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WHAT CAN ANYONE SAY SO FAR ON THE PEIRCE-CJC RELATION?

Robert Junqueira

Raising the Question

At the center of our focus is Charles Sanders Peirce, an extraordinary American thinker of whom Roman Jakobson (†1982) is reported to have declared that he was “much too good” for Harvard University.1 Outstanding thinkers such as Christine Ladd-Franklin (†1930), Thorstein Veblen (†1929), and John Dewey (†1952) were his students. It remains the case today that Peirce is “something of a cult figure, with his bearded portrait occasionally decorating T-shirts.”2

Peirce, who many consider having founded philosophical pragmatism,3 is often referred to as the pioneer behind semiotics as it is understood and practiced nowadays.4

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2 Sebeok, “Foreword,” xii.
Semiotics has no shortage of definitions to be found in scholarly literature. We can find all kinds of definitions and then there are a couple more. As Göran Sonesson (†2023) said, “It is impossible to establish a consensus among all semioticians on what semiotics is all about.” Indeed it is, but it is worth noting a few fine instances here in which quite a bit of common ground emerges, despite the specificities of each particular example:

“Semiotics is (...) the theoretical accounting for signs and what they do;”

“Semiotics is both a science, with its own corpus of findings and its theories, and a technique for studying anything that produces signs;”

“Semiotics is the field devoted to the study of signs—what they are, how they are used, and what must be true of a world in which signification, interpretation and meaning are possible;”

“While semiotics is concerned with signs, which is directly similar to code, semantics is concerned with its message, sense and meaning;”

“Semiotics focuses on signs, or signifying systems, and subsequently anything can be considered a sign;”

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“Semiotics is an inclusive term for various research efforts, but all versions of semiotics concern signs;”¹²
“Semiotics is the study of signs, sign systems and meaning;”¹³
“Basically, semiotics deals with signs.”¹⁴

Semiotics revolves around signs. All human activities are conditioned and driven by the action of signs of this or that kind. Consequently, all such activities are within the purview of the general studies on signs, that is, semiotic studies. Accordingly, it seems hardly surprising to observe that Peirce's definition of the sign constitutes one of his most critical inputs to the research community. Indeed, a vast body of research has been devoted to studying Peirce's account of signs,¹⁵ i.e., the object of semiotics; or likewise “semiotic logic.”

For Peirce, to say semiotics is to mean logic in another fashion and the other way around. A number of distinguished experts in the field have embraced this formulation (semiotic logic) in referring to Peirce's semiotics. Peirce has indeed indicated that logic is "synonymous with semeiotic, the pure theory of signs in general," and also that "in the present state of knowledge logic should be regarded as coëxtensive [sic] with General Semeiotic."  

So, how does Peirce define the sign? Peirce's understanding of the sign is diversified and went through a nuanced evolution throughout the years, nevertheless preserving its fundamental three-dimensional quality. Let us

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16 Deledalle, Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs, 78; Martin Švantner, “Struggle of a Description: Peirce and His Late Semiotics,” Human Affairs 24/2 (April 1, 2014) 204, https://doi.org/10.2478/s13374-014-0220-2.


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turn to a very select sample of those definitions of sign that Peirce presented:

A sign is “anything which represents something else, its Object, to any mind that can interpret it so;”\(^{20}\)

“anything which being intelligently determined by an Object in its turn intelligently determines an Interpretant, which thus becomes mediately determined by the Object;”\(^{21}\)

“a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object;”\(^{22}\)

“something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C;”\(^{23}\)

“something which in some measure and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign;”\(^{24}\)

“a thing which serves to convey knowledge of some other thing, which it is said to stand for or represent;”\(^{25}\)

“an object which stands for another to some mind;”\(^{26}\)


such a thing that has “three references: first, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that thought it is equivalent, third, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object.”

Peirce was constantly on the hunt for new ways to articulate his ever-evolving understanding of the sign. Keeping in mind the variations in wording, the maturity and development evident in Peirce’s understanding of signs through the years, his definition bears a close resemblance to that proposed by John Poinsot (†1644) [also known as John of St. Thomas, the religious name he adopted in Madrid on July 18, 1610].

Poinsot regarded the doctrine of signs to be of the utmost concern and defined the sign as “that which represents something other than itself to a knowing power (id, quod representa aliud a se potentiae cognoscenti),” which is a paraphrase of an earlier definition requiring no different translation: “in general terms (in communi),” the sign is “id, quod potentiae cognoscitivae aliquid aliud a se representa.”

Poinsot claimed to have formulated the definition of the sign in such a “general” (communiter) fashion “so as to include all the kinds of signs (ut complectemur omnia signorum genera),” regardless of the relation taken into account in the sign: signs should always fall under such a definition, no matter the angle, i.e., be it from that of the relation between

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28 As to more than one possible scenario concerning the details of Poinsot’s passing, see Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985) 31.

29 José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016) 26. For a recent rationale for employing the baptismal name see also 14-15.


32 [1632] Poinsot, *Tractatus de Signis*, 116; see also 125.
what signifies and what interprets, be it from that of the relation between what signifies and what is signified.\textsuperscript{33}

That a late Scholastic such as Poinsot cared so much for matters semiotic ought to be of little surprise, since in Late Scholasticism “the sign and representation were regarded as a universal cognitive instrument (...) relevant for the analysis of natural causality, social institutions, artistic production, cognition, and communication.” Let us keep on reading Yulia Nikitenko:

In other words, the doctrine of signs served as a philosophical method employed for understanding the human being in both natural and social aspects. On the one hand, it provided a key for understanding the relation between the intellect and reality; on the other, it was crucial to the understanding of the \textit{esse morale}, of the moral life as being determined and structured by signs and meanings.\textsuperscript{34}

No matter how significant the common ground between Peirce and Poinsot is, it remains a fact that the former was wholly ignorant of the latter's writings.\textsuperscript{35} John Deely (†2017) kept on making this claim throughout his later career, for as he went on finding commonalities between the doctrines of both authors, Deely felt compelled to further insist that the

\textsuperscript{33} See Mário Garcia, “Reflexão Sobre a Natureza e Divisão Do Sinal Na Lógica de João de S. Tomás,” \textit{Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia} 31/3 (1975): 301–304. We should also point out that the relation between what interprets (X) and what is signified (Y) is precisely what we are in fact studying when we study the relations between what signifies (Z), and the other two elements of the triadic sign-relation. So, the relations held between Z and non-Z (Z-X and Z-Y) are, to be sure, a whole new Z regarding the relation between X and Y.


insights Peirce and Poinsot shared are to be understood as the result of an identically sound development of the doctrine of a common source.\(^{35}\)

Poinsot and Peirce's definitions of the sign, especially from the standpoint of their triadic nature, happen to thoroughly correspond to that of the CJC (Coimbra Jesuit Course): “anything which represents something other than itself to a knowing power (omne id, quod potentiae cognoscenti aliquid a se distinctum repraesentat).”\(^{37}\)

Admittedly, it should also be borne in mind that, unlike Peirce, Poinsot read the Segovian Domingo de Soto (†1560), who provided a definition of the sign that, besides preceding that of the CJC by about 77 years (1529-1606), corresponds to some degree to that of Poinsot.\(^ {38}\) Anyway, Poinsot was quite conversant with Soto and all the more so with the CJC,\(^ {39}\) while Peirce was not acquainted either with Soto or Poinsot.

Perhaps Peirce read the CJC and proceeded from there to unfold his understanding of the sign in general? What can anyone say so far on the Peirce-CJC relation?

**Introductory Development**

“CJC” stands for a close cooperative inquiry among Portuguese Jesuit philosophers, a set of eight volumes written by Manuel de Góis (†1597), Cosme de Magalhães (†1624), Baltasar Álvares (†1630), and Couto, the latter being the author of “the first systematic 17th-century treatise on (...}


semiotics,” a 1606 treatise only recently translated by John Doyle (†2016) into English and by Amândio Coxito (†2017) into Portuguese.

Deely rated Couto’s *doctrina signorum*—although there are no qualms about the fact that Deely did not fail to widen such a rating to the entire CJC—as “one of the major pieces in the puzzle of how to see the Latin Age of philosophical development as a whole in its own right, not merely as a lengthy footnote to or development in function of the ancient Greek heritage.”

“*Doctrina signorum*” is interchangeable with “semiotics.” The latter is the name used after John Locke (†1704) and Peirce to refer to the subject area to which the medievals called, in their specialized jargon, “doctrine of signs” (*doctrina signorum*). The latter was “adopted by both Locke and Peirce as a synonymous amplification of “semiotics” as a proper name.”

“Latin Age” stands for the western scholarly Middle Ages, an expression made popular in philosophical historiography by Deely, who has employed it recurrently at least since 1981; comprises the entire span from the mid-fourth century to the mid-seventeenth century; and is said to be “the very Age that the moderns fell into error trying to bury.”

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41 Couto, *The Conimbricenses*.
44 Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding*, 362.
46 See John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Censoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2016),
The CJC is claimed to be among the finest examples of late Latin scholarly outputs.\textsuperscript{48} The volumes of the CJC were published for the first time between 1592 and 1606 either in Coimbra or Lisbon,\textsuperscript{49} summing up over three thousand pages, 73\% of which are concerned with natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} J. Raymond Zimmer, “A Comedy of Eras: Tiered Nested-Sign Diagrams of Cenoscopic and Ideoscopic Ways of Thought from Deely’s Descartes and Poinset,” in Semiotics (Semiotic Society of America, 2009) 444, https://doi.org/10.5840/cpsem200963. We will turn to this issue later.

\textsuperscript{48} This point is made insistently in Deely, Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinset).


Designed for the philosophy syllabi of the numerous colleges of the Society of Jesus throughout the globe\(^51\) and having been edited no fewer than 112 times and almost invariably in territories outside of Portugal,\(^52\) the CJC undividedly deals with philosophy, aiming at commenting on Aristotle's (†322 BC) works.

To produce philosophical commentaries is such a patently philosophical behavior that it can only in a rather “naïf or ignorant” way be mistaken for mere replication.\(^53\) As a matter of fact, dissimilarly from solely restating previous philosophical works, manifold philosophical commentators perform analysis, engage in critical dialogue, provide explanations, and start brand-new discussions.

Through the production of philosophical commentaries, according to Pinharanda Gomes (†2019), the Society of Jesus—which has its genesis in 1534, a time in relation to which we already hear mention of the existence of a Second Scholasticism, aimed at reinvigorating the older tradition\(^54\)—was bound to update not only Thomism but also Aristotelianism in order to meet the challenges of an epoch of intense dynamism.\(^55\)

At the time Góis, Álvares, Magalhães, and Couto were composing the CJC, “to philosophize in the school of Aristotle was to have access to the most cutting-edge knowledge.”\(^56\) The CJC not only grows flesh on Aristotle's bones but it is also equipped with a whole arsenal of earlier Aristotelian commentaries, tapping into both the mainstream and shadowy voices of Arab, Greek, and Latin literary holdings.\(^57\)

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\(^{51}\) Mário Santiago de Carvalho, “Cursus Conimbricensis,” in Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019), https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3234133. On the relation between the Latin-age Coimbra school and Japan, we eagerly await the results of the doctoral inquiry of Mitsutake Ikeda, a researcher who is a member of the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra.

\(^{52}\) Espírito Santo, Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás), 23.


\(^{54}\) Espírito Santo, Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás), 30–32.

\(^{55}\) Gomes, João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII, 12.

\(^{56}\) Carvalho, “Cursus Conimbricensis.”

\(^{57}\) Pinharanda Gomes, Os Conimbricenses (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1992), 73–75.
It may be argued that to learn from the CJC is, even nowadays, to be *au courant* with the most sophisticated philosophical teachings.\(^{58}\) Moreover, the acknowledgment of the value of the CJC is multifarious and crosses the centuries. Even in the heat of the Portuguese expulsion of the Society of Jesus in 1759 and its worldwide suppression in the ensuing decades,\(^{59}\) the CJC kept being openly eulogized, as exemplified by Luis Antonio Verney (†1792).

Indeed, in the fourth edition of Verney's *De Re Logica*, published in Naples in 1769 and translated into Portuguese by Coxito, the author—a sharp critic of Scholasticism\(^{60}\) who is hardly famous for his affinity with Jesuit education—declares that the Jesuits Pedro da Fonseca (†1599) and the authors of the CJC are among the rare instances of didactic excellence he was aware of in the field of philosophy.\(^{61}\)

In our times some claim that special attention should be paid to the CJC due to the fact that it contains sound and highly topical theses—plus all that remains unresearched about the multitude of authors and traditions that have absorbed some of their most vibrant knowledge from the CJC, as is the case regarding the Poinsot-CJC relation\(^{62}\)—some of which have not yet been properly understood by the vast majority of the community of inquirers. Consider one example:

Let me emphasize this point as firmly as I can. Once it becomes clear that ‘all thought is in signs’ (the realization first formulated by Poinsot’s teachers, the Conimbricenses, but credit for which these days is assigned customarily to

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\(^{59}\) Gomes, João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII, 13.


\(^{61}\) Verney, 570–71.

Peirce), it becomes further clear that all objects are objects signified, or, to suppress the redundancy, that all objects are significates. Not all things are significates, but all objects are.\(^\text{63}\)

No matter how deep and far-reaching the pages of the CJC are, we should be significantly careful in case we ever feel tempted to attribute first occurrences in intellectual history to the authors of the CJC without first double-checking the works of preceding authors such as Fonseca or los maestros of the Salamanca School, particularly Soto.\(^\text{64}\)

The names of Fonseca and Soto should be emphasized, considering the prominence they achieved in and beyond the Iberian world. Deely argued that, after the latter, “the author who more than any other seems to have been responsible for bringing about the focus that led to the successful resolution of the problem of the sign as Augustine of Hippo (†430) had launched it was the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca.”\(^\text{65}\)

The said “problem” has been pointed out at least since the thirteenth century, in light of the penetrating insights of Thomas Aquinas (†1274)—who is credited for having grasped properly the importance of coming up with a definition of the signum broader than Augustine’s\(^\text{66}\) —, but also those of Robert Kilwardby (†1279), Roger Bacon (†1292), and others who stepped onto the scene later on.\(^\text{67}\) The problem here has to do with the fact that what is truly essential to the being and function of a sign is not that it be something perceived, as Augustine’s definition would require, but merely that it be an element of awareness bringing into further awareness something

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\(^{64}\) Mário Santiago de Carvalho Personal communication 2020, April 28; see also John Deely, “A Sign Is What? A Dialogue between a Semiotist and a Would-Be Realist,” *The American Journal of Semiotics* 20/1-4 (2004) 42; see also Ashworth, “The Historical Origins of John Poinset’s Treatise on Signs.”

\(^{65}\) Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding*, 441; see also Robert Junqueira, “Pedro Da Fonseca in a Research Lead Dropped by John Deely,” *Academia Letters*, August 2021, Article 3086.


\(^{67}\) Ashworth, “The Historical Origins of John Poinset’s Treatise on Signs,” 138.
besides itself, something that it itself in the awareness is not. Augustine's
definition, in logical terms, is defective by reason of being too narrow. It
leaves out a part of what is to be defined. 68

Fonseca authored the Dialectical Instructions and the Isagoge Philosophica, 69 the former being a masterpiece flowing from an
unconditional take on Aristotelianism 70 which had more than 50 editions
as early as 1624 71 and was translated—same as the Isagoge 72—by Joaquim
Ferreira Gomes (†2002) into Portuguese. 73

Whether the writings and remaining activities of the “Portuguese
Aristotle”—that is, Fonseca—had a significant impact or not on the
community of inquiry entertains no debate. Fonseca was even considered
the most relevant figure in the modest though underestimated
philosophical tradition developing in the Portuguese geographical and
cultural landscape. 74 Fonseca’s status in the framework of the history of
philosophy in Portugal is due to his profound doctrinal perusals, not solely

68 Deely, Four Ages of Understanding, 223.
69 Respectively Pedro da Fonseca, Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo
(Lisboa: Ioannis Blauij, 1564), http://www.conimbricenses.org/pedro-da-fonseca/
and Pedro da Fonseca, Isagoge Philosophica (Lisboa: A. Alvarez, 1591),
70 Gomes, Os Conimbricenses, 71–72.
71 Deely, Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age, 348.
72 Pedro da Fonseca, Isagoge Filosófica, trans. Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, Cultura
Portuguesa (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1965).
73 Pedro da Fonseca, Instituições Dialécticas, trans. Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, 2
vols., Cultura Portuguesa (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1964). The
Lusophone readership can have access to detailed research on Fonseca in António
Manuel Martins, Lógica e Ontologia Em Pedro Da Fonseca (Lisboa: Fundação
Calouste Gulbenkian; Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica,
1994); for an English-language introductory reading on Fonseca see Mário
Santiago de Carvalho, “Fonseca, Pedro Da,” in Conimbricenses.Org
Encyclopedia, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra:
English-language collection of essays devoted to Fonseca is Simone Guidi and
Mário Santiago de Carvalho (eds.), Pedro Da Fonseca. Humanism and
Metaphysics (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023).
74 Amândio Coxito, “Introdução,” in Estudos sobre filosofia em Portugal no
to his remarkable productivity nor primarily to his involvement in setting up the conditions for the CJC to come to light.

Yet, it is worth highlighting here the leading role played by Fonseca in terms of the advent of the CJC. The CJC was thought of “to serve as a base for the Course in Philosophy in which the commentaries of the Aristotelian texts and connected questions prescribed by the statutes of the University of Coimbra would be adequately treated,” so a commission was nominated, “and presided over by Pedro da Fonseca.” António Martins goes on:

Pedro da Fonseca, with his demand for rigor, immediately proposed that the composition of the course should not begin without first making a detailed and up-to-date study of the most relevant works, as well as the most important difficulties effectively felt by the students and teachers in their pedagogic practice.75

Both the CJC and its authors, together with Fonseca, Poinsot, and many others, belong to the Scholastic tradition, i.e., what the Modern Age philosophers, on the heels of what has been referred to as “Descartes’ madness,”76 pushed into the shadows of memory to such a degree that a whole lengthy period of Western history has become infamous under the sign of darkness, a prejudice still hanging over us today.

A cliché about Western and particularly European medieval times is that “[l]ack of knowledge and lack of tolerance were some of the dark attitudes which prevailed in those days.”77 This is one illustration of the kind of modern construction that also taught that the Scholastic inquirers brought no benefit to the evolution of science, rendering the history of

science badly incomplete (a gap that only recently has begun to be bridged).78

So the result was an at least partial blackout of historical consciousness, meaning that “folk-thought, superstition, ancient philosophy, mystical traditions, scholasticism and other cogitations” were discredited wholesale, on the grounds that the thinkers associated with such labels cared, in their musings, for the noumenal world, the world of things as they are in themselves, or simply the “realm of uncertainty.”79

Among the expressions of modernity—an age gone haywire, overstating its own worth and the worthlessness of Latinity, an age in declension80—were some relativist, evolutionist, and symbolist trends—as was Kantian idealism, this latter having even remarkably affected professed admirers of Aquinas—and let it be added that these were all trends tendentially sharing a certain antipathy toward Scholasticism.81

Peirce “was well acquainted with the way modern philosophy worked”82 and became proficient in the primary literature of Kantian idealism, the legacy of Immanuel Kant (†1804), quite early in his life.83

So, is there any basis for believing that a person such as Peirce, a well-educated modern scientist (see below), would have ever cared to pay attention to the early modern Scholastic oeuvre of the Coimbra Jesuits? As a matter of fact, one question should be raised prior to that, to wit: would Peirce even be in a position to access the CJC?

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78 For example, in Deely, _Medieval Philosophy Redefined_; a milestone in Portugal was the 2002 publication of the first edition of Mário Santiago de Carvalho, _A Síntese Frágil. Uma introdução à filosofia (da patrística aos conímbricenses)_ , 2nd ed., Recursos em Linha (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2022), https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6345442.
80 For a reminder of how brittle most historical caesuras see Mário Santiago de Carvalho, _Dicionário Do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense_, Skiagraphia’s (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020) 32.
In 1830, before Charles Peirce was born, his grandfather Benjamin (†1831)84 worked as a librarian at the Harvard University Library, which in the same year published *A Catalogue of the Library of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts* (henceforth CLHU). Edited by Benjamin Peirce, the first volume of the CLHU85 systematically indexes the works contained in the institution's public library.

The CLHU is lacking six volumes of the CJC, among which is *On the Whole of Dialectics*, the one on logic. The only two volumes of the CJC to be found in the catalog, as part of a section dealing with Aristotle, are Cologne editions of the 1598 volume *On the Soul* and the 1593 volume *On the Heavens*, respectively published in 1617 and 1603.86

Since Benjamin Peirce's catalog dates from 1830, it is open to question whether Harvard University came into possession—at a later date, but one that still would allow us to hypothesize soundly about Peirce's having access to *On the Whole of Dialectics* at the Harvard University Library—of the other volumes of the Coimbra Course, in particular the volume on logic. Certainly, Peirce's grandfather was aware of the existence of the CJC and greatly treasured the centuries-old masterpieces, such “rare and valuable works” in which “the arts of typography, of engraving, and binding have exhausted all their powers of execution and embellishment.”87 These were the kind of thoughts in Benjamin's writings shortly before passing away.

To be sure, during Peirce's lifetime the Boston area had some reading and writing about the logic of the CJC. We are referring to the 1902 “Some Observations on the Doctrine of Proximate Cause,” authored by Prescott F. Hall (†1921). This text was published in Boston and written in

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84 Peirce’s father is also Benjamin Peirce (†1880). We are most appreciative to Edison Torres, lecturer in History of Science at the Nueva Granada Military University, for having kindly corrected us on February 18, 2023, about a mistake we had made during an event of the Charles S. Peirce Society on account of the homonymy between both father and grandfather of Charles.


86 Harvard University Library, 1:39; see also 189.

Boston as well. Not only does Hall refer to Couto by the Latin version of his name, “Sebastianus Contus,” but he also unequivocally quotes On the Whole of Dialectics, concerning how knowledge is gained as to why something is.

Yet it remains unclear at this point how could Peirce have accessed Couto’s logic, even though there are plenty of possibilities. Who knows if Charles Peirce obtained a copy of Couto’s volume for his private library? Perhaps Peirce would not have needed to travel a long distance within his homeland to get his hands on some of the volumes of the CJC, bearing in mind (i) the fact that the Public Library of Harvard University was not the only library in the institution, and (ii) how rich the Boston area was as far as available study resources are concerned. The witness of Benjamin Peirce is echoing:

Besides the Public Library, there are very respectable libraries belonging to some of the societies in the University; and it may also be mentioned, among the advantages enjoyed at this seat of learning, that within one hour’s walk are various other repositories of learning, particularly the noble collection of the Boston Atheneum, second in extent and value to no other collection, probably in this country, with the exception of Harvard College Library.

Core Inquiry

The CJC has made its way around the world and it is not at all far-fetched to think that Peirce may have been able to access one or more of its volumes. Though the worldwide reach of the CJC is beyond dispute, such an inarguably vast global impact remains mostly unexamined, and is furthermore rather tricky.

A showcase example of this trickiness lies in logic-related topics. Both a genuine and a counterfeit version of the logic volume of the CJC were widely circulated. The latter, printed in Austria, Germany, and Italy.

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91 Carvalho, The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course, 155–57.
92 Respectively Couto, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagirite; Unknown, Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu Commentarii Doctissimi In Universam Logicam Aristotelis
possibly reproduces 1584 lessons of the Jesuit University of Évora, which in turn reproduce Francisco Cardoso's (†1604) lessons proffered in Coimbra in 1571.⁹⁴ Both versions “give us two different stages of the Logic, as taught in Coimbra, by the Jesuits, separated by at least thirty years.”⁹⁵

Though some Jesuits may have illegally sold the manuscript of the 1604 publication to the Hamburg editors, mentioning the Coimbra origin of the volume, it may as well be true that the source of the unauthorized and counterfeit CJC volume was, not a Jesuit, but a German or Italian junior who back then studied at Coimbra or Évora.⁹⁶ So, even if Peirce would have been able to access the CJC and would have bothered to pay attention to Latin works, how to be sure that he did not rely on a counterfeit version, as far as logic is concerned, or even second-hand references?

Would anyone expect Peirce to care about works such as the CJC, considering (i) that Peirce's mother tongue was English, (ii) that his activities took place from the nineteenth to the twentieth century after Latin, the native written language of the CJC, had been pretty much swept away into the seas of neglect, and (iii) his background in the natural sciences and modern philosophy was quite substantial?⁹⁷

Peirce's background is beyond dispute. Peirce was a scientist trained primarily as a chemist, who spent many years doing geodetic research. While doing such research, Peirce based his work on the assumption that

⁹³ Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined*, 356; Carvalho, “Couto, Sebastião Do.”
⁹⁵ Carvalho, “In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae. Editorial History.”
science is always conducted with both an eye on the data gathered by yesterday’s community of inquiry; a second eye on what present-day active peers are up to; and an extra eye open to observing reality first hand.98

Sure, Peirce’s professional research occupations may well fail to make the case for the likelihood of him having studied the CJC, but what about Peirce’s studies concerning semiotic logic and overall philosophy, not least the history of philosophy and science as a whole? Peirce labored a great deal on the history of philosophy, and was also insightful of and very much concerned with matters of historiographical methodology.99

In light of this, it cannot possibly be substantiated that Peirce’s background would trigger any person to become suspicious about the likelihood of him giving his attention or any serious thoughts to the CJC or any other major philosophical opus of the past. And what is more, the CJC has never failed to reach a far-and-wide readership.

Peirce would neither have been quite the first nor would he have been the very last person to have learned from the CJC, all the more so in the latter case when we consider that a whole host of scholars working in the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century have benefited invaluably from their exposure to this benchmark of Coimbra’s wealthy cultural heritage.

From all around the place and regardless of their particular thematic orientations, more and more scholars are now resorting to the CJC, either alluding to its volumes or its authors with high esteem, devoting entire sections of their research outputs to it, or even writing whole works about it.

As can be found in “The Conimbricenses: A Bibliography,”100 there is no shortage of scholars interpreting the CJC. The missionary character of the Society of Jesus, together with the extension of the Portuguese empire, caused the Jesuit treatises to be read all over the planet since shortly after being published for the first time.
It seems unlikely that pivotal players of the Western philosophical, scholarly, and cultural scene, such as Clemens Timpler (†1624) René Descartes (†1650), Christoph Scheibler (†1653), Locke, Gottfried W. Leibniz (†1716), Karl Marx (†1883), and many others did rely on one or multiple volumes of the CJC to inform their studies.\(^{102}\)

The tangible and intangible pages of the CJC are true international waters. Shortly after being published, these waters were already being eagerly sailed by Catholics from all over the place, as well as by the authoritative German Protestant tradition, both Calvinists and Lutherans, and they quickly became very popular across the English Channel as well, surely in Cambridge and quite probably in Oxford.\(^{103}\)

And Asia should not be overlooked, from the eve of modernity up to our age, as is evident when considering all the treasures being salvaged from the ocean of history by the community of inquirers working closely in connection with Conimbricenses.org project.\(^{104}\)

None of this indicates that Peirce also became involved with the CJC. Would Peirce be at all willing to spend his time studying the CJC? Strange or maybe not, Peirce had an open ear when it came to Scholasticism. The landscape of the Scholastic Latin scholarship's effect on Peirce encompasses and extends beyond late Scholasticism, for several Latin philosophers have been instrumental in bringing Peirce's monumental corpus well past the narrow margins of modernity.\(^{105}\)

Peirce is said to have “violated the cardinal commandment of modernity: Thou shalt not learn from the Latins.” \(^{106}\)

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individual, one might wonder what led him to break up with modernity and look deep into the history of philosophy. Two plausible reasons are that he needed to find nutriment for the development of his semiotics, plus the fact that he considered “inquiry” to be “a collective enterprise,”107 not excluding those already dead and those not yet living.

Peirce did not consider “inquiry” to be a private affair, but as “a social, cooperative, and cumulative process.”108 In Peircean terms, inquiry is a social venture comprising both the efforts to “settle opinion in the face of doubt” and the “move towards the truth that is approached in the long run,”109 as well as transcending the borders of the different scientific disciplines. In a 1901 monograph titled “On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, especially from Testimonies,” Peirce declared that

... the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe is a third; but all these different conceptions have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to,—agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is the scientific truth.110

From the early stages of his path, Peirce studied the Latins and profoundly respected the science-oriented spirit of Scholasticism. In an 1869 writing entitled “The Spirit of Scholasticism,” Peirce maintained that the Schoolmen did not attribute much weight to the literary refinement of theories. In this aspect, they “resembled modern scientific men,” who cannot be understood by “men not scientific,” and admire theories due to their “minute, systematic, extensive, strict, scientific researches.” Peirce continued:

This same scientific spirit has been equally misunderstood as it is found in the schoolmen. They have been above all things found fault with because they do

not write a literary style and do not “study in a literary spirit.” The men who make this objection cannot possibly comprehend the real merits of modern science. If the words quidditas, entitas, and haecceitas are to excite our disgust, what shall we say of the Latin of the botanists, and the style of any technically scientific work? (...) But above all things it is the searching thoroughness of the schoolmen which affiliates them with men of science and separates them, world-wide, from modern so-called philosophers. The thoroughness I allude to consists in this, that in adopting any theory, they go about everywhere, they devote their whole energies and lives in putting it to tests bona fide—not such as shall merely add a new spangle to the glitter of their proofs but such as shall really go toward satisfying their restless insatiable impulse to put their opinions to the test.111

Not only did Peirce respect the Schoolmen, he rooted his lifetime study of signs in the good old Latin writers. Reports tell us how “characteristically amazed” students customarily get when they realize that Peirce was remarkably sympathetic to medieval Scholasticism.112 However, this hardly implies that Peirce was familiar with what we are concentrating on, i.e. the CJC, a collective body of scholarship that spread far beyond the geographical limits of its origins to become an exemplary work of internationalization in the domain of philosophy broadly construed.

As far as Peirce is concerned, the case of the Portuguese theologian and philosopher Poinsot, philosophically trained in Coimbra under the umbrella of the pages of the CJC,113 is paradigmatic; for even though Poinsot was ranked shoulder to shoulder with Suárez as one of the greatest Latin authors,114 there are no signs whatsoever of Peirce being conversant with Poinsot's works or, indeed, being aware of the very fact that the latter and his works ever existed.

Even though we do realize that Peirce did not read Poinsot's treatise, there are signs that Peirce was acquainted with the CJC. Actually, Peirce is

113 Beuchot and Deely, “Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot,” 554; see also Carvalho, “Cursus Conimbricensis.”
114 Deely, Four Ages of Understanding, 209.
said to have been “very familiar” with the “Conimbricenses.”115 By “Conimbricenses”, Doyle refers to the CJC or their authors. Admittedly it is true that the global community at times seems to be reducing Coimbra's cultural heritage to the CJC. Geographical designations such as “Conimbricenses” or “Coimbra Course” (Cursus Conimbricensis)—as well as CJC for that matter—should be used with caution, considering that such designations include but are not limited to the CJC or their authors.116

Nevertheless, such designations are still very commonly used, the first of which seems to be the closest to Peirce and the remaining English-speaking CJC readership's minds. Whether or not we use “Conimbricenses”, the fact is that some references to the Peirce-CJC relation can be found in the scholarly literature, first and foremost owing to Deely's zealous engagement with all matters philosophical as well as with those key atlases related to the history of philosophy understood as the diachronic breadth of the *doctrina signorum* or, in short, semiotics.

Apart from Deely, a few other authors have noted the Peirce-CJC relation. Yet the bulk of such a handful of studies merely remarked in passing about the Peirce-CJC relation. Deely himself has addressed the matter only in a fairly superficial way. So, what has so far been reported by the community of inquirers on the Peirce-CJC relation?

In a nutshell, all that is said about the Peirce-CJC relation is (i) that Peirce was very well acquainted with the CJC, most notably the treatise on logic in general and the doctrine of signs more particularly, (ii) that Peirce held its authors in high regard, and (iii) that the CJC is the link rendering the Peirce-Poinsot relation more than a mere coincidence.

Nearly all over the literature, the same hypothesis is echoed, with virtually the entire community pointing towards Deely as the one behind the assumption, which the latter puts forth in one of his books in the following manner:

... the Conimbricenses, Poinsot’s as well as Peirce’s teachers in matters semiotic, whence he [Peirce] took up the expression ‘*doctrina signorum*’ or

116 Carvalho, “Cursus Conimbricensis.”
‘doctrine of signs,’ (...) and whence he took up, more importantly, the idea of
the sign as necessarily involving three terms in a single relation.  

While Deely may be right that Couto's treatise provided a stepping
stone for Peirce, as earlier for Poinsot, to arrive at the triadic definition of
the sign understood as a sign-relation, the fact remains that no authoritative
research exclusively focused on the Peirce-CJC relation has been
undertaken up until now. Prior to this research, the community of inquiry
will be unable to achieve growth in this particular respect, at least not to a
sufficient extent as to grant researchers a comfortable sense of soundness
upon which to ease the irritation of doubt and attain belief.

Admittedly, some hypotheses seem more promising than others, and
the assumption that Peirce got his definition of the sign from the CJC is
certainly worth serious consideration. Beyond the evidential degree of
commonality between the CJC and Peirce's definitions of the sign and the
fact that the latter was indeed in direct contact with the work in which such
a definition is proposed, the fact that those experts who endorse the
hypothesis form a truly respectable roster should also be taken into
account.

To nobody's detriment, some of the most prominent among them are
Beuchot and Deely’s “Common Sources...”, Doyle’s “Introduction,”
Beuchot’s Estudios..., Benedict Ashley’s The Way..., Susan Petrilli’s

\[117\] Deely, Purely Objective Reality, 129.
\[118\] We are speaking of Couto, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate
Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritea.
\[119\] Beuchot and Deely, “Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and
John Poinsot.”
\[120\] Doyle, “Introduction.”
\[121\] Mauricio Beuchot, Estudios Sobre Peirce y La Escolástica (Pamplona, España:
Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2002),
https://dadun.unav.edu/handle/10171/5881; but also Mauricio Beuchot, “Peirce y
la escolástica hispánica,” Revista anthropos: Huellas del conocimiento, 212
\[122\] Benedict M. Ashley, The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and
Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics, Thomistic Studies (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).
“Working…”, 123 Carvalho’s *The Coimbra…*, 124 Martine Bocquet’s “Le triangle…”, 125 Susana Pérez’ “La Memoria…”, 126 and Michal Karl’a and Tuuli Pern’s “Early-Modern…”. 127

By and large, Ashley, Petrilli, and all others do not claim much more than merely mentioning the Peirce-CJC relation, in many cases under Deely's authority, and usually only regarding the definition of the sign, which is maybe the most significant though the least well-grounded—in light of Peirce's references to the CJC (see below)—of all the aspects of Peirce's semiotic logic that could be claimed, based on the current state of the art, to draw on the CJC.

Above we bypassed most of Deely's works in which the Peirce-CJC relation is brought up without going any deeper into the matter than in *Medieval Philosophy Redefined*, 128 where the author goes in-depth about the CJC but has very little about the Peirce-CJC relation. So from the secondary literature, it is known that Peirce was quite conversant with the CJC, having in some way gained access to Couto's *doctrina signorum.*

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124 Carvalho, *The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course*.


What is more, Peirce is not among those who have been tricked by the *Logica Furtiva*, the counterfeit version of the logic of the CJC as opposed to the genuine one, Couto's *Dialectica*. Indeed, as we show in what follows, when Peirce methodically made references to it, he was directly and unequivocally pointing to the CJC.


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Essence… Proposition” (v) “Note…” (vi) “A Practical…” (vii) “Specimen…” (viii) “[Introductory…]” (ix) “Notes….” We will take a look at each of the references very briefly.

In (ii), Peirce addresses the logical quantities—what today we might call for example extension/comprehension or breadth/depth—of Porphyry of Tyre (†304/309), arguing that the Scholastics diligently studied them, very well clarified what they meant, and provided them with various names. Then (para. 391), without providing a bibliographic reference, Peirce mentions the “Conimbricenses” as a golden source for those who wish to find synonyms to speak of logical quantities.

In (vii), Peirce uses the CJC to give an account of “abstractive knowledge.” This account is in fact no more than a translation from Latin into English, presumably executed by Peirce, of an extract of the CJC. Afterward (p. 117), Peirce points to “De Anima, lib. 2, cap. 6, qu. 3, art. 1.” The section that Peirce refers to is headed “Urum per divinam potentiam aliqua notitia abstractiva in externis sensibus dari queat” (“Whether it is possible to some extent that abstract knowledge is imparted to the external senses by the divine power”), while the article is titled “Quid in re proposita sentiendum videatur” (“What ought to be considered in the proposed question”).

In (vi), Peirce drew attention to “Sebastianus Contus”, clearly showing his belief that what Couto said about Scotist logic is more correct than what both Duns Scotus (†1308) and his followers professed about their own logic. In (vii), Peirce encouraged his students to “dip into” the old controversy about “whether logic is an art or a science” by “looking over the Commentary of the Conimbricenses.” In (iii), Peirce clarifies (para. 27) that when he uses the expression “Thomistic Logic” he is making reference not only to the logic of Aquinas but also to those of Lambertus...

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132 The article under consideration is contained in Ibid., 391–97.
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de Monte (†1499), Antoine-Marie Bensa (†1887), and “the highly esteemed Logic of the Doctors of Coimbra.”

In (iv), Peirce appealed (para. 38) to the authority of the CJC when countering an opinion he attributes to Carl von Prantl (†1888) regarding Aquinas’ logic, claiming that if Prantl had been right about the said controversy, it would seem beyond belief that “men of such learning as the doctors of Coimbra” failed to make precisely the same point as Prantl.133

In (i), Peirce puts forward (para. 361) various sorts of predication and, immediately after introducing two instances of “identical predication,” he pointed to the CJC, particularly to “Conimbricenses in Praef. Porph., q.i. art. 4.”134

In (v), right after a briefing on a “great controversy” between the Thomists, the Scotists, and the nominalists pertaining to matters at the crossroads between logic and cognition, Peirce invites the reader to see “Conimbricenses in I. Anal. Post., iii.”135 In (ix), at last, we can read (para. 613) that due to “the neglect of fallacies by the more scientific logicians, it is not easy to cite many who define the fallacy [of the converse, i.e., the fallacia consequentis] correctly. The Conimbricenses (than whom no authority is higher) do so”; and then we find a reference to

133 It is true, however, that it seems as though Peirce was struggling against a spook the size of his fantasy because of a misunderstanding concerning what Prantl’s writings actually say. See Junqueira, “Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed,” 7–8; Prantl’s text can be accessed in Carl von Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, vol. III (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1867) 108.

134 Peirce is reading from Couto, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, 68–69 (the first pp. 68-69, for the book is divided into two sets of pagination). Peirce borrowed a good deal from these particular pages. A first glance at the topic in: Junqueira, “Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed,” 8.

135 Couto, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, 382–396 (the 2nd pp. 382-396). The matter has to do with how it happens and what it means that a proposition is known per se. Besides translating an excerpt of the CJC (pp. 389-390), Peirce draws heavily on the whole section. This is partially examined in Junqueira, “Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed,” 8.
Couto's 1606 “Commentarii in Univ. Dialecticam Arist. Stagir., In lib. Elench., q. i. Art. 4.”

**Brief Answer**

As a minimum, Peirce drew on two volumes of the CJC: *On the Soul* and *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Peirce relied on the CJC for guidance at least regarding the following: logical quantities; abstractive knowledge/cognition; whether logic is an art or a science; predication; fallacies; understanding Scotist logic; the same about Thomistic logic; plus the relations between these two traditions and nominalists.

Sad to repeat, the community of inquiry has not yet yielded to date any research specifically devoted to the Peirce-CJC relation, save for the preliminary and as yet unpolished studies carried out by us. Moreover, as yet no one has pioneered the comparative study of both what Peirce says about the aforementioned issues and what is said about those issues in the CJC. To affirm the impact of the CJC on Peirce in a legitimate way, the matter has to be examined, for it is by no means sufficient that Peirce claims to have made use of the CJC for such fundamental purposes.

As regards the definition of the sign, the problem is somewhat similar to that of the issues mentioned, only with added complexity in that Peirce has not referenced the CJC explicitly with respect to it. The logical relationship here, however, is established, though its extent has yet to be evaluated. A comparative study that goes beyond the formulation of the definition of sign in general, a definition that as we have seen is strikingly alike, is called for.

Since Peirce shows signs of being so well acquainted with the logic of the CJC, it is worthwhile to carry out an analysis that not only compares the general definition but also other doctrinal aspects relative to the sign,

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136 The definition of the CJC can be found in Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae*, 545–46. In the double pagination set, these pages are not duplicated.

like the divisions of signs into different kinds and other details that may be of use to compare. No such work has so far been produced.

That the question lies in this state of paucity is bound to result in a considerable workload, but it also signals unmistakably the extent to which a doctoral project on the topic is needed, something that the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra already has begun to fund.\textsuperscript{138} The case for further inquiry into the matter is the single most pressing point that can be made right now.

We already know that Peirce was to some extent being intelligently determined by the CJC and that the Peirce-CJC relation is not a figment of our imaginations, yet we do of course remain unaware of the extent to which Peirce can be linked to the CJC.

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ABSTRACT

Charles S. Peirce (†1914) is often referred to as the founder of contemporary semiotics. Peirce provided the community of inquiry with a very convincing explanation of what a sign is. Peirce's definition of the sign bears a striking resemblance to that proposed in the 1606 volume of the CJC, the Coimbra Jesuit Course, authored by Sebastião do Couto (†1639). The community of inquiry holds the belief that Peirce drew from the writings of Couto to arrive at his triadic

\textsuperscript{138} We are speaking of an ongoing doctoral research project that Junqueira is undertaking, under the title “The Coimbra Jesuit Course as a Source of the Semiotic Logic of Charles S. Peirce” and under the supervision of Mário Santiago de Carvalho, António Manuel Martins, and Simone Guidi. In the hands of the first is the leadership of the whole institutional agenda devoted to the Peirce-CJC relation in particular and the CJC more broadly; in those of the second rested the leadership of the growing and organized activities of philosophical inquiry at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra for nearly two decades, until the former was handed the baton from the hands of the latter, upon Carvalho being chosen as the Coordinator, in 2016, by the doctoral board of our philosophical institution (Martins included). Guidi taught in Coimbra only for a very short while, yet his technical and scientific efforts are very meaningful as far as the Coimbra Institute for Philosophical Studies is concerned, and his involvement in starting the operational stage of the Conimbricenses.org Project proved to be of particular merit. This is a remarkable team for supervising a doctoral project.
conception of the sign. Could it be that the effect of the CJC on Peirce is restricted to the definition of the sign? What can anyone say so far on the Peirce-CJC relation? Our ultimate purpose here is to provide a contribution to settling such doubts.