CAPITALISM’S HOLOCAUST
OF ANIMALS

A Non-Marxist Critique of Capital,
Philosophy and Patriarchy

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From the post-human to the non-human

For decades, the project of post-humanism has been dedicated to the transcendence of the human as metaphysical-ideological creation of the post-Enlightenment anthropocentrism. It seems to rely mainly on the post-structuralist methodological apparatus and, in that sense, it represents an attempt toward deployment of the full political and philosophical potential of Foucault’s declaration “Man is dead.” This exclamation is Foucault’s invitation that we examine and admit the limits of the modern paradigm of anthropocentrism. It is neither a call toward its transcendence, toward moving to the next stage of development and arriving at a status of a superhuman, nor is it a nihilist realisation. It merely points to the historical limits of the paradigm, as well as to the fallacy of treating humanism as the self-evident post-metaphysical gravitational center of thought and political reality. Considering that, according to Foucault, there is no progressional continuity in the change of epistemic paradigms, one might ask if transcendence of metaphysics would have to be the necessary development of the process of abandonment of the humanist paradigm. What would be transcended is the illusory self-evidence of what being human means and its post-Enlightenment presumptions (Foucault, 1966: 346–360). Throughout his opus, and more specifically in his
considerations of biopolitics or the control and exploitation of life and death, Foucault committed to a philosophical and political rehabilitation of the body. In Foucault, life and physicality have come to occupy the place previously held by the now evacuated specter of humanism. Foucault’s project is post-humanist, not post-human. The human in its aspects of life and physicality, determined by the body, is to be salvaged and becomes the fundament of his or her “care of the self.” The center of gravity has been pushed toward human animality.

Similarly, Donna Haraway has been insisting on a post-humanism with an animal face establishing a physical and transcendental continuum with technology. In her “Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980’s” (Haraway, 1985: 65–108), building on one of the fundamental tenets of the socialist utopia, Haraway urges the subjugated bodies and decentered selves of the post-humanist era to seize the means of production (not her words but my interpretation): admitting that the origin of contemporary technological development lies in capitalist militarism, she insists that the animal the human has always been becomes essentially and unavoidably hybridised with technology, that this dyad is the essence of the post-human she later renamed “the inhuman” (Haraway, 2015: 160). Post-humanism, as the result of its own “philosophical spontaneity” (Laruelle), attempts to reconcile the two of the radical dyad of technology and the animal by way of proposing some sort of a resolution of the opposition, a dialectical outcome—a unity of some sort. The (post)human is a “hybrid,” a unified duality, in which the element of intellect holds a superior and exploitative position vis-à-vis its prelingual counterpart, the body. Therefore, the automated self is what the dyad amounts to in most of the post-humanist visions of society. Such seems to be Rosi Braidotti’s and Katherine Hayles’s (1999) vision of the future post-human self—in spite of the sensibility toward human animalism and the animals, “becoming posthuman” seems to be the next evolutionary but also revolutionary step.
There is another fundamental problem with the residual humanism of the analytically posthuman attempts to moralize technology and sideline experiments with new forms of subjectivity, namely their over-confidence about the moral intentionality of the technology itself. More specifically, they neglect the current state of autonomy reached by the machines. The complexity of our smart technologies lies at the core of the post-anthropocentric turn. (Braidotti, 2013: 43)

This is an example of what pervades contemporary post-humanism, as demonstrated by Cary Wolfe in his book from 2009 *What Is Posthumanism?* (Wolfe, 2009: xiii–xviii). There seems to be a teleological trajectory, which transcends not only the humanist conceptualisation of the human but also the human itself, and it does so along the lines of the axiology animal-human-post-human-full automation. At one point in her argumentation as to why she embraces post-humanism in spite of the fact that it causes “deep concern for the status of the human” (Braidotti, 2013: 64), Braidotti states that the technologically enhanced post-humanism represents “an evolution” (2013: 64). Admittedly, she makes a trans-speciesist argument in favor of a vitalist concept of “life”; in favor of the body and the non-human (including the animal), she insists on a vitalist continuum and attacks capitalist commodification of life (Braidotti, 2013: 62–64). Nonetheless, further on and on the pages of the same chapter, its technological mutation as “advancement of evolution” is advocated too. I subscribe to Wolfe’s generalisation that the majority of the post-humanists, in particular those of the “cyborg strand,” end up sounding like transhumanists despite the utterly opposite and playfully ironic and ambivalent stance of Haraway’s manifesto (Wolfe, 2009: xiii). Haraway’s inhuman or the cyborg remains monstrous—it does not culminate in a unification of the two elements that, ultimately, “makes sense” (such as being an evolutionary step). At the heart of Haraway’s inhuman, there is an element of inanity, or of the gaping real, that escapes meaning and philosophy (Haraway, 2016: 10–17).
The cyborg does not serve the “advancement of humanity” overcoming itself, making the next evolutionary step. In her later work, Haraway compares the inhuman to Cthulhu—it is closer to an animal than to the flat-surfaced intelligent and anthropomorphic Uebermensch of automated reason or the cosmology of artificial general intelligence (AGI) (Haraway, 2016). It is not a proposal that is anti-humanist as in anti-human: it could be seen as a radical deconstruction of the modern notion of the human and humanism arriving at a new definition of the “human”—a radical hybridity of the animal of prosthesis.

Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women worldwide. Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other. (Haraway, 1991: 165)

The two elements, the animal and the prosthesis (or technology), are equally defining of the hybrid and neither is superior in relation to the other; the dyad is “radical” in Laruellian sense, which will be explained in the pages that follow. The two do not amount to a unifying single sense or, for that matter, to any sense. The inhuman is homologous to the non-philosophical non-human (O’Maoilearca, 2014: 113–129) or to Laruelle’s human-in-human (1995) that is determined in the last instance by the real irreducible to language. The inanity of the inhuman, or of the non-human, is the gaping real at the heart of a selfhood; the post-structuralist turn has reduced to an effect of the signifying automaton, i.e., the subject. Pure physicality or materiality, regardless of whether living or not, synthetic or artificial, if devoid of signification assumes the status of the real—that which escapes language, meaning, sense, which is
the unruly, the absurd, the *unheimlich* (uncanny and outlandish) out-there. In Laruellian sense, a dyad is radical insofar as its components are not determined by the relation of one of the elements to the other but rather by the real, inside the dyad and the real of the dyad itself as determining materiality. In other words, the relation between the two is unilateral.

The radical dyad and the method of dualysis

The presence of one of the elements is treated by the other as the real. Considering they do not amount to a meaning achieved through unification, they do not interact in order to produce a truth but are rather unilaterally exposed to one another; considering they serve as the delineation or exteriority to one another, their relation is unilateral. Such unilateral relation, when transformed into a method of non-philosophy, i.e., of a thought that seeks to correlate with the real while affirming its fundamental foreclosure, is what Laruelle calls the procedure of dualysis (Laruelle, 1989: 93–95). The relation of the two elements in Laruelle's human-in-human, namely of the real and the transcendental (or the instance of language), is unilateral and the dyad's constitution could be subjected but to a dualysis rather than analysis (Laruelle, 1995: 221–224). The relation between the real and language, thought and the real, the human-in-human insofar as the real and its subjectivity insofar as a formation of language is based on the same logic of unilaterality, which is the foundation of Laruelle's method of dualysis (Laruelle, 1989: 13–14 et passim). In Laruelle, the relationship between truth and the real has been radically shifted or has undergone a non-Euclidian transformation: the thought seeks to “describe” the real while admitting its radical foreclosure (Laruelle, 2014: 144, 161). Laruelle explains the concept of “truth”—it is the product of the philosophical desire to create a reality of transcendence of the real, or sublimation of the real into sense, meaning, intellect as perfected form
of the real, as if a more evolved plane of realness (Laruelle, 1989: 54–58). The non-philosophical aspiration for knowledge approximates in ambition and in manner that of the sciences—it “describes,” explains the workings of the real or the exteriority thought seeks to understand and “domesticate” (Löffler, 2018: 14–18) without the pretension to accomplish unity with it, a dialectical mutual transformation, sublimation, or elevation of any sort.

The real remains an ultimately messy exteriority and science submits to this fact. Such is science’s metaphysical choice, I would say: even if it does not pose metaphysical questions, science has taken positions on a number of fundamental questions of metaphysical nature that define it as a form of intellectual production. For example, as Laruelle argues, science accepts thought’s finitude and the real’s foreclosure as the determination in the last instance of its practice (Laruelle, 2010b: 233). The real remains obstinately indifferent to the pretensions of language or thought whereas language continues to unilaterally correlate with the real seeking to mediate it (Laruelle, 1989: 56). By way of “dualysis,” the non-philosophical posture of thought and language mediates its object of knowledge, i.e., philosophical transcendental material (Laruelle, 1989: 18–20 et passim), while submitting to the diktat of the real. It establishes mimesis of the posture of scientific thought while operating with the chôra of philosophical material (Laruelle, 1989: 64–69, 133). Or in Laruelle’s own words:

We are abandoning the traditional ambitions of philosophy—they are but hallucinations to us—and vindicating finitude, precisely the “radicality” or “finitude” of scientific posture. (Laruelle, 1989: 27)\(^1\)

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\(^1\)My translation from the original French. All of the citations that refer to the original French publication from 1989 are mine. When a published English translation is referenced, it is the one released by Univocal Press in 2013 and translated by Taylor Adkins. In the subsequent chapters, I am referencing the translation more often than the original. In the Introduction, however, as I am presenting the fundamentals of the terminology I am choosing to refer to the original rather than the translation.
Laruelle’s non-philosophical method is realist. Nonetheless the realism of non-philosophy is not indebted to a particular philosophical doctrine. It emulates the realism of Marx’s writing. In *Introduction to Non-Marxism* (2014), Laruelle affirms Marx’s project of exit from philosophy—by way of philosophical material—and the form of realism it brings forth. He expresses his reservations toward dialectical-materialism as profoundly philosophical but nonetheless admits that Marxism is the only successful project of establishing a non-philosophical science of humanity, next to that of psychoanalysis (Laruelle, 2014: 68).

It is impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and even more so in philosophy, to find the radical concepts of the Real and the universal—only those of the unconscious and productive forces, of desire and work. But after this discovery, psychoanalysis and Marxism take on more than a new meaning—a transformation of their theories into simple materials. Such disciplines demand more than a simple theoretical revision—a discovery of a “non-” that is an effect-(of the)-Real or its acting. Different from a philosophy, such theories demand that they not be relatively “forgotten,” superseded, reactivated by and for another but transformed in a heteronomous way by this “non-” that is the effect of radical immanence. (Laruelle, 2014: 68)

Let us note that “dialectical-materialism” was not Marx’s epistemological commitment or at least he never used those words to describe the tenets of his science (Wood, 2005: 212–213). Indeed, Marx’s method is what we would call materialist, but he gave preference to the words “realist” and “naturalist” to describe it instead of “materialist”: he did so in *Philosophical-Economic Manuscripts 1884* as well as in *Communist Manifesto*. Let us note in the following quote from *The Communist Manifesto* the discursive continuity between “the young and the older Marx” when it comes to the notions of the real and natural(ism), notwithstanding the surprisingly masculinist—I
would not call them sexist as the *Manifesto* vehemently advocates full equality between men and women—and nationalist overtones:

The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome “French one-sidedness” and of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of Truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy. (Marx and Engels, 1969b: 30)

In fact, Marx dedicated pages to the question of materialism—in particular, in his critique of Feuerbach—only to criticise the unavoidable residuals of philosophy in it. Instead, the science based on an exit from philosophy seeks to establish itself in the following way and with the following goal:

Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being—a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. (Marx, 1959: “Private Property and Communism”)

Humanism is equated with naturalism and thereby a certain destabilisation of the anthropocentric worldview is introduced. The fact that “the human essence”
is discussed and a vision of its realisation is proposed does not necessarily imply a form of philosophical humanism or anthropocentrism of any sort. The subject matter of study is the reality of “the species being of humanity” and the pursuit of its determination in the last instance. The determination is, in its last instance, the physicality of the “species being” of humanity or the aspects of “the real” and “the sensuous” underlying social relations. My research has shown that wherever one would expect for the term “materialism” or the material to appear in a writing by Marx, regardless of whether one of the young or the mature Marx, “the real,” “the sensuous,” and “the physical” are used instead. At places Marx is very explicit about the terminological choice at issue:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as a sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. (Marx, 1969a: “Theses on Feuerbach”)

Concurring with Michel Henry (1983: 10), based on his exhaustive analysis of Marx’s archives and careful examination of his opus, in addition to the one I have undertaken myself in a previously published book (Kolozova, 2015), I argue that there is no such thing as an “epistemological break,” and the terminology in the sense thus described does not change in the works of the older Marx to reflect such presumed break. Certainly there are expressions such as “material products,” “material production,” or “material reality” but their referents are independent from the philosophical tension between materialism, idealism, and realism, on the one hand, and Marx’s epistemic choice, on the other hand. Even when the occasional use of “material” and “materialistic” could be said to have an epistemic sense, it nonetheless most often appears with an explanation that refers it to the notions of real
(production, experience, etc.) or the natural but also to realism. Here is an example of the nuancing in the use of these terms:

However little our written histories up to this time notice the development of material production, which is the basis of all social life, and therefore of all real history, yet prehistoric times have been classified in accordance with the results, not of so-called historical, but of materialistic investigations. These periods have been divided, to correspond with the materials from which their implements and weapons were made, viz., into the stone, the bronze, and the iron ages. (Marx, 1978: 138, note 5)

The attack on Feuerbach’s materialism and philosophy, such as in Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General, is not something the older Marx has abandoned. Quite the contrary, in a letter to Engels he reaffirms that his lifelong project concerning scientific treatment of philosophy has never been abandoned and that his political economy should be seen as part of that very same project (Henry, 1983: 10). Let us notice that the notions of realism, the treatment of the real—physicality, practice, and the “real abstractions” such as social relations (Sohn-Rethel, 1978)—and the stance on exit while still operating with philosophical material or via philosophy are homologous to Laruelle’s non-philosophical project. Let us call these tendencies of critical philosophy with the provisional name of post-philosophy. I will argue in the chapters that follow that we can indeed place psychoanalysis among them, as Laruelle insists in his Introduction to Non-Marxism (2014), but also include structuralism and, in particular, structuralist linguistics next to it. As said, according to Laruelle and also according to Marx, this is a stance that is also the axiomatic precondition and the identity in the last instance of science or of the sciences (Laruelle, 2013a/1989; 2014; 2016).

Just as the two elements of a binary in structuralist linguistics do not yield a dialectical resolution or any other form of unification, but are rather discrete constituents, so does the method of Laruellian dualysis enable a treatment of
the radical dyad of physicality (and animality) and the signifying automaton (including technology) as determined in the last instance by the materiality of discrete duality. The radical dyad's “identity in the last instance” (Laruelle, 2016: 17–24) is determined by the concreteness of its constitution, namely by the materiality of the animal-machine—or of physicality-automaton—minimal structure of discrete elements. Our non-philosophical treatment of the human invites the use of the terms “non-human” and “inhuman.” The radical dyad is the identity in the last instance of the non-human, homologous to Haraway’s cyborg and the inhuman, and its determination in the last instance as belonging to the category of the real insofar as the real is instantiated as a specific form of materiality.

The “identity in the last instance” is a transcendental entity engendered by way of “cloning the real” (Laruelle, 1992; 2016). In order to avoid confusion with notions pertaining to empiricism, positivism, or philosophical realism of any sort, let us further elucidate the concept of “identity in the last instance” with the following quote from Laruelle:

We can call “science” a knowledge that is unilaterally ordered to the real. The thought of Identity as the sole (real) cause is the simplest of all and the most minimal. The most rigorous, the one that reflects rather than expresses the real’s structure with the least possible mediation and that emphasizes this structure as the cause of theoretical representations. The poorest because it rejects—although it exercises itself as a transcendence or a dimension of the theoretical—every foundation in a metaphysical or religious transcendence: in an autopoiesis. (Laruelle, 2016: 61–62)

In Introduction to Non-Marxism (2014), Laruelle explains the procedure of cloning as thought’s following “the syntax of the real” and as being fundamentally “descriptive” (Laruelle, 2015: 109, 144), which can be understood as mimesis of the real’s structure. The task of science as “describing the real,” according to Laruelle’s definition of it, is similar to
Wittgenstein’s idea of scientific thought acting as “Maßstab of the structure of real” (Tractatus, 2.1512). The identity of the last instance, or the Maßstab of the real the non-human or the cyborg is, reflects a structure of radical duality consisting of the physical and the automaton of signification, and of the animal and the machine, as an asymmetric binary irreducible to a single underlying truth that would redeem the seeming senselessness of the odd pairing. The binary carries a kernel of non-sense issuing from the mere materiality of the unity without unification, of the absence of an answer to the question of what such unity amounts to. It is not a step in an evolution because we have always been cyborgs (Haraway, 1991: 178), and it is not reducible to either animality or technology, nor to their sublation or sublimation. There is no contradiction to be resolved as their unilateral (non-)relation cannot produce either coherence or contradiction. What remains there, at the heart of this discrepant, awkward mess of animal and machine establishing some form of continuity between its two components, inhabiting the same real and subjected to a single determination in the last instance, is a certain remainder that escapes sense. It also escapes any teleological purpose such as humanity transcending itself with the help of technology or humanity transcending its estrangement from nature by returning to it as its true essence. The hybrid of physicality and automation—that can manifest itself as a hybrid of animal and machine—is the identity in the last instance of humanity. This understanding of humanity is neither humanist nor anti-humanist; it is non-humanist. It goes beyond the humanist metaphysics of anthropocentrism. Non-humanism remains aligned with some of the goals of post-humanism but it is also profoundly different from it: the identity in the last instance it seeks to explain and the real it correlates with is that of humanity, albeit explaining it by means of non-humanism. The non-human is endowed with both synchrony and diachrony; it has a certain structural transthistoric sense, which is nonetheless always already subjected to historical transformation. It can be seen as a radical structure and explained
by means of Saussure’s structuralism simply because it is a binary without unification or a dialectical outcome; it is the minimal structure, which is utterly senseless unless integrated in a finite automaton of signification (in Lacanian sense).

The speculative machine of capital: Marx meets non-philosophy, feminism, and animal studies

There is an almost perfect analogy between philosophy and capitalism if subjected to both non-philosophical analysis and heuristics based on Marx’s writings (leaving aside the subsequent tradition of Marxism). Laruelle’s diagnosis of philosophy—radicalised to its identity in the last instance rather than generalised—is that it is the product of thought grounding itself as the real by way of subsuming or sublating the real insofar as thought’s exteriority into a mixture of thought and the real (Laruelle, 1989; 2013a, passim). Such “mixture” par excellence, the founding concept of philosophy, is “the being” (Laruelle, 2013a: 1, 2, 7, 12 et passim). The “being” is not only a postulation but also—and even more so—installation of the real insofar as its substance is to be understood as a certain truth, a conflation of thought and the real while submitting the latter to the former. Philosophical truth is an elevated real, a “perfected” real, or a real more real than the real itself (Cf. Laruelle, 2016: 10).

This is what the problem of “philosophical decision” in Laruelle comes down to, ruled by the “principle of sufficient philosophy” or PSP (Laruelle, 2013a: 12, 77, 99 ff). Marx’s “critique of philosophy in general” (Marx, 1959; 1968; 1969b) concerns its auto-referentiality, the fact that it deals with itself even when purporting that it explains the physical or material exteriority—philosophical materialism is inverted idealism, writes Marx, precisely because it does not submit to the real insofar as “physical, sensuous, lived” and “practice” (Marx, 1968; 1969a). The inability to think in terms of a “third person’s perspective”
but rather subjectively is what keeps philosophy trapped in its pretentiousness to inaugurate reality, to decide what is real instead of ordering to it, instead of submitting to materiality and practice as its determining exteriority.

A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being for its object; i.e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. A non-objective being is a non-being [...] For this third object I am thus a different reality than itself; that is, I am its object. Thus, to suppose a being which is not the object of another being is to presuppose that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for an object. But a non-objective being is an unreal, non-sensuous thing—a product of mere thought (i.e., of mere imagination)—an abstraction. To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have sensuous objects outside oneself—objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer. (Marx, 1959: “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General”)

The post-Kantian, linguistic turn—and, thus, “post-metaphysical”—response would be that the real in itself is foreclosed to thought and therefore it cannot be its object of theorising. The post-structuralist radicalisation of the same position consists in the proposal to think only the linguistic constructions of our realities, the economies of our languages as power, while assigning the real in itself—or the Real understood in Lacanian sense as per the post-structuralist canon—to the domain of unthinkability (Kolozova and Trajanoski, 2001: 76–77). And this is precisely what a philosophy—based on its underlying mythopoetic drives—desires: a knowledge that has engulfed the real, grasped it fully, and absorbed it without a remainder in order to sublimate the real into a reality of truth, in order to elevate the real into a more perfect form of existence, one whose core or essence is “meaning.”

The fact that the pursuit of the real has been abandoned by the post-structuralists and thereby its incommensurability with thought affirmed does
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not mean that the old metaphysical mover of thought has been transcended. Quite the contrary, giving up on considerations of the real insofar as thought’s radical exteriority speaks of the conviction that only if the form of “metaphysical” knowledge at stake were possible the pursuit of the “truth of the real” would make sense. Thus, the post-structuralists would admit its relevance for theory only if the totality of the real, its “essence,” were graspable or only if it had essence. Indeed, Laruelle is right; nothing has changed in the old philosophico-metaphysical equation real = fiction except that has been replaced by fiction = real. Apparently, the positions have been swapped but the equation remains unchanged (Laruelle, 1989: 231).

The circularity in which post-structuralist philosophy remains trapped in—and, for that matter, the entire legacy of the linguistic turn too—is one defining philosophy rather than metaphysics. The principle of philosophical sufficiency as opposed to science’s acceptance of its own finitude, as Laruelle would put it, marks the difference between philosophy and science. Assuming the posture of thought defining of sciences in the treatment of philosophy and for the purposes of explaining the reality of the “species being of humanity” (Marx, 1969a: Estranged Labour) is what serves, in both Laruelle and Marx, as the foundation for establishing a science of humanity. Moreover, let us note that sciences and philosophy make a different choice, take a different decision, vis-à-vis the questions of accessibility of the real and finitude of thought and knowledge.

Therefore, let us note that what the linguistic turn should have been in search of by trying to approach sciences and separate itself from philosophical atavism is, in fact, the exit from philosophy, not metaphysics. Metaphysical questions could be seen as clones of the experience that verges on the prelingual, stemming from that grounding bewilderment by the outsideness, by the real as the limitation to one’s self-expansion but also as an invitation to join it, an experience that invites not only philosophy but also science and art. The experience can be treated scientifically insofar as it
is consisted of materiality, insofar as it is the instance of the real preceding thought. It could also be treated philosophically or metaphysically, the latter being a form of philosophy. Let us reiterate, in order to exit the viscous circle of metaphysics, we should first exit philosophy. Metaphysical questions as objects of inquiry are nonetheless impossible to “exit” or abandon. Moreover, to do so would be unnecessary as they are the prime movers of all knowledge, including the scientific. They can also be seen as objects of a non-philosophical or post-philosophical science of humanity, treated as *chôra*, as disassembled set of concepts not constituting any philosophical doctrine in particular or a coherent theoretical unity of any sort (Laruelle, 1989: 17, 29–31, 127). They can come from philosophy as a discipline or more generally from the “world,” a term Laruelle considers synonymous with philosophy—both are defined by the same grounding decision of what the real is, and both seek to establish an amphibology of the real and thought in the form of (philosophical) truth (Laruelle, 1989: 12, 23, 27–29, 34–36).

In the quote above, Marx argues that the non-objective being, the one that cannot postulate itself as an object for a third person, in addition to being unable to postulate objects of theorising, but is rather preoccupied with questions of its subjectivity, is an “unreal being.” It is an abstraction rather than material reality or the real as “sensuousness” (Marx, 1968; 1959). What he problematises here, but also later in *Capital*, is the substitution of the abstraction with the real—the attempt at reification (turning abstractions into things, engaging in *Verdinglichung*) of social relations (Marx, 1978: Vol. 1). Relations are abstractions and as such they have their material or real determination. The fetishisation of value, on the other hand, through monetisation and commodification, constitutes the grounding gesture of capitalism. The concreteness of the physical product is transposed onto the plane of pure value, absorbed in the signifying chain of M-C-M, transformed into monetary worth, into an abstraction conflated...
with materiality. Whether use value or surplus value, what is fetishised as commodity is the abstraction, the value itself. Even the materiality of money is a fetishisation of “social relations,” which, with the acceleration of exchange, becomes unnecessary.

In simple circulation, C-M-C, the value of commodities attained at the most a form independent of their use-values, i.e., the form of money; but that same value now in the circulation M-C-M, or the circulation of capital, suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, passing through a life-process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value; as the father differentiates himself from himself qua the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the surplus-value of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital, and so soon as this takes place, so soon as the son, and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does their difference vanish, and they again become one, £110. (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Part 2, Chapter 4)

The spectrality of this sort of universe, its autopostulation and sufficiency, its unreality is similar to that of philosophy Marx discusses in the previous quote. Both are unreal as both do not submit to the real as their determination in the last instance. In this sense, they both produce the amphibology characteristic of philosophy as explained by Laruelle. The constitution of both universes, that of philosophy and that of capitalism, is identical in its axiomatic postulation. From this perspective, it becomes almost tangibly evident why Laruelle equates the notions of the world and of philosophy (Laruelle, 2013a: 101–102, 106, 142, 144). The real and the physical are in both cases mere “material resource”—that which ought to be exploited in order to create value—for the self-sufficient universe of pure value to be constituted and sustained.
The material for the capitalist machine: Animals and humans that can be reduced to animality

The capitalist machine of value production, the instances of quantification and calculation of worth, enabled by the infrastructure of the multinational and national banking and state institutions, rely on the combustion of the world of real economy. Commodities are created not in order to satisfy the general population’s needs, physical and “spiritual” (geistige, as Marx would put it), not for their use value. Their determination in the last instance is not the material use but rather their value (divided into use value and surplus value)—thus exchange must be maintained at an ever-greater speed. At a certain point what is being exchanged becomes completely dissociated from its alleged physical referent, such dissociated purely speculative entities are, for example, derivatives, bonds the “finance industry” operates with as its “material.” The creation of a “bubble” was inevitable in the first decade of 2000s. What collapsed then was the universe of projected values and the monetary profit that would have been gained from such projections—the real economy, the material production that sustains the livelihood of humanity, was in fact uninvolved in any sense and affected only indirectly. The M-C-M automaton has the intrinsic tendency to accelerate and arrive at its homeostasis of M-M. The following passage from Marx explains in what way:

A more rapid circulation of money takes place whenever a larger number of transactions are performed with the same amount of money. This may also take place under the same periods of capital reproduction as a result of changes in the technical facilities for the circulation of money. Furthermore, there may be an increase in the number of transactions in which money circulates without representing actual exchanges of commodities (marginal transactions on the stock-exchange, etc.). On
the other hand, some circulations of money may be entirely eliminated. (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Chapter 17)

It is not that the self-sufficient universe of capital underestimates the physical in the sense of a living and killable body and its aspect of animality only but also physicality as materiality regardless whether living or mere non-living object—the treatment of real estate in the post-2007 crisis, that is, the irrelevance of use value of housing, is based on the same contempt for the “merely physical (object)” as that for the exploited underpaid labor. Such is the treatment of nature as resource too. That is why, I argue, capitalism is based on a metaphysical fallacy in its treatment of the real determined as material or by a material instance. Similarly, for philosophy, a stipulation and its crisis or, god forbid, a collapse of a theoretical framework seem more real and urgent than the crisis in the real, tangible political-economic world and the destruction pertaining to the Capitalocene (Haraway, 2015; 2016). In both cases, it is more about the contempt for the real and the “objective” (in the sense Marx referred to the notion, rather than in the positivist sense: see above) than for the body and the animal exclusively.

“The human” is a matter of recognition of an *embodiment* of an idea, that of humanity. As said at the beginning, it is an invention of modernity and Enlightenment as philosophy. The model embodiment of the idea is the white man as patriarch. The rest of humanity has always strived for recognition as human from a lower or bottom position on the axis of humanity or from the position of the excluded, just as women, slaves, and people of color were at the time of the birth of the anthropocentric philosophy, sciences, economy, of the “world” as we know it. One might say that struggle is still ongoing in most corners of the world, including the “developed” ones (note: “development” is not an unambiguous term). The intellectual era of humanism coincides with the rise of capitalism and industrialist society. The human abstraction as subject of embodiment or value that can be attributed to certain entities
and the human that can also be transformed into the abstraction of labor—embodiment of estranged generality—are in correspondence. According to bourgeois reason, the human dignity of the worker is intact by this process, as the sense of the self, self-awareness, reflection—all of the individualist and auto-referential categories of subjectivity—is deemed independent from the body as embodiment.

All forms of humanity that can be easily dehumanised, rendered representationally closer to the animal than the human, are mere resource of labor—they are not even subjectivities, not workers; they are simply “labor” as materiality. Labor is to be dispensed with in the name of the creation of value. “Human resources” is just a form of resource as are the other “material resources” so the pure and maximal value can be accomplished. In order to do so, it is necessary to reduce or completely eliminate the notion of use value, to expand that of surplus value to the point of irrelevance of any distinction between the two. The complete expenditure of all animality, as part of the expenditure of all natural and unnatural physical resources, is the precondition of capitalism’s ideality. If it were to accomplish its goal of idea triumphing materiality and nature, as per Hegel, a holocaust of all animals is required, human and those deprived of language. Politics of the non-human is indispensable for a postcapitalist vision of society and its socialist response.

It is, however, the ontology or the metaphysics of the body-machine hierarchy, of the hierarchy of physicality and automation, of matter and idea (or intellect) as stipulated by philosophy that sustains the logic of capitalism and the destruction it entails. Exploitation of “resources” for the sake of “value” is a formulation that will always come up with all sorts of “progressive” mutations, all of them under the guise of (post)human rights, unless its status of a grounding philosophical-political axiom remains unchallenged. What enables its unquestionability is precisely the philosophy of this world—or simply the World in Laruelian sense—sustained by philosophy as an academic discipline. It is apparent that the metaphysical choice cannot be avoided.
or dismissed: the metaphysical question cannot be evacuated either from political discussion or from the realm of scientific inquiry. After all, science is about a different (from that of philosophy) stance toward the metaphysical hierarchy in question: its ambition is to explain the outsideness, the reality as exteriority and material world, and it is premised on realism, which is a position in relation to a metaphysical question, that of “is the outside world knowable?” (Laruelle, 2016: 39).

Thus, instead of evacuating metaphysics from the discussion, the materialist and scientific post-philosophical treatment of the non-human—or the animal with or without the capacity of speech—would submit to the real as its determination in the last instance instead of the philosophical auto-referential circularity. Capitalism is indeed a quasi-physical realisation of a philosophically postulated universe, much in the vain of Hegel’s idea conquering nature by way of its annihilation yielding its transformation into the “Idea in and for itself,” into the self-realisation of the Absolute.

The method of dualysis described above, likened to the posture of thought determining scientific thinking, as already said, submits to the real it seeks to explain, or to instantiations of the real, rather than to concepts, theorems, and philosophemes. It certainly operates with the transcendental, and the chôra derived from various theorems and philosophemes is the material the non-philosophical or post-philosophical thought draws on but in the last instance submits to the determining real. The real is not substantialised, it is not some vague absolute, it is not an entity, or, in Aristotelian terms, it is not ousia but rather tropos (or modus in Latin). Reality has its aspects of transcendence and of immanence or of the real as the determination in the last instance manifesting itself to thought as defining limit, as the Aristotelian-Lacanian tuché interrupting the signifying automaton, as trauma to language as automaton. It is thus vis-à-vis this instance only that thought positions itself in terms of unilaterality, or, in other words, thought always already presupposes that there is no relation of reciprocity with the real. The indifference of the
real is irrevocable and the scientific and post-philosophical posture of thought is premised on the affirmation of that indifference. In Laruelle, this posture of thought is sometimes called a Vision-in-One. In spite of its seemingly theological overtones, “the Vision-in-One” is quite the opposite—it mimics the scientific submission to the indifferent determination of the real pertaining to a particular reality it seeks to describe and explain. The operation with philosophical and theoretical materials, the conceptual bulk it draws on, does not deter the scientific stance from its defining submission to the singularity it seeks to render intelligible. In Laruelle’s own words, unilaterality (or “the Vision-in-One”) and the synonymity of philosophy and “the World” are described as follows:

The One thus described is unthinkable from the speculative point of view alone; it challenges the speculative imagination itself as power of synthesis of contraries, as transcendental power of philosophical imagery. It reclaims a thought without image, for, in a sense, it is always absent, at least invisible within the horizon of the World or philosophy. But it is not because it is unimaginable, non-projectable into the element of transcendence, that it would be unthinkable or ineffable. The philosopher wants to fold the real onto his thought and decrees through idealism that the real does not exist if he cannot think it. Vision-in-One constrains us to do the opposite: fold our thought onto the real by modifying the concept in accordance with it; no longer to be able to be willful, decisionist, idealist, but to be necessarily naive, experimental, realist, and to modify our traditional practice of thought and language in accordance with this experience of the One-real that we cake as our transcendental guide. (Philosophy and Non-philosophy, 2013: 50)

In Laruelle, therefore, to think in terms of the one is to think in terms of the real, and such methodological stance vouches for the determination in the last instance of the radical dyad in question. To affirm the radical dyad of the
non-human is to affirm its singularity insofar as the real determining its identity in the last instance. The two do not produce a third entity nor do they yield one but rather remain radically two constituting a singular identity in the last instance, which is a single clone of a single instance of the real. It is a procedure similar to Wittgenstein’s thought acting as real’s Maßstab mentioned above and to Marx’s thought determined by practice and materiality understood as post-philosophical realism. By way of such method we shall attempt to explore the socialist, anti-capitalist potential of Haraway’s figure of the cyborg arriving at its radicalisation under the name of the non-human. We shall unravel its logic of exploitation as underpinned in a defining way by the treatment of the animal and the human body in its aspect of animality.

But in order to explain the resilience to criticism of the logic of exploitation of animal(ity), we need to divulge and explicate the logic of exploitation tout court. The tautological phenomenon called “value” and its fetishisation enabled by the hierarchical incommensurability between thought and physicality constitute the “moral substance” of exploitation. The suffering in the name of a “greater good,” which once used to be the dignity of human life and now the Good seems to be detached from any “physical support” floating as a sort of an “in itself” and “for itself” (a self-standing Absolute), is a metaphysical fundament that pervades the political economy and “civil society” (in Marx’s sense) of our era, i.e., the logic of patriarchy, race, and the treatment of the animal. In order to make the structure of exploitative reason, and its speculative metaphysics, as unambiguously identifiable and as universally applicable to the world-philosophy of today, it is imperative that the categories of analysis are as formal as possible. That is why we begin by radicalisation of several concepts by way of arriving at two categories of the grounding binary of the following planes of reality: the post-human and/or the non-human, capitalism, patriarchy, and industry as the holocaust of the animal. The grounding binary is constituted of the physical and the automaton.
Overview of the chapters

The physical and the automaton, introducing the radical dyad of the non-human

By abandoning the principle of philosophical sufficiency in the analysis of the dialectics between thought and the real, following Laruelle and Marx, we arrive at the determination in the last instance of what philosophy calls the “human.” In its last instance, viewed beyond what philosophy postulates, the radical dyad, consisting of a signifying automaton (language) and body, we shall call the non-human resembles Haraway’s inhuman. It is a hybrid of the two categories that establishes a material continuity whereas on the transcendental level the two categories are in relation to unilaterality (or non-relation, relation that is in no sense determining). The expansion of the philosophically conceived dialectics of the two —whereby the transcendental utterly subjects and supplants the real insofar as material—is the metaphysical foundation for the emergence and instauration of universes of purportedly self-standing automata: subjectivity (transcending body), capitalism (transcending matter), patriarchy (transcending human animality or femaleness). These self-regulating automata purport to be self-sufficient whereas matter is of marginal philosophical relevance. Matter has economic sense by way of being invested in the creation of value. Without investment as its teleological purpose, matter is senseless. The notion of the non-human affirms the continuity between the prelingual (or the physical) and the automation of signification on the plane of the real and the material, while nonetheless relies on the postulate that the thought and the real are unilaterally positioned. The real is indifferent to thought’s making sense (of it). The dialectics of the non-human enables a different metaphysical stance that would provide the foundation for a universe after capitalism, one based on the presupposition that value, sign, and abstraction are in the last instance determined by the real of human activity and materiality. The reverse logic sustains the axis of the automata of patriarchy,
capitalism, and philosophy and its pretension to sufficiency accompanied by the contempt for matter as nothing more than expendable.

**Formalism of materialist reason**

The notion of the non-human enables a more productive operation with its two constitutive categories, the automation of signification, and the real (mainly referring to the physical). The categorical clarity, and moreover formalisation of the categories, is necessary for an exit from the anthropocentric mythologemes that spontaneously inhabit philosophical thought. The formalisation we propose establishes mimesis of the practice of formalisation we identify in Marx's political economy, but also in structuralist linguistics, anthropology, and psychoanalysis. The procedure in question can be summed up in Saussure's famous statement that his science of the language has moved from the concrete to the abstract, only to return to the concrete in order to subject it to scientific explication. We identify similarities between structuralist linguistics and Marx's materialist formalism on the one hand and Turing's formalism and treatment of abstraction (Cockshot, 2012) on the other hand. Having endorsed Laruelle's proposal to exit the principle of philosophical sufficiency by way of reversing logic of thought and real and their inter-conditioning, we apply the method of formalisation on matters that have been traditionally treated within the framework of philosophy (including critical theory). Thought's posture vis-à-vis the real emulates the procedure of superposition in quantum theory. We find homology between the treatment of the real in Laruelle and that in Wittgenstein. The procedure of Maßstab (Wittgenstein) is in structural symmetry with that of cloning (Laruelle). The universalism proffered by the combination of procedures proposed here enables feminist universalism beyond the differences of cis and trans, culture and other variables that are treated here as richness rather than points of division, unified by the structural laws of the material reality of women's position in the contemporary patriarchy.
Subjectivity as inherently philosophical entity and the third person’s perspective

Marx subjects Feuerbach’s materialism to an uncompromising critique because it fails to transcend the bounds of idealism, arriving at the conclusion that it is the inevitable result of any philosophy. Finally, he concludes that the problem of all philosophy lies in its auto-referentiality and inability to submit to practice. His diagnosis is almost identical to the one Laruelle elaborates as part of his critique of the principle of philosophical sufficiency. Marx identifies one structural constant in philosophy, which is the organisational principle of philosophical sufficiency—the subjective perspective. It morphs the outside reality to mirror human subjectivity. This is also the organising principle of another tautological universe, that of capitalism—it is centered on the human and of the form of the “Universal Egoist” (Marx). The science of the species being of humanity postulates all reality, including the subjective, as object of investigation and, therefore, the thought as objective. This type of objectivity is placed beyond the subject-object dialectics. Rather it assumes the third person’s perspective and from such posture of thought produces its “philo-fiction” (Laruelle). In this way, Marx circumvents the fallacy of Kant’s *noumenon*. Laruelle recognises the foreclosure of the real. Put in Laruellian or Lacanian parlance, the foreclosure of the real is admitted in its radicalness and impenetrability whereas the thinking subject succumbs to its structure by way of superposition. From such position the practice of thought becomes the work of “coding” the real, transposing it onto the plane of the transcendental or language, *tracing* its syntax through signification.

Homologies and asymmetries between the automata of capital and patriarchy

We engage in closer examination of Irigaray’s proposal to look at the automaton of patriarchal value production, and the treatment of women as
commodities, as following the same ontological model as the automaton of capital. Therefore, we will investigate the structural homologies and political-economic symmetries and asymmetries between the two automata expressed in the formulae M-C-M and P(hallus)-F-P(hallus). By way of operating with the two formalised categories of the non-human, namely the automaton and the physical, we are able to identify the structural correspondences between the two automata, which are always already subjectivised. We revisit Haraway’s figure of the cyborg or the inhuman and its presupposition that it is not a proposal for a human perfection or a metaphor of a perfectly humanoid machine.

Haraway’s cyborg is not a figure of perfection, it is not a perfectly humanoid machine, and it is not about flawless accuracy and potency. It is a figure of blurring boundaries, of pollution and monstrosity—the cyborg is an irredeemable hybrid of animal and the automation of signification. We revisit the theme of the fallacy of the animal-machine opposition as both are on the side of the material whereas what lies on the opposite side is automation. The cyborg or the inhuman (or the non-human) is also a feminist figure because it not only disrupts but ultimately demolishes the “marriage exchange” as the automaton of P-P’ . The transformation of oikos is the precondition of the political-economic transformation toward a socialist oikonomia.

New political economy is possible only under the condition of abolishment of the metaphysics of animal-for-killing

In one of his lectures held at Cerisy in 1997, Derrida states that the gesture of destruction of animals or of the Animal is foundational of all philosophy: “The gesture seems to me to constitute philosophy as such, the philosopheme itself” (2002: 408). The radical dyad of the (non-)human is fully humanised by the unilateral action of the transcendental to engulf the real and erase the
physical by transforming them into a purposeful form of existence, into a truth or the being. That is the foundational gesture of philosophy indeed. The same metaphysics is enacted in capital’s treatment of the physical: it does not seek to accumulate “material wealth”; it seeks to accumulate fetishised value, pure value parading as if material or physical. (It’s not about the performances of the car the capitalist drives but about what it represents.) Capitalist metaphysics is anti-materialist and it is so because of the disgust toward animality and the embarrassing similarity humans share with other animals. Humanity that has been dehumanised (or is included in the category of “Man by courtesy only,” as Haraway puts it), such as all women (cis or trans, regardless), workers of color, and the homines sacri of all walks of life but mostly emigrants, must be exploited on the basis of its proximity to the animal. Haraway’s remedy is to elevate the use of animal bodies in exchange of value production to the level of “laborers.” The procedure she proposes is philosophical par excellence as it seeks to emulate the structure of man’s subjectivisation as wage laborer. Labor is always wage labor, explains Marx, and the producer in patriarchy is always male, demonstrates Haraway. Animal is material (matter) invested in the production of value by way of its combustion, destruction that is enacted not for economic reasons only but also for metaphysical reasons, those of capitalism and capitalism-as-philosophy. Laruelle suggests we assign a different “use” to the animal (including the human animal). I suggest we emancipate use vis-à-vis value, and having demonstrated that the specular world of purportedly independent (from matter) automata is unsustainable, refute the metaphysical fallacy of capitalism and, thereby, conceive a different, non-capitalist organisation of social relations for the species being of humanity and its interaction with the environment.