SHOULD ATHEISTS WISH THAT THERE WERE NO GRATUITOUS EVILS?

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Abstract. Many atheists argue that because gratuitous evil exists, God (probably) doesn’t. But doesn’t this commit atheists to wishing that God did exist, and to the pro-theist view that the world would have been better had God existed? This doesn’t follow. I argue that if all that evil still remains but is just no longer gratuitous, then, from an atheist perspective, that wouldn’t have been better. And while a counterfactual from which that evil is literally absent would have been impersonally better, it wouldn’t have been better for anyone, including for those who suffered such evils.

We inhabit a world which contains a staggering amount of suffering. Atheists argue that this evil is reason to think there is no God. Some atheists hold that such evil is logically incompatible with the existence of a supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient being. Others concede that God may have sufficient moral reasons to permit at least some instances of evil. But these atheists, and many theists, still agree that if there is, or were, a perfectly good God, He wouldn’t permit the occurrence of gratuitous evil—evil that “could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or preventing some evil equally bad or worse”. These atheists and theists agree that

(1) If God exists (or had existed) there would be no gratuitous evil.

Atheists and many theists also agree that a great deal of the evil that we find around us seems utterly gratuitous. These theists think that this is just an appearance—since God does exist, He must have perfectly good reasons to allow such evil to occur. This is what atheists deny: they hold that things are (or likely to be) as they appear and that we should therefore conclude that God doesn’t exist.

I will be concerned here with another thing on which many atheists and theists would agree. Lougheed writes that “[e]veryone could… agree that no gratuitous evil is good”. Put slightly differently, the claim is that

(2) It would be better if there weren’t (or hadn’t been) any gratuitous evil.

We should therefore ardently wish that this were (or is) the case. Of the multiple theist, agnostic, and atheist authors who have explicitly considered the matter, I’m not aware of anyone who rejects (2). In fact, (2) is widely assumed to be so blindingly obvious so as to require no defence. Licon goes even further when he writes that:

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1 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism.
2 Rowe, “The Problem of Evil”. See also Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder, “Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?”.
3 Though skeptical theists often deny that we can even say that some evils seem gratuitous.
4 Lougheed, The Axiological Status of Theism, 22.
5 I accepted (2) in Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?”. Others who accept it include Kraay and Dragos, “On Preferring God not to Exist”; Kraay, “An Invitation to the Axiology of Theism”, 8, 15; Tooley, “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms”; Wielenberg, “The Absurdity of Life in a Christian Universe”;

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“if we had a button that when pressed would eliminate all gratuitous suffering from the world (while leaving everything of value intact), it is difficult to imagine that anyone, except perhaps sociopaths, would think that they lacked a strong moral pro tanto reason to press it.”

Licon’s rhetoric certainly raises the stakes. But I’ll nevertheless argue that things aren’t so straightforward. We shall see that the idea of a world without gratuitous evil can refer to two very different possibilities. Licon, Lougheed and most other authors take this possibility to involve a world that contains all the horrendous evil we see around us, but where that evil isn’t gratuitous. We shall see, however, that it is hard to explain why atheists should regard that as better. A more attractive way of interpreting this possibility involves the literal removal of all that evil. But this counterfactual, while itself obviously better, wouldn’t have been better for anyone.

THE NO GRATUITOUS EVIL ARGUMENT

The argument we shall be considering can be set as follows:

THE NO GRATUITOUS EVIL ARGUMENT (NGEA)

(A) No Gratuitous Evil (NGE): God will permit an evil to occur only for the sake of obtaining a greater, otherwise-unobtainable good, or for the sake of preventing a greater, otherwise-unpreventable evil.⁶

(B) Our world contains a great deal of evil that would count as gratuitous if God doesn’t exist.

By contrast,

(C) If God exists (or had existed), there would be no gratuitous evil. [From A]

(D) A world without gratuitous evil is better, in one important respect, than a world that contains a great deal of gratuitous evil.

Therefore,

(E) If God exists (or had existed) then the world would be better, in one important respect, than if God doesn’t exist (or hadn’t existed). [From B, C, D]⁷

As I wrote, most atheists and many theists accept (A)/NGE, and I will just assume it in what follows. Now some theists reject it.⁸ But if God’s existence wouldn’t mean that there is no gratuitous evil then obviously God’s existence cannot be claimed to be better on that⁹

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⁶ I take this formulation from Kraay & Dragos, “On Preferring God not to Exist”; see also Kraay, “An Invitation to the Axiology of Theism”.

⁷ In Kahane, “Is Anti-Theism Incoherent?” I criticise a formal argument purporting to show that (E) is directly entailed by (A)/NGE (see e.g. Kraay & Dragos, “On Preferring God not to Exist”). By contrast, the argument I’m considering here revolves around (D), a substantive value claim.

⁸ See, for example, Hasker, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil”; van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil; Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds.
count. So we can set aside such views here. Premise (B) is also widely accepted, assuming the definition of gratuitous evil that I offered earlier. And (C) simply follows from (A). So, for our purposes, (D) is the critical premise. As we saw, it is widely accepted and certainly sounds very plausible.

The NGEA supports an axiological claim about a respect in which God’s existence would be better compared to His non-existence. It supports what, in the current debate on the axiology of theism, is referred to as narrow impersonal pro-theism. Pro-theism is the view that God’s existence would be better (the contrary view, that God’s existence would be worse, is known as anti-theism). Narrow pro-theism makes claims about certain ways in which God’s existence would be better; such claims leave it open that there may also be downsides of God’s existence that outweigh these benefits. Wide pro-theism claims that God’s existence is overall better than His non-existence—better when we take into account all benefits and costs. Finally, impersonal pro-theism claims that God’s existence would make the world as a whole better, whereas personal pro-theism claims that it would make the lives of individuals better.

Since the NGEA focuses on one way in which God’s existence might be better, it can only establish narrow pro-theism. However, I suspect that for many people, the supposed downsides of God’s existence—say, loss of privacy—would be easily outweighed by the good of there being no gratuitous evil. So the further step to wide pro-theism may be small. And the NGEA supports only impersonal pro-theism since NGE is silent on whether, when God permits some evil to an individual, the relevant great goods thereby achieved (or evil thereby prevented) relate to the very same individual, or indeed to anyone else. However, on most ways of fleshing out NGE, many individuals will benefit from these evils being permitted, supporting at least a restricted form of personal pro-theism. And we’ll later consider a patient-centred reading of NGE which could support an even stronger form of personal pro-theism.

The NGEA is attractive in a further way. Some pro-theist arguments appeal to value claims that those attracted to anti-theism would reject—say, the superlative good of a relationship with a divine being. But even hardcore atheists are horrified by the idea of utterly gratuitous evil. Penner and Arbour say something even stronger. They argue that since most atheists accept some version of the Argument from Evil, they should find it hardest to reject the NGEA. Because of all the seemingly gratuitous evil we observe, atheists conclude that God doesn’t exist. But this seems to commit them to thinking it would be much better if God did exist—and therefore to deeply regret that He doesn’t. As Penner & Arbour write, one

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9 Though I suspect that some of these authors still want to say that (i) God’s existence would mean that there is less gratuitous evil compared to His non-existence; and (ii) although some evil would remain gratuitous even if God exists, God’s justification in allowing that evil nevertheless still relates to a greater good (e.g. free will) and, in virtue of that, that gratuitous evil could still be claimed to be better compared to its godless counterpart. My main argument here, I believe, also applies to such a view.

10 Even sceptical theists who deny that we should even describe actual evils as seeming to be gratuitous presumably still hold that, if God doesn’t exist, many of these would be gratuitous. Notice that (B) is a claim about atheism when applied to the world around us; we can certainly conceive of godless (if perhaps supernatural) worlds containing no gratuitous evil (see Kahane, “If There is a Hole”; Lougheed, The Axiological Status of Theism, 184).


12 Notice that impersonal value doesn’t exclude the value of persons and their lives: these also contribute to the overall value of the world.

13 See Penner & Arbour, “The Problem of Evil”.

14 Penner & Arbour, “The Problem of Evil”.

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“might find arguments from evil or anti-theism compelling, but adopting one precludes the other.”¹⁵ Since it’s largely (perhaps exclusively) atheists who are attracted to anti-theism, the NGEA has considerable dialectical force.

**TWO WAYS OF REMOVING GRATUITOUS EVIL**

I wrote that most authors assume that (D), that claim that a world without gratuitous evil is better, is just obvious. But its plausibility depends on what possibility is referred to by the subsequent of the conditional

(C) If God exists (or had existed), there would be no gratuitous evil.

The problem is that this subsequent is ambiguous. It can refer to a world from which evils like genocide, torture and rape are absent, or it may refer to a world that *still* contains such horrors yet where they are no longer gratuitous.

Theists must interpret (C) in this second way since they of course hold that the antecedent is true. If they also accept (A)/NGE, and don’t attempt to absurdly claim that the great evils we see around us are illusory, then when they assert that the world contains no gratuitous evils they mean that while all these great evils exist, none of them is in fact gratuitous. When agnostics consider the possibility that God exists, it’s also natural to take them to have in mind the very same possibility that theists take to be true. Atheists, however, believe that the antecedent is false, and for them the consequent is a counterfactual. That counterfactual might still refer to the very same possibility that theists take to actually be true, and which agnostics think might be true. Call this possibility ‘This-Worldly Theism’: a version of the actual world, but with, say, chattel slavery and the Black Plague somehow necessary for, or justified by, a greater good. However, when atheists reason from (C) to the non-existence of God, they assume that had God existed, we *wouldn’t* see many or all of the great evils we see around us.¹⁶ That suggests a rather different counterfactual: a world from which things like genocide, slavery, murder, torture and rape are simply absent. Call this ‘Other-Worldly Theism’.¹⁷

Return to Licon’s imaginary button that would remove all gratuitous evil. This could refer to literally *removing* horrors such as the Holocaust or chattel slavery. It does sound morally insane to refuse to do that. But Licon actually has in mind the ‘this worldly’ reading on which all those horrors remain even after we press the button—doing so just adds surroundings that mean that this evil is no longer gratuitous.¹⁸ And it is far less clear why *that* is supposed to be such a great thing.

In this paper, I will largely interpret (C), and thus also (D), as referring to what I just called This Worldly Theism (TWT). There are several reasons for this focus.¹⁹

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¹⁵ Penner & Arbour, “The Problem of Evil”, 199; see also Tooley, “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms”.

¹⁶ See Tooley, “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms”.

¹⁷ For further discussion of this distinction, see Kahane (forthcoming), which is something of a companion piece to the present paper, though it is not specifically focused on pro-theism or, indeed, theism.


¹⁹ A further reason is that I already discuss Other Worldly Theism at length in Kahane, “Is the Universe Indifferent?”. 
First, this is also the main focus of the current debate about the axiology of theism. One advantage of focusing on TWT is that it allows theists, agnostics and atheists to discuss the axiological properties of the same pair of possibilities; it wouldn’t impress atheists, for example, if theists argue that it would be worse if God didn’t exist because, if that were the case, there would be nothing. And since these possibilities are constructed around features of the actual world that remain broadly constant whether theism or atheism are true, they are relatively well-defined; by contrast, it’s rather hard to say what Other-Worldly Theism would be like.

Second, this focus also reflects, I believe, the most common way that atheists (outside of philosophical discussion of the problem of evil) understand counterfactual conditionals of the form ‘If God had existed, then…’, especially when these involve some evaluative or affective claim. For example, when those who lost their faith experience the world as chilly and depressing they are obviously contrasting this now godless world with the way they had previously thought the world was like. And when Thomas Nagel expresses the contrary anti-theist sentiment that he ‘doesn’t want the world to be like that’, it seems clear that the world he refers to is this world—i.e., TWT.

Third, and perhaps more importantly, nearly everyone who has endorsed (D) either explicitly has TWT in mind or seems to assume that this distinction doesn’t matter much. And I suspect that many will find (D) extremely plausible even when applied to TWT. Draper, for example, reports that he is “horrified by the possibility that the suffering of innocents has no purpose and no compensation”.

I will argue, however, that it is hard to see why atheists should accept (D) under that interpretation.

**THE VALUE OF NON-GRATUITOUSNESS**

So we’re considering the axiological implications of a world which contains no gratuitous evil when that world is understood to be much like the world we find around us: a world containing the suffering of sentient beings over millions of years of evolution, the Black Plague, slavery, the Holocaust, and so forth. This evil is still there. It’s just that none of it is gratuitous. I’ll refer to the parallel atheist world, in which that evil is gratuitous, as This-...
Worldly Atheism (TWA). We are asking whether this difference makes TWT better than TWA.

To answer our question, we need to compare evils that we assume to be gratuitous with counterparts that are exactly alike yet non-gratuitous. To bring out what is at stake, I will, with some trepidation, largely focus on an example of a truly horrendous evil, the Holocaust.

If we accept that

NGE: God will permit an evil to occur only for the sake of obtaining a greater, otherwise-unobtainable good, or for the sake of preventing a greater, otherwise-unpreventable evil.

then in TWT,

(3) God permissibly allowed the Holocaust to happen only because it was necessary either (i) to obtain a good great enough to outweigh that evil or (ii) to prevent an even worse evil.

So in TWT the horror of the Holocaust remains. It’s just that while in TWA all these people suffered and died in vain, in TWT that isn’t so. And that certainly does sound much better.

Now implicit in NGE is a deontic claim, a claim about what God may permissibly allow to happen; but that permissibility is grounded in two axiological patterns (bringing about a greater good or preventing a greater evil). We’re not interested here in whether this deontic claim is true but in its axiological implications.

In exploring these implications, we need to distinguish three aspects of NGE, each of which could potentially make a distinctive difference in value. These are:

- **Permissibly Allowed Evil.** That an evil is *permissibly allowed* to occur by a good agent who could have prevented it;
- **Axiologically Offset Evil.** That this evil will be *offset* by a greater good or the absence of a greater evil;
- **Necessary Evil.** That this evil will occur only *because* its occurrence is a necessary condition for that greater good or prevention of a greater evil.

I will consider each in turn.\textsuperscript{25}

**PERMISIBLY ALLOWED EVIL**

If God exists then

(4) The Holocaust could have been prevented by a benevolent agent who acted *morally permissibly* in choosing to allow it to occur.

\textsuperscript{25} Notice that even theists who reject NGE will typically accept *Permissibly Allowed Evil* and *Axiologically Offset Evil*. My discussion of these two claims thus applies to those views as well. These theists do reject *Necessary Evil* but they typically accept that the *possibility* of the evil in question is necessary for that great good (because e.g. free will makes possible evil choices). What I will say about *Necessary Evil* applies, I believe, with even greater force to these views.
When we ask whether (4) would be better than the atheist alternative (in which there were just the malevolent perpetrators and indifferent bystanders) we should bear in mind that even if such an agent had existed, the evil of the malevolent perpetrators of the Holocaust would remain in place and add to the badness of the world. If such horrific acts are intrinsically bad, then this badness is held fixed between TWT and TWA: in fact, on theist accounts on which natural evil is due to malevolent supernatural agents, TWT contains a great deal more evil of this sort. All that (4) directly adds is a further, morally permissible choice. But merely acting permissibly, let alone permissibly omitting to act, needn’t make the world any better—if only it were that easy to add good to the world! Supererogatory acts involving great sacrifice may perhaps add further value to the world. But I find it hard to see (4) as counting as such an act. If anything, having to allow such evil to occur when you can prevent it seems bad rather than good.\footnote{But isn’t a world in which an agent is acting permissibly better than one where they act impermissibly? That may be so, but this isn’t the comparison we are considering—our contrast is with a world from which this agent is simply absent. Notice also that we’re now considering only whether adding this permissible allowing of evil \textit{in itself} makes a world better in itself; we’ll consider below the specific properties that, according to NGE, \textit{make} that allowing of evil permissible. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.}

Now it’s true that many religious victims of the Holocaust, and other theists, deeply wished there was some way that, despite appearances, (4) were true. But that is because they wanted to reconcile the horrors they were experiencing with their belief in God, not because (3) would have been independently better than the godless alternative.

**AXIOLOGICALLY OFFSET EVIL**

So God’s permissibly allowing evil to happen doesn’t, on its own, make TWT better than TWA. What is more likely to make it better are God’s moral grounds for allowing that evil. NGE entails that

\begin{enumerate}
\item The Holocaust either (i) made possible a good great enough to outweigh that evil or (ii) had the Holocaust not occurred, something even worse would have happened.
\end{enumerate}

If (5) is true, then all the evils we see around us, however horrendous, must be equalled or, more likely, outweighed by some greater value. And doesn’t this mean that TWT must be better than TWA, in which these evils just occur without any such counterbalancing?\footnote{See Licon, “Aspirational Theism”, where he appeals to ‘morally offset’ suffering.}

Now, clauses (i) and (ii) are both assumed to be ways of grounding claims such as (4)—ways of making it permissible to allow evil to occur. But their axiological upshots are rather different. If permitting an evil is supported by (i), we get what I’ll call \textit{intra-world axiological offsetting}: the evil permitted will be counterbalanced by an equal or, more plausibly, greater good \textit{within} the world in question. So that evil, however horrific in itself, cannot make that world overall worse; and if each evil that occurs brings about a greater good, we can know a priori that the overall balance is positive. By contrast, (ii) involves only \textit{counterfactual axiological offsetting}: it only entails a comparative claim about the value of alternatives to that world; it entails nothing about the value contained \textit{in} this world. So unlike (i), it has no direct implications for the overall value of the world—which, in this respect, should be the same as in TWA. Moreover, when (5) asserts that it would have been worse had the Holocaust not occurred, this is intended to apply to a theist range of possibilities. We \textit{cannot} assume that this also applies to their atheist counterparts. On the contrary, atheists will
insist that the multiple ways in which the Holocaust could have been avoided, had God not existed, would almost certainly have been monumentally better.\(^{28}\)

Thus, if NGE is realised via (ii) this entails no difference in value between TWT and TWA. Since NGE is silent on which form of offsetting will be involved in a given evil, and since it’s even compatible with all evils occurring because of (ii), the offsetting entailed by NGE doesn’t, on its own, entail any advantage to TWT over TWA.\(^{29}\)

Even when NGE is realised via (i), we cannot assume that this must mean that TWT is better. That’s because it cannot be ruled out that a similar offsetting will also occur, de facto, in the godless alternative. First, for at least some goods that have been taken to justify God’s permitting evils to occur, these would either also be present in TWA—think of the supposed good of a world governed by simple, exceptionless natural laws, or of the supposed role of evil in making moral motivation, virtue or compassion possible—or might also be present in TWA—think of libertarian free will. Second, even setting this aside, it may still be that for every evil in TWA, there is, or will be at some point, some greater good that will outweigh it. We of course have no idea if that’s the case because we don’t know what lies in humanity’s future, or what wonderful things extra-terrestrial civilizations might be achieving. But if, say, our future is very bright, containing billions of utopian years, then the horrors of early human history might be thoroughly outweighed by that immense future bliss. Now if such intra-world offsetting does occur in the TWA, that’s far more likely to be accidental than by design (though we can imagine future humans who, using powerful simulations, identify each and every instance of past evil and make sure to produce some extra good that is equal or greater to it). And that does mark an important difference from the way such offsetting is achieved under NGE. But since those past evils would be outweighed all the same, that’s irrelevant to the question of axiological offsetting. We’ll later consider whether this difference in the source of the offsetting might make an intrinsic value difference.\(^{30}\)

Couldn’t impersonal pro-theists still appeal to the point that such offsetting is guaranteed under theism while highly improbable under atheism?\(^{31}\)

We can understand this suggestion in two ways. On one reading, what matters is that there is axiological offsetting. It’s just that, if atheism is true, we don’t know if that’s the case, while we do under theism. But that’s an epistemic, not an axiological claim, and therefore cannot support (D) since for all we know theism might confer no such advantage. Such an epistemic difference might still bear on a different question, the question of whether we should prefer God to exist. It might be argued, in particular, that the expected value (in this respect) of theism is greater, and that this gives us a pro tanto reason to prefer theism to be true. However, even this seems doubtful. First, while we don’t know if there’s offsetting if atheism is true, I doubt we’re in a position to say that it’s improbable that there would be such offsetting. Second, since offsetting under theism might be merely counterfactual, we also don’t know the probability that there will be intra-world offsetting under theism. So I

\(^{28}\) That’s compatible with accepting that, for all we know, some of the ways in which the Holocaust could have been avoided would have led to an even worse outcome.

\(^{29}\) Particular accounts of how NGE applies (or could apply) to the actual world might take a stand on this issue; I’ll later briefly consider some examples. But if pro-theists are appealing to some such (controversial) account then it’s no longer NGE itself that’s doing the work.

\(^{30}\) It might be objected that if the contents of the natural world are held fixed between TWT and TWA then the kind of intra-world offsetting I described would be shared by both, but in TWT there will also be the extra value of the offsetting that God intends, making TWT better. I concede that this would be so under this assumption. But first, I don’t see why we should accept that TWT and TWA must be exactly the same, in this respect, all the way to the heat death of the universe. Second, as mentioned above, some goods that theist take to justify the existence of evil are also present in TWA.

\(^{31}\) Licon, “Aspirational Theism” emphasizes this ‘metaphysical guarantee’.
doubt that we can really assert that the probability of intra-world axiological offsetting is greater on theism.

Moreover, even if it were unlikely that TWA will turn out so rosy, the fact that it might means it’s also the case that

(6) There are possible godless naturalist worlds in which all evils are offset by greater goods.

Even if TWA isn’t one of these worlds, it remains the case that, in the relevant respect, these worlds offer the same advantage as TWT. And at least for atheists, such worlds seem a more fitting focus for preference than the far more distant theist alternative.

It is the second, axiological reading of the claim that is more relevant to our discussion. On this reading, the claim is that it’s good in itself that axiological setting is guaranteed. So even if there is axiological offsetting in TWA, it would still lack this second-order value. It seems far from obvious that this modal property is intrinsically valuable. Even if it is, I suspect it would offer only a modest support to pro-theism, one that could be overturned by the downsides that anti-theists associate with TWT.  

I therefore don’t think that axiological offsetting can show that it’s better if an evil is non-gratuitous. There are, however, two complications. First, some of the more attractive versions of NGE require the relevant offsetting to occur within the lives of the suffering individuals themselves. It’s very hard to see how this could be realised in a naturalistic framework. I’ll return to this later in the argument. Second, I’ve focused only on what follows from NGE but there are other aspects of theism that may well guarantee a priori that there will be de facto intra-world axiological offsetting in a theist world—just think of God’s own immense (likely infinite) value, and the many other goods His existence is supposed to entail. That’s a fair point. But then NGE is no longer doing any work. Indeed, God’s infinite value could generate such de facto intra-world offsetting even if God allowed all hell to break loose, so to speak.

NECESSARY EVIL

I’ve argued that the axiological offsetting entailed by NGE needn’t make TWT better, and we can anyway obtain the de facto intra-world offsetting from other implications of theism. It might be objected that what makes NGE desirable isn’t such bare offsetting of evil but that on NGE evil occurs only because it’s necessary to prevent a greater evil or bring about some great good. After all, as we have seen, evil might be offset only by chance, or if not by chance, only after the fact. And even if an evil leads to greater good, that (or an equivalent) good might have been realised anyway. In such cases, although the evil doesn’t lead to an overall value deficit, it remains without point or meaning. The current proposal is that NGE is better because it means that all evils that occur do have a point. This takes us to the last element of NGE, the one relating to necessary evil.

As I’ll understand necessary evil, there’s a sense in which an evil can be necessary even if no agency is involved. When an evil is necessary to bring about a critical good, or prevent a far worse catastrophe, then an agent who can bring about that evil might be required, or at least permitted, to bring about that evil, or to nor prevent it from occurring. But we can regard evil as necessary in this way even if we can’t choose to bring it about or prevent it. It’s

32 I discuss this value claim in Kahane, “Is the Universe Indifferent?”.
33 See, e.g., McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils.
34 See Kahane, “Is Anti-Theism Coherent?”, 380-381.
enough that we know that its occurrence was necessary for some great good or meant that a
greater evil was avoided.

We are asking, then, whether it’s better if a given evil is also a necessary one, in this
sense—whether it’s better that,

(7) The Holocaust was **necessary** for some greater good to be realised, or to prevent an
even greater evil.

Or the further teleological claim that,

(7') The Holocaust only occurred **because** it was necessary for some greater good to be
realised, or to prevent an even greater evil.

We are asking whether these features would, in themselves, make the world better. In
thinking about this suggestion, it’s important not to confuse it with the familiar claim that

(8) Evil is much harder to bear when it’s taken to have no good purpose.

Such a psychological claim about suffering is repeatedly emphasized by Nietzsche, that
arch-atheist; and Victor Frankl famously made similar claims on the basis of his experience
in Auschwitz. But even if correct, (8) cannot help the pro-theist. It’s a claim about the
consequences of belief that evil has a good purpose. But in the comparison we are
considering, people’s beliefs are held fixed on both sides. Perhaps victims of the Holocaust
who were religious believers suffered less because they believed that the horrors they were
subjected to were somehow morally necessary, though that’s doubtful. But if so, they
suffered less whether or not God exists and NGE holds. Now perhaps people find it easier to
endure evil that had a good purpose because they see such necessary evil as better. But
whether it really is better is precisely what needs to be established.

So we are considering the claim that

(9) **INTRINSIC VALUE OF NECESSARY EVIL.** Holding two evils and all surrounding first-
order value fixed, if one evil was necessary for a greater good, or to prevent a
greater evil, it is better than the parallel evil that wasn’t thus necessary for greater
value.\(^{36}\)

Preventing evil and making a great good possible again play out rather differently.
Consider first prevention of evil. It can help here to consider a way in which (7') could have
been true even in a godless world. At the end of WWII, the allies had the ability to bomb the
railway lines leading to the extermination camps and decided, for strategic reasons, not to do
so, permitting great evil to occur. That was a grave moral error. But we can imagine different
circumstances in which this would have been the right choice—because, if they had bombed

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\(^{35}\) Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*.

\(^{36}\) It’s important not to confuse this proposal with claims about the value of desert or of justice more generally.
Someone may be subjected to an evil that is necessary in our sense without in any way deserving that evil. Now
if God is permitted to allow that evil then God doesn’t act unjustly in doing so but the evil itself may still
involve great injustice; and a world that contains much evil that is gratuitous in our sense needn’t contain any
injustice. It would be better if, at least at an ultimate level, our world was just and everyone got what they
deserved (though theism puts extra pressure on the already problematic idea of desert). But this is distinct from
the claim about gratuitous evil that is our concern here.
the railway lines, that would have put the entire war effort at risk. By assumption, this would have made a great deontic difference: turning an unforgivable mistake into a justified tragic choice. But what’s generating this deontic difference is that the nearest alternative to the evil occurring is now worse. It’s hard to see how that could add to the value of the (imagined) actual course of history. As if, knowing that some misfortune is coming your way, I can benefit you by making it true that if it didn’t occur, things would have been even worse (say I hire an assassin to kill you if you don’t get cancer). To be sure, if we’re aware of that even worse alternative, this should change our attitudes to the evil in the actual world, and to some of the acts that enabled it. We would, for example, no longer regret the Allied commanders’ choice in the bombing scenario I described. Painfully aware that things could have been even worse, we treat this kind of necessary evil with a kind of sorrowful resignation. But this change in attitudes needn’t indicate any change in valuation. It reflects a change in the alternative to which we’re comparing the actual world, not a change in our evaluation of the actual world.

Let us turn to the case where the evil is necessary for some greater good. In assessing such scenarios, it’s important that we set aside the value of that great good. Of course, if one world contains a great good and another doesn’t, the first is better—even more so if a superlative supernatural good is in question. But that tells us nothing about the value of evil being necessary. It’s the superlative good that’s doing the work, not the fact that evil was needed to realise it. Such superlative goods would have made TWT better regardless of the evil—if anything, the presence of the evil, even if necessary, only reduces the degree to which that good improves things. And such goods anyway bear only on the issue of axiological offsetting, which we’ve already discussed.

So even when the evil was necessary for a greater good, we should be comparing two worlds that contain the same first-order goods and evils. It’s just that in one, the evils are necessary for the realisation of the good and in the other they aren’t. Now, again, when evils are necessary for good in this way, this changes how we feel about them. At least the suffering wasn’t in vain, at least it led to something good. And, if the good is great enough, we might no longer wish that the evil hadn’t occurred. But do we also see the evil itself as better? This seems to me far from obvious. Moreover, even if it’s better if evil at least leads to good, it seems similarly worse if good is dependent on evil. Perhaps, when witnessing a great evil, you might wish that at least something good will come of it. But when you consider the things you most cherish, do you really wish that they only came about because of some horrific past catastrophe? Thus, if being a necessary evil is better, this extra value might be cancelled out by the badness of good depending on evil.37

Let us suppose though, for argument’s sake, that it is better if evil is necessary. For this to be an interesting result, this extra value shouldn’t be negligible. But if it’s significant, then it follows that

(10) In comparison to a course of history where the Holocaust is gratuitous, an alternative where the Holocaust was necessary for some great good would have been better, in itself—setting aside the value contributed by that great good—even if in that scenario the Holocaust had involved even more suffering and murder.

37 The value of achievement arguably resides in effortfully overcoming great obstacles. But this doesn’t show that it’s generally good for good to depend on evil. To be subjected to horrendous suffering isn’t an achievement of the victim, and a project that would require subjecting others to horrific evil would not, I believe, possess value as an achievement. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing to address this issue.
I find this hard to accept. At the very least, this seems far from obvious. And if we reject (9) or even just (10), then e must either reject I don’t see how we can defend (D) in any sense worth considering.

I’ll now go on to argue that, when we consider the sense in which the Holocaust would be a necessary evil in TWT, this seems not better, but much worse. Since this further argument is compatible with accepting (9) and (10), I will proceed, just for argument’s sake, as if these claims are correct.

Return to my imaginary example of the allied commanders deciding not to bomb the rail lines leading to Auschwitz. The commanders regard the horrors that they therefore allow to continue as necessary evils. Needless to say, these horrors aren’t literally necessary. There are, to begin with, numerous possible worlds in which they don’t occur. And many of these possibilities are also massively superior. The link between the evil and the greater evil that would otherwise occur is entirely contingent. The evil is necessary only relative to a given set of circumstances and to these agents’ limited powers and knowledge. If the circumstances had been a bit different, or if these agents had greater capacities or resources, they could have prevented the evil without ending up with an even worse one.

Because of these unfortunate circumstances, the imagined allied commanders are facing a tragic choice. If their choice is correct, there is a sense in which, looking back, they needn’t regret making it. They needn’t since that would be to prefer the even more horrific alternative. But what they surely wish, both at the time and looking back, is that the evil weren’t necessary. Not of course in the sense of wishing it had occurred pointlessly. But what they wish is that the evil was severed from the causal factors that would have led to a worse outcome. Or in scenarios where an evil was necessary for some greater good, agents, as well as spectators, wish that this good could have been obtained without needing that evil. In typical instances of necessary evil, these possibilities remain on the table. They are merely out of reach, or improbable.

But the sense in which an evil would be necessary to God is very different. In TWT,

(11) The Holocaust could have been prevented by an omnipotent benevolent agent who acted morally permissibly in choosing, out of all available options, to allow it to occur because it was necessary for some greater good, or prevented even greater evil.

Here, the Holocaust isn’t a necessary evil in the sense that it was, tragically, the best option out of the limited range open to finite agents operating in awful circumstances outside their control. It is necessary in a much stronger sense—when all options are open, including, for example, the success of one of the many assassination attempts against Hitler’s life, or even Hitler becoming an obscure painter. It seems, in particular, that NGE applied to TWT implies that

(12) All the possible theist worlds in which the Holocaust (or equivalent evil) doesn’t occur (or is cut short earlier, or occurs on a smaller scale, etc.) would be worse (or at least no better) than the horrific actual course of history.38

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38 So far as I can see, (12) is simply entailed by the conjunction of NGE and TWT; notice also that it’s compatible with rejecting the idea of a best possible world. Some theists might object that in the case of moral evil such as the Holocaust, it was open to the Nazis to act otherwise, and worlds in which they had are indeed superior. What would be worse, and undermine the great good of free will, is for God to intervene to prevent or block such free acts. This, however, isn’t compatible with NGE. We’d need to revise it to say that what’s necessary for the great good (or prevention of greater evil) is God’s allowing the evil, if it is independently
Moreover, while it remains within God’s power to prevent the Holocaust in all these ways, there is also a sense that when we conjoin NGE and (12) then, given God’s nature, He will never bring about one of these alternative, worse scenarios; under TWT such evils therefore approach literal necessity.

Both TWT and TWA contain the Holocaust and its horrors. Once we set aside the presence of a good agent permissibly allowing the Holocaust to happen, and the offsetting of evil, then (12) seems to me to remain the key difference between these worlds. Would it be better if (12) were true? I earlier quoted Nagel saying, of the possibility that God exists, that he doesn’t “want the universe to be like that”. Well, I don’t want the universe to be like *that*. I don’t want horrors such as the Holocaust to be written, so to speak, into the very fabric of the universe. I don’t want a world in which such horrors occur to be the best, or even good enough—and for all the many ways in which they could have been avoided to be even worse (or no better).

TWA is pretty bleak. It contains many horrors. If we are in TWA, we should wish that these horrors hadn’t happened—that the world had been better in a vast number of ways. But it seems to me better that we *are* in a position to so wish—that the world *could* have been better in all these ways. A world in which evil is contingent, in which even when things are bleak, they needn’t have been, seems to me far more attractive than a world in which such evils are necessary in the maximal way entailed by the conjunction of Theism, NGE, and TWT.

I said above that in typical cases of necessary evil, even though we sorrowfully resign ourselves to their occurrence, we also wish they weren’t necessary. But, since this isn’t possible on TWT, that is very close to saying that we should wish that TWT weren’t true.

Those who are attracted by (9) and (10) are presumably impressed by the idea that

(13) *If* some evil is *going* to happen, it would be better if it at least wasn’t for nothing, if it at least brought about a great good or prevented a greater evil.

And I can understand why this may seem attractive. But it’s a big slide from (13) to

(14) It’s better if *all* actual great evils (or equivalent ones) *had* to happen, because absolutely *all* the alternatives in which they don’t occur would have been *even worse* (or at least no better).

I find nothing attractive at all in (14). As I said, I find such a world far worse than TWA. But to block the *NGEA* it’s enough if it is no better.

GOODS THAT CANNOT BE REALISED WITHOUT EVIL

It might be objected that the examples of necessary evil that I have focused on so far are misleading. The link between, say, bombing the rail tracks and losing the war is merely contingent. But when theists claim that evils such as the Holocaust were necessary, they
typically mean that if God didn’t allow these evils to occur then the relevant goods would be simply impossible to realise—the link in question isn’t contingent. For example, it’s argued that without facing great evils, it would be simply impossible to achieve a certain kind of moral maturity or spiritual growth, or experience deep compassion, or the ‘incommensurate good’ of achieving the deepest kind of communion with God. It’s similarly claimed that a varied world that is governed by simple natural laws, or in which libertarian free will is realised, will contain a degree of evil. But if so, does it really make sense to complain that in TWT there aren’t better alternatives where evils like the Holocaust are absent?

In reply, recall first that in considering this objection we need to set aside the value supposedly contributed by these supposed goods—if their presence in TWT is what makes it better, this has nothing to do with NGE or indeed with evil more generally. Moreover, if these goods aren’t already realised in TWA then they may well involve value claims that anti-theists (or atheists more generally) reject—forsaking one main attraction of the NGEA.

Second, for this reply to work, it’s not enough that we accept that, say, libertarian freedom is a great good. Even if we assume NGE, we also need to hold that:

(i) The realization of this good really requires, not just that some evil occur, but horrific evil of the magnitude of the Holocaust;

(ii) This good is so great that it outweighs such horrific evils;

And since NGE only states a necessary condition for God’s allowing such horrors, non-consequentialists may still hold that it would be wrong for God to allow such horrors to occur even if it is required for the realization of such great goods. So we still need to further add that

(iii) In TWT, it will be morally permissible for God to allow such evils to occur to secure these great goods.

So, for each such supposed good, this reply requires us to accept at least three controversial normative claims that go well beyond the bare NGE. Notice, moreover, that atheists who appeal to the Argument From Evil are already committed to rejecting (or at least to seriously doubting) at least one, if not all, of these three claims. For example, atheists either deny that libertarian free will has such great value, or that the realisation of that value necessarily requires allowing great evils to happen, or that, if it does, the value gained is so great that it would justify permitting horrors such as the Holocaust to occur. Thus, even if successful in its own terms, this reply has no force for its intended audience of atheists—precisely those who were claimed to be particularly vulnerable to the NGEA.

Third, and most importantly, making evil literally metaphysically necessary for good seems to me to make things even worse. When I consider from outside, so to speak, the idea of a world in which the realisation of certain superlative goods necessarily depends on the occurrence of unspeakable horrors, this seems to me not to offer relief, but to make that world even more horrifying.

ALTERNATIVE MORALITIES

39 See e.g. Hick, Evil and the God of Love; McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils; Stump, “The Problem of Evil”.

40 Though see note 38 for discussion of views on which the good of libertarian freedom only makes possible, rather than requires, such great evil.

41 This needn’t be a single good—the good of free will may make possible a range of further moral goods, such as virtue.

42 For a rejection of several of these claims, see Schellenberg, “The Atheist’s Free Will Offence.”
If an evil happens, it can seem better if it at least serves a good purpose. It can seem better if it were a necessary rather than a pointless evil. But I’ve argued that this impression changes when we realise that the evil had to be necessary in a much stronger sense—that TWT is such that there are simply no better alternatives from which this (or equivalent) evil is absent.

Some pro-theists claim that when atheists argue that God doesn’t exist because the evil we observe cannot be reconciled with NGE, this strongly commits them to thinking it would have been better had God existed, and NGE did hold. I have argued that insofar as this is a claim about TWT, it isn’t correct. We can now dig deeper into the reason why, despite appearances, the Argument From Evil is perfectly compatible with, and indeed reinforces, anti-theism.

I said that atheists typically hold either that NGE cannot apply to at least some of the great evils we see around us, or that it’s highly unlikely that it could. As we just saw, to hold this view is to reject, or at least seriously doubt, the kinds of normative claims that are needed to reconcile NGE and actual evil. Many atheists don’t just think that such claims are mistaken—they are repulsed by the very idea that it would be morally permissible to allow horrors such as the Holocaust. What this means is that to ask atheists to contemplate TWT is to ask them to contemplate the possibility that some of their deepest moral and evaluative convictions are false. And to the extent that these are confident atheists, they aren’t contemplating the possibility that these convictions are mistaken. Rather, for them TWT describes a counterfactual universe that is governed by a different moral and axiological framework.\(^\text{43}\)

It should now be clearer why, when what TWT involves is spelled out, it doesn’t seem so attractive to atheists: few are attracted to the idea of a universe governed by a moral framework they deem deeply mistaken. Put differently, even if TWT (internally) realises NGE, there’s a sense that, for atheists, a great deal of the evil in it is gratuitous (in light of their moral framework).

Worse, it now seems as if the NGEA, as applied to TWT and viewed from an atheist standpoint, ultimately relies on the claim that

\[(15)\text{ A world is better, and should be preferred, if it contains less evil, even if this is only because the moral and axiological framework holding in it is different from the one we take to be correct.}\]

But (15) has to be false. For consider the following:

\[(16)\text{ If Nazi ideology were correct, the Holocaust wouldn’t have been an evil.}\]

The idea that such a counterfactual—if such a counterfactual is even intelligible—would be better, let alone something we should long for, seems profoundly misguided.\(^\text{44}\)

\textbf{INTRA-PERSONAL AXIOLOGICAL OFFSETTING}

\[^{43}\text{A question I cannot address here is whether it even make sense to compare the value of possibilities in which different axiologies hold. Another issue is that fundamental normative claims are widely assumed to be metaphysically necessary, meaning that, from an atheist standpoint, TWT might be an impossibility. Since this worry already arises when we contemplate the possibility that God, a supposedly necessary being, doesn’t exist, I set this aside here.}\]

\[^{44}\text{See also Kahane, “Is the Universe Indifferent?” , section 7.}\]
We can now address the issue of ‘patient-centred’ NGE (PCNGE)—a version of NGE on which the overall good, or prevention of great evil, must refer to good and harm for the very agent who endures the given evil.\(^{45}\) When discussing axiological offsetting, I conceded that it’s extremely hard to see how something like this could ever be realised in TWA.

Notice, however, that since PCNGE only directly differs from NGE in the distribution of goods and evils, not their total amount, it may leave the total amount the same. Thus, even if it gives further support for personal pro-theism, especially for those who had to endure great evils, it doesn’t immediately add to the case for impersonal pro-theism.

It could, however, add to that case if also we hold that

\[(17) \text{ It’s } \text{impersonally} \text{ better that evils and benefits are counterbalanced in this way within each individual life, as opposed to some innocent individuals suffering greatly without compensation.} \]

So we are again adding a further non-obvious value premise to the argument. Suppose though we accept (17). However, even if that meant that TWT is, in this respect, impersonally better than TWA, there would still be counterfactual godless alternatives to TWA that, at least in this respect, seem even better than TWT: ones where the victims of great evil live decent lives and aren’t subjected to such horrors in the first place.\(^{46}\) As we saw, such alternatives won’t be on offer if God exists and PCNGE holds—meaning that my main argument can be extended to cover PCNGE, since PCNGE still commits us to a world in which horrific evils are strongly necessary. It might seem callous to cavalierly dismiss in this way the possibility that all these victims didn’t suffer in vain, and where the suffering they endured is amply compensated for. But this objection forgets that such compensation is at issue only because TWT is governed by normative principles that anti-theists are almost certain to reject. As an analogy, consider Aztec human sacrifice. In a world in which the Aztec gods really do exist and require such sacrifice, the victims of such sacrifice help to realise great cosmic goods and therefore don’t die pointlessly. Let us even assume that being sacrificed to the gods is a great honour. That’s how those deaths are assessed by the framework internal to that imagined world. But that in no way makes that world attractive to us, who find that framework itself deeply repugnant.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXISTENTIAL AND AXIOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

Questions about the value, both absolute and comparative, of a set of possibilities should be independent of the question of which of these possibilities is actual. It’s plausible that

\[(18) \text{ Once we individuate a pair of possibilities, and adopt a certain axiology, this should be sufficient to settle whether one is better than the other.} \]

\(^{45}\) See e.g. Stump, “The Problem of Evil”; McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils.

\(^{46}\) It’s true that if these counterfactuals are naturalist, these victims won’t enjoy, say, eternal heavenly bliss. But first, the independent value of eternal heavenly bliss has nothing to do with the gratuitousness of evil, and second, such heavenly bliss can also be on offer in (supernatural) godless alternatives (see Kahane, “If There is a Hole”).
And many therefore assume that our take on the pro-theism/anti-theism debate should be independent on whether we believe that God exists. It may therefore seem surprising that many of the claims I made were explicitly tied to an atheist starting point. However, whether you believe that God exists can make a difference in the following two ways. One way is by bearing on your axiological commitments. Now, if we consider theism on its own—independently of the further claims of some specific religious tradition—then it seems compatible with a wide range of axiological frameworks. At the same time, actual theists, especially when members of religious traditions, may in fact accept values that are rather different than those accepted by atheists, and this will affect how they evaluate a given set of possibilities. But I have in mind something stronger than this. On the one hand, theists will be led to accept certain axiological claims (or at least take them to be more likely to be true) because they must reconcile their theism to various facts about the actual world, most obviously ones relating to evil. If they accept NGE, for example, then this can lead them to accept or at least seriously entertain various claims about the point (or possible point) of the evils we see around us. Conversely, atheists who appeal to the problem of evil will reject claims of this sort, denying that these ways of accommodating actual evil within NGE are successful or likely enough to be successful. To the extent that atheists reject these claims, they also take up certain axiological commitments, commitments that will also affect how they evaluate the possibility of God’s existence, a possibility they take to be false because of these commitments. As we saw, such commitments can lead atheists to regard TWT in a negative light, and are perfectly consistent with—indeed driven by—the Argument From Evil.

The second way in which your existential commitments can affect your answers to axiological ones is by bearing on which, of the range of possibilities, offer the most relevant interpretation of the contrast in question. The Argument From Evil involves normative assumptions that should lead atheists to see TWT in a negative light. But it can also be understood to direct atheists’ attention to a different way of conceiving of a counterfactual where God does exist—to the counterfactual that I earlier called ‘Other-Worldly Theism’. I will end by briefly considering how such a change in focus will affect the NGEA.

OTHER-WORLDMY THEISM

While TWT might be the world we in fact inhabit, Other-Worldly Theism (OWT) is necessarily a counterfactual. It’s a world that realizes NGE in a very different way than TWT. Instead of holding fixed horrors such as the Holocaust, and just removing their gratuitousness, in OWT such horrors are literally removed. So we needn’t worry about the presence of evils that are strongly necessary or about worlds governed by alternative moralities.

If we interpret the NGEA to refer to OWT then it does, I believe, offer a sound argument for narrow impersonal anti-theism. And when we bear in mind that the horrors that stain our world will be absent from this counterfactual, I suspect that many will find the negatives that anti-theists associate with God’s existence to be puny in comparison. If so, then this may well

47 I claimed that in Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?”; see also Kraay & Dragos, “On Preferring God’s Non-Existence”.
48 Tooley, “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms”, offers a different argument from anti-theism to atheism which I don’t have space to discuss here.
49 This change in focus will be reinforced if we understand the upshot of my argument so far as showing that TWT describes what, for atheist, is a morally impossible world.
50 For a fuller discussion, see Kahane, “Is the Universe Indifferent?”.
be the basis for an argument for wide impersonal pro-theism—though this is compatible with holding that a supernatural atheist counterfactual from which both great evils and these negatives are absent would be superior to OWT.  

But there is a catch. To want OWT to be true isn’t to want God to exist. In fact, if my argument so far is correct, atheists should want God not to exist—for TWT to be false. The question is whether they should nevertheless wish that God had existed—wish that OWT had been true. Suppose that wide impersonal pro-theism is in fact true when we contrast the miserable TWA with the rosy OWT. The problem, however, is that OWT is so different from the actual world that it makes little or no sense to think that it would have—or even could have—contained any of us, including any of the victims of the actual horrors that will be absent from OWT. If World War I hadn’t occurred, few if any of the people who exist today would still have been born. But if we remove all gratuitous evil, not just from the entirety of human history, but even throughout millions of years of evolution, it’s hard to see how any of us, or any actual past humans, could have come to exist in OWT—and that’s assuming that Homo sapience, that unimpressive product of blind evolution, will even be created in that utopian universe.

If that’s right, there is nothing in OWT for us, or for anyone who actually existed or had existed. I understand personal pro-theism to claim that God’s existence would have been better for all (or most) of us. So even if shifting to OWT salvages the argument for impersonal pro-theism, it also entails the falsity of (wide) personal pro-theism and, if counterfactuals in which we don’t even come to exist count as worse for us, may even support personal anti-theism.

Should we wish, then, that OWT had been true? If, at the beginning of time, we were choosing whether to create OWT or TWT it would indeed be monstrous to choose TWT with all its horrors. But we’re not in that position. We’re already here, and OWT offers us (literally) nothing, nor is it a counterfactual where the victims of past horrors instead go on to prosper. Compare: our parents could have had many other children and surely some of these would have been better than us; yet how many of us regret that we were born instead? Atheists similarly needn’t wish that God had existed, even if OWT would have been marvellous, impersonally speaking.

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51 Kahane, “If There is a Hole”.
52 See Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil”.
53 It might be objected that when we consider a counterfactual, we should focus on the possible world that realises it that is closest to the actual world. And if so, shouldn’t we entertain a version of OWT in which we do exist? But OWT just is incredibly distant, and it’s doubtful that this combination makes sense. It’s true that if someone asks, for example, how things would have been like had the Holocaust not happened, it would be odd to take this to refer to a counterfactual where, say, Constantine didn’t convert to Christianity, even though such a radically different history almost certainly wouldn’t have contained the Holocaust. But nor should we consider instead a counterfactual where Holocaust deniers are right—although such a counterfactual is much closer to the actual world, and easily still contains us, compared to one where Hitler became an artist, and in which many of us would never get born. See Kahane, “History and Persons”.
54 Unless our lives are so bad that they are worse than non-existence.
55 For a more general application of this point to our attitudes to past evil, see Kahane, “History and Persons”.
56 How do add up such impersonal and personal (or ‘person-affecting’) considerations is a difficult question. Some hold that when we compare possibilities, we should give weight only to how things might be better or worse for existing persons. In a relevant discussion, Mawson, “An Agreeable Answer” argues that impersonal considerations do count, but for very little. On either of these views, OWT holds little attraction.
CONCLUSION

The world around us contains a mass of unspeakable evils, horrors that seem utterly senseless. Many find it blindingly obvious that it would be better—so much better—if God had existed and the world contained no such gratuitous horrors. Licon even suggests that only a sociopath would reject such a wonderful thing. But I have argued that things are more complicated. A world without gratuitous evil can be our world, or a world much like ours, that contains all actual horrors but with a supernatural backstage that means they aren’t gratuitous. Or it can be a world utterly different from ours from which all the familiar horrors are literally absent. In this paper, I largely focused on this first possibility. I have argued that ‘non-gratuitousness’ in this sense has several dimensions, and the only one that is straightforwardly attractive—‘axiological offsetting’—may already be a feature of our miserable actual world even if God doesn’t exist. In fact, we saw that when we unpack what it would mean for God’s existence to render the evils we find around us non-gratuitous, then, at least for atheists, this possibility has a sinister side. This sinister side is admittedly absent from the second possibility, that of a counterfactual world from which all terrestrial atrocities are absent. But since we, and everyone who had ever existed, will almost certainly also be absent from that alternative, we needn’t regret that it wasn’t realised instead of the disappointing actual world.57

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