To Vanessa and Ashley, for making it possible for us to continue to think this way
of that elusive energy known as 'effort' (cf. Damasio, Descartes' error, p. 71); J.E. LeDoux, The emotional brain: the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); J.M. Allman, A. Hakeem, J.M. Erwin, E. Nimchinsky, and P. Hof, 'The anterior cingulate cortex. The evolution of an interface between emotion and cognition', Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 935, no. 1 (2001): 107–17. Damasio describes the case of Mrs. T, who, for months after a stroke damaged her ACC, lay nearly motionless, blank-faced, and almost speechless in bed. She would occasionally pull her bedsheet up higher (assumed by Damasio to be a purely reflexive, autonomically commanded action) or repeat her name, the names of loved ones or the name of her childhood town, but that was all. When she emerged from this mutism and akinesia a few months later, Mrs. T insisted she never felt her mind or her desires to be imprisoned by her immobility. She reports she simply felt no motivation to do anything other than she did: 'I really had nothing to say' (Damasio, Descartes' error, p. 73).

12. Ratcliffe, Feelings of being, p. 111.
18. Slaby, 'Affective intentionality and the feeling body,' p. 437.
22. Sheets-Johnstone, The primacy of movement, p. 84n.16.

Phenomenological Distinctions: Two Types of Envy and Their Difference from Covetousness

Michael R. Kelly

The title of my chapter takes its inspiration from the subtitle of an essay by Robert Sokolowski, 'The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions'. Just as phenomenology's descriptive work doesn't invalidate the natural attitude intentionalities but leads us back to them in a way that we can see them and their structure more clearly, philosophy doesn't do anything new, so to speak. As Sokolowski remarks, 'philosophy does bring to the fore things we already know and take for granted; however, ... it brings them forward in a way that illuminates ... tells us old stuff, but ... interesting and valuable old stuff'. As the subtitle of my paper suggests, I hope in what follows to be working from and in and with this modest yet challenging vision of philosophy—which is a vision of phenomenology and of which I will say a bit more in conclusion—for envy is an emotion on which much light could be shed for philosophy, phenomenology, phenomenological theology, and most importantly mundane experience.

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Some recent discussions of envy in moral psychology have defended two controversial claims: (1) envy occurs in two types, and (2) one of the types is benign. Such views challenge the dominant view in Western philosophy that envy is always bad and entails distress over another's good fortune. For different reasons, Robert Roberts and Gabrielle Taylor, for example, hold that envy is not always and all bad (but sometimes benign) because envy does not always begrudgingly regard the other. Roberts holds that there are two types of envy the ensuing behaviors of which are such that one 'attacks' the neighbor and another motivates the envier to improve himself through something like healthy, competitive striving. Gabrielle Taylor more directly articulates two types of envy, one that 'attacks' the neighbor and another wherein the envier focuses less on the neighbor and more on the good 'thing' possessed. Regardless, both thinkers rightly identify a mode of envy focused upon the envier and lacking that familiar characteristic of envy, namely, the hostile regard of the neighbor who occupies some superior status with respect to a thing, trait, or capacity of importance to the envier.

In what follows, I attempt to provide a phenomenological account of envy that preserves the two-type distinction—a traditional type that regards the neighbor with malice and a nontraditional type that effectively eats away at the envier—without requiring an appeal to the illicitious notion of benign envy. More precisely, I want to claim that these two types of envy (one self- and another other-assessing) are founded upon envy's full intentional structure; before such objectifying regard, we should describe the first moment of envy as a pre-reflective and self-aware moment that correlatively accompanies the agent's objectifying realization of his neighbor's superior standing. I shall look closely at Taylor's account, which expressly articulates two types of envy and only implicitly endorses a view of benign envy therein. Her view of emotive intentionality, however, precludes her from successfully developing envy's self- and other-assessing types and instead leads her to a view of envy wherein one of its two types is conflated with covetousness. Phenomenologically, what needs to be shown is that at the pre-reflective level of experience all envy is both self- and other-assessing before the envier's intentional 'focus' hones in on the self or the other as an object. And, whether directed to the other or the self, we cannot consider envy benign because (at the very least) it incapacitates the agent's ability to see the good and his own good.

To adopt an observation from Robert Sokolowski in anticipation of preserving the badness of even self-directed envy, 'vice is self-destructive because even the vicious agent is striving for what is good, but he has made himself incapable of displaying the good to himself, and so as a "rational" agent he acts blindly and ruins himself.'

I shall proceed in three steps. First, as a foundation for a view of two types of envy, I present an initial picture of envy as a self-assessing emotion in light of Gabrielle Taylor's analysis of self-assessing emotions. Second, I argue that while Taylor distinguishes two types of envy—"state-envy", which regards with hostility the status or state of the envied, and 'object-envy', which denotes an envying agent's reaction to the object possessed by the envied and yet wherein the envied plays a minimal role—her description of object-envy paints the envied person out of the picture and thus presents a case of covetousness; her description of object-envy thus misses envy's self-assessing dimension. In the third section, then, I propose a decidedly phenomenological development of Taylor's position. I distinguish envy from covetousness, for unlike envy covetousness neither attacks the possessor of the coveted good nor the 'status' of the coveter for lacking that good. In conclusion and to better capture the bidirectionality of envy's intentional structure, I propose to replace Taylor's notion of state-envy with a notion of possessor-envy and her notion of object-envy with a notion of deficiency-envy. A phenomenological account of envy can accommodate Taylor's insight that there are two types of envy without (1) running either type of envy into covetousness and (2) endorsing the perhaps indefensible view of a benign form of envy.

**Envy and Emotions of Self-Assessment**

Envy is an essentially comparative emotive intentionality that we may preliminarily define as the (at least) begrudging and self-reproaching response to perceiving, or believing there exists, a disparity between me and another on the grounds that some proximal other (neighbor) possesses a thing, trait, or capacity that I value, desire, and wish to possess, but lack. This emotional response presupposes that the envier (1) has evaluated and desires something as advantageous, (2) apprehended the other as possessing that thing of advantage, (3) apprehended oneself as lacking that thing, and thus
(4) is experiencing some kind of bidirectional begrudging feelings of distress. One feels envious when one perceives, believes, or imagines another with something that one judges as desirable and important for oneself but which one lacks. Correlatively, the other's status appears enhanced, while one's own status appears diminished or deficient.

An adequate account of envy must include its moment of self-assessment: an account of how the envier feels, what he believes, wishes for, and reflects on in an episode of envy regarding himself and his neighbor. Yet envy remains omitted from lists of self-assessing emotions—perhaps because work on envy since Aristotle has tended to focus on envy's begrudging regard of the envied and the envier's potentially harmful actions directed toward the envied.

According to Taylor, we group emotions as other- or self-assessing, according to the nature of the belief characteristic of certain emotions. Taylor includes within the group of self-assessing emotions those such as remorse, guilt, shame, humiliation, pride, and regret (PSG 1). Consistent with this grouping, philosophers such as Peter Hacker distinguish self-assessing emotions from 'paradigmatic emotions' or other-assessing emotions such as jealousy, envy, indignation, fear, love, and so on. Taylor explains her criteria for self-assessing emotions as follows:

[In experiencing [self-assessing] emotions, the person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in the world. The self is the 'object' of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an assessment of the self. (PSG 1)]

To refer to the self as the 'object' of these emotions does not mean simply that the self is the intentional focus or object of the emotion. On the one hand, Taylor refers to that toward which the emotion is directed as an 'external object'. On the other hand, she argues that emotions also have an "internal object," constitutive of the emotion, which is expressed in propositions stating the agent's view of the given situation (DV 14). For example, an agent's belief that his particular action is estimable or his particular gaffe is inestimable might constitute the emotion of pride or humiliation, respectively. The action or gaffe is the external object, while the self's propositional attitude regarding the act or gaffe is the internal object. The moral psychology of emotions of self-assessment is such that...
Why, then, has philosophy tended to exclude envy from the group of self-assessing emotions? There seems to be two major reasons. First, unlike the shamed, humiliated, or guilty person, we don't typically think the envied person becomes an object for himself. Rather than objectify himself, an envier typically takes the envied as the object of reproach. As such, we are wont to say that enviers typically do not revise their beliefs about themselves; rather, enviers revise their beliefs about the world in something like a Sartrean 'magical' transformation wherein the distressed emotion agent changes his view about the world but this does not change the world itself. This device, however, is very much about the self-assessing dimension of envy. Nevertheless, we typically believe that the envy does not believe he has, as Taylor puts it, 'deviated from some norm', like Sartre's discovered voyeur who experiences shame. Indeed, the envier often attributes his condition to the other. But I think the experience of envy escapes both possible objections to its inclusion in the category of self-assessing emotions.

Concerning the second worry, Aristotle noted in passing, in his Rhetorica, that we 'envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us ... for it is clear that it is our own faults we have missed the good thing in question'. While Aristotle does not pursue this insight into the self-assessing dimension of envy—pre-reflective or objectifying—it implies that however perverted the envier's beliefs, however distorted the envier's assessments concerning the envied, the envier believes he has violated some norm. The envier believes he has deviated from the norm of what is deserving of a person of his standing in the world or status. Insofar as envy is always and essentially a comparative emotion, the envier deviates not from a moral norm of conduct but from a norm associated with social status. It does not matter if the envier's belief or emotional response is unjustified or unwarranted; it does not matter if the envier deserves or does not deserve the good in question. What matters is that the envier looks askance at himself and the envied insofar as that person's superior standing is 'a reproach to [him]', that is, the envier, upon perceiving a person of comparable social standing in possession of that which he lacks, already assesses himself vis-à-vis his neighbor.

This defense against the second worry, however, seemingly returns us to the first worry in labeling envy a self-assessing emotion, namely, that an envier typically does not become an object for himself. Envy is complicated because it tends to conceal itself, often even from itself. Rare is the envier, we believe, who may change or critically assess his beliefs concerning his deservingsness or the quality of his efforts to secure what he believes he deserves. Most enviers tend instead to change their beliefs about certain persons in the world thought responsible for the envier's inferior status, to redirect their painful feelings of self-assessment outward to compensate for, explain, or excuse his apprehension of his 'altered ... standing in the world.' In any event, according to a phenomenological notion of pre-reflective self-awareness (upon which Taylor's notion of self-assessing emotions would rest) we can say that the envier assesses himself even when he attempts to reinforce his opinion of himself in light of this perceived or believed disparity. Enviers who typically redirect or translate their envy into an approximate, more tolerable emotion (often indignation or resentment) must have first comparatively evaluated their shortcoming vis-à-vis the envied. And in the act of comparison the envier assesses himself at a pre-reflective level by measuring himself against the envied.

In an objectifying act, the envier may not necessarily isolate and focus on his shortcomings in the way that Taylor speaks of the self as an object in self-assessing emotions. But there is a pre-reflectively apprehended sense of self-assessment involved in the comparative act essential to the intentional structure of envy; indeed, in a moment of envy, the envier is constituted by the other in such a way that he will or will not permit into his worldview. The judgment at play in an interpersonal comparison of this sort says, 'I am inferior to him at least in this measure of importance.' If this experience grows to a focus on the other and her superior status because the self cannot admit this disparity into his world without rationalizing its presence, then I shall call this possessor-envy. But if this experience develops into a 'reproach to oneself' and one's inferior status, I shall call this deficiency-envy. The former is other-assessing in Taylor's sense and captures our conventional understanding of envy. The latter is self-assessing in Taylor's sense that the self takes itself as an object. But in either case, the original experience of envy stems from a pre-reflectively apprehended presentation of self-and-neighbor in a comparative intentionality that considers oneself as inferior to another with respect to a thing, trait, or capacity that the self deems important for its status and/or self-worth.
Self-Assessing and Self- and Other-Assessing Emotions: Covetousness and Envy

In *Deadly Vices*, Taylor develops a subtle account of various types of envy built upon a distinction between state-envy and object-envy. State-envy recapitulates the standard view of envy as other-assessing and hostile toward the neighbor. Object-envy defends a view of that overshadowed (and think more common) self-assessing type of envy that targets the envier's shortcomings. As I don't think Taylor's account of this fundamental distinction always works, I shall forgo her discussion of the more subtle types.

Object-envy denotes a desire for some good such that, as Taylor writes, 'its possessor plays a relatively minor role as being merely the occasion for the envious person's realization of her deficiencies' (DV 43). In such a case, the envious person's perception of the other's possession of the good turns her attention to irritating or even humiliating thoughts about her lack of it (DV 43). The intentional focus of object-envy is a bit vague. But the humiliating thoughts are about 'her lack of [the good]' more than the other with her possession of the good that the envier values and desires but lacks. That the possessed good itself as lacked is, on Taylor's account, the focus in object-envy, becomes clear when we consider Taylor's notion of state-envy, which denotes 'the other's "state" of occupying some comparatively advantageous position; it is their possession of the good rather than the good itself' that bothers the state-envier (DV 44). The state-envier sees the other as 'somehow crucially involved in her finding herself in an inferior position'; it is the kind of envy Iago has for Cassio. The state-envier takes the envied as the 'cause' and object of his inferior self-standing. If the state-envier has a disagreeable view of himself, it is one he does not entertain precisely insofar as he reproaches the other and not himself (DV 45). Taylor thus concludes that 'it is object-envy that is not vicious in the sense traditionally understood, for [object-envy] lacks what is often thought to be a crucial feature: a degree of hostility directed against those seen as the possessor of the desirable good' (DV 43-4).

But her account of object-envy doesn't capture its self-assessing dimension adequately. What Taylor calls object-envy is not yet self-assessing precisely insofar as it includes humiliating thoughts not about herself but about 'her lack of [the good]'; but the center of gravity in this experience if it is to be envy—and not longing or covetousness—must be about the envier and his assessment of himself as inferior, diminished, and so on, insofar as he feels humiliated because he lacks the good in question. Three points of her view require further clarification.

First, we should note that Taylor's account of object-envy blurs into covetousness. Taylor's rather weak claim that 'in object-envy ... its possessor plays a relatively minor role' conceals this much. Her preliminary examination of envy, in fact, conditions this separation of the object from the possessor and runs envy into covetousness, for she maintains that 'by analogy with the distinction between the sin and the sinner, we should distinguish between the possessor of the good ... and the good possessed'. With this distinction in place she maintains that in state-envy 'it is [the envied's] possession of the good rather than the good itself' that distresses the state-envier. Accordingly, what bothers the object-envier is 'the good itself' that she desires but lacks. Yet, if the object itself in its possessor's absences generates in me irritating or humiliating thoughts about myself, then we may have a case of covetousness and not envy.

Second, it does not strike me as plausible to say that any kind or type of envier is bothered by 'the good itself', for the very desire for the good that is presumably thought good for my social status or desired sense of self begets envy—it is its founding condition, the condition upon which envy is built and without which it cannot arise.

Lastly, her claim that object-envy 'is not vicious' is misleadingly incomplete. Object-envy may not be vicious in the sense that it is not hostile toward the other. One cannot hold that object-envy 'is not vicious' if by not vicious we mean benign; to hold that object-envy is benign is to continue to operate with the bias in philosophy that has inadequately viewed envy as only hostilely directed toward the other. Object-envy is not benign and is vicious insofar as it affects the envier in any number of negative ways. As Taylor herself concedes, such envy 'may not drastically harm the agent' (DV 43). Indeed, a close look at her account reveals that the object (the good something in question) motivates a turn to the self's deficiencies disclosed in and by those irritating or humiliating thoughts; these thoughts, moreover, are not about the envier's lack of the good something itself in question but his inferiority to his neighbor when he notes his lack of the desired and valued thing, trait, or capacity.
To develop Taylor's account, I want to suggest that the intentional structure of any type of envy essentially includes negative affect, directed toward oneself and/or another on a comparative scale—comparative intentionality of self- and other-assessment wherein the self is pre-reflectively given (nonobjectively) as inferior in the very encounter with the neighbor's status given (objectified) as superior. I live through the sense that I am less than him with respect to whatever thing, trait, or capacity that I value and desire but lack. That is, I objectively apprehend his superior status and nonobjectively apprehend my inferiority, which is implicated by and in the neighbor's superior status and thus is an intrinsic feature of this specific type of comparative assessment. A better distinction within envy seems to me to be one between deficiency-envy and possessive envy. This distinction has at least three merits. First, it captures a feature of envy obscured by Taylor's fundamental distinction, namely, that both types of envy fundamentally and essentially are about status. Second, it avoids the infelicitous commitment to a benign type of envy. Third, it can accommodate Taylor's notions of object- and state-envy without separating the object from its possessor, which cannot happen in envy lest we confute it with covetousness. I shall work backward from these claims first distinguishing envy from covetousness.

Both envious and covetous persons value and wish for but lack something and accordingly feel distress over this lack. The intentional focus of envy differentiates it from covetousness; what the envier's belief and evaluation "focuses" on is not simply the lack of the valued and desired thing but the lack of that something vis-à-vis the one who possesses that something that the envier values and desires but lacks.

One likely will envy another only if he perceives the other to be socially proximal, an equal, or perhaps a rival; I may covet the position of royalty, for example, but it makes little sense to envy the queen of England for genealogical, social, and anatomical reasons. I may, however, envy my local city council woman if I actively wish to involve myself in lower-level politics. Here is a social space where envy and covetousness come closer together. What distinguishes them, however, is the envious person's distress over the other possessing the desired thing, or amount or quality of that thing, for possessing that desired thing while the envious person lacks it (and by virtue of lacking it descends beneath the neighbor at least with respect to that good something in question). The covetous person, unlike the envier, desires the object and is distressed over his unfulfilled desire that another has fulfilled. As such, the coveter is not necessarily distressed by the possessor of that something, that is, the coveter does not necessarily begrudge the possessor for possessing the desired thing, for the other is separated from the good possessed—like the sinner is separated from the sin in Taylor's analogy.

Although we often hear it said that one covets palatial estates, for example, if this coveter does not begrudge the other that capacity or thing because he lacks it, then he cannot also be said to envy the financially successful. This is not merely because the one possessing the coveted object is fungible, which indeed s/he is. But the coveter covets even when no one possesses the valued and desired object, for example, the coveter covets the Bentley or the Rolls on the showroom floor. In fact, the coveter sometimes doesn't even notice the possessor at all. As J.R.R. Tolkien's character of Gollum exemplifies, the coveter is often blinded by the object, and thus sees only the object of his desires—his 'precious'. The possessor thus appears more absent than fungible for the coveter, occupying a space on the margin of the experience. That the possessor is absent or fungible for the coveter seems quite close to the minimized possessor in Taylor's account of object-envy. The act of coveting, moreover, shares with envy only the desire for something that is an object not inherent to its possessor. Unlike covetousness, envy extends beyond a desire for something and sometimes desires a trait or capacity of the other (as when Iago envies the Moor's political savvy and/or Cassio's purported military acumen). Perhaps this is why biblical wisdom does not warn against coveting thy neighbor's good looks (trait) or quick wit (capacity).

What bothers the envier is another person who possesses the desired something, whereas the intentional focus of the coveter is on the thing itself, full stop. Both the envier and the coveter may feel pain in light of this perceived lack, but the envier's pain is both self- and other-assessing, whereas the coveter's pain remains only self-assessing. And yet the coveter's self-directed pain is very different from the envier's, for the coveter may feel the pain of longing for the desired object—the void left in himself by the absence of the object—but he need not take his lack of the coveted thing as a reproach to himself.
Dramatic depictions of covetousness or envy sometimes end the same way, namely, with the agent under the spell of the vice killing the other. I have a bit to say about this below, but for now, this broad-minded analysis of the intentional focus of envy and coveting reveals that the coveter and the envier share at a superficial level only a distressing feeling in the self-assessing moment of this experience of lacking some desirable thing. Basically, covetousness and envy are not bidirectional feelings, that is, not both self- and other-assessing. Here we have a correlate to the claim that the coveter, without begrudging the possessor, 'loves' and desires the object and is only distressed over his lack of it and/or his failure to secure it. The coveter may feel inadequate or incomplete without this thing, but since coveting is not essentially comparative, he need not feel a sense of inferiority with respect to social status that the envier will—even if he believes his life and status would be enhanced by possessing that thing. As we have seen, Aristotle suggests that the envier reproves himself in light of his comparative assessment of the envied person's success. Coveting is not a comparative intentionality, and the coveter certainly does not see his neighbor as responsible for, or the cause of, his inferiority; that would amount to what Taylor termed state-envy and I term possessor-envy. In short, the envier in both senses is necessarily a coveter but the coveter is not necessarily an envier in either sense.

These distinctions are underscored by the way ordinary language itself expresses these emotions. Compare the sentences, 'I covet X' and 'I envy X.' When we let X be you, the sentences are grammatical and make sense, but the expression 'I envy you' could be one of those oddly welcomed but poorly expressed forms of flattery, while the expression 'I covet you' is peculiar, perhaps creepy, and surely unwelcome by the second person. If we let X be your goods, the sentences again are grammatical and make sense; yet it would be an odd use of envy insofar as envy intends persons. Finally, if we let X be you your goods, only the sentence where envy is the intentional act makes sense. The very syntax of the expression 'I covet you your oxen' is more than peculiar and looks like a category mistake because one covets objects, not their possessors.

Two Types of Envy Both Self- and Other-Assessing

All envy begins for the envier in a pre-reflective, lived (through) experience of seeing a socially proximate equal having secured that which I value and desire but lack—an experience that entails the objective givenness of the other as superior and thus the implicit givenness of the self as inferior (at least with respect to that good something in question). These are the facts the affects evaluate as displeasing. Different types of envy, I believe, contain different intentional contents based on different enviers' beliefs. Let's take an example: A scholar leaves a talk by another scholar to whom the audience responded quite favorably, a talk for which this honored scholar deserved praise; our irritated scholar remarks to his companion, 'So-and-so's paper was pretentious, unclear and full of jargon.' How this agitated scholar experiences the unpleasant feelings that motivate this remark indicates important differences in the intentional structure of envy, its intentional content as conditioned by the agent's beliefs.

If the agitated scholar targets the honored scholar for possessing great talent or capacity in the way that Lago envied Cassio's genius, then he may be said to suffer from possessor-envy. This type of envy wishes inordinately to possess that thing, trait, or capacity in superior degree and/or exclusivity from the envied. Lacking that desirable thing, the possessor envier considers the envied responsible for, or the cause of, his lack of honor. In the case of exclusivity, a possessor envier wishes to possess the desired something at the expense of his neighbor or rival enjoying that something. The distress experienced by the possessor envier in his inferiority couples with a hateful feeling directed toward the honored scholar who has the desired something exclusively or in superiority. The honored scholar in the possessor envier's view is the cause of the unremarkable scholar's hostility much like Taylor's person in the grip of state-envy. But Taylor's analysis of envy, which operates on an analogy of sin to sinning, implies that no self-assessment occurs in state-envy.

In the case of possessor-envy, it is easy to see how it is other-directed: the envier now hostilely sees the envied as someone who is the cause of, or responsible for, the envier's depravation or not having some good. It matters not whether the envier is correct in this other-assessment. Were it not for
Whereas in the case of possessor-envy it is easy to see how it is other-assessing but hard to see how it is self-assessing, in the case of deficiency-envy it is easy to see how it is self-assessing but difficult to see how it is other-assessing. My account of deficiency-envy, unlike Taylor's analysis of object-envy, suggests that deficiency-envy is other-assessing because the envied—with her possession—is essential to the feeling of envy insofar as the other and not the good itself is the painful reminder of one's lacking a certain desirable good. Taylor has noted this dimension of object-envy but only at the level of reflective regard, noting that the envier turns on himself because of his lack of the desired good. I think she is right about what I am calling the deficiency envier turning on himself, but her account obscures the way in which the deficiency-envy is as much about status as possessor-envy; these types of envy differ in how the envier handles their perception of the their changed standing in the world that first occurred in the comparative moment.

Contra Taylor's theory of object-envy to which I am drawing a parallel in deficiency-envy, the other person is essential and is assessed because the deficiency envier believes that the envied has a good that the envier should have, and the 'should' here is spelled out as follows: given that the deficiency envier believes himself equal or superior to the envied with regard to the virtues/strengths and vices/weaknesses of the envied, the envier should have the good that the envied has but he does not. As with possessor-envy, the other is assessed necessarily because the deficiency envier measures what he should or should not have based his view upon of what an apparent equal does have. The envier is someone who believes this good is essential to his self-esteem or standing in the world vis-à-vis not just anyone who possesses that thing but is an apparent equal or rival who does.

What is unique about deficiency-envy, as Taylor intuited in her notion of object-envy but ambiguously articulated, is that the envied is not believed to be the cause of my lack and the envied is not perceived or believed to be an impediment to my attaining the good that I lack. Both conditions contribute to the fact that the deficiency envier may begrudge the envied but not direct hostility toward the envied. Since the envied did not cause the deficiency envier's predicament and does not block my efforts to resolve this predicament, she should not be the focus of this type of envy—but she should not be excluded or separated either.
What goes missing in Taylor’s account that my view of deficiency-envy can capture is that while the other may recede to the margin of the experience, she first played a crucial role in my deficiency-envy insofar as her appearance as the superior (at least with respect to some desirable good) constituted the self as deficiency envier in a robust way. The other is the cause of my recognizing and thus focusing on my deficiency, but she is not the object of my deficiency-envy, for the object of the focus of my deficiency-envy is precisely in my deficiency—those irritating or humiliating thoughts Taylor rightly described. In this sense, then, deficiency-envy is not benign, for if harms—rots of the bones of, as Proverbs 14:30 warns—the envier even if it is not hostile toward the envied. The superior other in possessor-envy still constitutes the possessor envier in an even more robust way. The possessor-envier apprehends the same disparity as the deficiency envier, but he cannot admit the facts of the disparity, for the self-examination would prove too painful, the psychic distress too great; he thus attacks the other to protect what little self-esteem he has (and this is why enviers don’t often believe themselves inferior to their neighbor even when they admit their inferiority in that moment—an admission evidenced by the fact that we see no other reason for their agitation).

It is, of course, one thing to begrudge another her goods, traits, or capacities and quite another to malign her for them. In deficiency-envy, to begrudge or acknowledge something reluctantly, namely, that another has a thing, trait, or capacity that I desire but lack, can take the form of neither celebrating that good with her nor condemning her for that good, nor even condemning the good itself insofar as she possesses it and I do not. But possessor-envy takes the form of not celebrating that good, as well as condemning the other for possessing that good although it will not condemn the good itself in light of the fact that the other possesses it and I do not. The possessor envier does not simply look on the disparity between himself and the other with reluctant acknowledgment (begrudgingly). The possessor envier seeks to outstrip the good possessed by the envied or even to minimize the envier himself if he cannot secure the good in greater or exclusive measure. This is why possessor enviers often criticize the envied for reasons that go beyond the perception of that trigger envy as Iago looked askance at Cassio’s martial, political, and moral qualifications, or lack thereof.¹⁸

The distinction between types of envy can forestall the possible objection of an overlooked convergence between envy and covetousness as found in Taylor’s account of object-envy. As I mentioned above, a typical coveter simply wants the thing, does not begrudge its possessor, and need not reproach himself or feel inferior for lacking the thing; yet pathological covetousness, one may note, can grow to monstrous proportions and converge with possessor-envy where one hates or attacks the possessor. But even here, we find that the coveter and envier differ; at least insofar as the possessor envier would destroy the object to strike back against the envied who is not fungible, whereas in order to acquire the desired object the coveter would destroy the possessor who is fungible if not absent but never destroy the object, which is not fungible. Gollum would never destroy the object but might destroy its possessor, whereas the envier would destroy the object but not necessarily the person. And with respect to deficiency-envy and the coveter, the latter need not disparage himself for lacking that which he desires. Deficiency-envy may not be vicious in the sense we typically regard envy’s viciousness, but it is vicious in the eudaimonistic sense, for it harms the agent by making him unhappy—or even incapable of seeing his unhappiness, for while he’s conflated the relation between certain goods and the worth of persons, and while his ‘inclinations overcome his better judgment, ... he does have better judgment and is full of regrets’, teetering on psychic ruin.¹⁸ Envy is an emotion that is always bad—even if it is not all bad; it is especially bad for the envier and only in rare instances bad for the envied.¹⁹

Riding Waves, Making Waves

Starting from Sokolowski’s account of the method of philosophy—and phenomenology—my dialogue with Gabrielle Taylor’s (and more broadly the) moral psychology of envy was motivated by an interest in contributing to some growing but still marginal discussions in phenomenology. First, while phenomenology has been a crossing between analytical and continental worlds for some time, less has been written about ethical matters (including the study of emotions as ‘an index to our character’,²⁰ as Aristotle put it), and this seems a fruitful
path for phenomenological research. Second, I try to follow Steve Crowell's suggestive remarks concerning the future of phenomenology. Crowell has wagered that phenomenology's future depends on the talent of those who take it up; but he especially meant, I think, that the future of phenomenology rests on the talent of those who practice phenomenology in the context of issue-oriented rather than merely historic research. Correlatively, Crowell more recently proposed a view of 'new existentialism' located largely in analytical philosophy (work by Bernard Williams, Kristine Koonsgaard, etc.) and extended by Crowell, revival of existentialism designed to 'performatively ... demonstrate the vitality of existentialist thought' by examining issues in existentialism 'philosophically pertinent' for contemporary philosophical research.

I've attempted to present a chapter that broadens these three contexts by taking them together. My intent is to contribute to the ethical and existential discussion in phenomenology by doing phenomenology, which includes dialoguing with those ethical and existential themes that already permeate the work of moral psychologists (especially those working on emotions such as Taylor, Roberts, Peter Goldie, and Robert Solomon). I think such work is of value to both analytic and continental philosophers (for it's certainly valuable for (younger) phenomenologists to engage these analytic 'existentialists' and for (younger) analytical scholars interested in moral psychology to engage phenomenological and existential thinkers).

Continuing with my motivation to help expand the realm of phenomenological research into problem-oriented philosophy (rather than historical philosophy) it seems appropriate in this vein to claim that my contribution also may serve as a call for a 'new phenomenological theology'. This subdiscipline in phenomenology has tended toward metaphilosophy; it has asked about method, the availability of such experience for phenomenological description, and so on. But it has not availed itself of perhaps the most valuable avenue for research, namely, the phenomenological description of issues of theological/religious concern such as envy and covetousness, the theological virtues, developments of Sokolowski's phenomenology of the presence and absence of the Eucharist, and so on.

Regarding these several issues and more, I can still hear John Drummond's voice from my graduate days (not infrequently) saying there's a lot of good phenomenological work to be done. Phenomenology can ride these waves for some time. And with some combination of vision and talent, it can create new ones.

Notes

3. Sokolowski, 'The Method of Philosophy,' p. 518, 'Now, what happens in philosophy is that we interrupt our focus on what is being said and we turn to the distinctions that permit the things and states of affairs we are concerned with to appear. We turn to what normally remains latent. We foreground what was in the background. These background distinctions had been made by us at some time in the past, but in all likelihood they would have been made only vaguely ... We had never made them truly our own. Now, in our philosophical reflection, we try to make these distinctions our own in a new and different way.'
9. I will use 'neighbor' for short to convey this sense of a socially proximal other. Following Hume against the more dominant view in Western philosophy that envy stems from rivalry, it's social proximity and likeness

10. If we use the word ‘experience’ to suggest that in order to envy X one has to be conscious, then this is imprecise or even wrong. One can point to a sleeping person and truly say ‘He is very envious of X, you know.’ ‘Perceiving’ even is unclear. True, if ‘perceive’ means what it does in ‘he perceived that the car was heading toward him’, then perception requires consciousness. But if it means ‘knows’ or ‘realizes’ or something like that, then the point of the sleeping person comes in again. I want to thank Brian Davies for reminding me that this would be a point for further inquiry.


16. It is for this reason that I might argue against a classical example of possessor-envy, namely, Salieri and Mozart. What makes this Salieri/Mozart relation not one of envy or indignation but likely resentment is that Salieri sees Mozart as superior and himself as inferior. His anger and resentment stem from and are directed to a God who would bestow such skill and beauty on such a spiritually and morally unworthy and ungrateful buffoon.

17. If the possessor envier begins to minimize or revalue that good if it cannot be gotten, if the possessor envier’s desire cannot be satisfied, and his possessor-envy veers toward resentment. See my Envy and Resentment: A Difference in Kind: A Critique and Renewal of Scheler’s Phenomenological Account,” in *Early Phenomenology: Metaphysics, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion*, ed. B. Harding and M. Kelly (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).


25. In addition to John Drummond for his intellectual and personal generosity, I’d like to thank Christopher Arroyo, Brian Davies, John Drummond, Brian Harding, Jeff Hanson, Anne Ozar, and Anthony Steinbock for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The chapter’s deficiencies remain my responsibility and are surely fewer in number than before their thoughtful guidance.