

The Limits of Experience: Dogmatism and Moral Epistemology

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Abstract. Let “phenomenal dogmatism” be the thesis that some experiences provide some beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. A basic question-mark looms over phenomenal dogmatism: Why should the fact that a person is visited by some phenomenal feel suggest the likely truth of a belief? In this paper, I press this challenge, arguing that perceptually justified beliefs are justified not purely by perceptual experiences’ phenomenology, but also because we have justified second-order background beliefs to the effect that the occurrence of certain perceptual experiences is indicative of the likely truth of certain corresponding beliefs. To bring this out, I contrast “perceptual dogmatism” with “moral dogmatism”: the thesis that some emotional experiences provide some moral beliefs with immediate justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. I argue that moral dogmatism is much less antecedently appealing, precisely because the counterpart second-order beliefs here are much less plausible.

1. Introduction: Dogmatism

I have a justified belief. It is the belief that Paris is a European capital. Why am I justified in believing this? Because I inferred it from my independently justified beliefs (1) that Paris is the capital of France and (2) that France is in Europe. I performed an inference – a *good* inference – from beliefs (1) and (2) to the belief that Paris is a European capital.

My belief that Paris is a European capital is indeed justified, then. But its being justified depends on my having justification for other beliefs, namely (1) and (2). If I believed (1) because I were brainwashed, and (2) because a hammer fell on my head, my belief that Paris is a European capital would *not* be justified. My justification for believing that Paris is a European capital is thus *mediated* by my justification for believing (1) and (2).

In a way, what my good inference does is that it *transmits* justification from my beliefs (1) and (2) to the belief that Paris is a European capital. Obviously, now, for it to be

possible for beliefs to transmit justification like this, there needs to exist justification for them to transmit. Where does justification come from *originally*, so to speak? That is, how is justification injected into one's web of beliefs to begin with? The justification for (1) and (2) themselves may have been transmitted from other beliefs, but if so we can ask how those other beliefs got their justification. At some point, arguably, some beliefs must be justified not because justification was transmitted to them, but in some other way.

What other way? The only possible way, it might be thought, is this: There must exist some mental states that (i) justify one in believing that *p*, even though (ii) nothing justifies those states themselves. Since those states are not themselves justified, and yet they manage to justify, the justification they provide is not justification they *transmit* but rather justification they *generate*. Consequently, the beliefs these states justify are justified in an importantly different way: their justification is not mediated by the subject's justification for any other beliefs. Theirs is an *immediate* justification.

The subject who believes on the basis of these privileged mental states is being dogmatic in doing so, insofar as there is no epistemic justification for these mental states themselves. But this dogmatism is not only epistemically permissible, on the line of thought we are exploring, it is epistemically *mandatory*: Only by believing on the basis of such mental states can the subject have beliefs that can have justification they can start transmitting to other beliefs (e.g., via inferences). We may call "dogmatism" the view that there are such mental states: states that justify the subject in believing the world to be one way rather than another even though the subject has no (epistemic) justification for being in those states themselves.¹

One question dogmatism raises immediately is which mental states are the ones that *generate* justification (and correspondingly, which beliefs are *immediately* justified). According to *phenomenal* dogmatism, it is *phenomenally conscious* mental states that do – mental states there is something it is like for the subject to be in. Sociologically speaking, most dogmatists are phenomenal dogmatists (see especially Smithies 2019, Chudnoff 2020 Ch.3, Moretti 2020, but also already Pryor 2000 fn. 37 and Huemer 2001 Ch.5). Typically, the view is that *some* (rather than *all*) phenomenally conscious states immediately justify, and they do so in virtue of having the right phenomenal character.

What kinds of consideration might support phenomenal dogmatism? At a minimum, we might want to adduce examples of phenomenal experiences for which it is *intuitive* both that they justify and that they are not themselves justified. That is, there need to be some phenomenal experience(s) E blessed by *two* intuitions:

Forward-looking intuition :: E can justify

Backward-looking intuition :: E cannot be justified

If both the forward- and backward-looking intuitions hold for some type of experience E, that would create at least a prima facie presumption in favor E being the kind of justification-generator which can provide *immediate* justification.

Here is an example of a possible phenomenal experience that seems intuitively to have the requisite epistemic profile (Kriegel 2023: 283, inspired by McGrath 2013):

(Dark Room) You wake up from a groggy nap and find yourself in a pitch-dark room that feels unfamiliar. A warm voice startles you with a question: do you (a) *believe* that there is a laptop in the room, (b) *disbelieve* that there is a laptop in the room, or (c) *suspend judgment* about whether there is one. After you answer, the lights come on, and you have a vivid perceptual experience as of a laptop right in front of you. The voice comes on again and asks whether now you (a) believe, (b) disbelieve, or (c) suspend judgment about there being a laptop in the room.

The first time you're asked about the laptop, the right doxastic attitude for you to take, epistemically speaking, is clearly suspension of judgment: you have no useful information on the basis of which to either believe or disbelieve that there is a laptop in the room. But the second time you're asked, when the lights have come on and you experience a vivid laptop phenomenology, it is belief that becomes the right doxastic attitude for you to take. It would be weirdly over-cautious of you to choose to suspend judgment at that point.

Thus the forward-looking intuition does apply to your laptop experience in *Dark Room*: intuitively, the experience justifies you in believing a laptop is present. But it has been argued that the backward-looking intuition applies as well. According to Pryor, at least, it is something of a *category mistake* to expect this experience – perhaps *any* experience – to admit of epistemic justification. He writes:

unlike beliefs, experiences aren't the sort of thing that *could* be, not do they *need to be* justified... If someone comes up to you and demands, "*How dare you have that experience? What gives you the right?*" what would you say? (Pryor 2005: 210; italics original)

Thus, the question "What gives you the (epistemic) right to have a laptop experience?" seems to be out of place. You just *have* the experience. The normative question of whether you (epistemically) ought to does not properly arise.²

In this way, a case like *Dark Room* creates a prima facie presumption in favor of the "philosophical hypothesis" that some phenomenal experiences are justification-generators – as per phenomenal dogmatism. Many questions are left open, however. The experience you have in *Dark Room* is a *visual* experience. Do other kinds of perceptual experience also generate immediate justification? Do any *non-perceptual* experiences do? Do the justification-generating phenomenal experiences, whatever they are, generate justification

in virtue of their phenomenal character, or could it be something else about them that generates the justification associated with them?

2. Dogmatism and Appearances

One approach to some of these questions is to consider what types of experience can elicit forward- and backward-looking dogmatist intuitions through *Dark Room*-style vignettes. Certainly we may replace the light coming on in the story with certain *sounds* appearing – say the sound of a cat meowing by the bedside. Such perceptual variations on *Dark Room* would motivate what we might call *perceptual dogmatism*:

[PD] For some perceptual experience E and belief B, E provides immediate (prima facie) justification for B.

PD is fully consistent, of course, with there being *non-perceptual* states that *also* provide immediate justification. But some phenomenal experiences definitely *don't* seem to elicit the dogmatist intuitions. Imagining, for instance, seems to elicit only the backward-looking intuition, not the forward-looking one. If we tell the story so that, instead of the light coming on and you experiencing a perceptual phenomenology as of seeing a laptop, you simply *imagine* a laptop (or imagine *seeing* a laptop), intuitively that does not result in a justified belief that there is a laptop in the room.

What is the feature that perceptual experiences have and imaginative ones don't that makes the former but not the latter intuitively apt to justify belief? And what other experiences, if any, might share that feature with perceptual experiences? Looking at the dogmatist literature, one's impression is that perceptual experiences justify because they deliver certain *appearances* of how things are. Pryor himself tells us that when we have a perceptual experience of a laptop, "it 'feels as if' we could tell" that there is a laptop in front of us (2000: 547 fn37). This is what distinguishes perception from imagination:

[I]t's not the irresistibility of our perceptual beliefs ... which explains why our experiences give us the immediate justification they do. Rather, it's the peculiar "phenomenal force" or way our experiences have of presenting propositions to us. Our experiences represent propositions in such a way that it "feels as if" we could tell that those propositions are true... [T]his "feeling" is part of what distinguishes the attitude of experiencing that *p* from other propositional attitudes, like belief and visual imagination. (Pryor 2000: 547 fn37)

When you imagine a laptop in front of you, it does not thereby appear to you that there is one – imagination does not deliver appearances the way perception does.

A similar idea is developed more fully by Mike Huemer. Huemer calls his view “phenomenal conservatism,” where “phenomenal” is meant as the antonym of “noumenal” – so to do with *appearances*. Typically Huemer formulates the point in terms of “seemings” rather than “appearances,” but the terms seem interchangeable in this context. Huemer writes:

When you have a visual experience of a tomato, it thereby seems to you as if a tomato is actually present, then and there. When you merely imagine a tomato, it does not thereby seem to you as if a tomato is actually present. (Huemer 2001: 77)

Huemer’s general formulation of phenomenal conservatism is this: “If it seems to *S* as if *P*, then *S* thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that *P*.” The idea is that when a person experiences a seeming of *p* being the case, they are justified (prima facie) in believing that *p* is the case.

The resulting approach to dogmatism grounds the capacity of mental states to provide immediate justification in their delivering appearances – appearances of matters being one way rather than another. We may put the general principle – call it “appearance dogmatism” – as follows:

[AD] For any mental state *M*, if *M* delivers an appearance, then there is a belief *B*, such that *M* provides immediate (prima facie) justification for *B*.

I use the locution “delivering appearances” to skirt a certain systematic ambiguity in appearance talk: “appearance” is sometimes used to denote certain mental states, but other times to denote what is *represented* by those states (e.g., “appearance properties” of external objects – see Shoemaker 1994). If appearances are mental states, then to “deliver an appearance” is simply to *be* an appearance. In this use, the perceptual appearance of my laptop is just a perceptual experience of my laptop. If appearances are what’s *represented* by the relevant mental state, then to “deliver” an appearance is to *represent* or *disclose* an appearance. In this use, the perceptual appearance of a laptop is a cluster of properties (perhaps “secondary qualities”) of my laptop.

It is not immediately clear how the relevant notion of appearance is to be analyzed. Indeed, this may well be one of those “phenomenal primitives” (Kriegel 2015 Ch.1) that do not *admit* of analysis, and are to be grasped mainly through suitable introspective juxtapositions (so-called phenomenal contrasts). But one epistemic *symptom* of the difference between appearance-delivering and other mental states concerns the nature of the cognitive act involved in forming beliefs on their basis. When we transition from the beliefs that Paris is the capital of France and that France is in Europe to the belief that Paris is a European capital, the cognitive act we perform is aptly described as *inference*: we infer the third from the first two. But it is odd to describe a person who adopts the belief that

there's a laptop in front of them on the basis of a laptop experience as having performed an *inference*. The person does not *reason* their way from the experience to the belief. It is not as though in *Dark Room* you say to yourself "aha, I seem to see a laptop, so very likely there is a laptop." There are certainly subpersonal processes taking place, but at the personal level you simply *endorse* your experience, cognitively "taking it at face value."

What is involved in this act of endorsement? Phenomenologically, it simply appears to the person as if something is the case, and they take the appearance at face value. The taking of an appearance at face value is what endorsement consists in. It constitutes a transition from mental commitment to *p appearing* to be the case to mental commitment to *p being* the case. Thus one symptom of the difference between appearance-delivering and other mental states is that the justification the latter provide is *inferential* justification, whereas that the former provide is *non-inferential*, "endorsement-y" justification.

If Appearance Dogmatism (AD) is true, then to determine whether a phenomenal state justifies immediately, we need to determine whether it delivers an appearance. If it does, it justifies immediately; otherwise, it doesn't. Huemer is explicit, for instance, that perception is not the only mental capacity he takes to deliver appearances. In addition to perception, he holds that recollection can deliver appearances of the past and intuition can deliver appearances of the realm of abstract objects (2001: 109-10).³ Recall, however, that phenomenal dogmatism is not only an extensional claim about which mental states justify immediately, but also an in-virtue-of claim about why they do: it is the claim that (some) phenomenal states justify immediately *in virtue of their phenomenal character*. If we incorporate AD into phenomenal dogmatism, we obtain the thesis that phenomenal states justify immediately, when they do, in virtue of delivering appearances.

An autobiographical comment: It is my natural intellectual disposition to believe that phenomenal consciousness is somehow crucial to the very possibility of knowledge and justification. To that extent, I am instinctively attracted to phenomenal dogmatism (see Kriegel 2023). But the thesis that phenomenal states can justify immediately purely in virtue of their appearance-delivering phenomenology is something I find very hard to believe, and I now want to explain why.

3. A Problem for Dogmatism

The (forward-looking) intuition *Dark Room* elicits is that the onset of a perceptual experience brings with it justification for belief. But it doesn't elicit any clear intuition about in-virtue-of-what it does so. We might frame the issue here in terms of explanation. The explanandum would be:

(*Explanandum*) There is a change, in *Dark Room*, in which doxastic attitude is right for you to take toward the proposition <there is a laptop in the room> before and after you have your laptop-y perceptual experience. Before, the right doxastic attitude is suspension of judgment. After, it is belief.

What explains this? Clearly, the occurrence of the perceptual experience is a big part of the explanation of this change. But according to the phenomenal dogmatist, the best explanation is more specifically that an experience *with the right phenomenology* has occurred. It is in virtue of this phenomenology occurring that the epistemic change occurred.

One alternative explanation might be that once the lights came on and your perceptual experience occurs, a mechanism of visual laptop-detection, reliable in well-lit rooms, produces a certain perceptual state in you. It is not because of the *phenomenology* of this perceptual state, but because of its *reliability*, that it is now epistemically rational for you to believe there is a laptop in the room. On this alternative explanation, it is not the phenomenal properties of the perceptual state that make your ensuing belief justified, but some other properties – perhaps the kinds of property reliabilists call “sensitivity” (if there were no laptop before you, you would not have a laptop experience) and “safety” (if you had no laptop experience, there would be no laptop before you). These are properties to do not with what it’s like for you to have the experience, but with how the world likely is given that this experience has occurred.

In an adaptation of Stew Cohen’s (1984) “new evil demon” argument, however, Declan Smithies (2014) argues that this alternative explanation is highly problematic. The problem is that the intuition about the change in which doxastic attitude is right does not disappear when we run *Dark Room* with a brain in a vat. Imagine that while you were asleep, neuroscientists anesthetized you, removed your brain from your cranium, and placed it in a vat full of nutrients that’s hooked up to a computer that feeds your brain stimuli pre-selected by the scientists to mimic the stimuli your brain would likely be presented with in the external world. Your brain then goes on to live in this vat for 20 years, never realizing the trick that has been played on it. One day, you-qua-envatted-brain have the experience of waking up from a groggy nap in a pitch-dark room etc., just as described in *Dark Room*. The intuition, claims Smithies, is still that you-qua-envatted-brain are justified in believing that there is a laptop in front of you once you experience the laptop phenomenology (but not before). Your belief is not *true*, of course, but it is still *justified* (*prima facie*). Crucially, in this scenario your laptop-experience-to-laptop-belief mechanism is completely unreliable, systematically producing a preponderance of false beliefs. (We may stipulate, if it helps, that there are no laptops in the basement where the brain “lives.”)

If this is right, then what explains why your envatted brain is justified in believing that there's a laptop in the room cannot be the reliability of its laptop-detecting mechanism; it must be something else. The presence of laptop phenomenology suggests itself, of course. Now, on the plausible assumption that what explains why your envatted counterpart's laptop belief is justified should be the same as what explains why your ordinary (non-envatted) laptop belief is, it follows that the right explanation in *Dark Room* is what it seems to be: that you have the perceptual laptop phenomenology you do.⁴

Presumably, various standard responses to the new evil demon argument (see Graham forthcoming for a useful review) could be adapted for Smithies' argument, and failing that, reliabilists always have the option of swallowing the matzoh ball ("biting the bullet") and denying that your envatted version's belief is justified (compare Goldberg 2012). That's always an option. Is it a *reasonable* option, at least for a reliabilist? We enter here a complicated area in meta-epistemological theorizing, to do with what we ultimately want from our notion of epistemic justification. We cannot hope to resolve such foundational issues *en passant*. Instead, I will now argue that there is at least one other alternative explanation of *Explanandum*, one which Smithies fails to consider and which can be offered without substantial divergence in meta-epistemological convictions.

The alternative explanation I have in mind invokes *two* factors in explaining *Explanandum*: first, the occurrence of the laptop experience, with its appearance-delivering perceptual phenomenology; but *second*, the presence in the subject of a (justified) standing belief that forming beliefs about the environment by endorsing perceptual experiences tends to lead to true beliefs.

It is quite plausible that neurotypical human adults *have* such a standing belief.⁵ In the course our lives, we have often found ourselves desiring getting a hold of our laptop. When, in pursuit of this desire, we have acted on beliefs formed by endorsement of perceptual experiences as of laptop, our desire to use our laptop has tended to be satisfied. This pattern would be an incredible miracle if forming beliefs (e.g. that our laptop is right there) on the basis of perceptual laptop experiences did not tend to lead to a preponderance of true beliefs. Thus we are quite *justified* in believing that endorsing our perceptual experiences is a *reliable* way of forming beliefs. This second-order reliability belief, if you will, is not only psychologically real but also epistemically justified.

On the view we are considering, this second-order reliability belief is, in addition, also crucially relevant to why the right doxastic attitude to take in *Dark Room* changes once the lights come on. To be sure, the occurrence of your perceptual experience is crucial as well. But on the view under consideration, it is only the compresence of your perceptual experience and this second-order reliability belief that can explain *Explanandum*. Without the perceptual experience occurring, merely having the second-order reliability belief does

not rationalize believing specifically that there is a laptop in the room; but similarly, merely undergoing the perceptual experience, without also having a justified belief that such an experience recommends believing in laptop presence, does not rationalize belief that a laptop really is present.⁶

This is important, because if perceptual experience cannot justify all on its own, but needs to be backed by a certain belief, *which moreover needs to be itself justified*, then we have not yet found the justification-generators that can inject justification into an otherwise epistemically virginal web of beliefs. It is crucial to the dogmatist program that experience provides *immediate* justification, that is, justification that does not depend on the subject's justification for any of their other beliefs. But this is no longer the case if perceptual experiences do not justify unless accompanied by a justified second-order reliability belief.

Importantly, the second-order reliability belief is justified not only for us, but also for our envatted duplicates. For they too systematically satisfy their laptop-use desires when forming laptop beliefs by endorsing laptop experiences. So the two-factor view can account for our intuitions about the envatted variant of *Dark Room*. Moreover, the two-factor view can even explain the initial appeal of dogmatism. Arguably, the epistemic role played by the second-order reliability belief, in scenarios like *Dark Room* but also in everyday life, is hard to appreciate in part because it is such a deep-seated, unconsciously formed belief. We hold this type of second-order belief so deeply that we effectively take it for granted in the management of our doxastic life. It is natural to surmise that the deep-seatedness of this second-order belief is why its role in greasing the wheels of epistemic justification is so easy to miss, making dogmatism seem more plausible than it really is.

What advantage, then, might the phenomenal dogmatist offer for their own explanation of *Explanandum* – the explanation that invokes only the perceptual experience – at the expense of the two-factor explanation that invokes also the second-order reliability belief? There is one notable advantage, to which I will return in the next section. But there is also an extremely troubling disadvantage – for me, a kind of deal-breaker, really.

The problem may be put as follows. Without the second-order reliability belief, the phenomenal dogmatist faces a challenge explaining *why* the occurrence of an appearance rationalizes a belief that the world is one way rather than another. Granted, believing becomes the right doxastic attitude for you in *Dark Room* only once you are visited by the right phenomenology – a laptop-appearance-delivering phenomenology. The question still arises of why and how the occurrence of this kind of phenomenology recommends belief. The two-factor view has a simple answer: the fact that the subject is visited by the relevant phenomenology recommends their believing that a laptop is present because the subject has a justified belief that forming beliefs about the presence of laptops on the basis of the relevant phenomenology tends to lead to true beliefs. So, since the justification we are

talking about here is *epistemic* justification, that is, justification for taking some propositions *to be true*, the conspiracy of the right phenomenology and the right second-order reliability belief produces the requisite justification for the first-order laptop belief. In contrast, the phenomenal dogmatist has no explanation for why being visited by some phenomenology recommends adopting some belief. Indeed, the phenomenal dogmatist must treat this as a *primitive fact*: there is no reason *why* appearance-delivering experiences provide justification, while imagination and social pressure, for instance, do not. It is not as if appearance-delivering experiences have their special epistemic oomph because the beliefs they produce are more likely to be true, or even that they just give the subject a *reason to think* these beliefs more likely to be true. Appearance-delivering experiences have their special epistemic oomph independently of all that and simply because they are appearance-delivering experiences. There is no deeper epistemic fact that grounds their special epistemic oomph. Even the facts about whether they make beliefs more likely to be true, or give one reason to think those beliefs more likely to be true, are irrelevant.

This all sounds very strange to me. As noted, the kind of justification we are talking about here is *epistemic* justification, and that seems *by definition* to involve a certain truth-connection. If a basketball player's unreliable and evidence-free belief that she is the best player on the court tonight makes her play better, then her belief is *practically* justified but – intuitively – not *epistemically* justified. Not epistemically justified because nothing recommends the likely truth of this belief. Thus recommending likely truth is built into the very nature of the kind of justification epistemology is concerned with. The problem with phenomenal dogmatism is that it explicitly makes any truth-connection irrelevant to the justificatory power of its designated justification-generators: they are claimed to generate justification because of their phenomenology and irrespective of any connection they may or may not bear to likely truth. At bottom, phenomenal dogmatism fails to secure, or even take into consideration, the truth-connection aspect of epistemic justification.

4. Moving Forward

I have considered two explanations of *Explanandum*: (a) the dogmatist one citing appearance-delivering experience and (b) the two-factor one citing appearance-delivering experience *plus* a justified second-order belief in the reliability of forming beliefs by endorsing appearance-delivering experiences. But there is also (c) an intermediate proposal, citing appearance-delivering experience plus absence of any justification for doubting the reliability of forming beliefs by endorsing appearance-delivering experiences. Is there a reason to prefer (b) over (c)?

I don't think this kind of move can help the dogmatist. To see why, consider that there are two versions of the move. In one, we only require that the fact *obtain* that there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the subject's experience, but do require the subject be *aware* of this fact. In the second version, we also require awareness: say, that the subject have a justified belief that there is no reason for doubt. In this second version, the move amounts to changing the content of the justified second-order belief we require from the subject: instead of requiring a reliability belief, we require a (kind of) no-unreliability belief. In this form, the move makes no difference to the dialectic: the subject still needs to already have *some* justified belief in order for their laptop experience to justify a laptop belief, so the resulting justification is still not immediate. But the first version does nothing to restore a truth-connection to justification. For in this form, (c) requires nothing from the subject's actual mental life other than their having the right laptop phenomenology. There is no progress whatsoever here on the basic problem of understanding how the fact that a subject is visited by some phenomenology could justify them in thinking the world to be one way rather than another.

For the same reason, I also don't think it helps the dogmatist to stress that it is only *prima facie* justification that experience provides all on its own, with *ultima facie* justification still depending on justified second-order reliability beliefs. It is a coherent view, of course: that the epistemic function of any doubt in the reliability of laptop experiences is to serve as defeater of a defeasible, *prima facie* justification for a laptop belief, which justification is provided entirely by an individual laptop experience. The problem, however, is that even *prima facie* epistemic justification is epistemic justification, and this must have something to do with the prospective truth of the belief thereby justified. The occurrence of a laptop phenomenology, in abstraction from the fact that it is indicative of the likely presence of a laptop, simply fails to secure this truth-connection of epistemic justification.

It might seem odd that I insist so much on the truth-connection of justification as an embarrassment for dogmatism, given how Pryor stresses that the phenomenal feature in virtue of which experiences justify is precisely their truth-y feeling. As he puts it in the passage quoted above: "Our experiences represent propositions in such a way that it 'feels as if' we could tell that those propositions are true" (2000: 547 fn37). The problem, however, is that taken on its own this is just a feeling. What the feeling provides for is a phenomenology *as of* truth-connection – that's all. Now, I am very much open to the possibility that the truth-y feeling in our perceptual experiences is not historically accidental, but has emerged over time due to the fact that endorsing these experiences has systematically resulted in beliefs later confirmed to be true. In this way, one may conjecture, the reliability of forming beliefs by endorsement of perceptual experiences had come to be phenomenologically encoded, so to speak, with (neurotypical, adult, human)

perceptual experience acquiring a phenomenal quality of “felt endorsability,” whereby each experience “invites” its subject to endorse it. All this seems reasonably plausible to me, if somewhat speculative. Even in this scenario, however, it is not simply the *feel* of the experiences that generates their justificatory power, but the *etiology* of this feel, the fact that endorsing these experiences really did result in a preponderance of true beliefs. Divorced from this fact, the mere feeling provides no justification, I contend, since divorced from this fact it does not recover the truth-connection of epistemic justification.

On the two-factor view I am defending, this truth-connection is established when the perceptual appearance is accompanied by a justified second-order reliability belief, for instance the belief that forming first-order beliefs by endorsing perceptual appearances tends to result in true beliefs. (Since these second-order beliefs are tacit, standing beliefs, there may be very many of them simultaneously, of various degrees of granularity: one belief specifically about endorsing *laptop* appearances, one about endorsing *visual* appearances, one about endorsing *perceptual* appearances, or endorsing *any* appearances, as well as many other, more specific beliefs. We may require that for the endorsement-based first-order belief to be justified, at least one appropriate second-order belief must be justified.)

One notable advantage of phenomenal dogmatism over the two-factor view is that the latter must still explain how the relevant second-order beliefs get justified, and more deeply, how epistemic justification gets off the ground in the first place. The phenomenal dogmatist at least *tries* to address this foundational issue. The two-factor view, in requiring that the second-order reliability belief backing the subject’s experience be justified, leaves us with the original problem of how justification can be injected into our web of beliefs to begin with.

What this shows, I think, is that the two-factor view does not stand on its own and will ultimately require supplementation by a view on justification-generation and immediate justification. I have such a view, involving knowledge-by-acquaintance of truthmakers of foundational beliefs (Kriegel forthcoming), and it is this view I would want to supplement the two-factor explanation of *Explanandum* with. Here I am pursuing an argument to the effect that phenomenal dogmatism, although it tries to solve the foundational problem of justification-generation, does not succeed in doing so, thus opening the door for my alternative. The reason phenomenal dogmatism is not successful, I have argued, is that it fails to secure the truth-connection of epistemic justification. In the next section, I relate a parable designed to bring out this point more vividly – you might say more *rhetorically*. Later I will develop a more concrete argument, involving the juxtaposition of perpetual dogmatism and moral dogmatism.

5. A Parable of Postal Happenstance

Consider the following vignette:

(Postal Happenstance) Through incredible postal happenstance, Jimmy receives an anonymous letter every few days, each making its own propositional assertion about certain matters of fact on which Jimmy has no other information, e.g. that the number of inhabitants in Sri Lanka in the 13th century was such-and-such, or that there are 73 species of beetle in Tasmania. Jimmy proceeds each time to form a belief that things are as the letter says they are. He comes to hold beliefs about 13th-century Sri Lanka's population, the number of Tasmanian beetle species, and many other things purely on the basis of these letters.

The intuition is that Jimmy's resulting beliefs are *not* justified. The correct doxastic attitude for him to take is *suspension of judgment*; belief is the wrong doxastic attitude to take given only the reception of these letters and absent any other information of relevance. Of course, if Jimmy checks on the internet and sees that the letters are reliable, say, or corroborates the information they provide in some other way, he may *then* be justified in believing their contents; likewise if Jimmy lives in a society where honest people commonly send letters to each other by way of propagating knowledge. But the mere fact that he has received those letters, on its own, does not seem to justify him in believing the assertions made therein.

Incidentally, it would not redeem Jimmy if he decided to hold his letter-based beliefs only tentatively and pending evidence suggesting that what the letters say is false. That is already too much credulity given what he knows – i.e., nothing – about where these letters came from and why they assert what they do. This suggests that the reception of these letters does not provide even *prima facie* justification for believing their contents.

These intuitions about *Postal Happenstance* are naturally explained by the fact that Jimmy doesn't have a justified second-order belief – nor justification *for* a second-order belief – that forming beliefs about matters of fact solely on the basis of anonymous letters tends to lead to justified beliefs. There may be other explanations as well, but the fact that Jimmy has no justification to take the letters to make true assertions is certainly *an* explanation of the fact that Jimmy's letter-based beliefs are intuitively unjustified. Again, we can stipulate into the story facts that would *create* justification for such a second-order belief (e.g., that Jimmy lives in a society where propagation of knowledge by anonymous letters is common). But as long as we tell the story in a way that guarantees there is no justification for a second-order belief that believing what the letters say will tend to lead to true beliefs, the intuition remains firm that Jimmy's letter-based beliefs are unjustified.

On the dogmatist picture, phenomenal experiences assert that things are thus and so (e.g., that there is a laptop in front of you). These assertive representations land in the

mind's "faculty of receptivity" the way the letters land in Jimmy's mailbox. They are consumed by the cognitive system's belief-forming mechanisms the way the letters were consumed by Jimmy. In both cases, I want to suggest, the resulting beliefs are not epistemically justified – not until they are backed by justified second-order reliability beliefs.

Now, granted, if perceptual experiences are like letters in the mind's faculty of receptivity, they are very special letters – ones that deliver appearances. But absent any information about where these appearances come from, there is still the question of why we should *believe* that things are the way they appear to be. Why should the fact that a person is visited by a certain phenomenology, *on its own* and without any background knowledge about *why* they are visited by just that phenomenology, justify the person in believing that the world is the way the phenomenology says it is?

It is worth noting that the vivacity or assertivity of the phenomenology should not on itself be a crucial factor. A particularly assertive letter about 13th-century Sri Lanka is no more rationally believable than a meekly assertive one. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the notion of appearance relevant to phenomenal dogmatists is not a matter of vivacity or phenomenal intensity, and ultimately is not even something that comes in degrees. As Huemer (2001: 77) points out, an extraordinarily vivid imagination of a tomato would not justify believing a tomato is present. The epistemically relevant feature of experience is not vivacity, but the fact that when you have the tomato experience, "it thereby seems to you as if a tomato is actually present, then and there" (Ibid.). What is crucial about the perceptual experience is that it makes the tomato *appear* to you – it delivers an *appearance*. But *this* feature, unlike vivacity, is not a feature that comes in degrees. Either something appears to you or it does not.

I have told *Postal Happenstance* to motivate preferring the two-factor over the dogmatist explanation of *Explanandum*, by making vivid the way in which phenomenal dogmatism fails to secure the truth-connection of epistemic justification. Ultimately, however, the best way to evaluate which explanation is better is to try to envisage circumstances in which appearance-delivering experiences occur but the relevant second-order reliability beliefs are absent. This is not the case in *Dark Room*, where second-order reliability beliefs are present, nor in *Postal Happenstance*, where appearance-delivering experiences are absent. Can we find a case – ideally: a realistic case – where appearance-delivering experiences are present but justified higher-order reliability beliefs are not (or not to the same extent)? This is where moral epistemology may become relevant. I will now argue that moral epistemology offers us an instructive case: certain emotional experiences plausibly deliver moral appearances (§6), but do not seem accompanied by second-order reliability beliefs as justificatorily robust as our perceptual experiences (§7).

6. Emotional Dogmatism and Evaluative Appearances

In the years since the emergence of dogmatism as a central force in contemporary epistemology, several philosophers have suggested that *emotional* experiences provide immediate justification for *evaluative* beliefs analogously to the way *perceptual* experiences provide immediate justification for *empirical* beliefs (Döring 2007, Milona 2016, Tappolet 2016). We may call this *emotional dogmatism*:

[ED] For some *emotional* experience E and evaluative belief B, E provides immediate justification for B (and does so in virtue of its phenomenal character).

If I feel afraid to walk down a dark alley in the middle of the night, that may immediately justify me (*prima facie*) in believing that walking down that alley is dangerous; on the rare occasion I am proud of some paper I've written, that immediately justifies me (*prima facie*!) in believing that I have written something of value; and so on.

A subset of the emotions in our psychological repertoire are *moral* emotions, such as indignation and guilt. A particularly interesting version of emotional dogmatism would include the moral emotions among the immediate justifiers – we may call this *moral dogmatism*:

[MD] For some *moral-emotional* experience E and moral belief B, E provides immediate justification for B (and does so in virtue of its phenomenal character).

If I'm indignant about the dean depriving the philosophy department of a line in theoretical philosophy, that immediately justifies me (*prima facie*) in believing that the dean is being unjust; if I feel suspicious of a car salesman, that immediately justifies me (*prima facie*!) in believing that the car salesman is dishonest – and so forth.

Often epistemological theses like ED and MD are coupled with a *psychological* thesis about the nature of emotion, namely, that emotion is a sort of *value perception*: fear is the perception of danger, indignation the perception of injustice, suspicion the perception of dishonesty, and so on (see already de Sousa 1987). Now, it may seem that against the background of a perceptual theory of emotion, perceptual dogmatism leads *straightforwardly* to emotional (and moral) dogmatism: if perception justifies immediately, and (moral-)emotional experience is a kind of perception, then (moral-)emotional experience justifies immediately. But the road to emotional (and moral) dogmatism is in fact not so straightforward. For the exact status of the perceptual theory of emotion is not so very clear. The theory does *not* state that emotional experience is a kind of visual perception, or auditory, or olfactory, or any other perceptual experience in a recognized

modality. So emotional experience must constitute a *sui generis* kind of perception, something that qualifies as perceptual experience only because it shares some essential property with visual, auditory, and other recognized forms of perception. Adoption of the perceptual theory of emotion thus involves (a) an account of the special property which makes a mental phenomenon “perceptual” and (b) an argument that emotional experiences *have* that property.

In the present context, it is natural to propose that emotional experiences qualify as perception insofar as they *deliver evaluative appearances* – analogously to the way visual, auditory, etc. experiences deliver “empirical” appearances: fear delivers the appearance of danger, indignation the appearance of injustice, suspicion the appearance of dishonesty, and so on. Indeed, it may be precisely *because* emotional experiences deliver evaluative appearances that they immediately justify evaluative beliefs.⁷

Importantly, opponents of the perceptual theory of emotion may in principle agree with the thesis that emotional experiences deliver evaluative appearances, rejecting the perceptual theory only because of some other disanalogy with sensory perception which they find essential. For instance, opponents often reject the perceptual theory on the grounds that emotional experiences can be justified or unjustified, whereas perceptual experiences allegedly cannot (Brady 2013, Brogaard and Chudnoff 2016). But for all that has been said so far, this can be true of emotions even if they deliver evaluative appearances. Thus it is possible to accept emotional dogmatism without being a proponent of the perceptual model of emotion.

What reasons do we have to take emotions to deliver appearances similarly to the way perceptual experiences do? At least three plausibility considerations support this.

First, it is reasonable to conjecture that emotions have evolved to provide us with a quick-and-dirty way to track evaluative factors in our environment, similarly to the way perception has evolved to track empirical facts about our environment. Suppose this conjecture is correct. Then there is a kind of functional parallel between perception and emotion – emotion is to our evaluative environment what perception is to our empirical environment – that may underwrite a phenomenological parallel. That is, if a mechanism designed to provide a quick-and-dirty way to track empirical features of the environment somehow “translates” phenomenologically into empirical appearances, it stands to reason that a mechanism designed to provide a quick-and-dirty way to track evaluative aspects of the environment should “translate” phenomenologically into evaluative appearances. And indeed, when we imagine creatures capable of perception and emotion but not of thought and reasoning (“central cognition”), what we seem to imagine are creatures enjoying a certain awareness of factual and evaluative aspects of their environment but without the capacity to “take distance from” that awareness and cognitively consider whether or not to

endorse the deliverances of its perceptual-cum-emotional awareness. In other words, we imagine a creature stuck with empirical and evaluative appearances, and lacking the resources to cognitively evaluate whether objective reality aligns with these appearances.⁸

Secondly, in undergoing emotional experiences, we are typically passive in the same way we are in perception. Although I enjoy a measure of indirect agentive control over the orientation of my bodily organs and the focus of my attention, once I open my eyes and look straight ahead, I become patient rather than agent: I am perceptually appeared to one way rather than another. Emotional experiences are notoriously similarly passive: they are called “the passions” for a reason. We can try to control our environment so it is less likely to feature the kind of situation that induces anger in us, but once we find ourselves in such a situation, and our attention is trained on the potentially angering element, typically we will experience anger. In such circumstances, we are simply *appeared to evaluatively* a certain way, just as when we open our eyes and see a laptop we are appeared to perceptually a certain way. This aspect of emotional experience is effectively embraced as a working assumption in the area of cognitive science and clinical psychology known as “emotion regulation” (see Gross 2014 for an authoritative overview). Leading models in this area focus almost exclusively on subjects’ capacity to control environmental and attentional conditions likely to induce certain emotional reactions, as well as subjects’ *behavioral responses* to the emotional experiences they undergo, but leave out *direct control* of emotional experience itself (where control over x is “direct” just when there is no y such that one controls x by controlling y). This seems to betray a clear recognition that our capacity to exercise direct control over our emotional experiences is virtually null – just as with our perceptual experience. There are of course many *unconscious* mental processes we exercise no direct control over, but it might be conjectured that when we exercise no control over certain types of experiences, the result is that we feel ourselves simply *appeared to* a certain way.

Thirdly, there is the fact that, just as with perceptual experience, one way we move from an emotional experience to an evaluative belief is by *endorsement*. When we are indignant about x , we need only endorse our indignation to form the belief that x is unjust. To be sure, one can envisage a creature who performs *inferences* from their emotional experiences to corresponding beliefs: when it feels afraid of a snake, for instance, it *reasons* along the lines of “aha, I am afraid of this thing, therefore it may be dangerous to me.” Perhaps sometimes we too reason this way. But this is not the typical way, and certainly not the *only* way, we go from emotion to belief in everyday life. Often, we feel afraid of something, or suspicious of someone, endorse the fear or suspicion, and thereby acquire the belief that the thing is dangerous to us or that the person is dishonest. We are perhaps *not as quick* to endorse our emotional experiences as we are our perceptual ones, and this is something I will return to momentarily. Nonetheless, we *can* form evaluative beliefs simply by endorsing our emotional experiences, just as we can form empirical beliefs by endorsing

perceptual appearances. Insofar as the latter correlates with perceptual experiences delivering appearances (as argued in §2), the former may be reasonably thought to correlate with emotional experiences delivering appearances as well.

Taking together all these considerations, we get a reasonably good prima facie case for taking emotional experiences to deliver evaluative appearances. As before, depending on how you hear “appearances,” you may interpret this to mean either (a) that emotional experiences *constitute* evaluative appearances or else (b) that they *represent* or *disclose* evaluative appearances. Either way, if emotional experiences deliver evaluative appearances, then the following path opens up from appearance dogmatism (AD) to emotional dogmatism (ED) and moral dogmatism (MD):

- 1) Emotional experiences (including moral-emotion experiences) deliver evaluative appearances (including moral appearances);
- 2) Mental states that deliver appearances can justify beliefs immediately (as per AD); therefore,
- 3) Emotional experiences (including moral-emotion experiences) can justify evaluative beliefs (including moral beliefs) immediately (as per ED and MD).

Call this the *evaluative appearances argument* for emotional dogmatism (and its parenthetical variant the *moral appearances argument* for moral dogmatism).

This kind of argument is supposed to establish a measure of dialectical parity between perceptual and emotional (and/or moral) dogmatism: in both cases, the dogmatist thesis is reached by noting that certain phenomenal states deliver appearances, claiming that this enables immediate, non-inferential justification of some beliefs. Many philosophers of emotion have welcomed this dialectical parity, trying to leverage the antecedent plausibility they attached to perceptual dogmatism to bestow plausibility-by-association on emotional dogmatism. I want to do essentially the opposite: in the next section, I will use this dialectical parity as a trojan horse to undermine perceptual dogmatism.

7. Lessons from Moral Epistemology

Despite this apparent affinity between perceptual and emotional experiences as appearance-delivering, resistance to emotional and moral dogmatism remains strong, even among philosophers well disposed toward perceptual dogmatism. Sometimes this is because emotional dogmatism is claimed to have trouble sustaining the backward-looking dogmatist intuition, insofar as emotions are susceptible to epistemic justification in a way perceptual experience allegedly aren't (see Brogaard and Chudnoff 2016). But sometimes it is also the forward-looking dogmatist intuition that emotional experience is thought to fail

to sustain: “at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient reason to justify an evaluative judgment and/or an action, not even *prima facie*” (Álvarez González forthcoming: 1). There seems to be here this asymmetry between perceptual and emotional experience: while an epistemically rational human agent endorses their perceptual experiences more or less automatically (pending rather unusual circumstances), they take a little more critical distance from their emotional experiences. We have all learned through the vicissitudes of life to take a more deliberate approach, for instance, to the endorsement of our anger experiences, or our suspicion experiences, or our guilt experiences – different people have different susceptibilities.⁹ Indeed, subjects who take an overly dogmatic stance toward their emotionally delivered evaluative appearances seem epistemically criticizable. Thus, if we tell a *Dark Room*-style story but where the protagonist suddenly experiences suspicion toward someone, and proceeds to judge the person as dishonest without seeking the slightest corroborating evidence, our intuition is not so strong that the protagonist is *prima facie* justified in believing the object of their suspicion to be dishonest.

In this connection it seems very relevant that a second-order reliability belief is much more justified for perceptual experiences and empirical beliefs than for emotional experiences and evaluative beliefs. If your life is anything like mine, your track record in getting desirable outcomes when acting on beliefs formed by uncritically endorsing the emotional appearances is not so impressive as compared with acting on beliefs formed by uncritically endorsing perceptual appearances. An epistemically rational human subject would and should have much lower credence in <forming beliefs by endorsing my emotional experiences tends to lead to true beliefs> than in <forming beliefs by endorsing my perceptual experiences tends to lead to true beliefs>.

If this is right, then even if emotional experiences deliver appearances just as perceptual ones do, there is still this important epistemic difference between the two: the accompanying second-order reliability beliefs are much less justified for the emotional than for the perceptual appearances. Arguably, this is *why* epistemically rational subjects take a more critical distance from their emotional experiences than from their perceptual ones. To “take critical distance” here means to be less immediately disposed to endorse the appearances, that is, less disposed to take the appearances at face value. Presumably, the reason an epistemically rational human subject is less disposed to endorse their emotional experiences is precisely that their credence in the reliability of forming evaluative beliefs that way is considerably lower than their credence in the reliability of forming beliefs by endorsement of perceptual experiences.

What I am proposing here is that perceptual dogmatism seems antecedently compelling in part because we take for granted, and hence fail to notice the epistemic work done by, the standing second-order reliability beliefs we all have about beliefs formed by

endorsing perceptual appearances; and that the reason moral dogmatism is less immediately compelling is that the parallel second-order reliability beliefs are considerably less well supported in that case. This suggests that in both cases the epistemic force often associated with the relevant appearance-delivering experiences in fact comes in part from the accompanying second-order reliability beliefs.

Now, imagine a person thrust overnight into a situation where certain of their experiences systematically distort information, in a sort of localized Matrix/evil demon scenario. Perhaps the story goes like this:

(Local Matrix) Every time Mona faces a spherical object, she has a visual experience as of a cube – and vice versa. And every time a dog barks nearby, Mona has an auditory experience as of a meow – while nearby meows she experiences as barks. In the fullness of time Mona picks up on this, and so when she hears a bark in the next room she comes to confidently form the belief that there is a cat in the next room, and when she decides to play soccer, as soon as she has a visual experience as of a soccer-ball-patterned cube she forms the belief that she has found the soccer ball.

Mona not only *lacks* the second-order beliefs that endorsing cat or ball experiences is a reliable way of forming true beliefs, she positively *disbelieves* this, believing instead – justifiably no less – that it’s a reliable way to form *false* beliefs. And instead of the second-order belief <forming ball beliefs on the basis of ball experiences will tend to result in true beliefs>, she has the (justified) second-order belief <forming ball beliefs on the basis of cube experiences will tend to result in true beliefs>.

The dogmatist would presumably say that when Mona “sees” a soccer-ball-patterned cube, she does have justification for believing there is a cube in front of her, but this justification is merely *prima facie* and is instantaneously defeated (presumably by Mona’s second-order belief). But this seems odd, in the same way it seems odd to say that Jimmy in *Postal Happenstance* has *prima facie* justification to believe the letters he receives in the mail. As I argued in §4, *prima facie* epistemic justification requires a truth-connection too, and in *Local Matrix* there is neither a reliable connection between cube experiences and true cube beliefs nor justification for a second-order belief in such a connection.

Indeed, suppose one day Mona has a visual experience as of a sphere and on its basis forms the belief that there is a spherical object in front of her, despite lacking the second-order belief (as well as the justification for believing) that forming sphere beliefs on the basis of sphere experiences tends to lead to true beliefs. Compare now Mono, who has a phenomenally indistinguishable perceptual experience as of a sphere, but also has a justified belief that forming sphere beliefs on the basis of sphere experiences tends to lead to true beliefs. I think everybody would agree that intuitively, Mono’s belief is more justified than Mona’s. But it would be odd to hold here that their respective sphere beliefs are

equally *prima facie* justified, and Mono's simply enjoys some *secunda-facie* boost from his second-order belief. More plausibly, Mono's experience and second-order belief jointly produce *prima facie* justification for his belief that he's facing a spherical object, while Mona's belief that she's facing a spherical object lacks any kind of epistemic justification.

Cases like *Local Matrix* and *Postal Happenstance* are fanciful, of course. But the case of moral-emotional experience and our limited confidence in second-order reliability beliefs about them is not. Being drawn from real life, the latter case does not create as stark a contrast as *Local Matrix* does. Nonetheless, it manages to point to a certain dissociation between our intuitions about justification and the presence of appearance-delivering experiences, suggesting a crucial epistemic role for second-order reliability beliefs that are easy to take for granted in scenarios like *Dark Room*. In this way moral epistemology provides an instructive lesson for perceptual epistemology.

The lesson provided, I think, is that phenomenal experiences do not provide immediate justification purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. When it seems like they do, this is only because we don't notice the epistemic work done "behind the scenes" by certain tacit second-order beliefs. Without those beliefs, the fact that a person is visited by a phenomenology is insufficiently truth-linked to generate epistemic justification. It is only when justified second-order reliability beliefs get involved that the appropriate truth-connection arises.

8. Conclusion

The problem this leaves us with is that we still don't have an explanation of how epistemic justification gets off the ground in the first place. To play their epistemic role, the relevant second-order beliefs must themselves be justified, so they too must derive their justification from *somewhere*. It is still unclear how justification is generated in the first place, if the mere occurrence of certain experiences is not enough. The dogmatist at least *tried* to address this foundational epistemological problem. As noted, elsewhere I have argued that the best approach here is not dogmatism, but the idea that a belief that *p* is *immediately* justified just when it is based on knowledge-by-acquaintance of its truthmaker (Kriegel forthcoming). This approach might in fact be appealing to some dogmatists, insofar as it recovers a role for phenomenal consciousness in making empirical knowledge possible. For plausibly, knowledge-by-acquaintance involves phenomenal experience. If empirical knowledge is impossible without knowledge-by-acquaintance, and knowledge-by-acquaintance is impossible without phenomenal consciousness, then empirical knowledge is impossible without phenomenal consciousness (Kriegel forthcoming: 19). If I am right,

this is the better way to secure a role for phenomenal consciousness in grounding knowledge.¹⁰

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¹ If we add to dogmatism, so construed, the thesis that the justification for all our other justified beliefs is transmitted to them, ultimately, from our dogmatic justified beliefs, we get a form of traditional foundationalism.

² To be clear, not everybody *agrees* with Pryor on this – see notably Siegel 2017 Ch.4. (For my own take on this, see Kriegel forthcoming: 11.)

³ Huemer nowhere attempts an exhaustive list of appearances (personal communication). Pryor, too, despite focusing in writing on the perceptual case, is sympathetic to the idea of non-perceptual immediate justifiers (personal communication).

⁴ This is essentially an adaptation of Stew Cohen's (1984) "new evil demon" argument against reliabilism in general, adapting it to the more specific issue of explaining what justifies you in switching from suspending judgment to believing that there is a chair before you when you undergo a phenomenal experience as of a chair before you.

⁵ Whether children and animals do, and if so from what age or at what level of organismic complexity, are more difficult questions. But as a tacit belief, this kind of higher-order reliability belief may be easier to form than might initially seem, and in any case it may not be counterintuitive to deny justification to infants' and simple animal's beliefs formed in the absence of this kind of higher-order belief.

⁶ To be clear, the explanation I have in mind insists that the *com-presence* of the second-order reliability belief is necessary for the justification of the first-order laptop belief, but may not take this to be *sufficient*. It may impose further conditions. Plausibly, for instance, it may require that the presence of the second-order reliability belief be relevant to *why* one has the first-order belief, at least insofar as they subject would not have the first-order laptop belief had they not had the second-order reliability belief. This is a sort of basing or supporting requirement. One may add other requirements as well. The point for our purposes is that the mere presence of the perceptual laptop appearance is in any case insufficient to justify a laptop belief.

⁷ Note well: I am condensing into one-word descriptors ("dishonesty," "injustice," etc.) what in truth are much more finely textured appearances. But the fine-grained, conceptual-resources-outstripping character of emotions' evaluative appearances does not distinguish them from perceptual appearances, which are notoriously richer than what subjects' concepts can typically capture. Also, I am using just these descriptors only in an illustrative capacity: it may well be that it is not really the appearance of *dishonesty* that's delivered in suspicion, say, but of some other negative value. In that case, we would need to plug in the correct account. All this is orthogonal to my main point, which is this: the substantive content of the perceptual theory of emotion is that *emotional experiences deliver evaluative appearances*.

⁸ I thank Anna Giustina for pressing on me this point.

⁹ Álvarez González takes to flow from the very nature of emotional phenomenology (forthcoming: 3), which someone could take to suggest that emotional experience is not appearance-delivery. But it is also possible to suppose that both perceptual and emotional experiences deliver appearance, but the former inspire a greater tendency to endorse.

¹⁰ For comments on a previous draft, I am indebted to Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Tricia Magalotti, Michael Milona.