In the final chapter of *Consciencism*—“Set Theoretic Terms”—Kwame Nkrumah presents a formalization of his main ideas espoused in the previous chapters, using symbols and logical notations. This formalization maps out from one horizon, the course of action required for a colonial territory to be liberated in order to obtain genuine independence, and from another view, the conditions necessary for maintaining the independence of the territory. African societies, for Nkrumah, are faced with the problems of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, disunity, and lack of development. It is, therefore, the aim of *philosophical consciencism* in its political manifestation, first, to chart a course of action to defeat colonialism and imperialism; second, to reveal the whims and caprices of neo-colonialism so that the defeat of colonialism does not become pointless; third, to marshal all the various forces and groups in a territory towards a national (or continental) unity; and finally, to articulate an (philosophical) ideology suitable for national reconstruction and development. Nkrumah’s “Set Theoretic Terms,” is intended to give us a *political formula* for achieving the four aims above.

Although Nkrumah’s final chapter is rarely read and examined because of its use of symbols and logical notations which make it quite daunting to work through, it is, arguably, the most important chapter of his book, for at least two reasons: One, the chapter gives us an application–on the social and political plane–of the central theses of philosophical consciencism; it brings together Nkrumah’s ideas on liberation, materialism, dialectical moments, socialism, and positive action. The interrelation and interconnectedness of these ideas help us to appreciate the broader spectrum and applicability of Nkrumah’s *Consciencism*. Two, it presents to us a road map for the journey from the struggle for independence through to the attainment of national and
continental unity and development. This road map, borne out of the experience of Ghana’s struggle and independence with Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party (CPP), provides not only a strategy for the liberation of any colonial territory, but also the socio-economic-political system appropriate for maintaining and sustaining the independence of a territory. In a single statement, we can describe the significance of the final chapter as philosophical consciencism in actu.

My task in this chapter is to present and analyze Nkrumah’s reasoning for this political dimension of consciencism with the aim of understanding his theoretic terms and appreciating the general spirit of his philosophical consciencism. I will do so structurally, by outlining Nkrumah’s strategy and scheme for dealing with the problems facing African societies which I listed as the four aims of philosophical consciencism in the first paragraph. I will use Nkrumah’s symbols and notations, but with some modifications, and I will limit the discussion to the key aspects of his theoretic terms using less notations. Let us begin our analysis with the project of Consciencism itself.

According to Nkrumah, the conscience of the African society is plagued with three strands of influences which have competing and conflicting ideologies.

African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neocolonialism as its primary vehicles (Nkrumah 1964, 68).

When these three segments with their conflicting ideologies are allowed to co-exist, the African society “will be racked by the most malignant schizophrenia” (ibid., 79).

The option of allowing the status quo to remain is undesirable. There is the need, therefore, to either accommodate the other two segments into the experiences of the African traditional way of life, or seek a harmony among the three segments. But this disjunction is misleading. For Nkrumah, the harmony to be forged is the accommodation of the Islamic and Euro-Christian influences into the traditional African way of life; that is, the harmony is to be done in such a way that the combined presence of all three influences “is in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society” (70). An ideology that can solidify into a philosophical statement is needed for animating the harmonic process, and for couching a harmony that will preserve or restore the humanist and egalitarian principles of communal African societies. This philosophical statement Nkrumah calls philosophical consciencism. Philosophical consciencism is, thus, “the map in intellectual
terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality” (79).

We can understand Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s philosophical consciencism in its bid to offer a diagnosis of, and medication for, the schizophrenic African conscience from the diagram below:

The triangle represents the tripartite elements of African society. At the base of the triangle is communal African society which upholds the principles of humanism and egalitarianism. The base of the triangle represents the foundation upon which the harmonization or accommodation of the other sides of the triangle is to be built; the base will ‘digest’ or ‘absorb’ the other sides. Consciencism is replete with a characterization of the Euro-Christian segment of the tripartite, and Nkrumah associates this tradition with the ‘evils’ of colonialism and neo-colonialism, animated by the principles and systems of feudalism, capitalism and individualism. These principles are not only foreign to, but are in conflict with, the communalism, humanism and egalitarianism of traditional African society.

Nkrumah does not give any description or the extent of the Islamic influence on the conscience of Africa. Hence, it is not clear whether the principles underlying the Islamic tradition are in congruent with, or antithetical to, the humanist and egalitarian principles of traditional African societies. However, since Nkrumah thinks that the three segments have “competing ideologies” (68) we can infer that the principles underlying the Islamic tradition are different from those upheld in traditional African societies. But, without any characterization of the ideology and underlying principles of one of the segments in the tripartite, without knowing the what and how the ideology of this segment competes (if it genuinely does) with the other two, it makes the furnace in which to forge the object of harmony a lukewarm one, and the harmony forged somewhat incomplete. Despite this observation, the aim of philosophical consciencism could still be a viable one: it is to be the emergent
and overarching ideology that will inspire and direct the accommodation or harmonization process irrespective of what the ideology of the Islamic tradition might be.

We can observe from the diagram that philosophical conscientism is intended to translate or transform the conflicted tripartite elements of the African conscience into a uniformed ‘personality’ whose fundamental principle or ideology is socialist in nature. Socialism is the shape and form of the harmony forged out of the three segments of the African society. Philosophical conscientism is the furnace in which the harmony is moulded, and dialectical materialism is the oil that fuels the oven. Nkrumah has two basic alignments of systems which are parallel to each other and never intersecting: on one line is capitalism which shares the same principles and ideologies with slavery, feudalism, colonialism, imperialism, idealism, and individualism; on the other line exists socialism and its kindred terms—communalism, humanism, materialism, and egalitarianism. This neatly aligned systems and principles allow us to see why Nkrumah will naturally favor socialism over capitalism. He writes:

Whereas capitalism is a development by refinement from slavery and feudalism, socialism is obviously not a development from capitalism. In order that socialism should be a development from capitalism, it needs to share a fundamental principle, that of exploitation, with capitalism. Socialism most avowedly has no share in this principle. Hence socialism cannot develop from capitalism. Rather it stands for the negation of that very principle wherein capitalism has its being, lives, and thrives, that principle which unites capitalism with slavery and feudalism.

If one seeks the social-political ancestor of socialism, one must go to communalism. Socialism stands to communalism as capitalism stands to slavery. In socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in modern circumstances... Socialism, therefore, can be and is the defense of the principles of communalism in modern setting. Socialism is a form of social organization which, guided by the principles underlying communism, adopts procedures and measures made necessary by demographical and technological developments (73).

I said Nkrumah will naturally favor socialism over capitalism in the sense that if an essential condition for the harmony to be forged is to maintain or restore the fundamental principles underlying traditional African communalist societies, then it is expected of him to adopt an ideology that is committed to maintaining those principles of traditional African societies. We may have qualms about whether socialism is the appropriate system for African societies; we may think that not everything about capitalism is as evil as Nkrumah makes it seem; we may even argue that there were certain capitalist elements
in traditional African societies; but all these misgivings, to my mind, are misplaced here. Nkrumah’s reasoning can be expressed in this conditional:

(A) If the harmony to be forged from the three segments of the African conscience must maintain and restore the underlying principles of traditional African societies, then adopt the system (for the harmonization) that shares the same principles with, and is committed to the restitution of, the underlying principles of traditional African societies.

Now, since for Nkrumah there is ‘continuity’ from communalism to socialism, and since socialism is the only socio-economic-political system that shares the same underlying principles with traditional African communal societies, and hence fulfilling the condition, socialism is the system to be adopted for the harmony of the African personality. So, our qualms and misgivings should rather be about the antecedent of the conditional. But the antecedent of (A) makes the restitution of the cardinal principles of traditional African societies a necessary condition:

(B) Maintain or restore the underlying principles of traditional African communal societies if you are to forge a harmony among the conflicting ideologies of the Euro-Christian tradition, the Islamic tradition, and the traditional African way of life.

From the diagram above, we can see that the resultant harmony of the tripartite elements in the African personality does not have a rounded or circular shape—as we might expect a harmony to be—but a shape that rests on a base, the same base as the base of the triangle. This is correctly so, as a necessary condition for the harmony in Nkrumah’s view, is to restore the cardinal principles of one of the segments, the segment that identifies us as Africans. The other two segments are ‘influences’ and ‘infiltrations’, that has to be accommodated or absorbed into the base. To reiterate an earlier point, the project of consciencism cannot fail because of worry over socialism in practice, or whether socialism is the best system for African societies; it cannot fail if we discover that there were capitalist tendencies in traditional African societies, or that there was class stratification in traditional African societies. If we accept Nkrumah’s reasoning on harmony that maintains one segment as the base, if we accept his necessary condition for harmony as the restitution of the underlying principles of the base segment, and if we accept his condition that the resultant system of the harmony must be akin, in form and content, to the underlying principles of the base segment, then, the project of consciencism remains theoretically, if not practically, a viable and feasible one. However, if we can argue against conditions (A) and (B) and undo Nkrumah’s
perfect alignment of socialism with communalism, humanism, egalitarianism, materialism, then ipso facto we would have ruined the project of conscientism. Harmony of the three conflicting segments of African society per se is not the ultimate goal of philosophical conscientism. The crux of Nkrumah’s Conscientism is the call for, and the institution of, socialism in African societies. That is, the harmony of the three strands of African society culminates into the institution and practice of socialism in African society. The diagram, again, should give us a pictorial representation of the reasoning behind the prospects of philosophical conscientism. African society is bedeviled by the influences of, especially, the Euro-Christian tradition, which has resulted in its being colonized and exploited. The effect of colonialism is the erosion of the cardinal principles underlying traditional African societies and the establishment, in its place, of capitalism which is a “betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa” (74). Philosophical conscientism, represented by the arrow, is the road map to liberate African society from the fetters of colonialism and transit it to the ‘promised land’ wherein flow the streams of sovereignty, unity, development, from the source of socialism which, in itself, marks the restoration of the underlying ethical and ontological principles of traditional African society.

The route and progression from colonialism to national unity and development is marked by four stages. The first stage is liberation or independence from colonialism and imperialism; and it is the task of philosophical conscientism to charter a course of action for the liberation of African societies from the pinions of colonialism. How does Nkrumah’s philosophical conscientism achieve this aim? The answer lies in Nkrumah’s notion of dialectical materialism. The philosophical bedrock of Nkrumah’s conscientism is his subscription to a monistic materialism. Nkrumah’s conception of materialism, unlike most other forms of materialism, is not committed to the thesis of the sole existence of matter. Rather, it asserts, first, “the absolute and independent existence of matter” and second, that matter has “capacity” for “spontaneous self-motion” (84). By regarding matter as the primary reality, Nkrumah also asserts the reality of “categorial conversion” that converts a category of one logical type into another by a “dialectical process”. What is pertinent to our discussion here is Nkrumah’s view of matter as “a plenum of forces which are in antithesis to one another” (79). He explains that according to philosophical conscientism “matter, in being a plenum of forces in tension, already contains the incipient change in disposition which is necessary to bring about a change in quality or property” (89). And this because “matter is capable of dialectic change, for if natural properties are nothing but surrogates of quantitative dispositions of matter, then since natural properties change, matter must change in quantitative disposition” (ibid.). Nkrumah also writes that:
Since matter is a plenum of forces in tension, and since tension implies incipient change, matter must have the power of self-motion original to it. Without self-motion, dialectical change would be impossible. By a dialectical change, I mean the emergence of a third factor of a higher logical type from the tension between two factors or two sets of factors of a lower logical type (90).

What is the relevance of the view that matter is a plenum of forces in tension requiring a dialectical change to the first stage of the journey from colonialism to national sovereignty? In Nkrumah’s view, on the social-political plane, philosophical consciencism acknowledges that there are two forces in tension in every colonial territory. He refers to these forces as Positive action (pa) and Negative action (na). According to Nkrumah, Positive action represents the sum of the revolutionary forces “seeking social justice in terms of the destruction of oligarchic exploitation and oppression” while Negative action represents the sum of the reactionary forces “tending to prolong colonial subjugation and exploitation.” Negative forces tend to promote colonialism by ensuring that the colonial powers maintain political ties with the colony. These forces could be composed of external elements—the colonial powers—and/or internal elements—indigenous people in the colony. Positive action is prepared to revolt against the oppressive dispositions of the colonial powers and negate or thwart the efforts of the Negative forces within the colony. Nkrumah opines that statistical facts about production, distribution, and income in any territory could reveal the relations between Positive action and Negative action. Three possible situations can arise in connection with the relations between Positive and Negative actions: Positive action may exceed Negative action, or Negative action may exceed Positive action, or they may form an unstable equilibrium. A colonial territory is one in which Negative action exceeds Positive action.

If we let $g$ stand for territory and $col. g$ for a colonial territory, we can define a colonial territory in the following terms:

1. $col. g \equiv [(na > pa)g]$

That is, a territory is a colony if and only if Negative action (internal plus external forces) is greater than Positive action. A colony, generally, is “any territory in which the interests of the people are alienated from them and subjected to those of a group distinct from the people of the territory itself” (108). But Nkrumah’s definition in (1) allows that a colony could be both internally and externally subjected because (na) is composed of both oppressive elements of the colonial powers and the reactionary elements of the people of the territory. “A change can only result from an operation of forces”, writes Nkrumah, and so in order to liberate a colonial territory, “a dialectical moment needs to be introduced in (na>pa)g to transform it
to \((pa > na)g\)” (109). A dialectical moment either converts \((na > pa)\) into \((pa > na)\) or transforms \((pa > na)\) into \((na > pa)\). Nkrumah’s first approximation for a dialectical moment \((D)\) is given as:

2. \[ D (na > pa) \rightarrow (pa \land na) \]

That is, when a dialectical moment is introduced to transform \((na > pa)\) into \((pa > na)\), it implies that revolutionary force of Positive action is on the increase and while at the same time Negative action reduces to zero. It is significant that the increase in positive action should be in conjunction with the decrease in negative action. Genuine liberation cannot be won with only one arm of the conjunction. Since matter is a plenum of forces in tension it is impossible for the negative action in a colonial territory to reduce to zero. This means that (2) is highly unattainable. Nkrumah revises his formula and reasons that negative action, though will not disappear altogether, should reduce to a negligible quantity. Thus:

3. \[ D (na > pa) \rightarrow (pa \land \xi na)\]

where \(\xi\) means stands for a negligible quantity.

With the introduction of a dialectical moment, Nkrumah represents a liberated territory \((lib. g)\) as:

4. \[ lib. G \equiv [D(na > pa)g \rightarrow (pa > na)g] \]

Once we embrace philosophical consciencism with its emphasis on dialectical materialism we come to understand that a territory can attain independence if and only if there is a dialectical moment that transforms the relation of forces operating in the territory. The dialectical moment occurs in the antecedent of the conditional to show that its introduction is sufficient for liberation to occur. Positive action should be on the increase to overwhelm the negative forces and actions in the territory for independence to occur. However, it is possible for Negative action to act in disguise so as to “give the impression that it has been overcome by positive action” (100). And then use subtle ways and means of controlling the territory even after independence has been won. It is also possible for the colonial powers to try to “contain” the revolutionary forces of Positive action by devising “frivolous” reforms in order to “divert positive action into channels which are harmless to it” (101). According to Nkrumah, “a colonialist country can in fact offer independence to a people not with the intention which such an act might be thought to imply, but in the hope that the positive and progressive forces thus appeased and quietened, the people might be exploited with greater serenity and comfort” (102). When all these possible scenarios occur, neo-colonialism has set in. Neo-colonialism in the words of Nkrumah is “negative action playing possum.”
The second stage in the road map of consciencism, then, is to suggest ways in which genuine independence could be won where the whims and caprices of neo-colonialism are thwarted. The most effective way to defeat neo-colonialism is for Positive action not to relent in its revolutionary efforts not only against the negative external forces, but more importantly, against the internal negative forces who become “the political wolf masquerading in sheep’s clothing” (101). Using the experience of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in the fight for Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah contends that it is necessary for Positive action to be “backed by a mass party, and qualitatively to improve this mass so that by education and an increase in its degree of consciousness, its aptitude for positive action becomes heightened.” Social and political education on the tricks of neo-colonialism and the awakening of the consciousness and self-awareness of the populace are two effective instruments for maintaining the independence of the territory by reducing Negative action significantly. In the CPP, there were different wings, such as the worker’s wing, the farmer’s wing, the youth wing, and the women’s wing for the political education to be feasible. Nkrumah also thought that a people’s parliamentary democracy with a one-party system was “better able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multiple-party parliamentary system” (ibid.). A one-party system is better suited in the fight against neo-colonialism than a multi-party system where, as it often happens, the opposition political parties, under the influence of the colonial powers, militate against the progress of the ruling political party.

Now, Nkrumah may be wrong in these proposals—formation of a mass party and the institution of a one-party system—but so long as we understand these as proposals for forestalling the advent of neo-colonialism, their implausibility may not be detrimental to the spirit of philosophical consciencism. Neo-colonialism must be defeated in order to enjoy true independence, and it matters little what protean forms the strategies for defeating it take as long as it is defeated. Nkrumah is, however, right, in insisting that a crucial way to combat neo-colonialism by reducing the subtle negative forces is by focusing on the conscience of the masses, that is, by awakening, quickening, and vivifying the consciousness and awareness of the populace to the insidious threats of neo-colonialism, hence, conscience-ism. Philosophical consciencism arms the masses with an ideology to combat the negative forces of neo-colonialism.

With independence won and the pernicious disease of neo-colonialism combated, Negative action will seek to foment discontent and disunity in the independent territory. Positive action now “requires a new orientation away from the sheer destruction of colonialism and towards national reconstruction” (105). The reconstruction or reform of the nation should
begin with building national unity and harmony among all the forces of the independent territory. Positive action should carry the liberated territory to the level of a united nation; and in a geographical zone with several liberated territories, it should translate them into a united zone of liberated territories, viz; a united states of Africa. If $UG_i$ represents a liberated territory that is united, we have this formula:

$$5. \quad UG_i \equiv (pa \land na)$$

It is significant to note that on Nkrumah’s view Positive action (pa) itself is a sum of the individual positive actions. For instance, the mobilization and consciousness of a mass party, in Nkrumah’s view, is a mobilization and consciousness of individuals. Therefore, positive action as a quantity varies with people and their degree of consciousness and mobilization for progress. Positive action through the formation of a mass party and its wings unites individuals, and where there is only one mass party comprising of a larger proportion of the society, the net effect is that national unity could be attained. Positive action should also introduce policies and reforms that aim to harmonize the various groups and promote equity and social justice. According to Nkrumah, positive action must also “seek an alignment of all the forces of progress and, by marshaling them, confront the negative forces” (104). But he sounds a caution: Positive action “must at the same time anticipate and contain its own inner contradictions, for though positive action unites those forces of a situation which are, in regard to a specific purpose, progressive, many of these forces will contain tendencies which are in other respects reactionary.” Hence:

When positive action resorts to an alignment of forces, it creates in itself seams at which this alignment might fall apart. It is essential that positive action should in its dialectical evolution anticipate this seminal disintegration and discover a way of containing the future schismatic tendencies, a way of nipping fragmentation in the bud as colonialism begins to reel and totter under the frontal onslaught of positive action (ibid).

The final aim of philosophical consciencism is the institution of socialism for the development of the liberated nation. According to Nkrumah, “for the purposes of true development a liberated territory must embrace philosophical consciencism” (113). Philosophical consciencism has a materialist aspect which preserves the humanist and egalitarian principles of traditional African societies. It also posits that the material conditions of a territory in addition to the experiences and consciousness of its people should be taken into account in the fight for liberation and the development of the territory. Another aspect of philosophical consciencism is its accommodation of dialectic as the efficient cause of all change. Materialism ($M$)
and Dialectic \((D)\), two essential constituents of Consciencism \((C)\) are the main factors that drive the society towards the institution of socialism for national development. Using \(f\) to stand for the “relation of forces required for development”, Nkrumah gives us this formula:

6. \(\phi \equiv [m \land C \land D]\)

This formula contains a redundancy for \(C = (m \land D)\). So it should rather read \(\phi \equiv C\). However, Nkrumah says that the redundancy is “valuable” in order the make the “necessity for \(m\) and \(D\) both explicit and unmistakable” (ibid.). This shows how dialectical materialism is very essential to Nkrumah’s thought. Development for Nkrumah, as I have remarked above, should be socialist in form and content. Philosophical consciencism issues forth socialism that has a “strong continuing link with our past” and an “assured bond with our future”. We have already seen why Nkrumah favours socialism over other socio-political systems of development. But it is worth reading what he has to say about socialism in connection with liberation and development. He asserts:

It is only a socialist scheme of development which can ensure that a society is redeemed, that the general welfare is honestly pursued, that autonomy rests with the society as a whole and not in part, that the experience and consciousness of the people are not ravaged and raped. It is only a socialist scheme of development that can meet the passionate objectivity of philosophical consciencism (ibid.)

From (5) and (6) Nkrumah derives the formula for socialism \((S)\):

7. \(S \equiv (\phi \land Gi)\)

and if we want to expand \(f\) and make it more explicit we get:

8. \(S \equiv (m \land C \land D \land UGi)\)

This means that there is socialism if and only if there is the conjoint presence of philosophical materialism, philosophical consciencism, dialectic and national unity, in a liberated territory. In Nkrumah’s thought then, just as there cannot be socialism in a colonial territory, so there cannot be socialism in a liberated territory that is not united. National unity is a pre-requisite for the presence and practice of socialism. This might seem a bit too strong a condition for socialism. However, if we reflect again on the diagram we discussed earlier, we see that philosophical consciencism issues forth socialism only after (or by the formation of) a harmony of the conflicting segments of the African personality. A socialist program is geared towards social equality and the development of all in the society, and hence the development will be marred if all the forces and individuals in the society are not united with a common purpose and aspiration. And, as materialism admits of differences by allowing the co-existence of opposing forces in tension, there cannot be an absolute unity of all the forces and individuals in the society; rather, positive action will increase
Socialism as formulated in (8) reflects the general conditions that are necessary for its presence in national development. However, philosophical conscientism advocates that material conditions in a territory and the consciousness and experiences of its people should be considered in the quest for liberation and national development. If socialism does not take into account the experiences of a people in a specific territory it will only serve an idea and not the people; socialism will only be a dogmatic system if it is not modelled to be in tune with the aspirations and experiences of a particular group of people. To the extent that philosophical conscientism must pay attention to the material conditions, the experiences, and consciousness of a people, its actual content will vary from territory to territory; to the extent that the form and content of the dialectical moment will depend on the situation it seeks to change and the resources available for bringing about the change, \( D \) is a variable; and to the extent that \( U Gi \) is a function of the negative and positive actions in relation to the dialectical moment, \( U Gi \) is also variable. The only constant parameter of the formula in (8) is \( m \)–materialism. The tenets of materialism–humanism, egalitarianism, matter as the primary reality–remain the same irrespective of the actual practice or form of socialism that a particular society might adopt. We can distinguish the general form of socialism in (8) from the more specific socialism in (9) that pays attention to the prevailing currents and social contentions in the particular territory (g).

9. \( Sg \equiv (m \land cg \land d \land U \text{ lib. } g) \)

That is, for socialism to be applicable in a particular territory (g) that territory “must be liberated; it must enjoy unity; it must embrace philosophical materialism; it must have a specific philosophical conscientism holding its general nature in common, but expressing its individuality through the actual material conditions of the territory for which it is formulated, and through the experience and consciousness of the people of that territory; it must apply suitable and adequate dialectical moments, expressed through positive action, wielded through a mass party” (115). Specific socialism in (9) is therefore an instantiation of the more general form of socialism in (8); the general form of socialism serves as a reference point for the specific form of socialism.

One positive implication of the general-specific distinction in socialism that Nkrumah makes is that it makes socialism both a universal ideal to for all societies to aspire to appropriate, and a practical system that a country could fashion out to meet her own conditions and experiences. Nkrumah advocated for socialism for Ghana and all African states but he in no wise expected Ghana and the rest of Africa to practice the same form
of socialism. Likewise, he did not argue that a Marxian kind of socialism should be appropriated wholesale into the African context. Socialism in practice will vary from country to country depending on the varying parameters he sets out in the constitution of socialism.

The upshot of all these is that Nkrumah’s consciencism gives us the road map, the formula, the necessary and sufficient conditions that have to obtain for a colonial territory to be liberated and march towards national unity and development, but the application of this road map and conditions should pay attention to the socio-economic-political exigencies of a particular society at a particular point in time. Perhaps, other non-African (colonial) territories are not plagued with the schizophrenia of the African personality, but they may have other viruses and Trojan horses that militate against their liberation and development. They can look up to Consciencism for inspiration. By understanding the import of philosophical consciencism as I have tried to present here, we not only appreciate Nkrumah’s logic and reasoning in his project. We also come to understand where to locate our criticisms and attacks of the central ideas in his book.

NOTE

1. I will maintain the letters that Nkrumah used but I will introduce parenthesis to make the formulas well-formed, and replace the addition sign with the logical connective of conjunction throughout the paper. The bi-conditional ≡ should be read as either providing a definition or stating the necessary and sufficient conditions.

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