Halla Kim’s Kant and the Foundations of Morality is an ambitious new exploration of the fundamental principles of Kant’s morality as articulated in his *Groundwork for a metaphysics of morals*. In what follows, I shall give a quick chapter-by-chapter summary of Kim’s book. I then shall make some critical remarks about Kim’s treatment of the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of a Law of Nature (FLN) before ending on a more positive note.

Kim’s book has 7 chapters. After establishing his intended readership in the preface (“a general audience including the beginning students of philosophy” (xv)) and sketching the historical background to Kant’s moral philosophy in the introduction, chapter 1 focuses on the purpose, method and structure of the *Groundwork*. Chapter 2 gives an exposition of section I of the *Groundwork*, concentrating on Kant’s discussion of acting from duty and the derivation of FUL.

Chapters 3-5 cover section II of the *Groundwork* (GII). In chapter 3, Kim discusses the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives before moving to an examination of how the Categorical Imperative (CI) is supposed to function (*qua* principle of practical reason) in moral deliberation. Chapter 4 centers on the derivations of FUL and FLN in GII and on Kant’s application of FLN to duties regarding suicide, false promising, self-improvement and benevolence. In chapter 5, Kim concentrates on the other formulations of the CI in GII and their interrelations; the chapter ends with a discussion of five common misunderstandings about the CI.

Chapter 6 explores section III of the *Groundwork* (GIII). Kim discusses the general idea of a deduction in Kant’s moral philosophy before presenting the deduction in GIII and tackling the notorious GIII circle. The book concludes in chapter 7 with an examination of the metaphysical foundations of Kim’s solution to the GIII circle and a brief account of the evolution of Kant’s views regarding the will in his *Critique of practical reason* and *Metaphysics of morals*.

I have three critical remarks. First, Kim argues that determining what one may do by means of FUL/FLN requires a two-step procedure: (I) apply FUL/FLN “to decide which policies or maxims are morally accept-able” and (II) use moral judgment to apply this policy to one’s situation (94). I think Kim is right about this two-step procedure. What I find troubling is that Kim does not address what Kant would say about agents who act badly solely because of poor judgment. The passages are admittedly sketchy, and they do not occur in the *Groundwork*. But this is especially troubling given that Kim advocates applying FUL/FLN only to “fundamental” maxims and not to specific intentions (46): this opens the doors to a wide spectrum of downstream effects from poor judgment, rendering the lack of discussion an important lacuna.

Second, Kim argues for the following tripartite division of maxims on the basis of FUL/FLN: a maxim is (1) forbidden iff its opposite is universalizable and it is not; (2) permissible iff it and its opposite are universalizable; (3) obligatory iff it is universalizable and its opposite is not (160; also 116-9). But there are three problems with this: (a) it overlooks the possibility that both a maxim and its opposite might not be universalizable; (b) it renders the classes of obligatory and permissible maxims disjoint; and (c) it makes an ineliminable appeal to the notion of a maxim’s opposite, which various commentators have argued is not well-defined. The first two problems are easily remedied: Kim might argue that the class described in (a)
is empty, and in response to (b) he might emend (2) to define the class of merely permissible maxims. But the third problem is more trenchant. Moreover, Kim is inconsistent on this score: on pages 144 and 153, he claims (without explanation) that FH rather than FUL/FLN should be used for deriving positive duties, and on 126 he cautions that “Kant never directly derives positive duties from immoral maxims by way of simply negating [them]...it is a simple non-sequitur to infer what we ought to do from the immorality of certain maxims.” But it is a non-sequitur only if Kim’s tripartite division is incomplete in the way suggested in (a) (and even then, the non-sequitur is easily fixed).

Third, at 154-5 Kim argues that “Mowgli...cannot be bound by any morality” because the “procedure of universalization suggests that we must consider other (actual or possible) agents.” But (i) there are other actual humans in The Jungle Book; the nonhuman animals are unquestionably rational; and if possible fictional agents are a thing, there are those, too. Moreover, (ii) even if Mowgli were the only possible agent, FUL still would generate duties for him to himself if (e.g.) consideration of other time-slices of a single individual is sufficient without consideration of others.

I conclude with two remarks. First, although I have focused my criticism on Kim’s account of FUL/FLN, this should not be taken as tacit agreement with his account of other parts of Kant’s ethics (or even aspects of FUL/FLN not addressed above). For example, I think his derivation of FH at 136-9 does not work: on 136 he infers from (A) imperfect rational beings always act for ends and (B) the CI is addressed to imperfect rational beings, to (C) there is an unconditioned end. But imperfectly rational beings need not act always for the same end in following the CI if it is purely formal. Second, my negative comments should not undermine the positive value of Kim’s book, which (among other things) gives a new perspective on and fresh insight into Kant’s ethics; Kim’s emphasis on the transitions as well as the method in the Groundwork; and the glossary, which will be especially helpful to beginning students. With that in mind, I give this book a big thumbs up.

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