Franz Brentano was not a systematic writer, but he was very much a systematic thinker. Through his manuscripts, lecture notes, letters, dictations, and occasional published writings, one can discern a systematic, unified approach to the true, the good, and the beautiful. My goal here is to articulate explicitly this approach, and the philosophical program it reflects. The exercise requires going over big stretches of terrain with some efficiency; I will go just as deep into Brentano’s approaches to the true, the good, and the beautiful as is required to make explicit their structural unity.

The basic idea behind Brentano’s program is that there are three distinctive types of mental act that proprietarily target the true, the good, and the beautiful. To understand the true, the good, and the beautiful, we must obtain a clear grasp (i) of the distinctive mental acts targeting them and (ii) of success in such targeting. According to Brentano, the true is that which it is correct, or fitting, or appropriate to believe; the good is that which it is correct/fitting to love or like or approve of; and the beautiful is that with which it is correct/fitting to be delighted. The next three sections develop and (do the minimum to) motivate each of these claims.

1 THE TRUE AS THAT WHICH IT IS FITTING TO BELIEVE

Many things can be said to be true—notably sentences, utterances, and thoughts. However, for Brentano, truth attaches originally only to judgments; other things can be said to be true only derivatively, insofar as they are suitably related to true judgments (Brentano 1966b: 6).

There are many divisions among judgments, but the most fundamental is this: some judgments are positive and some are negative. Positive judgments are judgments that, by their nature, are committed to the truth of what is judged; negative judgments are ones committed to the falsity of what is judged (Brentano 1973a: 223). When one person
believes that the sun rotates around the earth and another disbelieves that the sun rotates around the earth, both are making a judgment about the same thing: whether the sun rotates around the earth. But one is making a positive judgment, committing to the truth of \(< \text{the sun rotates around the earth} \>\), while the other makes a negative judgment, committing to the falsity of \(< \text{the sun rotates around the earth} \>\).

Belief is committed to the truth of what is believed, then, whereas disbelief is committed to the falsity of what is disbelieved. In both cases, we can ask whether the commitment is built into the content of the judgment or the attitude. This is not Brentano’s terminology; Brentano would put this by asking whether the commitment is an aspect of the intentional object or of the mode of intentionality. But the point is the same: either belief’s commitment to truth is part of what is represented by the belief, or it is an aspect of the way belief represents what it does. Brentano’s view is clearly the latter: truth-commitment is an attitudinal feature of belief (Brentano 1973a: 201). This makes sense, of course: we typically believe \( \text{the sun rotates around the earth} \), not that \( \text{it is true that the sun rotates around the earth} \). The commitment to the proposition that the sun rotates around the earth is built into the very act of believing, not into what is believed. We may put this (though Brentano does not) by saying that for any given proposition \( p \), believing that \( p \) is not a mental act that represents \( p \) as true, but rather a mental act that represents-as-true \( p \). More generally:

What constitutes the distinctive feature of judgment … can[not] be a difference in content…. [T]he distinctive feature of judgment [is rather] a particular kind of relation to the [intentional] object.

(Brentano 1973a: 222; my italics)

In our terminology: representing-as-true is the essential property of belief, while representing-as-false is the essential property of disbelief.

From this perspective, the answer to the question ‘what is truth?’ is simply: the kind of thing targeted by belief (rather than disbelief or other types of mental act). More precisely, to say of any given sentence ‘\( p \)’ or proposition \( p \) that it is true is just to say that the right attitude to take toward \( p \) is that of believing it (Brentano 1966b: 122). The correct or fitting attitude to take toward \( p \), of all attitudes in our psychological repertoire, is belief—that attitude which, by its very nature, represents-as-true.

The idea that the true is that which it is fitting to represent-as-true might seem circular. And indeed it would be if the only way to understand the notion of representing-as-true is compositionally, by understanding the meaning of “representing” and “true.” But this is not what Brentano thinks. For Brentano, there is only one way to grasp the distinctive, essential property of belief. It is to encounter in introspection, or rather in inner perception,\(^2\) mental acts of believing, disbelieving, contemplating, and so on; and to pay attention to the felt difference between them. Through such comparison and contrast, one can zero in on the distinctive property of belief. For Brentano, the true is that toward which it is fitting to have the kind of mental act that exhibits this distinctive property encountered in inner perception. Accordingly, a person who has never experienced and inner-perceived belief, disbelief, and so on would be unable to grasp the nature of truth: “our definition would convey nothing to one who lacked the necessary intuition” (Brentano 1966b: 25).\(^3\)
So far, I have conducted the discussion as though Brentano, along with virtually every other philosopher, takes judgment to be a propositional attitude. But one of the most fascinating parts of Brentano’s philosophy is his nonpropositional theory of judgment as an objectual attitude. This theory allows Brentano to turn his account of truth into an account of existence. This move is based on two central ideas.

The first is that all beliefs are existential (Brentano 1973a: 218). We do not believe that the weather is nice but rather that there is nice weather. We do not believe that all dogs are cute but rather that there is no uncute dog. Every belief report, claims Brentano, can be paraphrased perfectly into an existential-belief report. Accordingly, the truth-commitment of beliefs boils down to existence-commitment: all our beliefs and disbeliefs commit to the existence or nonexistence of something.

The second idea is that this existence-commitment is, again, an aspect of the belief’s attitude rather than content. Our beliefs do not represent things as existent but rather represent-as-existent things. To that extent, belief reports are better formulated not in terms of “belief that” but in terms of “belief in.” We do not believe that there is nice weather but rather believe in nice weather. We do not believe that there is no uncute dog but rather disbelieve in an uncute dog. Observe, now, that belief-in is an objectual (and not propositional) attitude: what is believed-in is nice weather, not the existence of nice weather; what is disbelieved-in is uncute dogs, not the existence of uncute dogs. As Brentano puts it,

the being of A need not be produced in order for the judgment ‘A is’ to be … correct; all that is needed is A.

(1966b: 85)

In a slogan: the truthmakers of existentials are not existences but existents.

What motivates this attitudinal account of existence-commitment is the (highly plausible) traditional idea that existence is not an attribute (Brentano 1973a: 229). If existence is not an attribute, (true) existentials cannot be understood as attributing existence to something (if things do not have such an attribute, any judgment which attributed it to them would be erroneous). How, then, can a true judgment involve commitment to the existence of that which it is about? The answer is that the judgment must not represent its object as existing but instead represent-as-existing its object. That is, existence-commitment must be an aspect of the judgment’s attitude, not its content.4

Brentano’s reasoning may be summarized in two steps. First: all (dis)belief reports can be paraphrased into existential-(dis)belief reports; all existential-(dis)belief reports can be paraphrased into (dis)belief-in reports; therefore, all (dis)belief reports can be paraphrased into (dis)belief-in reports. The fact that A-statements are paraphraseable into B-statements does not in itself guarantee that the latter capture the real structure of what those statements are about. A substantive argument is needed for taking the B-statements to be more faithful to how things are. This is provided by the second part of Brentano’s reasoning: the truth of (dis)belief-in reports does not require there to be an existence attribute, whereas the truth of existential (dis)belief-that reports does; there are good reasons to reject an existence attribute, but no good reasons to think there are no true existential judgments; therefore, there are good reasons to take (dis)belief-in reports to capture the real structure of judgments.5
The upshot is that Brentano’s fitting-belief account of the true effectively becomes a fitting-belief-in account of the existent. To say that a duck exists, for example, is just to say that the right or correct attitude to take toward a duck is that of believing in it. (By the same token, to say that there are no dragons is to say that the correct attitude to take toward a dragon is that of disbelieving in it.) Brentano writes:

If “the existent,” in its strict sense, is a name, it cannot be said to name anything directly. It comes to the same thing as “something (etwas) which is the object of a correct affirmative judgment” or “something which is correctly accepted or affirmed.”

(Brentano 1969: 68)

Since for Brentano all beliefs are existential, he sometimes runs his correct-attitude accounts of truth and existence together: “We call something true when the affirmation relating to it is correct/fitting” (1969: 18).

Here too, Brentano maintains that our only grip on the crucial property of representing-as-existent derives from inner perception of beliefs-in. We only truly grasp the notion of existence when we understand it as that toward which it is fitting to have a mental act with the kind of distinctive attitudinal property we encounter in comparing and contrasting beliefs-in and other mental acts in our psychological repertoire (Brentano 1973a: 210).

Crucially, the same holds of the correctness or fittingness of our (dis)beliefs-in. Actually, for Brentano, we may be able to analyze correctness in terms of self-evidence (Evidenz); but the notion of self-evidence itself is primitive and can only be grasped in inner perception through the same sort of contrastive exercise:

The correct method is one that we use in many other cases where we are concerned with a simple mark or characteristic. We will have to solve the problem by considering a multiplicity of judgments which are self-evident and then comparing and contrasting (vergleichend gegenüber stellen) them with other judgments which lack this distinguishing characteristic.

(Brentano 1966b: 125; my italics)

Thus both the distinctive property of belief-in and the property of fittingness are to be grasped originally in inner perception. Once we do, and given certain theoretical positions, we can appreciate the nature of existence and truth.

2 THE GOOD AS THAT TO WHICH A PRO ATTITUDE IS FITTING

Just as judgments embody commitment to the existence or nonexistence of what they are about, Brentano maintains that there are mental acts that embody commitment to the goodness or badness of what they are about. He uses the terms ‘love’ and ‘hate’ to denote those mental acts but uses them widely to cover any favorable or unfavorable mental act, such as loving a certain wine (Brentano 1973a: 199) or hating the weather. Indeed, he argues that under the headings of ‘love’ and ‘hate,’ so understood, fall all pain and pleas-
ure, all emotions as such, and all acts of the will (Brentano 1973a: 236–7). Essentially, his ‘love’ and ‘hate’ are what we refer to in contemporary philosophy of mind as pro attitudes and con attitudes. Pro attitudes embody commitment to the goodness of their intentional objects, con attitudes commitment to the badness of theirs. Thus, liking ice cream involves mental commitment to the goodness of ice cream, while disliking rain involves mental commitment to the badness of rain.6

As with judgment and existence, Brentano construes the goodness-commitment of pro attitudes as an attitudinal property. We may put this by saying that approving of world peace is not a matter of representing world peace as good but a matter of representing-as-good world peace. The goodness is not a part of what is represented but a modification of the representing itself. What is approved of—the content of the approval—is just world peace. The commitment to goodness comes in only at the level of attitude. And indeed, excluding goodness from the content of a pro attitude is as intuitive as excluding truth from the content of belief: one desires ice cream, not the goodness of ice cream, or that the ice cream be good.

A more theoretical motivation for the attitudinal account of goodness-commitment parallels the motivation for an attitudinal account of existence-commitment—namely, the notion that there is no worldly goodness that inheres in the things themselves. Brentano dismisses the notion of goodness as an intrinsic attribute of ice cream, for instance, in a 1909 letter to Kraus:

What you seek to gain here with your belief in the existence (Bestehen) of goodness with which the emotions are found to correspond (in einer adäquatio gefunden) is incomprehensible to me.

(Brentano 1966a: 207; see also Chisholm 1986: 51–2)

Given that there is no such intrinsic property as goodness, if approving of world peace were a matter of attributing that property to world peace, it would be a misattribution and thus a misrepresentation. Since approving of world peace is quite appropriate, though, the mental commitment to world peace’s goodness must be an aspect of the attitude of approval.

Accordingly, when we say that peace is good, we are not attributing anything to peace. In a sense, we are not (in the first instance) really characterizing peace. What we are characterizing is, in the first instance, the attitude it would be fitting to take toward peace. We are saying that, of all the attitudes in our psychological repertoire, a pro attitude would be the right attitude to take toward peace. In that respect, peace is a suitable or appropriate object of a pro attitude; it is the kind of thing it would be correct to like, desire, or approve of (see Chapter 20). In sum:

everything that can be thought about belongs in one of two classes—either the class of things for which love [pro attitude] is appropriate, or the class of things for which hate [con attitude] is appropriate. Whatever falls into the first class we call good, and whatever falls into the second we call bad.

(Brentano 1966b: 21–2; see also 1969: 18 and even 1973a: 247)

Our only grasp on the good, then, is as that to which a pro attitude—a mental act that by its nature represents-as-good—would be fitting.7
Since goodness is not an attribute of external items, we cannot acquire the concept of the good by outer-perceptual encounter with items that exhibit or fail to exhibit it. Rather, our competence to engage in goodness talk and thought is ultimately based on inner-perceptual grasp of the fittingness or correctness of our own pro and con attitudes:

When we ourselves experience such a love [a love with the character of correctness (als richtig charakterisierte)] we notice not only that its object is loved and loveable, and that its privation or contrary hated and hateable, but also that the one is love-worthy and the other hate-worthy, and therefore that the one is good and the other bad.

(Brentano 1969: 22; my italics)

Further: not only is our grasp of the distinctive and essential property of a pro attitude derived from direct inner-perceptual encounter, so is our grasp of the fittingness that sometimes characterizes a mental act with that property. (More accurately, just as a judgment's correctness can be understood in terms of self-evidence, which itself can only be grasped through direct acquaintance in inner perception, so there is a practical "analogue of self-evidence in the domain of judgment" (1969: 22) in terms of which an attitude's fittingness can be understood; but this practical self-evidence itself can only be grasped directly in inner perception.)

It is easy to see the symmetry between Brentano's approaches to the true and the good. The characterization of pro attitudes as embodying mental commitment to goodness, the attitudinal take on goodness-commitment, the fitting pro attitude account of goodness, and the inner-perceptual grasp of both the relevant attitudinal property and its fittingness echo parallel views in Brentano's account of truth and existence. Brentano himself emphasizes this symmetry:

In calling an object good we are not giving it a material (sachliches) predicate, as we do when we call something red or round or warm or thinking. In this respect the expressions good and bad are like the expressions existent and nonexistent. In using the latter, we do not intend to add yet another determining characteristic of the thing in question; we wish rather to say that whoever acknowledges [believes in] a certain thing and rejects [disbelieves in] another makes a true judgment. And when we call certain objects good and others bad we are merely saying that whoever loves [has a pro attitude toward] the former and hates [has a con attitude toward] the latter has taken the right stand. The source of these concepts is inner perception, for it is only in inner perception that we comprehend ourselves as loving or hating something.

(1973b: 90; see also Brentano 1969: 73–5, as well as manuscripts Ms 107c 231 and Ms 107c 236, quoted in Seron 2008)

This passage includes in an extraordinarily compressed way virtually all the elements making up Brentano's accounts of the true and the good.

It is worth noting that Brentano does recognize that the phenomena force certain disanalogies between the two cases. First, the fittingness of judgments and that of pro/con attitudes is not exactly the same feature (Brentano 1969: 144). More interestingly,
the good comes in degrees, whereas the true does not. Accordingly, while the theory of
the true requires no account of “the truer,” the theory of the good does require an account
of the better. Brentano’s account is in terms of fitting preference: to say that a is better than
b is to say that it would be fitting or correct to prefer a to b (Brentano 1969: 26, 1973b: 92).
Despite such differences, it is easy to appreciate that Brentano’s fundamental philosophical
approach to the true and the good is structurally extremely similar.

3 THE BEAUTIFUL: DELIGHT AND AESTHETIC VALUE

Brentano’s psychology divides mental acts into three fundamental categories (Chapter
9). We have already encountered judgments (affirmative or negative) and attitudes (pro
or con). According to Brentano, both of these presuppose a third, more basic type of act
consisting merely in the entertaining, or contemplation, or presentation (Vorstellung) of
an object—without committing to either its existence/nonexistence or its goodness/bad-
ness (Brentano 1973a: 198). This may suggest that just as existence and goodness are tied
to judgment and attitude (respectively), so beauty is tied to presentation or contempla-
tion. After all, it is plausible to say that a beautiful thing is worthy of contemplation in
more or less the same sense in which a good thing is worthy of approval and a real thing
is worthy of acceptance.

This might suggest the following account of the beautiful: to say that something is beau-
tiful is to say that it would be fitting to contemplate it. However, this “clean” account is
frustrated by the fact that while acceptance and approval carry existence- and goodness-
commitment (respectively), contemplation does not by itself carry beauty-commitment: I
am not mentally committing to the beauty of a book on my desk merely by contemplating
it. In addition, there is no standard of fittingness for presentation (Brentano 1973a: 223),
but there would have to be one if we were to appeal to fitting contemplation in accounting
for beauty. Finally, while judgment and attitude come in positive and negative varieties,
contemplation does not (1973a: 222), so the opposition between the beautiful and the ugly
could not be captured through the fittingness of two opposing types of contemplation.

Something else must be added to contemplation, then, to capture beauty-commitment.
What? Brentano notes a peculiar feature of the experience of encounter with the beau-
tiful: it always entrains a measure of joy or pleasure. If one manages to contemplate El
Greco’s Saint Martin and the Beggar joylessly, one cannot be said to experience it as beau-
tiful. “Only when a presentation is in itself good and joyful (erfreulich) we call its pri-
mary object beautiful” (Brentano 1959: 123). Thus the account of the beautiful requires
posing a special mental act composed of both contemplation and joy—a kind of joyful
contemplation. In some places, Brentano calls this mental act “delight” (Wohlgefallen).
Delight, rather than mere contemplation, is the kind of mental act that embodies com-
mitment to the beauty of that which it is about. It is also the kind of mental act for which
there is a standard of correctness and one for which a contrary is available in the form of
dejected or wretched contemplation (we might call this dismay).

Note well: the joy component of delight is a pro attitude, so delight is a compound
state with a presentation component and a pro-attitude component. More specifically,
to be delighted with x is to be in a state which is directed contemplation-wise at x and
enjoyment-wise at the contemplation-of-x. By the same token, to be dismayed with
x is to be in a state which is directed contemplation-wise at x and dejection-wise at the contemplation-of-x.

With this in place, Brentano can offer a “fitting delight” account of beauty analogous to his accounts of truth and value:

The concept of beauty [has to do with] a delight with the character of correctness (als richtig charakterisiertes) being elicited in us.

(1959: 17)

To say that something is beautiful, then, is to say that it would be fitting to be delighted by it. That means it would be fitting to contemplate it while taking joy in the contemplating—both the contemplating and the enjoyment must be fitting. Meanwhile, the ugly is that which is a fitting object of dismay. Note that since delight and dismay involve the fittingness of a pro or con attitude, the fittingness of delight or dismay is ultimately a species of fitting (pro or con) attitude. This captures nicely, within Brentano’s framework, the fact that aesthetic value is a species of value.

The motivation for, and consequences of, this account are broadly the same as those associated with the fitting belief-in and fitting pro-attitude accounts of truth and value. To start, Brentano rejects the existence of a worldly attribute of beauty, exhibited by some items and not others, just as he rejects the attributes of truth and goodness:

But it may well happen that a word which has the grammatical form of a noun or adjective actually denotes nothing at all…. For example: … ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ as well as ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ and the like. Strictly speaking, there is no concept (Begriff) of the good, or of the beautiful, or of the true.

(Brentano 1966b: 71; my emphasis)

The last sentence in this passage is surely an infelicitous overstatement (of the sort one is liable to find in an unpublished fragment). Brentano does accept, after all, the existence of the concepts of truth and goodness (ultimately acquired, as we have seen, through inner perception). His view is rather that there are no such attributes as truth, goodness, and apparently beauty. Presumably, though, just as Brentano embraced existents and goods as worldly things in spite of rejecting existence and goodness as worldly attributes, so he embraces beauties despite rejecting beauty.

As before, this leads to a construal of beauty-commitment as an attitudinal rather than a content feature of delight. It is an aspect of how delight represents, not of what it represents. To experience aesthetic delight with an orchid is not to represent the orchid as beautiful but to represent-as-beautiful the orchid. The content of the delight is simply the orchid. The commitment to the orchid’s beauty comes in at the level of attitude. It does not appear in the delight’s content. This makes sense: we delight at the orchid, not at its beauty; the orchid’s beauty is just the reason why we delight in the orchid.

Since there is no attribute of beauty that some worldly items exhibit and others do not, presumably we do not acquire the concept of the beautiful through outer-perceptual interaction with external-world beauties. Instead, we grasp the notion of beauty through inner-perceptual interaction with our delights’ distinctive property of representing-as-beautiful and with its characteristic fittingness. We have no other handle on the beautiful.
The parallelism with Brentano’s accounts of the true and the good is evident: beauty is accounted for in terms of the fittingness of a specific kind of attitude. At the same time, there are disanalogies here too. First, unlike the attitudes relevant to the true and the good, that relevant to the beautiful is not primitive but compound; it is therefore to be understood not through direct acquaintance but through analysis into its components. Secondly, there appear to be no sui generis fittingness special to delight: its fittingness reduces to the fittingness of second-order enjoyment.

4 BRENTANO’S PROGRAM

In what is quite possibly the most scholarly English-language overview of Brentano’s philosophy, Liliana Albertazzi writes that “It is the general opinion that Brentano’s theories do not constitute a system” (Albertazzi 2006: 295). As a sociological remark, this may be unobjectionable. But as the foregoing discussion suggests, Brentano’s philosophical thought is, in reality, extraordinary systematic. If the goal of a philosophical “grand system” in the style of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy is to provide a unified, structurally symmetric account of the true, the good, and the beautiful, then Brentano clearly had at least a program for such a system. Indeed, his may well be the last grand system of Western philosophy. For a variety of reasons, twentieth-century philosophy has taken a distance from systematic thinking in this sense. Brentano, whose system reached a certain resting point circa 1915, seems to be the last philosopher to have offered a system in the sense of a structurally unified account of the true, the good, and the beautiful. One suspects it is primarily the unsystematic character of Brentano’s writings that has encouraged the otherwise implausible notion that there is no systematicity in his philosophical thinking. Arguably, however, in his mind Brentano was continuously refining and chiseling away at a unified grand system, a system that harmonized and stabilized the bits and pieces in his messy literary estate.

The superstructure of Brentano’s program is quite straightforward. We grasp the nature of the true, the good, and the beautiful by grasping (i) the distinctive or essential feature of three types of mental act—affirmative judgment, pro attitude, and delight—and (ii) the standard of fittingness or correctness for each. Thus, six notions are essential to Brentano’s system: affirmative judgment, judgment-fittingness, pro attitude, attitude-fittingness, delight, and delight-fittingness. However, since delight is analyzable in terms of (first-order) contemplation and (second-order) pro attitude, and its fittingness is but the fittingness of pro attitudes, Brentano’s account of the true, the good, and the beautiful requires only five basic and unanalyzable notions: affirmative judgment, pro attitude, contemplation, judgment-fittingness, and attitude-fittingness. These five notions receive no informative philosophical account in Brentano’s system. They are treated as primitives. As such, we do not grasp their nature by appreciating some philosophical theory. We can only grasp their nature directly—through acquaintance in inner perception (against the background of the right contrast). At the end of an 1889 lecture on truth, Brentano says:

We have been concerned with a definition, i.e., with the elucidation of a concept … Many believe that such elucidation always requires some general determination
[i.e., definition by _genus et differentia_], and they forget that the ultimate and most effective means of elucidation must always consist in appeal to the individual’s intuition … What would be the use of trying to elucidate the concepts of red and blue if I could not present one with something red or with something blue?

(Brentano 1966b: 24–5)

In our case, we appreciate the nature of belief-in by inner-perceiving mental acts that _are_ beliefs-in alongside ones that are not; we understand what judgment-fittingness is, ultimately, by inner-perceiving judgments that are self-evident alongside judgments that are not; we appreciate the nature of a pro attitude by inner-perceiving mental acts that _are_ pro attitudes alongside ones that are not; and so on. In each case, some contrast brings into sharper inner-perceptual relief the feature whose nature we are trying to grasp. We grasp that nature simply _as_ that which is present in the one case and absent in the other. There is no fuller, more articulated, more informative, more theoretical account to be had.

It is a central feature of Brentano’s program, then, that the ultimate basis for our grasp of the nature of the true, the good, and the beautiful is inner perception of our mental acts and their fittingness. This explains psychology’s pride of place in Brentano’s system:

> We see that … the triad of ideals, the beautiful, the true, and the good, can well be defined in terms of the system of mental faculties. Indeed, this is the only way in which it becomes fully intelligible.

(Brentano 1973a: 263)

Insofar as the study of the true, the good, and the beautiful is grounded in the study of the mind, philosophy of mind (or Brentano’s “descriptive psychology”) assumes the role of _first philosophy_. The status of philosophy of mind as first philosophy will remain a unifying theme of the Brentano School. In fact, since for Brentano, all mental life is conscious, his philosophy of mind is at bottom a philosophy of consciousness. In Brentano’s thought, then, we find a rare instance of a philosophical system based ultimately on the philosophy of consciousness.

Despite this _methodological_ primacy of philosophy of consciousness, Brentano’s picture of the world is thoroughly realist. Brentano’s world contains just so many individual objects, and nothing more (see Chapter 13). When we say of any of the concrete particulars inhabiting Brentano’s world that it exists, or is good, or is beautiful, we are just saying that it would be fitting to believe in it, have a pro attitude toward it, or delight in it (respectively). It is in this way that the notions of the true/real, the good, and the beautiful make their entry into our worldview. This entry does not entrain, however, a transcendental mind that does the accepting, approving, and delighting. Rather, among the individual objects inhabiting this austere world are individual minds, including believing-minds, approving-minds, and delighted-minds, and indeed even some correctly-believing-minds, rightly-approving-minds, and fittingly-delighted-minds! It is because (and only because) each of us has on occasion _been_ a correctly-believing-mind, rightly-approving-mind, and fittingly-delighted-mind, and has _inner-perceived_ himself or herself to be such a mind, that each of us is able to experience the world in terms of truth, goodness, and beauty.
CONCLUSION: THE THREE LEGS OF THE BRENTANIAN STOOL

As noted, Brentano’s classification of mental acts divides them into three basic categories: presentation, judgment, and (pro or con) attitude. All three are species of a single more generic phenomenon, namely intentionality:

Nothing distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena more than the fact that something is immanent [that is, intentionally inexistet] as an object in them. For this reason it is easy to understand that the fundamental differences in the way something [in]exists in them as an object constitute the principal class differences among mental phenomena.

(Brentano 1973a: 197)

The three categories correspond to three different modes of intentionality, or three different modifications of the basic intentional relation. These are the modes of representing-as-existent/nonexistent for judgment, representing-as-good/bad for attitudes, and a kind of neutral mere-representing for presentation. These are obviously different, but they are all modifications of the same underlying phenomenon of intentionality. As noted, the natures of both intentionality and the fittingness of different intentional modifications can ultimately be grasped only through inner perception. Together, intentionality, fittingness, and inner perception can be seen as the three legs of the Brentanian stool; they are the central concepts in his system. It is through their interrelations, modifications, and interrelations of modifications that we obtain philosophical illumination of the true, the good, and the beautiful.9

NOTES

1. The term Brentano prefers in this context is Richtig, most naturally translated as “correct” or “fitting.” But in one place he offers a number of synonyms—konvenient, passend, and entsprechen (Brentano 1969: 74)—which are more or less interchangeably translatable as “appropriate,” “suitable,” “fitting,” and “adequate.”

2. Brentano draws a sharp distinction between introspection and inner perception, and hangs his epistemic hopes only on the latter. On the difference between the two, see Chapter 3.

3. Plausibly, it is precisely because the only way to grasp the essential property of belief is by direct inner-perceptual encounter that Brentano does not characterize this property as “representing-as-true.” But the expression is useful for bringing out that the characteristic commitment of belief is an aspect of its attitude, not its content. Nonetheless, we must treat this expression with care and keep in mind that it is hyphenated for a reason: “true” is intended as a merely morphological, and not syntactic, part of “representing-as-true” (just as “apple” is a merely morphological part of “pineapple”).

4. In more Brentanian terminology: it is not an aspect of the object of consciousness but of the mode of consciousness (1973a: 201).

5. Brentano also has other arguments to plug into the second part of the reasoning. For example, he thinks that (dis)belief-in reports are more parsimonious than (dis)belief-that reports, since they concern only concrete objects and not propositions (see Brentano 1966b: 84). Here I focus on one particular argument Brentano employs, because it is one that recurs in the domains of the good and the beautiful.

6. Such commitment need not be all-things-considered commitment; it can be just prima facie commitment. In fact, it appears to be the crucial difference between emotion and will, for Brentano, that the former’s value-commitment is prima facie and the latter’s is all-things-considered (1969: 150). Both, however, qualify as pro/con attitudes.
7. This, at least, is Brentano's view of intrinsic goodness; instrumental goodness may be understood in terms of its relation to intrinsic goodness (Brentano 1969 §16).
8. There are clearly exceptions to this rule, though (see Gabriel 2013).
9. This work was supported by the French National Research Agency’s grants ANR-11-0001-02 PSL* and ANR-10-LABX-0087. For comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Johannes Brandl, Géraldine Carranante, Arnaud Dewalque, Guillaume Fréchette, Anna Giustina, and especially Lylian Paquet.