarks have always been noted, but typical interpretations in the first half of the twentieth century aimed at reconciliation, defending Cajetan's theory as an authentic formalization of Aquinas's views on analogy. After a time, however, it became more common for scholars to point out that the differences between Cajetan and Aquinas were too great, and the trend through the second half of the twentieth century was to criticize Cajetan for getting Aquinas wrong.

Both defenders and critics have shared the assumption that Cajetan intended to interpret and systematize what Aquinas said about analogy, to write the ex professo

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treatise that Aquinas never wrote. But what if Cajetan was not trying to interpret Aquinas after all? What if he had his own agenda? What if Cajetan was addressing a philosophical problem that Aquinas had not answered, a problem that Cajetan knew Aquinas had not answered? If this were the case, however much Cajetan would have intended to remain in the spirit of Aquinas’s thought, his concerns would have led him to propose a theory that could not be found explicitly in Aquinas’s texts.

De Nominum Analogia strongly suggests what questions primarily preoccupied its author. The two most often noted features of Cajetan’s analogy doctrine are its classification and hierarchy of modes of analogy. Cajetan distinguishes three modes or kinds of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportionality; and he says that the last of these is analogy in its truest and most proper sense. Both of these aspects of Cajetan’s theory have been criticized by those who argue that the theory departs from the teaching of Aquinas. But these positions indicate something about Cajetan’s intent, for they serve as answers to two questions that seem to preoccupy Cajetan.

First, there is the question of how there can be a mean between univocation and equivocation. In univocation, a term signifies the same nature by means of the same concept: predicated of a man and a horse, the term ‘animal’ in each case signifies the nature animality, by means of the same intellectual act of conception of animality. In equivocation, a term signifies diverse natures by means of diverse concepts: predicated of a duck’s bill and a bill of sale, the term ‘bill’ signifies different natures, by means of different acts of intellectual conception. Analogy is supposed to be a mean between univocation and equivocation. But how is such a mean possible? In particular, how is it psychologically, and so semantically, possible? How can there be a mean between one and multiple concepts?

The traditional way of solving this problem is to say that in analogy there are multiple concepts which are somehow related. This makes analogy not a true mean between univocation and equivocation, but a species of equivocation, deliberate equivocation or aequiputatio a consilio, to be contrasted with pure, accidental equivocation, aequiputatio a causa. But this only gives rise to a further problem, for some terms central to the sciences of theology and metaphysics are analogical, and sciences rely on deductive syllogisms. If analogy is a species of equivocation, how can an analogical term avoid causing the fallacy of equivocation when used in a syllogism?

These questions, which arise quite naturally from theoretical reflection on analogy, were given historical urgency by Scotus’s objections to the analogy of being. Metaphysics is the science of being, and according to Scotus there can only be science of univocal terms. One concept, not two, must mediate a syllogistic inference, and “where there is one and the same concept, there is univocation.” Scotus even went so far as to define univocity in terms of the capacity to sustain valid inference. This poses a semantic challenge to those who want to defend the traditional Thomistic understanding of analogy. Historically, we know that several Thomists after Scotus turned their attention to describing a non-univocal unity which characterizes the analogical concept, and Cajetan’s teaching on analogy can be understood as an attempt to respond to this particular challenge. Cajetan’s threefold division of modes
of analogy is presented as a three-fold answer to the question of how there can be a mean between univocation and equivocation; and analogy of proportionality is given primacy because, according to Cajetan, it involves a non-univocal term which does not precipitate the fallacy of equivocation.

My aim here is not to defend this interpretation of Cajetan’s *De Nominum Analogia*. In lieu of the historical and textual study that would justify this interpretation, I offer this brief, primarily theoretical, exposition only to indicate the importance of these semantic questions, and suggest the fruitfulness of interpreting *De Nominum Analogia* in light of them. Assuming that these are the questions which concerned Cajetan, I want to raise here a further question, which is whether Cajetan could have found help in answering these semantic questions about analogy—help in solving the Scotist semantic challenge—in the writings of Aquinas. Does Aquinas offer enough semantic detail in characterizing the unity of the analogical concept to explain how a non-univocal concept or term could mediate a valid syllogistic inference?

2. Thomas’s Semantic Specifications of Analogical Unity

Though Aquinas was not explicitly concerned with the question of the unity of the analogical concept, or the other attendant semantic questions which would come to occupy Thomists in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, he did articulate some apparent semantic rules which touch on this concern. Moreover, he was interested to establish that analogical terms do not cause the fallacy of equivocation. In Aquinas’s discussions of analogy he is always aware, at least implicitly, that some cases of analogical signification—especially the central cases of metaphysics and theology—must exhibit enough unity to allow valid inferences. Indeed, it would be difficult to ignore this requirement, since this is part of the reason why analogy is understood as a mean between univocation and equivocation: analogical signification is not so completely unified to count as univocation, and yet it has sufficient unity to distinguish it from pure equivocation. This is why many commentators have emphasized that analogy provides orthodox theology a safe path between the Scylla of anthropomorphism and the Charybdis of agnosticism; God must be “other” enough that words said of creatures are not univocally said of Him, and yet, if we are to avoid agnosticism, our language must apply to God somehow, so that we can legitimately reason from creatures to God.

But despite the essential requirement of (at least some) analogical terms that they do not cause the fallacy of equivocation like pure equivocals, and despite this requirement’s central role in orthodox theology, in only a handful of passages does Aquinas explicitly address the issue of analogical terms in valid reasoning. In only two texts does Aquinas explicitly acknowledge the need for analogy to have sufficient unity to avoid the fallacy of equivocation. In *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q. 13, a. 5, he says that what is said of God and creatures cannot be predicated equivocally, because if it were, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God, for attempts to reason about him would commit the fallacy of equivocation. In *De Potentia Dei*, bk. 3, q. 7, a. 7, he elaborates on the same point, saying that if words said of God and creatures are purely equivocal, then proofs about God would be sophisms; he
even gives an example of a good theological syllogism which would be a sophism if analogical terms caused the fallacy of equivocation. A handful of other texts, while not explicitly mentioning the fallacy of equivocation, directly acknowledge that analogy must sustain valid inferences. In *Summa Contra Gentiles*, bk. 1, chap. 33, speaking of the possibility of gaining knowledge of God from creatures, Aquinas says that pure equivocation would not suffice for us to gain knowledge about God from our knowledge of creation; equivocal terms “break the continuity of argument.” In the disputed questions *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, Aquinas again addresses the same difficulty in confronting the question of whether knowledge (sciencia) is predicated equivocally or univocally of God and creatures. And in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, bk. 4, lectio 3, Aquinas insists that ‘one’ and other central terms of metaphysics are, while not univocal, nonetheless unified enough to sustain a single science because of “reference to one.” Similarly, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, propr., q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2, Aquinas considers the objection that theology is not a science because God and creatures do not share a genus; he responds that it is enough that God and creatures have analogical community.

While all of these passages acknowledge the possibility, indeed the necessity, of non-univocal terms mediating valid inferences, none of them address the semantic puzzle this presents. Aquinas only asserts, without explanation of how it is possible, that analogy does exhibit sufficient unity to sustain valid reasoning. An opportune occasion for explanation would have been his commentary on Aristotle’s brief mention of analogical middle terms in the *Posterior Analytics*, and yet there too Aquinas’s remarks are very limited. And in no other text does Aquinas explicitly set out to explain how different analogical uses of a term can be sufficiently unified to avoid the fallacy of equivocation.

Nonetheless, neither this lack, nor the often-noted fact that Aquinas never presented a systematic, *ex professo* treatment of analogy, prevents us from looking in Aquinas’s writings for some further specificity about the semantics of analogy. What is needed is some account of the unity of the mediating concept(s) involved in analogy, an account which provides some specificity to the more general semantic characterization that the analogous concept(s) must be “partly the same and partly different.” What kind of sameness, and what kind of difference? Further semantic detail, in the form of specific answers to these questions, is needed, and some more specific characterization is available in Aquinas. In several places, and in several different formulations, Aquinas offers what appear to be general and categorical descriptions of analogical signification, which give some of the necessary further semantic detail. It is not surprising that some of these formulations have been taken as universal “rules” for analogy by Aquinas’s readers, although Klubertanz, in collecting the relevant texts, has decisively shown that “not every discussion that appears to be a general description applicable to all analogies is such in actual fact . . . even when the description is couched in categorical language and no qualifications at all are explicitly made.” For present purposes, it does not matter whether the proposed “rules” are in fact applicable to all analogies. Indeed, the semantic detail we are looking for need not be a feature of all analogical terms, as only some analogical
terms need to exhibit sufficient unity to mediate reasoning which depends on different analogical senses of those terms. Whether they are applicable to all analogies or not, we will see that none of the rules succeed in explaining how an analogical term could avoid causing the fallacy of equivocation.

I will consider in turn three characterizations of analogy which are provided by Aquinas, each of which has been proposed as a semantic rule for analogy. They are the following: (1) analogy involves a term which signifies *per prium et posterius*; (2) in analogy the *ratio* of one analogate is posited in the definitions of the others; and (3) in analogy there is a "proper ratio" which is found only in one analogate—*ratio propria non inventur nisi in uno*.

(1) *Analogy involves a term which signifies per prium et posterius.*

The first Thomistic proposal to consider as a semantic rule of analogy is that an analogical term signifies *per prium et posterius*. The phrase "*per prium et posterius*" ("according to priority and posteriority") is one of the most common descriptions of analogical signification in Aquinas. Considered on its own, the phrase seems to offer some of the semantic detail that is required to explain how analogy can be a mean between univocation and equivocation. Apparently in analogy, different analogical senses are related according to an order of priority. This alone, however, does not address the issue of how the different senses display enough unity to sustain inferences from one sense to another.

Even if the order of priority is further specified, however, we still do not have the right kind of semantic detail to respond to the Scotist challenge. E. J. Ashworth has shown that Aquinas spelled out the notion of signification *per prium et posterius* in terms of the order of reality, the order of knowledge, and the order of the imposition of terms. While distinguishing these different orders allows us to understand how analogical terms can be learned, and how there are different senses of priority which are especially important to keep in mind in discussions of religious language, they do not allow us to understand why an analogical term is sufficiently unified to sustain valid inferences.

In most of its occurrences, it is clear that the characterization of analogy in terms of "*per prium et posterius*" is meant primarily to distinguish analogy from univocation. Aquinas will often introduce the phrase by noting first that univocal things are named equally, and then noting that, in contrast, things named analogically are not named equally but exhibit an ordering *per prium et posterius*. Yet the kind of characterization we are presently looking for would not emphasize how analogy differs from univocation, but how it differs from pure equivocation. Specifically, it would emphasize how analogy so differs that it does not cause the fallacy of equivocation. Signifying "*per prium et posterius*" does answer this question partially, for the multiple significations of purely equivocal terms are not so ordered, but under this rule analogy is still just a special case of equivocation, exhibiting, like equivocation, multiple significations. Thus, as McInerny has put it, "the analogous name is a name of multiple signification, but the multiplicity has a unity of order, *secundum prium et posterius*." While this does distinguish analogy from pure equivocation, it does
not do so in a way that would exempt analogy from the fallacy of equivocation. If
signifying *per prius et posterius* is for Aquinas a rule of all analogical signification, it
is not the kind of rule which addresses with sufficient detail the semantic unity
of analogical signification.

(2) *In analogy the ratio of one analogate is posited in the definitions of the others.*

At first glance, the rule that "the ratio of one analogate appears in the definitions
of the others" appears more promising as a semantic rule which distinguishes
analogy from pure equivocation. The primary textual basis of the rule is *Summa
Theologiae* 1a, q. 13, a. 6, where Aquinas says: "in all names which are said analogously
of many, it is necessary that all are said with respect to one; and therefore it
is necessary that that one is posited in the definition of them all." Silvestro Mazzioli
(1456–1527) regarded this passage as offering "the decisive rule" of Thomistic
analogy and more famously Francis of Ferrara (a.k.a. Francesco Silvestri da Ferrara,
1474–1528) also regarded this passage as determinative. Authors continue to refer
to it as giving Aquinas's "rule" for analogy. Actually, as a rule for all analogies, it
is controversial; Aquinas himself denies the universality of the rule in *De Veritate*,
q. 2, a. 11, ad 6. Klubertanz finds the rule rejected as often as accepted. But we
shall consider it in any case.

We can see from the quoted passage that the "one in the definition of the others" rule is connected to, and apparently derived from, the requirement that
analogue signification involves a relation or reference to one. In this sense, it fits with
other well-known descriptions of analogy, from Aristotle's *pros hein* equivocation
to Owen's "focal meaning": analogy is a special kind of equivocation, where diverse
significates are united by a single, "focal" significate to which all other significates
are related. This "relation to one," or *pros hein* equivocation, thus entails that the
ratio of the "one" in question appears in the definition of the others, for they are
only understood under the analogical term because of a relation to that ratio.

We know that this "relation to one" is, in Aquinas's mind, important for analogy. Moreover, we know that it is important for unifying terms under a single
science, for in the passage from Aquinas's *Metaphysics* commentary discussed above,
it is "relation to one" which is supposed to make it possible for things not univocally
named to be the subject of a single science. However, though Aquinas says *that* this does unify a science, it is not clear *why* it does. And upon inspection, the
rule seems to apply best to the cases that are least relevant to our present semantic
concern. This is why Ross, for instance, takes "one in the definition of the others"
as a rule for only one kind of analogy, analogy of attribution. Ross's classification
is indebted to Cajetan rather than to Thomas, but even Thomas saw that the rule
works better for some cases of analogy than others. For instance, the rule seems to
apply well to the classic example of an analogical term, 'healthy' but it does not seem
to apply well to other analogical terms, for example 'wisdom.' The health of the
animal appears in the definition of 'healthy' predicated of urine and food, because
urine and food have a relation to (respectively *sign of* and *cause of*) the animal's
health. The animal's health is obviously the one to which all the senses of 'healthy'
are related. But such an analysis does not seem to work for 'wise.' Divine wisdom does not enter into the definition of human wisdom, nor does human wisdom enter into the definition of divine wisdom. 39 But, to stick with these examples, it is the term 'wise,' and not 'healthy,' for which we need sufficient unity to avoid the fallacy of equivocation.

It must be admitted that though the rule does not seem to hold for terms of theology, 40 it does appear to hold for at least some terms of metaphysics. For example, the term 'being' is said analogously of substance and accident, and 'being' as predicated of an accident implies a reference to, and is defined in terms of, the being of substance. (This is not the case for 'being' as said of creatures and God.) 41 Yet the rule still does not help us to see how such a term could sustain valid inferences free of the fallacy of equivocation. To say that the ratio of one appears in the definition of the others is, then, a rule insufficient to meet the Scotist semantic challenge.

(3) In analogy there is a "proper ratio" which is found only in one analogate (ratio propria non inventur nisi in uno).

Another proposed rule for analogy is that it always involves a proper ratio, which is found only in one of the analogates—ratio propria non inventur nisi in uno. The rule seems to be entailed by the previous one, but is in fact weaker than it.

One source of textual support for this rule is Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 16, a. 6: "When something is said analogically of many, it is found according to its proper ratio in only one of them, from which the others are denominated." 42 As with the previous rule, it seems to work best for 'healthy' and other terms which exhibit the kind of analogy which has come to be called analogy of attribution; it is not clear how the rule relates to 'truth,' say, as it is found in both created intellects and the divine intellect—indeed, this is not even clear in ST Ia.16.6 where Thomas invokes the rule. In any case, what is important to note for our purposes is that this rule could not address the challenge with which Cajetan was concerned. It emphasizes the difference between analogates, saying that the proper ratio is found only in one. What we need to address Scotus's challenge is a rule which explains how the different analogates, or the different rationes by which those analogates are signified, are sufficiently unified to avoid the fallacy of equivocation. The current rule, ratio propria non inventur nisi in uno, offers nothing in response to this, and in this sense is even less helpful than the previous rule, which told us that the different rationes would at least be unified inasmuch as the ratio of one would appear in all the rest.

Taken individually, then, none of the three Thomistic rules for analogy considered above is sufficient to address the particular semantic challenge with which Cajetan was concerned. But before dismissing them, it is worth considering whether taken collectively they provide detail which no individual rule provides. It is not difficult to consider them together. It is easy to see how (2) can be a clarification, or specification, of (1); indeed, this is already apparent in Aquinas, who says that "the prior is included in the definition of the posterior." 43 And we have already seen that (3) is an implication of (2). McInerny’s interpretation of Thomistic analogy
provides a good example of how these rules can be related to each other. According to McInerny,

the analogous name signifies a plurality of rationes which are related per prius et posterius; that is, one ratio is primary and presupposed by the others, this being revealed by the fact that the first ratio enters into the others. These secondary rationes signify diverse proportions or analogies to the first; they are said per respectum ad unum.  

And again:

Things are named analogously when they share a name that receives several accounts and one of them is controlling or primary, a sign of which is that it enters into the other accounts. The rule expressing this is that the proper meaning of the term, its ratio, is found in only one of the analogates and the others are named with reference to, by proportion or relation to, it.  

In these and other passages, it is clear that rule (1) can be clarified by rule (2) which in turn implies rule (3): a term signifies per prius et posterius in the sense that one ratio is primary and appears in the definitions of all the others, and this primary ratio is necessarily found properly only in the primary analogate.

But considering these three rules together does not add to the semantic detail that they provide when considered separately. The account of analogical signification that they provide may be true, but it is still not sufficient to explain how it is possible that an analogical term could support valid inferences from one of its analogous senses to another. Analogy is still a kind of equivocation, albeit an equivocation in which the different significates are related, but the characterization of that relation—that the ratio of one is included in the others—is not sufficient to make this kind of equivocation exempt from the fallacy of reasoning which is named for equivocation.

3. Res Significata and Modi Significandi

Lastly, let us consider a fourth rule for which several interpreters claim to find support in Aquinas. According to McInerny, for instance, the above rules can be further specified in terms of the logical distinction between res significata and modus significandi. In particular, says McInerny, the ratio propria of a term must be understood as not just what it signifies but this together with how it signifies. That is, the ratio propria includes not just the res significata but also the modus significandi. Thus according to McInerny, an analogical term is a term which has one res significata and multiple modi significandi.

As a proposed Thomistic rule for analogy, this is controversial. Although McInerny treats this as Aquinas's express doctrine, there is very little textual support for it as a general rule of analogy. Aquinas often appeals to the variation of modi significandi to explain how some terms can be common to God and creatures, but
outside of discussions of religious language it is not clear that Aquinas ever describes
analogue signification as involving one *res significata* and diverse *modi significandi*. One of McInerny’s best texts is from Aquinas’s commentary on the *Sentences,* though, as Ashworth has pointed out, the text speaks not of *modi significandi* but of *modi praedicandi.* 51 Though other texts do explicitly mention *modi significandi,* according to Ashworth the distinction between *res significata* and *modus significandi* is “central to Aquinas’s theory of religious language,” but “it is in no way central to his theory of analogy (insofar as he has a general theory)” 55; for Aquinas, Ashworth says, “*modi significandi* have no role in analogy as such.” 56

Whether or not Aquinas meant it as a general analysis of all analogue terms, it is still worth considering the rule that an analogue term has one *res significata* but diverse *modi significandi*. The interpretation is widely held, 55 and even if it was not Aquinas’s view, Ashworth has pointed out that the rule could be attributed to another medieval figure, Peter of Spain. 56 Furthermore, even if the rule is not a general one for all analogue terms, but rather is specific to religious language, it is still worth considering, for theological reasoning is an example of just the kind of reasoning involving analogue terms which we wish to safeguard. Words said of God and creatures are better than, say, the stock example of ‘healthy,’ if we are looking for an account of the unity of the analogue concept which can overcome the Scotist challenge to the semantic possibility of a non-univocal term immune from the fallacy of equivocation.

However, a first indication that this is not a satisfactory semantic rule is that its primary recent defender takes it to apply to the word ‘healthy.’ According to McInerny, the analogue term ‘healthy’ can be understood as having a single *res significata* (the health that is manifested by a healthy living thing, say, the proportion of its humors), and the term is made analogue by its several *modi significandi,* i.e., the several ways that health is signified. 57 McInerny does not carry out such an analysis, but apparently the various analogous senses of the predicate ‘(is) healthy’ exhibited by the sentences ‘Socrates is healthy,’ ‘This food is healthy,’ and ‘This urine is healthy,’ would be achieved by completing the *res significata*, the health of the animal, with the various respective *modi significandi*: “has . . . ,” “is a cause of . . . ,” and “is a sign of . . . .” 58

Whether or not this analysis of ‘healthy’ is *ad mentem Thomaes*, it clearly shows that understanding analogue terms in this manner does not help us secure the validity of syllogisms with certain analogue terms. For again, ‘healthy’ is not the kind of analogue term for which we are seeking a semantic rule. The different senses of ‘healthy’ are logically speaking equivocal in precisely the way that should cause a fallacy of equivoquantation if these different senses are interchanged in an inference. For example, in the syllogism: “Whatever is on your plate is healthy, and whatever is healthy is alive; therefore, whatever is on your plate is alive,” the premises, insofar as they are plausibly true, contain the term ‘healthy’ in different analogue senses, and this is precisely the reason why the conclusion does not follow from these premises. Yet if these different senses can be analyzed in terms of a common *res significata* and diverse *modi significandi*, then the proposed rule that analogy involves a common *res
significata and diverse modi significandi does not help us explain why some analogical terms can be used in syllogisms without causing the fallacy of equivocation.

4. Conclusion

On the basis of these considerations, I conclude that Aquinas does not offer a rule for the semantic unity of analogy sufficient to meet the Scotist semantic challenge. We concur with Lyttkens, who observed, “We have no direct evidence of St. Thomas’s own attitude to the question of the unity of the concept in the analogy of proportionality.” Of this we should not be surprised, because, as Ashworth has shown, the question of the unity of the analogical concept was considered by Thomists in the contexts of philosophical developments after Aquinas.

If, as I have supposed, Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia was meant to address the Scotist semantic challenge, then Cajetan would have regarded this project as all the more urgent precisely because it had not been undertaken, and so had not been fulfilled, by Aquinas. A proper evaluation of Cajetan’s analogy theory, then, cannot be made by seeing if the theory can be found already taught in Aquinas’s texts, but by investigating the adequacy of the theory to answer questions which Aquinas never addressed.

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Notes

1. The most prominent defenses of the Thomism of Cajetan’s analogy theory were M. T.-L. Penido, Le Rôle de L’Analogie en Théologie Dogmatique (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1931) and Aloys Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie; ihr Verhältnis zu Thomas von Aquin (Speyer a. Rh.: Pilger-Druckerei, 1938). Cajetan’s teaching on analogy is also treated as authentically Thomistic in Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukewie: Marquette University Press, 1941); Yes Simon, “Order in Analogical Sets,” New Scholasticism 34 (1960): 1-42; and in the writings of such influential Thomists as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Jacques Maritain.


3. The distinction is traced back to Boethius, *In Categories Aristotelis,* lib. I (PL, vol. 64, 166b–c); it is expressed in somewhat different terminology in Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriarum Decem,* §17 (PL, vol. 32, 1421–1422).

4. It is worth providing some examples of relevant syllogisms involving analogical terms. Aquinas gives as an example: Whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual; all things are brought into being by God; therefore, God is actual (DPD III.7.7, corpus). Cajetan offers: Every simple perfection is in God; wisdom is a simple perfection; therefore wisdom is in God (De Nominum Analogia [hereafter DNA] §105). Bochenski's example is: Every being is good; God is a being; therefore God is good (I. M. Bochenski, "On Analogy," *The Thomist* (1948), §16. Presumably all of these cases involve the use of a term whose signification is originally gained from, and so initially properly predicated of, created things; but the conclusion of each argument extends that term to be predicated of God.


8. This will be the business of a separate paper, in progress, entitled "What is De Nominum Analogia About? Reconstructing Cajetan's Question."


syllogisms, in *God: His Existence and Nature*, vol. 1, 224–227; he provides his own account of how this is possible in vol. 2, 203–221.


12. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentiæ Dei*, III.7.7.c: “[C]um omnis cognitione nostra de Deo ex creaturis sumatur, si non erit convenientia nisi in nomine tantum, nihil de Deo sciremus nisi nomina tantum vana, quibus res non subserret. Sequeretur etiam quod omnes demonstrationes a philosophis datae de Deo, essent sophisticae; verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est in potentia, reducir ad actum per ens actu, et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per ipsum omnia in esse educantur; 乃至 fallacia aequivocationis; et sic de omnibus aliis.”


14. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, 2.11.c: “[N]ec tamen potest dici quod omnino acqueivoce praedicetur quidquid de Deo et creatura dicitur; quia si non esset aliqua convenientia creaturar ad Deum secundum rem, sua essentia non esset creaturarum similitudo; et ita cognoscendo essentiam suam non cognosceret creaturas. Similiter etiam nec nos ex rebus creatis in cognitionem Dei pervenire possemus; nec nominum quae creaturar aptantur, unum magis de eo dicendum esset quam aliquid; quia ea acqueivoce non differt quodcumque nomen imponatur, ex quo nulla rei convenientia attenditur.”

15. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio*, IV, lect. 3 (§568 Cathala): “Non enim sequitur, quod si aliquid dicitur multipliciter, quod propter hoc sit alterius scientiae vel diversae. Diversa enim significata si neque dicuntur secundum unum, ideo secundum unam rationem, scilicet univoce, nec ratione diversa referuntur ad unum, sicur est in analogicis: tunc sequitur, quod sit alterius, ideo diversae scientiae de his considerare, vel ad minus unius per accidentem. . . . Haec autem omni referuntur ad unum principium. Sicur enim quae significantur per hoc nomen Unum, licet sint diversa, reducantur tamen in unum primum significatum; similiter est dicendum de his nominibus, idem, diversum, contrarium, et hujusmodi.”


sicut os sepiarium, quod vocatur sepion, et spina piscium, et ossa animalium terrestrium. Omnia enim ista conveniunt secundum proportionem,quia eodem modo se habent spineae ad piscis sicut ossa ad terrassia animalia.” Aristotle’s example of the analogical relationship between bone, spine, and pounce will be invoked by Cajetan at DNA §§109, 117, and De Conceptu Entis §3, and Cajetan obviously finds it useful for answering questions about the role of analogical notions in scientific reasoning. Interestingly, Aquinas’s comment on Aristotle quoted here is not among the texts collected by Klubertanz in St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, although Klubertanz’s catalogue of texts does include another passage from later in the Posterior Analytics commentary (Book II, lectio 19, n. 3).

18. The work De fallacis, for a time spuriously attributed to Aquinas, describes three species of the fallacy of equivocation, and briefly mentions analogy in connection with the second: “secunda species est quando unum nomen principaliter unum significat, et aliud metaphoricum sive transumptive. . . . et ad hanc speciem reductur multiplicitas nominum analogorum quae diciturur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius.” De fallacis, c. 6.


21. Cf. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 38: “Analogous intelligibles are not exactly the same nor completely different; they are halfway between the two extremes. Though this is not an especially revealing description, it provides us with a minimum meaning which can be applied to all analogies.”

22. Ibid., 37.

23. There are 58 occurrences of the phrase in 21 works listed in Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 301. Klubertanz also notes several occasions of other terminology which also expresses priority and posteriority, 65. Aquinas was not the first to describe analogy as signification per prius et posterius; for some citations from previous authors, cf. E. J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Medieval Studies 54 (1992), 107–108, and Libera, Alain de, “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être,” Les Études Philosophiques (1989), 333.


25. SCG I.32: “Quod praedicatur de aliquisb secundum prius et posterius, certum est univocum non praedicari.”

26. E.g., ST I.5.6, ad 3.

28. Klubertanz notes that Aquinas sometimes seems to deny that the *per prius et posterius* rule applies to analogy between God and creatures (Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, 29–30), yet later he discusses the rule as a "doctrinal constant" in Aquinas (64–69).


37. Cf. e.g., Aquinas, *De principiis naturae* 6: "Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus, quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur alicui uni eidem."


39. Aquinas himself raises this objection at *De Veritate* 2.11., obj. 6.

40. In a parallel case, Aquinas denies that "God is good" can be taken to mean only that "God is the cause of good things." Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.13.2.c

41. Cajetan, *Commentaria in de ente et essentia* §21: "[A]naloga primo modo [i.e. analogy of attribution] ita se habent, quod posterius secundum nomen analogum diffinitur per
suum prius: puta accidens, inquantum ens per substantiam. Analogata vero secundo modo [i.e. analogy of proportionality] non: creatura enim inquantum ens non diffinitur per Deum."

42. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, 16.6.c: "[Q]uando aliquid dictur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominatur."

43. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.32: "Nam prius in diffinitione posterioris includitur." Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.13.6: "Et quia ratio quam significat nomen est definitio, ut dictur, necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropiant ad illud primum."

44. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 98.

45. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 114.

46. E.g., McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 78: "The analogous name names one thing primarily, and others insofar as they relate in some way to what it principally names. The rationes of the secondary analogates will express their reference to the thing which perfectly saves the ratio propria of the word."


49. McInerny, "The Analogy of Names is a Logical Doctrine," 283: "St. Thomas will say that a term used analogously signifies the same res significata but has different modi significandi."; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 103–104: "In a pithy text, Thomas compares univocals, equivocals and analogously named things. . . . Univocal terms have the same res significata and the same way of signifying it in all relevant uses; equivocal terms have different res significatæ things are named analogously when their common name has the same res significata, which is signified in different ways in each of the accounts."

50. I Sent., 22.1.3 ad 2: "dicendum quod alter dividitur aequivoque, analogum et univocum. Aequivoque enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos. Unde cum ens prae dicetur analogice de decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. Unde unicuique genui debetur proprius modus prae dicendi."


52. E.g., I Sent., 25.1.2 c: "Dicendum quod personæ dictur de Deo et creaturæ non univoce nec aequivoce sed secundum analogiam; et quantum ad rem significacem per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed quantum ad modum significandi est e converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus aliis nominibus quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur."


55. In addition to McInerny, the view can be found in Mascall (Analogy and Existence, 100, 120), and is common in Copleston, although the latter’s comments are always made


58. In this sense McInerny’s analysis of analogy as involving one res significata and several modi significandi is probably not genuinely ad mentem Thomae, insofar as the example just given does not exhibit a Thomistic use of modi significandi. Being a cause of something or being a sign of something are not modi significandi in Thomas’s sense, and a Thomistic analysis of the various senses of “healthy” would rather assign a different res significata to each sense of healthy: animal health, cause of animal health, and sign of animal health.

59. Lyttkens, 471. Wilks frames the semantic issue felicitously: “For a word to retain the same meaning through successive uses it is for it to remain linked to exactly the same ratio in each case. This is how univocity is to be understood; non-univocity will, conversely, involve successive uses with linkage to different rationes. Whether that non-univocity amounts to analogy or equivocation depends on the conceptual space that exists between the two rationes; the difference between them is capable of being greater or less, and if sufficiently less then the usage is said to be analogical.” Then, Wilks says, “Aquinas gives us no theoretically comprehensive way of explaining what constitutes closeness of ratio.” Of the rule that he considers, viz. “that in each case one ratio constitutes part of another,” Wilks admits, “we cannot get a rigorous semantic account of analogy from this.” Wilks, 37.