Temporality and Philosophical Theology in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

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Lectures on the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, such as the investigations of the early period by Husserl, have often become the subject of study and interpretation. As for the methodology of phenomenological description, and for historical and philosophical comparison of the philosophy of time with other theoretical systems of the twentieth century, a diagram of phenomenological time generates a wide range of issues in the analysis of subjectivity. Because the specific phenomenological justification the issue of time does not exist in isolation from other problem fields in the analysis of the transcendental self, and an explication of the total scheme of time-consciousness involves an examination of phenomenological reflection as such, Aleksey Grigorevich Chernaykov indicates the engagement of phenomenology in the interpretive strategies of the description of consciousness as a finite consciousness.¹ Phenomenology treats the ways of givenness of the intentional object, and in this context, under the theological question we do not mean the concept of God as an object of philosophical systematization, but some idea about the sense of divine presence, included in the motivation of all manifestations of consciousness.² This idea allows us not only to summarize the principles of the phenomenology of time, but also to explicate the classic

question of the relationship between time and eternity in the analysis of subjectivity. In addition, turning towards the sense of the divine presence is phenomenologically related to the constitution of human presence, or rather to the fullness of the presence of reflecting consciousness. Following Held’s interpretation, theology in Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered on the basis of the idea of a “living present” and the principles of its constitution, given the nature of transcendental subjectivity. As early as the Ideas, Husserl mentions the need to review the concepts of God. In later manuscripts, especially those that relate to genetic phenomenology, we find the statement of the problem of rational theology, its possible phenomenological study, an analysis of the status of religious judgments in the consciousness, of universal world teleology (Weltteleologie) and of the boundary problems of metaphysics and teleology.

The subject of this paper is to analyze the thematic unity of the phenomenology of time and the theological question. I consider the fact of the emergence of theological difficulties in Husserl, its prerequisites and its theoretical potential. The article consists of three parts. The first part is devoted to disclosing the structure of the ‘living present’ and the experience and perception of time by which the reflecting nature of consciousness and the related theological justification become clear. In the second part I examine one of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts on theology and ethics, to identify the phenomenological understanding of the tasks of theology as such. And the third part is devoted to the central theme, based on Held and his understanding of theology in a phenomenological method.

3 Hua III, 1. S. 109, 124-127.
4 I primarily have in mind unpublished manuscripts, A V 21/2-16, A V 21/24-25, E III 4/38-46. I thank Prof Dieter Lohmar in the Husserl-Archive of Cologne for the opportunity to use the manuscripts and German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for my research scholarship at Cologne.
The structure of the ‘living present’

The key mechanism of time consciousness is the constitution of the present. The transcendental ego as the center of intentional functions is founded on the actuality of perception. In the mind inherently objective phenomena must be distinguished not only from the properties of the objects in themselves, but above all in the way we are aware of the differences between the properties. Awareness of differences always occur as though from the perspective of the present now (Jetzt-Punkt), based on the fact of the actual duration of a point of perception. Perception constitutes the noematic present, constitutes temporal objects from their temporal determinations, and is the framework of temporally constitutive consciousness. In describing Husserl’s transcendental perception, Roman Ingarden insists on the importance of shading (Abschattung) for the reconstruction of the nuances of the act of inner perception. Any perception, including the perception of physical things, reproduces the image of the object not as some monolithic whole but rather as a collection of shades, aspects of things, joining in a single impression, an image thing. It is impossible to argue that Husserl made some new concept of perception, which is obviously different from what is meant thereby in psychology: the principle of perception as an act of vision or the fixation of the object remains in the transcendental sense. But phenomenology describes perception in all its detail, based on the principle that perception is not static, but, as an intuitive self-givenness, is a continuing act which can be decomposed into phases, component parts, giving the quantitative and qualitative characteristics their fullfillment and adequacy.

Not even when he explicates the understanding of transcendental perception, as seen in his earlier lectures

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on time, does Husserl give perception the signification of a certain point of reference, which is relevant to any act of difference. The extended tone is given in an extending point of perception, which continues and is fixed (festhält) simultaneously. Time as order of references arises in a certain sense from the fixation of the operations of perception. Each act of consciousness, as an act of perception and perceived constitution, is reflexively fixed and provides a temporarily passive attitude. The object is perceived by definition with a retentinal reference, as something that has already become, and by the act of fixing (as apprehension) creates a temporal relationship where there is a difference between perceived object and the act of perception. For example, any internal experience in the empirical sense, having a certain duration, takes on a temporal feature at the moment when it is fixed, at the moment when it is perceived. At the moment of perception/awareness arises, a distinction defining the limits, the borders of this experience, which are primarily temporal boundaries; it can be the limit between the occurrence of the past and of the present. The distinction as identifying reflection forms the structure of the Ego, being a kind of a division (Spaltung) of subjectivity. In an act of reflection, the Ego identifies itself as something temporal (Zeitliches) and simultaneously finds itself to be an act of self-temporalisation (Selbst-Zeitigung).

The act of perception must include also the present now and retention. “The constitutive act, built from the now-consciousness and retention-consciousness, is an adequate perception of a temporal object.” Perception provides the

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6 I use the term „fixing“ as a neutral aesthetic term to avoid discussing here the important difference between apprehension and apperception.


continuity, the unity of the act of consciousness, which unites present and past, the present now and the primary memory, impression and retention. Between them there can only be an “ideal” limit; in reality, past and present never separate in the continuous modification of consciousness. The self-giveness of perception can be described as ‘presenting’ (Gegenwärtigung), as the initial measurement of intentional consciousness. Being in the present as the primary basis of the receiving Ego has a dynamic genetic structure, which forms the constitution of the identity of the Ego.

This structure is brilliantly presented by Klaus Held in his analysis of the concept of the ‘living present’—the present understood as a way of being of the transcendental ego, as the constitutive core and primary function of the transcendental Self, a way of being of any subject, involved in the ‘I’, defined in the present. The ‘I’ as functional center (Funktionszentrum) of various acts and passive affections is thus due to the temporality that creates some ‘standing’ (stehend) fixed structure, a “Präsenz meines Präsentierens,” which Husserl characterized in the later manuscripts as pre-modal (urmodale) and pre-temporal (vor-zeitliche). This is the result of a specification and a radical reduction, which is necessary for an adequate phenomenological analysis. Standing is accompanied by its streaming (Strömen), a characteristic of time as the flow that is reflected in the


11 Ibid. S. 61.


13 See also Hua XXXIII, S. 90-106.
properties of the present. Thus, the structure of the living present, including the self-presenting (Selbstgegenwärtigung) and thus the self-temporalisation (Selbstzeitigung) of the ‘I’ may be denoted as a standing-streaming (stehend-strömende) in terms of the way of givenness of phenomenological reflection. This assumption does not mean that presence is understood by Husserl as a certain objectified flow; on the contrary, the meaning of the properties of the present now was disclosed by reference to the ‘I’ as an acting, functioning ‘I’ (Ich fungiere) in its transcendental function of the constant actuality of consciousness, according to Held, the ‘aliveness’ (Lebendigkeit) of consciousness.

It is obvious that the ‘I’ and the ‘living present’ can not be identical in structure, taken separately. Presence as intentionality can be described separately from the ego, as a part of retentional-protentional scheme. Likewise, the transcendental ego, taken as a set of acts of consciousness, at the axiomatic level can be considered statically, without a genetic component. However, the meaning of the description of adequate perception and, hence, an adequate mode of being is the primordialy-genetic pattern of the constitution of the ‘living present’ as a primary mode of actualization of the ego. The complexity of this structure is associated with two terminological/constitutive features.

First, the distinction between the act and the object in Husserl generates a series of necessary distinctions within a process of reflection. Thus, distinguishing the ‘external’ perception from the inner, we already distinguish between external acts of perception and objects of external perception. This difference is essentially useless for phenomenological analysis, because the description is at the level of inner, reduced perception. But the inner perception in the same manner is divided into the act and object and is reflected as an immanent consciousness. The act of reflection, which can be analyzed separately as any act of consciousness has its own duration, and its own present, defining the character of
the object that is reflected. The various acts of consciousness that Husserl so often lists separated by a comma—fantasy, belief, perception in the narrow sense—also take on their phenomenal fullness through the duration of reflection, and can thereby change their way of giveness in the description. But this does not mean that the phenomenological description is a continuous series of differences, whenever we deal with the perceived object. Phenomenology is still in the sensory perception, although internal, but adds an extra dimension to its description. In other words, we can not descriptively reproduce the full range of “experiences” in the contemplation of an object, owing to the always limited temporality of reflection, which gives a kind of limit for objectivity. In this case, the temporality of reflection involves the possibility of a permanent intervention and, hypothetically, the modification of the mode of giveness of experience. This process is not a formal consistency, since we are talking not only about the static result, but primarily on the genetics of the motivation of acts of reflection that constantly returns to the primary data of consciousness. That the goal of phenomenological analysis is a kind of return to the things themselves (zurück zu den Sachen selbst), reflected not only in the nature of the reduction, but also in the intuitive praxis, the constitutive form of which is the realized duration, the time in the phenomenological sense.

The second feature that organizes time analysis in phenomenology is a distinction, at least terminological, between the levels of temporality. The duration of apprehended objects is not similar to the duration of the act. But more importantly, Husserl genetically selects a certain kind of temporality as the original source of the living

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14 Although, of course, the founder of phenomenology gives rise to such an interpretation. In addition to the well-known ideas of Derrida in the modern analysis of the subject, there is also a methodological reception, based on the idea of constructivism. See A. Schnell. Husserl et les fondements de la phénoménologie constructive. Millon, 2007.
present, distinguishing between the origin and modality in the constitution of the ego. Primordial temporality, *Zeitigung*, is the process of constitution the temporal objectivity, Held writes, “the ability to detect the temporal subject unity\(^{15}\)” , the constitution of things in the temporal modalities: “*Zeitigung - das ist die Konstitution von Seiendem in Zeitmodalitäten.*”\(^{16}\)

In later manuscripts, Husserl for the most part employs this term, since this term is due to more in-depth study of the initial motives of the transcendental ego, embodied not only in the term structure as the structure of references, but in the intersubjective self-identification of the reflecting ‘I’. Husserl often points to the ‘anonymity’ of the subject, located along with the other objects (*Gegenstände*) in the constitution of a primary flow (*Urström*), which as pre-phenomenon is substantive for each unity, primarily, the unity of ego for himself and for the recognition of the Other\(^{17}\). Thus venturing into the sphere of pre-predicative experience, Husserl turned to the primary elements of the constitution of the sensation (*Empfindung*) associated with the problems of the phenomenal life-world (*Lebenswelt*). His examples from the experience of the relationship between mother and child, elementary notions of corporeality and spatiality bring together genetic phenomenology with psychology, as well as in the earlier periods of creativity. That the concept of the ‘living present’ is central to the egological (*egologische*) analysis of later texts indicates not only the fundamental demand for the issue of time for phenomenology, but also the need to analyze the relation between the mundane and the transcendental ‘I’. In other words, time is not only understood as a diagram of intentional references in the purified reduced perception, but also as the core of development and vitality, the adequacy of the presence of the subject in the world.

\(^{15}\) Held, a.a.O. S. 38.

\(^{16}\) Ibid. See also MVIII, S. 274.

\(^{17}\) MVIII, S. 2-4, 13-15.
Disclosure of the structure of the ‘living present’ can, thus, clarify the status of the ego in the phenomenological method. Self-presenting and self-temporalisation include in the structure of the ‘living present’, along with the radicalized reduction and sustainable-streaming (stehend-strömend) synthetic unity. The status of the ego as a structure ‘I-present’ (Ich-Gegenwart) and self-presenting can be clarified, according to Held, just by analyzing reflection.\(^{18}\)

Self-presenting is constituted by the reflecting ‘I’ in the act of reflection. A feature of this act is not only contradictory verification - the adequacy of reflection is almost confirmed only by the reflection itself, - but the fact that the object of a reflexive action is the ego itself. In other words, the ‘I-present’ is constituted in the act of the reflection of self-givenness. It would seem that we are talking about a kind of division (Spaltung), a dichotomy of consciousness. However, as Held points out, this dichotomy is reduced to the identity of the ‘I’ as ‘I functioning’ (Ich fungiere) in the fundamental mode of continuity (Ständigkeit), reproducing the character of the ‘I’ as “I can.” “I can at any time again and again carry out self-reflection.”\(^{19}\)

In addition, self-reflection as verification, as a fixation of self-givenness occurs in the passive mode of synthesis, as indicated by Held, so that there is a “pre-passive (urpassive), trans-synthetical (übergangssynthetische) presenting.”\(^{20}\)

Perhaps this difficulty, thematically linked with the concept of evidence (Evidenz), can be interpreted as an assumption of the original thrust for the ego to itself. In an act of reflection, the ‘I’ is not supposed to change itself. The ‘I’ is always identical in the ‘living present’; the adequacy of reflection is given in the continuity and unity of the Ego.

Accordingly, self-temporalisation means that the “I functioning and the formation of its life are immanent

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\(^{18}\) Held, a.a.O., S. 79-80.

\(^{19}\) Ibid. S.81-82.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. S.81.
temporal objects.” Presenting as temporalisation determines the temporal individuation of the Now (Jetzt); and the while the identity of the subject. In the continuous series of temporal changes ‘I’ remain identical, thanks to the continuity of different phases of time in the succession. In a sense, the only sustainable point of time is just the ego.

Theology and the phenomenological understanding of faith

In manuscript A V 21, which dates from the years 1924-1927, Husserl holds a consistent description of the phenomenological understanding of theology, as well as those functions that it performs in a system of philosophical knowledge. The ancient distinction between philosophy as a science of nature and theology as knowledge of the supernatural is still in the concept of scientific thinking. Speaking of the phenomenological understanding is necessary to distinguish in the first place, “theology in the conventional sense now, as the science of religion, for our Christian religious sources of knowledge and, secondly, theology as a science about God and divine (von göttlichen Dingen), but the science of natural light.” When it comes to the “natural light of reason” (and science is understood in terms of rationality also in the modern European sense), the rationality of judgments becomes the primary validation of scientific knowledge. - Husserl challenges the Cartesian tradition in a way that can be found in his other writings. Rationalism is the belief that a priori principles are supposed for knowledge or knowledge finds its justification in experience. Husserl points out that rationalism often involves empiricism; apriorism and verification complement

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21 Ibid. S. 83.
22 Ibid. S. 84. See also MVIII, S. 29-33.
23 A V 21, S.1.
each other in search of justification.24 This method uncovers his inconsistency when it comes to super-rational or non-rational (arationale) justification, that is obvious to the understanding of theology. There is a need to clarify the theological grounds, as well as the fact base as such, when, along with logic and reason, there are non-rational (ausserrational) reasons.

Religious faith is based on the tradition of fundamental religious principles. Tradition is the active force of beliefs, but does not claim absoluteness; for Husserl, the religious tradition is not related to the credibility of the knowledge derived from a „simple“ vision (Sehen) or recognition (Einsehen). Faith is a judgment but not a judgment of the doxological or axiological order. Husserl argues about what the structure of judgments is as such in scientific knowledge, pointing to the difficulties which are found phenomenologically—the difference between the proposition and its ground, between cause and motive, between judgment and premise. This issue, known more from the Logical Investigations, is considered in the manuscript in the direction of religious judgement, or, as the author writes, “the faith of reason” (Verstandesglaube).25 Judgments reflect all areas of human knowledge: social and cultural values and norms are also judgments. The same can be said about religious values. However, phenomenologically, it is important to clarify the foundation of faith as an act of consciousness, in this sense, as the foundation of any judgments, in the mode of evident self-giveness, “pure vision.”26 In faith as the self-givenness of judgments, I take belief in its “true self,” “I have decided on faith, because I see the believed as such (Geglaubte selbst).”27 Pure vision corresponds to faith as a foundation of judgment. Thus, distinguishing between the

24 Ibid. S.4.
25 Ibid. S. 5.
26 Ibid. S. 7.
27 Ibid. S. 8.
proposition (as one of the opinions on those or other values) and the judgment (as based on faith in its self-giveness), we are talking about the origin of value itself. Husserl sees some kind of “need” for a judgment in the soul (Gemüt), “causes” or a “will,” which enable us to appreciate judgments (wert legen). In this sense, the motivating force (motivierende Kraft), is different from a causality that would create a kind of obligation (Sollen) in judgments, as set out precisely in sensuality.28

This fragment of the manuscript (pp. 5-9) may seem to offer three possible parallels. First, since we are talking about the status of judgments as such, the theological question is relevant to the idea of premiseless thinking, essential, as is known, for the formation of the phenomenological method as a whole. Second, Husserl’s arguments are very similar to the phenomenology of the early Heidegger, methodically built on the principle of keeping the attention on the primary data of consciousness and turning towards the origin of the phenomenon. Despite the fact that both philosophers had different objectives in carrying out their philosophical views, the religious question brings them together. A third historical and philosophical analogy possible for examining this fragment is the medieval question of the relationship between faith and reason, which is also traced in Husserl’s arguments. In this case, we can both prove and disprove the similarity between the ideas of Husserl with scholastic argumentation, but in Husserl’s phenomenology, we find a fundamentally different conception of the subject in contrast with medieval philosophy. Therefore, this parallel can only sharpen the urgency of the problem of the relation between faith and reason for the twentieth century, but it is hardly possible to speak of continuity or similarity of phenomenological analysis and the theology of the Middle Ages. Not accidentally, continuing his reflections on faith and judgment, Husserl refers to issues of feelings and

28 Ibid. S. 9.
satisfaction, that is, continues the analysis of mental life, not normativity.

Value and satisfaction often accompany each other. “I assign to one situation a value, to another a disvalue. Whatever is a disvalue to me destroys me; I strive to get away from it, I wish it away; its non-being, not-being-so-and-so would eliminate the dissatisfaction.”

Feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction associated with the various manifestations of psychic life, especially in its disharmonious species—pain, suffering, doubt—always lead to an increase or decrease in the value of experience. The internal unity of the value of experience and its “correctness” is materialised through practical implementation as a confirmation of the values in everyday life, through reflection of regulated practical living (durch Überlegung reguliertes praktisches Leben).

Satisfaction depends precisely on the value of experience, the same is characteristic for judgments. Verification of the value of judgments is nevertheless intersubjective in both psychological and phenomenological reflection. The author cites an example of faith as belief in people who are close - the mother to her child, a lover to his favorite; faith gives in these cases a “persuasive force in action.”

The difficulty of ethical judgments is not described by Husserl in terms of psychological credibility, but as a relationship between intersubjective and epistemological systems. Turning to the original data in daily mental life, the author points to both the intentional act of faith (belief in something or someone), and the faith that can be seen as a kind of need of the soul (Gemütsförderung), being the primary feature of social cognition.

29  Ibid. “Ich lege auf einen Sachverhalt wert, auf andere unwert. Was mir unwert ist, stört mich, ich strebe davon weg, ich wünsche es weg; das Nichtsein, das Nicht-so-Sein wurde eine Unbefriedigung beseitigen.”

30  Ibid. S.10.

31  Ibid. S.12.
Perhaps this fragment (pp. 10-13) can be interpreted as a consideration of faith as the ethical equivalent of intentionality. Faith, forming the basis of judgments and the relationship to the Other, becomes the primary basis of any understanding. Husserl calls the understanding associated with the primary motive but aimed at disclosure of those motives the “absolute ought” (*absolutes Sollen*). Such an “absolute ought” has the character of a kind of obligation that is mediated by an Other (norms, values), but is due to the nature of human understanding. As in any phenomenological distinction, *absolutes Sollen* can be understood “naive,” and can be understood as having the force in the relationship “with a deeper latent motivation” (*versunkener verborgener Motivation*)32. In the second, phenomenological understanding, ‘*absolutes Sollen*’ has the character of self-deciding (*Sich-Entscheiden*) and given in the mode of evident self-giveness.

Thus, opening the possibility of a theological perspective in the phenomenological method, Husserl suggests the self-giveness of faith as a natural property of the act of understanding. Some kind a need for faith and values is characteristic of consciousness as well as intentionality, and is manifested in the act of the constitution of Other. Because intersubjectivity is not only considered on the level of description of perception, the problem of faith and understanding necessarily connected with teleology as the property of intersubjective relation. In acts of faith and understanding intersubjectivity reveals as the teleological problem of the subject and his existence in the world. Thus, teleology is just the link, which connects the one hand, the issue of intersubjectivity and ethics, including belief and, on the other hand, the problem of time as the problem of the fullness of the presence, displayed in the concept of ‘living present’.

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32 Ibid. S.13.
Time and philosophical theology

Following Klaus Held’s interpretation, theology can be considered based on the idea of the ‘living present’ in its unity (\textit{Einheitlichkeit}) and permanence (\textit{Ständigkeit}) and the principles of the constitution of the unity given by the nature of transcendental subjectivity. Held suggests the possibility of a philosophical theology based on the factuality of the reflecting I and its teleological structure. The acting, functioning I (\textit{Ich fungiere}) is rational in self-foundation and self-reflection, being intentionally directed not only at an adequate reproduction of objects of consciousness, but also in achieving its own unity and identity. God is conceived as something that exists in the co-present (\textit{Mitgegenwart}), moreover, as part of a specific “interior intersubjectivity” (\textit{innere Intersubjektivität}) of the transcendental ego.\textsuperscript{33} From the standpoint of the subject, this form of intersubjectivity mediated by the goal of achieving internal unity and the adequacy of the transcendental ‘I’ is expressed by Held (also by Husserl) in terms of ‘communalisation’ (\textit{Vergemeinschaftung}) and ‘self-communalisation’ (\textit{Selbstvergemeinschaftung}).\textsuperscript{34} Unlike other identical mechanisms of the internal logic of acquisition of the transcendental ego, the ‘self-communalisation’ demonstrates precisely the temporal dynamics of reflexive actions –the unification achieved by them (\textit{stehend-strömende Einigung}) of the internal state of reflection and of “liveliness” (\textit{Lebendigkeit}) of the present, or, as A. Chernyakov pointed out, the “energy”\textsuperscript{35} of the present. In other words, ‘self-communalisation’ as a permanent process of actualisation and a kind of ‘gathering’ of the reflective

\textsuperscript{33} Held, a.a.O. S.181.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. S. 180-181.
present as a guarantee of its relevance and, thus, of the adequacy of the presence of the reflecting subject is the foundation of the mode of being expressed in the concept of the living present.

The reflecting I has the property of so-called anonymity (Anonymität), given by the nature of reflection itself\(^\text{36}\). The necessary reflection focuses on the intuition and the grasp of its proper functions in the ‘I’, which ways of giveness are anonymous, or concealed. Anonymity as a property of the object of reflection is immanent also in the case when the I becomes an object. The temporal paradox expressed the need for a certain pre-present for the constitution of the reflective ‘real’ present, removed the urgency for the act of reflection, whose status is present there as the most phenomenally adequate, ‘live’. Anonymity does not mean the unknown; it displays a passive side, implicitly included in the act of reflection. ‘I’ becomes anonymous for myself with the goal of the fullest possible disclosure of its functions, and in this teleological context the instance of God takes on significance. For consciousness the basic concealment of God is essential as part of its own anonymity.\(^\text{37}\) Such concealment, in a sense, forgottenness is required as part of a process and a means of reflexive self-discovery and, ultimately, gaining the identity and unity of the I, ‘self-communalisation’ (Selbstvergemeinschaftung). However, ‘self-communalisation’ is, as Held says, “an anonymous first act of my freedom.”\(^\text{38}\) Arising in this way from phenomenology, philosophical theology continues the tradition of the philosophical relation of human freedom and divine grace as a unity-in-separation (Einheit-in-der-Geschiedenheit),\(^\text{39}\) and not as a confrontation between God and man.

\(^\text{36}\) Held, a.a.O. S.118-122.
\(^\text{37}\) Ibid. S. 180-181.
\(^\text{38}\) Ibid. S. 182.
\(^\text{39}\) Ibid. S. 183.
In addition, as pointed out by Held in another work, a finite human perception has a motivation in relation to the understanding of the divine unity, where it is adequate to the understanding of God as one God. World, phenomenally perceived in a dual perspective (*doppelte Perspektivität*), namely, from “my actual perspective and the perspective of Others, is experienced, thus, in the temporal and intersubjective experiences of the “clash” (*Widerstreit*). And God is conceived as substance, leading to the “unanimity” (*Einstimmigkeit*) the whole structure of the experience of intentional consciousness. The foundation for the meaning of human action, beginning from the action of consciousness, refers to the need for the original instance of trust (*Urvertrauen*). God is the substance that can legitimize the unity and coherence of the structure of consciousness. Motivation as an integrated, unified motivation (*einheitliche Motivation*) originates precisely from the needs of the inner relationship of the ego as intentional consciousness. And the teleology of reflecting consciousness exists to achieve consistency, coherence, or rather the tendency for it, in the form of longing for one God.

Such a teleology has a paradoxical character – the *telos* is fundamentally not achievable. The achieved goal as the integrity of the unity of temporal horizons and intersubjective perspectives would have meant the perfection of the world, and in this sense, the ‘perspectiveless’ of human consciousness. The teleology of consciousness, based on the teleology of the world, includes a commitment to the divine as a necessary but irresistible idealization. Thus, the theming of theological perspectives within the phenomenology of time reveals the internal needs of the end of consciousness

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41 Ibid. S.22.
to achieve an understanding of the divine presence as an adequate understanding of self-reflection, and in this sense, the adequacy of their own presence, the unity of being and reflection.