THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 1)

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Husserlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’s last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.

Keywords: ontological (traditional) mind-body problem, conceptual mind-body problem, transcendental phenomenology, the lived-body (der Leib), Descartes, Husserl

The whole history of philosophy since the appearance of “epistemology” and the serious attempts at a transcendental philosophy is a history of tremendous tensions between objectivistc and transcendental philosophy. ...

The clarification of the origin of this internal split in the philosophical development, the analysis of the ultimate motives for this most radical transformation of the idea of philosophy, is of the utmost importance.

E. Husserl

[1] [Husserl, 1970: p. 70; Hua VI, S. 71].
Introduction

Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that invites us to address the things themselves (die Sachen selbst), as they are given in our experience from the first-person perspective. Also, phenomenology is about dealing with the problems or matters themselves, in order to clarify and show their original meaning. Thus, phenomenology is dealing with problems immediately, rather than mediately — that is, as they are given in our intuition. Therefore, the main justificatory basis for all phenomenological investigations is phenomenological evidence.

In this paper, my key “die Sache selbst” will be the celebrated mind-body problem. In the phenomenological tradition, this problem is mostly ignored as the metaphysical one. But, it is one of the foundational problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, I want to explicate the discussion of the mind-body problem in the context of Husserlian phenomenology (especially, his “Crisis”).

Conventionally, the origins of this problem date back to René Descartes and his “Meditations on the First Philosophy”. Here, I will argue that Descartes had not just one, but two mind-body problems. The first one is explicit: the mind-body (brain) problem. How can our immaterial mind or soul interact with the material body (brain)? This problem has been widely discussed for generations by philosophers and was thoroughly developed within the philosophy of mind tradition.

The second one is implicit: I argue that Descartes’ res cogitans can also be understood as a concept the meaning of which is amathematical, as opposed to res extensa, which is a purely mathematical concept (subject-matter to pure mathematics). Thus, Descartes’ implicit mind-body problem can be formulated as the conceptual mind-body problem.

And the very Cartesian framework can be considered from this two-fold perspective:

1. From the ontological perspective: as a gap between two ontologically different realms: material (body) and immaterial (mind);
2. And the conceptual one — as a gap between two different meanings: (proto) phenomenological meaning (mental; intellectual), which is asensible and asymbolic, and natural-scientific one (physical), which is sensible and symbolic (as the subject-matter of mathematics).

2 In this paper, the attitude of my dealing with Descartes’ philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology is neutral. Regarding Husserl, for example, it is not analytic (or West-Coast), nor continental (East-Coast). My attitude here is problem oriented: the main focus is made on the “mind-body problems” in Descartes and Husserl, and how Husserl’s phenomenology (namely, as depicted in “The crisis of the European sciences”) can be analyzed in this light. The same goes for Descartes: I am not interested in framing myself into this or that methodology while dealing with Descartes’ philosophy. I am involving this or that thinker only if he or she are relevant to the discussion taking place in this paper.

3 Though, there are exceptions, e.g., [Smith, 1995; 2013; Gallagher, Zahavi, 2013: p. 123–125].
I will try to prove that Husserl has answers for both traditional and the conceptual mind-body problems.

Furthermore, one of the main ideas of the paper is to show that Husserl’s “Crisis” represents not just one “crisis of the European sciences”, but two:

1) *As a gap between the life-world and the natural sciences* (as explicated in Husserl’s critique of Galileo);

2) *The opposition between the natural sciences (physicalism) and the transcendental phenomenology*. I think that, this crisis stems from the Cartesian metaphysics of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* (namely, from what I call the “conceptual” mind-body problem) and thus, is the “crisis” within the Cartesian framework, as well as of the latter.

I will put the major emphasis in this paper on the latter crisis and its origin and, will therefore omit the general discussion regarding the former (the life-world), though mention it only with regards to Husserl’s understanding of the “traditional” mind-body problem.

In alliance with Husserl, I claim that Descartes’ discovery of the *res cogitans* (as *mens*) opened the realm of *transcendental subjectivity*, and although Husserl’s main target for the “crisis of the European sciences” is Galileo (relating the problem of the mathematization of nature), I want to demonstrate that the “modern opposition between physicalist objectivism and transcendental subjectivism” clearly has its origin in Descartes’ “Meditations” and his main phenomenological discovery.

**Part 1. Two mind-body problems in Descartes’ “Meditations”**

Although, the *Second* and the *Sixth Meditations* are considered to be the most important parts regarding the mind-body problem in Descartes’ “Meditations”, my references will be made to the whole corpus of these texts. I will follow this approach in order to demonstrate the difference between my understanding of the “traditional” mind-body problem and the “conceptual” mind-problem.

**1.1. The traditional mind-body problem**

The core of the *traditional* mind-body problem is the *ontological* distinction between *mind* (consciousness, soul) as something immaterial, non-physical and *body* (biological organism) as something material or physical. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the very heart of the mind-body problem is the *hard problem of consciousness*, which can be stated in the following manner: “why does our brain produce consciousness, if everything in the physical theory is compatible with its absence?” In other words, “why aren’t we just zombies, who in every respect are just like us, but lack the very things that make us human beings: phenomenal consciousness, or the ‘what-it-is-likeness’ of our experience”? Thus, the essence of it is an *explanation* of our consciousness and brain relation. Therefore, the essence of the traditional mind-body problem today is the “consciousness-brain” problem.

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4 For example, one can see it here: [Chalmers, 2002].
5 [Crane, 2000]
Contemporary battles in the philosophy of mind can be summarized as those between physicalists and non-physicalists. The *hard problem of consciousness* is the central obstacle for the physicalist explanation of our mental life and phenomenology\(^6\).

No doubt, the origins of the traditional mind-body problem one can find in Descartes’ “Meditations”. The main issue of the traditional mind-body problem is that of *metaphysics or ontology*. What substance (or fundamental reality) is primary: res cogitans (the thinking thing) or res extensa (the extended thing)? Descartes’ answer is well known: he is a *thinking thing*\(^7\), which he identifies with soul\(^8\). By the latter, Descartes understood what is indivisible and non-physical, and which is epistemically and ontologically prior to whatever is physical and extended and perceived by senses. By body (corpus) Descartes also understood what is “my own body”\(^9\), or as composition of organs and limbs. Thus, if my primary being is a *thinking thing*, my existence as a physical (and one can say *biological*) body is a *secondary* one.

But that being said, one doesn’t have to understand Descartes as a solipsist. His all-bracketing doubt is nothing but a *thought experiment*; one of the purposes of which was the *clarification* of our ontology. In the *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes is talking about human nature as a “composite”, which has both mind and body. One of Descartes’ goals was therefore to show that our *primary ontology* is that of mind (soul, psyche or consciousness). It is *given* to us *directly*, rather than physical reality, which is given to us *indirectly* (through the mediation of senses).

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\(^6\) The originator of the *hard problem of consciousness* is the Australian philosopher David Chalmers. The classical statement of this problem and its treatment one can find here: [Chalmers, 1995; 1996].

\(^7\) “I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason… (sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio…)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27]. “What then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions (Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 19; 1957: p. 28].

\(^8\) “…[S]ense-perceptions and thinking (sentire & cogitare); and these actions I attributed to the soul (…quas quidem actiones ad animad referebam)” [Ibidem, p. 17; Descartes, 1957: p. 26].

\(^9\) The following footnote in the Cottingham’s translation expresses this ambiguity: “The Latin term *corpus* as used here by Descartes is ambiguous as between ‘body’ (i.e. corporeal matter in general) and ‘the body’ (i.e. this particular body of mine). The French version preserves the ambiguity” [Descartes, 2008: p. 54].

“Well, the first thought to come to my mind was that I had a face, hands, arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called body (Nempe occuberat primo, me habere vultum, manus, brachia, totamque hanc membrorum machinam, quails etiam in canvere cernitur, & quam corporis nomine dignabam)” [Ibidem, p. 17; Descartes, 1957: p. 26]. “I am not that structure of limbs which I call a human body (…non sum compages illa membrorum, quae corpud humanum appellatur...)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27].
1.2. The conceptual mind-body problem

The conceptual mind-body problem is the problem of “mind” and “body” as concepts, which have different meanings. Thus, it is the problem of meanings, rather than of ontologies.

In this light, res extensa is a concept of a physical thing and its meaning is the subject-matter of pure mathematics and thus can be formalized (quantified) and is symbolic concept in its essence.

Res cogitans is the concept of a non-physical thing, which cannot be quantified (formalized or mathematized). Thus, it is asymbolic concept.

As we have seen, ontologically res cogitans is prior to res extensa. The same goes for them as semantical concepts — res cogitans possesses meaning, which is primary in relation to that of res extensa. That is, subjective meaning, which is grounded in intuition and is asymbolic, is primary in relation to the physical meaning, which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics.

In this sense, subjective meaning is more “objective” and primary for us than that of physics, which is relative in its essence, and is the subject-matter of the mathematical sciences. Further, corporeal nature, which is quantifiable, is given to us through asymbolic (immediate) intuition. Namely the latter fulfills the former, which is given symbolically (mediately). Mathematics and physics are not invented by our intuition, but nevertheless, are discovered and given through it. Subjective meaning (as self-evident, guaranteed by God’s existence and indubitable) is primary. Physico-mathematical meaning is secondary. In other words, res extensa is

10 For example, in the end of the Fifth Meditation, Descartes is talking about “the whole of that corporeal nature which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics (...tum etiam de omni illa natura corporea, quae est purae Metheseos objectum...)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 49; 1957: p. 71].

11 By symbolic, I mean that, which can be expressed through the means of mathematics or mathematical (formal/symbolic) logic. By asymbolic, I mean that, which cannot be expressed symbolically in the given sense.

12 As Descartes puts it in the First Meditation: “...physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other subjects of this kind, which deal with only with the simplest kind, which deal only with the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. (...Physicam, Astronomiam, Medicinam, disciplinasque alias omnes, qua a rerum compositarum consideration dependent, dubias quidem esse; atqui Arithmetica, Geometrica, aliasque ejusmodi, quae nonnisi de simplicissimis & maxime generalibus rebus tractant, atque utrum eae sint in rerum natura necne, parum currant, aliquid certi atque indubitati contineire. Nam sive vigilerm, sive dormiam, duo & tria simul juncta sunt quinque, quadratumque non plura habetlateralam quam quatuor; nec sieri posse videtur ut tam perspicuea veritates in suspicacionem falsitatis incurrant)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 14; 1957: p. 20].

In this sense, there is some contradiction regarding the essence of the physical objects (which is relative and thus, dubitable), and that of pure mathematics, which is in its essence indubitable. The question can be put in the following way: “How can something dubitable in its essence (physical objects) be the subject-matter of that, which is indubitable in its nature (i.e., pure mathematics)?”
given through res cogitans. But again, towards the end of the “Meditations”, Descartes considers the mind-body relation in its unity, which can be reinterpreted as the unity of asymbolic res cogitans and the symbolic res extensa.

Let’s sum up what was just said. Res extensa appears to be the concept of the physical thing, which in its essence is quantifiable, and as such is a subject-matter of pure mathematics. Res cogitans is the concept of the non-physical thing, which is given to us in intuition and is self-evident, and is essentially not quantifiable. Thus, the meaning of the res cogitans cannot be expressed symbolically. Its nature is asymbolic. On the other hand, res extensa can be fully expressed through mathematical symbols; therefore, its nature is symbolic. Hence, res cogitans’s meaning is primary for us and is grasped in intuition immediately. The meaning of res extensa is given to us in intuition as well, but mediately (through symbols). In other words, res cogitans is a phenomenological concept which opens door to the dimension of phenomenological meaning. Res extensa is a physical concept, which in its essence is mathematizable, and expresses the meaning of the natural sciences. Thus, one can already see the essence of the conceptual mind-body problem here at hand: as the gap between phenomenological meaning and that of natural sciences. In my opinion, this is the very beginning and origin of one of the crises of the European sciences (namely, as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences), as portrayed in Husserl’s last work.

As mentioned-above, the Second and the Sixth Meditations are considered to be the most important Cartesian Meditations necessary for grasping the essence of the mind-body problem and Descartes metaphysics. Here, in this section, I want to attempt to look at those two Meditations in a different light.

Some Case Studies

Second Meditation

In this Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between wax as given through the senses, and as given through mind (mens). It appears that the true nature of the wax is not as something which has taste, smell, color, size, shape and is able to produce sound, but as something “extended, flexible and changeable” (extensum quid, flexibile, mutabile) 13 [Descartes, 2008: p. 20; 1957: p. 31]. And the very essence of wax as something changeable and flexible is grasped not by our faculty of imagination, which still depends on our senses, but “by the mind alone” (sed sola mente percipere) [Descartes, 2008: p. 21; 1957: p. 31]. Thus, the real perception of wax is nothing “but of purely mental scrutiny” (sed solis mentis inspectio) [Ibidem].

Thus, wax as a physical thing has two kinds of givenness:

13 “So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses; for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered — yet the wax remains.” (Quid erat igitur in ea quod tam distincte comprehendebatur? Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam quaecunque sub gustum, vel odoratum, vel visum, vel tactum vel auditum veniebant, mutate jam sunt: remanet cera) [Descartes, 2008: p. 20; 1957: p. 30].
1) **Sensory and imaginary** givenness: color, taste, smell, touch, sound, shape, size. This kind of givenness is not essential one. It is dubitable (as everything, which is given through senses) and thus, **contingent**.

2) **Mental or intellectual** givenness: wax as “extended, flexible and changeable” is essential, indubitable\(^{14}\) and necessary\(^{15}\). Namely this kind of givenness represents physical thing as *res extensa* and is given through *mind* (or res cogitans) only. Therefore, *res extensa* (the essence of the physical thing) is given through *res cogitans*.

**Sixth Meditation**

Here, Descartes still distinguishes between mind as pure understanding (puram intellectionem) and imagination (imaginationem) as based on sensory perception, which represent corporeal nature as a subject-matter of pure mathematics [Descartes, 2008: p.50-51; 1957: p. 72-74]. Although, here Descartes stresses the *unity*\(^{16}\) or *combination* of mind and body\(^{17}\) rather than their division; mind with its faculty of pure understanding still has the epistemological priority: for example, stars as given through senses do not represent their actual size, and only mind is capable of their true representation\(^{18}\). In the composite of the mind and body (composito ex mente & corpore), sensory (or bodily) perception has the function of providing the information to the mind about “what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part…” (...quia nempe sensuous perceptionibus, quae proprie tantum a natura datae sunt ad menti significandum quae composito, cujus pars est, commode sint vel incomoda…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 57; 1957: p. 82-83].

Our body or corporeal nature in general as extended is a subject-matter of pure mathematics because they are *divisible* (divisibile). By contrast, mind cannot be expressed mathematically, because it is *indivisible* (indivisibilis): willing, understanding, sensory perceptions are not parts of the mind, but “it is one and the same mind

\(^{14}\) That is, one cannot doubt that the essence of the physical thing is extension. Though, it does not mean that one cannot doubt the very *existence* of the extended things.

\(^{15}\) In this *Meditation*, before the wax example, Descartes states: “At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true” (nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum) [Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27].

\(^{16}\) “…I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but I am very closely joined and, as it were intermingled with it, so that I and body form a unit.” (...me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut natura adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid illo componam) [Descartes, 2008: p. 56; 1957: p. 81].

\(^{17}\) “…I am a combination of body and mind…” (...corpore & mente sum compositus…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 56; 1957: p. 80].

\(^{18}\) “For knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to the mind alone, not to the combination mind and body. Hence, although a star has no greater effect on my eye than the flame of a small light, there is no inclination in me to believe that the star is no bigger that the light; I have simply made this judgement from childhood onwards without any rational basis.” (...qua de ipsis verum scire as mentem solam, non autem ad compositum, videtur pertinere. Ita quamvis stella non magis oculum i meum quam ignis exiuxae facis afficiat, nulla tamen in eo realis sive positive propensio est ad credendum illam non esse majorum, sed hoc sine ratione ab inuente aetate judicavi…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 57; 1957: p. 83].
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that wills, and understands and has sensory perceptions” (...quia una & eadem mens est quae vult, quae sentit, quae intelligit) [Descartes, 2008: p. 59; 1957: p. 86].

The solution to the ontological mind-body problem has a neuroscientific inclination: only the brain (tandummodo a cerebro) is the connection between mind and body, and that, which affects mind immediately (or maybe, some part of the brain, by which Descartes understood the pineal gland (conarion)) [Descartes, 2008: p. 59–60; 1957: p. 86].

If to speak about the conceptual mind-body problem, in the context of mind-body unity or “the nature of man as a combination of mind and body” (naturam hominis ut ex mente & corpore compositi) 19, I think we can suggest that the phenomenological meaning as expressed by res cogitans is prior to the physical-mathematical meaning, as expressed by res extensa. That is, though phenomenology and natural sciences are essentially different, nevertheless, they form the composite, in which phenomenology is epistemically prior to the natural sciences and is more significant for us, but that does not mean that they must be apart from each other.

A Note on Descartes’ Notion of “Intellect”

It has to be noticed that Descartes uses “intellect” in a twofold way. The first one is “intellect” as the synonym of “mind” (mens) and “thinking thing” (res cogitans) in general. Already in the Second Meditation, one can meet the following statement: “At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am mind (mens), or intelligence (animus), or intellect (intellectus), or reason (ratio)…” [Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27]. It’s clear that Descartes finds it necessarily true.

In the beginning of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes is distinguishing between pure understanding (puram intellectionem) (or power of understanding (a vi intelligendi)) and imagination (imaginationem) (or power of imagining (vim imaginandi)) and sensory perception (sensu perceptae) [Descartes, 2008: p. 50–51; 1957: p. 72–73]. As it was noted, the former is essential to our mind, the latter is not 20. Later on, Descartes follows the same argument:

“[…] I find in myself faculties for certain special modes of thinking (modis cogitandi), namely imagination and sensory perception (imaginandi & sentiendi). Now I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these faculties; but I cannot, conversely, understand these faculties without me, that is, without an intellectual substance 21 (substancia intelligente) to inhere it. This is because there is an intellectual act (intellectionem) included in their essential definition; and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and myself corresponds to

19 [Descartes, 2008: p. 61; 1957: p. 88].
20 “…I consider that this power of imagining which is in me, differing as it does from the power of understanding, is not necessary constituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my mind” (...considero istam vim imaginandi quae in me est, prout differ a vi intelligendi, ad mei ipsius, hoc est ad mentis meae essentiam non require…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 51; 1957: p. 73].
21 Italics are mine. — A.L.
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the distinction between the modes of a thing and the thing itself” [Descartes, 2008: p. 54; 1957: p. 78].

In this sense, intellect, as a thinking thing, contains subjective experience or qualitative feel. To illustrate this, let me cite the very important passage from the Second Meditation: “…even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same I who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep and, so all this is false. Yet, I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a sensory perception” is strictly just this, and in this is restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking” [Descartes, 2008: p. 19; 1957: p. 29].

In the Third Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between thoughts as “images” (or “ideas”) and other thoughts with the additional variation of forms including volitions and emotions.

But further, in the Sixth Meditation, it seems there is an implication that intellect has nothing to do with subjective experience and qualia:

“Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing (res cogitans), would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect (puro intellectu) just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken, Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding (expresse intelligerem) of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body” [Descartes, 2008: p. 56; 1957: p. 81].

As one can see, here, in the Sixth Meditation’ passage, intellect is not identical with res cogitans, as opposed to the Second Meditation, where intellect, even if the objects of sensory perception do not exist, still seems to have the very perceptions of them, as if these objects really existed. And the very perceptions (seeing or hearing something, feeling pain, hunger or thirst, being warmed etc.) cannot be false, even if the real objects which caused them were inexistent, because intellect (ego) have them as intentional objects, which are accompanied with qualitative feel.

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22 “…thus when I will (volo), or am afraid (timeo), or affirm (affirmo), or deny (nego), there is always a particular thing which I take as the object of thought (subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo), but my thought (cogitationes) includes something more than the likeness of the thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions (voluntates) or emotions (affectus), while others are called judgements (judicia)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 26; 1957: p. 37]

23 Italics are mine. — A.L.

24 Italics are mine. — A.L.
Thus, in the *Sixth Meditation* passage, cited-above, intellect has a role of an *information-processing tool* with nothing subjective as its companion. And the very qualitative sensations are caused by the *union* of mind (mens) with the body (corpus), and thus, do not belong essentially to the intellect. Therefore, those, who are inclined to label Descartes as “pure intellectualist” only in this *latter* sense, have to mind the very ambiguity of the Cartesian notion of intellect in general.

(To be continued)

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Received 08.06.20