to Schmid's view that the will to power is an "exoteric" doctrine for Nietzsche. According to this position, the notion of the will to power can only be expressed as a metaphorical designation (271). One reason why Holger Schmid takes this position is that the argument for the will to power in *Beyond Good and Evil* appeals to a "causality of will" that Nietzsche repudiates. (272) What Bönig seems unaware of is that the "exoteric" or, more accurately, mythical nature of the idea of will to power is an interpretation that was put forward before the appearance of Schmid's book and article of 1984 (i.e., in Stack's "The Myth of the Will to Power," *Dialogos*, XVII [Nov. 1982] and M. Clark's "Nietzsche's Doctrines of the Will to Power," *Nietzsche-Studien*, vol. 12 [1983]: 458-63). In the former article, it was held that "the conception of will to power is an aesthetic mythopoetic invention, a philosophical myth that seeks to synthesize art and science" (47). And Ms. Clark characterized the idea of will to power as a self-conscious myth." So Schmid's interpretation follows in the wake of these two earlier interpretations of Nietzsche's central conception.

Despite a habit of quoting pithy remarks of Nietzsche's without offering any elaboration on them, and despite the unjustified claim that in his later thought Nietzsche simply returns to his earlier artists' metaphysics (320), Bönig guides us through the rich (if abbreviated) materials in the notes of the 1870s and focuses on an important aspect of the philosophy of Nietzsche: the presentation of exoteric and esoteric "doctrines." Another healthy feature of his study is his polite, but firm, rejection of Heidegger's attempt to convert Nietzsche into a philosopher of Being. And for those with the taste and patience for it there is that second "book" in Bönig's *Anmerkungen*.

GEORGE J. STACK


This excellent book continues Broadie's investigations into the logical and epistemological work in the University of Paris in the early decades of the sixteenth century, carried on in *George Lokert: Late Scholastic Logician* (Oxford, 1983), *The Circle of John Mair* (Oxford, 1985), and *Introduction to Medieval Logic* (Oxford, 1987), but it also throws much light on earlier work in the Ockhamist tradition. Broadie's topic is the theory of the notitia, or "notion," which is a cognitive act through which we attend to some object, and is a sign of the object attended to. These notions differ from Lockean ideas, inasmuch as they do not enable us to attend to their objects by presenting themselves to us as more immediate objects of knowledge. (The chief significance of their being signs of their objects is that the belief or apprehension they ground is thereby guaranteed to be correct.) Typically, they are not objects of awareness at all, but only mental acts through which we are aware, though they can become objects of awareness through reflexive notions, at least in a creature with free will. (Animals have notions just as humans do, but their coarse humors and spirits make them dull, and they lack the ability to reflect on their own notions.) The thinkers Broadie examines took the theory seriously enough that, accepting that notions are qualities in cognitive powers, they considered how far theories current at the time concerning qualities could be extended to cover the presence of notions in their proper powers. Broadie examines some of their considerations here, for instance, whether it made sense to speak of notions varying in degree, and whether it would be possible for God to place these qualities in unusual subjects, so that a notion could be transferred from an immortal (and indivisible) human soul to a (divisible) animal soul, or even into a stone, and how the notion maintains its identity if it is thus transferred. The usual solution to the last problem was that a notion could be placed in a stone by God, though not by natural processes, but it could not impart knowledge to a stone, as it does to a cognitive power. Another important topic examined by Broadie is the question whether there are syncategorematic notions, and, given that there are, what their objects might be.

Broadie then examines, in three full and detailed chapters that nonetheless leave one wishing
for more, the divisions into intuitive and abstractive notions, which concern the individual as such (and is either sensory, or, some thinkers allow, recordative), or the individual as it falls under a kind (how abstractive notions arise is an important topic); into sensory and intellectual notions; and into apprehensive and judicative notions (which have on the one hand a thing, and on the other, some proposition about the thing as their objects). In his final chapter Broadie takes up assent (every assent is a judicative notion). Evident assent is what we would call knowledge, and is divided into two sorts: there is natural evident assent, which is caused in such a way that the cognitive power cannot be deceived by natural means, given the usual influence of God, and there is highest evident assent, which is caused in such a way that it cannot be deceived at all, even by God's supernatural power. Add to this the opinion that evident assent is (unlike in evident assent) necessitated, so that one cannot freely will not to believe it, and the connection of these theories to Descartes's thought seems clear.

One cannot always agree with Broadie's assessments of the theories he studies. In particular, he sometimes falls prey to residual Lockeanism. Failing, for instance, to recognize that imperfect (recordative) intuitive notions, that is, the notions underlying memory of facts about particular objects, might provide cognition of the past state of a thing as direct as any present-tense intuitive cognition (pp. 39-41). But his assessments are necessary in any real attempt to come to terms with this material, and he does them in an honest, hard-working, and immensely intelligent way that informs the reader even when part of it seems wrong (and he always keeps it clear when he himself is speaking, and when he is reporting the opinions and reasonings of his authors). One can only praise a scholar of such erudition and drive. This is ground-breaking work.

JOHN LONGEWEAY


It would be hard to praise this book too highly. It is carefully written, philosophically informed, sensitive in the use of Nietzsche's texts, and knowledgeable, appreciative and critical of other interpreters. There is not a cheap line in it; it makes one more hopeful for the spirit of scholarship. Clark moves the discussion of Nietzsche's view of truth—a central issue—to a new level of sophistication; she ends with shorter, but still well-argued and new, interpretations of the will to power, the overman, and the eternal recurrence. She presents very subtle readings, especially of "On Truth and Lie" (hereafter TL), Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil (BG), and Essay III of The Genealogy of Morals.

Clark begins with Nietzsche's apparent claim that there is no truth. Then, arguing for the importance of the interpreter's own commitments, she presents the view of truth she herself has come to find most plausible, given Nietzsche's projects. In a dialogue with much recent reflection, she argues that Nietzsche would be most defensible if he had what she calls a neo-Kantian conception of truth: that is, if he accepted a minimal version of correspondence, but rejected metaphysics and metaphysical correspondence along with crude pragmatism, foundationalism, and subjective idealism. In subsequent chapters she argues that Nietzsche moved gradually toward this view, embracing it fully in his last six books, the works after BG.

Within Nietzsche's early work, the celebrated TL receives most of her attention. She reveals inconsistencies and weaknesses in it. She argues that the claims about language in it fail by themselves to support its denial of truth, and that the deeper sources of that denial lie in a representational theory of perception, the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, and the idea that only such metaphysical truth would have unlimited value.

Then she sketches Nietzsche's progress from his early to his ultimate views. Human, All-Too-Human shows serious advances. Finally in BG Nietzsche clearly rejects the conceivability of