Should Europeans Citizens Die—or at Least Pay Taxes—for Europe? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited

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Abstract: In the concept of European citizenship, public and international law intersect. The unity of the European polity results from the interplay between national and European loyalties. Citizens’ allegiance to the European polity depends on how much they see the polity’s identity as theirs. Foundational ideals that shaped the European project’s identity included social reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, economic reconstruction and widespread prosperity, and the creation of supranational structures to rein in nationalism. A broad cultural consensus underlay the first impulse for integration. Europeans had little trouble giving explicit or tacit allegiance to such a project, which resulted in an unparalleled success. However, roughly 60 years and 20 Member States later, social integration is being challenged as immigrants with diverse cultural backgrounds arrive, while far-right political parties surge in reaction; economic integration is confronted with a faltering euro and countries struggling to meet financial commitments; and political integration weakens as the EU seems to fail the democratic test. Cultural assumptions are no longer shared by all. Allegiance to today’s EU is problematic for the ordinary European citizen. This paper submits that careful attention to the spirit of the foundational ideals sheds light on how the present problems as well as future integration could and should be approached.

Keywords: allegiance, analogical unity, differentiated cooperation, European citizens, integration paradigms, interculturalism, political identity, inclusive public sphere

In August 2010, European Union (EU) budget commissioner Janusz Lewandowski declared that many Member States wanted to be “unburdened” of their contributions to the EU. Due to the difficult economic times, they wished to reduce those payments. This situation, in Mr Lewandowski’s view, was opening the door “to think about revenues that are not claimed by finance ministers”. Spain, Austria, Poland and Belgium seemed initially sympathetic to the idea. The Netherlands, UK, Germany and France were not impressed. The controversy so opposed the European Council against the European Parliament and the European Commission, that approval of the 2011 EU budget was compromised. This debate about “own resources” would imply the creation, for the first time, of direct EU taxes.

Probably the number of EU citizens who—moved by romantic Euro-patriotism—would lose sleep over the consideration of giving or not their lives for the EU, is not overwhelming. But, could their commitment motivate them to at least pay EU taxes? The following paper will try to delve into the question on how allegiance and identity
play out in the intersection of global, regional and domestic contexts, affecting a
concrete legal form of political belonging: EU citizenship.

Allegiance to “Europe” (or, more accurately, the EU) is more problematic than, say,
commitment to a nation state, due to the nature of the European polity. The EU
cannot claim to possess attributes that provoke strong (or at least significant)
identification from its citizens. Elsewhere I have suggested that if there is a European
identity, it a nuanced one, much less intense than national identities, and
subordinated to them.8 This is why the legal figure of European citizenship especially
when one focuses on the affiliative dimension of citizenship—regarding sense of
belonging—presents a most interesting case in the study of the interactions between
international and public law, between domestic and transnational identities, and
between the allegiance to nation and to community of nations.

Furthermore, allegiance to Europe may mean not only adhesion to a set of institutions
that inspire more or less enthusiasm—the occasional reference to “Brussels” as
alleged centre of decisions with European reach—but also as the source and symbol
of certain historical memories, cultural and religious traditions, and social and
economic ways of life shared by Europeans and by those who, in parts of the world as
distant as Canada, Argentina or Australia, consider themselves part of European
(often called “Western”) civilisation.9 In this sense, “Europe” could in fact receive the
allegiance of citizens in many nations not only inside, but also outside its geographical
limits.

This paper focuses on the political identity of the EU—having to do, therefore, with
the citizens, the polity, and one among several aspects of what makes the former feel
part of the latter: its political culture. To that end, I will explore first the foundational
ideals on which membership to the European project (much before the creation of EU
citizenship) was based. I will argue that those ideals gave a certain configuration, an
identity, to that project, and that such identity received the allegiance of the
Europeans participating in it. In the second section, I will review some problems that
the project faces at the present, and how they relate to the foundational ideals, the
identity of the project (today the EU), and the allegiance of its members (EU citizens)
to it. In the third and final part, I will advance normative arguments for the future of
the European project, using as reference, again, the identity of the polity and the
allegiance of its members to it.

1 Original integration paradigms

According to Joseph Weiler, the European Communities (which would evolve into the
EU) were created with three goals in mind: social integration (reconciliation and
peaceful coexistence); economic integration (reconstruction and widespread
prosperity); and political integration (restraint of nationalism through supranational
structures).10 These elements constituted the purpose or telos of integration, as can be
seen in the Schuman Declaration:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without...creative efforts... The
contribution, which an organised and living Europe can bring to
civilisation, is indispensible to the maintenance of peaceful relations...
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto
solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the
elimination of the...opposition [between] France and Germany.11
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The first and main purpose was to attain peace and reconciliation between France and Germany, but as a step towards “the coming together of the nations of Europe” and in the wider context of world peace.

In order to start a process towards reconciliation, peace and European solidarity, the Schuman Declaration proposed to create a supranational institution, initially Franco-German but open to other countries of Europe: a common High Authority to regulate the production of coal and steel. This in turn would provide “common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe” and solidarity so that “any war between France and Germany” became “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”.

The three goals were, in practical order: economic first (“pooling basic production” of coal and steel); political second (“instituting the new High Authority” whose decisions would bind France, Germany and other European countries); and social third (the proposal would lead towards “a...federation indispensable to the preservation of peace”). However, their importance followed an inverse order: economic cooperation was an instrument for political unity, which, in turn, would be a means towards the attainment and keeping of the social goal of peace.

Prosperity, the moderation of nationalism, and peace were, in Weiler’s view, objectives with more than a purely utilitarian intent. They were ideals: a set of values, which could captivate the imagination of Europeans, mobilise broadly-based political forces, and counteract the powerful pull of nationalism. And those were not just any values, but “higher” ones: desiderata that were altruistic (not self-serving, but implying a sacrifice), ethical (virtuous) and communitarian (needing the cooperation of all). These four characteristics appear as features qualifying the foundational high values or ideals in Table 1.

Underlying those three ideals or goals was a basic, broad moral consensus with shared—or at least to a certain extent compatible—worldviews. Because that cultural atmosphere was obvious to most, it required little discussion or specification: it simply was assumed. At the heart of such European culture of the 1950s were the religious tradition of the Bible (or Judeo-Christianity) and the secular tradition of the Enlightenment.

Table 1 provides a schematic view of the ideals and features described so far. The social ideal contained peace as desideratum, with an altruistic view to reconciliation, exercising the virtue of collective forgiveness (inasmuch as that was possible), and requiring an effort of all of the European peoples to translate those ideals into their daily coexistence. The economic ideal presented the desideratum of prosperity, with an altruistic aim to seek improvement for everybody so that each one could lead materially dignified existences. Such goal required practicing the virtue of solidarity, and the creation of common mechanisms to allow the flow of goods, services and eventually labour, while keeping possible undesirable outcomes of the market forces in check, at the service of European societies. Finally, the political ideal presented the desideratum of unity, with an altruistic will of supranationality, practicing the virtue of moderation regarding nationalism, and with a European—as well as a national—perspective in view. All along, an underlying normative atmosphere, drawing inspiration from Bible and Enlightenment values, provided a medium—a sort of common language in an analogical sense—for mutual understanding and
working together.

Table 1 – Original ideals and their features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature Ideal</th>
<th>Desideratum</th>
<th>Altruistic</th>
<th>Ethical</th>
<th>Communitarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Social market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Supranationalism</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
<td>Co-sovereignty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political culture: Basic moral consensus

| Bible/Enlightenment |

The table has only illustrative purposes. It does not pretend to give an exhaustive account of the ideals referred to by Weiler, but rather to show them in synthesis. A short explanation of the terms, however, should be made.20 “Social”, for instance, can be used in very different ways. Thus, “European Social Model” might refer to the legal recognition of benefits that are expressed in economic outcomes (say, an unemployment monetary aid). “Culture” might be interpreted as the knowledge and behaviour of a certain elite, or as the expression of average Europeans through different kinds of arts (even graffiti), or as specific ethnic and linguistic expression. Likewise, “reconciliation” could be considered as much a social as a political quality.

In this paper, “social” is understood as related to society, and this latter one as “the aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered community.”21 “Social” then is related to the community of people living together. How they subsist materially, how they create and distribute wealth is left to the “economic” sphere. How they govern themselves as a collective is placed in the “political” realm. Because of that “reconciliation”, “forgiveness” and “coexistence” are seen here as part of the social ideal of how the aggregate of Europeans can live together in harmony.

“Economic” refers to either economics or to the economy. “Economy” means “the state of a country or region in terms of the production and consumption of goods and services and the supply of money”, or the “careful management of available resources”.22 “Economics” is “the branch of knowledge concerned with the production, consumption, and transfer of wealth.”23 “Economic” therefore is an adequate adjective for the ideal that has to do with material prosperity, its distribution (equality) and its production (the so called “social market economy”).

“Political” relates to “the government or public affairs of a country”24 and derives from “politics”, which can be understood as “the activities associated with the governance of a country or area…”25 And “governing” is to “conduct the policy, actions, and affairs of (a state, organization, or people) with authority.”26 In this context, issues of sovereignty, moderation of nationalism, political unity and supranationalism fall under the political idea.

Finally, the cultural background existing at the beginnings of the European communities was certainly not an ideal, not even an atmosphere explicitly acknowledged, but a shared assumption. “Cultural” relates, among other things, to “the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a society.”27 Arguably, those ideas,
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customs and behaviour of a society are normatively informed by a weltanschauung, or “...particular philosophy or view of life.”28 It is to this aspect of culture that I would like to refer. Notice that, from this perspective, culture as a worldview is not a separated segment, but an atmosphere that finds manifestation in the most relevant realms of a community's existence, including its political, social and economic life as I have defined them here.

1.1 The social ideal: security and pax europaea

After a conflagration like the Second World War, the goal of peace could have hardly surprised anyone. It was obvious that nobody wanted another event like that. Europe could not afford it. However, Weiler believes that the kind of peace that the founders of the European project had in mind was more than a purely utilitarian goal: it possessed the features of an ideal. It was a call not only to stop the violence, but also to forgive and to overcome hatred. “The Schuman notion of peace” in Weiler's view, “resonates with and is evocative of the distinct discourse, imagery and values of Christian love”, which was natural in that historical context and given the personal backgrounds of such founding fathers as Adenauer, De Gasperi, Monnet and Schuman himself.29

Peace certainly was a desideratum. However, it contained as well an altruistic element, an implied sacrifice beyond the appeasement mood of the 1930s. It required therefore the exercise of virtues: for example overcoming the desire for revenge and for the humiliation of the former enemy. It was, finally, only attainable through an effort involving the community of European nations—France and Germany first, then the Six, and so on.30

1.2 The European economic ideal

That the European project in its beginnings had economic goals is hardly debatable. Indeed, for some this was the only purpose. After all, until the 1990s even though the proper way to refer to the project was “European (Coal and Steel, Atomic Energy, and Economic) Communities”, it was often called simply “the Economic Community” with the Common Market as its most distinctive attribute. One of its better-known symbols in the 2000s decade was going to be its new currency – the euro. Yet Weiler's assertion that the economic aspect involved an ideal beyond pure self-interest is less obvious.

For him the economic reconstruction of the devastated continent was “intimately connected with the notion of peace”.31 Firstly, because prosperity was a condition for peace. But secondly, because mediating the utilitarian aspects of prosperity was an altruistic element, evident when contrasted with the destruction and poverty of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War: the element of individual and social dignity. Under the Enlightenment vision of the individual, “poverty resonates with the embarrassment of dependence on others, with the humiliation bred by helplessness, and with the degradation of a lack of autonomy”.32

There was indeed virtue in the pursuit of prosperity as a means to promote the dignity of individuals, regions, nations, and Europeans as a whole. Prosperity won through hard work and effort, as well as through cooperation with other individuals and nations. Such cooperation “inevitably blunted the sharp edges of avidity feelings” that might appear along the enterprise of prosperity building. Here the communitarian feature of the economic ideal was important. The Community aimed
at reconstruction with a sense of collective responsibility. It “attempted to constrain the unchecked search for economic prosperity by one Member State at the expense of the others”.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, the processes of liberalisation of barriers and open markets at which the European project aspired were conceived, at the same time, in a context of solidarity. This communitarian notion of prosperity was rooted in a strong tradition propounding an ethos of collective social responsibility for the welfare of individuals in the community as a whole. A tradition originated in the XIX century, and which for Weiler includes socialism.\textsuperscript{34} Social Democracy is an outstanding example of this tradition in Europe.\textsuperscript{35}

1.3 The European political ideal

Weiler has called the third ideal of European integration “supranationalism”.\textsuperscript{36} Supranationalism can be interpreted in at least two ways, depending on how political integration is envisaged: either as a union or as a community. Both the European Defence Community and the European Political Community were planned as unions and failed.\textsuperscript{37} Based on this fact, and attending to the articulation of supranationalism under the Treaties of Rome in 1957, Weiler feels more inclined to favour the community perspective. Among other problems of the union approach, he mentions how ironic it would be if the process of integration that sought to rein in the excesses of the nation state resulted in a super-state.

The community vision, on the one hand, affirms “the values of the liberal nation state by policing the boundaries against abuse”. On the other hand it also “seeks to redefine the very notion of boundaries of the state, between the nation and the state and within the nation itself.”\textsuperscript{38} The union vision is liberal and federal (and can be utilitarian as well); the community vision is communitarian and hybrid. The unity vision entails the end of supranationalism, the check on nationalisms and statisms, because it creates a super-state.\textsuperscript{39} The community vision advocates a stateless polity.\textsuperscript{40} At any rate, supranational cooperation was from the beginning a desideratum: it meant moderating the excesses of nationalism; or more precisely, those of states trying to advance their “national interest” in the European arena. It aimed at the creation of a transnational atmosphere where individual nation states became linked to the other nation states of the European Communities, so that the main distinguishing category between peoples ceased to be their sense of belonging to a nation state. This is for Weiler “the value side of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, of free movement provisions and the like.”\textsuperscript{41} Therefore supranationalism at the level of nation states “pushes for cultural differences to express themselves in their...spontaneous form, rather than the codified statal legal forms.” And at the intra-group level (within each nation state) “it attempts to strip the false consciousness which nationalism may create instead of belongingness derived from a non-formal sense of sharedness.”\textsuperscript{42} Supranationalism in this sense entails also an altruistic aim for Europeans to see each other in terms that go beyond the usual category of state-nationality. Weiler sees in this supranationalism an heir to the Enlightenment in its privileging of the value of every human individual, expressed for example in the liberal notion of human rights.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, as in the case of the ideals of peace and prosperity, supranationalism could not be attained by nation states separately: it required the assent and collaboration of all of them.
1.4 Political culture: the basic moral consensus

The shared worldview or, to use in Anderson’s terms, the “basic moral consensus” that allowed Europeans to start the project of integration was based on two main cultural traditions—those of the Bible and of the Enlightenment—often in conflict but not altogether incompatible with each other. Actually, because of their contrast, they served to keep a certain cultural balance in the European communities even as they included more and more countries. The role of the Enlightenment or humanistic secularism is generally acknowledged as part of the make-up of Europe in general and of the EU in particular, with roots that can be traced back to the French Revolution and more in general to the beginnings of Modernity. The role of Christianity, not only as a question of heritage from Classical and Medieval history, but as a specific and essential force propelling European integration in the second half of the 20th century, has been less studied.

Shelledy argues that international scholars have until recently lagged behind at incorporating religion and religious organisations into their studies “with the same level of analytic rigor and empirical investigation” with which they “address other facets of human existence.” This role includes, but is not limited to the views religious leaders have expressed about the European project. It is related, but not fully explained, by the empirical allegiance of Christians to European integration.

For Dougherty, Christian figures like Thomas Hooker, Roger Williams or John Wise were at least as influential as Enlightenment characters such as John Locke for the ideological foundations of the United States. Similarly, she assigns a key role to Christianity in the formation of European democracies after World War II, in the writing of their basic law and—eminently through the work of Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain—in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Dougherty advances that, thanks to the political reconciliation of Catholics and Protestants, Christianity was essential to the construction of German democracy and in the configuration of the EU.

Villagrasa adverts to the significance of ideology for most of the prominent figures who laid the first bricks of “little Europe”. At the side of communist Altiero Spinelli, socialist Paul-Henri Spaak, and liberal Carlo Sforza, Villagrasa mentions Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schumann (Weiler adds Monnet), all of them Christians inspired in Maritain’s humanism, Mounier’s personalism or Sturzo’s popularism.

Kaiser questions the frequently accepted idea that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was a compromise of national interests and emphasises “the decisive role played by Christian democratic networks in setting a European agenda” and their conscious intention to create Europeanised nation sates embedded in a supranational system.

For Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, research on Christian Democracy “pales when compared to the effort that has gone into theorizing and investigating empirically the twin political phenomena of socialism and social democracy”. Yet Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, together, shaped post-war European politics and society. These authors consider it impossible to appreciate the impact of Social Democracy, or even of understanding contemporary Europe altogether, without taking into account Christian Democracy. In the neglect of Christian Democracy, they
perceive the “deep difficulty” of many European studies scholars, “in grasping the relationship between religion and politics...despite the central role of religion in the emergence of modern, secular European societies.”

Christian Democrats can credibly claim paternity of the idea of European integration, and take pride in the success of the undertaking—Kalyvas & van Kersbergen assert. The key place of Christian Democracy in the project brings not only historical clarity but also a better understanding of the role that religion has played in the construction of contemporary Europe. Christian democracy’s influence appeared as much in politics as in the welfare system, from prosperity to reconciliation, from the creation of consensus about the most varied issues to the voluntary—if partial—surrender of sovereignty to attain a higher and common good.

Crucially, realisation of the essential place of Christian democracy in the European project sheds light, in a very concrete way, on how religion and politics have played out in contemporary Europe. To be sure, Christian democracy did not mean institutional or ideological association of the political party with any church. Nor did it mean involvement of Christian churches in politics—they moved away from direct involvement in politics in order to keep their universalistic identities. Christian democratic political parties were simultaneously Christian and secular. They drew inspiration and values from Christianity—a cement that held their heterogeneous social base together. Christian democratic political parties had a pivotal role...

...in anchoring new party systems in post-war Europe; in legitimizing the market economy through social security and welfare provision; in the introduction of corporatist forms of consensual policy making; and in ending national frictions and rivalries by constructing the supranational European Union in the early twenty-first century.

Kalyvas & van Kersbergen question the mainstream assumption that the post-war era in Europe had been mainly or exclusively a social-democratic one. Their research regarding the function of religion in the political, social, and economic spheres in contemporary Europe through Christian democracy can be extremely useful in three ways. First, it challenges the assumption that Europe today is a purely secularist product—separation of churches and state does not equate with non-existence of religion in the configuration and life of the political community. Second, it reveals that at least some secularist positions are also cultural worldviews. Third, it renews perspectives to assess the growing importance of culture inspired in religion, especially Islam. Part of Europe’s identity crisis today is reflected prominently in the social sphere, though not only. As I will argue later on, in the ideological realm such crisis comes from denial that Europe’s culture—also its political culture—partly possesses a religious background (mainly Judeo-Christian so far). The crisis reveals incapacity to recognise and address the importance of religion (mainly Islam) in the cultural background of a growing number of immigrants and citizens in Europe.

In this section, we have seen how the social, economic and political ideals of the European project were founded on core cultural values provided respectively by Christianity, democratic socialism and Enlightenment liberalism. This is why, for Weiler, the project was successful both at the level of elites and at a broader societal level. Europe’s recent past had been the negation of those 1950s values and ideals. The European project provided for individuals and societies a way of dealing with that recent past. Since there was a broad consensus on the values, the discussion centred on “the political structure and the technology for their realization”. In these
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shared ideals and culture, with tolerance towards different religious traditions occupying a prominent place, the European project had a specific configuration, an identity.

2 Midlife crisis: challenges today

Against the expectations of detractors, sceptics and critics, the project has been one of the greatest successes in the history of Europe.\textsuperscript{65} The fact that reconciliation (between France and Germany, but not only), reconstruction, and taming of excessive (state-) nationalism (at least at a continental scale) are not the problems they were in the 1950s, means that the European project reached its goals, at least to a certain satisfactory extent. However, it appears to be in a “midlife crisis”.\textsuperscript{66} Probably it is natural that it should happen that way. After all, the EU encompasses not two (or six) countries, but 27.\textsuperscript{67} It represents not an economy in reconstruction but the largest economy in the world. It holds a currency common to 17 of its members that has rivalled the USA dollar in stability, and has become a popular reserve currency for governments worldwide.\textsuperscript{68} With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been able to consolidate political integration as well as to coordinate efforts in foreign affairs and immigration policy.\textsuperscript{69}

The EU’s success and its capacity to attain important goals, has enabled it to grow. But because of that, it faces new challenges. “Midlife crisis” does not need to have a negative connotation: it can also describe a turning point or crossroads situation, like the one the EU faces today, after generally successful first stages.\textsuperscript{70} In the part of the paper, I have attempted to describe the original objectives, the ideals that set the European project in motion, gave it an identity, and made it successful.\textsuperscript{71}

In this second part I will try to describe challenges that make the integration process show some signs of exhaustion. Let us scan some current affairs to sketch those challenges.\textsuperscript{72}

2.1 The spectre of parallel societies

Social integration is being challenged by the presence of new immigrants and/or citizens of diverse cultural backgrounds. This is evident in the case of at least two minorities already present in the EU: Roma and Muslims. Due to the complexity and peculiarity of each of these issues, I will review only one of them and leave aside the other, which is by no means less important, since it has to do with Europe’s largest minority.\textsuperscript{73} Turkey’s potential accession to the EU and the resurgence of far-right political parties in several Member States are linked with the Muslim minority issue. I do not intend to analyse these phenomena in detail, but only emphasise their importance and centrality in EU debates against the background of the first ideal of integration, that of peaceful coexistence.

Until recently, the assumption that liberalism can invariably mould open and free societies has gone, by and large, uncontested. Now it is being questioned both at the theoretical and at the empirical level. Jeremy Fortier, for one, claims that (Rawlsian) liberalism “cannot separate itself from its Enlightenment origins” and from the philosophic claims characteristic of enlightened liberalism.\textsuperscript{74} Orgad warns against the practice of an “illiberal liberalism” in United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{75} A tension exists between the desire to run society under liberal values—like openness and tolerance—on the one hand, and the fear that if those very values are practised
towards immigrants with different ideas and views, the liberal society will be undermined.\textsuperscript{76} The cases that follow reflect this tension.

During 2010, Germany was preoccupied with “the Sarrazin debate”. Thilo Sarrazin, by then still a board member of the Bundesbank, published Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (Germany does away with itself: how our country is putting itself at risk)\textsuperscript{77}, a book on Muslims in Germany (63\% of whom are Turkish).\textsuperscript{78} The publication attracted the attention not only of political or intellectual elites but also “a mass following from the population at large”\textsuperscript{79}. The issue was so inflammatory that the Bundesbank started a complicated procedure to remove Sarrazin from its Board and the SPD (Germany’s centre-left social democratic party) is seeking to expel him from its ranks.\textsuperscript{80} Chancellor Merkel deemed the comments as “completely unacceptable”.\textsuperscript{81}

While distancing itself from what it described as inaccuracies or plain mistakes in Sarrazin arguments, the German media still attempted to explain why the debate had involved practically the whole nation. Though few in Germany would fully endorse Sarrazin’s position (some of his views are allegedly racist), he verbalised a problem that many would like to see addressed by the government, but few dare to speak about: how to integrate immigrants and how to avoid the creation of parallel societies within the country.\textsuperscript{82} Sarrazin’s book quickly sold out. Bookshops asked for a new edition. Researchers and academics presented arguments opposing it.\textsuperscript{83} For some, Sarrazin’s ideas were transforming Germany “from a tolerant society into one dominated by fear and Islamophobia.”\textsuperscript{84} Nonetheless, mainstream German politicians—including Chancellor Merkel—have begun to speak openly about the failure of multiculturalism, and to call for new measures to integrate immigrants more effectively.

Simultaneously, two countries with an outstanding tradition of tolerance saw far-right parties on the rise, to the point that those parties hold the balance for minority governments to stay in power. In the Netherlands, the government relies on Geert Wilders, famous for his controversial anti-Islam rhetoric.\textsuperscript{85} In Sweden, the winning centre-right Moderate Party, in order to achieve majority came to terms with the Sweden Democrats, a far-right, anti-immigrant party which emerged from neo-Nazi groupings in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{86} The Sweden Democrats became kingmakers for the Speaker of the House, the Moderate Party’s Per Westerberg.\textsuperscript{87} Under Marine Le Pen, France’s Front National has experienced a “renaissance”: she has received consistent support at the polls and is expected to perform well at the presidential elections.\textsuperscript{88}

Other recent affairs include the debate about the ban on wearing in public the Islamic veil, particularly in France and Belgium, and on the construction of minarets in Switzerland.\textsuperscript{89} The rise of the far right or at least of an anti-immigration sentiment in Europe is not limited to Sweden, Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands: it is also being strongly felt in Denmark, Austria, Hungary, France, and Italy.\textsuperscript{90} The United Kingdom has experienced several related problems as well, and since 2006 a legal provision allows the Home Office to “take away your British citizenship if, in our opinion, it would be in the public interest for us to do so and you would not be made stateless as a result of us removing British citizenship.”\textsuperscript{91} Thwaites shows how citizenship can be used “as a weapon” by a liberal society against its alleged illiberal members.\textsuperscript{92} She makes the case for a culturally neutral citizenship, which does not equate to the liberal form: liberalism indeed possesses cultural assumptions held by the majority and thence taken for granted as “neutral”.

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The problems of immigration and the integration of culturally diverse minorities cannot be fully understood without mention of the “civilisational” context that characterises Europe today.93 One of whose most tangible manifestations being the slum of fertility rates to below replacement level (2.1 children per woman) across the continent.94 By some projections Europe’s population will soon start decreasing in absolute terms, even after considering the effect of immigration.95 This fact, unique in the world,96 has been interpreted by some as a sign of civilisational decline and lack of hope in the future.97

The ideal of peaceful coexistence among Europeans (both traditional and new) seems far from fully achieved. A fresh analysis, and the corresponding solutions will take into account, however, the extent to which such ideal has already been realised so far, so much so that the challenges reviewed in this section appear to today’s Europeans as anomalous and extraordinary.98

2.2 Economic fragmentation

The idea that a transnational currency may be able to survive without a state seemed plausible at least until the Greek crisis at the beginning of 2010.99 Since then, economic integration has faced the possibility of derailing, creating several blocks within an EU running at different speeds. Two groups are already evident: the countries who have adopted the euro as their currency and those who have not. However, with the sovereign debt crisis there were fears of an intra-euro-zone divide developing between northern and southern (or “Mediterranean”) Member States.100

Risks to the euro’s stability during the financial crisis have brought proposals by the EU Commission to regulate markets more closely, but also to tighten control over Member State’s finances, with sanctions for those who do not maintain fiscal discipline—a new stage of “economic governance”.101 Not everybody agrees with this step because it implies that nation state governments would have to give more sovereignty to Brussels.102 More importantly, many citizens (in Germany, Spain, Portugal, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Bulgaria) have concerns about the euro’s impact on their national economies.103 There are even fears that the EU citizens no longer feel well served by the single market and that the EU needs to revive the objective of the social market economy.104

Measures of fiscal discipline enacted by governments at the risk of debt default (not only small economies like that of Greece, but the third and fourth biggest ones in the EU—Italy and Spain—as well) have caused mixed feelings among the population, who see the hard economic situation as a consequence of their membership in the EU (rather than poor national management). Due largely to an impasse caused by a lack of leadership on the politicians who could make a difference (see next section), the eurozone peripheral difficulties became problems, and after months of ineffective actions evolved into a crisis that is threatening not only the common currency but the whole European project itself. The latest literature on the future Europe seems everything but optimistic.105 At the point in time when these lines are written the EU could either advance towards greater economic coordination or split into two or more economic groups.106

Since the 70s a “Werner Report” on monetary union foresaw that closer economic cooperation would push towards political coordination as well. Eurozone member countries accepted German-style monetary management as the price for keeping
Germany at the heart of the European project. Fiscal targets were agreed in 1997, but not observed. Wide differences between the productivity and competitiveness of eurozone members remained unchanged, yet after adoption of the euro governments lost two of three tools of adjustment (the third one being fiscal tightening): devaluation of the national currency and movement of interest rates. The system “was deliberately designed to have no defaults, no bailouts and no exits.” Credit became relatively cheaper for many member countries on entering the eurozone. And European banks expanded lending beyond their borders, including a major role as creditors in the US real-estate market, seen as a safe investment until 2007.\(^{107}\)

The costs of breaking the euro would be enormous, there are no legal means of leaving the currency, and a unilateral departure from it would mean separation from the EU as well. According to economists of the USB the cost per citizen of a country leaving the euro would be around 10,000 euros. And history indicates that when monetary unions break up extremes of civil disorder or even civil war follow.\(^{108}\) The crisis has revealed problems not only with a shared identity but also of trust between peoples of Europe. It presents at the same time an opportunity to grow. As Nicholls has argued, for the euro to last “a central bank with incontestable powers that is truly the lender of last resort, and a body that can oversee fiscal harmony” must be built. Such institutions

...could take the political sting out of unpalatable tax rises and spending cuts. It will not be politically sustainable...for one country [eg Germany] to be telling the other [eg Greece] how to live. But it will be more acceptable if strong European institutions are setting the terms for—and delivering—Europe’s long-term prosperity.\(^{109}\)

But does this mean that the EU should become a federal state? We will consider this further along the paper (part 3). For the moment however I would like to stress, in agreement with Maull, that “the present crisis is at its core political”. I would agree even when by “crisis” what is meant is only economic crisis.\(^{110}\) Let us look a bit more into the political problem.

2.3 The eroding political impasse

Political integration is weakening under pressure from three forces that pull the EU in different ways. Euro-statists want the process to continue towards full union, the closest thing possible to a strong federal state that provides, they believe, a more definite and therefore stable situation.\(^{111}\) They would fall under Weiler’s “union vision” mentioned above. Intergovernmentalists push for devolution of as many competences as possible ceded in the past to Brussels. For them the process has already gone too far. Finally, advocates of a hybrid regime, those who favour Weiler’s “community vision”, see the present situation of the political integration process not as an anomaly, but as the most desirable and workable state of affairs that needs only to be perfected.\(^{112}\)

All of them agree—and this is a widespread perception among EU citizens as well—that as a polity the EU lacks sufficient legitimacy. Members of the European Council (heads of governments) reach agreements without always consulting their electorates. The Commission is subject to little accountability. Ministers and permanent representatives in Brussels decide on new EU laws and policies behind closed doors. The European Parliament is directly elected but lacks several powers of a true legislature. Citizens have no direct say in appointments to the Court of Justice.
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There is no such thing as an EU public sphere yet. Few EU citizens vote for their representatives (members of the EU Parliament), and if they do, their vote follows more the politics of their nation state than an EU-wide perspective.\textsuperscript{113} This “democratic deficit” is one of the most intricate present challenges in the political field.

For Euro-federalists, many problems not only in the political but also in the economic and even the social fields can be solved only if the EU becomes a fully-fledged democracy.\textsuperscript{114} Whatever the possible solutions, the fact is that the EU is frequently said to be experiencing a legitimacy crisis and to be facing a democratic deficit that must be addressed. The early political ideal has encountered new challenges especially in what is now a much larger but still stateless polity.\textsuperscript{115} The way in which the EU works politically makes it much slower than a “normal” (federal) polity. Nevertheless, the amount of sovereignty that Member States have transferred to the Union is already significant.

2.4 Cultural radicalisation

As has been seen above, in parallel with traditions originating from the Enlightenment—including liberalism and social democracy—which share a secularist worldview, other influences have shaped contemporary Europe too. A very important one is Christianity, and not only historically but also in the construction and evolution of European integration. The debate in 2003 about whether to mention God and religion in the European constitution was not accidental.\textsuperscript{116} It reflected a genuine concern from governments of different EU Member and Candidate States for whose populations a transcendent dimension is important. Their respective national constitutions attest to this: Germany, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Poland and Malta have specific references to God and/or Christianity in them.\textsuperscript{117} In the UK, the British Monarch is also “Defender of the Faith”, with a specific role in the established (recognised by law) Christian Churches of England and Scotland.\textsuperscript{118}

Of course, this does not necessarily mean that Christianity as a religion, in its Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant streams, is widely practiced in these countries. It does not mean, either, that other countries do not adhere officially to a fervent secularist tradition—France is an eminent example. Neither does it mean, finally, that it is not possible to find official positions that represent a compromise between Christianity and secularism, as the Polish Constitution shows.\textsuperscript{119} It does mean, however, that Christianity is an important element in the culture—also the political culture—of contemporary Europe and of the European Union even today. Such presence of Christianity in Europe’s political culture is subtle, and competes with the dominant cultural paradigm in European politics today, that of secularism.\textsuperscript{120}

Secularism may refer simply to the pragmatic arrangement of relations between religion and politics—church and state. Yet it could also denote a cultural position. Using Casanova’s terms, secularism as “statecraft doctrine” seeks to keep the separation between church and state, between religious and political authorities, or the religious and the political.\textsuperscript{121} Secularism becomes an ideology when the political dimension demands for itself an absolute, quasi-sacred character; or when the secular “arrogates for itself the mantle of rationality and universality, while claiming that “religion” is essentially nonrational, particularistic, and intolerant (or illiberal), and as such dangerous and a threat to democratic politics once it enters the public
One effect of ideological secularism is the widespread view in Western Europe that religion is intolerant and creates conflict. However, this view “can hardly be grounded empirically in the collective historical experience of European societies in the twentieth century or in the actual personal experience of most contemporary Europeans.” Indeed, Casanova affirms, none of the massacres that occurred in Europe between 1914 and 1989 “can be said to have been caused by religious fanaticism and intolerance. All of them were rather the product of modern secular ideologies.”

Secularist ideology has the function “of positively differentiating modern secular Europeans from ‘the religious other,’ either from pre-modern religious Europeans or from contemporary non-European religious people,” the religious other in their midst: Islam. I suspect that one of the main reasons why the arrival and presence of the “culturally other” (ie Muslims) has provoked so much turmoil in Europe is precisely the grip that ideological secularism has had in public opinion, and on those who can influence it the most. Ideological secularism equates progress, modernity and Europeanness with the non-religious. Alternatively, it thinks of religion as pre-modern, in need of enlightenment, and non-European. For this reason, United States presents an uncomfortable puzzle: it is undeniable modern, but decidedly religious too.

Ideological secularism can be problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it does not necessarily correspond to the reality of Europe. A privileged establishment is given to Christian churches in England, Scotland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Malta, Greece and other countries. In addition, special arrangements between state and several Christian churches in areas like education, media, health and social services, exist in Germany, Netherlands, and even France. As Grace Davie shows, beside the undeniable phenomenon of secularisation in Europe, another phenomenon has become prominent: that of religion's persisting salience and importance in the European public sphere. “Religion, it was widely assumed,” says Davie, “had been ‘dealt with’ in an earlier stage in European history and had become essentially a private matter”; but it has re-appeared both dramatically and publicly.

Secondly, ideological secularism can be problematic because it creates, perhaps unintentionally, an unfriendly atmosphere to newcomers. It judges them not according to their behaviour, but to their cultural background—especially when that background is significantly shaped by religion, as in the case of Muslims. Secular ideological elites that see religion with suspicion and as a threat to the public sphere are likely to exacerbate the problem of the encounter with Islam. In the third part of this paper, I will submit that one way to face these difficulties might be the construction of an inclusive public sphere.

The European project, therefore, successful so far to a large extent, is undergoing strains in all three areas: social, economic and political. The overwhelming political cultural consensus at the foundation stages of the communities, allowed Europeans to obviate debate about ideals, and focus instead on practical issues. As Europe reaches 60, the situation has changed. There is no longer a clear political cultural consensus. Ideals and paradigms for integration should be revisited if the European project is to survive.

3. Ideals, identity and allegiance: revisiting integration paradigms
With Weiler, I would like to suggest that a renewed analysis of the ideals of integration could explain not only why the process was so successful in the past, but also what the constitutive elements (or identity) of the European project were. That might in turn shed light on how the EU should address the challenges it faces today in the social, economic and political spheres. Table 2 provides a synthesised vision of the ideals in their dynamic dimension:

### Table 2 – Original ideals, present challenges, future possibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Stage</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Supranationalism</td>
<td>Bible &amp; Enlightenmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Parallel societies</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Impasse</td>
<td>Radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>Differentiated cooperation</td>
<td>Analogical unity</td>
<td>Blended culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What follows is a proposal on how those ideals might be revisited and pursued into the future.

#### 3.1 Reciprocal social openness: interculturalism

In the social sphere, the intercultural paradigm would translate into mutual openness. In Davie's words “Islam must adapt to Europe...but Europe must also adapt to Islam.”

“Europe” includes both, the Enlightenment and the Bible (or Judeo-Christian) traditions. Acknowledging these two sources of Europe's cultural configuration is the best starting point in the dialogue with the culturally different newcomers. In Weiler's words:

> True tolerance—as that discipline of the soul which resists the tendency to coerce the other—can only exist against a basic affirmation of certain truths. And there is a contempt for the other, not respect, in an “everything goes attitude”. How can I respect the identity of the other if I do not respect my own identity?

The first step in order to start an open and sincere dialogue with Muslims—and to ask the same from them—is the acknowledgement that the sources of European political culture include the Enlightenment and religion (until recently, mainly Judeo-Christianity). Realisation of religion's influence in the political culture of both—Europeans and Muslims coming to Europe—might, after all, work as a bridge for reciprocal understanding, communication and harmonious integration. Jenkins highlights how the Kantian notion of enlightened autonomy commands, among other elements “independence of culture and religion”.

Wherever the ‘stranger's culture
and religion do not fit into what in reality is just another cultural position—that of individualistic liberalism—it immediately receives the label of irrationality and therefore underdevelopment. This labelling has disastrous consequences in terms of reciprocal social engagement because it deprives the other of critical speech. Moderate perspectives familiar with secular, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim positions, such as Habermas's, Taylor's, Rabbi David Rosen's or Talal Assad's are useful and helpful, especially when they involve dialogue and exchange of ideas. Yet this is not always the predominant attitude in mainstream Western intellectual circles, particularly in Europe. Jenkins brings to attention how often enlightened (secularist) authors conflate “Europe” with “Enlightenment”, and leave no space for the continent’s transformation.

The second step is of course for all those living permanently in Europe to realise that they might have to be with each other for a long time. There is no way to improve the situation without first acknowledging it. One can tolerate, with a respectful ignorance, someone travelling on the same train for a few hours. But living with that person in the same house for a year is altogether different. The frame of mind one has in either situation changes. While possible dialogue and knowledge of the other can be obviated in the first case, it cannot in the second case. And true dialogue demands that the parties in conversation are ready not to leave their own cultural positions (or deny them in a veil of ignorance), but to acknowledge that each of them has a cultural background, while trying to reach to the other looking for common ground present in their respective cultures, a transcultural dialogue therefore.

The third step is to engage in a certainly difficult but necessary and productive dialogue to create a new way of life—and a new political culture— together. Casanova, Taylor, D’Andrea, Beuchot, van Leeuwen and others, have suggested possible avenues. What those proposals have in common is the idea that respect and tolerance are not enough: they are only the beginning. Social integration will only happen through exchange and interaction among the different cultural groups. And the result will be a new, richer, and common culture. Dialogue goes beyond discourse, to new ways of life together. That is what I mean by reciprocal social openness. It ought to be based on a different paradigm: interculturalism. The dialogue cannot be limited to understanding basic principles and reaching agreement on minimal standards and procedures. It ought to include the sharing and discussing of values, considerations of “thin” and “thick” identities alike, and the realisation of the dynamic character of identity.

Sincere and open dialogue does not mean, as we have said, ignoring the other’s culture. Neither does it not mean necessarily accepting everything either, or renouncing one’s own identity. Intercultural dialogue requires the capacity to listen and to answer. It implies a disposition that is critical—also self-critical. In addition, it presupposes the gradual construction of a new society together, a new way of life and a new culture with elements of both the traditional and the newcomer groups.

In recent times, the dominant paradigm to deal with cultural diversity has been multiculturalism. This is particularly true of western academic circles, but also to some extent of political and policy-making elites. Multiculturalism denotes sometimes a fact: the presence of peoples with varied cultural backgrounds in a (“multicultural”) society. Under a second meaning, it can be a normative theory, a liberal approach to how coexistence of peoples with differing and even potentially conflicting backgrounds ought to be managed. Here by “multiculturalism” I understand the
second meaning.

Multiculturalism had the virtue of providing an alternative to assimilation for cultural groups living in polities dominated by a culturally different majority. This seems to have been the situation faced by linguistically different communities in France—for instance those speaking Breton and Occitan.  Multiculturalism was introduced in the nineteen seventies in Australia and Canada. It has had advocates and inspired policy in several other Western countries as well. Prominent examples in Europe include for instance Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Multiculturalism is widely known in academic literature. Recognised scholars such as, among others, Will Kymlicka, have developed it. For him, multiculturalism is “an umbrella term” that covers “a wide range of policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethno-cultural groups, whether those groups are ‘new’ minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or ‘old’ minorities (e.g. historically settled national minorities and indigenous peoples).”

However, multiculturalism has also been criticised on several counts. One is that when applied, precisely because of its stress on the value of individual cultural communities and their need to be preserved and protected from discrimination, it may lead those minority communities and, in fact, the majority community also to grow isolated from each other. They might tend to become parallel societies. Multiculturalism has been a very good first step in the search for alternatives to assimilation. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be enough.

Recognition of and respect for minorities present in the political community does not bear, of itself, social cohesion. It is under this perspective that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent remarks about the failure of multiculturalism should be pondered. She is known for her moderate views, and surely she is not suggesting expelling millions of residents of Muslim background (mainly Turks) from Germany, just because their integration in German society appears to be difficult.

Interculturalism implies going beyond parallel societies respectful of each other. It entails a degree of cultural blending. Two prerequisites for intercultural dialogue are first, acknowledgement that individuals and human groups (including the majority or recipient group in a country) are “cultural”—possessing culture. And, secondly, communication with the aid of a “transcultural grammar” based on a basic notion of equality among human beings.

Culture is always part of people’s character, and yet it does not explain them completely. Culture evolves, and several cultural sources may characterise not only a group, but also individuals. An interculturalist perspective will assert that every human being (or group) is “cultural” and at the same time, that this does not exhaust the explanation of what they are: there is more to them than their culture. That “more” transcends cultures—is transcultural—and can serve as a point for intercultural dialogue and communication. Table 3 presents these ideas in a schematic way:
Interculturalism has already been presented as an alternative to multiculturalism in different cases. Bouchard & Taylor’s proposal for Quebec is only one example. Among other elements, they suggest “intercommunity action with a view to overcoming stereotypes and defusing fear or rejection of the Other taking advantage of the enrichment that derives from diversity, and benefiting from social cohesion.”

According to their proposal, “the majority ethno-cultural group, like the members of ethno-cultural minorities accept that their culture will be transformed sooner or later through interaction”. Importantly, “…[c]ultural, and in particular, religious differences need not be confined to the private domain. The following logic underpins this choice: it is healthier to display our differences and get to know those of the Other than to deny or marginalize them.” What an intercultural society in Europe could look like in 20 or 30 years remains of course a matter of speculation. Yet it ought to include, among other elements, three essential cultural streams that are already present in Europe—even if by “Europe” we think only of EU member states: Christianity—a minority today but with an important place in Europe’s cultural configuration; secularism—the majority culture today; and Islam—the fastest growing minority, already undeniably significant in the continent.

In a multiculturalist scenario various cultures and groups are recognised, and “tolerated”. They remain, however, always different from each other. Those individuals and groups, whose culture is closer to the main, dominant culture, will be more inclined to pay allegiance to the political community. Individuals and groups with cultures farther away from the main culture will continue to feel alien—even after two or three generations of having arrived to the host country—and their allegiance will be much weaker, if existent at all. In the interculturalist scenario the initially distant cultural positions, through communication and exchange, slowly achieve degrees of blending, in a way that after some time they have constituted a richer culture together—one whose paternity everybody can claim. One way to achieve this has been developed by Pierpaolo Donati through what he calls “relational sociology”.

Interculturalism needs to be developed further theoretically, and appropriately tested empirically. Here I have wanted to at least bring it to attention as an alternative to the multiculturalist paradigm of social coexistence. But other paradigms of integration must be revisited as well. Let us give a thought now to the economic paradigm.

3.2 Differentiated economic cooperation

European integration in general and economic integration in particular should also be conceived in a different way, adapted to the new situation in which the European project finds itself today. As I have tried to show in the first section, this project was not a purely economic arrangement based on self-interest and otherwise ignorant or mindless of whom the partners were. Economic cooperation was a tool, not the main
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goal. Even in the EU as it is today—let alone one with more members—economic cooperation is already problematic and governance very difficult.\textsuperscript{158} There has been talk among European leaders about reforming the Treaty of Lisbon to deal with indebted euro zone States in crisis (like Greece).\textsuperscript{159} We have already mentioned how thorny the issue of possible EU taxes is. In face of this situation, Vivien Schmidt plausibly has advanced the idea of differentiated cooperation, a “Europe à la carte.”\textsuperscript{160}

Schmidt’s proposal is both pragmatic and deeply insightful especially on two counts. First, she observes that in practice the EU has already dropped the ideal of uniformity and unanimity. Second, she points out that there are different conceptions of the EU—its identity—that cannot be easily reconciled. A “Menu Europe” may be in part a description of what is happening in the integration process, but is also a normative position on the possible way ahead.

For Schmidt, four normative visions of the EU are already present in the academic and political debates about European integration.\textsuperscript{161} The first one, held according to her by the UK, the Scandinavian countries and some central and eastern European countries, is the EU as “a borderless, problem-solving entity ensuring free markets and regional security.”\textsuperscript{162} The second one, held by the founding Six (Germany, France, Luxemburg, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium) plus Austria thinks of the EU rather as “a bordered, values-based community.”\textsuperscript{163} A third conception “attributed to the Commission” and to philosophers like Habermas, Beck and Grande, would have the EU as “a border-free, rights-based, post-national union.”\textsuperscript{164} A final, fourth idea, which Schmidt attributes to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and the British ex-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, sees the EU in strategic terms, as a global player acting through multilateralism, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{165}

Schmidt’s account of the different visions of Europe may not be comprehensive. For instance, she does not mention the perspective under which the EU would be mainly a vehicle for the “European Social Model” conceptualised by, among others, Anthony Giddens.\textsuperscript{166} She does not abound on “Eastern” or “Southern” European perspectives much either.\textsuperscript{167} The political form that she proposes for the EU—a “Region-State”—is not altogether convincing, especially considering the political ideals analysed in the first section of this paper. Yet, nowhere does Schmidt express the intention to give a comprehensive account of the normative conceptions of the EU, nor is she specially concerned about the precise terms with which she will express her idea of the EU—its identity.\textsuperscript{168}

Schmidt emphasises the variable membership of EU institutions. The UK and Denmark have opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty. The Schengen open-border includes non-members such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, while the UK and Ireland remain out, as do Bulgaria and Romania temporarily. Denmark is not in the European security and defence policy.\textsuperscript{169} The euro-zone includes only 17 out of 27 Member States, plus three micro- (and non-member) states (Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican) which use the euro as their official currency.\textsuperscript{170} Bulgaria and Romania will not enjoy worker freedom of movement for several years yet. The Bologna process for higher education harmonisation includes some non-Member States, whilst some Members like the UK, did not join it. The Eastern partnerships process launched in 2009 also involves non-Member States.\textsuperscript{171}

Differentiated cooperation may appear as a somewhat chaotic avenue for the European project.\textsuperscript{172} Yet it could allow countries with different conceptions of the EU to engage in closer cooperation with like-minded partners.\textsuperscript{173} It would require,
though, changes in the paradigm for political integration. This we will ponder next.

3.3 An analogical unity for the European polity

Under conditions of social interculturalism and differentiated economic integration, the EU regime should be conceived in innovative terms too. Schmidt has suggested that the Commission could adopt the role of “regional “community organizer” or an administrative support link, as in the Bologna process for higher education.” These ideas require further reflection. A stateless polity, with some resemblance of a state but short of being one, could be more compatible with political integration as it has been conceived from the beginning. Differentiated cooperation might allow for small groups of like-minded countries to enhance political union in quasi-federal terms, for instance the founding Six, or the members of the Nordic Council. It could also allow those joining cooperation in a certain area to have active participation in decision-making regarding that area. Additionally, it would permit countries which do not wish to extend cooperation in for them difficult or sensitive fields to stay out of specific agreements, without being deemed “anti-European”.

There could be possible inconveniences to this approach. One is that the different conceptions about what the identity of EU ought to be do not necessarily match perfectly with the identity of national populations. Beyond clichés, not every British person is a Eurosceptic or every French individual a Euro-federalist. Decisions in one country to undertake cooperation with others might encounter strong opposition within the country itself. Yet this already happens inside Member States under the present structure of the EU. Another risk is that certain areas of cooperation or exclusion were in practice very difficult to separate, for instance free-trade with free-movement of labour. The idea, notwithstanding, is worth exploring.

At any rate, the unity of the European polity ought not to be conceived as that of a state, be it national or even multinational. Differentiated cooperation would require an alternative, analogical conception of political unity, one corresponding to a stateless, supranational polity.

One way to foster political unity could be to apply the idea of “institutional belonging” provided the institutions are neutral. In the European context, this would mean that a national-like identity is not essential, provided—extrapolating Balint's ideas—that the EU institutions were effective and culturally impartial. At the same time, institutions of themselves will not necessarily create allegiance. Their face, their identity as institutions may mean very little to citizens—something that seems to happen in the EU and has concerned scholars and politicians alike.

Whatever the source of cohesion for the political community, unity ought to be considered as weaker than, and subordinated to, the national (or even the regional) kind. To put it bluntly, Europeans are likely to be less enthusiastic about paying taxes to the EU than to their national states. Whether Europeans are ready to make sacrifices for Europe will depend, most certainly, on what “Europe” is, its identity as a polity. Even more importantly, it will depend on who the “Europeans” are—their personal and group identities are changing rapidly. Analogical unity can be conceived once these elements are taken into account.

In order to illustrate the idea of analogical unity I would like to bring to attention Joseph Weiler’s Principle of Constitutional Tolerance. This principle is an example, in the realm of constitutional law, of analogical unity, and it has been already at work throughout the history of European integration.

In the European constitutional landscape, Weiler notes, “Community norms trump
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conflicting Member State norms.” This hierarchy however, “is not rooted in a [top to bottom], but rather on a “bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and real power.” For Weiler this singularity shows the Grundnorm of the European constitutional construct. He calls it Principle of constitutional tolerance (PCT).184

The political organisation of the EU in good part reflects this principle of tolerance and defies the normal premise of constitutionalism. In an ordinary constitutional state, where the polity understands itself as being constituted of one people, the minority accepts the authority of the majority. The bending of a minority to the authority of a majority, when this minority does not consider itself as belonging to the same people “is usually regarded as subjugation”. And still,

...in the Community, we subject the European peoples to constitutional discipline even though the European polity is composed of distinct peoples. It is a remarkable instance of civic tolerance to accept to be bound by precepts articulated, not by ‘my people’, but by a community composed of distinct political communities: a people, if you wish, of ‘others’.185

Under the PCT, the member states accept the European constitutional discipline not because they are subordinated to a federal state, part of whose constitutional demos they are. They accept it as “an autonomous voluntary act, endlessly renewed on each occasion, of subordination,” in areas governed by a European norm which is an aggregated expression of other political communities. This “creates in itself a different type of political community, one unique feature of which is that very willingness to accept a binding discipline which is rooted in, and derives from a community of others.”

The French or the Italians or the Germans are told: in the name of the peoples of Europe you are invited to obey...When acceptance and subordination are voluntary, and repeatedly so, they constitute an act of true liberty and emancipation from collective self-arrogance and constitutional fetishism: a high expression of constitutional tolerance.186

The PCT reflects a peculiar polity and a sort of unity that has at least three characteristics: 1) it is like the unity in a federal state; 2) but it is not exactly that; 3) it is partly similar, and partly different. This is why I mean by analogical unity.187 Europe is not a demos, but a collection of demoi. The European demoi have in fact paid allegiance to the European project as it has been, always as a community of peoples, never as a people. A European polity based on this analogical unity is more likely to stay together, but it is also more plausible because it respects the autonomy of the parts, it is a real “unity in diversity”. If, as I am convinced, national diversity is a treasure to Europe—in its languages, just to mention one example—then analogical unity ought to continue being the way of keeping the polity together.

Analogical unity, as the PCT shows, relies on something different to a legal obligation. It presupposes willingness, in other words a free assent to act even if there is no punishment (say, a fee) for not acting. Solidarity, for example, cannot be dictated by law and presupposes such free assent. It will be easier among those who see themselves as equals, and even more, as part of the same (not a parallel) community of peoples. In a democratic polity equality finds formal expression in citizenship and actual realisation in an inclusive public sphere. To that we now turn.

3.4 An inclusive European public sphere
In the second part of this paper we mentioned three very significant sources informing the political culture of Europe: the Enlightenment, Christianity and Islam. Representatives of these streams have already contributed with interesting ideas to this discussion. Christians and Muslims are minorities in Europe and they know it. For all their long history of coexistence and conflict, they are in dialogue based on some common ground. This is not always obvious for the secularist establishment, who face the double challenge of recognising that the majority cultural stand is a cultural stand, on the one hand; and that religious positions, including Islam, can only be ignored at their peril, on the other. Nor can it be denied that within religious communities there are some who do not want any dialogue. Nevertheless, the only way forward for Europe seems to be acknowledgement that culture plays a role in human beings’ and groups’ lives, and that only through constructive exchange—also in cultural terms—parallel societies can acquire a certain level of blending and integration to form a new, culturally richer community.

The way is certainly not easy, but neither is it impossible. History provides evidence of intolerance and persecution on religious grounds, under Christian and Muslim rules. But Secularism can also be intolerant and even persecute religion. To a society harmonised through interculturalism (see above) corresponds an inclusive political atmosphere. As in the case of interculturalism, differentiated cooperation, and analogical unity, my intention here is not to develop a practical proposal of an inclusive public sphere, but to indicate it as a possible and desirable avenue for future European integration. Interesting ideas for an inclusive public sphere have come from thinkers pertaining to diverse cultural political traditions. Due to lack of space here I will refer to only one.

Jürgen Habermas distinguishes between “the normative demands of a liberal order” and “the functional social imperatives of modernization”, which among other things demands “the secularization of state authority.” Secular citizens must adjust to a new situation, that of post-secular societies, where religious communities continue to exist (i.e. did not disappear according to the Modern myth). At the same time, believer citizens take it for granted that the atmosphere is increasingly secular and that they must learn to live in it. In other words, secular and religious citizens must learn to live in disagreement about certain issues with each other. This realisation must motivate citizens of either group not only to speak in terms that the other may understand, but also to help those with a different worldview to “translate” their claims into a language understood by all. The “common language” for Habermas is secular, but the effort of translation from religious to secular on the part of believers, must be matched with an effort of interpretation of religiously inspired claims on the part of non-believers: “secular citizens must open their minds to the possible truth content of those presentations and enter into dialogues from which religious reasons then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible arguments.”

In order for secular citizens not to become secularist, they must adopt a self-critical view of the limits of secular reason (as religious citizens become critical of religion). Indeed, there can be pathologies (for instance fanaticism) of religion as well as pathologies of reason (e.g. scientism). “Religion must continually allow itself to be purified and structured by reason”, while (secular) reason can benefit as well from the enrichment of faith and religion.

Real neutrality or—as I have preferred to call it—inclusiveness in the public sphere, requires citizens to become aware of the distinction between secular and secularist.
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One thing is a secular arrangement of the state. Another, very different, is a secularist worldview erected into the official weltanschauung of the political community's public sphere. Citizens, and indeed authorities in the political community, are required to adopt at least an agnostic stance towards religion and religious citizens. The agnostic citizen grants religion and religiously inspired claims in the public sphere, a potential of truth. This observation, concludes Habermas,

...paves the way for a dialectical understanding of cultural secularization...of public consciousness in Europe as a learning process that affects and changes religious and worldly mentalities by forcing the tradition of the Enlightenment as well as the religious doctrines to reflect on their respective limits.

What interculturalism is for the social context, inclusiveness in the public sphere is for the cultural realm. As watered down as the political identity of Europe should be in our view, the polity still needs a link among its members to keep it together. That link can be strengthened through an inclusive public sphere, whose most prominent outcome is a common political culture.

One of the theories about why dinosaurs became extinct relates these formidable creatures' incapacity to diversify before changing conditions. The European project has been greatly successful so far, but whether it can expect a better fate than that of dinosaurs is still an open question. Europe's “ecosystem”, its local and global environment, is changing rapidly. In order to earn and keep the allegiance of its citizens, the European polity must adapt gracefully and renew its paradigms of integration. It must promote social spaces for intercultural openness. It must conceive integration under flexible and differentiated schemes. It must aspire to an analogical unity, which has some resemblance with national unities but aspires to a more modest result. Finally, It must acknowledge and engage with the different cultural streams that matter to citizens today.

If the identity, the configuration of the European polity, corresponds at least in part with the identities of citizens and their cultural, social, and national contexts today, there will be some allegiance. Then it will be time to ponder how far such loyalty can go.

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Notes

1I would like to sincerely thank Prof. Tom Campbell, Prof. Simon Bronitt, Prof. Kim Rubenstein, Dr John Besemeres, Dr Anne Schwenkenbecher, Dr Vito Breda, Dr Dorota Gozdecka, Dr Maria Teresa Gil-Bazo, Dr Matthew Harvey, Christian Wicke; the participants at the conference on European solidarity organised by the Centre of Excellence Foundations of European Law and Polity, held at the University of Helsinki, September 2011; and the editors of this book, for very helpful comments and suggestions to earlier versions of this paper.

2Australian National University Centre for European Studies, and Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Canberra, Australia.


6Some indirect taxes—for instance the one that European milk producers pay to the EU as a function of their quota production—are already paid. I thank Dr Breda for this observation. In the paper's title I am referring, though, to the kind of direct tax that was under discussion according to the news reports, the generic kind that an overwhelming majority of Europeans would have to pay directly to the EU (not their respective national state), for instance on carbon emissions or on consumption (for instance a percentage of the “value added tax”).

7The contrast between Europeans giving up their life for Europe or acquiescing to contribute with taxes to its construction has only a rhetorical purpose and is made not only from a respectful perspective, but also from one of enthusiasm and admiration, not only for what Europe has achieved: equally for what that means to other regions, to “the West” however defined, and the world. I for one, not being European, could not explain the countries from which I am citizen, Mexico and Australia, in their history, politics, economy, society and culture, nor the connection between these two nations, without very strong reference to Europe. Without Europe as a historical origin and also as reference today, the languages that I speak, the systems of government under which I live, the ancestors from which I descend would disappear. There is a lot at stake—not only for Europe—in the future of the European project. Only because I value immensely what Europe is in its nations, languages, history, cultures, do I dare to use this ideas in a rhetorical sense. Finally, since the European Union is neither a nation nor a state—and I favour the opinion that it should stay that way, I do not intend the expression “die for” in a military connotation. Always mindful of the continent's violent past, the EU has been in the international scene a pacific actor, promoter of human rights, democracy, development and the rule of law. Hopefully it will continue to have such configuration.

8Pablo C Jiménez Lobeira, "Eu Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)." Australia National University Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series 1, no. 2 (2010).
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9In very broad terms Europe and Europe translated to other parts of the world. That is the background meaning of “west”, considering that it can include, for instance, New Zealand (farther than the “far east”). “European” intended in no sense as “the only” or “the highest” or “better than others” civilisation. “Civilisation” only as a term grouping a broadly shared culture. “Culture”, finally, as a set of values and existential meanings of reality, as a wettschauung.

10 Joseph Weiler, The Constitution of Europe : Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European Integration (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 244.

11 Robert Shuman, “Declaration 9 May 1950,” Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982(1950), http://www.ena.lu/schuman_declaration_paris_1950-2-613. For those less familiar with the history of the EU, the Schuman declaration is considered the starting point of the creation of European integration. The declaration was made on the 9th of May 1950.

Today the 9 of May has become one of the “symbols” of the EU and is celebrated every year as “Europe Day”.


13 Shuman, “Declaration 9 May 1950.”

14 Ibid. Note however that for Schuman “federation” did not mean a federal state, but rather a new kind of political form, a “supranational polity”. “From the beginning, the effort to organise Europe had had a double purpose: first, to strengthen the European countries...France...envisaged the creation of such strong organic bonds among European nations...and the establishment of a living and permanent community...based on mutual good faith and confidence...recognizing that what promotes the common advantage will promote [the member countries'] individual welfare...For the first time in history there was to be an agency above national parliaments...which would be responsible only to an assembly representing the participating Powers...The objective was to remove the danger of war between rival nations and to develop a community spirit which would not weaken national attachments but provide a wider basis for new activities and new goals.” (emphasis added): Robert Schuman, “France and Europe,” Foreign Affairs 31, no. 3 (1953): 352-53. Or even more clearly: “The idea is not to merge States to create a Super State. Our European States are a historical reality...Their diversity is a good thing and we do not intend to level them down or equalise them.”, and “It is greatly to [the nation’s] credit that [nationalism] has given the States traditions and strong internal structures. A new level must be built on these ancient foundations. The supranational will now rely on national bases. Hence there will be no denial of glorious histories, but a renewed rise in national energies, since they will be pooled together to serve the supranational community.” Finally, “Political borders arose due to admirable historical and ethnic developments and a long drive towards national unification: it would be hard to imagine their disappearance. In former times they would shift after violent conquests or because of fruitful marriages. Nowadays, it would suffice to diminish their value. Increasingly, our European borders should be less of an impediment to the exchange of ideas, people and goods.” (emphasis added) —— For Europe, trans. Foundation Robert Schuman, First ed. (Paris: Nagel Editions 2010), 15-16.


Throughout this paper references to the Biblical tradition and to Christian democracy refer as much to the moral influx of Christianity on the social, economic and political life of Europe, as to that of Judaism. Apart from the role that Judaism has played in Europe on its own right, Christianity cannot be understood without strong (essential) reference to Judaism, both in theological and historical terms. See: THE PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION, “The Jewish People and Their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible,” ed Joseph Ratzinger. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2002), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/pcb_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_200202 12_popolo-ebraico_en.html#PREFACE.

18 For schematic purposes those two traditions are mentioned separately here. But this does not mean that they are whole independent from each other. There is abundant literature to show the relation and mutual influence between these two sources of Western culture. See for instance: Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), D. Goldman, Globalisation and the Western Legal Tradition. Recurring Patterns of Law and Authority., Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). As Taylor has shown, the present situation of most people in the West is not, save exceptional cases one of a black and white distinction between believers (Christians for instance) and non-believers (say, militant atheists), but
rather a gamut of shades and nuances somewhere in between. And even those who exclude any plausibility to transcendence have evolved to the present situation from one in which it was inconceivable not to believe (say in the 1500s AD). At the same time, even the most fervent believers today cannot, when practising their faith, abstract themselves from the “immanent frame” in which we presently live, completely different from the one 500 years ago. I thank Dr Matthew Harvey for helpful comments related to these issues.

19 In fact, Weiler does not use a single adjective to qualify the ideals. I have introduced them to contextualise the ideals better and to be able to carry out the analysis along time.

20 I thank, especially, Professor Bronitt, Dr Besemer, Dr Schwenkenbecher, and Dr Gozdecka for very helpful comments to this section.


24 “Political”, in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press 2010).

25 “Politics”, in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2010).


29 Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 241. I take it that Weiler wants to underline that some of the founders of the EU were religious people (practising Christians). This does not imply by any means religion was the only element inspiring those ideals. The project was clearly, from the beginning, framed under modern conceptions of tolerance, progress and others come from the Enlightenment as well. I thank Dr Breda for useful comments to this respect.

30 Ratzinger points out that the common basis for the pursuit of this ideal lay, among other things, in the cultural background of Europe contained in the traditions of Christianity and the Enlightenment (Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 36-36, 77-79. ). See the “cultural presuppositions” section below.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 246.

35 According to Ratzinger, socialism soon subdivided into two different paths, “the totalitarian and the democratic”. Democratic socialism was going to constitute a “salutary counterbalance to the radical liberal positions, enriching and correcting them” and coincided - and even worked together with - “Catholic centrists” in this area during the Kaiserreich of Wilhem I (1871-1918). A more recent example that comes to mind (second half of the XX century and first decade of the XXI) is the several “grand coalitions” formed in that country between Social and Christian Democrats not only in Germany, but also the Netherlands and other countries (Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 28. ).


37 McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, 52. It is true that the Communities became the European Union. Arguably, however, the polity with that name contains, even today, elements of both views according to Weiler’s terms. The conflict between those views would account for problems European integration has faced during the failed attempt to create a constitution (2002-2005), during the painful approval of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007-2009, and more recently in face of the sovereign debt crisis affecting Europe since 2010.


39 “Supranationalism” is, by the way, much more than only a term of scholarly analysis. It was used profusely in the original vision of the European project (see for instance Schuman’s remarks in foot note 14). It also was included not less than in the foundational treaty of European integration, to start the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Paris (18 April 1951) in its Article 9: “...La Haute Autorité ne peut comprendre plus de deux membres ayant la nationalité d’un même État.Les membres de la Haute Autorité exercent leurs fonctions en pleine indépendance, dans l'intérêt général de la Communauté. Dans l'accomplissement de leurs devoirs, ils ne sollicitent ni n’acceptent d'instructions d'aucun gouvernement ni d'aucun organisme. Ils s'abstiennent de tout acte incompatible avec le caractère supranational de leurs fonctions. Chaque État membre s'engage à respecter ce caractère supranational et à ne pas chercher à influencer les membres de la Haute Autorité dans l'exécution de leur tâche...” (emphasis added) “Traité De Paris,” Titre II, Des institutions de la Communauté(1951), http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/europe/1951ceca2.htm.

40 ———, The Constitution of Europe, 91-96.
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Ibid., 252.

Ibid. I take it that Weiler's point is to question the pre-eminence of belonging to a state (and since the beginning of Modernity, a nation state) as source of identity for individuals and groups. For centuries individuals and groups defined themselves primarily in different terms, either beyond the state (for instance religious, academic or linguistic identities across different states) or within it (families, guilds, volunteer groups). The implication is very powerful: European identity does not have to be conceived in “statal” terms only; there can be allegiance to a stateless polity.

Ibid. In a context wider than that of the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), which preceded the EU, has had an important role uphelding these values.


See: Habermas and Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 77-78. Here, Ratzinger speaks about the “pathologies” both of religion and of reason. For him, the interaction between the two spheres enriches both.


As an ideology, or rather as source of culture and in particular political culture.

Jude P. Dougherty, ""The Fragility of Democracy" " Modern Age, no. Spring 2006 (2006): 120-23. 52 As Vincent has shown, “ideology” is a concept that has received different interpretations and normative standings in political science, history and political philosophy of the XX century. Andrew Vincent, "Ideology and the Community of Politics," Journal of Political Ideologies 4, no. 3 (1999).

Along this paper by “ideology” I understand a political cultural position. I.e., the political views deriving from a particular culture. Or alternatively, if culture is a “worldview” or comprehensive explanation of reality, ideology would be the part of that worldview that applies to the political realm (political community, common good, sovereignty, regime of government and others). Ideology is then “a system of ideas and ideals...which forms the basis of economic or political theory or policy.” "Ideology," in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2010). Or finally, a more complete definition—but essentially not different from the one I have given above—could be, again from Vincent: “...ideologies are bodies of concepts, values and symbols which incorporate conceptions of human nature and thus indicate what is possible or impossible for humans to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of human interaction; the values which humans ought either to reject or aspire to; and the correct technical arrangements for social, economic and political life which will meet the needs and interests of human beings.” A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 18.

Weiler, Un’ Europa Cristiana : Un Saggio Esplorativo, 121.


Ibid.

Ibid.: 191-200.

Another aspect in which Christian democracy was crucial in the second part of the XX century was the Cold War. Christian Democrats pointed to Communism as a threat to the cultural, economic and political order of (Western) Europe. The idea to safeguard the West was thus translated into an impulse for integration. I am very thankful to Christian Wicke, who has studied Helmut Khol extensively, for pointing this out to me.


Ibid.: 185.

In my analysis the ideological realm belongs within the political culture and the public sphere. It might be objected to this vision in the case of Christianity that to present it as a unified front might overlook deep divisions between different groups of Christians, for instance Protestants and
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Catholics. There are two possible (and complementary) justifications. First, a close consideration of the other two sources (liberalism and social democracy) will reveal that they are not wholly homogeneous fronts either, there are divisions and subdivisions, and strong disagreements within each ideological “family”. Second, as much as Christians may disagree in theological and even moral matters, they have been able to agree on common political positions (and religion matters to this paper inasmuch as it has an influence in culture in general and political culture in particular).

Christian Democracy is not only a prominent political force in Europe: it also symbolises the reconciliation—at least in the political realm—between Protestants and Catholics. José Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,” Eurozine(2004), http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html# Finally the Christian spectrum, especially after 2004, is wider than Western Christianity: it includes as well Eastern Christianity (Orthodox and other churches). I thank Professor Bronitt for helpful comments on this topic.

66 Considering as the genesis of the project the 9th of May 1950.
70 “Crisis” comes from the Greek krinein or “decide”. “’Crisis’,” in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2010).
72 A methodological note for this section. I am not intending to give a comprehensive account of European current affairs. That would require a more thorough analysis of the media. It would also call for an outline of periods of time, regions of Europe and, indeed, the topics themselves. Furthermore, I am not even attempting a current affair account. Finally, I am not pretending that the reports that appear on the media can equate to, say, official communiqués from government institutions or agencies. My only intention is to give snapshots of situations that I consider emblematic of Europe’s crisis today (and that change and update constantly with fresh information, like any other journalistic news). These snapshots will, it is my hope, help the reader to situate the ideas of this paper within the very real context of European public affairs. I thank very helpful comments by Dr Breda and Dr Jenkins regarding my methodology.
73 In August and September 2010, a heated controversy arose around the decision by the French government to deport hundreds of Roma people to Romania. Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, likened the deportations to those made by Germany during the Second World War. France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy responded ironically that maybe Luxembourg (Ms Reding’s own country) should open its doors to the Roma people. Italy complained that France was able to get away with Roma expulsions, whereas in 2008 the Commission had threatened Italy with legal action if it implemented similar measures. See: Jan Puhl, “Unwanted in France, Unloved in Romania - a Desperate Homecoming for Deported Roma,” Spiegel Online, no. 31 August 2010, 2:18pm (2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,714649,00.html. Yet “Roma” and “Romanian” do not mean the same. “Deporting Roma to Romania” showed at least ignorance. Roma people are the largest minority group in Europe. Traditionally they have spoken Romany, an Indo-Aryan language derived from Sanskrit. They seem to have migrated from the Rajasthan region of India to North Africa and Europe via the Iranian plateau about 1,000 years ago. Most of them are European citizens, with sizeable populations in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as in the Balkan countries, Turkey, and other countries and regions in the world. A large proportion of the Roma community in the EU is disproportionately affected by unemployment, extreme poverty, poor housing, low health standards and difficult access to education. Today there are between 10 and 12 million Roma living in the EU. Their religious affiliation varies according to the country where they live. See: J.P. Liégeois and Council of Europe, Roma in Europe (Council of Europe Pub., 2007), 77-86. They speak Romany, the language of the country where they live, or a mixture of both. For insightful studies see: A. Bancroft, Roma and Gypsy-Travellers in Europe: Modernity, Race, Space, and
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Exclusion (Ashgate, 2005). and especially I.F. Hancock, We Are the Romani People (University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002). Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, likened the deportations to those made by Germany during the Second World War. France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy responded ironically that maybe Luxembourg (Ms Reding’s own country) should open its doors to the Roma people. Italy complained that France was able to get away with Roma expulsions, whereas in 2008 the Commission had threatened Italy with legal action if it implemented similar measures. See: Honor Mahony, “Italy to Raise Eu Citizen Expulsion Policy at September Meeting,” Euobserver.com(2010), http://euobserver.com/?aid=30637.


Or even, in an extreme case, cease to exist as such: become a non-democratic society via democracy, i.e. as a result of a democratic decision making process, as happened, arguably, in the Gaza strip in 2006.

My translation.

"Muslims in Germany," (Der Spiegel, 2010).


Sarrazin ceased to be a member of the Bundesbank’s Executive Board on the 30th of September 2010. Charges to expel him from the Social Democratic Party of which he remains a member, were dropped after he apologised: “Firebrand Politician Can Remain a Social Democrat,” Der Spiegel Online, 22 April 2011 2011.

David Crossland, "Renegade Central Banker 'Tells Devastating Story' of Integration," Spiegel Online no. 31 August 2010, 2:12pm, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,714839,00.html.

Ibid.

Bode, "Sarrazin’s Integration Demagoguery."


Though not an EU country, it is strongly connected with many of its members, and is experiencing similar phenomena. For instance the far-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is promoting successfully the automatic expulsion of foreign (non-traditional Swiss resident) criminals. Tony Paterson, “Swiss Referendum Set to Support Deportation of Foreign Criminals,” The Independent(2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/swiss-referendum-set-to-support-deportation-of-foreign-criminals-2144024.html.


If we take “civilisation” as meaning “the society, culture, and way of life of a particular area” in this case Europe. See: “Civilisation,” in Oxford Dictionaries (2010).


This is already happening in Russia, Ukraine and possibly other countries. I thank John Besemer for pointing out this information to me.

With a few exceptions, like that of Japan. See: "The Japan Syndrome," The Economist(2010),
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http://www.economist.com/node/17522568


98 Just as contrast, it can be remembered that a decade before the European communities were founded, another minority was suffering appalling treatment: Jews were being persecuted and exterminated in the heartland of what today is the EU. "Soft Centre. Can a Currency Survive without a State?," The Economist Online, no. 11 Jun 2009 (2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13767419.


101 Jess Sme, "The Eu Has Finally Opened the Door to Economic Union," Spiegel Online, no. 30 September 2010, 2:54pm (2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,720479,00.html.


103 Honor Mahony, "Eu Citizens No Longer See Benefits of Internal Market, Barnier Says," Euobserver.com, no. 22.09.2010 @ 17:41 CET (2010), http://euobserver.com/19/30845


106 Ibid.: 21-23.


109 Ibid.: 34.

110 Maull, "Europe's Decline, Continued," 204.

111 I thank Dr Harvey for suggesting me to specify the meaning of “federal”. From foedus, “league”, and foederare, “alliance”, “federation” can be “a group of states with a central government but independence in internal affairs”, “an organization or group within which smaller divisions have some degree of internal autonomy”, or “the action of forming states or organizations into a single group with centralized control”; “federation noun” Oxford Dictionary of English. Edited by Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press 14 January 2012 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e0290320; “federation” is also “the process, and the resulting institution (a federal system), arising from unification of discrete local entities such as states or associations into one centralised national body. The local bodies may share power with the federation, or relinquish their power to it.” "federation" Australian Law Dictionary / editor, Trischa Mann Australian National University. 14 January 2012 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t317.e1366. Finally, "federal" is the adjective “having or relating to a system of government in which several states form a unity but remain independent in internal affairs”, or as well “of a system of government in which power is divided between a central government and several regional ones.” ("federal adjective" The Canadian Oxford Dictionary. Katherine Barber. Oxford University Press 2004. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press 14 January 2012 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t150.e24372>). Hence “federation” can be understood at least in two ways: (1) as the combination of power sharing arrangements within an alliance, with the parts and the whole negotiating for more or less power in different areas, say education or military defence; or (2) as a political form, where a “federation or a confederation could be part of a continuum, at which extremes could be conceived a completely centralised unitary state, on the one hand, and an intergovernmental organisation with no pool of sovereignty on the other. If this is true, two of the positions (“Euro-federalists” and “supranationalists”) mentioned in this section (2.3) need specification. In sense (1), Euro-federalists arguably would have “the whole” (say the EU) with a bigger share of power and in more areas than supranationalists would like. But the most important difference is in sense (2), and specifically regarding the noun subject of the adjective
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“federal”, or the meaning of the noun “federation”. For in both cases the implied meaning is “a polity”, however for Eurofederalists as they are being presented here federation would mean “a state” (even if a state of states); whereas for supranationalists federation would mean “a stateless (or supranational) polity”. For three different (in time and discipline, yet to a great extent compatible) accounts of supranationalism, see: Schuman, For Europe, 15-27.; Joseph Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism,” Yearbook of European Law 1, no. 1 (1981)., J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991), ———, “Europe: The Case against the Case for Statehood,” European Law Journal 4, no. 1 (1998). And Rainer Bauböck, “Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Surpanational Union,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 2 (2007): 455-64. In Bauböck’s words, “The EU is a federal polity, but not a federal state. It is composed of independent member states and has a common structure of political authority for joint decision-making. But it is also not a mere alliance of states [ie confederacy] or an international organization, with a limited purpose and exclusively intergovernmental procedures for decision-making. It has its own parliament and court, and although the scope of legislation that can be adopted or adjudicated is strictly limited by the EU Treaties, such legislation has direct effect and supremacy over national law.” Bauböck, “Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Surpanational Union,” 457.


116 Weiler, Un’ Europa Cristiana : Un Saggio Esplorativo, 53-84.


118 “(...) We, the Polish Nation, every citizen of the Republic, either those who believe in God as the fountain of truth, justice, good and beauty, or those who do not share this faith but respect those universal values as derived from other fountains, [both] the same in rights and duties in the face of the common good...” (my translation from the Italian, quoted in: ———, Un’ Europa Cristiana : Un Saggio Esplorativo, 70.)

119 Cf Taylor, A Secular Age, 548-56., especially in p. 550: “...but one reading is the obvious, the “natural” one. In the nature of things, that claim is made today most often by protagonists of the “closed” reading, those who see immanence as admitting no beyond. This is an effect of the hegemony of this reading, especially in intellectual and academic milieux. The sense that this reading is natural, logically unavoidable, underpins the power of the mainstream secularization theory, the view that modernity must bring secularity in its train.” A view described earlier in p. 448: “And so we can come to see the growth of civilization, or modernity, as synonymous with the laying out of a closed immanent frame; within this civilized values develop, and a single-minded focus on the human good, aided by the fuller and fuller use of scientific reason, permits the greatest flourishing possible of human beings. Religion not only menaces these goals with its fanaticism, but it also undercuts reason, which comes to be seen as rigorously requiring scientific materialism.”


121 Ibid.: 1058.

122 Ibid.: 1059.

123 Ibid.: 1060.

124 Ibid.: 1059.

125 “Secular Europe and America: Implications for Transatlantic Relations," (2005), http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Secular-Europe-and-Religious-America-Implications-for-Transatlantic-Relations.aspx. According to recent polls 84% of Americans believe in God; more than 80% would vote for politicians who “stand for Christian principles on which the country was founded”; 55% attend religious services at least once a month; 64% want to learn more about their faith; 93% would vote for a politician who would “uphold religious liberty and freedom of conscience”; 76% favour the display of religious symbols on public land; and 76% (to 24%) are more interested in protecting the freedom to practice one’s religion than in stripping government land and institutions of references to religion. Anderson, Beyond a House Divided, 27-41. And, together with religion, there is also, of course, secularism in the United States’ public sphere. No doubt about it.

respondents no longer felt at ease. Neither of these models, assimilation or multiculturalism, is applied in fact. However, a recurrent theme of the consultation was that multiculturalism was a policy with which individuals – and, in particular, women – within minority communities, perceived as if these were single segregation and mutual incomprehension, as well as having contributed to the undermining of the rights of differing only in endorsing separation of the minority from the majority rather than assimilation to it. [72x152] frequently shared the same, schematic conception of society set in opposition of majority and minority, majority. While this was ostensibly a radical departure from assimilationism, in fact multiculturalism recognition of what was perceived as the distinct ethos of minority communities on a par with the “host” paradigm: “In what became the western part of a divided post-war Europe, the experience of immigration of the CoE, there is recognition of this important shift in this analytical and normative

Elements of them combine with aspects of the emerging interculturalist paradigm, which incorporates the best of both. It takes from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes from multiculturalism the recognition of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, critical to integration and social cohesion, of dialogue on the basis of equal dignity and shared values” (emphasis added) In: Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council of Europe, “White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals in: Dignity” (2008),


The cultural diversity of contemporary societies has to be acknowledged as an empirical fact. However, a recurrent theme of the consultation was that multiculturalism was a policy with which respondents no longer felt at ease. Neither of these models, assimilation or multiculturalism, is applied singularly and wholly in any state. Elements of them combine with aspects of the emerging interculturalist paradigm, which incorporates the best of both. It takes from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes from multiculturalism the recognition of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, critical to integration and social cohesion, of dialogue on the basis of equal dignity and shared values” (emphasis added) In: Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council of Europe, “White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals in: Dignity” (2008),


133 Muslims have been around in Europe for centuries. But their growing importance in contemporary Europe and specifically in the EU, is new.


144 Muslims have been around in Europe for centuries. But their growing importance in contemporary Europe and specifically in the EU, is new.


Ibid., 41.

Ibid.

Though religion and culture would seem in this paragraph almost interchangeable, they are different. I thank Professor Bronitt for alerting me of a possible “conflation” of the two concepts. Religion is a particular system of faith and worship."Religion," in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2010).

It may inform the worldview that characterises a particular culture. But it is perfectly possible that some people identifying with that culture, while sharing the general worldview, will not see themselves as belonging to the related religion. And, conversely, it is possible that a religion can live in, and influence, different cultures. Finally, it is impossible for religion to exist in the absence of culture: religion may transcend particular cultures but cannot do without them. See an interesting analysis about the interaction between cultures and religions in: Benedict, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 59-79.

Pierpaulo Donati, "Beyond the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: Recognition through ‘Relational Reason’," International Review of Sociology 19, no. 1 (2009). and ———, “Relational Sociology and the
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Elsewhere, precisely trying to synthesise the ideas about European identity, I have described similar positions only with different names. See: Pablo C Jiménez Lobeira, "Towards a Notion of European Political Identity," Proceedings of the 17th Annual Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics Conference, June 15-17, University of Sydney (2010). The only position not described there was the free-market one, because its proponents are in general little interested in thinking of the EU in terms of political identity. In that study I referred to Manners' explanation of what Schmidt calls 'strategic' approach as "international", where Europe is seen as a normative actor using 'soft power'.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid. She acknowledges, rightly, that "the term itself is not as important as the concept". Schmidt, "Re-Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy*", 26.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Following agreements with the EU to that end.


A creative idea in this vein, for the field of labour policy, proposes making citizenship attainable for migrant workers and so benefit host societies with their improved allegiance. Giovanni Di Lieto, "Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World," in Connecting International Law with Public Law, ed. Nolan Rubenstein, Jenkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). There are many other proponents of differentiated cooperation, and this topic is likely to grow in importance given the eurozone crisis, which does not appear to abate way into Year 2012. For more perspectives see: K. Dyson and A. Sosos, Which Europe?: The Politics of Differentiated Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).


The "founding Six" are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The members of the Nordic Council are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Danish territories) and the Aland Islands (Finnish territory) have associate membership.

176 By no means would I want to give the impression that I am suggesting that the EU continues to grow without limit. Elsewhere I have expressed reservations about conflating “European” and “Cosmopolitan” (see: Pablo C Jiménez Lobeira, “Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach,” Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 12, no. 1 & 2 (2010): 165-66.). How to define that “Europe” noun (and notion) from which the adjective “European” derives and specify “Union” (in EU) is a thorny issue indeed, much controverted and, in the end unsolved, if anything just because Europe is not a mass of land isolated by water, but of course not only due to that (Duvold Berglund, Ekman & Schynick, Where Does Europe End?: Borders, Limits and Directions of the Eu, Sten Berglund ... [Et Al], ed. Sten Berglund (Cheltenham, UK : Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2009.). Yet something can be said about this, when dealing with the issue of potential expansion: Europe comprehends at least the EU countries and at most those in the CoE (47, plus Belarus and arguably Kazakhstan—with part of its territory located west of the Ural River—and the Holy See, which is only an observer in that organisation). However, whereas a CoE vision of Europe should remain in the background, at least in the near future expansion beyond the Western Balkans (Albania plus the parts of the former Yugoslavia which are still not in the EU) where a significant distance of the road has been travelled already (see: {}, 2003 #455)) should be postponed. And this for practical considerations that apply the same to Turkey than to, say, Ukraine or Belarus: the EU is still struggling to “digest” the last member states intakes of 2004 and 2007 in terms of legal structures, economic governance, political democratisation, and social integration. Practical and provisional reasons related more to the EU itself, already stretched in its capacity, than to the importance or “Europeanness” of those countries.

177 The idea of a stateless polity requires an appropriate awareness, and at the same time transcendence of the political categories that have come to us from the nineteenth century. As Lester notes, the emergence of modern nation states gave way to forms of political identity granted by authorities with the monopoly of citizenship (or nationality) in a certain territory, which explain many of our present “immigration problems”. From a liberal perspective, the autonomy of the migrant to move may collide with the autonomy of the national community to set barriers to entrance and to membership. See: Eva Lester, “Disenfranchising the Disenfranchised: The Foreclosure of Allegiance, the Fixing of a Faceless Identity and the Legacy of the Nineteenth Century Globalisation,” in Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World, ed. Nolan Rubenstein, Jenkins (Australian National University: Centre for International and Public Law, 2010), 13. Nation state autonomy (or sovereignty) is used sometimes to coerce outsiders or even insiders, as Boreham has shown certain governments have sometimes done in the name of a state’s self-determination. See: Kevin Boreham, “Allegiance and Identity and Rights: ‘The Indians Are You,'” in Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World, ed. Nolan Rubenstein, Jenkins (Australian National University: Centre for International and Public Law, 2010). See also footnote 111 and 176.


179 Ibid., 18.

180 Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratisation of Europe, 21-36.

181 See: Jiménez Lobeira, "Eu Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)."

182 It is true that in some countries there is, for historical and other, complex reasons that I cannot analyse here, a culture of tax evasion, and a perception of “Europe” as rather good for the national state to raise standards. Yet what I am referring to here is the disposition to be more solidary to those closer to us, in our sub-national region, then our country, then our supra-national region.

183 Weiler’s remarks were advanced during the debate about the creation of a Constitution for Europe (2003).


185 Ibid., 21-22.

186 Ibid., 22. The main reason why Weiler objected to the creation of a European constitution was that this Grundnorm of European constitutionalism and essential feature of the European polity, indeed, could be lost.


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Ibid.: 294.


I am calling the place where the political culture if found, formed and transformed, the public sphere. For Taylor it is “a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these.” The sensed general view that results from the discussions between different people—citizens—in the “space” of the interconnected media becomes “public opinion” (at least for as long as it remains unchallenged). See: Taylor, A Secular Age, 185-86.

For a wonderful and thorough study on the public sphere, which has become point of reference, see: J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT Press, 1991).


For two reasons: first, he has accurately described the problem of a neutral public sphere, realising that “secular” is not always a synonym of “neutral” (i.e. when it becomes “secularist”); secondly, his point of departure is the dominant political cultural view in Europe today (secularism), but he is a moderate; because of that, finally, he has been able to engage in very productive discussions with moderate believers.

Habermas, "Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism*," 23.

Ibid.: 11.

Ibid.: 15-16.

Jürgen Habermas and Ratzinger, Dialectics of Secularization, 77-78.

Of course the converse should be true: religious citizens must also respect the fact that their secular peers do not believe in God or transcendence. But this is usually an unproblematic assumption in the “immanent frame” atmosphere of the West.
