In his 2000 work, *Introduction au non-marxisme*, François Laruelle lays out the principles of his non-philosophical political project of establishing 'thought in terms of radical concepts'. The concerns of this project are chiefly epistemological; or rather, they represent another significant contribution to the development of his more general project – that of establishing a 'science of humans' (*science des hommes*) which, he argues, should come in the stead of philosophy. "Thought in terms of radical concepts" – which is what non-Marxism in its last instance ought to be – aims to radicalise Marxism by ridding it of its transcendental constructions, fixed and unmovable as its unalienable 'essence'. Laruelle argues that 'Dialectical Materialism' or 'Historical Materialism' is not merely a thesis, hypothesis, axiom, or mere presupposition that can be seen as an individual, isolated claim. Rather, it is a complex 'cosmology', a transcendental structure that represents a system of answers to what are radically rudimentary and fundamentally theoretical questions. It forms a complex, inert and virtually indisputable (by those who adhere to Marxism) transcendental universe creating a closed narrative of answers to questions which are in fact 'affected by the immanence' of the Real which every Human in the last instance is. The questions Marxism asks are phrased in what Laruelle calls radical terms. Nonetheless, the proposed answers are products of philosophical autoreferentiality representing self-sufficient transcendental edifices.

All theoretical questions in their radical form, i.e., at the instance when they hold the status of a 'transcendental minimum', clone the Real rather than the Transcendental – they are posed by the 'Human-in-Human', not the Philosopher. Such are the questions that inspire scientific inquiry. Such are the questions posed by the Gnostics and the Marxists, explains Laruelle. Such are the
questions of the Human-in-Human we all are in the last instance. And such are the questions of the Heretics of Christianity and of Marxism.

Philosophy in the technical sense of the word does not recognise heresy, says Laruelle. Still, according to non-philosophy, the ‘World’ and ‘Philosophy’ are synonyms – they are one and the same thing.

Philosophy in this sense of the word is scarred by heresy, which is inherently present in it, and stained by the wounds of its persecuted heretics. ‘The World’ could be explained through an analogy to, say, Foucault’s ‘Discourse’ or Lacan’s ‘Symbolic Order’ and that is why it equals to ‘Philosophy’ – it is the totality of sense we assign to the mute immanence of the ‘Lived’ (or the Real) we all are. It is not only that alienated and alienating ‘Essence’ that weighs on us, it is also the norm, the normality and the discipline the ‘World’ dictates. Thus it is a ‘materialised transcendence’, it implies living one’s life according to a certain Universe-of-Meaning and it lays the foundations of Right and Wrong – of that which the ‘World’ praises and of that which it punishes. It is the Orthodoxy in the total sense and, therefore, it too has its heresies and persecuted heretics.

In Future Christ, first published in French in 2002 and in English translation in 2010, Laruelle attributes the capacity of ‘immanent struggle’ to the figure of Christ understood in a way which is, as he puts it himself, ‘evidently not very “Christian”’, in a way which is heretical. Rebellion (rebéllion) or struggle (lutte) is the essence of the Subject, maintains Laruelle, and it is so ‘because there is a Real cause of struggle that is not itself in struggle’. That cause is the radically insufficient Human-in-Human. Laruelle’s Human-in-Human is the instance of the Real behind the subject and – quite similarly to the Lacanian concept of the Real – it is passive. Therefore, it is fundamentally vulnerable. Thus, it necessitates the ‘Subject’ (or the ‘Stranger’, as termed in Laruelle’s Théorie des Etrangers first published in 1995) whose function is to struggle with and for the World.

Laruelle expressly links the heretical understanding of the Christian subject, as one modelled according to the figure of Christ, with the Marxian idea of struggle: in his attempt to explain the ‘immanence of struggle without goal’, he declares he will rely on Christianity, Gnosis and Marxism. Here, we shall seek to explore how and why Laruelle chooses to explicate the ‘subject of
immanent rebellion’ precisely by virtue of combining Christianity and Marxism and according to the procedures of his non-standard philosophy. It is precisely these non-standard procedures of working with the philosophical or, for that matter, with any transcendental material, which make non-philosophy itself heretical – its abandonment of the authority of the Doctrine (any doctrine), i.e., of the authority of Philosophy itself.

The Status of Heresy in Philosophy

Speaking of philosophy in Future Christ, Laruelle says the following: ‘The metaphysical forgetting of heresy is its second aspect of significance. What is there in the essence of heresy such that it still has not penetrated philosophy, never acquired the status of a true concept, even a negative or polemical one?’12 ‘Metaphysical forgetting of heresy’ refers to the fact that, speaking from the standpoint of non-philosophy, heresies do not exist in philosophy – such a possibility is a priori cancelled. As soon as an idea emerges as a ‘heretical’ re-appropriation of a doctrine, of a system of thought, it unavoidably becomes the foundation of a new philosophical orthodoxy. Such course of development is inevitable by virtue of philosophy’s intrinsic tendency to create ‘cosmologies’ (universes of meaning), systems (even when they claim to be unsystematic or anti-systematic) – its founding principle being that of ‘auto-reflection’.13 Any ‘aberration’ in the pursuit of truth is susceptible to normalisation. Whatever forms a ‘coherent teaching’ – a final and enclosed universe (a ‘cosmology’) of meaning – offering the sense of controlling the Real by way of reflecting it through Thought is part of Philosophy. In other words, whatever constitutes a certain orthodoxy is, in fact, philosophy.

According to Laruelle, by its determination in the last instance, Philosophy deals with itself – not the Real.14 It has duplicated the Real into the concept of ‘Essence’ and ‘Being’, says Laruelle, and its history consists in thinking the endless variations of these two products of its own. The history of philosophy is a history of philosophy thinking itself. Concepts usurp the place of the Real – by suppressing it entirely – and form endless chains of systemic configurations which pretend to be the reflections of reality. Thus the transhistorical philosophical debate has never been about the Real. Rather, it has always been a ceaseless, perennial dispute of different configurations of the auto-referential Transcendental. François
Laruelle argues that even when the ‘linguistic’ or ‘Wittgensteinian’ turn in philosophy forwards the claim that the Real is inaccessible,\textsuperscript{15} it still has the pretension to \textit{re-present} the reality, simply because it claims there is no reality but the transcendental one we cognitively construct. Thus, the constructed reality has claimed the status of (the only possible) reality. This is in fact the absolute or total completion of the act of philosophy folding into itself and over itself (\textit{se repliant}), i.e., of its duplication or what Meillassoux calls ‘correlationism’.\textsuperscript{16}

The only possible heresy in philosophy would be that of non-philosophy. Of a stance which is outside philosophy, outside its self-content self-circumscription, which operates with its ‘transcendental material’ in an irreverent way which dismisses any authority of philosophy over reality or any superiority whatsoever over the scientific (or, for that matter, the poetic). It is a \textit{non-philosophical} posture of thought, one which heretically renders philosophy to mere \textit{chôra} (a mess of unorganised ‘transcendental material’) with which it operates when theorising while succumbing to the ultimate authority of the Real.

The heretical stance is inherently rebellious. The heretic-subject is of the immanent struggle. Laruelle claims that there is a ‘transcendental universe’ issuing from philosophy which is irreverently heretical with respect to its origin and founded upon ‘radical concepts’ – the theoretical universe of Marxism.\textsuperscript{17} Marxism is already in its origin a heretical posture of thought that has stepped out of the cycle of philosophy’s auto-mirroring. But not entirely, according to Laruelle. It is still subject to the essentially philosophical constraints imposed by the doctrine of Marxism. Orthodox reverence of \textit{transcendental constructs} such as ‘dialectical materialism’ and the inability to reduce them to \textit{chôra} – mere transcendental material instead of finished conceptual wholes – is what disables the completion of the project of stepping out of philosophy which Marxism initially set for itself (in the \textit{Theses on Feuerbach}).

In order to radicalise its position, argues Laruelle, and place itself outside philosophy, Marxism has to take a step outside itself by virtue of admitting its own transcendental, i.e., philosophical character. It has to adopt the stance of the ‘non-’ that is situated in the Real that clones itself through concepts. In order to preserve its grain of ‘thinking affected by immanence’,\textsuperscript{18} Marxism ought to become non-Marxism, argues Laruelle. It is only to Marxism and
psychoanalysis that Laruelle ascribes the status of theories that are based on ‘radical concepts’ and have, therefore, accomplished a significant although not complete Ausgang from Philosophy.

The ‘real’ solution to the problem of the DLI [determination-in-the-last-instance] as the object and cause of its own theory should avoid Hegelian idealism better than it has been done by the materialism. Neither a cause in exteriority nor a dialectical identity of contraries, the Real is the cause by virtue of immanence and determines cognition of its own syntax, of its own causality, through a process that one would call ‘cloning’ ... Suppose there is an object X to be cognised. Provided it is affected by immanence or susceptible to DLI, that is seen-in-One, it also can clone ‘itself’ from the material that is its transcendence.19

What remains to be done in order to fully realise the act of exiting the circular entrapment of the Transcendental (that is, of Philosophy) is to adopt the ‘Syntax of the Real’ in the use of language whose most rudimentary element and defining component is – the thinking in terms of ‘radical concepts’. This position of radicalising Thought, bringing it closer to the Real (in the form of it being ‘affected by immanence’), is accomplished through the adopting of the heretical posture of thought – a position of immanent, infinite rebellion. To the forms of thought endowed with the potential of radical thought – one that is always already attuned to the Real – i.e., to psychoanalysis and Marxism, Laruelle adds gnosis in so far as it is further radicalised by way of abandoning its philosophical constitution and preserving its ‘Gnostic essence’, i.e., the immanent hairesis of the ‘Human-in-Human’.

In order to establish the most radical possible stance of heresy, i.e., heresy in the last instance, one adopts the immanently rebellious position vis-à-vis ‘the World’, i.e., vis-à-vis Philosophy. Therefore, non-philosophy as a form of heretical situating with respect to the discipline of philosophy is further radicalised through the adopting of the heretical stance informed by Gnosticism and non-Christianity. This positioning of the subject is heretical in the last instance – it is the Human-in-Human in its immanently rebellious situatedness as the ‘non-Christian Christ’ or the ‘Messiah’ (terms which do not refer to the historical or doctrinal Christ but rather to the radical idea of it, to the transcendental minimum of the notion of ‘Christ’).
Marxism and Non-Marxism: Cloning the Real into the Transcendental Chôra of Marxism

Laruelle’s *Introduction au non-marxisme* represents an endeavour to establish the non-philosophical principles – or rather, the non-Marxist principles – for Marxian theory and practice in a way that will bring forth its ‘source of immanence’ and ‘power (of) thought’. Non-Marxism is a re-appropriation of Marxism which takes place by way of transforming it into a thought of ‘the immanent mode’ [*de la manière immanente*], which is only possible if it is dismantled as a consummate doctrine or a ‘cosmology’ – a transcendental structure which, in spite of its potential for various reconfigurations, remains an unchangeable structural minimum. The abandonment of the ‘cosmological’ foreclosure of Thought leads to its rendering into conceptual chôra, the chaos of the unorganised transcendental material. As the result of Thought’s succumbing to the authority of the Real, it is affected by the immanence (that the Real is) which produces the cloning of the Real into the Transcendental.

Laruelle argues that in order to arrive at the source of immanence for Marxism, and, in that way, clone the *identity-in-the-last-instance* of Marxian political vision, one has to first evacuate not only Dialectics but also Materialism, and undertake afresh the elucidation of Marxism’s Determination-in-the-last-instance (or *la Détermination-en-dernière-instance*, hereafter referred to as DLI). Both Dialectics and Materialism are circumscribed conceptual constructions, closed systems of belief. In other words, they are not subjected to radical criticism which might issue in complete abandonment of both the dialectical and the materialist thesis. This is due to the conviction that if one rids Marxism of these two ‘cosmologies’, what remains is hardly Marxism. Laruelle’s claim is quite the opposite: radical concepts, among which the One which is its ‘identity in the last instance’, are what defines Marxism, not the finished doctrinal compounds. Radical concepts are always produced according to the syntax of the Real: they are not the result of purely philosophical disputes – although they are engaged inside philosophy and its history – but rather, of the ‘transcendental being affected by immanence’. Radical concepts are products of the encounter of Thought with the (indifferent) Real which results in Thought ‘cloning’ (‘describing’) the Real by minimum use of transcendental material. The Transcendental
‘mimes’ the Real. This process is enabled by the Real’s status of the Lived. The Real the non-philosophy attempts to correlate with is never the inaccessible In-Itself – it is, rather, the Lived that has not been reduced to concepts, ideas, interpretation according to any worldview or philosophy.

In Théorie des Étrangers, Laruelle elaborates the concept of the Lived (le vécu) in terms of the non-philosophical appropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The Lived is also termed ‘le joui’ (the enjoyed) of the ‘jouissance’ (enjoyment). The latter is always of the ‘World’ whereas the former represents the sheer experience (preceding Language) of - let us resort to Lacanian terminology – the thrust of Tuché (or the Real) into the Automaton (Language), i.e., into the ‘World’ and its instance called the ‘Stranger’ (the alienated Self or the Subject). By an analogy to Lacanian psychoanalysis, we can explain the Lived as the trauma caused by an intervention of the Real (‘le joui’ which is the purely experiential derivative of ‘jouissance’ – that which is plainly lived, beyond the dichotomy of the corporal and the intellectual). The Lived is the product of the plasticity (in Catherine Malabou’s sense) of the Real. We are resorting to the term ‘plasticity’ in order to describe the capacity of the lived to form a posture which enables the syntactic configuration of the Real which is then cloned into the Transcendental. It is in this sense that the radical concept ‘clones the Real’. It is not the reflection of the Real. The latter continues to remain indifferent to Thought’s actions and pretensions. In itself, the Real remains inaccessible to Thought. One of the central goals of Laruelle’s non-philosophical project is precisely to rid Thought of its pretension to reflect the Real, to rid Philosophy’s determination in the last instance as relative to the Real by way of affirming its unilateral correlation with it.

The DLI is the core of the ‘radical concept’ – it is dictated by and necessarily correlates with the source of immanence. The radical concept is the immediate transcendental extension of – or it can also be synonymous with – the determination-in-the-last-instance which necessarily succumbs to the authority of the Real albeit generated by the Transcendental. The non-philosophical Real is without ontology – ‘Being’ is an inherently philosophical notion and non-operative in the context of non-philosophy. Laruelle warns that it should in no way be understood as ‘the-Being’. The latter is a purely transcendental product of philosophical auto-reflexivity – in its last instance, the concept of ‘the-Being’ is
unaffected by the Real. Its origin is purely philosophical. In the last instance, explains Laruelle, it is determined by the Greco-Judean history of Thought/Philosophy.27

The Real is quite simply a number or a ‘number’ – it is ‘the One’. However, it is an instance which is beyond the dichotomy of Matter and ‘Idea’, beyond the dichotomy of the Body and the Mind. It is also an instance beyond the traditional philosophical concept of the Number. The One of non-philosophy is not a numerical category in the conventional mathematical (or philosophical-mathematical) sense of the word, since it remains to be the impenetrable In-Itself – the Real which evades any pretension of Thought to reflect it (without a remainder). It is the Real which is indifferent to Thought, one that can never be reduced to a concept.

It is a grammatical category in some way: the Real is that ‘one thing’, that ‘certain something’ we are attempting to think, mediate via Language – render it ‘meaningful’. It is also a formal category of the non-philosophical thought which prescribes it as the only mode of ‘theorising’ – theoria en hen28 – that can bring about accuracy (that is to say, a thought attuned to the Real). It is also endowed with political potential since it represents the basis for the creation of radical concepts which correlate with the immediate Real the ‘Human-in-Human’ is. ‘The Real’ is the ‘Lived’ of the ‘Human-in-Human’.29 The three terms can function as synonyms or as metonymic renditions of the ‘One’. According to non-analysis (the non-philosophical version of Lacanian psychoanalysis), the Real is the Lived prior to its alienation through representation.30 The Lived shapes the syntax of the non-philosophical political stance, of the revolutionary (or immanently rebellious) thought and practice of non-Marxism but also of the heretic-subject of non-Christianity. Laruelle frequently refers to the notion of the ‘Lived’ as indeed the Real that every Human in the last instance is.

Non-Marxism is grounded in its DLI which describes the Lived and is the product of the non-philosophical vision-in-One.31 The operation which produces it is the aforementioned ‘cloning’ of the Real. The latter is a unilateral gesture which renders the DLI essentially non-dualistic or ‘unmixed’, that is, not constituted by the amphiboly of Thought and (the idea of) the Real it produces, i.e., of what usurps the position of the Real.32 The DLI is the product of the pure Dyad, a binary whose two components (the
Thought and the Real) are viewed in their unilaterality. The split between the Real and the Thought is insurmountable – thus the Dyad is pure. The Transcendental is defined as that transcending trajectory, that gesture of correlating with the Real which is a mere vector (the opening of \textit{epekeina}) which does not make a circular turn in an attempt to envelop the Real as Philosophy does. In this way, non-philosophy – and, for that matter, non-Marxism as well – escapes the philosophical trap of creating the limitrophy of the Transcendental and the Real which results in a transcendental grounded in the constitutive split (between Thought and the Real). This is what makes all philosophical thinking essentially dualistic. The dualism in question is always embedded in a form of \textit{unity} the two components of the binary inevitably create. The only way out of the ‘unitary thought’ (and its dualistic foundation) is via the unilateral stance and the thought of the ‘pure dyad’ it generates.\textsuperscript{33}

So, radically different from the \textit{philosophical dyad} where immanence is duplicated by way of creating its re-presentation in the ‘transcendental immanence’ (by presupposing that a priori the Transcendental ought to participate in the immanence),\textsuperscript{34} in the non-philosophical \textit{pure dyad} the immanence remains obstinately mute. By way of affirming its radically different status (that of transcendence as tenaciously irreducible to immanence) Thought only strives to describe the immanence rather than ‘express’ it.

The ‘immanent way’ of re-reading Marxism (or its non-Marxist re-appropriation) consists in the search for the cause-in-the-last-instance of Marxism by way of using its transcendental material in accordance with a principle of isolating the radical concepts.\textsuperscript{35} As the result of such a procedure of \textit{demontage} of the construction of Marxian orthodoxy we can see the possible obsoleteness of the dichotomy materialism/idealism (and, consequently, the constructs of dialectical materialism or historical materialism). It will also enable us to identify that which really corresponds with the ‘Lived’ and, thus, to establish a symptomatology of the Real present in the text.

If it [non-Marxism] would seem to go back there [to Marxism], it would be more to its problems rather than to its texts, and to problems whose solution implies treating the texts as symptoms, by way of suspension of the philosophical authority . . . It is impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and even more so within a philosophy, to find radical concepts of the Real and the uni-versal – solely the unconscious
and the productive forces, desire and labour. As soon as one arrives to this discovery, psychoanalysis and Marxism gain one utterly new sense – a transformation of their theories into simple material… These sorts of disciplines require more than just a simple theoretical transformation – a discovery from in ‘non’ that would be the effect (of) the Real or its action.  

According to Laruelle, the most radical concept the Marxist corpus of knowledge provides is ‘productive forces’ or ‘labour’. It is the result of ‘cloning’ the Real into the Transcendental since it comes directly from the *lived* of the exploitation of labour, in a form which is not philosophically conditioned, defined and produced. It is a rudimentary description (of the Lived or the Real) generated as a unique conceptualisation which is heedless to the possible history of philosophical elaborations of a similar concept. The Lived is the *joui* which can follow from the *jouissance* but in fact ‘precedes’ it – or rather, it is beyond the historic temporality. The *Lived*, the Real of the Human-in-Human, is (in) the radical *past*. Its ‘time is without temporality’. Or as Laruelle says, ‘The immanent or inecstatic past is inexistent and inconsistent but precisely as capable of determining memory and the present as material for the future.’

The experience of labour and of exploitation of labour takes place *always already* – it happens prior to and after any form of political conceptualisation (which could be any process of transcendental transposition including the non-philosophical ‘cloning’). And it is to the lived of the exploited labour force that the determination in the last instance of non-Marxism should succumb.

The Source of Ceaseless Rebellion: The Heretic

Laruelle establishes analogous couplings of Gnosis to Christianity and of Marxism to Philosophy claiming that what links Gnosis and Marxism – and, in that respect, what makes them fundamentally different from Christianity and Philosophy – is that they have both tried to respond to the question ‘what is the real cause of human struggle’. Not only are their respective determinations in the last instance affected by immanence – i.e., they mainly rely on radical concepts cloning the Real – but they also succumb to the Real of the human struggle (or the immanent rebellion). However,
Laruelle insists, they have both also retained much from philosophy remaining entrapped in the circular arguments engendered by the 'amphibiological' transcendental.

In spite of the radical grain they are based on, they are still, in the last instance, part of philosophy and the 'World'. In order to further radicalise their potential - bringing them to the (pure) Transcendental which would unilaterally correlate with the Real and would be determined by radical concepts - Laruelle proposes their transformation into *transcendental chôra*. The produce of this process would be Gnosis transforming into non-Christianity and Marxism turned into non-Marxism. Both the subject of non-Christianity and the subject of non-Marxism are defined by a single trait in common – the Heretical Subjectivity and the immanent struggle it executes.

We are pursuing an initial goal, indeed if we have one other than that of the immanence-without-goal of the struggle. It is solving the Gnostic problem of rebellion as priority of struggle over war and over every other determination of a theological nature. However, this solution continuously relies on Christianity, gnosis and more distantly on Marxism, but refuses the Greek confusion of struggle with the agonistic that still marks rebellion.\(^{40}\)

Agonism implies dialectics. It implies a philosophical project and certain eschatology. The immanent struggle, on the other hand, one which defines the Gnostic and/or non-Marxist subject, the heretic or the 'future Christ', is one which originates from the Real, the struggle of the unlearned with the World and its Authority.

The heretic-subject is the subject of ceaseless, immanent struggle. What defines it is its continuous rebellion against the World (against Philosophy, against the Church and Christianity, against all forms of ortho-doxy): 'to struggle in an immanent way with the World, this is the theorem of the Future Christ. In the beginning was the struggle, and the struggle was *with* the World and the World did not know it . . . That is rebellion, its reasons and cause.'\(^{41}\) The rebellion that never ceases is affected by the immanence of the struggle which precedes any political project. It is 'given without givenness' to the Lived since it is only through struggle that it establishes its relation to and within the World. The anteriority of struggle to a political project which is possible only by virtue of being in and of the World is not defined in terms
of temporal succession. It is embedded in a form of ‘a-temporal temporality’, or rather, it dwells in the *tempus* which is constituted by the Lived itself – that of the ‘radical past’.

It makes a clean cut at once with the contents of the past and of the present as well as with their sufficiency, in the name of a radical past and that which does not pass in being-in-the-Past. This is the human immanence of a time-without-consistency, and it makes a clean break from their only sufficiency in the name of the future . . .

The radical past of the Real and, therefore, of the immanent struggle, is pregnant with the potentiality of the immanent and infinite struggle – a struggle to come. Radical future is nesting in the radical past of the Human-in-Human – the real cause of immanent struggle and of the heretic subjectivity. This is an idea which reminds us of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘eternal return’ as the past of the constant becoming. In spite of the fact that the Deleuzian-Nietzschean ‘radical past’ does operate as the Real, the Void, the Hole of negativity carved into the World of words, the World of images and sounds, it is still one which remains faithful to the Transcendental or to History. This is so because, in the last instance, it succumbs to the authority of the Transcendental rather than the Real – to the ever Returning Narrative of the Eternal Return and of the eschatological vision of Humanity at the centre of it, coinciding with the ‘fissure in time’ but only in its aspect of the historic occasion of a ‘murder of God or the father’.

Unlike the epic historicity which defines the ‘eternal return’ and its past ripe with future, the radical past of the Lived or the Human-in-Human non-philosophy speaks of is a-historical, or rather, it has no ‘historic intentionality’ – it is not of the World, it neither uses its means nor does it have the competence to make use of them (the Transcendental of the World) and therefore lacks hegemonic conceptualisation which would be essentially historic.

The Lived (*le vécu*) of the radical past is that which *always already* – or repetitively – becomes the Subject of the World or the Subject of *Life*. The latter, unlike the Lived, is made of the Transcendental – and this is what constitutes the ‘future Christ’. Subjectivity is of and for the World and so is that of the future Christ, of the non-philosophical Gnostic or of the immanent Heretic – it is made of Language. What makes it essentially
Theories of the Immanent Rebellion

The Lived is the radically solitary stance of 'human insufficiency' and prior to the 'intervention of the World' taking place via 'subjectivation' — it is an instance of radical vulnerability. The Heretic Subject remains to be 'affected by immanence' — by the Real or the Lived. It is essentially unprotected, essentially exposed — radically vulnerable, in the precariousness which constitutes the reality of the human animal facing the spectral structure of sheer authority that the World is: "I (am) in-Life, therefore I am in it for-the-World", is the new cogito in which the Future Christ performs, that is to say every man or every Lived thing [Vécu] that becomes a subject.45 The heretic's vulnerable opening toward the World exposes the solitary Human-in-Human, immanently incessantly suffering because the Lived is sheer suffering (beyond the distinction of pleasure and pain). The protection that can be provided through the instance of the Subject — by mediation of the Stranger (l'Etranger) — is fatally porous since the Heretic Subject is affected by the radically vulnerable Lived: 'Because man is without-consistency, he is on principle, in contrast to other beings, able to be murdered, he is even the Murdered as first term for heretical thought and for the struggle that it performs.46

Unlike the other animals which can also be killed by the World, the human animal, the 'Murdered one', as 'the first term of the heretic thought', is not only murdered by but also for the World. The directedness toward the World, this vector or arch (one-way trajectory of a pure opening) of exposed vulnerability toward the World is what the rebellious subject substantially consists of. Hence, the radical vulnerability or the possibility of being murdered is the origin of the immanently rebellious nature of the Heretic Subject or the Future Christ. The Gnostic or the Marxian subject is one defined as a subject-in-struggle and if further radicalised as heretic in the last instance, it becomes the Future Christ the non-philosophy invokes. 'We gain in this way from the most innovative practical part of Gnostic rebellion as well as from class struggle in order to gather with faith as so many simple aspects in the figure of Future Christ as subject in-struggle.'47 The immanence of heretical struggle stems from the fact that the Lived is radically isolated, solitary and in so far as it is simply the instance of the Real indifferent to Thought and its pretension to express or reflect it — it is marked by the struggle to 'translate' itself in/to the
World, by way of estranging itself from itself through the instance of l'Etranger.48

The opening the Stranger (l'Etranger) constitutes exposes the vulnerable Lived to the lived effects caused by the World. The vulnerable Lived by which the Heretic Subject is always immanently affected generates immanent struggle with the World as the determination in the last instance of the Non-Christian and Non-Marxist Future Christ. The World prescribes the Subject, while the Lived mediated through the Stranger struggles against the inhibiting effects of heightened alienation. The World has the immanent tendency to re-produce estrangement, to frame the Lived as Philosophy, to introduce the constraints of the Transcendental. The Lived is endowed with the tendency of immanence and, thus, of opposing and rebelling against the spectral authority of the Transcendental. All transcendental systems are necessarily authoritarian; the Heretic-subject, the agent of immanent struggle constitutes the inexhaustible source of unending rebellion against the all-encompassing Orthodoxy – the World.

Notes
5. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
8. The terms ‘rebellion’ (rébellion), ‘revolt’ (révolte) and ‘struggle’ (lutte) are interchangeable in Laruelle’s Future Christ; consider the following quote from the French original: ‘Pour éclairer l’enjeu et les limites de la rébellion, posons le problème hors des errements philosophiques. La philosophie est toujours indifférente à l’homme ou, ce
n'est pas très différent, trop vite compatissante. Il y a des souffrances et des aliénations, et l'on conclut du mal, et souvent des maux, à la nécessité de se révolter. Les révoltes ne sont "logiques" que dans ce sens-là. Admirable cercle vicieux de l'incertitude et de la contingence d'une rébellion désirée à la quelle personne ne croit' (François Laruelle, *Le Christ future: Une leçon d'hérésie* [Paris: Exils, 2002], p. 20). Translated as: 'In order to clarify the stakes and the limits of rebellion we pose the problem outside of philosophical bad habits. Philosophy is always indifferent to man or, though this isn't very different, too quickly compassionate. Sufferings and alienation exist in the necessity of revolt and one concludes from this that there is evil, and often evils, there too. Revolts are only "logical" in this way – admirable vicious circle of uncertainty and the contingency of a desired rebellion in which no one believes’ (Laruelle, *Future Christ*, pp. 5–6).

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 9.
12. Ibid., p. 36.
15. Ibid., pp. 193–5.
16. Laruelle, let us note, uses the term 'correlation' in a different sense – it is a relation which is not 'relationist', one that remains in the One, one that merely correlates with the Real without mirroring it, within the gesture of relative constitution of the both terms. So Meillassoux’s 'correlationism' corresponds to the non-philosophical notion of the relative mutual constitution of the Real and the Transcendental, i.e., of Philosophy’s Unity (of the Two) or auto-reflectivity.
19. Ibid., p. 47.
20. Ibid., p. 48.
21. Ibid., p. 10.
26. Ibid., p. 7.
27. Laruelle maintains that philosophy as such is the product of the Western civilisation, it is determined by its Greek origin and 'Judaic' appropriations: 'freeing the one from the other, the real as much as representation; drawing them from this aporetic situation where the Greeks, under the name of “philosophy”, abandoned them and committed them to preventing each other' (Laruelle, *Philosophie et non-philosophie*, p. 14). He also often refers to the Judaic Other (ibid.) or the Judaic notion of the 'Messiah' (in *Future Christ*, passim). In these ways, it is implied that Philosophy is inherently a Greek or Greco-Judaic civilisational creation or the civilisation itself. [Translations are by Nicola Rubczak unless otherwise noted.]


30. 'The identity of the Real is lived, experienced and consumed by remaining in itself without the need to alienate itself representationally' (Laruelle, *Philosophie et non-philosophie*, p. 57).


32. 'The problem of philosophy in general originates in its not thinking terms in their specificities, but rather as opposites, in their relations or moreover in their borders and neighbourhoods. The concept of fiction, then, designates, as any other concept, an amphibological reality, a limitrophe of the real, whether it be beyond the real, below it, or the border between the two. From classical rationalism to contemporary deconstructions, fiction has always been taken as this relation of mixture, which is to say, unitary. Excluded by the real, interiorised within it, and with this interiorisation in turn claiming to co-determine it in every way, never has fiction escaped this play of inter-inhibition of philosophy with itself, and as such fiction can be no more than one pawn among others for a history which claims to exceed it' (Laruelle, *Philosophie et non-philosophie*, p. 232).

33. 'On the one hand, from its real foundation or its essence, this would be nothing but an Identity; it would be rigorously identical to the real without undergoing a division or a Dyad; and on the other hand, it would be a pure Dyad, a radical duality which is moreover not obtained through division, and not re-hybridised with Identity' (Laruelle, *Philosophie et non-philosophie*, p. 56).

34. See Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 123, where he writes: ‘For Laruelle, a philosophical decision is a dyad of immanence and transcendence, but one wherein immanence features twice, its internal structure subdivided between an empirical and a transcendental function. It is
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at once internal to the dyad as the empirical immanence of the datum coupled to the transcendence of the a priori factum, but also external as that supplement of transcendental immanence required for gluing empirical immanence and a priori transcendence together. Every decision divides immanence between an empirical datum which it supposes as given through the a priori factum, and a transcendental immanence which it has to invoke as already given in order to guarantee the unity of a presupposed factum and a posited datum'.

35. 'The problem with a new treatment of Marxism is isolating this kernel of a purely symptomatic universality, but whose isolation is also its determination in the last instance; its “radicalisation”' (Laruelle, *Introduction au non-marxisme*, p. 21).

36. Ibid., p. 61.

37. ‘In-Man is the radical past which in-the-last-identity determines the Christian and the Gnostic, and every man-of-this-World, as Future Christ’ (Laruelle, *Future Christ*, p. 29).


40. Ibid., p. 2.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 18.

43. Although it surges from an event which sets ‘time out of joint’, from a position which is that of what Laruelle would call ‘past-outside-time’, it is still defined by a moment which has historic value and determination in the last instance which should cause reversal in the way the World is constituted, such as ‘tuer le Père ou Dieu’. See Gilles Deleuze when he writes: ‘The caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole ... Such a symbol adequate to the totality of time may be expressed in many ways: to throw time out of joint, to make the sun explode, to throw oneself into the volcano, to kill God or the father. This symbolic image constitutes the totality of time to the extent that it draws together the caesura, the before and the after’ (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], p. 89). Laruelle’s ‘time-outside-time’ and ‘radical past’ on the contrary, does not envisage a historic change – it is an immanent struggle which is there before it receives any name.

44. ‘But Life is not above all productive or auto-generative and so it is
first transcendental. The old problems of beginning and generation are for it not posed and we prefer to designate it by the paradoxical use of the term Living and even, according to our writing, *Lived-without-life* (Laruelle, *Future Christ*, p. 22).

45. Ibid., p. 23.
46. Ibid., p. 64.
47. Ibid., p. 11.