What about homosexual relations? Well, I’m dubious that most people actually believe that homosexual relations are permissible. Now, it’s likely that most people in the West think this, but what about people in Africa, South America, East Asia, the Middle East, Russia, and Eastern Europe? If most people in the world think that homosexual relations are wrong, then according to Harrison, we have good reason to suppose that homosexual relations are wrong. There exist normative reasons to not engage in such relations. That’s a conclusion that I don’t think he will want to accept. Of course, those who practice traditional forms of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, won’t have a problem with this specific conclusion. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, rejecting (2) has its doxastic costs, even for those practitioners of the traditional Abrahamic traditions.

Overall, Harrison’s book is engaging and innovative. While, I am sure that the work won’t convince most of those who don’t already believe, I think Harrison’s book will propose an intellectual challenge to those who don’t believe. Theism in philosophy seems to be experiencing yet another resurgence.

ERIN KIDD
St. John’s University


Over the past few years I have had the fortune of witnessing a change occurring in the field, a much-needed diversification in both the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of analytic philosophy of religion. Alongside a special issue of Res Philosophica and the forthcoming Voices from the Edge: Centering Marginalized Perspectives in Analytic Theology, this volume consolidates that movement, setting a bold new agenda for the future of philosophy of religion. The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion gathers together a diverse group of philosophers using the sharpest critical tools in this tradition to think about the intersections of religion, race, gender, ability, and species. It was conceived, according to its editors, out of a “dissatisfaction with the state of contemporary philosophy of religion” (x). As they explain in the introduction, while debates exist over whether analytic philosophy of religion is flourishing or in crisis, it appears
clear that at the least it suffers from its narrowness. On the whole it neglects to engage cognate fields like religious studies, theology, and biblical studies which in turn leads to misreading source texts (5–6); it is dominated by theism in general and Christianity in particular (6–7); its participants are too often white, male and Christian; and it is overly cognitive in both method and object, focused on collecting what Merold Westphal calls a “pocket full of true propositions about God,” rather than a wide understanding of religious belief and practice (7–8).

As the editors argue, such narrowness is not merely a matter of scope, but of bias. Quoting Eleanore Stump, they note that this narrowness is not neutral—a certain focus on “rigor” necessarily slants against precisely those topics that are the messiest—“issues where the interactions of persons make a difference” (8). Unfortunately however such messiness is often a justification from excluding not only these topics, but those most likely to be interested in them. Lost Sheep therefore, seeks “seek to direct attention to both under-represented topics and persons within philosophy of religion” (9) — or, in the language of its title, “by bringing more sheep into the fold” (9). The volume accomplishes this with sections each on methodology; religious epistemology and experience; non-human animals; disability; and sex, gender, and race.

The first two chapters — Helen De Cruz’s “Philosophy of Religion from the Margins: A Theoretical Analysis and Focus Group Study” and Michelle Panchuk’s “That We May be Whole: Doing Philosophy of Religion with the Whole Self” — are two of the strongest and work well together to both make the case for the volume and to sketch a way forward to diversify analytic philosophy of religion. “How do our personal life experiences and position in society affect our philosophical practice?” De Cruz asks. Through focus groups conducted with minoritized philosophers, she examines in particular “how being a minority in philosophy might affect the practice of philosophy” (31). Proceeding with an intersectional account of identity, De Cruz shows how her findings confirm the basic insights of standpoint epistemology. For all of the participants, philosophy was personal (50). Regardless of their current religious commitments, participants were drawn to the philosophy of religion precisely through their experiences of religion (38–39, 50); all but one reported experiencing testimonial smothering when it came to speaking on issues related to their minoritized identity (42–43); and many noted their own research on issues of harm, suffering, and/or evil emerge from their
experiences of experiencing or witnessing marginalization within religious communities (46–8). As De Cruz argues, there is no “view from nowhere.” One’s particular experience gives rise to and shapes one’s philosophical inquiry. Given this, we should expect for philosophy to be stunted without full participation of scholars from a wide variety of social locations. Instead, the fact that it is dominated by white male Christian scholars creates what De Cruz calls a “skewed epistemic landscape” (51). Thus, working to make the field more inclusive is a matter not merely of justice, but of truth.

Panchuk reaches similar conclusions by investigating how the “view from nowhere” operates to exclude marginalized voices and perspectives. Beginning by recounting her own experiences doing philosophy on a closely-held subject, trauma, Panchuk interrogates “the myth of the dispassionate, disembodied view from nowhere” (56) that haunts analytic philosophy of religion, arguing that it forecloses certain topics, such as gender or disability (58); that it forecloses certain wisdom, such as that which comes precisely from being personally invested (59–60); shields scholars from needing to address the real-life consequences of their arguments (60–62); and warps our understanding of value, by asking us to engage in moral reasoning without love (62–63). It is no surprise then that “the view from nowhere often looks suspiciously like the view from the dominant group” (63); if personal investment disqualifies one as biased, only those privileged enough not to be affected by their arguments will be recognized as doing philosophy correctly. Using work in epistemic justice, Panchuk argues that privileging the view from nowhere leads to both testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering of underrepresented scholars in analytic philosophy of religion (67); and that assuming oneself to occupy the view from nowhere is an example of pernicious ignorance, which both harms members of the community and distort philosophical inquiry (69–71). Instead, Panchuk urges us to develop the virtues of epistemic modesty (71) and empathetic listening (72) both for the sake of inclusion and the epistemic success of philosophical inquiry.

The strongest of the chapters that follow demonstrate the immense potential of this new and diversified analytic philosophy of religion. Joshua Cockayne’s “Smelling God: Olfaction as Religious Experience” draws attention to a contemporary over-dependence of sight and aural metaphors as inhibiting our ability to understand earlier generations of Christians’ belief that one could, in fact, smell God, and offers an excellent case study for those interested in
embodied cognition and/or disability studies. Faith Glavey Pawl invites us to think how non-human animals might enjoy the divine presence, while also interrogating faulty assumption about how human animals might in “Exploring Theological Zoology: Might Non-Human Animals Be Spiritual (but not Religious)?” Scott Williams’ “When Personhood Goes Wrong in Ethics” provides a genealogy of the concept of person in Christian trinitarian discourse to argue that concepts of personhood today cannot be employed as simple and/or obvious, particularly to limit who counts as a person. Modern personhood is both a discriminatory way of understanding membership in the moral community, and a distorted way of understanding early Christian doctrines.

In “A Transfeminist Critique of Mormon Theologies of Gender,” Kelli D. Potter notes that the existence of patriarchy in Mormonism, a highly materialist religion, offers an interesting counter-example to a standard story given by feminist philosophers of religion that patriarchy entails a “denigration of matter and the body.” As she argues, patriarchy operates in a unique way the LDS Church, but some of its stranger inconsistencies highlight a transfeminist Mormon theology of gender is possible. While the essay is specifically directed at Mormon theologies of gender, Potter provides a broader transfeminist standpoint-theoretical critique of Butler-ian feminism that is so lucid and helpful that I am already planning a unit in my feminist theologies course around it.

Finally Sameer Yadav’s “Religious Racial Reformation Theory and Its Metaphysics” introduces the reader to a number of scholars who have argued that Christianity played a major role in the development of our modern racial order and helpfully charts the metaphysical assumptions about race operating in these theories. Yadav’s chapter in particular shows how valuable analytic tools can be when directed toward rather than abstracted from the insights of historical, social-scientific, and theological accounts of identity.

Some of the weaknesses of this volume are a natural result of the broader issues in the field it is trying to combat. The editors admit as much in the introduction, where they note that the volume is still limited in terms of its authors all working in America and Europe, and in most of the chapters being centered on theism, particularly Christianity (9). In addition, the volume is heavily white. The editors also mention that the volume fails to interrogate methodological assumptions often inherent in analytic philosophy or religion (9). While it’s not immediately clear to this reader what assumption they have in mind,
there are a few substantial ways in which the volume perpetuates rather than combats they very disciplinary narrowness the editors identify as pernicious.

The first relates to methodology, particularly surrounding the study of identity. Unfortunately, the authors of the later chapters do not build on or otherwise seem to be aware of the methodology section. Six of the chapters use eschatology to tease out what about various facets of human (and non-human animal) identity matter and/or are essential for relationship with the divine, but less attention is given to how these identities operate on the ground. Gender and ability become facts about an individual person abstract from power relations and political projects. There is little sense that identities intersect, despite De Cruz’s earlier call for and justification of intersectional analysis. And ironically, apart from Yadav’s chapter, little is given to how these identities themselves are regulated in and through religious practice and belief. If analytic philosophy of religion is truly to rise up to engage the messiness of identity, then it cannot be content with simply adding propositions about identities to the pocket full of propositions about God.

Relatedly, the one chapter on sexual orientation and biblical interpretation cites no queer biblical criticism, and depends for its interpretation of the New Testament on one 1997 book by NT Wright. This is not merely a failure to engage cognate fields but abstracting oneself from the actual project of LGBTQ+ Jews and Christians to understand their holy texts, to treat Jewish and Christian queer lives as an object of study that demands no new reading.

Second, it is unclear who the book is written for — both the foreword and the beginning of the introduction spend time defending the existence of philosophy of religion as such (presumably to other philosophers suspicious of the sub-field and religious belief more broadly), but some chapters slip into “we” language when speaking about Christianity. One chapter appears to run at cross-purposes with the book by arguing that religious experience is epistemically marginalized in the West (a category never defined and in need of examination) but which provides only three quotes from the new atheists to demonstrate that “the social status of religion is marginalized” (86), a fact upon which the entire argument hinges. The volume seems caught then between the logic of defending its frequent theism to philosophy at large while attempting to dismantle the exclusionary operation of that same theism from within.

Limitations aside, Lost Sheep will be invaluable for those working in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. It offers a model for those analytic
philosophers of religion looking to think carefully about the intersection of epistemology, identity, and religion, and serves as a rallying cry for those currently marginalized within philosophy of religion. Those who teach will find that most of the essays are written in a clear and easy style that will work well with students. De Cruz notes that those in her focus group, despite their personal commitments to inclusion and their own minoritized identities, still found it difficult to put together diverse syllabi for introductory courses in philosophy of religion. Thankfully, that work just got a little easier. And hopefully the moves toward diversification this volume makes will lead to a wider range of scholars seeing themselves as having a place in analytic philosophy of religion.

MICHAEL POPE
Boston College


John Pittard’s *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment* investigates the rationality of religious (or irreligious) commitment given disagreement between informed and thoughtful people. Disagreement-motivated skeptics present a higher-order argument against the reasonableness of religious belief formation, rather than first-order evidence against a religious outlook(s). After expositing what he calls the “master argument” for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, Pittard develops a weak conciliatory argument that religious commitment can be reasonable in cases where a believer has genuine rational insight. While strong conciliationism is committed to strict impartiality, Pittard’s conciliationist position is “weak” in the sense that partisan justification is possible in some cases, allowing for a middle path between unbending epistemic impartiality and steadfast deference to oneself. In this way, Pittard’s approach offers an interesting contribution to debates about disagreement beyond disputes about the significance of disagreement for religious commitment. As Pittard points out, though, discussions of disagreement in general do not settle questions about religious disagreement in particular. So, his argument is essential reading for those interested in the higher-order troubles that accompany religious disagree-