EMOTIONS, MUSIC, AND LOGOS

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Abstract. The article introduces a cognitive and componential view of religious emotions. General emotions are claimed to consist of at least two compounds, the cognitive compound and the affective compound. Religious emotions are typically general emotions which are characterized by three specific conditions: they involve a thought of God or godlike, they are significant for a person feeling them and their meaning is derived from religious practices. The article discusses the notion of spiritual emotions in Ancient theology and compares the idea of it with emotions in music. By referring to the notion of mental language, it is argued that some religious emotions are like emotions in music and as such they can be interpreted as tones of Logos.

In what follows, I first sketch out the general view on emotions as componential and cognitive mental phenomena. I then shift the focus onto specific properties of religious emotions. At the end of this article I make a suggestion that what Ancient theologians called spiritual emotions can be interpreted as tones of Logos. According to the notion of spiritual emotions, there are emotions which cannot be uttered in natural language. They are based on new senses and new kinds of supernatural cognitive contents. According to the idea of music put forward by Peter Kivy in his Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, there are emotions which are not only caused by music but which are in music. By using Kivy’s idea I shall discuss the relation between emotions, music, and Logos.
I. EMOTIONS AS COGNITIVE AND COMPONENTIAL PHENOMENA

Good morning, on July 7

Though still in bed, my thoughts go out to you, my Immortal Beloved, now and then joyfully, then sadly, waiting to learn whether or not fate will hear us – I can live only wholly with you or not at all – Yes, I am resolved to wander so long away from you until I can fly to your arms and say that I am really at home with you, and can send my soul enwrapped in you into the land of spirits – Yes, unhappily it must be so – You will be the more contained since you know my fidelity to you. No one else can ever possess my heart – never – never – Oh God, why must one be parted from one whom one so loves. And yet my life in V is now a wretched life – Your love makes me at once the happiest and the unhappiest of men – At my age I need a steady, quiet life – can that be so in our connection? My angel, I have just been told that the mailcoach goes every day – therefore I must close at once so that you may receive the letter at once – Be calm, only by a clam consideration of our existence can we achieve our purpose to live together – Be calm – love me – today – yesterday – what tearful longings for you – you – you – my life – my all – farewell. Oh continue to love me – never misjudge the most faithful heart of your beloved.

ever thine
ever mine
ever ours 1

This is a letter written by Ludwig van Beethoven to his immortal and ‘unknown beloved’. The identification of Beethoven’s beloved has long been an open issue to some extent. An interesting though controversial account concerning this matter has been given by Maynard Solomon in his Beethoven biography. According to Solomon, the letter is addressed to Antonie Brentano. 2 If so, one encounters here a pretty nice historical curiosity. The founder of modern psychology, Franz Brentano seems to belong to the younger generation of the same family with Beethoven’s unknown beloved. In general introductions such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he is meant to be a nephew of the poet Clement Brentano, who was a brother of Franz, Antonie’s husband. 3

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3 For the Brentano family and its relations to Beethoven see also Denis Matthews, Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
As is well known, Franz Brentano’s notion of intentionality is a basic concept of both psychology and philosophy of mind. Intentionality distinguishes human minds from machines which are just functional. According to the notion of intentionality, the human mind is directed to inner objects, called intentional objects, as believing, wishing and imagining. Intentional objects for their part are mental construals which typically involve some correlate in the extramental world.

For instance, when writing a letter to Antonie Brentano, Beethoven’s loving mind was directed to its inner object that was the image of Antonie Brentano as the object of love. Such an inner object had its correlate, the real and living Antonie Brentano. But the question arises which kind of correspondence there was between an inner and an outer object of love. Was the inner object just a pure copy of the outer object? Well, if you prefer, for instance, some kind of Augustinian theory of sense perception, you can rely on the fact that forms of entities transfer to mind as such as they are. But if you are willing to take the Kantian position, you of course argue that there is no pure mind. The mind is doing something with perceptions as forming them. For this reason the unknown beloved remains unknown even when knowing her name.

The contemporary discussion on emotions in philosophy of mind has strongly paid attention to the intentional character of emotions. For some theories, for instance those put forward by Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum, the intentional object of emotions is so crucial to them that it is almost sufficient to characterise emotions by referring to their intentional aspects. For Solomon and Nussbaum, emotions are judgments. For Solomon emotions are existential judgments that magically change the world. The world is different from the point of view of love and from that of hate, for instance. For Solomon emotions are our personal attitudes to the world. For Nussbaum emotions are judgments of value. Following Nussbaum’s own example: when it was reported to her that her mother was dead, it was grief that made such a state of matters significant and valuable for her.

Judgment theories of emotions in modern discussion have historical predecessors. The Stoic philosophers thought that emotions are judgments of some particular aspect of the world as good or bad. As

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such they are all false. The wise Stoic is not tied to particular aspects of the world but he or she is rather tied to the world as a whole. In order to be a cosmopolitan person, the wise Stoic ought to get rid of emotions. Such a view was regarded as inhuman even in Ancient times. There is, however, a certain wit in the Stoic view. Let us imagine that a world is just a huge supermarket. All kind of sellers are all the time suggesting to you to buy something. A wise person says 'no, thank you, I am concentrating on world peace, women’s rights, ecological matters and so on, I have got bigger things on my mind’. According to my reading, that was exactly what the Stoics argued. For them emotions are suggestions which are leading the mind to nonsense. When getting rid of such matters, the mind is able to face things that are significant for human life. Moreover, even Stoics had the idea of passionate life with their notion of a new kind of intellectual emotions called _eupatheiai_.

I personally believe that even though the judgment theory of emotions is an elucidating one, it is not the whole story of emotions. First, there appear to be emotions that do not involve judgments. A person may have, for instance, a weak feeling that something positive is at hand. He or she does not know what it is and one is not sure whether there is reason to believe or not to believe so. One is feeling _something_, however. He or she has a guessing experience rather than judgment. It is one aspect of judgments that they involve an assent. Many emotions do not involve it. Furthermore, when characterising emotions, there are also other aspects of them to take into an account. Such a strategy is adopted to theories of emotions called componential theories. The early representative of componential theories was that put forward by Aristotle. In contemporary discussion, William Lyons, Ronald de Sousa, Patricia Greenspan and Peter Goldie have advocated theories which are componential and which emphasise the affective character of emotions more than the judgment theory.

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For Aristotle, emotions involve an evaluation stating that something positive or negative is at hand in a relevant way to a person. The former gives rise to a pleasant or unpleasant feeling that is associated usually with bodily changes. These together cause some suggestion to behave in a certain way. In modern discussion for instance William Lyons suggests that typical emotions are constituted by several components such as perception, belief, evaluation, desire, behavioural suggestion, physiological changes and their registrations. For his causal-evaluative theory, in order to be deemed as an emotion, a mental phenomenon has to involve self-regarding evaluation that causes abnormal physiological changes.

My own view is as follows. I call the generic condition of emotions the idea that all emotions involve both a cognitive component and an affective component. Love is sometimes regarded as a mood rather than an emotion. But let us consider shortly what Ludwig van Beethoven felt when loving Antonie Brentano. Components of such a feeling are at least: first, the external object of love, Antonie Brentano, secondly, the perception of Antoine which gives rise to thirdly, the inner object or intentional object of Antonie as interpreted in a certain way, fourthly, the self-regarding evaluation of Antoine which involves some cognitive attitude that Antoine is fascinating just for Ludwig. These four aspects give rise to the affective components. Beethoven felt bodily changes but he also felt some mental changes. It was his soul that was full of love. To be aware of such changes, both bodily and mental, is to feel. The term feeling is on the one hand synonymous to the term ‘emotion’ as well as it seems to me that the German ‘Gefühl’ is not synonymous with but correlates to ‘Gemûtsbewegungen’ in a certain use. In ancient discussion it was noted that affectus, passio, perturbatio and so on refer to the same. The term feeling refers on the one hand to the same mental phenomenon with the term emotion but it on the other hand refers to one crucial component of emotions. Feelings are unanalysable qualia, unpleasant or pleasant states of consciousness by virtue of which one is aware of one’s state.

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8 For Aristotle’s theory, see Simo Knuuttila & Juha Sihvola, ‘How the Philosophical Analysis of Emotions was Introduced’ in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 1-19.
10 Petri Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions (Luther Agricola Gesellschaft, 47) (Helsinki: Luther Agricola Society, 2000).
11 Augustine, De civ. Dei IX. 4
It was claimed above that Beethoven felt love in his soul. One could point out that such an argument involves just a kind of medieval commitment. There is no soul as well as there is not water but a chemical phenomenon. As is well known, there are various views of the soul. Moreover, there is not any common view accepted by all. This is one problem associated with the theory of emotions. Since there is no clear view of what mind is, it is not easy to characterise its movements such as emotions. I myself am influenced by the so called Cartesian framework even though I don't believe that the soul is a distinct substance of its own. But if I have to answer my opinion to John Searle's Chinese room, I would say that a person in the room cannot understand the Chinese language. Let us suppose that you are in a room with boxes and a book containing rules. From the window of the right wall someone is putting things into the room and you are arranging them into boxes following the rules in a book you have. Then you are outputting these boxes from the window of the left wall. People behind that can understand the Chinese language and it appears that the book you had was a grammar of that language. By the help of the book you had arranged boxes in such a manner that produced Chinese sentences. Did you understand that language if you produced it correctly? I think that no. Many people would say yes, however.

Saying 'no' means that you are operating within the Cartesian framework. You are finding understanding and corresponding mental phenomena as black boxes which cannot be explained precisely by material terms. I believe that Spinoza made a nice correction to Descartes' theory. Mind and body refer to the same from a different point of view. But I think that we are not able to explain mental phenomena purely by referring to bodily phenomena. Perhaps mental phenomena are emergent macro properties raised in our brains. Anyway, it makes sense to think like Ludwig Wittgenstein: I feel various emotions but if my skull is opened, who knows whether there are brains or not at all.

II. RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS AS SPECIFIC TYPES OF EMOTIONS

Let us proceed to deal with religious emotions. What is the difference if the unknown beloved in Beethoven's letter is not Antonie Brentano but
God? Is there something different in affective level of an emotion? Does a person feel differently if he or she loves God instead of human being? Are religious joy, sorrow and hope different from general joy, sorrow, and hope?

Let us suppose that typical religious emotions do not involve special affective qualities. Typical religious emotions as feelings are not different from other feelings. Historically, that kind of view has been advocated by authors from Augustine via medieval discussion to William James. According to Augustine, believers feel natural joy when love of God is present, natural hope when it is hidden, natural sorrow when it is disturbed and natural fear when it is in danger. Furthermore, in medieval discussion it was pointed out that if there are two monks who love God, it may be that one is taken to heaven and another put to hell depending on whether their love is caused by the Holy Spirit or not. But one is not able to evaluate the supernatural causation on the affective basis. Loving God caused by a person's own wishful thinking is not a different feeling from loving God caused by the Holy Spirit.

However, to my mind it makes sense to label typical religious emotions as specific type of emotions. As emotions they fulfil what I called the generic condition of emotions. They involve cognitive aspects and affective aspects. As a specific type of emotions they have to fulfil three conditions. First, they have to involve some thought, image, judgment, or idea of God or godlike implicitly or explicitly. Secondly, the cognitive component has to be personally significant for a person feeling the emotion. Thirdly, in order to be deemed a religious emotion, the cognitive component and the personal significance have to derive their meaning from religious practises. For one can feel emotions towards religious objects in such a manner that his or her emotion is not religious. If a person goes to a church and admires statues and paintings there, he or she may say 'how beautiful are the gods here'. So, there is an emotion towards religious objects. But such an emotion do not involve any religious meaning. I do not share here the argument of a Swedish atheist professor of philosophy who played the violin in the chapel orchestra. When asked why an atheist is so eager to play church music, he answered: even I have my right to religious feelings. A person

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13 Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, XIV.
may feel emotions towards religious contents without feeling religiously. I believe a person has to take such emotions religiously if they are to be regarded as religious emotions.\textsuperscript{15}

Taken for granted that religious emotions as felt experiential phenomena do not differ from other emotions, it is their cognitive content taken after the religious fashion that makes them specifically religious. Their cognitive content is associated with the notion of God or godlike, something transcendent that one finds holy. The notion of God is, however, an inner or intentional object of a religious emotion. Usually believers hold that such a notion refers to its correlate in the extramental world. But at least to some extend the extramental or outer object of religious emotions, God, remains as an unknown beloved, as \textit{Deus absconditus}.

As such religious emotions are cognitive. But, are they rational? Are there good philosophical reasons to feel them? Do they involve some epistemological value as it seems to have been argued by English speaking contemporary philosophers such as Swinburne, Plantinga, Alston and some others? Concerning proofs of God, religious emotions may involve some kind of supporting power for argumentation. One could say that because such a large amount of people are feeling them, it could make sense to take religion and its views seriously. It seems to me, however, that religious emotions do not provide any direct and testified knowledge. They are rather interiorisations of what is believed either on the basis or not on the basis of rational argumentation. Moreover, I find pretty speculative both views put forward by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Rudolf Otto according to which all people have kind of religious sense or feeling. There are people who do not feel religious emotions. There are even Christian traditions such as that advocated by Karl Barth according to which it is spiritually misleading to feel religiously.

A person who is an atheist could say to a believer that his or her religious emotion is of course cognitive thanks to its intentional object. According to atheistic point of view there is not, however, any extramental real correlate of the inner object of an emotion. Let us imagine that a person is listening to worship on the radio. While listening to it he or she begins to feel feelings toward God as profound as those Beethoven felt toward his unknown beloved. He or she could point out that it was God who raised those emotions in one's soul. What kind of rational

\textsuperscript{15} Petri Järveläinen, \textit{A Study on Religious Emotions}, pp. 45-70.
argument could a person give to an opponent who argues that those feelings came from drinking too much coffee throughout the worship? Coffee activated the brain of the worship listener and produced a strong mood. Such a mood gave rise to particular emotions. They adopted the notion of God as their intentional object.

The problem here concerns the rational justification of religious emotions. If one cannot explain their cause, the door is open to any kind of counter arguments against them. As an explanation, God is as strong as drinking too much coffee.

Such a problem seems to be one basis for the discussion of emotions in ancient theological thinking. Above all in Alexandrian theology, natural emotions, even natural religious emotions, were not highly valued. Influenced by a Stoic theory of emotions, both Origen and Clement of Alexandria thought that natural emotions such as fear belong to an early and preparatory stage of Christian life. Advanced Christians have reached a state of apathy which means that they are detached from natural emotions. In a state of apathy they are given new kinds of experiences, spiritual emotions that are only metaphorically similar to natural emotions.\footnote{For Origen’s and Clemens’ views, see Petri Järveläinen, \textit{A Study on Religious Emotions}, pp. 72-84.}

In ‘On the First Principles’, Origen maintains that there are two kinds of senses. The first group of senses involves senses that are mortal and human. The second group of senses are immortal and intellectual. They are divine or spiritual senses (\textit{theia aisthesis}). The spiritual senses signify a new kind of ability to apprehend divine matters. The divinised soul, having spiritual senses, is able to have an immediate relation to God.\footnote{Origen, \textit{De Princ} I. 1.9 (ANF 4, p. 245)}

More careful study should be done on this theme, but it seems to me that Origen’s notion of spiritual sense is a historical root of some modern ideas of religion as a natural property of a human being. Even though the theory of \textit{homo religiousus} holds that religion is something natural for people whereas Origen thought that it was something supernatural, the common idea is that there is some kind of specific religious ability of mind in the human constitution that makes religious attitudes possible. From such a point of view, it is not only the cognitive content of religious emotions that specifies them as religious. Moreover, there has to be some specific property of consciousness that is able to direct the mind
toward religious objects in a correct way. For Ancient theologians such as Origen, both the cognitive part of a spiritual emotion and the affective part of it are supernatural. Spiritual people have, so to say, a new kind of supplementary part or vehicle in their brains. According to this view, the Holy Spirit influences both the new kind of cognitive content and also the ability of the mind to apprehend them. One version of this line of thinking is Martin Luther’s notion of faith as *fiducia*. Fiducia is a gift of the Holy Spirit. In his early explanation of Paul’s letter to Galatians, Luther says that fiducia is *affectus certus*, a certain feeling or emotion, of the religious truth that Christ is the Redemptor of a person feeling such faith. If asked the justification of religious emotions within such a tradition, it is the emotion of faith that justifies feeling religiously.18

I find this to be a rather circular view elucidating in the context of the philosophy of religion. In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion, the rational justification of religious belief and epistemological questions have been quite dominating issues. If the justification of religious matters lies in the emotions, it is hard to find them to be particularly strong arguments within the discussion of rational argumentation. If emotions are taken seriously, it is not easy to regard religion itself as an argumentative form of life. If God can be apprehended by emotions and furthermore religious convictions and interiorisations are tied to emotions, rational argumentation for or against religion appears to be problematic. Rational argumentation is problematic since its notion of religion is problematic. Perhaps religion is not a particularly argumentative form of life at all.

Adopting the view of religion as a non-argumentative form of life leads to the view called fideism. There are different types of fideism. In my mind, religious attitudes are based on emotions. In order to make use of the idea put forward by Eva-Maria Dühringer and Ruth Tietjen, I think that religious attitudes are emotion-based judgments which give rise to judgment-based emotions.19 For this reason the term judgment in religious content is associated with a different significance than that of rational judgment. If a person feels that there is a God, he or she is experientially committed to the judgment-like utterance

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18 Martin Luther, WA II, in *Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius 1519* (D Martin Luther’s Werke 2) (Weimar: Herman Böhlau, 1884), p. 458.
‘there is a God’, but it is based on an emotion and not on the genuine rational justification of judgment. Religious attitudes are emotional judgments. They are not based on rational calculation or evidence given by methodologically justified research but on emotion. Religious people are feeling that religious matters are true or at least significant for them. Usually religious attitudes are not born in such a manner that a person first calculates in his or her mind whether religious sentences are true or not. Rather, religious attitudes are born experientially. To hold such a fideistic view does not necessarily involve a view according to which religious attitudes are totally autonomous attitudes. To put the idea in Wittgensteinian terms, a religious language game is its own and it does not make shifts in the game of rational argumentation. It, however, has some relation to it. If the game of rational argumentation proves that there is no possible world in which religious emotions make sense, such a proof could be very problematic from the point of view of religious faith. Religious faith in its mainstream forms supposes that religious sentences refer to something real.

III. SPIRITUAL EMOTIONS AS TONES OF LOGOS

One problem associated with spiritual emotions in ancient theology is that, according to advocators of this view, spiritual emotions are only analogous to natural, general emotions. Moreover, they cannot be uttered in natural language. The question arises, are they a kind of private language in the Wittgensteinian sense? To be sure, Origen and others did not think so. For them spiritual emotions belong to the new language used by Logos and they can be felt by virtue of new senses.

In order to make use of that kind of idea, I am now willing to sketch out rather personal and speculative idea on religious emotions.

Let us take seriously the idea that there are religious or spiritual emotions that are not expressible in language. Furthermore, let us take seriously the idea that there are religious emotions which are different from every other kind of emotion. Language here means linguistic and propositional language such as German, English, and Finnish, and the common rules of them.

Ancient theologians pointed out that there are also other kind of languages besides linguistic languages. In modern thinking from William of Ockham to Jerry Fodor, some authors have suggested that besides
linguistic languages there is something called the mental language.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, it is commonly argued that there is universal language called music. All people have mental language and all people understand the language of music but they cannot translate their content to linguistic languages.

In explaining Aristotle’s notion of spoken language as a symbol of mental effects, Boethius pointed out that there are three types of languages: written, spoken, and mental languages. The idea put forward by Boethius was adopted by medieval discussion. On the basis of it, William of Ockham employed the theory of language of thought. For Ockham, the language of thought was not to express silently in mind utterances of spoken language. It was the presupposition of natural language rather. According to Ockham’s view, there are pronomines, predications and objects in the language of thought. But it consists of moods and mental states also.\textsuperscript{21} It seems to me that he meant something like this. If one says ‘Beethoven wrote a letter,’ the meaning is different than if someone says the same proposition like this: ‘Beethoven wrote a letter?’ The change of meaning here is explained by virtue of properties in the language of thought.

In medieval discussion it was supposed that angels are using the language of thought when they are sending messages to each other. The special issue concerned the question of how to express the syntax of the language of thought. Far later, Gottlob Frege tried to write the syntax of such a language by logical symbols. The most well-known advocate of the theory of the mental language in contemporary philosophy is Jerry Fodor. He supposes that learning natural languages is based on the fact that we have language already, before learning one’s mother language. Language skills are based on an internal code that consists of symbols and mental processes within symbols. Fodor does not seem to believe that such a code can be opened.\textsuperscript{22}

I find Ockham’s notion that moods are included in mental language interesting. Moods are usually regarded as properties of experiences associated with music. Could one think that music is part of mental language? Moreover, music is of interest in this respect because it


\textsuperscript{21} William of Ockham, \textit{Quodlibet}, V, pp. 8-10.

\textsuperscript{22} Jerry Fodor, \textit{The Language of Thought} (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1975).
is possible to open its code as notation. As a matter of fact, Boethius claimed that analogously with language, there is played, listened and inner, mental music. Music is organised voice. It is formed by kinds of propositions, so called phares. It is interesting here that even though musical propositions seem to say something, they can be expressed only by playing or singing. They can be written by musical notation, and every composer knows how to write for instance melancholic or joyful music.

In the history of philosophy, the great debate has been concerned with the relation of music and emotions. Usually all suppose that music has something to do with emotions. The mode system in ancient times was meant to express emotions. The affect theory that was adopted for instance by Johan Sebastian Bach had a similar target. According to the affect theory of music, music influences bodily senses which are registered by the soul. Many philosophers have, however, insisted that music does not cause emotions. Such a view was adopted by the Stoics who thought that musical effects are associated with bodily sensations and do not form any of the judgments crucial for emotions. It seems that such a view was adopted also by Immanuel Kant. In modern discussion, some have argued that music does not cause emotions since it does not involve cognitive propositions as intentional objects for emotions. I find such a view wrong. I think that musical structure or the syntax of music correlates with propositions and affects a listener.

Ludwig van Beethoven was one of those first to argue that music does not belong to the lower sensational area of the human constitution but it is even more exact tool to apprehend reality than sciences. That kind of view was employed by Schopenhauer too. In contemporary discussion, Peter Kivy had advocated a philosophical theory of music according to which it reveals something new of reality. For Kivy, music is an intellectual phenomenon including emotions. In his An Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, Kivy points out that the emotionality of music reminds us of when one claims that yellow is a joyful colour. When claiming so, yellowness is supposed to involve joy as one of its qualities. Emotions in music are raised, however, as emergent phenomena of music from its complex forms. They may have some evolutionary basis. Because music seems to involve a lot of emotions which do not have any correlate among other emotions, it cannot be reduced to some evolutionary forms.

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23 I am following here Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
however. Emotions and moods in music are learnt by just listening to music. Perhaps major and minor are reflecting general joy and sadness but what is the reference of A major or d minor? For Kivy, they have their peculiar or own mood or emotion. In order to understand it, one must listen to A major or d minor. For this reason, music, for Kivy, is a black box. There is no outer explanatory tool to understand it.²⁴ People who cannot feel musical emotions cannot understand what they are just as, according to ancient theologians, people who don’t feel spiritual emotions cannot understand what they are.

One path of thinking is to say that the emotion of A major is just in brains and at the same time it is something that is in the physical reality of voices. For instance, Boethius thought that inner music is cosmic music at the same time: what is in mind is something that is in the structure of the world.

Let us return to the philosophy of religion. Augustine says in his *De Trinitate* that the heart is speaking words in no-language.²⁵ Correspondingly, Origen tells us in his commentary for Songs of the Songs that the soul has to sing first all six songs full of light and joy in order to reach the Song of the Songs.²⁶ These remarks remind us of the mystery of music. If cosmic music really is both in mind and in the structure of the world as Boethius argued, in Christian religious context it belongs to logos. Logos is namely the structure of the world by which God has created the world. If so, Logos is not speaking just German, English and Finnish. Logos is not only the linguistic structure of the world but something more. From this point of view Logos is also image and tone. And if so, religious emotions are tied to the tones of Logos.

²⁵ Augustine, *De Trin.* XV, 10-11.