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Preface

The idea that gave birth to this volume goes back some years to when we were discussing privately how to celebrate the forthcoming ninetieth birthday of our friend and instructor Holger Thesleff. This was to happen, we felt, discreetly and as unostentatiously as possible, and paying particular attention to Plato and his work, which have been the major focus of Thesleff’s scholarly interests over the past decades. As it happens, the honoree was not unaware of our plans, and indeed we are glad to recognize that during the whole process he had a host of constructive thoughts of how to deal with it. In particular, thanks to Thesleff’s farsighted and well-thought views, an initially planned gathering of a number of Platonists in Helsinki transformed into a volume, the present one, containing contributions by the same people. Rather than a traditional Festschrift, the book was to become a collection of critical reevaluations of various Platonic themes, many of which have been discussed by Thesleff himself. In many respects, then, what the reader has in hand may be literally taken as a 'second sailing'. Coincidence or not, Holger Thesleff himself is a sea-faring man, as is shown by the frontispiece photograph of the square-rigged windjammer Passat, one of the last true Cape Horn ships, with Holger as apprentice on board in the late 1940s on the voyage from England to South Australia and as third mate on the way back to Wales via Ireland.

This book would never have docked in harbour without the gratuitous and sagacious commitment of its chief editors, professors Debra Nails and Harold Tarrant, who became involved with the project at an early stage. We are immensely grateful for their contribution.

Our sincerest thanks go to the publisher, the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, for accepting this volume to appear in the Commentationes Humanarum Literarum, as well as to the general editor of the series, professor Jaakko Frössén, who gave invaluable support during the editorial process.

Helsinki, September 2015

Mika Kajava
Pauliina Remes
Eero Salmenkivi
Therefore, the paradigmatic method can lead to the awakening of knowledge but not solely through its own action: it is a crucial tool for dialectical enquirers inasmuch as it enables the division to resume and progress on the right track. Because it secures the starting-point of the enquiry, the methodical use of paradigms guides the introduction of significant differentiae that the dialectician will introduce in the genera he considers, in order to isolate his target. Yet, Plato is eager to make clear that the paradigmatic method that underpins any use of paradigms does not allow one to attain knowledge of the target.

*This paper is an update and translation into English of material taken from chapter 2 of El Murr (2014). I thank Mary Louise Gill for stimulating comments on an earlier version. This paper is offered to Professor Thesleff as a token of admiration for his groundbreaking work on the structure and styles of Plato's dialogues.

Pseudo-Archytas' Protreptics
On Wisdom in its Contexts*

PHILLIP SIDNEY HORKY

Among ancient philosophers, pseudo-Archytas has not fared especially well. With the exception of his work On the Universal Logos (or, in its alternative title, On the Categories), which has been studied for its value in calibrating the various reactions to Aristotle's Categories in the first century BCE (especially in Alexandria), the remaining fragments of pseudo-Archytas have generally received little discussion in the critical literature. The titles of these works are, in order of probable date of production, On Law and Justice (possibly composed around the late fourth or early third centuries BCE); On Wisdom, On Intelligence and Perception, and On Being (possibly fourth to first century BCE, likely leaning towards the end of this period); On the Universal Logos/On the Categories, On Opposites, On the Virtuous and Happy Man, and On Moral Education (very likely first century BCE); and Ten Universal Assertions (after the fourth century CE). Most of these works appear to be treatises, with the exception of On Law and Justice, which is currently the subject of an extensive study by myself and Monte Ransome Johnson, and which we hypothesize to have been an extract from a speech associated with Archytas by his biographer Aristoxenus of Tarentum in the late fourth/early third century BCE.

If these termini post and ante quem are approximately valid, then we have a situation in which production of Pythagorean pseudopigrapha was a sustained

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1 Studies of pseudo-Archytas' philosophy within the larger context of the Pythagorean pseudopigrapha include Cerone 2014, 2000b, and 1996; Reale 1990, 237–40; and Moraux 1984, 608–83. Suda 1972 is the only monograph dedicated to this author, and to only one work (On the Universal Logos/On the Categories). Griffin 2015, 97–99 discusses On the Universal Logos/On the Categories in the context of the fragments of Budoros and Andronicos.

2 I adopt a version of Thesleff's dating (1961) for the purposes of this article but suspend judgment at this time about dating these texts more precisely.

3 See Horky and Johnson (forthcoming).

4 Following Thesleff and Moraux, I refer to these works as 'Pythagorean pseudopigraphs' rather than 'pseudo-Pythagorean works' or 'Pseudopythagorica' (as Burkert, Cerone, Hoffman, Moraux, and Ulrici do), which, in my opinion, has the capacity to be doubly obscure. Not only does it assume that we can classify 'real' vs. 'pseudo-' Pythagoreans with any confidence (which I have argued is an effort that rests on dubious historiographical principles in Horky 2015, chapter 3); it
effort over a period of several hundred years, although it is quite difficult to say with precision who wrote them, or when or where exactly they were written, after the second half of the fourth century BCE, the period within which Pythagorean philosophy received systematic treatments in the works of the Peripatetics Aristotle, Dicaearchus, Eudoxus, and Theophrastus, on the one hand, and the early Platonists Xenocrates and Speusippus, on the other, all of whom wrote doxographical works that treated, or philosophical works dedicated to, Pythagorean philosophy and history, which were subsequentially passed down through the traditions. As is the case with Aristotle's dialogues, which have been lost to us but were available in the Hellenistic period, so too the treatments of Pythagoreanism issuing from the Academy and the Lyceum remain out of our reach, although one could speculate, for example, from the relative popularity of the philosophical biographies of Aristotle in the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic worlds, that Pythagoreanism in general held a certain place in the imaginations of those Romans and Greeks who celebrated Pythagorean wisdom.

It is thus in the shadowy context of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic worlds that a work attributed to the fourth century BCE Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum by the Neoplatonist Iamblichus (in Chalcis in Protrepticus), entitled *On Wisdom*, comes into view. The reception and reconstruction of Pythagorean thought in the Pythagorean pseudographia has a close relationship to both Early and Middle Platonism, probably due to the Peripatetic and Academic emphasis on the relevance of Pythagorean philosophy for Platonist metaphysics (the doctrine of the principles and form-numbers), theology (the craftsman-god and *bousines theos*), epistemology (the role of number in obtaining knowledge),

also de-contextualizes the writings from the genre of pseudographia, which flourished especially in the Hellenistic world. For useful introductions to the topic, see Ussace forthcoming, Centrone 2014, and Macris 2002, 78–85.

5. Such is the hypothesis of Thesleff 1961 and, with less confidence, Centrone 2014 and 2000a.

6. Generally, on the early Platonists and Pythagoreanism, see Dillon 2014, 250–60; for the Peripatetics and Pythagoreanism, see Huffman 2014. It is not often assumed that the links between especially the early Platonists and the Pythagorean pseudographia might be of relevance to the ‘rediscovery’ of both those corpora in the first century BCE. See Bonazzi 2012, 162–65. It may be telling that the first complete collection of the pseudographia was undertaken by Thesleff, although it is likely that Lamb, and Stob after him (the latter appears to have had access to the library of Lamb, or to have obtained a similar collection of pseudographia as those of Lamb), brought them together (see Lamb, *VPL* 157–8). See Macris 2002, 88–106.

7. See, for example, the popularity of Aristotle, *Life of Archytas* from the early first century BCE until the second century CE (cf. Horley 2011).

physics (the generation of the cosmos), ethics and psychology (virtue ethics, metapsychosis, and the bipartite/tripartite soul), and politics (the mixed constitution). While a great amount of work remains to be done on these topics, in this piece I would like to focus on just one topic which, to my knowledge, has almost never received substantial discussion among scholars, namely Pythagorean protreptic in the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic worlds, i.e., the fragments of the Pythagorean pseudographia that appear to evoke a young potential philosopher to philosophical education, especially by reference to the value that wisdom in particular holds for theoretical reasoning and practical intelligence. Two texts from the collected pseudographia can be associated with protreptic, *On Wisdom of ὁ πρεπετικός*, and the very closely related *On Wisdom of ὁ πρεπετικός*.

My project in this piece is twofold: first, to examine the philosophical content of the fragments of *Ps.-Archytas* *On Wisdom*, especially with reference to his claims about what theoretical philosophy is, in the context of texts that are of relevance to this unique expression; and second, to consider how Iamblichus, who preserves the five fragments of *On Wisdom* in the fourth chapter of his *Protrepticus*, reinterprets their content in order to justify his own philosophical claims about the beneficent relationship between theoretical philosophy and practical intelligence. I will start with the latter aspect of the inquiry and interweave both aspects by approaching the fragments in order of presentation by Iamblichus.

It is worth noting first that *Ps.-Archytas* *On Wisdom* occupies an important location in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*; it appears in the fourth chapter, just after Iamblichus has analysed the *acraments* and the *Golden Verses*, which he considers to have been passed down through the tradition from Pythagoras (3.10.14–17 Pistell), and explained their centrality for any universal exhortation to philosophy. Similarly, the fragments of *On Wisdom* also appear just before Iamblichus'...
quotation of proreptic passages from Plato's dialogues in chapter 5, which anticipate the extensive selections Iamblichus made from Aristotle's Protrepticus in chapters 6–10. From this point of view, Iamblichus understood ps-Archytas to be an intermediary between Pythagoras himself and Plato and Aristotle in advancing proreptic arguments. This is clear when we read the final paragraph of chapter 3, where one of the most 'Platonic' of the Golden Verses, also Hellenistic productions, is exploited for its proreptic value (Protrepticus 3.15.15–16.17 Pistell):

Moreover, at the end, [Pythagoras] exhorts to the departure of the soul to the life it leaves by itself, which is liberated from the body and from the names that are bound together with the body. This is what he says:

Set on high like a charioteer the thought that is best;
by leaving the body you go into the free aether,
you will be immortal, a god undying, a mortal no longer. [Apollon. Carmina 69–71]

Now then, setting up the best intellect as leader in the highest rank preserves the soul's undifined likeness to the gods, towards which it exhorts primarily; and leaving the body and departing to the aether, exchanging the human nature too for the purity of the gods, and preferring an immortal life over a mortal way of life, provide restoration to the very substance and circuit with the gods which we had even earlier, before we came into human form. Thus has been shown the method of such encouragements, exhorting us to whole kinds of goods and to all the types of a better life.

But if now we need to advance on the esoteric, i.e. scientific, exhortations as well, we should first take up those that, along with providing a teaching about the most authoritative and primary realities, at the same time also exhort to a theological and intellectual discovery and teaching of them, and encourage the most venerable wisdom.

As Hutchinson and Johnson (forthcoming) note in their working translation of Iamblichus' Protrepticus, Iamblichus' quotations/summaries from Plato's dialogues take this structure: three paragraphs of Socratic proreptic from PL, Euth.; then one paragraph with two conventional Academic divisions a bifurcation and a trifurcation; then three paragraphs of Academic proreptic from the Platonic corpus, derived from Crat. Alc., and Laws 5; then two paragraphs with proreptic content from PL, TL; then three paragraphs from R. 9 that lead up to a proreptic conclusion.

Archtas, then, right at the beginning of his On Wisdom, makes his exhortation in this way:

Wisdom (Sophia) excels in all human activities to the same extent that sight excels the (other) senses of the body, the intellect excels the soul, and the sun excels the stars. For sight is the most far-reaching and most variegated of the other senses, and the intellect is supreme as fulfilling what is necessary by means of reason (logos) and thought, since it is the sight and power of the most honorable things. Nevertheless, the sun is the eye and soul of natural things; for all things are seen, generated, and understood through it, and, since they stems and are born from it, they are now-

10 As Hutchinson and Johnson (forthcoming) note in their working translation of Iamblichus' Protrepticus, Iamblichus' quotations/summaries from Plato's dialogues take this structure: three paragraphs of Socratic proreptic from PL, Euth.; then one paragraph with two conventional Academic divisions a bifurcation and a trifurcation; then three paragraphs of Academic proreptic from the Platonic corpus, derived from Crat. Alc., and Laws 5; then two paragraphs with proreptic content from PL, TL; then three paragraphs from R. 9 that lead up to a proreptic conclusion.

11 All translations from lamb. have been aided by Doug Hutchinson and Monte Johnson (forthcoming). 'Translations of ps-Archytas, and ps-Polyb. are wholly my own, however. Page sections indicate quotations of actual fragments, phrases, or words.

12 Compare Lamb in Phil. F6 Dillon, where the charioteer, as intellect, is placed below the helmsman (as the 'one of the soul').

13 For the importance of 'scientific' study for Pythagorean education according to Lamb, (as a diverse project from interpretation of the acoumata), see Lamb. Comm. Math. 24.74.7–25.78.26 Frans-Klein, on which see Reitzen 2012, and Horsky 2013, chapter 1.
ished, grown, and quickened with sensation. [ps-Archytas, On Wisdom Fragment 1 = 43.25–44.3 Thesleff]

Here [Archytas] very scientifically exhibits both the nature and the activity of wisdom, and he establishes his exhortation to intellect (nous) and contemplation (theoria) starting from the fact of its being most useful and most authoritative. And he provides something else that is amazing, so to speak, for a good exhortation: starting from what is well known, he establishes the reminder (hupomnèsis) through a manifest analogy. For it is obvious to all that vision is the sharpest of the senses, the most precise, and the most honorable; and it escapes no one's notice that the sun excels the stars; and we presuppose that the intellect of the soul rules over the common conceptions. Starting from these, he hints at the excellence of wisdom with regard to all human affairs, in a well-known and scientific way, so that what is true is easily learned and easily grasped by those who listen to what is encrypted in obscurity.

I will first provide an analysis of the fragment on its own terms, before turning to lamblichus' interpretation of it. Ps-Archytas starts from a definition of 'wisdom', via an analogy, in which wisdom obtains its excellence by reference to all human activities to the same extent that sight excels the other senses, intellect excels the other parts of the soul, and the sun excels the other heavenly bodies. This strategy of analogical comparison can also be found in other works of ps-Archytas, including the first fragment of On Law and Justice (33.3–6 Thesleff), in which we hear that

the laws relation to the soul and way of life of a human being is the same as attunement's relation to hearing and vocal expression. For, whereas the law educates the soul, it also organizes its way of life; likewise, whereas attunement makes hearing comprehensible, it also makes the vocal expression agreeable.

It is clear from Aristotle's Metaphysics (7.2, 1043a14–26 = Huffman A 22) that the genuine Archytas of Tarentum established definitions by way of drawing analogies between things, and Aristotle in the Rhetoric (3.2, 1412a9–17 = Huffman A 12) praised Archytas' approach to employing metaphors that were 'on targets'. Within the Pythagorean pseudoepigrapha, such analogies are uniquely found in the writings ascribed to Archytas, which indicates the popularity, at least within the tradition, of passing down Archyean 'definition through analogy'. Lamblichus recognizes such an analogy as 'amazing', but focuses on its role as a 'reminder' in the economy of the protreptic—a likely reference to 'writing' as a 'reminder' (hupomnèsis — an unusual term in Plato) that is to be differentiated from the true 'memory' that leads one to wisdom in the Phaedrus (275a). For lamblichus, this employment of a 'reminder' through analogy allows us to realize the excellence of wisdom in all human affairs easily (he does not discuss how this works, here or elsewhere), as analogy stimulates the intellect to contemplate the comparative relations between immortal and mortal things.

Interestingly, ps-Archytas employs such analogies by comparative excellence of the various parts of the soul, the senses, and the heavenly bodies, in order to set up an argument that comes in Fragment 2, in which we see what appears to be an adaptation of the Function Argument from the first book of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (lamblichus, Protrepticus 4.18.19–20.14 Pistorii):

Now, then, such is the approach which proceeds from the fact that wisdom is honorable to the exhortation; the other approach, which proceeds from what is truly human, reminds us of (hupomnèmata) the exhortation to the things through which, when they are discussed in the following way [the fact that wisdom is honorable], is demonstrated:

The human has been born the wisest by far of all the animals. For he has the capacity to contemplate the things-that-are, and to obtain knowledge and wisdom concerning all of them. Wherefore the divine enstaved (enchased) in him the system of universal reason (i.e. that of the Logos, or WORDS) of being having been distributed, as well as the meanings of nouns and verbs. For a seat for vocal speech has been assigned—pharynx, mouth, and nostrils. But just as the human has been born as an instrument for speech, through which nouns and verbs are signified through being impressed, so too has he been born as an instrument for thoughts, in which the things-that-are are seen. It seems to me that this is the function of wisdom, for which the human has both been born and constituted, and for which he obtained his instruments and abilities from god. [ps-Archytas, On Wisdom Fragment 2 = 44.5–15 Thesleff]

This approach to exhortation arises out of the nature of a human being. For if a human is wisest and capable of contemplating (enchased) the things-that-are, then he should make efforts to get theoretical and theological wisdom; and if he has a supernatural capacity to acquire knowledge and intelligence about everything, then he should devote himself to the best of his ability to demonstrative science and the virtue that concerns intelligence, which is appropriate to him. And this is surely why the divine enstaved in him the system of universal

14 On 'species', if ps-Archyt. is thinking about establishing differentiae here.
speech, in which all the types of being inherere, as well as the meanings of nouns and verbs. For this reason, it is appropriate for him to pursue the whole of logical philosophy, since the human being has been a contemplator (theon) not only of meanings but also of the concepts that belong in things that exist; and it is for this reason that humans have been born, and have acquired instrumenata and abilities from God. So for these reasons again, about all beings insofar as it exists, humans need to pursue the degrees of wisdom and to act after scientifically both the principles and the criteria of all knowledge about every kind of being; and it is right for humans to investigate the intellect by itself and the purest reason; and it is appropriate to be taught eagerly from the beginning how many are the principles that afford the beautiful and good things in the human way of life, and how many are the things we reason over concerning virtues universally, and how many things we learn about mathematics and certain other skills and proficiencies. And this is how the invitation that takes us from the nature of the human being and urges towards the whole of philosophy arose.

Ps-Archytas echoes what is a somewhat commonplace axiology among some contemporary Platonists, and in the Pythagorean tradition, that the human being is wisest of all the animals because of his capacity to communicate and contemplate the true beings; this position represents a modification of the Stoic claim that man is wisest because other things in nature exist for the sake of him, but, despite the fact that the author seems to be soliciting Aristotle's function argument for his own purposes, the claim made by ps-Archytas is actually quite distant from that of Aristotle, who was ambivalent about whether humans were naturally born better than other animals, and focused instead on whether they could perfect themselves through deliberation concerning the goods appropriate to themselves, which is enhanced through experience. By contrast, ps-Archytas has the human being receiving his capacities and instruments for intellectual and perceptual engagement with the world through a divine gift—the 'engraving' of the 'system of universal reason', which ps-Archytas explains to be that within which the types of beings, as well as the meanings of nouns and verbs, are to be found. Ps-Archytas interestingly assumes that the human being has been generated as an instrument (oragemon) for speaking and thinking, rather than assuming that the mouth and the brain are the sole instruments for those activities. Ps-Archytas thus assumes that the human has a role to play within a larger cosmic economy, in which he is the vehicle for verbal communication and discursive thinking, and he possesses faculties distinctive from those of other animals in order to achieve this goal. The latter activity, discursive thinking, appears to be undertaken in pursuit of wisdom; the former activity, verbal discursive communication, makes possible the expression and grasping of meanings, and it is not clear from this fragment that ps-Archytas wishes to implicate verbal understanding in wisdom (sophia). Lamblichus too assumes that verbal communication exists for the sake of exhortation to theoretical and theological wisdom, which he glosses as 'how many are the principles that afford the beautiful and good things in the human way of life, and how many are the things we reason over concerning virtues universally, and how many things we learn about mathematics and certain other skills and proficiencies'.

The express relationship between theoretical and practical wisdom (phronesis) only comes once Lamblichus has laid the ground for what he refers to as a 'mixed' type of proreptic, namely, a proreptic that exhorts a young person not only to theoretical wisdom, but also to practical knowledge that is correlated with theoretical wisdom. So, quoting the short Fragment 3 of ps-Archytas' On Wisdom, Lamblichus says (Prorepticus 4.20.15-21.13 Piscilli):

18 Compare ps-Archytas. On Intelligence and Perception (38.10-12 Thoel), where 'form' (eidos) is defined as an 'imprint of being qua what-it-is' (topos to onas, eti ein astin).
20 It is possible that S. E. is referring to ps-Archytas, when he claims that the Pythagoreans study the constituent parts of the universe in the same way they study the constituent parts of words (ad loc. Vol. 2, 249-50), although there he might be attacking the position of the Neopythagorean Melecratus of Cadmus (ep. Porphy. V 48-49), whose works he decries.
HORKY, Pseudo-Archytas’ Protrepticus?

...Archytas also posits another approach, the mixed one, which exhorts to the same thing in the following way:

The human has been born and constituted for the purpose of contemplating the reason of the nature of the universe; and, therefore, it is the function of wisdom to endeavor and contemplate the intelligence (teoretan eurthein) of the things-that-are. [ps-Archytas, On Wisdom Fragment 3 - 44.17–20 Thesleff]

For we will not be passing through our lives in accordance with nature, which is the chief object of our pursuit, unless we live in accordance with reason, both the divine and the human; nor will we be successful in any other way, unless we acquire it through philosophy and we contemplate the intelligence of the things-that-are. Moreover, take note of this other sort of mixture in the same way: in the same way, [Archytas] tries to urge us on to both practical and theoretical philosophy. For the acquisition of intelligence of something productive is a function too of practical virtue, the end of which is not simply beholding how it is, but apprehending it through its activities; indeed, contemplation exists as an operation (eurygetis) of the theoretical intellect. Further, the exhortation turns out as it should, for both of them.

Interestingly, it is not obvious from ps-Archytas’ fragment alone that he seeks to implicate, as lamblichus does, practical intelligence in theoretical wisdom.21 As it stands, ps-Archytas only claims that it is the function of wisdom to obtain and contemplate the phronesis of the things-that-are, i.e., of real objects, in a Platonist sense (which he later explains, as we will see). How we translate phronesis here depends entirely on our assumptions about what this fragment is contributing to ps-Archytas’ system:22 if it is ‘practical intelligence’, one would need to explain why the qualification ‘of the things-that-are’ is present; if it is ‘intelligence’, in the sense of ‘prudence’, then the axiology remains intact, but we are forced to explain how the things-that-are, by which ps-Archytas appears to mean ‘forms’,

21 As apparently Aristotle, Hist. 9.9 Sedley = Cic. Fin. 5.58; see Dillon 1996, 75) and Alcin. (Dialog. 152.30-153.4; see Sedley 2012). The position of ps-Archytas with a strong emphasis on the importance of theoria in its own right, might also be thought to anticipate that of Plato, who, like Eudoxus (see Dillon 1996, 122), thought that theoria leads the way, and is fulfilled through poiesis (so Borazulu 2012, 148).

22 Interestingly, the ps-Archytas, who wrote On the Virtuous and Happy Man (11.23-26 Thesleff) differentiates ‘science’ (episteme) from phronesis, which are considered two sorts of wisdom: ‘When I say science, I mean the wisdom (phronesis) of divine and daemonic things; and prudence (phronesis), (the wisdom) of human things, and things that concern life. Are these arts written by different pseudopigraphers?’

Therefore, since the good of wisdom is made more apparent when it is common and extended to all things, the exhortation towards it (the good) becomes more complete through the following (words of Archytas):

Wisdom is not concerned with one delimited (epitomonom) thing among the things-that-are, but with all things.-that-are in an absolute sense (hupode), and it is necessary not for it to discover first its own principles, but rather those that are common to the things.-that-are; for wisdom relates to all the things-that-are in the same way as sight does to all the things that are seen. Therefore, it is proper for wisdom to consider and contemplate the accidents of all things universally (katakoinon), and, hence, wisdom discovers the principles of all things-that-are. [ps-Archytas, On Wisdom Fragment 4 - 44.22-28 Thesleff]

For here again, [Archytas] does not delimit its activity to some part, but says it extends in common over all the things-that-are, and he says that it investigates the principles that are common to whole things, and it contemplates...
according to these kinds and to the simple apprehensions, just as vision apprehends the things that are seen; and he says that it comprehends the universal rationales for everything and, in addition to this, contemplates and discusses; and he says that it is the only unconditional knowledge, too, since it discovers the principles of all the things-that-are, and is able to give a rationale concerning its own proper principles. This approach of exhortation, then, develops beautifully for if wisdom is of this sort and it is not possible for reasoning to acquire an exhortation that is more universal, more perfect, more common, more self-sufficient, more well-formed, or more beautiful than this one, then those who wish to be successful need to pursue this in accordance with reason and intellect.

As we saw in Fragment 1 of ps-Archytas' On Wisdom, wisdom fulfills its duty among human activities, and so is an activity practiced by human beings—but it is directed specifically towards the things-that-are.23 Because, so ps-Archytas seems to be arguing, wisdom concerns itself not with knowledge of composite individuals (which he refers to as 'delimited' things), but rather must consider all things absolutely; it cannot investigate its own principles before considering the common principles under which all the things-that-are, presumably including itself, fall.24 We might assume that it is only after discovering the principles under which all things fall universally that wisdom is able to pursue its own peculiar principles—if indeed it has peculiar principles. In order to advance upon the common principles, wisdom considers and contemplates the universal accidents, the properties that all the things-that-are possess. The rationale for this is that wisdom relates to the things-that-are in the same way that sight does to visible objects. What is the analogy doing? Ps-Archytas is not especially clear, and Lamblichus supplements the slightly obscure account with his own peculiar interpretation: by investigating the accidents that inhere in all the things-that-are, Lamblichus says, wisdom contemplates 'according to kinds and simple apprehensions'—the latter of which appears nowhere in ps-Archytas' text and represents an attempt by Lamblichus to make sense of the analogy between wisdom's contemplation of beings and sight's grasping of visible objects. But ps-Archytas doesn't really say this: he seems to be saying, rather, that the approach wisdom takes to its objects, as the approach of sight to its own objects, is peculiar to each activity:

it is appropriate for wisdom to study what is universal in all things, just as it is appropriate to sight to study what is visible in visible objects.25 The appeal to logos (which I've translated 'rationales' here) nowhere appears in the text On Wisdom either, and represents means by which Lamblichus can translate ps-Archytas' account of contemplation through wisdom into an exhortation to both theoretical investigation and practical intelligence ('in accordance with reason and intelligence').

It appears that ps-Archytas' lack of clarity about the relation of wisdom to phronesis supplies Lamblichus with an opportunity to make important corrections, and one gets the sneaking suspicion that Lamblichus' selection of portions of ps-Archytas' On Wisdom is quite intentional, and directed towards his own project of developing a robust account of the coherence of theoretical and practical knowledge within earlier Pythagorean protreptic texts. Indeed, we have what appears to be evidence of a portion of ps-Archytas' treatise that Lamblichus has passed over in silence: it comes in the form of a fragment from the Pythagorean pseudographs, quoted by Stobaeus, by someone called 'Perticius'.26 This author is closely connected with ps-Archytas, since, as we will see, portions of his work are near exact copies of the fragments of ps-Archytas' On Wisdom:

Geometry, then, arithmetic, and the other theoretical sciences are concerned with the things-that-are, but wisdom (Sophia) is concerned with all the genera (gena) of things-that-are. For wisdom relates to all the things-that-are in the same way as sight does to all the things that are seen, and hearing does to all things heard. With regard to the accidents (as sambalbivata) to the things-that-are, some universally (katholiko) apply to all things, others to the majority, and others to each individual (hen hekaston). Therefore, to consider and contemplate the accidents of all things universally is proper to wisdom; of the majority of things to natural science (peri phainomen episteme); and of per se individuals (as idia kath hekaston) to the science of what is delimited (peri ti aphiropismenon episteme). Hence, wisdom discovers the principles of all things-that-are: natural science discovers the principles of things that come-to-be naturally; and geometry, arithmetic, and music discover the principles that concern quantity and the harmonious.

23 Initially, it seems possible that this phrase might refer too to human affairs. But see below.
24 Again, compare ps-Archytas, On the Universal Logos/On the Categories 32.10–14 Theaet, where knowledge starts from 'delimited things' but proceeds to 'infinitesimals'.
25 Compare Aenesidemus, description (Didask. 153.3–9) of sophia as 'the activity of the intellect when it is investigating the intelligibles', on which see Sedley 2012, 155–57.
26 Perticius was the mother of Plato (D. L. 3.1), which is probably why her name gets associated with these sorts of texts.
Therefore, whoever is able to reduce all the kinds under one and the same principle and, again, synthesize and calculate them, he seems to me to be the wisest and absolutely best. And yet he will also discover a good look-out position, from which he will be able to behold god and all things that have been assigned to his columns and order. [ps-Perictione, On Wisdom Fragment 2 = 146.6–22 Thesleff = Stobaeus 3.1.121 = 86.4–87.13 Heine]

Ps-Perictione's fragment concludes with exactly the same passage of text that, as we will see, introduces the conclusion of ps-Archytas' treatise On Wisdom, which could lead one to speculate (a) that ps-Archytas has copied portions of ps-Perictione; (b) that ps-Perictione has copied portions of ps-Archytas, and the intervening portion preserves what lamblichus has left out in his analysis; (c) that ps-Perictione has preserved a portion of ps-Archytas, but the portion that comes before in this fragment represents a modification, or an adaptation, of what the author originally found; or (d) the suggestion favored by scholars, that the fragments of ps-Archytas were erroneously assigned to Perictione by later copyists, which is made more likely by the fact that the other fragments associated with this name are in Ionic.²⁷ The first hypothesis, advocated by Sarah Pomeroy,²⁸ does not account for the philosophical importance of ps-Archytas within the broader reception-history of the Pythagorean pseudopigrapha—he occupies a place either primary or secondary to ps-Ocelius and is known relatively early on within the tradition (at the latest Theon of Smyrna and Philo of Alexandria, but then Hippolytus, Porphyry, Lamblichus, Dicippus, Themistius, etc.), whereas ps-Perictione only appears as an addition to the fragment in Stobaeus, and has no independent historiographical tradition within the writings of the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists. The latter three hypotheses all point in the same direction: that ps-Perictione's fragment preserves what came between what lamblichus cited in Fragment 4 and the conclusion of ps-Archytas' work, in Fragment 5. Internal similarities in vocabulary suggest that ps-Perictione is employing the same concepts as ps-Archytas, which would lend credence to the notion that the fragment really is just assigned by Stobaeus, or a copyist, incorrectly to Perictione. Either way, we have what appears to be good evidence for what ps-Archytas said in the interim between Fragment 4 and the concluding Fragment 5.

If this interpretation is right, then we can see with greater precision what ps-Archytas in On Wisdom thought the proper objects of wisdom were, and the

²⁷ See Huffman 2005, 548.
compared with the tripartite division of 'theoretical knowledge' by Alcinous into a similar grouping (Didaskalikos 153.43–154.5): the theological, which deals with unmoved and primary causes; the natural, which deals with the motions of the heavenly bodies, especially their risings and settings; and the mathematical, which deals with those sorts of things subject to mathematical sciences. Alcinous and ps-Archytas can't line up exactly the same, but they do show similar inclinations.

Once we arrive at the final conclusion, lambichus has us return to the image of the charioteer riding aloft and reaching the vist that makes possible intellectual sight of reality, which he employed as a framing device in order to show the conclusion of his treatment of famous dicta of Pythagoras, and to introduce his account of 'exoteric, i.e. scientific' exhortation (Protreptikos 4.22.16–24.13 Piscelli):

Therefore, at the end [of Archytas' work], his advice rises to the highest peak, in the following way:

Therefore, whoever is able to reduce all the genera under one and the same principle end, again, synthesize and calculate them, he seems to me to be the wisest and absolutely trust. And yet he will also discover a good outlook position, from which he will be able to behold god and all things that have been assigned to his columns and orders; and furnishing himself with this charioteer's path, he will set out and arrive at the end of the course, connecting the beginnings (archai) with the conclusions (perissai), and finding out why god is the beginning, end, and middle of all things—that are defined in accordance with justice and right reason (orthos logos). [ps-Archytas, On Wisdom Fragment 5: 44.31–45.4 Theleff]

So clearly here too he has set down the end of the theological exhortation, not thinking it right to stop at a plurality of principles, i.e. of all the kinds of being, but: rather to reduce enthusiastically everything under one and the same principle, and dividing from the single One according to a definite number the things approximating the One, and in this way always investigating the things-that are further removed and separated, until the plurality may be calculated together for the synthetic things, i.e. those that are composed out of many things and by proceeding in both directions he is sufficient to ascend from the plurality to the One, and to descend from the One to the plurality.

But since we especially pursue truth and wisdom, he says, exhorting to this sort of science, that the wisest and absolutely trust person is the one who has this kind of science of division through the first forms and kinds, drawing these together into the One by way of the science of definition, and being contemplative of the One, which is an end of all theory. And he introduces a

Ps-Archytas' text concludes with an appeal to the person who is 'wisest and absolutely trust', i.e. the person who is able to practice all these sorts of theoretical activity referred to in the ps-Polyctene fragment (which ps-Archytas calls 'reduction of the genera to one and the same principle', 'synthesizing', and 'calculating'), respectively. Such a sophistatos and alkesteratos will also find a vista, from which to see god, and all the things that fall under his 'column and order' (by which apparently ps-Archytas means the 'good' column in the 'table of contraries' mentioned by Aristotle in the Metaphysics and known to ps-Philolaus). There is a distinctly logical flavor to his account of the charioteer, whereby ps-Archytas claims that the charioteer's path, which is presumably in a circle, will lead him to draw together first principles with conclusions, thus discovering the reason why god, for the Pythagoreans, is the beginning, middle, and end of all things—that are defined according to justice and right reason. The philosophical activity of the wisest and trust human seems to involve at least one, and probably all, of the...
three aspects of theoretical reasoning: reduction of classes of intelligible objects to establish basic definitions on which to establish proofs; some sort of syllogistic synthesis of first, last, and middle terms; and mathematical calculation of the relationship between composite intelligible objects (through arithmetic, geometry, or harmonics). Interestingly, the final appeal to 'justice' here, a Pythagorean watchword, might be thought to point towards practical intelligence—if so, this would be the only evidence in the entirety of ps-Archytas' treatise that survives of any focus on the value of theoretical inquiry for practical intelligence. But even Iamblichus doesn't make this move; instead he focuses on how such theoretical procedures allow one to move from the Many upwards to the One, and back down again to the Many. Such a procedure proceeds, so Iamblichus' exhortation states, to happiness and success in life.

Apocope of the appeal in the final fragment of ps-Archytas, it is time for us to allow our collective chariot to pause at a plateau and consider how we can bring all this information together. It is clear that, despite the lengths to which Iamblichus will go to try to influence his reader's interpretation, ps-Archytas' On Wisdom is not a protreptic text, at least in the sense that protreptic texts aim to exhort young people to a certain way of life that will help them to obtain the goods that will encourage them to live happily or successfully. This is because the text, as it stands, does not obviously refer to the Pythagorean 'way of life', as, for example, Aristotle does, but rather focuses on explaining axiologically how human beings are born for the sake of contemplating the rational system that gives order to the nature of things (Fragment 3), which they do by way of theoretical investigation through wisdom. Humans, so ps-Archytas argues (Fragment 2), have been gifted certain instruments for thinking and for communication, so that they might be able to perform their cosmic roles as exquisites of the system of universal reason, which has been imprinted upon them, and which can be understood owing to the guarantee of language, which also bears the imprint of universal reason. Wisdom, in particular, which deals with the kinds of things that are and are universally subject to such kinds, seeks to expose the intelligence that gives order to the things that are (Fragments 3 and 4). Two other types of theoretical reasoning are mentioned (Fragment 5): natural science, which deals with the attributes that most real things have, discovers the first principles of generated objects; and 'delimited' science, which deals with the attributes of perceived individuals, discovers the principles that give complex real objects their unique mathematical attributes. The wisest and truest person will be he who is able to master all three parts of theoretical reasoning (Fragment 6), which, according to ps-Archytas, allows him to see the things that fall under the column of god, and to discover the ultimate reason why god is the beginning, middle, and end of all things. Such a proposal is, to my knowledge, unique in antiquity, and it would require much more work to see whether, beyond the value it held for Iamblichus, we might be able to see reflections of this work in other Middle and Neoplatonist authors. Even if we cannot ultimately admit ps-Archytas' On Wisdom to the corpus of ancient protreptic texts, it still represents one of the longest, and best sustained, analyses of theoretical reasoning in ancient philosophy, expanding upon tropes that were first developed as such by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics—the differentiation of theoretical from other forms of reasoning and the function argument—but with a unique 'Pythagorean' twist.

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This piece is dedicated to Holger Theilei, whose scholarship has shone as a beacon to which much of my own research has striven. Hence, it is apropos that I treat the topic of ancient protreptics in the Pythagorean tradition here. This paper has benefited significantly from the audience at the Milan-Durham Workshop on Platonism Epistemology in October 2014, and I wish to thank especially Mauro Bonazzi and George Boy-Stones for suggestions.

35 For a similar description by reference to Aristotle, Protrepticus, see Hutchinson and Johnson forthcoming.
the upper level of reality, the Forms fulfill this role through the familiar if controversial process of instantiation.20 Their place in the upper level presents only a soft evhismos in the opinion of others as reflected, for example, in the divided line (Rep. 6, 509d–511e) and in the ladder of love (Symposium 209a–212a). Other bridges include philosophy at large and dialectic in particular with the ‘philosophers’ serving, more or less playfully, as a “clamorific intermediate” between the two levels (1999, 33 [= 2009, 417]). Yet Theiseller nominates the Forms as the most explicit, ambitious and famous of Plato’s attempts to bridge the levels and explicate their internal relations (1999, 33 [= 2009, 418]).

In the final analysis, no matter what Theiseller says, there will still be room for disagreement on both the existence and the nature of Forms, not to mention the meaning of existence, that is, its proper definition and explication. Theiseller has not, to my knowledge, deciphered the meaning of existence in any sense, unless he has been keeping it to himself. But he has clarified the nature of Plato’s Forms at least to my satisfaction. And this helps decide what to say about the existence of Forms.

Ultimately, maybe secretly, we all mean the same thing when we assert or deny the existence of something even if we disagree when we take up existence as a philosophical topic of its own.

What is most exciting about Theiseller’s approach is that it expands our understanding of the existence of Forms, telling us how they exist if they exist. He is generously forthcoming about what this includes, what it does not, and what difference it makes.

Do the Forms really exist? We are still allowed to disagree about that. But not so much about why they exist, how they exist, and where they exist. Perhaps most important, we now know what to make of a world—indeed, only one—in which they do exist.

Istanbul

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20 Note that Theiseller does not make too much of the traditional debate over ‘transcendence versus immanence’ (both habitually kept at a distance with scare quotes), preferring instead to balance the separation of Forms (1999, 62–3 [= 2009, 466]) with their coherence in particulars (1999, 30–1 [= 2009, 414–5]). He has been coaching me privately not to be more exciting about instantiation, especially in regard to working out the mechanics and sorting out the details, than would be absolutely necessary to understand Plato (cf. Alican 2014, 39–44).


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